EXPLANATION OF THE COMOR WORKING GROUP'S VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TARGETS FOR THE (SANITIZED) MISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002700030142-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 142
• Publication Date: October 30, 1963
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP92BO1090R002700030142-8
TOP SECRET vqw
NRO REVIEW COMPLETED
30 October 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Science and Technology)
Explanation of the COMOR Working Group's
Views on the Importance of Targets for
the Mission
On Monday morning, 28 October, I talked with
of OSA and was advised
that in addition to coverage of the NEFA area of the Sino-Indian
border another mission was planned to cover some transportation
routes between the NEFA area and the Ladakh area. In my own
mind, I doubted that this intermediate area warranted a special
mission. I accordingly dispatched the following telecon to the
COMOR and Working Group members:
In case of Sino-Indian border, COMOR
at last meeting (COMOR-M-208, para 3a) indicated
that except for the NEFA area further coverage
not necessary at this time. However, Chairman
advised by Operations that it wishes a confirmation
this statement takes account of fact that there are
transportation targets in area between NEFA and
Ladakh for which a mission is planned. Chairman
requested Working Group to consider this at meeting
29 October, to advise Chairman immediately as well
as principals on COMOR so that by cob on that date
Chairman will have views to transmit to Operations.
Copy// of 11
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TOP SLCRLI
2.. f OSA also advised of the
conclusion of the COMOR -ring Group on Tuesday, 29 October,
that they did not consider :.L se targets by themselves to be of
important significance so .:~.~ to!warrant a special mission.
3. My concern in this regard was that COMOR must
remain as alert as possible with regard to the coverage of COMOR
= to have failed, the first immediate question would likely have
been "Why did it go? " We need to be able to answer that question.
taken needlessly. Were that mission
targets, particularly in high risk areas, in order that risk is not
4. On the other hand, needless to say, if the Secretary
of Defense wants this area and the Director is willing to instruct
it to be obtained, the matter is out of our hands.
me . e e
1 Chairman
Committee n Overhead Reconnaissance
Copy 1 DDS&T.
2 DDS&T
3 CIA Member COMOR
4 Ch/ ?WG
5 AD/OSA
6 ID/OSA
7 FA/OSA
8 RB/OSA
9 SA/DDS&T
10 SA/DDS&T
11 SA/DDS&T
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP92BO1090R002700030142-8