NEED FOR CORONA SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002700030005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 30, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED 30 August 1963
a. Is the presently approved CORONA
satellite reconnaissance schedule for the remainder
of the calendar year 1963 in excess of our requirements?
b. Is the amount of CORONA photography being
acquired, along with all other exotic photographic recon-
naissance products, of such a magnitude that it exceeds
the capabilities of the exploitation assets at NPIC or
other governmental photo-processing centers? Does
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Need for CORONA Satellite Photography
1. This memorandum is for the information of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
2. Based on the reports of the Deputy Directors'
meeting on :Monday, 26 August, and on the discussion initiated
by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence at the pre-USIB
briefing on 28 August, it appears to me that there are 2 questions
which, though related, must be examined separately. These
problems are:
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etimes result in the intelligence analyst
receiving an inferior product; and, by and large, is
there excessive repetition in the photography and too
little that is new and of real value?
3. COMOR, on 27 August, held a special meeting in
response to a request to consider the first question. It concluded
that, taking into account the carefully defined needs of the Board
during the spring and summer of 1963, although the slippage in the
CORONA schedule would result in more coverage at the end of this
year than planned, the results to date have been fortunately fruitful
but by no means exhaustive. It was felt that at this time it would
not be wise to alter the remaining schedule for 1963. However,
the discussion and consideration of the data assembled at short
notice for this meeting showed clearly to the Committee that it would
be helpful to the Board if the COMOR continued its study and submitted
to the Board its findings and recommendations on the schedule by
about the first of October 1963. This timing in presentation is crucial
because a decision shortly after that date must be made on whether
the two now scheduled CORONA shots in November and the one in
December need in fact be used.
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It is already well-established practice with regard
to exotic manned and satellite reconnaissance that the Board through
COMOR and its Photo Working Group carefully examines the results
of each mission in terms of the requirements programmed into that
mission in order to fruitfully target subsequent missions. The close
working relationship of the intelligence analysts with the Photo
Working Group is the most certain method of obtaining the infor-
mation desired and assessing at any time whether we have reached
a point where additional reconnaissance is unnecessary. (A case
in point where change has been recommended is the Board's sub-
stitution of a CORONA mission for an ARGON in November 1962.)
This mechanism operated before the Cuban crisis, for all the Far
Eastern reconnaissance, for every satellite photo mission and, in
different form, has operated since the summer of 1956 with regard
to the U-2 program over Russia. In addition because of the opera-
tional and political hazards in both exotic manned and satellite photo
reconnaissance, because of the R&D difficulties met in developing
satellite reconnaissance on an assured basis, and finally because
of the extensive costs involved, the United States Intelligence Board
has interested itself in the validity of the reconnaissance and the timing
of planning and conducting operations.
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5. With regard to the second question noted in para Zb
above, COMOR has. continually over the years )and especially as a
result of the collection over Cuba, been concerned about the effects
of collection on the available PI resources and whether they will be
able effectively to exploit the material. It must be recognized,
however, that the responsibility for the management and coordination
of the photo exploitation assets of the Government have not been a
responsibility of COMOR except to advise with regard to the prelim-
inary reporting when the missions have returned. However, because
of the information on this subject which has been brought to light in
COMOR meetings, I personally do not believe that the examination
of CORONA material is at this juncture suffering in terms. of
scrutinizing all film to insure that all critical elements have been
discerned. This is not to say that because of the vagaries incident
to photo interpretation some critical activity might not be missed or
later discovered. Furthermore, the needs of the United States
Government which can be answered through the exploitation. of
satellite photography are multitudinous and whereas some -subjects
are of common concern and we profit by having different eyes examining
the photography in different governmental units, there are many
targets which are examined to meet; the unique and specialized needs
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of the various agencies. Furthermore, and based primarily on
the experience of the Photo Working Group of COMOR, it seems
that the intelligence analyst is far from glutted and in expressing
his requirements specifies the importance of photographic cover-
age. We cannot judge whether the embarrassment of riches had
had an adverse influence on the estimate process nor can we
estimate the factor of cost versus value.
6. Before this latter subject were to be raised at the
Board for discussion, I would strongly urge that the Executive
Director call together at a minimum the DDI, the Director, NPIC,
and the DDS&T as well as any of their concerned representatives
for a briefing from the Director, NPIC. Subsequently, there should
be a careful definition of what precisely is the problem and. the most
effective method of coping with it. At that point it may be desirable
to raise the problem with the Board.
Chairman
Copy 1 Acting DCI
2 :ExDir/DCI
3 :DDI
4 :D / NPIC
5 DDS&T
6 AD / OSA
7 :DDI
This document contains PorVMD $ A ?_5 r~
&T e
referring to Project C~ ON
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