RECENT SPEECHES BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92G00017R001100190012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 22, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
STAT
STAT
=.4*
22 December 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs
SUBJECT: Recent Speeches by Director of Central Intelligence,
William H. Webster
1. I have enclosed selected speeches given by Judge Webster over the past
several months. Two of the speeches, the World Affairs Council of Washington,
D.C. (25 October) and the Council on Foreign Relations (12 December), address
the changes under way in the Soviet Union. These two speeches also include
discussions of regional issues and the problems of advanced weapons
proliferation and narcotics. I have also enclosed the DCO remarks at the
dedication of the William J. Donovan statue at Headquarters (26 October) and
at the retirement ceremony for Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots,
Director of DIA (14 December).
2. If you have any questions or comments about these speeches, please
contact Chief of our Speeches Unit. She can be reached at
3. I encourage you to send these speeches to others in your office who
may wish to know what the Director is saying in his public appearances.
Attachments:
As stated
William M. Baker
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REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
DEDICATION OF A STATUE
OF GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
CIA HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
OCTOBER 26, 1988
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Former Director Helms, former Director Colby, Mrs. Casey, members of the
Donovan family, our friends here for this occasion: I have to tell you that
about 50 years ago I received an autographed copy of Father Duffy's book about
the "Fighting Sixty-Ninth." It was an inspiration to me then, and I can
hardly believe that, half a century later, I have the privilege of
participating in this ceremony.
Today we recognize General William J. Donovan for the central place he
holds in our profession.
We recognize General Donovan as an able and inspiring leader -- a quality
that earned him the lifelong respect of the unit he commanded in World War I,
the "Fighting Sixty-Ninth." It has also earned him the respect and admiration
of all of us in intelligence. We understand what a strong leader he had to be
to establish the Office of Strategic Services in the midst of strong
resistance, to lead the 0.5.5. in some of World War II's finest intelligence
successes, and to establish the foundations of modern American intelligence --
foundations that we in the Central Intelligence Agency build upon today.
The statue we dedicate this afternoon is a symbol of the man -- a man of
personal bravery, vision, and broad political and military understanding. A
man who, according to Bill Casey, was "curious about everything and
everyone." He was unusual, Casey felt, for he "realized, earlier and better
than most, that 'stranded' information was not much good. It had to be
analyzed, dissected, and fitted into the larger whole that modern warfare
required."
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General Donovan was also a man who inspired great loyalty and great
deeds. General Maxwell D. Taylor once asked an old soldier to give him a
brief definition of leadership. The man replied, "Leadership is when your
leader tells you he is going to take you to hell and back and you find
yourself looking forward to the trip."
Under General Donovan's leadership, the 0.S.S. achieved much. It helped
attain many Allied goals during World War II -- working with the French
resistance, facilitating the U.S. invasion of North Africa, and infiltrating
Hitler's reich. In these efforts and in others, General Donovan never stopped
trying to persuade the leaders of this country that intelligence, combined
with covert action, could help our nation achieve its strategic goals without
all the bloodshed he had witnessed in both World Wars.
To those of us here today, this is General Donovan's greatest legacy. He
realized that a modern intelligence organization must not only provide today's
tactical intelligence, it must provide tomorrow's long-term assessments. He
recognized that an effective intelligence organization must not allow
political pressures to influence its counsel. And, finally, he knew that no
intelligence organization can succeed without recognizing the importance of
people -- people with discretion, ingenuity, loyalty, and a deep sense of
responsibility to protect and promote American values.
Bill Casey commissioned Lawrence M. Ludtke to create a statue of General
Donovan that would be a monument to all that he means to us and to our
organization. .It was also Bill Casey's idea to place the statue here in our
main entrance hall across from the stars that represent Agency officers who
have given their lives in the line of duty. Both Bill Donovan and Bill Casey
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deeply mourned the sacrifice of our people -- even in the cause of freedom and
democracy.
It is said that President Eisenhower paid tribute to William Donovan as
"the last hero." We pay tribute to him today because, as Bill Casey realized,
he is our own. Let this statue remind us daily of the enormous contributions
that General Donovan made to American intelligence. And let his life continue
to be an inspiration to us all.
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A
REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DECEMBER 12, 1988
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When I was first asked to speak to you tonight, I didn't anticipate that
I'd be privileged to be introduced by Howard Baker, for whom I have the very
highest esteem, and with whom I was privileged to work for many months before
he left office. His guidance to me, both in the Oval Office and on the Hill,
was of extraordinary value, and I deeply appreciate the common sense that he
brought to the White House and to our country. I would also like to say that
we have occasionally swung a tennis racket together. I would like to talk
about how good we both are, but Sam - Hayes* is in the audience and he knows
better -- so I won't.
When I spoke to the Council in New York last December, I discussed the
role of intelligence in our society as I saw it -- to provide timely and
objective intelligence to policymakers, and to do so with fidelity to our
Constitution and to our laws. A year later, I remain convinced that these two
objectives are not mutually exclusive. We are collecting information in every
corner of the globe, and we are providing finished intelligence to
policymakers on hundreds of issues, ranging from arms control to the
earthquake in Armenia. Yet just as important, we are observing the rules of
oversight and accountability that build trust between those who have the
intelligence responsibility and those who are the elected representatives of
the American people. It is that trust tnat makes it possible for us to
operate with the confidence, the aggressiveness, the perseverance, and the
resourcefulness that we need to do our job.
*Samuel P. Hayes, a social scientist and educator, is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations.
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5.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, describes a view
held by many in this country about intelligence. "Americans," he said, "have
always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel
threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard
the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national security,
I think the American people want a lot of intelligence. And tonight I'd like
t6 focus on three concerns that have and will continue to command the
Intelligence Community's attention. These concerns are the changes under way
in the Soviet Union, the proliferation of advanced weapons, and the narcotics
problem. I could only pick a few issues but I think these are three that are
certainly going to be with us in large scale. I'd al so like to discuss the
changes that have made it possible for us to take on those challenges with the
confidence of the Congress and the American people.
As you might expect, those of us in the intelligence business have been
keeping a close watch on leadership changes and reform efforts in the Soviet
Union. Some of us were in New York last week watching that 45-car caravan
careen around the streets of Manhattan, drawing attention everywhere, making
short stops and receiving occasional cheers. And then, of course, there was
the sight of the President-elect and Gorbachev standing with the Statue of
Liberty in the background. But there is a contrast to that that I think I
should mention. A report from Moscow just came in and it says this: "The
smug, self-righteousness once so characteristic of Soviets is far less evident
today than a decade ago. They seem strangely deflated. Aside from those
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lively souls who pen letters to the editor, the truth seems to have made
Soviet man more introspective than inspired. Thousands of Soviets gathered ?
recently in Gorky Park to witness an emotional, well reasoned, and protracted
debate between a self-styled 'moderate' who supported perestroika in measured
terms and a ' radical ' who, espousing accelerated change and ' pl ural ism, ' was
sharply critical of Gorbachev for dragging his feet. The debate itself was
fascinating but more riveting still was the total absence of reaction from the
passive, silent, uncommitted crowd. Gorbachev has clearly experienced the
frustration of the debaters in Gorky Park." I found that contrast
extraordinarily interesting.
Although the range of intelligence issues that we face today is broad, the
Soviet Union is -- and will continue to be -- the primary focus of our
intelligence collection and analysis. Its military capability, its efforts to
increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities are
still serious threats to U.S. interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths. Arguably, they make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew -- bringing new life and
dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us
could have foreseen five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads --
especially in the Baltic republics. Although the USSR certainly is not headed
toward democracy as we know it, today's Soviet leaders appear to understand
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that their system is faltering largely because it has not given the people
enough breathing room -- room to innovate, room to inquire, room to unlock
creativity.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. This Soviet
leader has signaled by word and deed that he wants the USSR to be a more
active and effective player on the world scene. He is more willing than past
Soviet leaders to reevaluate the costs and benefits of Soviet foreign policies
and make decisions on that basis. For example, the Soviets are leaving
Afghanistan -- although with some difficulty and with a bittersweet taste in
their mouths. And they are eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons under
the INF treaty -- a process that includes unprecedented on-site inspections of
Soviet military facilities.
Gorbachev' s announcement of unilateral troop reductions at the U.N. last
Wednesday illustrates his willingness to pursue radically different approaches
even as it highlights the challenges that these new approaches represent for
the Western alliance. The announced reductions, if fully implemented, will
remove some -- but not all -- of the Warsaw Pact advantages over NATO. In
particular they will substantially reduce the ability of Warsaw Pact forces to
launch a surprise short-warning attack. At the same time, this step was
clearly calculated to put pressure on Western governments for reciprocal steps
and to undermine support in the alliance for modernizing defense programs.
This and other initiatives that may well follow will complicate the task
of maintaining unity within the alliance as we approach the upcoming talks
with the Warsaw Pact on conventional arms reductions.
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The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked
controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle continues between
reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the Communist
system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could destabilize the
very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this struggle will affect
how far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to which central authority
is relaxed, the general welfare of the individual , and how competitive the
Soviet system will be over the next few decades.
In late September, Gorbachev significantly strengthened his position in
the Soviet leadership -- undertaking the most sweeping overhaul of the top
party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in 1957. The
changes made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy agenda at home and
abroad with renewed momentum.
While an important victory, this struggle to reform the Soviet system will
go on for decades, requiring Gorbachev and his successors to overcome enormous
political, economic, and cultural obstacles.
There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and
concentrate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become
more decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of
its people. Nationalist unrest is currently testing the Soviet system's
ability to make reforms work. Communal unrest in Armenia and Azerbaijan have
forced Moscow to put the region in a virtual state of martial law on a
semipermanent basis. The tragic earthquake that struck Armenia last week will
temporarily divert attention from the nationalist struggles in the Caucasus.
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But the underlying problems will remain -- the nationalist issues are not yet
resolved. Just last month, the Communist leadership of Estonia declared the
republic "sovereign," an unthinkable development even a year ago. While
rejecting this declaration, Gorbachev has signaled a willingness to
compromise. It is by no means certain -- and many doubt it -- that minority
aspirations for independence can be squared with Moscow's need for control.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that
Gorbachev is a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the
possibility that he can, ultimately, pull off a "revolution from above" that
actually increases authority below.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some formidable challenges. We must pay closer attention than ever to the
political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev challenges the
established interests of individuals and institutions within his country.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and -- even more difficult -- how it may
change Moscow's foreign policy.
We must manage the information explosion that glasnost has produced which,
though welcome, challenges us to sort out what is important and what is not,
what is real versus what Moscow wants us to near.
We must provide intelligence and analysis for U.S.-Soviet arms control
talks. As these negotiations progress, the Intelligence Community will be
increasingly asked to assess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance
with the provisions of agreements. And the amount of support required is
tremendous. The INF treaty has required the United States to monitor about
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120 facilities declared by the Soviets. Monitoring the START treaty, if we
get one, could involve as many as 2,500 weapon locations spread throughout the
Soviet Union.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the U.S. makes with the Soviets, our
relationship is likely to remain essentially adversarial. Policymakers will
depend on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments
and even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected
initiatives, examples of which we saw in the United Nations last week.
But the Soviet Union is certainly not our only focus.
Another major concern is the proliferation of advanced weapons,
particularly ballistic missiles. By the year 20u0, at least 15 developing
countries will either have produced or be able to build their own ballistic
missiles. Although these missiles may be somewhat crude and inaccurate, many
of them will have capabilities well beyond battlefield range. And the high
speed of ballistic missiles enables an attacker to strike with little warning
and makes it difficult for the defender to destroy incoming missiles.
Ballistic missiles also convey important new political and military status
to,those who acquire them. Many of the countries where these missiles are
being developed are in the Middle East -- an area where we have important
security interests, and where regional tensions are highest.
All of the Third World missile development programs rely on foreign
technology to some degree. But much of this critical technology is already
diffused throughout the world, is available for other purposes, or can easily
be diverted. There is also extensive sharing of technology among Third World
missile countries, and they are increasingly pooling their resources and
technical know-how.
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Another disturbing development we have seen is the outright transfer of
complete missile systems from one country to another. This could become a way
for developing countries to leapfrog ahead of the competition, although most
countries will still seek to-develop missile capabilities that they alone
control. We can also look for Third World countries themselves to become
major exporters of missiles and missile technology.
As threatening as the increase in ballistic missiles and the transfer of
entire missile systems may be, we must also be alert to attempts by developing
nations to arm ballistic missiles with chemical warheads. A major question we
are now addressing is what lessons Iran and Iraq -- and the rest of the
world -- have learned from a war that involved the first sustained use of
chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II -- even during the
most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using chemical weapons --
weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq War ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for
future wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too,
employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
Chemical weapons are thought to offer a cheap and readily obtainable means
of redressing the military balance against more powerful foes. Some see them
as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and as many as 20 countries may
be developing chemical weapons. Our President, our Vice President, and our
Secretary of State have all spoken out strongly about this problem, and I must
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say that many of our friends in the Middle East see it not as a problem but
more as a practical opportunity. And therein lies a major diplomatic problem
for us.
It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been
breached. At least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons.
And this presents us with another intelligence challenge.
Along with assessing capabilities to develop and produce ballistic
missiles and chemical and biological weapons, we must make judgments about
what could prompt foreign countries to use them. This is one of our most
important tasks, and we will continue to provide U.S. policymakers with as
much accurate and timely information on this issue as we are able to produce.
The third matter of great concern to the Intelligence Community that I
want to discuss tonight is the narcotics problem. You heard a lot about it in
the Presidential campaign. And it is a real problem.
You are all aware of the alarming extent of narcotics abuse in our own
country. Almost 40 percent of organized-crime activity in our country is
related to drugs, generating an income estimated to be as high as $110 billion.
On the international scene, we have documented ever-increasing rates of
drug production and trafficking. Narcotics activity has been accompanied by
an alarming increase in violence and intimidation -- especially in Latin
America. Drug traffickers in Colombia routinely use violence. Judges and
other government officials, businessmen and journalists in that country have
been the targets of bribery, intimidation, and assassination. I suppose this
was symbolized especially in the destruction of the Supreme Court building by
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drug dealers or terrorists employed for that purpose who literally assaulted
the Supreme Court building with artillery.
The Intelligence Community collects and analyzes information on every step
in the operation of narcotics production, processing, distribution, and the
laundering of profits. Our efforts are designed both to meet immediate needs
for intelligence and to help fashion longer-term drug control strategies. And
this is not without its problems, because our interest in gathering
intelligence and protecting sources and methods is often inconsistent with the
law enforcement community' s desire to use that evidence and then being
required by the courts to furnish the source of the information in criminal
discovery.
We provide intelligence to the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard to assist them in their drug
interdiction and enforcement efforts.
We al so assist foreign governments in their counternarcotics programs.
Several Latin American countries are undertaking a major cooperative effort to
destroy drug processing laboratories, airstrips, and chemical holding areas.
We are al so supporting an interdiction operation at the southwest border that
involves federal, state, and local authorities in both countries.
Our intelligence can help foreign countries measure the extent of their
own drug problem. Using some of our intelligence analysis, U.S. diplomats
were able to show one foreign government the extent of environmental damage
done by the slash-and-burn agriculture of its narcotics growers. The
government intensified its eradication efforts and made a major dent in drug
production. But the narcotics industry is resilient. In this case, narcotics
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? i
production came down, but the country has increasingly become a regional
transit point for narcotics.
Intelligence is also used to help implement anti-drug laws. The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 and the bill recently passed by Congress call for the United
States to withhold some foreign assistance from nations that are not working
to counter drug activity within their borders. To support such legislation,
we monitor the activities of the drug traffickers and analyze how well other
countries' counternarcotics measures are working.
But policymakers recognize that intelligence, important as it is, does
not provide a solution to the narcotics problem. Intelligence can illuminate
an issue -- track, clarify, and predict an outcome. But the only real
solution -- in this country and worldwide -- is a reduced demand for
narcotics, coupled with a real reduction in supply. My own sense is that this
is going to be a major problem for us at home. Present machinery, including
the recently enacted law, will require much fleshing out by Executive order if
we are really, this time, to mount effective campaigns against drug problems.
It is encouraging that international cooperation in fighting the drug
problem has increased considerably. In 1987, 23 nations joined the U.S. in
eradicating drug crops -- in 1981, there were only two.
Supporting our national fight against drugs will continue to be a major
priority of the Intelligence Community.
I've talked thus far about three of the major concerns that will continue
to be at the top of the Intelligence Community's agenda -- Soviet affairs,
weapons proliferation, and narcotics. Now I'd like to talk a bit about the
changes that have occurred over the last 19 months -- changes that have
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strengthened the Central Intelligence Agency and have helped to build a higher
level of confidence in us and in our work.
You may recall that at this time two years ago, the CIA was at the center
of a storm that threatened to destroy confidence in our role in American life
and to shatter the trust that is so indispensable to our mission. Throughout
1987, we were subjected to the most searching inquiry into our part in the
Iran-Contra affair.
At the end of last year, I sent a note to all CIA employees that said:
"If ever a time in the 40 years of the Central Intelligence Agency required
the talent and energy of those who serve, this has been that time." And a
year later, I can report that our people have responded, and we have together
taken the Agency through one of the most challenging eras in our history.
We have, I believe, restored public confidence in the CIA and greatly
improved our relations with Congress. And we have done this by establishing
clear guidelines guidelines that are workable and well understood and have
been scrupulously followed.
We have established policies to ensure that our intelligence assessments
remain objective and that analysts are protected against the pressures of
political influence. As Director of Central Intelligence, this insistence on
objectivity may be the most significant contribution that I could make in
galvanizing a cohesive Intelligence Community without compromising the
integrity of the individual analysts and program managers. And I am proud to
say that in the time I have been at CIA I haven't heard anyone accuse 'us of
"cooking the books."
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I'm also proud of what we have done to strengthen the review of covert
activities. These activities are the focus of the greatest congressional and
public attention, but I think it is worth pointing out that only about three
percent of the Intelligence Community's resources are spent on covert action.
Under the guidelines I have established, the Agency's senior managers must
review all proposed covert action findings and related documents that are to
be forwarded to the National Security Council. They must apply tests designed
to ensure that each program can be done, is consistent with our declared
foreign policy, and if exposed would make sense to the American people. And
as I have consistently stated in all my public statements, we must have this
capability. It is a vital extension of our national foreign policy and we
need to protect its availability. We do this through the professional
measures I've just mentioned.
Because I know of the need to be absolutely candid with Congress, and the
responsibility that intelligence professionals have to protect sources and
methods, I have established guidelines governing our dealings with Congress.
And I have made it clear that in dealing with Congress there is no excuse for
deception. There have been some questions that Agency officials who brief on
the Hill -- and we've briefed a thousand times this year -- have had to refer
back to me. They've been authorized to demur rather than skirt issues that
they were not authorized to discuss, and we have worked out arrangements with
the Congress. Sometimes the questions have come all the way up to me, and
sometimes I've lost the issue. But we have not left Congress feeling that in
some way anyone in the CIA has been disingenuous with them. As a result, our
relationship with Congress has improved, and I believe it will continue to
improve without "giving away the store."
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There is another point I want to make about our work, and it is that the
intelligence we provide to policymakers on the Soviet Union, weapons
proliferation, narcotics and many other issues is not easy to come by. In
fact, it sometimes comes at great cost to the men and women of American
intelligence. And I think of that every time I walk through the main foyer of
our Headquarters building, where stars have been carved for those who have
given their lives in the line of duty. And I am reminded that it is the
creativity, the determination, the brilliance, and the courage of our people
that spells the difference between success and failure.
A German poet was once asked how the medieval Germans ever built their
lofty cathedrals. He replied, "Men in those days had more than just an
opinion, they felt a commitment."
I think our people show a similar commitment, and I hope that we continue
to attract those best suited to carry out our mission. We are looking for
people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are dedicated
and responsive to our law. People to whom fame and fortune are not a
necessary part of their_lives, but who can find in our important work an
avenue to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
With such people we can continue to provide the intelligence that
policymakers need, observing the rules of oversight and accountability that
both the Congress and the members of the Intelligence Community have a right
to expect. This is what you would want of us, what all American people would
want of us, and we are doing our very best to. supply it.
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REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE RETIREMENT DINNER FOR
LT. GEN. LEONARD H. PERROOTS
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
DECEMBER 14, 1988
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Thank you, Gordon.* Len, Mrs. Perroots, distinguished guests and friends,
I'm delighted to have a chance to participate in this evening to honor a
distinguished general and a distinguished intelligence officer. And I have to
say that those were some of the finest viewgraphs I have seen in my brief
experience in military intelligence.
I've tried to imagine a waiter commissioned by the GRU to report back on
the activities of the Intelligence Community here tonight. And I know that it
would only spread fear and trembling if they could see how efficient and
determined and lacking in humor and how serious we were this evening.
So, I'm tempted to tell you of a reputation that we already
have -- at least at one agency. The President is telling perestroika stories
he collects. They are supposed to be authentic, although Howard Baker says he
makes them up. The President confronted me the other day and said that
Gorbachev had directed the KGB to find out how perestroika was working in the
Urals. And the KGB officer went out into the Urals and visited the hamlets,
the small villages. In each case he would go to see the mayor. And in one
village he started off by asking how things were in the village. And the
mayor said, "Everything is fine in the village." He said, "What do you think
of perestroika?" "We like perestroika." "Are you prospering?" "We are
prospering." "Are there any television sets in this village?" "Yes. There
must be a television set in every hut in the hamlet. Some huts have more than
* Gordon Negus, Executive Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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one television set." "How about refrigerators?" "Oh yes, there's a
refrigerator in every hut in the hamlet." The KGB officer leveled his eyes at
the mayor and he said, "Do you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of
course, I do. Who else but a CIA agent would come into a village with no
electricity and ask questions like that?"
Well, I am delighted to have a chance to participate in this program, and,
in deference to our honored guest this evening, I shall not use a single
acronym.
The program we've just seen has made one thing pretty clear. Wherever
Lenny is, there's a lot going on. He's taken care of projects and people.
And when he's in charge, those around him will tell you that they have a good
place to work. That is because Lenny makes sure that those who work for him
have the information they need to get the job done and the training they need
to do the job better. And if they don't know what they need to do the job
better, Lenny can tell them that too. Lenny has never been accused of lacking
for words. But tonight our words are for Lenny, rather than from him.
When he retires on the last day of this year, Lenny will retire from the
highest position in military intelligence. In his 33 years of distinguished
service to the Air Force, the Intelligence Community, and the country, Lenny
has made a lasting contribution to intelligence. He has strengthened the
quality of our product, the capabilities of our intelligence officers, and the
integrity of our profession. Perhaps that may be his most abiding
contribution. With these accomplishments, he's made intelligence a more vital
and valued part of our nation's defense and national security policy.
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As Director of DIA, Lenny has set the highest standards for intelligence
collection and analysis. And he has not been shy in communicating this to the
troops. "If your intelligence reports are lousy," he told a class of new
defense attaches this past spring, "sending a mountain of them is not going to
help. Likewise, I assure you, that if you send fewer reports, but of better
quality, no one will complain, especially not me."
The intelligence that Lenny demanded also had to be free of personal or
political bias. And I have seen this again and again. Lenny and I share the
opinion that the credibility of our analysis depends upon the objectivity of
our product. Early this year, Lenny told a group of defense attaches, "You
have to keep the guy who needs the intelligence away from the guy who is
collecting it." And he has told his analysts to keep a similar distance from
policy concerns in developing their judgments to protect their independence
and the objectivity of the results.
Lenny's willingness to stand behind the analysis of DIA and of the
Intelligence Community has earned him our admiration and our respect. He has
resisted pressures to change his counsel, and he has both defended and
insisted upon the analytical integrity of his organization. From time to
time, Congress spots apparent errors in competitive analysis. And I have been
asked to reconcile apparent differences. I know on one occasion they had to
think a while when I told them that I felt that the methodology used was
correct and that the conclusions reached, while they differed from others in
the Community, were to be accorded the highest level of respect. And they
said, "Well, what do we do about this?" And I said, "Well, take the worst
case between the two and make your policy judgments accordingly." And I think
that's what they did.
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Under Lenny's leadership, DIA has won high marks, not only for the quality
and integrity of its intelligence, but for its ability to meet the
intelligence needs of its consumers -- from the operational commanders, to the
Joint Chiefs, to our allies.
Providing and enhancing intelligence support to operational commanders
around the world has been one of his top priorities, and he has done a whole
lot to eliminate the gaps, the redundancy, and the incompatibility in the
communication of intelligence both between services and from the intelligence
producers to the tactical commanders in the field. In 1986, the Defense
Intelligence Agency received the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for the
intelligence support it provided -- especially to operational commanders
during the Libyan air raid, the Achille Lauro incident, and the hijacking of
TWA flight 847 -- all in just a short period of time.
At the request of Secretaries Weinberger and Carlucci, Lenny has spoken
with foreign heads of state, briefed ministers of defense, and addressed
foreign parliaments on U.S. defense intelligence concerns. In fact, he
returned from a final and very successful briefing tour only last week. And
he was good enough to call me while he was away. He has probably briefed more
chiefs of state and chiefs of defense than any other living American.
I know that he is especially proud of his work with the Defense
Intelligence College. And this is an exciting, dynamic time for the College.
It's attracting and serving more students than ever
before -- students not only from the intelligence agencies, but from all parts
of the armed services and the federal government. Thanks to Lenny's efforts,
the Defense Intelligence College has expanded its faculty, broadened its
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curriculum, and become a center for research and learning in the intelligence
field.
His efforts to strengthen defense intelligence have benefitted the entire
intelligence process. Under his leadership, the Defense Intelligence Agency
has played a strong, respected role in producing national estimates --
managing many estimates and contributing significant expertise to others. DIA
is always in there when we have our meetings before reporting to the President.
I also think we've seen people get along a little better witn each other
in the Intelligence Community during Lenny's tenure as Director of DIA. More
analysts in different agencies are working with each other, rather than
against each other. And without in any way sacrificing the principle of
competitive analysis, we are producing complementary analysis. We've made
some real progress, and I think Lenny deserves a good deal of credit for this.
Under his leadership, DIA is now providing more and better support than
ever to our nation's defense and security policy. Intelligence is now a
regular, valued input at every stage of weapons development and procurement --
from the definition of need through the design of a particular weapons system
to its eventual retirement and replacement.
Arms control is another very important challenge. In early November, I
awarded a unit citation to DIA's Strategic Negotiations Branch for its
superior defense intelligence support to our strategic arms control talks with
the Soviets. And the Defense Intelligence College has been charged with
training our U.S. inspectors and escorts for the INF treaty. The first class
of inspectors was ready within three months of the treaty's signing.
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The late General Max Taylor, whom many of you knew as I did, once
recounted a conversation he had with a hard-bitten and highly decorated
Sergeant Major when he was conducting an Army study on leadership. General
Taylor asked the Sergeant Major if he could give him a brief definition of
leadership. The old soldier replied without hesitation, "Leadership is when
your leader tells you he is going to take you to hell and back and you find
yourself looking forward to the trip."
The toughest job of any leader is to inspire and motivate his people. And
I think this may be Lenny's greatest talent -- his great ability to
communicate his vision, his enthusiasm, his energy, and his commitment to
others. And his dedication and loyalty to his people have been returned to
him many times over.
Lenny, through your many accomplishments and through the dedication and
service you have inspired in others, you have done much for the intelligence
profession and for your country. Whatever you choose to do in the future, you
have our best wishes for your success and our gratitude and appreciation for
your distinguished service to our profession and to our country.
Thank you.
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REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1988
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Intelligence collection may be in the eye of the beholder. About two
months ago then KGB Director Chebrikov made one of his rare, perhaps even one
of his first, appearances to talk about intelligence. And he quoted a speech
that I made last year -- or at least a press interview, I think with
The Los Angeles Times -- in which I was asked whether, following the problem
with our Moscow Embassy, it was still possible to collect inside the Soviet
Union. And 1 had said yes, that we were indeed able to recruit assets who
would supply needed intelligence for that purpose. And then Chebrikov said
that nothing could be plainer -- this makes the point for why the Soviet Union
should spend more money on counterintelligence. I suppose you've heard us
make the same argument in this country. A few days ago, the chief of the KGB
in Leningrad made a similar statement.
It brings to mind one of the stories collected for the President as part
of his perestroika collection. This story was about Gorbachev's desire to
find out how his program of perestroika was working in the outer areas.
Gorbachev sent a representative out into the Ukraine to visit some of the
smaller villages. The representative went to the mayor of one of the villages
and, after talking to the mayor for a moment, he said, "Do you have any
television sets in this village?" The mayor looked at him and said, "Of
course we have television sets. In fact, there may be two television sets in
many of these huts." The representative said, "That is very interesting.
What about refrigerators?" And the mayor said, "Of course. We all have
refrigerators." The representative looked the mayor in the eye and said, "Do
you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who else but a CIA
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agent would come into a village with no electricity and ask questions like
that?"
Frank Carlucci, Crowe, Shultz and others are going around having
bilaterals, but I have to tell you we have no planned bilaterals with the KGB.
It is the fall of 1988. We edge toward the end of the year and the end
of the decade. I have been asked rather frequently in recent months to
reflect on what the most important intelligence issues of the 1990s will be.
The question reminds me of an observation once made by a nuclear physicist who
said, "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." With that
cautionary note in mind, I will make a few predictions about some of the key
issues that now confront the Intelligence Community -- issues that we expect
to be with us well into the next decade.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, who was Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and is now our Ambassador to the United Nations,
describes a view held by many in this country about intelligence.
"Americans," he said, "have always had an ambivalent attitude toward
intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they
don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national
security, I think the American people today want a lot of intelligence. And a
whole range of issues are commanding the Intelligence Community's attention --
international terrorism and drug trafficking, the proliferation of advanced
weapons, the transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Bloc -- to name
just a few intelligence issues that are global in nature.
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Our interests around the world as a free superpower require our awareness
of happenings, plans, capabilities, and intentions in many regions of the
world where insurgencies, war, and political change are going on -- such as in
the many different countries in Latin American and in Africa, the problems in
the Middle East, the struggle in Cambodia, to name just a few.
This evening, I want to concentrate on three geographical areas that
are -- and will continue to be -- of great interest to U.S. policymakers and,
thus, to the Intelligence Community. These areas are the Soviet Union, South
Asia, and the Persian Gulf.
The nations of these three areas have many common borders. Their
interests are, necessarily, interrelated. Yet it is really a region without
boundaries, for the force of developments there is felt far beyond Moscow, or
Islamabad, or Tehran. Gorbachev's plans for reform, the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan, and the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict -- one
of the bloodiest wars of our time and one that breached the international
restraint against the use of chemical weapons -- have an impact far beyond the
immediate region. All these events have major implications not only for
regional peace and stability, but for the interests of the United States and
the West and, indeed, for the entire world.
The Soviet Union will remain the primary focus of our intelligence
collection and analysis in the 1990s. Its military capability, its efforts to
increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities continue
to pose security challenges to United States interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths and, in fact, make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
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Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew -- bringing new life and
dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us
could have foreseen even five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads.
Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we know it,
today's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering
largely because it has not given the people enough breathing room -- room to
innovate, room to inquire, room to unlock creativity.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. For example,
the Soviets are leaving Afghanistan and they are eliminating a whole class of
nuclear weapons under the INF treaty -- a process that includes unprecedented
on-site inspections of Soviet military facilities.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked
controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle is under way
between reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the
Communist system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could
destabilize the very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this
struggle will affect how far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to
which central authority is relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and
how competitive the Soviet system will be over the next few decades.
Just a few weeks ago, Gorbachev successfully challenged a number of
individuals in the Soviet hierarchy -- undertaking the most sweeping overhaul
of the top party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in
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1957. The changes made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy agenda at
home and abroad with renewed momentum.
Yet this is only one victory in a very long-term undertaking to reform
the Soviet system. The process will be long and drawn out at best, requiring
Gorbachev to overcome enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles.
There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and
concentrate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become
more decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of
its people. The nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other
regions of the USSR will further test the Soviet system's ability to make
reforms work.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that
Gorbachev is a a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the
possibility that he can, ultimately, pull off a "revolution from above" that
actually increases authority below.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some very formidable challenges. We must pay closer attention than ever to
the political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev continues to
challenge the established interests of individuals and institutions.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and -- perhaps even more difficult -- how
it may change Moscow's foreign policy.
In the Intelligence Community, we must manage the information explosion
that glasnost has produced which, though welcome, challenges us to sort out
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what is important and what is not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to
hear.
We must support U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. As these negotiations
progress, the Intelligence Community will be increasingly asked to assess
Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of
agreements. And the amount of support required is tremendous. The INF treaty
has required the United States to conduct inspections at 117 Soviet facilities.
Monitoring the START treaty, which is now being negotiated in Geneva, could
involve as many as 2,500 weapons locations spread throughout the Soviet Union.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the United States makes with the
Soviet Union, our relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers
will depend on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate
assessments -- and even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and
unexpected initiatives, such as the proposal that he made recently to give up
Cam Ranh Bay if we would give up the Philippines, or to withdraw troops from
Hungary if we would give up our fighters based in Italy.
Moving south, intelligence about South Asia will continue to be important
to policymakers for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Soviet
influence in the region. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from
Afghanistan demonstrates his desire to cut Soviet losses in order to pursue
other objectives. But despite the Soviet troop withdrawal, Afghanistan is
going to remain a key foreign policy concern in Moscow. Because of the
Soviets' continued interest and its strategic location, Afghanistan will
remain an important concern in Washington as well.
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I recall a meeting with President Zia this time last year. He went to
his library shelf and pulled off a book showing a map of the region over which
he had put a red celluloid overlay to illustrate Soviet influence in
Afghanistan and show the strategic wedge that further occupation of that
territory represented not only to Iran, but to Pakistan and nations further
south.
We expect the Soviets to abide by their commitment to withdraw the rest
of their troops from Afghanistan by February 15th of next year. That has not
changed, despite the Soviets' pause in their withdrawal. At:the same time,
Moscow will try to retain its influence with Kabul through both economic and
political means. The appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan
just a few weeks ago indicates that Afghanistan remains a priority concern in
Moscow.
Following the Soviet withdrawal, we believe that Afghanistan will be
unstable for a considerable period and have so advised policymakers. The
Soviet-backed regime has minimal control or support outside Kabul, and the
withdrawal will make its position even more precarious. The Afghan resistance
will continue its effort to destroy what is left of the regime. However, the
ruling party's fragmentation may be as large a factor in the regime's collapse
as the military initiatives of the resistance. We believe that the military
could probably last for a longer period of time than we have predicted for the
political structure itself.
The post-Soviet period will also find the Afghan rebels :fighting among
themselves. That has been historically so. They did it throughout the Soviet
occupation and we expect that it will continue. Given that most ethnic groups
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are better armed than ever before and are likely to capture additional weapons
from the disintegrating Afghan army, we could expect to see tribal conflict
continue for some time after the Soviet withdrawal.
The fundamentalist groups of the Afghan resistance will enter the
post-Soviet era well-armed and well-organized. Whatever the composition of a
future government in Afghanistan, Islamic ritual and law will probably play a
larger role in its operations and its policies. But the nature and traditions
of Afghanistan make the imposition of a Khomeini-style fundamentalism unlikely.
I think it's important to say that the United States cannot dictate who
will finally emerge as the leaders in Afghanistan. A strong central
government is unlikely, and residual hostility to the Soviets may eventually
be matched by the return of historical suspicions about the West. Perhaps the
good news about events in Afghanistan is not so much what has been gained, but
what has been averted.
Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal and the struggle for political control are
the primary intelligence issues in Afghanistan for the near term. But efforts
by neighboring countries to exert influence there will also receive our
attention. In the longer term, we will examine the future Afghan government's
attempts to rebuild the country and resettle the world's largest refugee
population -- more than five million people.
About three mill ion of those refugees now live in Pakistan, a country
that has fully supported the Afghan resistance. Pakistan has always been of
strategic interest to the United States and to its policymakers, but the death
of President Zia in August has raised new issues.
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a.
The response to President Zia's death has been a smooth, constitutional
transition. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the Senate, has taken over as
Acting President. Under the Constitution, a new president must be elected
within 30 days after Parliamentary elections. President Ishaq has announced
that elections set for November 16th will be held on schedule. A series of
judicial rulings have removed the constraints placed on Pakistan's political
parties in the 1985 elections, and the November elections have become the most
closely contested in Pakistan's history.
I think I should also add that the military has supported this effort to
fill the vacancies through constitutional means. I think there is real
support for this process. Pakistan is plagued by problems of terrorism,
partly as a result of its role in support of the Afghan resistance. But I do
not think, as long as the terrorism is under control, that this will change
the military's willingness to let voters decide the issue.
Because of the close relationship between the United States and Pakistan
and because of Pakistan's strategic importance, the U.S. Intelligence
Community will be following these developments with the keenest interest.
Further south is another region of great strategic interest for the
United States -- the Persian Gulf -- an area where tensions remain high
despite the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. Not surprisingly, tne peace
talks between the two nations have been fitful and difficult. The animosities
built up over eight years of bitter conflict are not easy to dispel.
The Iran-Iraq war cost the two countries more than t350 billion, and even
more in human costs -- more than one mill ion casual ties and one and a half
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million refugees. This was one of the bloodiest wars of the century, and it
will take many years for the two nations to recover.
The conflict has affected nearly every aspect of economic life in Iran
and Iraq. Both economies have been weakened by the loss of oil revenues and
both have borne the expense of large-scale arms purchases. Both countries
have exhausted their financial reserves and have been compelled to cut
economic development programs.
We believe these costs of the war will deter both sides from resuming an
all-out conflict anytime soon. However, Iran and Iraq continue to distrust
each other, and both will probably maintain their military readiness.
The U.S. Intelligence Community has closely followed the Iran-Iraq
conflict, providing assessments of the intentions and capabilities of both
sides, as well as the implications for the region and the United States. When
the U.S. presence in the Gulf was increased, we began providing daily tactical
intelligence support to naval forces operating with the U.S. Central Command.
Our support included reports on Iranian antiship cruise missile sites, naval
bases, airfields, and coastal defense installations. As a result, U.S. forces
have been better able to successfully carry out U.S. foreign policy and
protect our security interests.
The end of the Gulf war has created a whole new set of intelligence
questions which we are now addressing -- questions such as what effect the
cease-fire may have on the Western hostages being held in Lebanon; how the
political struggle in Tehran to succeed Khomeini will be affected; what impact
the cease-fire will have on each country's drive for regional influence; and
the long-term impact of these developments on the cost of oil.
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Perhaps the biggest question we are considering is what lessons Iran and
Iraq -- and the rest of the world -- have learned from a war that involved the
first sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II -- even during the
most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using chemical weapons --
weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for
future wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too,
has employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
I'm sure you've read many accounts recently about the use of and the
effects of chemical weapons. These weapons are thought to offer a cheap and
readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more
powerful foes. Some see them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and
more than 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons.
Mustard gas, which is a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one
of the favored chemical agents for several reasons -- its relative ease of
manufacture, its long life in storage and on the battlefield, and its ability
to incapacitate those who are exposed to it.
Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more
difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain
and nervous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as
cyanide and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while
phosgene, widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs.
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Most of these plants look like nothing more than pesticide plants and are
difficult to detect.
The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor the ability of
foreign countries to develop and produce chemical weapons, and their
incentives for using such weapons. And with the increase of ballistic
missiles in the Third World, we must be alert to attempts by Third World
nations to arm these missiles with chemical warheads. Virtually every city in
the Middle East would be subject to such an attack, if these two types of
weapons are combined.
The proliferation of advanced weapons affects the prospects for peace and
stability in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. For Israel,
the spread of chemical weapons among the Arab states -- principally Iraq,
Libya, and Syria -- could seriously alter the regional balance of power. This
has major implications for peace in the Middle East.
It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been
lifted. At least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons, and
this presents us with another intelligence concern.
Intelligence support is also vital to the success of United States
efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons -- efforts such as restricting
the export of certain key chemicals and of ballistic missile technology. On
the international front, the United States participates in the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament, which
trying to negotiate a chemical weapons
ban. And on September 26th, President Reagan addressed the United Nations
General Assembly. He called on the signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
other concerned nations to convene a conference to consider actions that we
can take together to reverse the serious erosion of this treaty.
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6.3
Yes, assessing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is
one of the most difficult challenges we face in the Intelligence Community --
now and into the next decade. It is also one of our most important tasks, for
these weapons may well represent one of the most serious threats to world
peace in the coming years.
The famed British writer and cynic, Somerset Maugham, once noted, "It is
bad enough to know the past; it would be intolerable to know the future." It
would, of course, be just as intolerable not to be prepared for the future.
The intelligence issues that I have chosen for discussion today -- reform in
the Soviet Union, unrest in Afghanistan, and tensions in the Persian Gulf
are issues that will be with us into the next decade. Assessing these
questions and their far-reaching effects is the critical task of intelligence.
Our machines, our systems, and our satellites are the wonders of the
age. They help us to do our very difficult work. But intelligence is
preeminently an affair of people. It is the caliber of the men and women of
American intelligence -- their creativity, determination, brilliance, and
courage -- that spells the difference between success and failure.
And I hope very much that we continue to attract those best suited to
carry out our mission -- people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers.
People who are dedicated and responsive to our law and discipline. People who
understand and play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not a
necessary part of their life, but who can find in this difficult work an
avenue to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
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With such people, we can continue to provide the intelligence that
policymakers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our
national security. This is what you expect of us, what all Americans expect
of us, and I can assure you we are doing our very best to supply it.
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