NEEDS FOR KH-4 COVERAGE THROUGH 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002700030101-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 101
• Publication Date: September 20, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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'w TOP SECRET c?- L_.~.
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT : Needs for KH-4 Coverage through 1963
The attached COMOR study of the needs for KH-4 satellite coverage
during the remainder of 1963 has been placed on the agenda of the 25
September USIB meeting for Board consideration and action on the
recommendation in paragraph 7.
c ing 1xecu ive Secretary
NRO review(s)
completed.
Copy
TOP SECS -
USIB-D-410 15/17
(COMOR-D-48/45)
20 September 1963
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
J w grading and
declassification
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17.11-D-.41,15 /1
(COMDR-D-48 /45)
20 September 1963
Needs for KH-4 Coverage through 1963
.. '-/ .. v .Le V 1%. L 1
1. The COMOR has conducted a review of the amount of
satellite photography recently acquired and attempted to project on
the basis of past experience the likelihood of successes in the future
and the quantitative as well as qualitative effects of such success on
the intelligence community's exploitation and research processes. In
because the missions to date have been essentially R&D in nature. In
addition, ARGON has been excluded since its purposes are not princi-
pally the collection of intelligence information but rather information
for specific geodetic and mapping programs.
2. The COMOR has reviewed recent history on KH cover-
this review, COMOR has excluded consideration of the KH-6
age. It notes first of all that, after review of a schedule submitted by
NRO on 24 January, it requested revision of the NRO 1963 schedule to
insure one J in May and June, 2 in July, 1 in August, 2 in September,
and 1 in each of the 3 remaining months of the year. This scheduling
became the official USIB recommendation in USIB-D-41. 14/7 (COMDR-
D-48/21) of 11 February 1963. Since February there has been slippage
in the schedule. In July, Dr. McMillan submitted a revised schedule
which was confirmed on 18 July by USIB-D-41. 15/14 (COMOR-D-48/42)
of 18 July 1963. This schedule called for the first J to be fired on
29 July, the second on 30 August, the third on 17 September, the fourth
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USIB-.D-41. 15/17
(COMOR-D-48/45)
on 27 September, the fifth on 15 October, and the sixth on 24 October.
The seventh and eighth J packages were scheduled for November and
December. There has been further slippage in the program sitice that
time. There are still 6 Js: scheduled for 1963.
3. The attached Tabs A, B, and C summarize the success
we have had since June 1961 (a period of 2 1/4 years) in obtaining
coverage of the critical targets on the following major target categories:
ICBM complexes and missile R&D installations, missile production
facilities, submarine bases, anti-ballistic missile sites, long-range
airfields, nuclear energy facilities, and biological /chemical warfare
facilities. These target categories will remain, for the most part, our
major concern. If our launches are pointed toward coverage of these
installations, we will almost certainly satisfy a very great number of
our secondary target concerns and we are quite likely, through the
manner in which the photographic capability is programmed, to achieve
acquisition of the greater portion of the Soviet land mass. Our long-
range launch schedule should be based on the premise that we need
quarterly coverage, at a minimum, of at least 50% of the targets in each
category (which are the subject of the 3 tabs) and coverage of the whole
of the Sov Bloc once a year.
4. We must take into account the scheduling and slippage
'At Tab D is a tabulation of successful missions flown since August 1960
showing the unique area coverage of the Soviet rail net as (expressed
in percent` of total) as obtained by each mission.
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USIB-D-41. 15/ 17
(COMOR-D-48/45)
which is outlined in the first 2 paragraphs of this paper (which we
must assume will in some degree continue as evidenced by the fact
that within a period of one week the J 1002 slipped from 14 to 21
September and subsequently to 23 September) and that what is
scheduled cannot be definitely anticipated to be successful.
5. The circumstances which we now face are as follows:
a. That our situation in regard to coverage
has greatly changed since the spring and summer, a
period during which difficulties in KH-4 satellite collec-
tion occurred. We have not only received good coverage
in terms of quantity but we have had improvements in
quality and we have been favored by repeated coverage
of many of our highest priority targets. Thus our
intelligence base has been very materially improved
over what it was when the schedule for 1963 KH-4 mis-
sions was compiled.
b. The slippage in the schedules has now
caused a bunching of missions in a season of the year
less favorable to collection. There is a continuing
need not only to be prudent with regard to avoiding
unnecessary missions because of those costs involved
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USIB-D-41. 15/ 17
(COMOR-D-48/45)
but also to be prudent with regard to the proper
utilization of the United States Government?s limited
PI assets.
Conclusion
6. That the intelligence requirements for KH-4
coverage can be met by a reduced number of missions for the
remainder of 1963.
Recommendation
7. That NRO plan 4-day KH-4 missions at approximately
20-day intervals during the remainder of 1963.
ever
Chairman
Comae on Overhead Reconnaissance
Attachments (4)
Tabs A, B, C, and D
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