RECENT SPEECHES BY JUDGE WEBSTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92G00017R001100190007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 17, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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IDD/A Registryl
STAT
STAT
STAT
17 April 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: R. M. Huffstutler
Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs
SUBJECT: Recent Speeches by Judge Webster
1. I have enclosed three recent speeches given by Judge Webster. The
speeches, delivered to the Society of Barristers (16 March), the Palm Beach
Round Table (20 March), and the Town Hall of California (30 March), deal with
substantive intelligence issues -- counterintelligence, terrorism, changes in
the Soviet Union, and advanced weapons proliferation.
2. If you have any questions or comments about these speeches, please
contact Chief of our Speeches Unit. She can be reached at
3. I encourage you to send these speeches to others in your office who
may wish to know what the Director is saying in his public appearances.
Attachments:
As stated
.William M. Baker
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REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF BARRISTERS
NAPLES, FLORIDA
MARCH 16, 1989
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Thank you, Fred.* I appreciate all that you said. Fred very carefully
distanced himself from our own association, and I want to acknowledge it
because it has meant a lot to me. We were in law school together. When I
became a United States Attorney, I found that Fred was in the United States
Attorney's Office, having served with distinction for about five years as a
Special Agent of the FBI. He became my first assistant and, ultimately,
although we didn't get to practice law together, when I went to the bench Fred
joined my old firm as a partner. He's a very dear friend and one that I
always lookforward to seeing.
If I may, I'd like to introduce Bill Baker, who came with me from the FBI
and now heads the Public Affairs Office of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Bill, could you please stand up? I can't think of anything more challenging
than trying to represent an agency that consistently says "No comment." to the
press. But he does it.
I was really pleased to see that you had my good friend Pete Bay on your
program and also Tony Pappi, two of the real stars in the judicial system.**
It's fun to be back with you again. This membership has a reputation not
only in the art of trial lawyering but also in the art of selecting a great
* Frederick Mayer, member of the Society of Barristers Board of Governors.
** Peter T. Fay, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit;
Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, United States Supreme Court.
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site for an annual meeting. I hope you will someday invite me back again.
Those of you who have been following the events around the world know that
Gorbachev is keeping us very, very busy. He somehow has mastered the art of
public relations. As Larry Eagleburger said in his testimony yesterday,
Gorbachev is able to control propaganda better than we are, and he's able to
get his ideas out more quickly. It's still a challenge for President Bush --
as it was for President Reagan -- to deal with these constant initiatives
which are captivating and hypnotizing a good part of central Europe. I saw
the article in this morning's NEW YORK TIMES noting that Gorbachev is making
new demands for agricultural reforms. These are important issues, and they
emphasize the central role that he is playing now on the world screen. The
words perestroika and glasnost are clearly words that have become popular as a
result of Gorbachev and his activities. In fact, we have begun collecting
stories about both perestroika and glasnost, and I will tell you only one of
them.
According to this story, Gorbachev sent a representative out into the
Urals to check on the progress of perestroika. The man went to a village and
asked to see the mayor. He talked around the subject for a while, and then he
said, "How is perestroika getting along?" And the mayor said, "We like
perestroika; we like it very much." And the representative said, "Tell me, do
you have any television sets here in the village?" And the mayor said, "Oh
yes, we have television sets here. We have television sets, I believe, in
every hut in the hamlet. In fact, in some huts there are two or three
television sets." "Tell me about refrigerators." "Oh yes, we have plenty of
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refrigerators here in this village." The representative said, "By the way, do
you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I know who you are. Who
else but a CIA agent would come into a village with no electricity and ask
questions like that?"
The last time I had the pleasure of talking to you was in Phoenix in 1982,
when I was Director of the FBI. In that speech I discussed -- from a law
enforcement perspective -- the balance that must be maintained between each
citizen's right to be let alone and the right to be kept safe and free. When
I spoke at the American Bar Association's annual meeting in Toronto last
August, I addressed this topic from my vantage point at CIA. And today, in
the context of recent events, I would like to discuss how the work of
intelligence can provide greater safety without unreasonable sacrifice of
individual liberty.
The CIA and other components of the Intelligence Community collect
information on a host of issues that affect our national security. Two of the
issues that most clearly touch on the relationship between safety and
liberty -- issues that therefore demand special safeguards -- are the threats
posed by hostile intelligence services operating against this country
worldwide, and the threats posed by international terrorists. Our activities
in these and other areas are governed by Executive Order 12333, which
specifies the duties and responsibilities of the CIA as well as the
limitations upon intelligence activities undertaken by the Agency. The Order
reflects the requirements of the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of
1949, and other laws, regulations, and directives, as well as intelligence
policies.
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In addition to observing the Executive Order, the CIA and other agencies
within the Intelligence Community are required to develop and have approved by
the Attorney General their own guidelines and procedures. The procedures at
the CIA were developed to:
II encourage legitimate intelligence activities;
i provide legal protection to employees by providing authority for
intelligence activities;
I and -- I think this is of major importance -- assure the American public
and the intelligence oversight committees that all CIA activities
involving U.S. persons are lawful and related to legitimate intelligence
objectives. For instance, we file an annual report with the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on any involvement with U.S.
persons, and we follow up with briefings if necessary. Our activity in
this area is closely monitored by the oversight committees, which act as
surrogates for the Congress as a whole and, indeed, for the American
people.
It may surprise you to know that last year we provided over 1,000
briefings to the Congress. I believe we have formed an effective partnership
with Congress that has and will continue to contribute to our national
security.
The first of the issues that I mentioned, counterintelligence, is critical
to our national security and is clearly a legitimate intelligence objective.
Earlier this month, I spoke to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
about the counterintelligence and security issues we now face. An effective
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and comprehensive counterintelligence program has never been more important to
our nation, because the threat against us -- despite perestroika -- has
grown. The number of hostile operations against us and our allies has
certainly increased, and the number of intelligence services involved in such
operations has also grown.
Over the past four years, we have discovered more penetrations of the
United States' defense and intelligence communities than at any time in our
history. The costs of these compromises are estimated in billions of dollars.
Although many countries engage in intelligence operations against the
United States, I think it is no surprise to you that the Soviet intelligence
services -- the KGB and the military service, the GRU -- represent by far the
most significant intelligence threats in terms of size, ability, and intent to
act against U.S. interests both at home and abroad. And despite the economic
and political changes Gorbachev is attempting to make, we have no evidence at
all that the force of the Soviet intelligence effort has in any way abated.
Just last week, the State Department ordered the expulsion of a Soviet
diplomat on charges that he sought illegally to obtain documents showing how
our government protects secrets in computer systems. It's a nice way of
saying that he was caught spying. You probably read this morning that the
Soviets ordered the removal of one of our defense attaches in Moscow. This
act was plain retaliation; there was no basis at all for doing it.
Because we can protect ourselves best if we understand what our adversary
wants, I think it's worth considering just what is being collected. This is
the important thing for those on the collection side, because
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counterintelligence tells us what our adversaries believe they need to know,
and that tells us something about their strengths and their weaknesses. The
highest Soviet collection priority is information on U.S. strategic nuclear
forces. Other high?priority subjects are key foreign policy matters,
Congressional intentions, defense information, U.S. intelligence sources and
methods, and advanced dual?use technology -- the kind of technology that is
civilian in nature but can be adapted to military purposes. The Soviets also
target NATO intensively, partly as a means to obtain U.S. foreign policy and
military information, and I think also because NATO has historically been more
vulnerable and easier to penetrate because of the multilateral activities
taking place there.
And the methods employed by the Soviets to get the information they want
are becoming more sophisticated. We expect to see greater Soviet efforts to
recruit U.S. personnel abroad, and you've read about some of that already. We
expect to see increasing use of third countries for clandestine meetings with
American agents -- with its successful counterintelligence work in the United
States, the FBI has driven many of those meetings to Mexico and also to
Vienna. We also expect to see greater efforts to penetrate allied governments
that might be privy to U.S. secrets and greater emphasis on attempting to
exploit the intelligence collection capabilities of the Warsaw Pact allies.
Many of the cases that you've read about haven't involved the Soviets spying.
They have been about Soviet Bloc intelligence services doing the work for the
Soviets. That was certainly the case on the West Coast when efforts were
being made to penetrate Hughes Aircraft.
Soviet efforts are formidable, but I want to take this opportunity to
dispute allegations in a recently published book, also covered extensively in
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TIME magazine, that the communications unit of our embassy in Moscow had been
subject to electronic eavesdropping by Soviet agents. The Soviets had
considerable success in the Moscow embassy, but not there. There was an
implication that somehow CIA had covered up this information from the State
Department. Actually, an interagency group -- which included representatives
of the State Department, the National Security Agency, the FBI, ?and the CIA --
conducted the investigation and found no evidence of hostile penetration of
this very sensitive equipment. It was all taken apart and carefully
analyzed -- this is not to say that there may not be some microphone hidden
somewhere in that room; they've certainly been successful in doing that in
other places. But the equipment itself that transmits the communications
shows no evidence at all of penetration. We are currently working with the
State Department to protect all of our embassies from technical penetration.
The Soviet Union, of course, is by no means the only country trying to
obtain our secrets. Intelligence and security services throughout the world
have increased their efforts to penetrate our facilities. We have noted as
well that several African states, among others, are cooperating with Soviet,
East European, Cuban, and Libyan services, and we are monitoring these
activities closely.
I think I should emphasize, though, that the methods the U.S. Intelligence
Community uses to counter this threat are also impressive. And the most
impressive of those methods is the increased cooperation among the various
agencies within the Community. The arrest of former Army Master Sergeant
Clyde Lee Conrad in West Germany last August demonstrated the strength of the
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Community pulling together. The CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Justice
worked very closely with the Army during this long and extensive investigation
of Conrad. He is now awaiting trial in Germany on charges of spying for the
Soviets and the Hungarians.
We had similar cooperation in the case of Army Warrant Officer James W.
Hall, who was just recently sentenced to 40 years in prison for providing
information about military operations and technical collection activities to
the Soviets and the East Germans.
Here at home, the FBI in recent years has made great strides in countering
the intelligence activities of the Soviet Union and Bloc countries. The FBI
has improved the quality and sophistication of its capabilities and, as a
result, has succeeded in disrupting hostile intelligence operations aimed at
critical U.S. targets.
The FBI's main strategy has been to "spiderweb" known or suspected
intelligence operatives. And this is an important approach. It's not one of
suspecting and following and watching American citizens who have access to
secrets, but one of trying to make it difficult enough, if not impossible, for
that rare traitor to make contact with a Soviet intelligence officer without
our knowing about it. And so we focus on those who would target us. That's
called "spiderwebbing." In spinning webs with physical and electronic
surveillance -- and, incidentally, all electronic surveillance must be court
authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act -- U.S.
intelligence has been able to weave a barrier between the hostile agents and
our citizens. Those of you who are familiar with FISA, as we call it, will
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recall that there's a much higher threshold required to direct electronic
surveillance against U.S. persons. The "spiderweb" system is working and that
is one of the reasons why so many of the "meets" are now taking place outside
of the United States. This puts an extra burden on hostile intelligence
services, and it also weakens the resolve of those who want to sell secrets,
because they have to go through that extra risk and trouble.
To provide the information that will allow enforcement agencies to protect
our citizens, we have bolstered counterintelligence efforts both at home and
abroad. For the CIA, such efforts include collecting information outside the
United States on hostile intelligence activities directed against Americans.
We adhere to the laws and regulations for operations outside the United States
that involve U.S. citizens.
To improve the effectiveness of counterintelligence activities both within
the CIA and the Intelligence Community, I created a new Counterintelligence
Center last April. The center works to protect the Agency's foreign
operations and the security of all Agency components against penetration by
foreign security or intelligence services. The Counterintelligence Center not
only provides analysis of hostile intelligence threats and past espionage
cases, it also provides guidance for our people going abroad.
The CIA is authorized to collect information on another major concern
the activities of international terrorists.
Some 15 years ago, while I was sitting on the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, I had occasion to review a statute which made it unlawful to carry or
attempt to carry a firearm aboard a commercial aircraft. In the opinion that
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I wrote, I discussed the evolution of the airport inspection or checkpoint
system -- a system that at that time, remarkably enough, had been challenged
as a gross intrusion into personal privacy. I think I even ruminated that if
under those circumstances Americans should suddenly find that all checkpoints
at airports had been taken away, there would probably be a cry of outrage.
It's that balancing that we have to deal with in determining the minimum
amount of intrusion that is appropriate to accomplish significant security
gains. Subsequent to that opinion, a rash of hijackings brought home the
reality of the terrorist threat and the need to balance individual privacy
interests with legitimate security interests. The bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 last December, which killed 270 people, was a tragic reminder of that
threat.
During the past four years, there have been nearly 300 cases in which some
form of counterterrorist actions -- efforts to prevent terrorism -- were taken
on the basis of intelligence information collected and disseminated by the
Central Intelligence Agency. We can't say, of course, in all of those cases
that the information or measures taken were the sole reason for the
preventions, but they clearly had a role and this is important to us.
In one of these cases, the Agency received a report that terrorists
planned to assassinate a senior American diplomat in a Middle Eastern country
when he arrived for a meeting. When we told the diplomat about the report, he
confirmed that he was to have such a meeting. At the last minute, he arranged
for the meeting to be held elsewhere, a prudent measure that may have saved
his life.
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On numerous occasions in recent years, the Agency has received reports of
planned terrorist attacks on our embassies in several parts of the world,
including the Latin American countries of Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador. In
each case, the embassy, upon receiving this kind of report, increased its
security. On several occasions, we've had source information coming back to
us that the increased security persuaded the terrorist group to cancel its
plans to attack. I've observed that terrorists want to do these things the
easy way. They will back off and wait for another occasion if they think the
challenge has become too difficult. So, we want to keep them thinking that it
is too difficult.
But in spite of the success we've had, in 1988 the property and citizens
of some 70 nations were the victims or targets of international terrorist
attacks -- attacks that killed 658 people and wounded more than 1,100. There
were 856 attacks in 1988 and 835 in 1987. And I think that we should keep in
mind that about one of five terrorist attacks last year was aimed at United
States citizens, United States property, or United States institutions around
the world.
The CIA collects valuable information about terrorist groups and
cooperates with other U.S. government agencies to use that information to
check and minimize the capabilities of terrorist organizations. We learned,
for example, that the Palestinian terrorist, Abu Nidal, had an extensive
international commercial network that dealt in the gray arms market. This
network had key offices in Poland, East Germany, and several other countries.
We used this information. The State Department delivered a series of
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diplomatic demarches to the governments of these countries expressing our
concern about the presence of these businesses and, as a result, the companies
were shut down and one of the means of financing terrorism was dried up.
It's our job to keep track of the movements of wanted terrorists when we
have an outstanding warrant for the arrest of terrorist individuals. The
Agency can make any information that we have available to judicial authorities
so that they can locate and apprehend them. In some cases, the United States
asks for extradition. Sometimes we're successful and sometimes we're not.
There's still a political aspect to terrorist law enforcement that keeps some
countries, for a variety of reasons, just a little reluctant to be full
players in the system. But in a case such as Fawaz Yunis, who was wanted for
the June 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner which carried United States
citizens, the information the Agency was able to supply enabled the FBI to
arrest Yunis in the Mediterranean Ocean and bring him to trial.
We also share information with foreign governments on names of potential
terrorists, including the aliases that they used. This is an important and
evolving computer base that will be extremely helpful. Information has also
been used to deny entry and safe haven to known terrorists and their
associates in various parts of the world. Finally, after years of effort in
which I have participated on both the law enforcement and the intelligence
side, countries are coming to the view that we have always held, as have the
British, that denying sanctuary is one of the keys to reducing the threat of
terrorism. It simply doesn't work to offer a "leave us alone and we'll leave
you alone" exchange.
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I have been trying to make the point that effective counterintelligence
and counterterrorism programs are critical to our national security. And they
are certainly critical to the safety of our citizens. But I'd like to
emphasize as well that how the CIA and the other intelligence agencies carry
out their responsibilities is of equal importance to our country. We are
subject to specific laws and we operate under internal procedures approved by
the Attorney General. In addition, my General Counsel's staff briefs
employees -- both at home and abroad -- to ensure that those who deal with
issues that affect the constitutional rights of American citizens know what
our laws are and what our procedures are and that full compliance is
expected. My Office of General Counsel also works closely with the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review at the Department of Justice in dealing with
types of activities that may require Attorney General authorization. They
work together to examine relevant issues and obtain the necessary approvals,
consistent with applicable requirements of our law.
We want to catch spies and we want to curb terrorism, but we will not
circumvent our own laws to do so. We must maintain absolute fidelity to our
laws and our rules -- rules that are imposed to assure our citizens that we
are indeed accountable. I do not think the CIA, or the FBI, or any member of
the Intelligence Community is exempt from this principle. In fact, I believe
that it is the key to public acceptance of our vitally important work.
We must, in the end, have both safety and liberty. The balance between
the right to be let alone and the right to be kept safe and free is central to
our profession and to our heritage. And in our ability to strike that balance
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true, lies our future as a land of ordered liberty. Former Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson must have had this balance in mind when he observed
that the United States Constitution and its Bill of Rights was not a suicide
pact. The protections it includes and affords to us must be rationally
applied if we are to prevail against those who would threaten our national
security.
I really believe that we have sufficient legislative restraints and that
we should stop looking for legislative solutions to problems as they emerge,
because such "solutions" can impede necessary work in the interest of national
security. Rather, what is needed is a better understanding of the
requirements of existing law and the discipline -- indeed the iron
determination -- to see that our laws are scrupulously followed.
I've been at the CIA for nearly two years now, and during that time, I've
gotten to know many of our dedicated people, both here and overseas. These
are people who are risk takers, but are not risk seekers. People who are not
particularly interested in fame or fortune, but who see in our work an
opportunity to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
When I consider their commitment and integrity, I often come back to the
words of my old friend, Sir William Stephenson, who died earlier this year at
the age of 93. In the introduction to the book, A Man Called Intrepid, which
chronicled his remarkable intelligence accomplishments during the Second World
War, Sir William wrote:
"Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty
of any people. When the functions of all nations, however varied their
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ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition
is possible, it is in a future too far distant to foresee. Until that safer,
better day, the democracies will avoid disaster, and possibly total
destruction, only by maintaining their defenses.
"Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence
is an essential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret,
the most dangerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be devised, revised,
and rigidly applied. But, as in all enterprise, the character and wisdom of
those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of that
guardianship lies the hope of free people to endure and prevail."
It seems to me that a nation dedicated to the rule of law can protect
itself and its heritage in no other way, and that is the way we are trying to
serve you.
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REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
PALM BEACH ROUND TABLE
WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA
MARCH 20, 1989
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Mr. Daley and members of the Round Table, I just can't tell you how
pleasing it is for me to be back after a lot of years. And, once again, I have
to leave too soon. Some of you who may have been here ten years ago will
recall that we had to hustle home because the hostage rescue attempt was about
to take place and that interfered with enjoying the wonders of Palm Beach.
But it's good to see so many friends here and to say how much we enjoy seeing
you when you come to visit us in Washington. The one I'm really most pleased
to see is one who is very dear to me, Sophia Casey. We always look forward to
seeing her when she comes out to visit the Agency when she is in Washington,
and she brings back very many warm memories.
When I came down to participate in a program with Admiral Turner and
Marvin Stone, Stan Turner and I, who were classmates at Amherst, decided that
the time had come to make it very clear that the FBI and the CIA were going to
work together. It hadn't always been so. And we played tennis together to
show that we got along and we did a number of other things to make the point.
And relations really did improve. When Bill Casey came along, they got even
better. We traveled together, we did a lot of things together. We even
played golf together, and for a dedicated tennis player like me, that's a
major concession to make to a very fine and gifted person. And Sophia, we
have a lot of great memories, don't we?
Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of Central Intelligence, and
Marvin Stone, former editor of U.S. News and World Report.
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It is still early in the year and early in the term of our forty?first
President. Yet President Bush already faces a host of international
developments that affect U.S. interests -- from Central America to Central
Africa, and from insurgency to narcotics trafficking. The President is going
to rely on the Intelligence Community for accurate, timely, and objective
information on all of these developments and what they mean for our national
interests. Another friend of yours and a good friend of mine, General Vernon
Walters, had a comment that I think tells us a lot about intelligence. He
said the American people have always had some ambivalence about intelligence.
When they feel threatened they want a lot of it, and when they don't they
somehow think the whole thing may be a bit immoral.
Well, Dick Walters is right and I think right now the American people want
a whole lot of intelligence. They want it carefully analyzed and presented in
a timely and objective way so that the President and other policymakers in
this country can make wise decisions for our national security.
This afternoon I would like to concentrate on two very important issues
for the President and for the country -- what is going on in the Soviet Union
and what we have recently seen develop with the spread of chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles. We are witnessing many changes in the traditional threat
posed to us by the Soviets. And, at the same time, we are seeing an increase
in the threat posed to the United States and, indeed, to world peace by the
production and use of chemical weapons. I would also like to discuss with you
some of the changes we have undergone at the Central Intelligence Adency
during the past two years -- changes that I believe are healthy, productive,
and confidence building.
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The Soviet Union is -- and will continue to be -- the primary focus of our
intelligence collection and analysis. Its military capability, its efforts to
increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities are
still serious threats to United States interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths. In fact, they probably make the Soviet Union of even greater
concern to American intelligence.
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew -- bringing new life and
dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us
could have foreseen five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads
there -- especially in the Baltic republics. Although the USSR is certainly
not headed toward democracy as we know it, today's Soviet leaders appear to
understand that their system is faltering largely because it has not given the
people enough breathing room -- room to inquire and room to unlock creativity.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. This Soviet
leader has signaled by word and deed that he wants the USSR to be a more
active and effective player on the world scene. He is more willing than past
Soviet leaders to reevaluate the costs and benefits of Soviet foreign
policies, to make decisions on that basis, and even, on occasion, to head off
in new directions. For example, the Soviets did, in fact, withdraw from
Afghanistan, reversing a policy that had been divisive and costly. And they
are eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons under the INF treaty -- a
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process that includes unprecedented on?site inspections of Soviet military
facilities.
Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral troop withdrawals at the United
Nations last December illustrates his willingness to pursue radically
different approaches even as it highlights the challenges that these new
approaches present to the Western alliance. Two weeks ago the United States
and its allies reconvened negotiations with the Warsaw Pact about conventional
forces in all of Europe, including the European USSR. The Soviets are making
it clear that they are prepared to reduce the advantage that they hold in some
elements of ground forces. However, they are demanding that, in return, the
West reduce what the Soviets claim is an advantage in air forces. These
negotiations present challenges -- but also opportunities -- for the West to
maintain unity within our alliance and yet work with the Warsaw Pact to make
real reductions in conventional forces.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked
controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle continues between
reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the Communist
system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could destabilize the
very system they are trying to save. The recently concluded Central Committee
Plenum dealing with Soviet agriculture provided clear evidence of this clash
of views. Some of you, no doubt, have watched the crowds cheering Yeltsin,
who is complaining that reform is not taking place fast enough. The ultimate
outcome of struggles such as this one will affect how far and how fast reform
progresses, the extent to which central authority is relaxed, the general
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A
welfare of the individual, and how competitive the Soviet system will be over
the next few decades.
There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and
concentrate resources on building up the nation's military can become more
decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of its
people.
Nationalist unrest is currently testing the Soviet system's ability to
make reforms work. Communal unrest in Armenia and Azerbaijan has forced
Moscow to put the region in a virtual state of martial law on a semipermanent
basis. Last November, the Communist leadership of Estonia declared the
republic "sovereign" -- an unthinkable development even a year ago. In
Lithuania, both the Popular Front organization and the Roman Catholic Church
have publicly pledged to work for sovereignty. These developments are putting
increasing pressure on Gorbachev. It is by no means certain -- and many doubt
it -- that minority aspirations for autonomy or even independence can be
squared with Moscow's clear need for control.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that
Gorbachev is a highly skilled politician. Only last fall, he successfully
undertook the most sweeping overhaul of the top party leadership since
Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in 1957. We cannot rule out the
possibility that he can, ultimately, pull off a "revolution from above" that
actually increases authority below.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some very formidable challenges. We are going to have to pay closer attention
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than ever to the political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev
challenges the established interests of individuals and institutions within
his country, particularly the party bureaucracy. And we will pay particular
attention to the nationalist groups in the Baltic and in other parts of the
USSR who are increasingly testing the limits of glasnost.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and -- even more difficult -- how it may
change Moscow's foreign policy.
We must manage the information explosion that glasnost has produced which,
although very welcome to us, challenges us to sort out what is important and
what is not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to hear. We are sorting
through an incredible volume of position papers and public statements that
have never been available to us in the past.
We must provide intelligence analysis for U.S. ? Soviet arms control
talks. As these negotiations progress, the Intelligence Community will be
increasingly asked to assess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance
with the provisions of agreements.
And the amount of support required is tremendous. The INF treaty has
required the United States to monitor about 120 facilities declared by the
Soviets. And monitoring the START treaty, which is being negotiated In
Geneva, could involve as many as 2,500 weapon locations spread throughout the
Soviet Union.
Monitoring agreements on strategic weapons, however, would be relatively
simple compared to monitoring an agreement to reduce conventional forces. Our
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government might have to monitor an area encompassing about 10 million square
kilometers -- over 6 million square miles -- and literally thousands of Warsaw
Pact units and hundreds of thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery
pieces, and other kinds of equipment. The cost in money and manpower could be
staggering -- and yet this monitoring functions as an indispensable part of
Congressional thinking as it approaches ratification of any such treaty.
Yet whatever arms control agreements we make with the Soviets, our
relationship is likely to remain essentially adversarial. Policymakers will
depend on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments --
and even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected
initiatives. And I think you have seen again and again how these unilateral
initiatives have kept us reacting to a highly innovative and challenging
individual.
But the Soviet Union is certainly not our only focus. Another major
question we are considering is what lessons Iran and Iraq -- and the rest of
the world -- have learned from their bitter conflict, a conflict that involved
the first sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II -- even during the
most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using chemical weapons --
weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for
future wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too,
employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
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I'm sure you've read many accounts during the last several months about
the uses and effects of chemical weapons. You may know, too, that Congress is
very concerned about chemical weapons proliferation. Just this past month I
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee on the production and use of chemical weapons.
These weapons are thought by some to offer a cheap and readily obtainable
means of redressing the military balance against more powerful foes. Some see
them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and more than 20 countries
may be developing chemical weapons.
Mustard gas, a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one of the
favored chemical agents for several reasons -- its relative ease of
manufacture, its long life in storage and on the battlefield, and its ability
to incapacitate those exposed to it.
Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more
difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain
and nervous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as
cyanide and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while
phosgene, widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs. And others
are working to develop something even more horrible -- biological weapons.
The Intelligence Community is going to continue to monitor the ability of
foreign countries to develop and produce chemical weapons and their incentives
for using such weapons. And with the increase of ballistic missiles in the
Third World, we must now be alert to attempts by Third World countries to arm
these missiles with chemical weapons. With the combination of chemical
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weapons and ballistic missiles, no major city in the Middle East would be
immune from attack.
The proliferation of chemical weapons affects the prospects for peace and
stability in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The nations
of Iraq, Libya, Iran and Syria are of particular concern due to their use of
chemical weapons or their association with international terrorist activities.
Intelligence support is vital to the success of United States efforts to
prevent the use of chemical weapons. Our intelligence supports government
efforts to restrict the export of chemicals and of ballistic missile
technology that can be used to make chemical weapons.
The United States also participates in the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament, an effort by 40 nations to negotiate a chemical weapons ban. And
in early March, Secretary of State Baker proposed that we bring together
governments and representatives of the international chemical industry to
discuss the growing increase in international trade of the chemicals and
technology needed to produce chemical weapons.
Assessing the proliferation of chemical weapons is one of the most
difficult challenges we face in the Intelligence Community. Many of these
buildings look like ordinary fertilizer plants or pharmaceutical operations,
and indeed can be converted back and forth in a matter of 24 hours, as
conditions warrant. I believe this is one of our most important tasks, and we
will continue to provide policymakers with accurate and timely information on
this issue. I think the identification of the activity in Libya was one of
the great intelligence achievements of the last several years.
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So far, I've talked about two concerns that will continue to be at the top
of the Intelligence Community's agenda -- what's going on in the Soviet Union
and the proliferation of chemical weapons. Now, if I may, I'd like to talk a
bit about the changes that have occurred over the last 22 months -- changes
that have strengthened the Central Intelligence Agency and helped to build a
higher level of confidence in us and in our work.
At this time two years ago, the CIA was at the center of a storm that
threatened to destroy confidence in our role in American government and to
shatter the trust that is so indispensable to our mission. Throughout 1987,
we were subjected to the most searching inquiry into our part in the
Iran?Contra affair. As most of you know today, the center of responsibility
for that exercise was in the National Security Council, but we came in for
enormous heat and were handicapped by the loss of a leader able adequately to
defend us.
At the end of 1987, I sent a note to all CIA employees that said: "If ever
a time in the 40 years of the Central Intelligence Agency required the talent
and energy of those who serve, this has been that time." And a year later, I
can report that our people have responded, and we have together taken the
Agency through one of the most challenging eras in our history.
We've also improved our relations with the Congress. And we've done this
by establishing clear guidelines -- guidelines that are workable and well
understood and have been scrupulously followed.
We have established policies to ensure that our intelligence assessments
remain objective and that analysts are protected against the pressures of
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political influence. And I am particularly pleased to say that in the time I
have been at CIA, I haven't heard anyone accuse of us "cooking the books."
I'm also proud of what we have done to strengthen the review of covert
activities -- the special capability that our Presidents have enjoyed during
every Presidency in my lifetime to implement in a covert way important aspects
of our foreign policy that cannot be done overtly. Under the guidelines that
we've established, the Agency's senior managers must review all proposals for
covert action -- which only accounts for about three percent of our resources,
but about 98 percent of our problems -- the senior managers must review all
proposals that are to be forwarded to the National Security Council. And I've
asked that they apply, in addition to practical logistical tests, tests
designed to assure that each program can be done, is consistent with our
declared foreign policy, and would make sense to the American people if they
were to become aware of it.
Our relations with Congress have always involved balancing the need for a
candid relationship with the need -- indeed, my personal responsibility -- to
protect intelligence sources and methods. To help our officers balance these
demands, I have established guidelines to govern our dealings with the
Congress. And I've made it known that in working with the Congress there is
no excuse for deception.
During the Iran?Contra period of investigation, some of our officers,
although well?meaning, were trapped by the questions and did not know how to
answer and were charged with being disingenuous. Agency officials now who
brief on the Hill are authorized to demur rather than skirt the issues that
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they are not authorized to discuss. Sometimes these questions then come all
the way back up to me and I have to work them out with the chairman and
ranking minority member of the oversight committees. But we have not left the
Congress feeling that anyone in CIA has been disingenuous with them. As a
result, our relationship with the Congress will continue to improve.
It's my firm view that truth builds trust. But there are many things that
we cannot safely discuss in large forums of hundreds of staffers and committee
members. We have to work these problems out in an atmosphere in which
everything we say is true but we do not always answer everything we're asked.
An officer should not go around a question, he should simply say, "I'm not
authorized to answer that question, but I'll take it up at Headquarters." And
I think this approach is working. I've got some beautiful bruises and lost a
few battles, but we have protected our sources and our methods.
I want to briefly note two other things that I've been working on that are
of great importance to current issues. The formation of a Counterintelligence
Center at the Agency now provides a forum for coordinating the
counterintelligence efforts of the Intelligence Community to do a more
effective job in a world in which the Soviets, while talking detente, are far
more aggressive in pursuing clandestine intelligence collection in this
country and around the world than ever before. And I think we're out in front
of the curve on the narcotics issue. With the establishment of a
Counternarcotics Center in which the expertise from all the various, diverse
parts of the Intelligence Community is gathered, we can, in a centralized way,
make a major contribution to Bill Bennett and to all those who are seeking to
deal with this modern scourge.
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I would like to make one final point about our work, and it is that the
Intelligence we provide to policymakers on the Soviet Union, chemical weapons,
and many other issues is not easy to come by. In fact, it sometimes comes at
great cost to the men and women of American intelligence.
Since I was appointed Director in May 1987, I have visited many of our
intelligence facilities in this country and a great many nations around the
world. I have observed firsthand the success of our operations in managing a
myriad of complex issues -- issues so complex that we often rely upon highly
sophisticated technical systems -- satellites in the sky and so on. But, our
most important resource in the Intelligence Community has always been -- and
will continue to be -- our people. It is their creativity, their
determination, and their courage that spell the difference between success and
failure. I've found that the men and women we have been able to attract into
intelligence are not particularly concerned about fame or fortune, but they
find in this important work a way to express their highest aspirations for a
safer and a better world.
With such people we can continue to provide the intelligence that our
policymakers need, observing the rules of oversight and accountability that
both the Congress and the American people have a right to expect. This is
what you would want of us, what all Americans would want of us, and we are
doing our very best to supply it.
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REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
TOWN HALL OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
MARCH 30, 1989
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Thank you very much, Jim.* It's a pleasure for me to be back. I would
like to note that you first invited me to speak to you in 1980, just two years
after I had taken office as Director of the FBI. You've now invited me back
two years after I became Director of Central Intelligence. I don't know
whether that's an apprentice period before I'm eligible to speak to you, but I
can hardly wait to see on the next job that I hold.
Jim Miscoll and I were talking at lunch about some of the surprising
events that have been taking place, particularly in the Soviet Union. I'm
sure that most of you followed with interest the Soviet elections last Sunday
and the astonishing surge of independent expression, most of it aimed at
reform, that resulted from the elections to the new council. I think it's
part of the Gorbachev experience.
I was a little amused at the experienced public figure in Leningrad who
was defeated without opposition. I remember that when I was a young lawyer,
the biggest fear that you had was that somehow you would lose an uncontested
divorce case.
Well, there are a lot of things going on in the Soviet Union that I wish I
had to time to discuss, but that's not what I'm here to talk about today, even
though they're interesting and in some sense positive, at least with respect
to the impact of glasnost. And we could debate endlessly about the
implications of perestroika. It is producing some humor and President Reagan,
particularly, took an interest in the stories that were coming out of the
* James P. Miscoll, Executive Vice President, Bank of America Southern
California, and Chairman, Town Hall of California.
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Soviet Union on perestroika, and we used to deliver them to him when they came
back from our officers in the field. And one of these involved Gorbachev's
effort to determine the status of perestroika in some of the outlying areas of
the country. So he sent a representative to the Urals to visit the small
towns. The man went to a village and asked to see the mayor. He talked
around the subject for a while, and then he said, "What do you think about
perestroika?" And the mayor said, "We like perestroika." "Has it been good
to you?" "Yes, it's been very good to us." And the representative said,
"Tell me, do you have any television sets here in the village?" And the mayor
said, "Oh yes, we have television sets here. We have television sets, I
believe, in every hut in the hamlet. In fact, in some huts there are two or
three television sets." "Tell me about refrigerators." "Oh yes, we have
plenty of refrigerators here in this village." The representative looked the
mayor in the eye and said, "By the way, do you know who I am?" And the mayor
said, "Oh yes, I know who you are. Who else but a CIA agent would come into a
village with no electricity and ask me questions like that?"
Well, I hope that we can keep our respective responsibilities on that kind
of a note. There are some good things going on all over the world.
But I think it's ironic that at a time when the United States and the
Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate a whole class of weapons with the INF
Treaty, Third World nations are building up their own arsenals. This
afternoon, I want to talk about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons -- weapons that pose new dangers to regional stability and
to the interests of the United States. I want to discuss the proliferation of
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ballistic missiles, which are capable of delivering these weapons of mass
destruction rapidly and over great distances. And I want to discuss the role
intelligence plays in our government's efforts to stem proliferation of these
weapons and their means of delivery.
Since the first detonation of a nuclear explosive device in 1945 and the
subsequent first use of nuclear weapons in warfare that same year, the world
has lived with the perennial threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early
1960s, President Kennedy predicted that there could be 15 to 20 nuclear states
by 1975. But in 1989, as in the 1960s, there are still only five countries
which possess declared (that is, acknowledge possessing) nuclear arsenals --
the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France.
This is not altogether reassuring. While there are still only five
declared nuclear powers, there are a number of other countries that have
simply not acknowledged a nuclear weapons capability. Several countries
either possess a nuclear device or can fabricate and assemble one on short
notice, and I'm talking about in a matter of weeks. Others are developing key
nuclear technology that could later be used for a nuclear explosive, should
the decision be made to do so. And there are still other countries that are
in the early stages of nuclear technology research and development.
Clearly, nuclear technology research has a number of applications. To be
of nuclear proliferation concern to our government, a country must have
technical know-how and, in addition to that, political intent. Technical
know-how requires years of research and development. Once the technical means
are in place, a country is in a position to develop nuclear explosives -- if a
decision is made to do so.
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But intent -- that is, the political will and the desire to sacrifice what
are often limited national resources to begin developing nuclear weapons --
requires a conscious decision at the highest levels of government. Seldom do
we have hard evidence of this kind of intention. By developing a civilian
nuclear program, a country can postpone a decision to begin weapons work until
much of the basic research and development have been done.
There are a number of serious dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation.
First is the obvious danger that nuclear weapons might be used in regional
conflicts -- particularly in areas of high tension and instability such as the
Middle East and South Asia. Second, newly established nuclear powers could
enter a nuclear arms race that might be politically destabilizing and, in
itself, increase the likelihood of an outbreak of war. Third, the sheer
quantity and distribution of nuclear weapons and nuclear material across the
globe could increase the risk of theft, sabotage, and use by terrorists.
For potential proliferators the key to a weapons program is acquiring
plutonium-239 or highly enriched uranium. Sensitive and highly specialized
technologies are required to obtain enough of these materials for even the
simplest nuclear weapon. The ability to acquire and master these technologies
determines how quickly a nation can develop and produce nuclear weapons. You
can see the need for a heavy emphasis on protecting the fuel when the
technology is so readily available.
These sensitive nuclear technologies are subject to U.S. and international
export controls. But nuclear technology can still be acquired illicitly and
clandestinely through the use of front companies. falsification of export
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documents, and multiple transshipment points -- we call that diversion. It
is also possible to order equipment or material that is just below the export
control guideline but which, in the aggregate, would be subject to controls.
Attempts to control equipment and material are complicated by the fact
that many nuclear technologies are dual-use -- in other words, they can be
used for both nuclear and non-nuclear purposes. This makes it harder to
control nuclear exports and increases the difficulty of determining whether
such a weapons program may, in fact, be under way. And that, of course, is
part of our job.
In our view, nuclear nonproliferation efforts -- including treaties,
organizations, and export controls, ways to focus and spotlight the problem --
represent an indispensable element of common security for mankind.
As one part of that effort, the United States has long promoted the
peaceful use of nuclear energy because of its fuel economy and reliability, as
well as for its important applications in medicine, industry, and
agriculture. We support technical assistance programs to nations that have
subscribed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite the treaty's
growing success over 20 years -- 140 nations are now treaty parties -- a
handful of countries that are considered likely candidates for nuclear
proliferation have not yet agreed to it.
We do bring to bear on the nuclear proliferation problem numerous
intelligence assets and strategies. We begin with the premise that it takes
some years under the best of conditions -- given a reasonably sophisticated
nuclear energy and research program -- for a nation to develop a nuclear
weapons capability.
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There are both technical and political tip?offs that raise red flags for
intelligence analysts in the community who closely study the nuclear
proliferation problem. Our analysts not only look at the technical
capabilities that are under development, they also consider whether these
activities really make sense for purely civil reasons. For example, we would
be concerned if a nation began developing a difficult and expensive uranium
enrichment capability if its existing nuclear power reactors did not
require it.
Still, developing a nuclear weapons capability requires a lengthy
commitment of time and a major commitment of resources.
We cannot say the same of a nation's ability to develop a chemical and
biological weapons capability -- weapons that have been called the poor man's
atomic bomb. Twenty years ago, only five countries possessed chemical
weapons. Today, more than 20 countries may be developing these weapons, and
at least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons.
Unlike nuclear arms, chemical and biological weapons offer a cheap and
readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more
powerful foes. The technology required for chemical and biological weapons is
simpler than for nuclear weapons, and their production is harder to detect,
monitor, and control.
But like nuclear proliferation, the ability to limit proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons requires international agreements and requires
cooperation in their enforcement.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocal. During World War II -- even during the
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most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using such weapons --
weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for
future use. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too,
employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
As in the case of nuclear technologies, much of the equipment needed to
produce chemical and biological weapons is dual-use in nature. All of the
equipment needed to produce chemical warfare agents can also be used to
produce industrial chemicals, and many pharmaceutical or pesticide plants
could be converted to chemical weapons production. In appearance they are
almost indistinguishable. The equipment, materials, and expertise needed to
produce biological warfare agents all have legitimate uses in the
pharmaceutical and medical industries. With currently available technology,
biological warfare agents can be produced at such a rate that large stockpiles
are no longer necessary. Actually, any nation with a modestly developed
pharmaceutical industry can produce biological warfare agents, if it chooses.
I'm sure that you've read many accounts during the last several months
about chemical and biological weapons. You may know, too, that Congress is
very concerned about weapons proliferation. Both last month and earlier this
month, I testified before Senate committees on the subject.
The conference on chemical weapons in Paris last January contributed a
great deal toward galvanizing national and international concern. The United
States also participates in negotiations for a global chemical weapons ban at
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the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. We are one of 40 members of this
conference. Earlier this month, Secretary of State Baker proposed that we
bring together governments and representatives of the international chemical
industry to discuss the increase in international trade of the chemicals and
technology needed to produce these weapons.
As for biological weapons, the United States and 110 other countries have
signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. This convention
prohibits the production, development, and stockpiling of these weapons, but
contains no provisions for formal verification.
The Intelligence Community has and will continue to investigate the
technical and political tip?offs that raise red flags about a nation's
development, production, and incentives for using chemical and biological
weapons. We will also continue to track and report on the illegal transfer of
material for such weapons. We provided, I think, significant intelligence
support to our own policymakers in specific reference to the chemical weapons
plant in Libya. And, while it has been embarrassing to at least one country,
because of its citizens' cooperation with the development of that plant, that
focus of attention is producing progress in limiting its use and its threat.
The ability to develop a weapon and deliver it to a distant target with a
nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead significantly increases the threat to
global security. Until recently, we were primarily concerned about the
proliferation of ballistic missiles used mainly as the delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons. Now we see a threat that these missiles could he used to
deliver chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear and conventional
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weapons. We thus see that chemical weapons, particularly in tense regions of
the world, have moved on from tactical to strategic importance.
Ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads were used against
civilians last year, when Iran and Iraq launched scores of missiles at each
other's capitals in the "war of the cities." These missiles made the
Iran?Iraq war a harbinger: missiles have now become, it appears, an
acceptable means of waging war in the Third World.
By the year 2000, at least 15 developing countries will be producing their
own ballistic missiles. Although missiles being developed by these countries
are somewhat crude and inaccurate, many of them have capabilities well beyond
battlefield range and can strike in a matter of minutes. Once fired, they
cannot be called back. I think there is no city in the Middle East that is
now immune from this threat.
Ballistic missiles convey important new political and military status to
those who acquire them, so that's an incentive. Many of the countries where
these missiles are being developed are in the Middle East -- an area where we
have important security interests, and where regional tensions are highest.
Even a short?range ballistic missile provides Middle Eastern countries with a
truly strategic weapons system.
Like nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, Third World
missile programs rely on foreign technology to some degree. But much of this
critical technology is already diffused throughout the world. It's available
for other purposes or can easily be diverted. Third World countries are
extensively sharing technology, and they are increasingly pooling their
resources and technical know?how.
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Another disturbing development we have seen is the outright transfer of
complete missile systems from one country to another. This could become a way
for developing countries to leapfrog ahead of the competition, although most
countries will still seek to develop their own indigenous missile
capabilities. We can also look for Third World countries themselves to become
major exporters of missiles and missile technology -- just as we see the
threat that an oversized chemical plant in Libya can become a political and
economic brokering point for Colonel Qadhafi.
In April 1987, seven industrial nations -- the United States, Canada,
France, Britain, Italy, Japan, and West Germany -- announced the formation of
a Missile Technology Control Regime, which we call MTCR. The MTCR was
designed to limit transfers of technology and equipment that could make a
contribution to nuclear-capable missiles. While it has had some success, it
does not include some of the key players in today's missile and advanced
technology market. The agreement also doesn't reduce the incentive or ability
of Third World nations to develop ballistic missile technology on their own.
The Intelligence Community is closely following efforts by Third World
nations to acquire or develop ballistic missiles. By providing timely
Information on missile proliferation, we are supporting policymakers in their
efforts to make the MICR more effective. And we are supporting the
policymakers in their efforts to dissuade non-members of the MTCR from
marketing their missiles.
Assessing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
as well as ballistic missiles, is among the most difficult challenges that we
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in the Intelligence Community face. I believe it is also among our most
Important tasks. For, in our time, we have reached a point where agreements
to limit weapons of mass destruction are absolutely critical. And on each
nation's willingness to control and limit such weapons will depend the
security of all nations throughout the world. The intelligence that we
provide our policymakers, therefore, becomes increasingly important in
developing and verifying international agreements and in making wise decisions
in the interest of our country.
I'd like to make one final point about our work, and it is that the
intelligence we provide to the policymakers on the Soviet Union, advanced
weapons proliferation, terrorism, and many other issues is not easy to come
by. In fact, it sometimes comes at great cost to the men and women of
American intelligence. And I think of that every time I walk through the main
foyer of our headquarters building, where stars have been carved in the wall
for those who have given their lives in the line of duty.
In the nearly two years since I was appointed Director of Central
Intelligence, I have met with many of our intelligence officers, both at home
and abroad. I have observed firsthand the success of our operations in
managing a myriad of very complex issues -- issues so complex that we often
rely upon sophisticated technical systems such as satellites in the sky.
But our most important resource in the Intelligence Community has always
been -- and will continue to be -- our people. It is their creativity, their
determination, and their courage that spell the difference between success and
failure.
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With such people we can continue to provide the intelligence that
policymakers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our
national security. This is what you expect of us, what I believe all
Americans expect of us, and I can assure you we are doing our very best to
supply it to you.
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