CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CONGRESSMAN ASPIN AND SECRETARY CHENEY ON DECLASSIFYING INFORMATION ON SOVIET TANK PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92M00732R000400020004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2014
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 17, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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4.
The Directo.,wiuoimeinget ILU OCA
Washington, D.C. 20505
Arms Control Intelligence Staff
ACIS M377/89
17 October 1989
. MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT:
1.
Chief, Multilateral Negotiations Group
Arms Control Intelligence Staff
Correspondence Between Congressman Aspin
and Secretary Cheney on Declassifying
Information on Soviet Tank Production
Action Requested: None. . This is for your information.
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STAT
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2. The attached exchange of letters between Congressman Les
Aspin and Secretary of Defense Cheney was passed to us so that
CIA officers can comment on the factual portion of the
Secretary's response to the Congressman. (I have already given
copies to the appropriate people in the Office of Soviet Analysis 25X1
and the Office of Imagery Analysis.) STAT
3. In brief, Congressman Aspin asked the Secretary to
provide unclassified or declassified information so that the
Congressman could discuss in some detail and confirm the Soviet
claims that they have substantially cut tank production. (The
Congressman refers to his request to the DCI for declassified
information and to Mr. Kerr's refusal.) Secretary Cheney has
also turned down the request for unclassified information, but he
has also discussed the issue of Soviet tank production by using
classified information. 25X1
STAT
Attachments
cc: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director, Office of Soviet Analysis
Director, Office of Imagery Analysis
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs
25X1
STAT
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ACIS M377/89
17 October 1989
SUBJECT: Correspondence Between Congressman Aspin and
Secretary Cheney on Declassifying Information
on Soviet Tank Production
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (w/atts)
Orig - DDCI (w/atts)
1 - DDI (w/atts)
1 - D/OCA (w/atts)
1 - C/ACIS (w/atts)
1 - D/SOVA (w/atts)
1 - D/OIA (w/atts)
1 - D/NPIC (w/atts)
- ER (w/atts)
1 - ACIS Registry (w/atts)
1 - ACIS Chron (w/atts)
C/ACIS
(17 Oct 89)
STAT
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I ; !Irept
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: SecDef Response to Aspin Letter (U)
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(S) After yesterday's meeting, 1 spoke with Mr. Hadley. He laid out for me the kind of
letter he wants, stressing in particular the broader context in which we ought to view the
tank production figures. He also stated that he understood the difficulties of declassifying the
information Aspin wants. I'stressed there was an ENP draft; he said that he wanted me, in the
absence of Matheny, to do the letter. Accordingly, I have drafted a response, based on our
discussion yesterday and .Tiqqs original memo. I expect the folks upstairs to reconcile the two
drafts (for which I apologize to Jay). Please give me your comments ASAP, no later than
1300, 17 October 1989. Mr. Hadley has also asked tha
CIA.
A ttachments:
Aspin Letter
ESN Draft Response
Distribution:
Sherman Garnett
Deputy Director for
European Security Negotiations
Jay Savage, OSD/ISP/ENP, 1D469
David Epstein, OSD/NA, 3A930
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1 Dear Les:
. (U) Thank you for your letter of October 11 regarding Soviet tank production, as well ?
as for the advance copy of your Committee Delegation's report on its visit to East Germany
and the Soviet Union last August It is clear that you and your delegation were witnesses to a
wide variety of military activities formerly closed to outside observers of any sort, let alone
officials of the United States. I experienced similar frankness in my discussions with General
Yazov. However, while such contacts are profoundly encouraging, it remains to be seen
whether the changes they augur will be as sweeping or long-lasting as we all wish.
. I ?
Honorable Les Aspin
House of Representatives
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee
Washington, DC 20515
I
(S/NF) As part of your letter, you asked specifically whether DoD could confirm "that.
Soviet tank production had declined sharply to a level that, if continued, would be very dose,
to what Marshal Akhromeyev projected, and was, in fact, at a somehwat lower rate than ?
would be necessary to fulfill recent Soviet claims about tank production levels in the 1990s.?
regret to say that I cannot provide such confirmation. In the first place, primary authority
for declassification of specific figures and estimates resides with the President and the National.
Intelligence
Intelligence Board. In the second place, I could not support a projection of Soviet tank 4 i
production rates that appears at variance with the facts as I know them.
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(S/NF) As you are aware, the Soviets have five tank production facilities: 25X1fff
The latter facility is largely an R&D center, 25X1
t e nte me= Community extim2red Snvirt tanlr nrnthartinn
This
year s rust quarter estimate remained on line with the production rate of 1988. However, me
June, it was apparent that the production rate had fallen and that only
been produced during the first half of 1989. Production rates have dropped further since,j
June. DIA now estimates that 1989 tank production is consistent with Akhromeyev's claitk
of 1700. I presented my views on Akhromeyev's estimate during my television interview ail:
August 25, 1989.
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(S/NF) However, according to DIA estimates, if production were to continue in 19
at the lower rate of the end of the year, it would result in an annual Soviet production of;
bet wen 1300 and 1500 tanks, not the 850 of some Soviet statements. In my meeting with:
General Yazov, he indicated that Soviet tank production could fall to about 800 in the cou
of the next five years. Whether they reach this target is still a matter for the future. In my
view, whatever the production figures for the next few years, there arc several important
factors that put even a significant decline in Soviet production into a more sober perspectiv
Classified by: ASD/ISP
Declassify on: OADR
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-- First, at the present time, there has been no change in the Soviet production
capacity, just the annual output. No facilities have been shut down; no production lines have
been transformed to civilian needs. The capacity for surging back to the old rates remains. lE_
the Soviets want to reduce their production rates to levels such as the Soviet CFE negotiator
cites (and to reap significant benefits to the civilian economy), they will probably have to take
a facility out of tank production and redirect its output to something else. However, such a
transformation is a slow process, more likely to appear, if at all, as part of the thirteciith
Five Year Plan in 1991.
-- Second, the production rates for main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and
artillery and mortars since 1985 have been of such a magnitude that they can afford
significant reductions for years to come without hann to their military capabilities. From
1985-1989, the Soviet.Union has increased its productions of these systems 500, 1050 and
50% respectively. I recognize that ongoing efforts at political and economic reform irr the
Soviet Union aimed at defusing the current crisis dictate some military cutbacks. HoweNer,
believe these are easier for the military to accept given the build-up that has preceeded these
production cuts.
?
-- Finally, we do not yet understand the full import of the restructuring of the Soviet
military. However, these parallel changes in Soviet military doctrine, force structure, training
and equipment will ultimately determine whether the Soviets are creating the "leaner and
meaner" military many fear or are engaged in a redefinition of military means and aims that
significantly alters Soviet capabilities in Europe. The Soviet CFE proposal implies a wilingntss
to live with somewhere close to 14,000 tanks in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region after a CFE
treaty is implemented. Production rates at even their current reduced levels would lead to full
replacement in 9-10 years. We also do not know to what extent the Soviets have shifted- ?
emphasis from new production to retrofitting old systems with significant imporvements of
armor, power and armament.
(S/NF) In the great fog of change, it is difficult to know with certainty how the
landscape appears. We estimate as best we can. In my talks with Marshal Akhromeyev and
General Yazov, both indicated to me that our previous estimates for 1988 production of
tanks were "very close.
I would be happy to provide you with a IMA briefing on the
methodology we currently employ in tracking tank production in the Soviet Union.
(S) The foregoing letter has made plain some of my concerns, both with the tendency
to overestimate the extent of a slackening in military effort in the USSR and the need to place
ongoing changes in the broader context of past performance and future uncertainties. 1
this letter letter has provided you with some insight into my thinking on this issue. I would like to
close by thanking you again ifor the advanced coipy of your report, which should provide
insights that will help me to prepare for my own trip to the Soviet Union in the future.
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
niagbington. The 20515
ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS
LES ASPiN. WISCONSIN. CHAIRMAN
Honorable Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20304
Dear Dick,
11 October 1989
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As you know, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, former Chief of the Soviet
military's General Staff. testified before the House Armed Services
Cannittee on July 21, 1989. During his appearance, Akhromeyev stated that
the Soviet Union would produce 1,700 tanks in 1989. If true, this would
represent a sharp reduction from 0.1.A.s public estimate that the Soviets
produced 3,500 tanks in 1988.
. In mid-September we received a briefing from the Intelligence Community
assessing what the committee had learned during its trip to the Soviet
Union in August about the manner in which the Soviet Union was implementing
the unilateral force reductions announced by me. Gorbachev on December 7,
1988. Incidentally, I have attached an advance copy of our trip report
which I think you might Find interesting and useful.
During this briefing. we also learned that Soviet tank production had
dropped sharply in mid-July and, if continued, would total about 1.700 for
this year. Mbreover, during this past week, as a meMberof the arms
control observer group led by Rep. DiCk Gephardt, I was told by the chief
Soviet negotiator, Oleg Grinevskiy, that Soviet tank production in 199D
would' be 52 percent of what it was in 1589. I understand that Defense
Minister Yazov made similar statements during his recent visit here.
I am sure that you will agree that a drop in Soviet tank production 04
this magnitude is an amazing and important development. I also an sure
that you can understand the 00inrnittee'S -- and my -- great interest irN
subject: Conseouently. in a letter on 21 Septeminer 7989. I asked Oviiiiam
webster for permission to state publicly that U.S. intelligence sources -I
have confirmed that Soviet tank prodUction has indeed dropped sharply, arc.
assuming that the current rate is maintained, that Akhromeyev's statement
to the committee is being borne out.
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Honorable Richard B. Cheney -
Page Two
11 October 1989
Unfortunately. my request was denied. While confirming that Soviet
production has indeed dropped in the manner described above, Richard Kerr
as Acting Director of Central intelligence, decided that the Intelligence
Community in principle preferred not to provide official confinmation. In
fact, Mr. Kerr suggested that since you had addressed this issue publicly
that we use the fonmuiatlon that you used in your television appearance of
August 25, 1989.
!!
1 I
However, I would like to address the issue in somewhat more detail, in
particular indicatinglthat Soviet tank production had declined sharply to
a level that. If continued, would be very close to what Marshal Akhrameyev
projected, and was. In fact, at a somewhat lower rate than would be
necessary to fulfill recent Soviet Claims about tank production levels in
1990. Consequently. I would like your penmissidh to state publicly that
Department of Defenseisources confirm the previous statement. AF=717
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I hope that you will give My request Serious. 0Onsideration. I be
that the direct exchanges between the committee and Soviet officials,
especially our new relationship with the newly formed Defense and State
SecurityConnittee, have been fruitful and served cur national interests.
I believe that a statement along the lines I have described would
reinforce the importance of these direct contacts and maintain the
momentum we have establisht.J.
I hope that we will have chance to chat about our Soviet contacts same
time soon. I would like to hear haw your visit with General Yazov went
and I would be interested in your ticn to our report.
conference issues will prevent near future, but we shoufd take
the time to do it
LA:cmw
Attachment
SECRET
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Les Asia,
Inman
taiDFORN INCOCNTRACT
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