COMOR RELATIONS WITH NRO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002700030037-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: August 17, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED
17 August 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Dire.,ptor of Science and Technology
SUBJECT: COMOR Relations with NRO
1. After a thorough search of Jim Reber's files
and the COMOR minutes going as far back -as April 1962, I
am able to come up with a few instances of NRO procrastina-
tion and non-cooperation which can be documented.
2. I have also done some brain picking locally
but it has not been too lucrative. In the last analysis, Jim
is the only one I would trust to give an off-the-cuff resume
in any kind of formal '.memorandum going to the Director.
However, based on a fairly lengthy experience in COMOR,
my general feeling is that the tendencies to be jurisdictionally
jealous, to counter a request for information with a demand
for specific requirements, and to be unnecessarily upstage in
exaggerating security aspects have all plagued us since the
.beginning of our relationship. Most of these characteristics
are clearly reflected in the NRO reply to USIB on D-13.
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Comments on NRO Reply to D- 13
1. The general impression gained from reading
Dr. McMillan's 12 August memorandum, "Intelligence Require-
ments for Satellite Collection, " is that it is unnecessarily bellig-
erent, belabors jurisdictional problems, and fails to give much
guidance to COMOR in taking the next step.. Although it took 6
weeks for this answer, it did take COMOR 3 months to reply to
the NRO request for updating of the old SAMOS paper; and we
must also concede that the final COMOR paper was not a manage-
able package.
2. In our estimation, Dr. McMillan's recommendation
to the Chairman as contained in the 3d paragraph of his forwarding
memorandum is quite out of order. The penultimate sentence of
the 3d paragraph on the first page of the attachment is typical of
several instances of chip-on-the-shoulder comments which NRO
has made in the past. For some reason, it has been difficult to
grasp what NRO really wants in the way of requirements and
guidance. At which point we might observe that the NRO consultant
was invited to all of the many sessions needed to produce D- 13
and he attended the majority of them. At any point he could have
helped guide us. In any event, the statement that "... the NRO
has no recourse other than to make them" seems to be contrary
to the spirit of "interface. "
. 3.- The question of jurisdictional jealousy would not
worry us so much if confined to an occasional reminder to the
intelligence family hot to become too involved in operations.
However, it has been a recurring and quite bitter bug-a-boo over
too many months. In this one paper, it crops up in paragraph 2
on the second page where we are told not to concern ourselves
with such matters as swath width; it is emphasized again in para-
graph 3b of Tab B; again in 3d of the same tab; and once more in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Tab C which deals with SIGINT sensors.
Particularly with reference to the first instance cited above,
where we talk of swath width, method of data 'recovery, reliability,
etc; we have too often been at an impasse with NRO in trying to
explain that COMOR requires knowledge of the capability of collec-
tion systems if it hopes to task the variety of available capabilities
with appropriate targets.
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4. The paper contains, of course, a number of
substantive points with which we could disagree but these should
receive exhaustive study before they can be commented on fairly.
The anomaly of the paper is contained in Tab B. Although NRO
has protested vigorously that we have not given enough guidance,
Tab B actually contains some very helpful information. The
unfortunate feature is that all of these comments regarding uniform
criteria and outlining for us some realistic research and develop-
ment limitations could have been made known to COMORR at a much
earlier date. Conceivably, they could have been provided to
COMOR at the outset to guide it in forming its program, certainly
the NRO consultant could have ;provided such guidance as D- 13
developed. Parenthetically, it is unfortunate that NRO could not
have reserved these quite helpful comments until it arrived at.
the 2 CIA papers which were published as USIB-D-41. 14/31 and
USIB-D-41. 14/32. These were mare complete and should have
evoked better comments than could be provided in the summary,
USIB-D-41. 14/28.
5. Another example of the type of misunderstanding
which seems to have existed between NRO and COMOR is typified
by the frequent comment to the effect that certain paragraphs are
not appropriate or necessary in a requirements document. The
COMOR exercise was to produce a long-range planning paper as
well as a requirements document. For this reason and, because
it would :have to go to USIB for approval, it was essential to include
in it as much background thinking as possible without getting too
deeply into the complexities of research and development. However,
as stated above, acquaintance with present system characteristics
is essential and some knowledge of what may be over the hill is
also necessary to future planning.
6. Although this is skirting a substantive question, the
frequent use of the word, "quantitative, " is bound to raise questions.
We who have so far read the paper are unable to figure exactly what
is desired, in some instances we can make a good guess as to what.
is wanted, but in other cases the word is either used inappropriately
or it is a mystery as to why it was used. The most glaring example
of the latter is contained in Tab D wherein NRO comments on
USIB-D-41. 14/30, specifically Tabs B, C, and D. These are 3
DOD papers and they talk in terms of numbers of targets, frequency
of coverage, response time, and contain those other details which
NRO would seem to desire in every pa
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General Relationships with NRO
7. In mid-July 1962, NRO began officially to seek
interface with USIB. Anticipating USIB action on this, the
Chairman, COMOR in August orally invited NRO to send a repre-
sentative to COMOR meetings. attended
the 16 August meeting of COMOR. On 18 September 1962, USIB
approved the forwarding of COMOR documents to NRO and attend-
ance at COMOR of a consultant and observer from NRO. The
COMOR records show that beginning with the meeting of 8 September
NRO actually began receiving minutes and formal agenda beginning
with the meeting of 20 September. A member of NRO has attended
the majority of meetings since that time. In commenting further
on this attendance, it may be appropriate to note that whereas in
the Acting Chairman's memorandum to Director, National Recon-
naissance Office of 18 September 1962 it was specified that the
designee be the "Deputy for Operations, " the most consistent
has normally been the observer. He has no title an is in the
Office of the Deputy Director for Technical Services.
attendee has not enjoyed this position.
8. position may have something to do
with troubles we have experienced in getting action from NRO. He
has been extremely cooperative but has impressed us with the fact
that he has very little authority. He can never commit himself
to NRO action, even something as apparently innocuous and inte-
grally related to COMOR business as a statement on how long it
takes to manufacture an ARGON package.
9. In vindication ofl I participation and
his willingness to help, he has briefed COMOR quite frequently or
arranged for briefings of interest to the Committee. Since May,
for instance, he has provided a weekly briefing on both photo and
SIGINT satellite activity. Seemingly, he just hits a brick wall
when such policy matters as clearances and apparently even
ARGON are concerned.
10. The procrastination of NRO in providing clearances
is well known. On 21 January 1963, Mr. Reber made this a matter
of record in a memorandum to the DCI.
3. I regret to say that relations with the
(S) NRO Office, and particularly with
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inquired what of the information
have not been ood in regard to COMOR
business. NRO has and has had for quite
some time a representative on the COMOR
and has regularly received all documentation.
However, he is not in a position to adequately
serve COMOR's needs, not because he is
:incompetent, but because of limitations placed
upon him, a particular case in point is that in
July 1961 or thereabout, the Chairman was
briefed on two or three new forms of the satel-,
lite nhotogr.anhic programs. At that time
received wou d COMOR need. I responded
that they needed the same information which I
had received. It was only last Thursday, 17
January, that COMOR was 'finally briefed on a
program which is to take place on 24 February
and for which COMOR's requirements are
needed for 1 February. We intend to meet this
deadline but it is doubtful we will be able to do
as well as we might had we had more time.
Security was supposed to be the reason why
COMOR could not have been briefed. I, and
COMOR, reject this.
12. ARGON has always been a source of trouble between
COMOR and NRO. In the present 1964 schedule, NRO :has announced
that 4 ARGON packages will be available by June 1964. However,
COMOR has never been consulted as to whether there is a require-
ment for additional ARGON photography. COMOR could only
speculate that NRO regarded it as prudent to have these at hand
in case of the failure of both 9058A and 9059A. This speculation
of how long it takes to manufacture a package
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11. A prime example of NRO's high-handed method
of dealing with our cooperation occurred in the case of
COMOR?-D-61/ 1. At the request of NRO, COMDR identified
types of targets for photographic reconnaissance and broke
this down according to the need for "surveillance" or "tech-
nical intelligence. " This basic paper went to NPIC which did
an exhaustive study culminating in classification of objectives
according to the resolutipn needed to satisfy the intelligence 25X1
requirement; i. e. ,
This study was sent to NPIC 28 August 1962. At the time
COMOR began work on.D-13, 7 months later, reference was
made to this paper. NRO said it had read it but had paid it no
particular heed "because it had not come from USIB. "
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and a request to the NRO consultant that COMOR be advised on
this. This request has been denied.
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