REVIEW OF THE PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE CONTROL OF SANITIZATION AND DOWNGRADING OF SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002500030128-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 128
• Publication Date: September 6, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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IBSEC-PR /4
6 September 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the United States Intelligence Board
Review of the Procedures and Standards Within
the Intelligence Community for the Control of
Sanitization and Downgrading of Sensitive Intel-
ligence
Background and Discussion of Problem
1. The current study was presented to the Security Committee
USIB expressed its concern as to the effectiveness of sanitization and
downgrading procedures and directed that the Security Committee should
review the procedures within the intelligence community for the control
of sanitization and downgrading of sensitive intelligence. Since it was
felt that this problem invblves other community systems for the protec-
tion of sensitive intelligence, the review was extended and specifically
25X1 includes COMINT, T, K-HI systems of compartmentation.
Coordination was effected as appropriate with the SIGINT, COMOR
and GMAIC Committees.
25X1 2. The COMINT, T, K-H systems of compartrnenta-
tion vary as to delegated responsibilities and as to procedures followed.
Group 1
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Under DCID 6/3, the basic authority for the handling of COMINT, in-
cluding sanitization and downgrading, is the responsibility of each agency.
Consequently, the procedures for sanitization and downgrading among
the departments and agencies vary. These variances will be discussed
in detail later below. Procedures for the control and use of T and K-H
information are promulgated by COMOR and are uniforml1y implemented
throughout the community. COMOR exercises centralized control in
many instances.
3. A basic factor in considering compartmented intelligence is
that systems of compartmentation protect extremely sensitive intelligence
sources and methods which are critical to the national security posture
of the United States. In many instances, such systems produce the only
intelligence concerning large areas of the Soviet and satellite countries
which are highly controlled and inaccessible for intelligence exploitation.
The collection capabilities are many and include practically all fields
of intelligence. The Committee compiled certain figures set forth in
an attachment to this report which are illustrative of the volume of
material involved. Highly complex and unique collection facilities and
techniques inbeing or planned for future use are involved which require
considerable funds to develop and maintain. These must be afforded
continuous and absolute protection. This extreme concern is reflected
in Presidential Directives which set forth stringent requirements to
ensure the protection of such sources and methods. Systems of com-
partmentation, therefore, involve two vital considerations and require-
ments,. one being maximum source protection and the other being optimum
intelligence exploitation of the information collected. It is recognized that
in usual circumstances, the exploitation of information may take precedence
over the former; however, this is the exception and a decision to so act
must be weighed against the risks upon the continued security and pro-
ductivity of the sources and methods involved.
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determined by need-to-know and classification. A security assessment of
sanitization procedures would be measured against this basic premise.
However, before an assessment can be made of the systems of compart-
mentation under review, certain factors should be considered. The methods
of collection in the COMINT, T and K-H systems are so highly technical
that each method is unique. Certain source data, for example data re-
lating to the monitoring of Soviet missiles, rockets and satellites, in-
volves necessary technical compilations and as a result is self-revealing
of the methods of collection. In some instances, this revealing data may
not be readily identifiable as such when material is processed for sanitiza-
tion. In many instances, this data is an inherent and integral part of the
substantive intelligence and cannot be deleted without affecting the essence
of the substantive information. Of particular concern, these unique collec-
tion devices are continually collecting vast quantities of intelligence which
are beyond the capabilities of normal nontechnical intelligence methods
and sources of collection. Further, this vast information includes coverage
of broad denied areas within the Soviet Union and elsewhere about which
little, if any, intelligence is received from normal intelligence collection
facilities. In this regard, the sanitization of COMINT, T and K-H material
involves knowledge and understanding of the highly technical factors em-
ployed in the original collection process for this material. These highly
technical factors make it difficult to devise effective and plausible cover
stories that can be carried forward with the sanitized materials. Further,
such sources are "impersonal" and do not enjoy the high degree of
personal concern and understanding employed in the protection of "live
sources." In addition, there appears to be a definite limitation on the
number of plausible cover explanations or attributions available, including
the attribution of live sources, that can be utilized for the sanitization of
COMINT, T and K-H materials. Aggravating the problem is the fact that
sources and methods utilized in COMINT, T and K-H systems have been
openly identified or alluded to in the press. In certain instances, this re-
sulted from official Government action. Recognizing these basic factors,
the problem is further aggravated when it is considered that the tremendous
volume of COMINT, T and K-H information disseminated is continually
subject to sanitization by the USIB member agencies to meet specific
individual requirements. In many instances, this action can be taken
unilaterally.
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T and K-H information which were not originally intended or contemplated.
The Security Committee recognizes that the problems of sanitization of T
and K-H information are matters, for the COMOR Committee to resolve.
However, a detailed and extensive review of T and K-H sanitization pro-
cedures is considered necessary. Particular emphasis should be given to
targetting uses and requirements.
Communications Intelligence
7. The procedures for sanitization of COMINT in DCID 6/3 are
in vague terminology, permitting the utilization of COMINT in intelligence
studies and estimates "provided that the statements contained in them are
so generalized that they cannot be traced to their COMINT origin. " This
vague language has resulted in varying procedures within the community.
The Committee has found that in certain agencies there are focal points
established to authorize and record sanitizations; however, in other
agencies there have been complete delegations. and centralized control no
longer exists. It is difficult to determine what information has been sani-
tized in such agencies since central records are not maintained. The
Committee also found that markings as set forth in DCID 1/7 are not utilized
on sanitized material nor does such material bear any restrictive controls
limiting its dissemination and use to the purpose originally intended. It
is submitted that in recognition of those factors previously mentioned in
paragraph 4. above, which preclude absolute source protection in every
instance, that certain minimal procedures should be established and
uniformly implemented within the community. The Committee considers
that extensive data relative to source collection should wherever possible
not be included in sanitized material. If such data is considered an integral
part of the substantive data and must be disseminated, the material should
be appropriately marked to ensure it is not given broad dissemination. If
sanitized material is to be given broad dissemination, it should be reviewed
carefully to ensure absolute source protection rather than reliance upon
the mechanical application of prescribed sanitization procedures.
8. In considering the inherent security problems regarding source
protection, the Security Committee suggests that the SIGINT Committee
consider the possibility of separating highly technical and revealing COMINT
source and method data into a separate report apart from the substantive
information derived from such collection. The separation of source data
into a separate report would be the responsibility of NSA, the originating
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agency, and not the responsibility of receiving agencies since the latter
would result in numerous and varying reports on the same information.
The Security Committee has found that for the most part, recipients of
intelligence reports such as the CIB, and the DIA Summary, both within
and outside the intelligence community, are concerned primarily with the
substantive information involved and not with the technical manner of col-
lection. To assist in ensuring source protection, it is felt that such
recipients should be denied highly technical and revealing COMINT source
and method techniques unless it is clearly shown that a strict need-to-know
exists for such data. The separate report which includes technical and
revealing COMINT source data would be disseminated only to those analysts
who have need for the information. The Committee is aware that a similar
proposal was proposed by NSA in recent years (USIB-C-13.5/70 of 12 April
1962) but was not concurred in by the Board. It is felt, however, that
since serious unauthorized disclosures involving highly sensitive COMINT
sources and methods of collection have continued to occur it would be an
opportune time for the proposal for the separation of source data to be
reconsidered by the Board. It is recognized that any such proposal would
have to ensure that all intelligence personnel requiring source data are
furnished such information. The responsibility, therefore, for the dis-
semination of separate reports containing source data would be placed
upon an appropriate component within each receiving :agency to which
both the substantive publications and the separate source data publications
would be disseminated.
special controls.
9. Since the beginning of this inquiry, the Committee has found that
some of the difficulties result from confusing and often overlapping defini-
tions. The word "downgrading" under Executive Order 10501 describes
the simple act of lowering the level of classification on an item of classified
information. In the context of Executive Order 10501, it has no connotation
of inducing or reducing handling procedures or controls. However, down-
grading is defined in the 19 February 1962 Talent Sanitization Manual as
follows: "Downgrading: The release of Talent controlled materials and in-
formation from the Talent Control System in their original form and
substance at a lower classification and with Talent Control System identifica-
tion removed. t? By this definition the emphasis is switched from lowering
the classification to taking the item out of a system of special handling and
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The Com-
mittee also has found, as previously indicated above for the T and K-H.
systems, that the term "sanitization" is being used to describe certain
prescribed procedures of editing which, however, do not absolutely
conceal sources and methods. The Committee strongly affirms that the
word "sanitization" should be applied strictly to describe only those pro-
cedures which absolutely ensure source concealment. To ensure uniform
understanding and effective security, particularly in those instances
wherein information from more than one system of compartmentation is
included in one document, consideration should be given to the adoption
of uniform definitions within the intelligence community.
10. The COMOR Committee review its current sanitization pro-
cedures, particularly for targetting uses, and assess the concealment of
sources and methods. For this review, the following suggestions are
offered:
a. Sanitization procedures effected by COMOR
should produce and carry forward adequate cover
stories.
b. Consideration should be given to the preparation
of targetting and similar publications to be controlled
within the T and K-H systems and disseminated only to
appropriately cleared personnel.
c. If it is determined that current procedures of
editing for including T and K-H information in targetting9
mapping and similar publications do not conceal T and
K-H sources, but that in order to meet vital targetting
or other requirements the publications cannot be re-
stricted within the T and K-H systems, then the Security
Committee would recommend the following:
(1) The dissemination and use of targetting and
similar publications containing T and K-H informa-
tion be severely limited to those having a predetermined
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need-to-know by virtue of involvement in or support
of target destruction missions.
(2) Targetting and similar publications should
be prepared and disseminated to those persons having
an established need-to-know and concern with given
geographical areas and not be prepared and dis-
seminated on a world-wide basis to all recipients.
.(3) T and K-H information should not be
automatically included in targetting and similar
publications but rather should be included only to
meet specific requirements concerning a previously
identified strike target.
(4) The risks to sources and methods involved
in preparing targetting, mapping and similar publica-
tions should be carefully assessed at the highest levels
and reviewed periodically.
(5) It should be clearly recognized that the
edited T and K-H information currently included
in targetting, mapping and similar publications is
not sanitized and this should be clearly stated in
appropriate COMOR manuals.
11. The SIGINT Committee consider the issuance of certain mini-
mum uniform procedures for the sanitization of communications intel-
ligence and control of sanitized material. The following are suggested:
a. The SIGINT Committee consider for the Board
the possibility of separating highly technical source data
into a separate report apart from the substantive infor-
mation derived from such collection. The separation of
such data would be the responsibility of NSA and each
agency would receive both the substantive publications
and separate source data publications.
b. Extensive facts and figures relating to source
data should not be included in the sanitized material.
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If such data, of absolute necessity, must be included,
the material should bear the marking "CONTROLLED
DISSEM" which will confine the document to the intel-
ligence community and enhance source protection.
c. If sanitization is for a specific use and not
intended for broad dissemination, then an appropriate
caveat or control should be placed upon the sanitized
material to ensure that it is disseminated and used only
for that intended purpose.
d. Material which is sanitized for broad dissemina-
tion and use based upon classification and need-to-know
alone should be closely reviewed to ensure that sanitiza-
tion procedures followed absolutely ensure source pro-
tection.
e. Focal points should be established within each
department and agency to authorize and record the
sanitization and downgrading of COMINT. Information
recorded would include the name of the requester, the
purpose of the sanitization or downgrading; the document
in which the sanitized material is to be included; and a
copy of the sanitization.
12. The following definitions be uniformly adopted by the intel-
ligence community and utilized in appropriate sanitization and similar
manuals.
The effective concealment in classified material
of intelligence sources and methods through editing,
attribution, altering and other techniques.
The removal of material from a system of compart-
mentation for sensitive intelligence.
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DOWNGRADING:
The change of existing classification to a lower level
of classification.
DEC LASS IFICATION:
The complete removal of classification. (This
includes removal from a system of control).
Attachment:
Figures approximating the flow of Special Intelligence, T and K-H
information within the intelligence community
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