INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R000300020023-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 14, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 .? CIA-1461;92B01090R0003000200214 October 1952
INFOFP-IATV14
. ...?
INDOCHINA
Traamortation
Cveriand and inland water routes from China
1. a:ailroads
What is the maximum capacity for two-watraffic; ma.ximira.0,amissabla
axle loading' maximum gross and net trainatammeaaan &vents of line.,liza ?
liaaray, tasakasaita eatimated_aonnaaaaaa presertlyamayimabz.railroada_traansahiameaant
facilities at transfer pints3 neu construction and rstair activities._ statue
of dismantled rail seoents on the lines:
a. Kuraninsallenntze-Laolray-Yea
Nannin a-Pinasiana-Langson-Hanoi?
ca rtatus of reported railroada_Nannina-Liu Chow reninsula
precise details of the conditions limitina loads on these lines are not
known, nor is there sufficient information to assess the tonnages presently
moving.
As regards new construction and repair, the line from Pisechai to ',stoker
is apparently not being restored, the Hanoi Langson railway is inoperative and
portions of the roadbed are being used as a highway, and the Nanning-Pingsiang
line is reportedly being extended to Chennankuan. No details are available on
the progress of construction on the nanning-Liu-Chow peninsula railway.
2,, Inland Waterway
What is theaaapiara limitation of nalUation for shallow draft vessels ?
at low yater? ut_h_leilz.,41.6r ,Jarhat R.R.aLhaeapaavaatalataaaaumjaasa andtor_Lasita ea.21_` voacelea
...mm,..h..s.V_Iallitmwered and other, aptratingamaa aeaaeas_iverea Ars craft available
to increase this traffic? If .so, to what, extent?
a, The Red River is navigable up to Laokay at high water by vessels
drawing 7 feet. Beyond this point, numerous rapids obstruct navigation and the
maximum draft is reduced to 2 feet,
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b. The Clear River
which forms the Red saver from the north at
?
Viet Trio can be navigated up to 'Even Quang? a distance of 62 WI es, by
vessels drawing about 2 feet. During the high water season this draft is
increased to 5 feet; above Tuyen nnang? sampans can then navigate an ad_1-
tional 95 !dies.
c. Wier reaches of Iest :iiver which flows into China. 11.
tary 32 the 7;oot River, the Yu River, flows through caobang in Indochina.
Fri Caebang dosaistrean, this river is navigable by shallow draft native
d. On-, Doc River (Trans Ilassac). According to availa,de sources 9
!Is river is approxir2n.tely _r feet ,leen and 60 feet wide as far as Ca ran
and its mercer with the Cal Tau liver near Khaph An. Thron.--h its junction
with vary .)us connecting cannl., t furnishes aeoo:. s to a lar;-e portion of
the Trans-Dassac region, and by the caral from _.,mari Lo to Phun Iliep (8 feet
L',,en and 1.30 feet wide) at Ca 7a:t L is connedted r.-ith the Bas:ac :Ziver,, The
c.nac*. route of the upper river :17;nr confused by the connect:ens the
rintwork of canals in the area., To the northwest, a connection at Tan Lei links
the Canh:ia River, which 5n turn is connected by a canc:L route to the
Bay of ..iach aa (minimum depth 5 feet, width 60 feet). To the amith? the Ong
Doc is connected by t everal r vrr systems, including the Bay goar, Cua Lou,
!Junin-- Keo, Garth liao, and litr Minh rivers the canal from Ca ?:au to Bac Ll_eu
feet doep? (.0 feet wide). All the figures given are :or low water, and ace
dated 19L50 ni,-,11 rater fi4-nres Env not available. This r-1.,)n is nresently
held hy the Viet rinh.
.2-
apt Ar, MINI .01.
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we aw we Want ?-le
There is no information regarding the numbers or sizes of craft
available on the above rivers.? but numerous sloa.11 vessels are used in these
areas?)
3. Atta:LtzAts.....samatZ_handlir hoeled traffic and tilose map r.,utep
limited to human and animal li orticulaFl,7 the following: Ilanoi-Laoliva
lianoi-Langson-Dengdang-caobangi Sept .Par_42desn_91anrson-Nanninzd
.5. New E92-2./EL...nts2a2truction activitiess
Information concornin.: repair and construction activities
of these routes is not available,,
b. Estimr.ted tonnages nrepentl over ?tAc2LT-vi.. routes and
m m cci
notimoted maximum tonnages that couLl be moved over the
p incipal routes from China into Indochina are a. follows:
The eastern grourl of mads:
Caobang-Ilanoi
Langson-Ranoi
Honcay-Hanoi 1500 short tons/day
The western j'oop of roads:
Laokay4lanoi
Hagiang-Hanoi 450 short tons/day
estimate of tonna:Tps presently moving over thoE:e routes is
not available,
a, -OverSeas 'loutes from China
'ahat are the nrincl,z1 c os routes utilized b the nine se Cormanistc
to ferrj_. from Hainan Island and South China to the Viet Minh-
controlled areas of Vietnam? :'otinated tomages
these routes?? L3stim:ted
r.evs.ral overseas motes have bt.en used for ferrying suppliol. from China
to Viet !`inh-oontrolled areasc. rIorrever all liave allinished in imnortence due
3 4?-t..-C aj-T
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gas sze NEW ???
to improved land supply routes between China end the Viet rinh territories.
The air and navel blockade innosed by. the French elon, tee coast of Indochina
has also increased the reLtive dancer of the see r-utes? It is believed
that practically all of the material reaching Viet Vinh forces from China is
noa ohinpeC by land routes.
The principal sea routes are:
1. From nong Kone.,, Macao, or Communist Chinese ports to Thailand
by legitieate shipein: and thence from Thai ports clarelestinely by
small craft alone the coast to the nearest point on the coast of
Cambodia; thence along to the inland waterways of Cochin China to
final destinations. This eoute is not nor believed to carry any
considerable traffic due to the restrictions of the Thai govern-
ment as well as to the blockading efforts of the French are!. the
Associated Aatec.
2. From the Canton area to the Tonin Delta region, with possible
relays at such points as Fort Bayard and Pei-hai (Pak-ehoi). From
Tung-hsing (Tungehing) cargoes are moved in short night stages
close to the coast, French air reconnaissance tends to restrict
the size of the vessels engaged in the traf:ic alone the Indo-
chinese coast to small craft easily hidden or beached and camou-
flaged durin the da time. The coast route also probabL, involves
goods carried via land raites in China to Pak-hoi, rung-heing and
Pencay and then transshinped elong the coast by the Viet tanh in
small craft, This reAe probably enulx: c eost ceelted Lc the
sueuly cL seall Viet Iginh unite o7cret1n, alon,; the Iraterwa,ys of
the laver Tonkin rielta
3. From the Cantonaeca to the Tonin and Annam coasts, via Eeinan
and Wei-Chou Island, by motorized cea-o5elg junks OP fast vedettes
-4-
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vir. coo.
across the Gulf of Tonkin. 'Yulin is the most frequently mentioned of
thie Tiainan ports.
13 From the Tonkin arna to Southern Viet Uinh-held areas: - Sumo
material arriviny: both by the eorementioned routes .and by inler_d
routes is carried by combinations of coastal sea routes and inland
routes in stages alon,7 the coast of Annam. French naval d air
surVd.11.ance?lar:7oly restricts the use of those ro tes to short
a:lit hauls
5. Frora Canton to Hainan to Parsee]. Islands to Central ;imam coast
is one route by which some small amount of traffic ma:: 01;crir 0
No est:mate is available of the tonna;es moving along the
vcrIo s sea rouLes0 variety of tyocs of small craft ene in
the traffic but Prone' naval and air surveillance greatly restricts
its volume. Any estfnate of the capacity of these router, would have
to take into cnnsiderati >n the ei'fectiveness of the blockade inoosed
acainst it as well as the relative advantages attached to its used
ion' as the 7iet rinh are able to transoort most of ..:.he traffic
from China by less d.ancer.ous land routes they aro unlikely to risk
losing a considerable i.Jercenta7e of the goods carried on hazardous
sea ro;?tes. Should the French succeed in interruptin:-; a portion of
the traffic handled by the preeently-developod land rry)tes; increasea
traffic at sea co Lid lrobably be expected.
7 'i /I V Cl
000 00 00 .0 00 fir
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SEG' RET
C. Airfields
1. That is ttlmsent state of Franco-Vietnamese and net Minh
airfields? What are thLIEWALIEKL24aLdjbearingJamaties of these
airfields? What are the fuel storage facilities and what is the extent
of fuel stastallea_21121LEE!_the maintenanceandraqlsslagalt
ao
France.Vietnsmese Airfields --
Name
Class *
Coordinates
Users
?Ia.710.11?1?1111?11111.
Ban tle Thuot A/F
5
12-40N
FAF
108.03E
Battambang A/F
5
13.06N
FAF and
103-15E
Civil Air-
lines
Bien Ilea A/F
4
10-57N
FAF
106-49E
Cap St Jacques A/F
5
10-22N
FAF and
107-051
Civil Air-
lines
Fir.,In(Dalat/Lien
4
11-4511
FAF and
Khang) A/F
108-23E
French Civil
Airlines
Dong Hoi A/F
5
17-30N
FAF and
106-35E
Civil Air-
lines
Do Son A/F
5
20-43N
FAF
106-47L
Haiphong/Cat Bal A/F
20,-49U
FAF and
106-43E
Civil Air
lines
Haiphong/Kienan A/F
4
20-4911
FAF
106-3=
Hanoi/Bac !!ai
21-00U
FAF and
105-50E
French. Civil
Airlines
Description
40425 ft natural surface runway0
welt-bearing, 26,000 lbs; drum
fuel storage.
Good 3,930 ft. temporary runway,
weight-bearing, C-0.
5.000 ft temporary runway, weight,
bearing, light bombers; taxiways;
parking aprons; hangars; Major rem
pairs; drum fuel storage.
3,930 ft_ temporary runway, weight
bearing. 26,000 lbs.; taxSways,
14,870 ft, permanent runway, weight
bearing, C-47; taxiway, parking
apron; limited radio; limited drum
storage,
Good 3.000'ft. temporary runway.,
3.000 lb, weight-bearing capacity,
30640 ft, new permanent runway,
weight-bearing, light transport;
taxiways; parking apron; 4 fuel
tanks of 20.000 gal. capacity each
5,700 ft, good, permanent run-
way being extended to 7.396 ft.
weight-bearing, c-54 and jet
fighters; radio and. limited light-
ing; hangar; 116)3,000 gal, fuel
tank storage, largest a/f storage
in Indochina. minor repairs
New airfield; 5,900 ft permanent
runway. weight-bearing, 60,000
lbs.; taxiways; revetments; park.-
int; apron.
3,940 ft permanent runway, weight-
bearin, C-47; taxiways; parking
aprons; hangars; limited radio;
drum fuel storage; repair facili-
ties.
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* Claes 1
Permanent runways 79000 feet or more in length able to sustain
medium bomber operations
Class 2
Permanent runways 69000 feet or more in length able to sustain
limited medium bomber operations.
Claes 3
Runways 5,000 feet or more in length potentially able to sustain
medium-bomber operations.
Claes 14,
Runways 14000 feet or more in longth which can be used by light
transports and conventional fightersa
Class 5
Runways 2,000 feet or more in length; airfield operational or
potentially importanta
- 6a -
9.41;-C-n,E1
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asne?C
en Franco-Vietnamese Airfields (cont'd)
Name
Hanoi Lam A/F
Hue A/F
Class
4
14,
Coordinates Users
21-03N
I.05-53E
16-214N
lo7-41E
Kompong Chia
A/F 4
12-14N
104-39E
Krakor A/F
4
12-32N
104-07E
Luang Prabang A/F
5
19-53N
102-03E
Nha Trang A/F
3
12-114N
109-11E
Oudeng
5
11-52N
1014 42E
Pakse A/F
15-00N
105-47E
Phan Thiet A/F
5
10-54N
1.0a-OhL
Phnom Penh AIF
3
11-33N
104-51E
Savannakhet A/F
5
16-40N
105-00E
Siem deap A/F
14
I3-2 5N
103-49E
Son Trang A/F
9-35'N
105-57E
FAF? French;
and U. S.
Civil Air-
lines
FAF and
Civil Air-
lines
FAY`
FAF
FAF
FY and
French Civil
Airlines
FAF
FAF
(limited use)
FAF
FAF and
French Civil
Airlines
FAF and
French Civil
Airlines
Limited FAF
and Civil
Airlines
Civil Air-
lines and
limited FAF
C- T
Descrintiln
4220 ft permanent runwaYI
weiaht-bearina, J-54; taxiway;
radio; linhtinn; drum fuel sten.
age; minor repairs; hanaars.
4,260 ft., temporary runway,
weight-bearing; C-47; radio facil-
ities; limited dram fuel storage;
hangar.
5p425 ft temporary runway,
mninht-bearinn, c-54 in dry season
parking apron.
50300 ft., temporary- runway,
weight-bearing, 901000 lbs. in dry
weather; taxiways.
3420 ft, natural-surface runway,
weight-bearing, C-47 in dry
weather,
2. permanent runwaye? 5,920 ft, and
3,810 ft len, acith 40;000 lb.,
weight-bearing capacity; taxiways;
parking apron; radio; limited
lighting; PoL in underground tanks
major FAF repair.
5,900 ft, temporary runway, weight.
bearing, C-54; taxiway; emergency
field,
14,000 fta temporary runway, weight
bearing, C-54; limited radio;
minor repair,
3,230 ft, temporary runway,
weight-bearing; 0-47.
2 permanent runways, 5,300 ft. and
34C80 ft, long, with weight-
bearing capacities of 60;000 lbs,
and 30,000 lbs., respectively;
taxiways; parking apron a; radio;
limited lighting; POL; one of best
fields in Indochina.
Two 3,930 ft n permanent runways?
weight-bearing, C-147; taxiways,
parking aprons; limited radio;
POL available.
51460 ft. temporanyrau
weight-bearing; 0-470
Good 3,930 ft., permanent runway,
weight-bearing, 0-47; limited
drum fuel storage,
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. eame
?Tan Lon Nhut A/F
Franco-Vietnamese Airfields (cont d)
Class
Orrr?Oralia r?rrarrrrmr,
3
Coordinates
10-48N
106-39E
Users
FAF, domes-
tic, and
foreign air-
lines
Descrirteon
2 permanent runviys, ft,
and 5,250 ft, lona, with 93,000
lb weight-bearine capacity; taxi
ways; parking apron) radie and
lighting; 12 ,hangars; 23,000 gal.
.of fuel in surface tanks; -.5 under
ground tanks; 5,000 galL, oil stor
age; 500,000 gal, fuelstorage ih
Tehe ?one A/F
Thu. dau Met A/F
Teurane A/F
4
3
16443N
106-11E
10-59N
106-42E
16-02
108-12E
FAF
FAF (eamer-
eence uee
only)
FAF and
Civil Air-
lines
aalgon; major repairs; best and
most important field in indocLiaa
2 temporary runways, 4,090 ft., an,
3,300 ft0 long, with 23,000 ih.
weight-bearing capacity.
5,240 ft0 permanent runway/
weight-bearing, 60,000 lbs.
3 permanent runways, 6,820 ft.,
5,900 ft., and 23140 ?t long,
each with 30,000 lbs, weight-
bearing capacity; taxiway; park-.
Vientiane A/F
5
17-5')N
102-33E
FAF
b.
Viet Minh Airfields _-
raeae
Class
Coordinates
Controlled Bx
Baa Kan A/F
5
22-03N
Viet ;Iinh
105-50h
Cae eerie A/F
5
22-411.
Viet ninh
1064/IL
Ha Ciarie
5
22-52N
Viet Minh
104-56E
Lang on A/F
5
21-50N
Viet :linh
106-46h
Lee Kay 'A/F
5
22-29N
Viet Minh
l03-53E
Thai Ncuyen A/F
21-37N
Viet ainh
105-50E
That Ke reft
22-14N
Viet Minh
.
106.29E
Thee A/F
21-07N
Viet nina
105-26L
Vie:a f. ,'l'
10-44N
Viet Minh
l0-L.0
-8.
.0. NM NEIN NM MP IN.
ing area; limited radio and
liehting; tank and drum fuel
storage; drum oil storage; hangar;
minor repairs: best airfield in
central Indochina.
2 excellent temporary rurmays0
3,670 ft. and 2,350 ft. long, witi
C-54 weight-bearing capacity in
dey scaeon; taxiways, radio;
ii ted fuel and oil drum storage,
hangar; minor repair.'
Latalal
2,7e0 ft0 natural-surface runway;
weight-bearing, light aircraft.
2,400 ft natural-surface runway4
we,-ht-bearing? 23,000 lbs.
2,600 ft0 natural-surface runway,.
weieltabearing? light aircraft.
34600 ft,. natural-surface runway,
weight.-bearing , C-47; presently
cratered.
2,330 ft,. natural-surface runways
weight-bearing, C-47.
2,390 ftc, natural-surface runway.
2,400 fte, natural-surface runway,
weight-bearing capacity, 23,000
41160 ft, laterite runway; taxi-
ways, parking areas.
5,100 it. laterite runway; par-
tially destroyed; taxiways revet-
ments,
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2. What is the esent state of Chinese Communist airfields within
operstionsil_distiume of the Tonkin Delta? What are,,..ftlitedils.1011.22ad
bearin capacities of these airfields? What are the fuel storage facilities
and what is the extent of fuel stoe What are the maintenance and
1:2211E-Etaillaell?
Name
Chan-i A/17
Class
Cheng-kung A/F 2
(Ian-chow;
Coordinates
25-3E;N
103-47E
24-51N
102-WE
IA-h-tanj. A/F
3
25-13"
110-10L
run-ming A/r
2
25-ow
lo2-45-
Li-chta-tsun A/F
3
25-11N
110-19E
Lu-hang A/F
2
25-00V
103-3A
Liu-Chou AA'
2
2h47N
109-23E
Lo-ping A/F
24-52H
1014-21E
Users
CCAF CCAF
(Chinese Com-
mmnist Air Force)
Tomer B-29
field; not cur-
.rently in use.
CCAF
CCAF
CCAF and
Civil Air-
- lines
Not used
since aorld
War II
Former B-29
field, not
currently in
use.
CCAF
In use by
0-54 trans-
ports during
World.?i1.61r IL
Not currently
in use.
C'11
1.0, 'AM I. Ma! ZOli
pescriptiaa
5s,200 ft permanent runway,
weight-bearin, B-214 taxiw4Ys
parkin aprons; fuel-store;
limited radio; hangars,
6,530 ft, permanent rnwdy,
might-bring, taxiway87
parking ;ipron_
4,900 ft, temporary xixiluvo
atrer:St, underground
gasoline pumps- reported along
T4AZ :dyer opposite atrfield.
61560 ft permanent runway, easal
rehabilitated for use by jet
fighteraircraft; parking aprons;
limited radio; drum fuel storage.
Two 7,200 ft, permanent runways,
weightbearing? B-29 and jet-
figliler aircraft; taxiway-, parkin4
aprons; radio and ligh.ting, 9 fuel
storage tanks; hangar L? repair
facilities,
8,530 ft. temporary runway;
parking aprons, taxiways.
11,200 ft, permanent ranway3
weight-bearing, 160,000 lbs.; two
5,240 ft. permanent runways; can
support fighter aircraft; tax imuys
parkinc aprons; could easily be
rehabilitated for nedium-bomber
operations.
7,50 ft, permanent runway;
weight-bearing$ C-54; taxiways;
park*, apron; limited radio;
hangars. 1.asil,y rehabilited for
use by jet-aireraft.
7,380 ft, permanent runway,
weight-bearingl C-54; taxiways;
parking ;r4prom,
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Clacz
Coordinates
Men:-tzu A/F
4
23-20N
10-25E
Nan-ning A/F
2
22-49N
108-21E
Pa -se A/F
4
23-53N
106-39E
.
1;an-ya A/F
4
18-17N
(Hainan Island)
109-26E
Tan-ohu-hsu A/F
3
23-29N
(Tancnu)
- 110-32E
IVII-ning A/F
5
23-11N
108-151
Yang-tang A/F
3
25-19N
110-10L
Fo-lo
(Hainan Island)
Ch'iung-shan A/F
(Eaikou)
4
4
13-30N
108-48E
20-03N
110-20L
Useks
CCAF
'22EEZE1E112E
52240 ft0 permanent runwaY7
might-bearing? C-47; taxiway's;
parking aprons; hangars; drum
fuel stora-,e; radio and limited
lighting.
Not believed 6,000 ft permanent runways
currently in weight-bearing, 75,000 -lbs.;
use taxiway; parking aprons;
construction reported; but never
confirmed,
CCAF 5,030 ft, permanent runway;
weight-bearing capacity, 0746;
taxiways; parking apron; under-
ground fuel tank& and open drum
storage; minor repair facilities.
Not in use,
CCAF
CCAF
CCAF
Not in use
Two permanent runways, 4430 ft,
and 3,400 It lon, weight-
bearing, C-54; taxiways; parking
aprons; hangars,
60560 ft, permanent runway,
weight-bearing 0-46; taXiways-
3,900 ft. per.i.,t.J.L r. el
storag,:-
6,563 ft, permanent ray,
radio, par'.:An aprons.
Two permanent runways, 10920 ft,
and 3,930 ft, in length; weight-
bearings C-!4.7;-taxiways;
apron.
CCAF No 40900 ft0 permanent runways,
weight-bearing, C-46; taxdway;
parking aprons; hangars; limited
radio; drum fuel storage; minor
repair.
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Lt?
1. What are the berth to e anchora e and re ir facilities
following Phnom
1.12WALS,u_latr4.2eriattjaittdxers oflerlIllase For the principle yorts on
Rained? princinal ..rts from Liu Chow Peninsula to the Indo-
china border?
(a)
SAIGON:
The following is the berthage capacity at Saigon:
Alongside Cargo Berths = 8 Liberty, 400000 31-18' draft
2 C1-M? 790, 31-18' draft
Lighterage, 26000? 16-9' draft
Fixed Mooring Berths . 12 Liberty
Tanker Berths - 1 45000 25' draft
5 250', 13' draft
Naval Berths - 1 3900 DD
1 3120 $S
6 221' AN
4 98' AMC
1 800 PT
Estimated military port capacity 2 7,,500 long tons of general
cargo per 24-hour day.
There are about 220 lighters, 1.0600 junks, and barges with a total of
100,000 tons capacity. Cargo to be discharged is usually transferred from
vesselt berthed alongside the wharves, but cargo to be loaded (especially
nibbler and rice) is usually transferred from barges to oeean-goirg vessels
moored in the midstream berths.
There is no anchorage available except at the entrance to the port, near
Cap St? Jacques. Repairs of all types can be performs& There are two
graving docks and two floating drydocks? but drydock facilities are limited
U o veseela of the size of an LST.
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Machine shops and foundries are avallatao at the Naval Arsenal. Therc,
are four marine railways. Divers and diving gear, including deep sea
equipment, are available. There are no salvage tugs.
(0 TOURANE:
The Public Works wharf has a useable length of 140 meters (June 1952).
An additional 103 meters of reinforced concrete are now under construction and
are scheduled for completion in October 1952.
Tanker bertha; 1 email tanker, 1 tanker barge.
There are two mooring buoys in the Tourane River.
Cargo is discharged to lighters at the anchorage.
The following harbor craft are maintained at the ports four tugs, six
barges of 150 ton capacity each, four barges of 50.ton capacity each, and 20
wooden lighters of unknown capacity.
Zetimated military port capaeitys 850 long tons per 24.hour day.
Vessels of light or moderate draft may anchor about 400 yards south-eastward
of Observatory Island, in about 3i fathoms, mud, or mud and shells, with
protection from all winds. Vessels of deep draft should anchor westward of the
point on which Observatory Light is located, in depths of 6 to 8 fathoms, which
is a more exposed position during the northeast monsoon.
Some repairs can be effected at the railroad workshops and at the shops of
the automobile transport company.
(c) RUE:
There are no lighters nor alongside berthing facilities except for
small craft.
There is good anchorage about Li miles 16 degrees from North Fort,
in a depth of about 10 fathoms, sand, but it is very insecure during the north.
east monsoon.
There are no repair facilities at Hue.
(d) IFINOPI,PENHI
Vessels usually berth at the wharves, although cargo is occasionally
handled by lighters at the anchorage. The principal wharves available for
overseas vessels arcs one concrete jetty (railroad wharf) of about 27' of
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berthing space; three floating landing stages 125,-1950 long; additional
provisional landing stages which can be set up on short notice; and two
private jetties capable of handling small coastal tankers?
There are two -wharf cranes and four mobile cranes having a capaeitr
of 4.5 tons. There are no floating cranes.
, The port has three tugs, the largest of which is 150 horsepower. There
are five lighters available; two of 150 ton capacity, one of 50 ton capacity,
and two of 25 ton capacity.
Mereao vessels are customarily berthed at the port, anchorage is
remitted in the Tonle Sap River, within the limits of the port.
Only minor repairs, such as the repair of electrical equipment, can be
performed. There is a small machine shop but there are no foundries, heavy-
duty cranes, drydocks? marine railways, diving equipment, or salvage tugs.
(e) HANOIs
Hanoi has 29790" of wharfageu, Coastal vessels moor to buoys in tbe
stream; four such berths are available.
Numerous sampans and junks are available for lighterage.
Small vessels can anchor south of Hon Sup, a small island, in 3-1/4
fathoms. The anchorage area within the port is to the southward of Dower
bridge in 3 fathoms.
There are no repair facilities in the port.
(f) HAIPHONGs
The main wharf, with a depth of 10,-22 alongside, has berths for
two Cleft 350' long and a 2,100, lighter wharfage. There is one tanker barge
berth and one 350' BD berth. The present condition of the wharves is goo&
The mooring buoys in the river at Haiphong provide 7 berths, 4 for Cl-M
and 3 for coastal-type vessels.
Several tugs and a large number of lighters with capacities up to 100 tons
are available.
Crelinary repairs to hull and machinery can be effected. There are available
6 small eraving docks, the largest of which can accommeelate an LSTO
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(g) BENGAlt
There are three coal loading berths, a coal lighter wharfs and a
jetty for small Ships in the port. The three coal berths have 16 to 21 feet
alongside.
There are several coal lighters at Hongai.
Vessels can take anchorage southward of the entrance to Port Courbet.
Two mooring buoys are laid in Port Courbet.
. There is a workshop at Hongai with forges, foundries, and fitting shopss
and the repairing of ships is undertaken.
(h) QUAVDTPA:
Loading and unloading is accomplished by lighters only.. Anchorage
is available, but there are no repair facilities.
(i) VILTI
Benthuis located 10 miles up the Song Ea, is the port of Vinh.
There are four wharves with high-water depths of 61 feet to 10 feet
alongside. At low water vessels will ground on the mud.
There is no information on lighters.
Good anchorage in a depth of 4/ fathoms may be obtained abreast of the
tide gauge at Benthui. Vessels drawing 9 feet can anchor about 110 yards off
the wharves.
The railroad shops can perform repairs. It is reported that a shipyard
for the construction of wooden ships is located here.
(j) BANGOIs
A pier with a T-head extends 10300 yards southward from Xencon? a
point close eastward of Bangoi. There is a depth of 17q-211 at its extremity.
I, fixed mooring for one mall coaster is available.
There are no lighters at Bangois except for junks and sampans.
There is no difficulty in entering, and vessels can anchor agrwhere in
the harbors according to draft. The best place is on the eastern side,
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northward of the entrance, off the small piers. The holding ground is
good, but a position should not be taken too near the shore as the locality
is subject to on-shore equal's
There are no repair facilities at this port.
(k) CAM rink PORT
The coal wharf is 984 feet long and has a least depth of 26 feet
alongside. There is also a lighter wharf 530 feet long with berthage facilities
for five lighters, but it dries up at low water. A fixed mooring for I snail
coaster-type vessel is available.
There are no lighters at Cam Pha Port. Lighters are brought, as needed,
from Haiphong.
Good anchorage in depths of 31 to 5i fathoms may be talimn in the northern
part of the channel. The swinging room is limited to a radius of 165 yards,,
There are minor repair facilities at this porto
(I) .....,PETALTIAI:
The wharves, which occupy most of the waterfront, provide 20445
linear feet of berthing space consisting or a main mole (19200 by 500 feet),
two small piers (150 by 25 feet and 130 by 25 feet), and a construction mole
(275 by 350 feet). The berthing facilities will accommodate five standard
coasters and eight lighters with depths of from 6 to 8 feet alongside.
There are no froe-seinging berths in the harbor. Anchorage for large
vessels outside the harbor is fully exposed, but small craft can find shelter
in the lee of Yu-linechou.
Vumerous seall craft are available in the harbor.
No data are available on repair facilities.
(m)
The wharf facilities provide 2 ;*0 linear feet of berthing space of
which 19310 linear feet have depths from 26 to 30 feet, 19250 linear feet have
depths from 20 to 25 feet, and 330 linear feet have depths from 6 to 19 feet.
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The berthing facilities will accommodate one Liberty-type vessel, two
C1-M-AV1-type vessels, eleven lighters, and one tanker.
Anchorage facilities are apparently quite adequate in depths of at
least 20 feet over *pod holding groundo
There is no infornation available on harbor craft,
Some small-boat repair iork can be accomplished.
(n) PEI-HtI CHINA)
The only Chinese port from Liu Chow Peninsula to Indochina for which
there is any information is Pei-hai.
The harbor is 2i nautical miles long and I nautical mile wide outside
the 3efathom curve; it is 18 to 27 feet deep. The entrance is open.
Anchorage is opon to ere", There are ten Class III free-swinging berths.
(Class III has a diameter of 3110 yards and a 20 foot depth).
There are no wharves, pitare, quays, or other landiee facilities.
Lighters and sampans land on a beach.
There is no other information available on this port.
2. Wiatareth....=._t_sm_.__,...a.lndihannelsandaachestotheserte
and what navit........_Eationalaidsa2221.4111u2s12:1210117 What recent obstructions
to nevi ation are known to exiet?
On most of these ports information has been drawn from Hydrographic
Office Publication No, 1250 1937, with 1950 supplement. For more detail on
navieational aids at those ports see this publication.
(a) SAIGO12
The Saigon River is the channel used V. oceanegoing vessels bound
for Saigon. Navigation of the river is restricted to vessels of such drafts
as can be taken over the Coral Bank, an obstruction in the river about half.way
between the entrance and Saigon, on which the least depth in the fairway is
23 feet. Corea Dank has been dredged to provide a channel 164 yards wide and
19/ feet deep on the range line in the shoalest section.
There are several wrecks in the channel which are maeked by a green
buoy and a white buoy.
In 19420 it was reported that the harbor had been practically cleared of
"medics.
There are beacons, buoys, and lights to mark the channel; a signal station
is located at Dhaka, 9 miles below Saigon.
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(b) TOURANEI
The entrance of Touren. Bay has depths of 10 to 12 fathoms, and the
depths decrease gradually to the head of the bay, where the 5-fathom curve
is about one mile from the shore.
Outside the 5-fathom curve is Canton Rock, which lies on the southeastern
side of the entrance 650 yards from shore. The rock has two heads; one dies
two feet and the other is covered with one foot of water. A black conical
buoy marks the northeastern side of the rock, but is frequently carried away by
the eea. A stranded wreck lies about mile southeastward of Observatory Light)
Another stranded wreck, which is marked by a black and white buoy, lies about
1-3/4 miles westward of the light. There is also one capsized vessel off
Customs Pier (Appontement des Douanes). Depths of less than 3 fathoms extend
one mile off the month of the Tourane River. The Tourane River is obstructed
by a bar, above which, abreast the town of Tourane, there are depths of 12 to
24 feet. A channel, protected by a dike, has been dredged across the bar to
a depth of 14 feet. The channel is marked by lighted beacons, and there are
three unlighted beacons in the river above the bar. In 1947, it was reported
that vessels drawing more than 11 feet should not attempt to enter the channel
except when absolutely necessary, and then only during fine weather.
(c)
The Hue River discharges through a low shore 23 miles northwestward
of Chonmey Bay. About 7 miles up the river is Hue. The river is suitable only
for mall craft. The best marks at H110 River are Worth tort, upon which there
is a flagstaff, and the beacons for leading over the bar.
There are no dangers in the anproach, but the lead should be kept going.
The entrance is about 200 yards wide with a depth of about 7 feet and is
fronted by a bar that oxtends about one mile seaward and has about the sane
depth. The controlling harbor depth is only 3 feet*
An obstruction has been placed at the entrance to Hue River, so that
Thuanan Pass is now impracticable.
A native pilot can be obtained.
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(d) PHNOM PENH%
The controlling depth during the low water stage is 5 meters at
high tide, There are no special limitations.
A station at Cap St. Jacques communicates by international flags and
flashing light. There are no signal stations which furnish information on
;subjects each as weather and traffic.
There is no other information on this port.
(e) HANOI:
The main channel to Hanoi leads through the Lech Dal, thence it
follows the course of the Song Dai? the Canal de Phu ly and the Song Ka to
Hanoi. The entrance is fronted by a dangerous bar and drying sandbanks which
extend 7 miles off shore. The seaward end of the channel through the banks
lies 5 miles east and 1 mile south of Hon He, a small island which provides the
beet landmark for inward bound vessels. Depth on the bar is 9 feet at high
water, but the channel deepens immediately inside the river. Vessels of 9
feet draft may navigate the channel at high water; at low tide they cannot
proceed beyond Phu
There is no information on navigational aids or obstruction to navigation,
(f) BM/HONG%
since the silting up of the Cua Cam, vessels of moderate draft use
the Cua Pam Trieu, and then passing through the Maritime Canal they enter the
Cua Cam about 4 miles below Haiphong. The depth in the dredged channel across
the bar is 18 feet, and the bettom is composed of fairly hard muddy sand.
Under optimum conditions, using favorable tides a ship drawing 23 feet can
proceed to Haiphong and berth alongside.
Depths of 3 fathoms have been reported on and southward of the bar range
in an area 5,7 to 7 miles from the front light. Depths of 2-3/4 fathoms are
also located on the range about 2i miles from the front light. Less water
than charted has also been reported for about 1 mile above the Junction of this
range with the next channel range.
The dredging of the river and the channel across the bar is carred on
only during the northeast monsoon. While the dredging is stopped the channel
across the bar gradually fills to a minimum depth of about 18 feet at lowest
low water. This is the lowest depth observed during the year and occurs in October.,
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In May 1949, a vessel drawing 18 feet 10 inches crossed the bar on a
rising tide and observed a depth of 21 feet 4 inches. According to the
Haiphong pilots a vessel drawing 19 feat 8 inches can always cross the
bar on the next tide. Vessels frequently go in and out at night, as the
channel is well lighted, except that lights of some buoys have been
extinguished due to Viet llinh action.
Maritime Canal is an artificial cut through the middle of Dinh Vu
Island. It is nearly 1 mile long and has a low-water depth of 18 feet.
The navigable width of the canal is 300 feet.
In the harbor, the only obstruction is a wreck of a floating drydock
lying awash east of Transit dharf and clearly visible.
A light narks the position of a stranded wreck about 1 mile westward
of the front range light that leads up the first reach of the Kua Nam Trieu.
An obstruction, over which there is a uepth of fathon, lies on the north-
eastern side of the channel over the bar about six milee southeastward of
the front range light.
Pilotage is comoulsox7 and necessary because of uncertain depths.
(g) HONGAIs
A dredged channel, narked by five red conical buoys, leads across Belong
Bey from near Surprise Island to the deep-water area off Eongai.
Hamelin Cheinol is the deepest route to Hongai. The general depths are
not less than 15 feet except in one area where the depth is 12 feet.
Lights are exhibited along Hamelin Channel. Deacons and buoys are also
displayed in the area..
The channel through the bar southward of Chemal and Hopes Mete in 1946
had a depth of 12 feet and a bottom of soft mud. At this depth a vessel
drawing 19 feet could negotiate the channel at half tide and one drawing 26
feet at high water. These two channels are marked by buoys, and pilots are
available.
(h) QUANGTirs
Quangyen is a river port 9 miles above Haiphong. The controlling depth
of the entrance is 7 feet and that of the harbor is 6 feet. No further
information is available,.
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(1.) Trmr2
The entrance points of the Song Ka River, on which is located
Benthui, are both low and sandse On the northern one is a small fort, and
on the southern one a pagoda.
The bar, which is composed of hard sand and subject to changes, extends
over one mile timecard from the southern entrance point. In 1930 a channel
with a width of 164 feet and a depth of 12 feet was dredged across the bar.
This channel is marked by buoys, which are moved as changes occur. At high
water the channel is available for vessels drawing 18 feet. A more recent
report states that the entrance channel is dredged to 8j feet, but due to
silting constant dredging is necessary?
The port is open to junks or to very small steamers
Lights, buoys, tidal and storm signals are available at Benthui.
(j) BANGOI:
Camranh Bey, through which vessels pass to reach Bangoi? is one of
the finest harbors on the coast of Ammo It is available to all classes of
vessels and offers secure anchorage at all seasons. Tho bey is composed of
an outer and inner harbor and is sarrounded by mountains.
Grand Passage, the channel through the outer section of the bey, is
nearly 1-3/4 miles wide between Tagne Island on the east and the small island
of Hon Trung on the west. The passage has depths of 12 and 13 fathoms and
is free of danger,
Camranh Harbor, the inner part of Camranh Bays is 8 miles in length by
about 2 miles in breadth. The deeper section of the harbor is about 3 miles
long by 1 miles wide, is free of shoals, and has depths of 6 to 8 fathoms.
The harbor is easy of access and affords good and landlocked anchorage
over good holding ground of mud. Le Goulet, the entrance, is nearly 3/4 mile
wide and has depths of 10 to 13 fathoms.
There are lights, buoys and storm signals available.
(k) CAM PHA PORT:
Cam Pha Channel leads northward to Cam Pha Fort. The least depth
in the channel is 2-3/4 fathoms, and vessels drawing 26i feet can enter the
port('
20
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am. as. um:* .?0
There are beacons, buoys and lights availablo in the channel and
harbor.
Pilotage is compulsory?
(1)
The approach to the harbor is through the open waters of Pei-li
Chiana. The depths are about 24 feet near the harbor entrance, Landaarks
are conspicuous. The harbor is entered past either end of the detached
breakwater, The northeastern entrance is 240 yards wide and the southwestern
entrance is 260 yards wide. Depthe in either entrance are 21 feet.
(n) YU-UP_ leasA.__1=1.Aaa,--AIIMANg
The lan&locked northern part of Yu-lin Chiang is sepavated from
the southern part by a channel 120 yards wide and with a least depth of 28
feet. The entrance to the river estuary at San-ya Chiang is about 100 yards
wide and has depths of about 19 feet.
Navigation aids are available; pilotage is not neuessary.
Natural landmarks are not conspicuounn
3. What fuel oil stocks and fuel oil stommfacilities are_sEre!1_211E
available in thestmsW
Total petroleua storage capacity of Indochina amounts to 9480915
barrels0 distributed as follow=
Port 2IBUISE-142.1Frells
Saigon 7330832
Haiphong 1660239
Tourane 29074*
Phnom Penh 170500
Hanoi ?3-a212
Total 9480915
* Lt Tourane other tanks with a capacity of 370740
barrels are under construction by the &Toll Oil Compauy0
c r R r r
?
ONON 44.11.
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The petroleura storage capacity at Saigon is distributed as
followas
Product
Avgas
.(A1E1.91ILAILbalTels
27,123
Hogas
136s260
Kerosene
72,185
Gas oil
12,470
Diesel oil
1780083
Fuel oil
121,898
Miscellaneous
Total 733,832
Diesel oil is available at Phnom Penh, but no bunker C oil is
available. Thera is no data on fuel oil stocks at any of the other ports
in Indochina. There is also no data on fuel oil stocks or storage for
Pei-li, Hainan or Pei-hal, China, At Itu.lin.-San-ya? Hainan, a petroleum
denct is known to have six 7tcrage tanks and something over 15,000 square
feet of storage space. It iv estimated that the storage tanks have a
capacity of 45,000 barrels*
Information follows on Port Wallut? Ream, Qui Nilo% and The,
which are considered to be as important as, or more important than, the ports
named in questions 1? 2 and 3.
(n) TORT L7PLIJAng
#1
41? 22Eth2C2
200 linear feet of lighter Wharfage, at itzaa masonry
qu4y, suitable for handling general cargo.
b....1...._:.2.21L.a12.12Litrbers Liona
co Alichor;50 and mooriE2 ?
Protected anchorage le; and NW of harbor entrance
for a total of 2 stand&rd ocean-type vessels ana
41 coasters, in rood holding ground.
One mooring buoy for a small ocem-type vessel about
900 feet r of quay.
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(0)
(P)
di. Estimated military port capacity ,-. 200 long tons per
day, all by lighterage.
0 Repair facilities - Two hauling-out ramps for snail boats,
REAM (100 30, N, 103? 384 E)
a. Berthage - Alongside cargo berths? 300 feet of lighter
wharfage. Fixed mooring berths; None
b0 Lighters available - Nona
0. attam - 10 destroyer or coaster anchorages.
d0 Estimated military port capacity - 100 long tons per day.
e, Repair facilities - None
#2 Harbor
a. Approaches - Southerly approach free and clear with depths
over 30 feet to entrance, westerly approach more difficult
due to islands and shoals but has depth in excess of 60 feet.
b. Channels - Main entrance from the south, width 2/3 of a
mile, depth 21 ft; Western entrance l miles width with
depths of 23 feet, r3epths shoal to 15 fet at the northern
end of the harbor strait.
c. Navigational aids - Two metal pylons indicate axis of
entrance channel. No other navigational aids exist in
vicinity of port.
410 Harbor obstructions - None
e. 1:1121s2 - It is thought that pilotage is r.ot required at
aeam. nJre is no information on availability ot: pilots,
#3 Petroleum - None
QUI NHON (13? 400 N, 1090
#1
a. Berthew - Alongside cargo berths t 600 lin0 ft0 of lighter
wharfage. Fixed mooring berthas None
b. Lighters available - Several lighter and junks.
c. Anchorage - Berths for 9 coaster-type vessels.
.2 2&
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(q)
d.natedmilitca.acitstii - 600 long tons per day.
e. Repair facilities - None
#2 The harbor which opens directly into the sea has no
obstructions or restrictions in the approach. Is entered
by a passage 600 feet wide and dredged to 16 feet. Depths
in harbor fairway are from 72 to 18 feet. The harbor is
well marked with lighted and unlighted aids and require
periodic dredging.
#3 Petreleum namm - None
MY TiO (10? 210 N, 106? 21g,L)
#1
Le Berthage - Alongside cargo berthas 10400 feet of lighter
wharfage, fixed mooring berthst. None
b. Lighters available - Undetermined but several barges and
numerous native small craft are available.
co Anchor 2a2 - Hone
d. Estimated mtlitary port capacity- 500 long tons per day.
L. Rspair facilities- One 90 to 100 feet graving dock, limited
minor repairs c.:in be undertaken.
#2 TtOrbor
41.: Approach - Approach to the Song Cup. Tieus the most northerly
of the Mekong mouths is used. A bar 10 miles to seaward has
least depth of 8 feet and miles width. Inside the bar,
depths are somewhat greater to My Tho. About 20 miles above
the main approach the channel passes the 3ong Cua Dai? a
distributary of the Mekong. The fairway from this point has
a 10 ft least depth and 1,000 ft width, and eztends 7 miles
to My The where the river depth is 12 ft. off My Tho.
Navigational aide - The fairway is unmarked.
c, Harbor obstructions - One sunken Sloop or the northern side
of Cu ;Lao Rong is only artifical obstruction to navigation.
d.) , Pilotage is necessary but there are no data on
number or comnetency of pilots.
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... SAW .0It ??.? AIM ^"..
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IL Trade
A.. IL11:hatkinand qisntity of pjay.L...___ebeenshipped:L_otheV_iettUnkl
7.....p.sernist China and. by other Soviet Bloc nations? rhich routes are used
primarily? that are the economic capabilities of Communist China to supply
Viet Minh?
A. Trade with the Communist Bloc
1. Imports from Communist China
Reports from a variety of sources rihich in most cases cannot be
evaluated suggest that within the past year Communist China has sent the
folloving supplies to the Vietranh:
a. Arms and ammunition: Maintain guns; anti-aircraft guns; light
machine guns; heavy machine guns; field guns; howitzers; mortars; rifles,
including 3reen:511g automatic rifles; pistols; rocket launchers; spare parts;
ammunition; TNT and other explosives; fuzes; detonators; projectiles;
grenades and remade throwers; and land mines.
b. Commissary:
(a) Food: Rice; maize; dried sweet potatoes; cereals; and
soybeans, flour.
(b) Clothing: Uniforms; cotton material; army blanket; cloth
shoes; rubber shoes; steel helmets.
CO Transportation and communication equipment: Trucks; tires; spare
parts; gasoline; oil; kerosene; radio seta arel field transmitters.
d. Other: Medical and clinical supplies; Xray metal testing
equipment; balances; electric meters; electric drills; files; abrasives;
saw, blades; iron and stool for making cables; electrical distributing
machinery; agricultural machinery; oxygen containers; ocygexigenerating
machines; gas masks; binoculars; industrial machinery,
In spite of the fact that these reports frequently include quantity
figures, the frequent over-lapping of the time periods covered and, more
important, the incompatibility of quantity designations (e.g0 rounds, cases,
or tons of ammunition) make it impossible to reconcile quantity figures or
to arrive at a meaningful total. Moreover, in a few cases where cross-checking
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of reported totals has been possible, the nagnitude of the resultant
discrepancy has cast further doubt upon the validity of the figures reported.
2. I etc from the USSR and other Seviet-blec nations
No reliable information is available concerning direct trade between
the Viet Minh and the USSR or other Soviet-bloc nations. Uagy of the items
imported by the Viet Minh from China, however, are of Soviet or Soviet-bloc
manufacture0 lee believe? therefore, that there is some trade either directly
or indirectly and that such trade is of importance to the Viet rinh0
30 .22mILERELT.
Although inforuation concerning supple routes from Ccenunist China
to the Viet Einh is eetensive? it is by no mans conclusive? The most
important supply routes apparentey-follor the natural invasion routes entering
Indochina at Deng Deng or Tv Lung along the Kwanesi border and proceeding to
Langson (by railroad or truck) or to Cao Bang (by truck). Low grade reports
indicate that $ on the Kwangsi side, supplies reaching or originating in Nanning
are sent to the border via 'angelica or Chingehi to Chennankuan and Poinghsiang.
There is no reliable information concerning possible supply routes north and
east of Nanning?
4. Economic capabilities of Conmunist China to supply the Viet Minh
Presently available information does not permit a quantitative
estimate of Chinese Conmunist capability to supply the Viet lanh. It seems
probable, hem/ever, that ultimate capability exceeds the present rate of
assistance? Except perhaps for some categories of specialized military
equipment, the rate of supply is apt to be deternined primarily by policy
decisions concerning the extant to which it is desirable to sustain the Viet
Minh at the expense of civilian sectors of the Chinese econoey and of Chinese
mdlitary efforts elceehere. The outcome of the Korean truce negotiations rills
therefore, bear directly an the future capacity of Communist China to supply
the Viet Minh, particularly with munitions.
D. that kind and quantity of supplies of ma or importance have been shipped
to the Viet Minh by non-Sloe nations? Which routes are used primarily?
Because of the French blockade and the unavailability of exports from
Viet Minh areae? it is unlikely that there is any substantial trade between
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non-eommunist bloc; nations an the it 1nh. o figures are avel Lable,
heeever. There is probably a lieitea emoent of trade between ,riet inh
"Ietnee:ieseeliele areas in '.1:letnelas deepite Covernetunt efforts te
maintain a land and see blockalie, Individuals who have floe. from dot einh
toreitory have stated, without confire.ation, that trusted oricero' st)
art y members are deeionated in each sector to conduct trade with non-Comunist
regions, arid eoen trade ie. supposed. to be lucrative te arouse
envy ei..ong lees favored individuals,
elthough the total voLeie of .!.-miee trade is probably leoL, great, it ee,;
of considerable importance to the Viet With becaure of specific shortagos?
UncoeAimed reeorts suggest that special efforts are made to el,,,cure medical
supplies, fuel, and transportation equipment and parts.,
There have also been reports of arms etaugjing between - and Viet
Linn areas:, carried on by coastwise ehipping to Ceracunist-held erees in Coclan-
china and overland through Cambodia. 1:o est!mates hee:e beee made of the
volume of this traffic.
C, Which Tridochinese exports are of major iraportance to non-Lloe nations?
erincipal inaochinese exports aro rice, coal and rubber roc,,ctn of
all these commodities has been drastically curtailed by destruction of equip-
cent and transportation, by actual military operations, au e in the case of
rice, by Governmental restrictions on exports. Only rubber production has
been restored to approximately its pre-war levek, :eduction o.ie- acreage devoted
to rice production in Vietnae has cut exports from a pre-war annual average
in excess of one million tons to 300,000 tons in 1951... it is unlikely that
1952 eroorts vtifl excek-A. 1400,0je tons.. .eeports from .',renbodia are banned at
present, partly cue fear of shorta:c and partly to a nationalistic drive
to devalue local mil_ine; facilitiee to replace the practice of ship,)ine,
paddy thro..:.gh the port of 3aen,
:von reduced exports of rice are vital, however, Lecau,ie.of rice deficits
in other Aaian countries,: ::estoration of pro-war production levels would
contribute importantly. to improvu:ie::t of the presently critical food supply
for large areas of the Far -ast,,
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-1;)or::ation is thero ro;lardinr the)And qu4ntiIia and loc&tion of stoc-
. .
1/3 eloyed in Indochina?
A, teol.2i1es within :let inii territory
There arc two types of supply durvs: those established on the border
whom 1,he Viot take delivery of the material and tl,ose established
along the roads vihio run through the Viet Anh zone,
1. Depots established on the border are as fellows: Thuy Cau (most
importmt), Mau., Don he, Nan Alan, ?hue
2, Depots estblished in the interior oi the Viet _inn zono are as
folic': La "'ac, Gao r, Cho. Iang Nihh? Clang Tien, Pho Ncu, Ea Lieu,
dall La, ha ;:a1 Tuven- 'Uang, itly Tao, Thai Nguyen? and Yen Cay4 The most
important of these depots are those of Na 2ac, Cao iy ai 2?inh Ca, Tho a Fac,
CLo Tuy-un -9ang? Dinh Ca depots are reserved for tlis storinc of
arullment,
The aii Einh ani na gicu depots arc reserved ,aostly :04 the storing of medical
The?inng Tien and Linh Ca de?oto are -used .lostli for quarturLaster
_al of tx2ce depots (partic;aarly Na 17ac) also sore ga3olinc.
'1:11c q: t7' of rApplies in those various dumps is not knoim.
4
:tocLpiles wAhin r,outh ,hina
Information conserninc: the location of steekA.les in Louth i, and
the quantities and tjpes of material stored in this areal, it., -s a eneral
rule, limited to low-grade reports of doGtful reliabilitr Furtl.ormore? the
information contained in such reports in eAremely fragneutaty, ,von if the
reports were talen at hrce value? they would -provide insuiTicient information
upon which to make an estir:latc either o-;: the quantities of mAcrial stored
in any given location or of the total inventories of LIDterial in the entire
3outh China area or any other area of 6:1-.InL
The general tenor of the repeats, Siowever, indicates -L,Lt military supplies
are stored in warehouses and storace facilities ih virtuall-/ all of the princig:a
towns and cities along the !.7outh China rail net (Changsha, :IonLyang? Kukong,
Canton, Evieilin, Liuchou, feniiw, etc) as well as in nume;:ous river tovrls
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such as tuchou and Baiyarao A number of reports indicate that military supplies
are stored in the Whampoa area, the Wanshan Islands, and Hainan Island, Most
reports concerning Haiman,re probably greatly exaggerated? In the China-
Inodchina border area, stoccpiles and/or warehouses (inclusiing caves, templea,
and private residences r:lacil have been converted into warehouses) have been
reported in the Nengiang? auaecheu, Fangcheng, Yamchow, Chinghsi? and Kunming
areas ?
Apart fror aeneralized stataments that "military supplies" are stored in
a particular alas? the reports irdicate that a wide variety of military items
are stock/A.01, including rifles:, mortars, artillery pieces (including AA),
ammunitira feeds, tiothing5, medical supplies, signal equipment, engineering
equiyaat, POlq trucks., spare parte, explosives, and "strategic materials"
T' re is insufficient information upon *del to assess these categories with
aeapect to quantity of a given category in any single location or the total
quantity for the area as a.whole?
T3--21=
Ac Tihat is the military manpower of the Viet Minh? that is the recruitment
potential? 7:hat are the limitin factors -- equaaaa t, trained cadres, other?
"What are the re'lacement policiee of Viet Minh?
A recently released French study estimates that rithin t%cir areas of control
in Vietnam, the Viet Minh can draw on a population of 9,712,000c Of this
number, 1,112,000 are males of military age (18-45) who are fit for combat?
The study points out, horiever? that theoretical. Viet Minh recruiting capabil-
ities are actually of little importance, since the requirements for fighting
troops; for eilainisianAdve, communications, transport, and police
and for procurement of food supplies indicate that the number of additional
men available for the Vietyinh Army, above presently constituted forces, is
really very slight,. The Viet Minh has difficulty, furthermore, in exploiting
all manpower not controlled by the French and Associated States particularly
in. remote and backward regions? On the other hand,, the Viet Minh has been
able to recruit some manpower located within the Red nivor Delta and in areas in
Cochin-.China which are surrounded. by French Union Troops?
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The Viet Lir-1_ *tale thus far revealed the capacity- to replace combat
casualties and other losses, although there are reports that the military man-
power situation has recently deteriorated, both in terms of morale and availa-
bility of replacement. Although unconfirmed thus far, these reports suggest
that increasine numbers of teenage youths are being drarted for military-
service, alia that there have been relatively lerge-scale desertions from some
units? The accuracy of these reports probably cannot be determined prior
to the end of the summer rainy season, When fighting maybe renerea on a scale
larger than at present. Even if the Viet Minh is having difficulty meeting
its manpower requirements, it is probable that its regular usitawill be
reconstituted by the end of the 1952 rainy season.
It seems likely that the Commanists will be able to maintain roughly
the present degree of mobilization in the absence of territorial gains by
the Franco-Vietnamese forces, a reduction of supplies and technical assistance
from the Chinese Communists, or some unforeseen developmniteehiCh severely
reduced the food supplies availabas to the Viet Frinbe
Increased mbilization, on the other hand, is inhibited by the
necessity of maintaining existing levels of food and armaments production, by
Shortages of some ieepes of military equipment, and by depletion of trained
combat cadres in battle or through disease? It is probable that some types
of technical training, particularly in artillery and communications, are
being provided in China, and maintenance of the osent degree of combat
efficiency is probably dependent on continuance of these forme of assistance?
Vo information has been received concerning troop rotation and
replacement policies of the Viet ittah.
B. What is the extent of Chinese Communist s:rsonnel assistance to the
Viet Minh?
1. Chinese Communist technical "advisors"
Et.2.12.1.attmlberaL..2sfunctionandinfluence
2. Chinese Communist Military "volunteers" with the Viet Minh: the
number, method of integration, command relationships? training, status,
runo_tAmp_onandinfluenceofthesele,,
with the Viet Minh: the
or these people,
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It has been l'airly well established that Chinese Communist
personnel -- instructors/ technicians, political and military advisers, ard
perhaps transport labor along major supply routes -- have been operating
with the Viet Minh. Estimates on the extent of this personnel assistance,
hoe:even, have varied widely. Thile the average of the several estimates
in the past has been in the neighborhood of 10,000 to 15?0001 there hes
been a gradual decrease during 1952, and the present strength estimate is
roughly 5/000? This decrease was apparently attributable to the progress
made by the Viet Mirth in their organization, to the development of treieieg
camps in South China and to the difficulties encountered in the presence
of Chinese in Viet Minh zones. With respect to this latter point, it is
felt that the Viet /1111h, thile not dazing the necessity of Chinese
Connunist assistance, have been atterpting to reduce the numbers of
advisers and techniciaes in Viet Minh zones because of the possibility of
a resurgence of traditional antipathy among the Indochinese for the Chinese.
There are no identified Chinese Communist combat units in
Indochina except for some units which may temporarily cross the northern
Tonkin border for local operations from time to time. There are in additlen,,
various border tribeenen (probab)y from both sides of the border) in Viet
Vinh units,
There have been frequent references to a so-called "vnlunteeru
force in South China organ4ed to fight in Indochina if this should eventually
become desirable. The specified mission, composition? organization and
size of this force are not known.
The Viet Minh may, in fact, pursue a deliberate policy of restricting
contacts betreen Chinese personnel and the Vietnamese population, in order
to avoid arouting historic animosities held by moot Vietnanese toward the
Chinese:, There are no confirmed reports of Chinese combat casualties,
except for miner operations along the northern border, It appears,
therefore, that Chinese Comnunist personnel operate primarily in conjunction
;nth central administrative units and at higher command levels/ and such
a policy -mead definitely limit the capacity of the Viet Minh organization
to absorb foreign specialists and advisors.
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Ow. SM,
The precise nature of the relationship between Chinese Communist
advisers and the Viet Eiralpersornel with efetam they operate is unclear.
There is no evidence to suggest that Peiping has forced the Viet Vinh
leadership into accepting personnel assistance, and the degree of direction
or control exercised by these specialists is unknown?
It is probable that there are Chinese Communist agents opereting
within the Chinese community in Indochina, which is largely concentrated
in the South Vietnam city of Chelan and its environs, and there have been
numerous, unconfirmed, reports of special schools in China for training
organizers and intelligence specialists for work in Indochina. Neither
the number nor the functions of these specialists can be given?
C. To what extent are Viet vinh technicians including airforce pilots
and mechanics being train, d
many specialized units have
The Chinese Communists are reported to be training Viet Minh drivers,
mechanics, and personnel for the more specialized units such as artiliTry?
signal corps, medical, and engineer. Nest of this training es taking place
In Chiaa. The number of units receiving this training is not lenorn
by the Chinese Comnunists? V:hat type and haw
the Chinese Communists trained?
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Since eao.y 195o tht leet 1:le Command has recruited speeially qualified
yeeng mee to take paraehute, eer me-,:teleie, and fiying courses. Irr 195C :It was
claimed that they possessed about 10 American aircrafts single and twie-engine, with
no qualified personnel to fly them. Jiinc e that time various rewrtr have iadieated
Viet Minh ilet training at Chinese airfields in Kwaagsi? YUnnan2 ere', reeegtung
Provinces. A recent unsubstantiated report alleged that Seviets Chineee :;ommuniet,
and Viet Minh repreeentativeo had decided that the Viet Minh had eneegh air offieere
for the nueleus of an air force and that 250 aircraft would be nubsequently transfelred.
A ,une 1952 report etated that 197 -ciliate from Indochina were sent to Pei-wj,eg,
eeeoute to the USSR for adveaced pilot training
In northern Vietnam are airstrips which could be used by a Viet Minh Air Force.
The .,enelieg strips are not more than 3,6CC feet long, but would be adequate for
the Levoch Kin., Yak, and po-2 Viet Minh headquarters are at Thai Nguyen Aiefied
(21-37N2 105-50E)? end inetellat2_on with slight mUitary potential, Langson Alefield
(21-50N, 106-63)0 the best field poeressed by the Viet rink could made serviee-
able for eonventional-fighter and light-bomber operations in a maxim= of seven days
An air-training program for Viet Minh personnel iF being undertaken by the
Chinese Coemunists with advice and supervision frem the Soviees. However the Preneh
Air- Force hasp to dates received no air opposition fron the Viet Minh,
17 Food
A, To what extent does Viet Minh meet its own foed requiremente:
zr.Licinal items? i'h_e_mentities?
There is no reliable information eoncerning the extent to wnich food production
in Communist-oontrolled areas satisfies Viet Minh food requirements, Although
certain inferenees regarding the general agrieultural situtatien within Viet Minh-
_ eontreaed areae an be draw a from numeroue propaganda broadeaste outlinieg
agricultural policy, the need for intensified produetion ane the importanee of the
rice tax, and from the fact that riee crops have bene important military objeetiveso
no quantitetive data ars avaiAehowing Viet Minh requirements and/or foed
production. - It is probable however, that the Viet Minh would be unable to meet
its food requirements in the absenee of its present ability to commandeel,' eeppliee
in regions uominalay held by Franee-Vietnamese forces.
Principaa Coed items in the Viet Minh diet are assumed to be generally the
SE
What are the
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same as for do.td r '-oLe,-, with rice end ealt of primary importance, It ie
believed tnat itertS of secondary importance aviable te t.he Viet Minh include iiee..?
maniect sweet !,atatoesi, soy bears and various other veeetables, Quantities are un-
known.,
B,. What additional food resources would be ayailatie to the Viet Minh if it werete
?.."...A?rapatglar sceelite,
take all of Tonkin? All of indcelkina7
If the Viet Minh -were to take all of Tonkin the most important result in terms of
food resources would be the aequinition of the rice-producing areas ref the rich Red
River Delta? the most productive en all of northern Vietnam:, They weuld also gain
.zontrol of imnortant salt pans in the lower, river delta.. At peceent? however? North
Vietnam is a rieeedeficet area, se that seizure of all Tnekee woeld not? in the
short runs solve the food problems of the Viet Minh? Current shipments feet, eoehiee
China woi.d presumably be tut of f? and only extensive efforts to increase tote,
.produetion in the Worth would make the area self-euffieleat in .foodstuffs,
If the Viet Minh were to gain control of all Indochina? the Communists would net
only solve their own faced supply problems but have a potential rice surplus which
presumably would be exported to the Communist bloc0 in additioe to rice .supplies?
important eureeproduzing and cattle-raising areas in Cambodia would fall to the Viet
Minh.
C,, How doe?, rice roduction _and supzlies affect Viet Minh militsytionS?
Communist military oeerations are frequently undertaken primarily for the purpose
of securing rice supplies. Current Viet Minh operations within the Tonkin delta appear
to be designed chiefly to seiee harvested rice and to secure recruits. The timing of
the harvest seasons,apparently also effects Viet Minh miletary operations to some e.x-
tent; and Communist propaganda broadcasts have suggested that troops are frequently
used at .eritical timer, to harvest and transport Flee, iteeent Communist 'guerrilla
activities in Cambodia have shown increasing concentration in rice surplus areas.
D. To what extent are the Viet Minh forces deondent on feed imports from Communist
ita..r..L.o.ryLr,..12T' Bloc natims? From non-bloc natione?
There are reports of food imoorts from Communist China (see IIA)? but no
quantities are known.. The total volume of supplies shippee from China is believed,
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E
CRET
0.1 boo
?
to be stsfioiciri:.y lou? however so th'yt foodstuffs prol'ill)V a;'-nount to littlo
than efforts .?'o meet seasonal shortages in the least productive regions.
There s no informr.tion concerning possible food imports from other countrics,,
.1110 Caz.c.itv
Lhatare ile :el area::: in wi-?.ch Viet Minh military_sp/.2211er? arc manu-
factured? 1That quantities and types of weapons and mrif..1-22off_.....L...par being produced
.10????????????*..
:11.2:Lat. r2.12?
?ne principal area of Viet..;'Inh in which military ry,:ilplier, arc boinc zianu-
faetured is 7bakin0 The it3 considerable manufat?!ture of small l'-`7-1( inc11.411%,,
mortars and bazookas and also arr?tzlition for these wek)onas but no evidence of the
ranufacture of heavier ticapon o their amanition,, The ind,kliry is very primitive
and carried on :In a =libel' of mall establishments with little Nuipment,, recause
of their small size, the establish:tents are highly ziob1le and can inove to avoid
capture. Inasmuch as shortages of ee,?:1-)rent9 r?aw rcteriffis and technical knowledge
seriously ref.trict the ea:I.:abilities of thcindrr IL rioo's not meet the nee& of the
Viet, tilrih forces. :Limited maounts of pistol rIu10 -,ubmachine ce.:no? g?ermales and
snail arms aaramition are produced. Althe.tgb artotalts re not sisaLle or auffi-
ciento they supplement supplies from China and serve to meet temporary r!aps in t.1;ee
supplies?
Ts>Lre the Viet Minh develuinv Northern knmeir into a stron.o.mommic aad iLLta
:156.4001=1.
bane?
Th dev oryl-xn': of north Ann.in into a strong economic bac let liinh
is conr.:1(1orod u:1ike1y0 north !Imam 1ae 1:,';'t; mineral roso .rcea for Industry that
arc fornd in Tonkin. Also the area n1d probably not be used as a large supply
base at, it is located too Thr from sources of supply on the ".',0.72'1. )fIL
china border. Decause of poor transportation facilitiesl, it would be difficult to
transport maerial overland to north Annan. The movement of supplies by water from
:Jail-Ian island is difficult also because of the French nakral blocado.
C0 TO what extent are th(7..,s1;: ,t1,7Y: their o:-77). reirent ;11'1c min-
Uinta,-vesent level of fr21.127.,tmLiz'
r T
141
ii.os Yaw VA. 11111.
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V.1., ? eiltt, 10.0 OF.
The Viet ii ro not considered ctipable of meeting their own requirements
at the present 3evel of milf.tary aotivitro They have no resores for the manu.,
facutre of heavy eq1ZLpment or large caliber ammunition and can only pari'ally oudport
their requirements in small arms and ammunitl.00,
VII., Political
What is the 0,EalLallEF1 structure of the Coo ooniot regino in the DM4,
(b) the Lien Viet) and (c) the Workers Party.? Whi the otate of oorso'
amine Viet leadersho
io. oo. loroo ,
--a
IfEEII.:_mi_the extent of conoolidat,en of control over territories hc1tc by
Viet the political economic arel oclice inotrumerts of control. the exent
to which the reo!ime is welcomed or22.22marted; the dooree of MESLIY al.jYfr
-
2.sicre.iJA.n...),r_ion-r3e,Pornmitt oaroo leadersilz1Le_procent role of 7o-Chi4linh the
an22212.21e of other Viet _o;nh leaders' frictions, if ozsEt_22.51.stio- :Jetween
the Viet ninh and the Chdnenc Comanoists; the eld_ctencej, if any, of Viettanh
"nationalloy as distinouished from "Coonutist" aWraitons. the disolagircf.
,4
am- of indioenous leadership and influence bl:,zanese 2rosourc or ooroonclo.-
ties. tle existence if ana_of frictions between PeilliDo and cow concerniac
maLmInfluenco over the DRV?
The Oranizational fAructore of the Conmunist Eegine
The "DRV0 In general :.!onss the "DRV" appears to be evolving a000rding
to the patten foflowed in other Comnunist satelitos_ The process of consolidating
control and orranizior: governmental funct;ons goes on despite thoon-cootir ity of
Communist-held areas and the conUnoation of the war which has abS013:ANCEA. of the
availatle hanan ,4r-x2 oaterial resources of the re..;ion for almost seven ye'ars,
The Government propers headed IT "President' 3o Chi ranhs osonsibly functions
through a cabinet which includes the usual ministries Direction of the war effort
is primarily in the hands of a Supreme Council or National Defenses yid& oarenqT
exercises power over i,he ci-ollan oertovo of the economy as well as military plans
and operations. The National Asoelblys forged following the "elections" of January
1A6s is not known to have functionco oinoco, Governments thereforoc, is 1.7 decree
of the Council of riniosters.
, 17"
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At lower levels, the ;:winciigal ;:ovsrnmental adirdnistrative or.77rs are the
Resistance and .-.d.7rdnatrve, established in Vict 7:inh Interzo.les? i7e.r0-?
vincet--.:9 and lcalit.les. 'Mese bodies presumably arc organi7.ed in sections corresron-
ding to par tic:u1.nr r:overnno-l't fUT.IC t 7_ r::$ ? 'ut little i tn3 0 nccrnirc actual -
structure oporntior 0 In COriC intair.c, militant 'antlers aim occupy posts in
t1131 civil at1m1.1:1,;:ixatione The propaganda and indoctrination apparatuS is organiza-
tionally Loaded by the Informat.on 3ervice, with a Director of cabinet rank.,
The judicial system annears to develoixingisL.os:fstrer.:cf 'peoples triburth'Ll.t,"
which has resulted in the displacement of French magistrates by officials who reach
decisions on the basis of ...t2he political objectives of the regime
At the present time, the "Ira" constitution is reportedly being revised, with
the declared objective of removing the rOranral ft of "bourgeois parliareni,.,arianiano"
The Lien Viet and The I.Orkers, If...qv. The Lien Viet, or liational United FrkAnt,
is an amalgamation of political paries and mass organizationso It in.:.ludee the
Workers; (Communist) Pa.rizr which? in fact, dominates its activities, ,and the Demo-
cratic and ',:acialist- 'Parties which are apparently designed to secure the support
of non-Cortiunist intellectuals for the "Mil" program, In addition, "Front" groups
represent:LT, occupational, cultural, and religious Erroups are affili.ated with the
Linn -,Tiot, and serve as a device for recruiting widespread participaLion in acti-
vitles iLa. are sanctioned by the leadership which, ultinately Ic th3 C071'711.111.10
i'artyc,
Headed by an izrks.cutive Cotivittee composed of reprosentatives of the constituent
organizations, the Lien Viet is organized at interzonos pror5 nci al, and local levels
paralleling the goverment structua.--e, flpparently, the Lien Viet comnittee at any
particular level is supposed to PV:)Ordin: ?.te its activities with the programs of the
corros.,-onding Resistance ard CofIlLttco? in addition to being responcible
for carrying out spc,Aal tacks e.i.-;signed by the 7Liceol,:tive.;orr4~.1.11-,tce of the Lien Viet.
Tiorkers" iCortmunist) Tho iJorkers Party declares itself to be the
.4. 414 4.4.4 4..4.4?44
"lead:ing clerient in the n1-..t-..ir.onal otruggle for indeuricrcE,,,, and is acknowledged
be the source of tatiracte guidance by all admiu'Lctrative and "front" group orrani
tions It 1$.3 therefi.:?re? ns in other Ccaortunist states? the key to the cctual operation
of the entire govornmorital ctructuTe., Control in maintained prirarily by placing
Party ncr.tbers in key oitiorc in all governmntal and macs orilanization In
tie cabinets, for example$ sore ministers are non-rarty people:) brit in all these canes
it appears that the vice-ardnis,or -Is a iNrty member,: Party mothers are charged with
seizing "loading roles" in ;;II crg7..n1.7,ations to which they belong
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Reported figures for Party membership vary so widely that no adequate
estimate is possible, nor is it known whether membership is increasing. The
Party apparently pamtrates the military services by a system of political
commissars {in some instances the military commander serves in both capacities),
but the ratio of Party members to total troop strength has not been established,
The precise membership of the Tongbos or Politburo, is uncertain*
Viet Minh Morale and Internal Controls
In their public utterances, Viet Minh leaders radiate confidences although
no effort is made to disguise their belief that a protracted struggle, involv-
ing many hardships, uill be necessary before the "completion of the revolution"
will be achieved* The ability of the Viet Minh to hold off the forces of a
major world power for almost seven years, and the consolidation of Communist
control in a powerful neighbor to the North, must lend encouragement to the
leadership* Although the leaders, current estimates of capabilities and
prospects cannot be surmised, there is no evidence that doubts, if any, have
been communicated to the population at large.
The existence of diseontent among some segments of the population in
Communist-controlled are e-,- is revealed by continuing defections and by the
constant stream of Viet Minh propaganda attempting to justify and explain the
hardships which must be endured during the present stage of the struggle* There
are some indications that intellectuals, as a group, are anong the most
disillusioned and frustrated elements in the population -- presumable because
they better understand the implications of Communist control of the Viet Minh
movement and because their position in society is jeopardized by the necessity
for conforming to Party structures. Popular dissatisfaction attributable to
repressive controls may be increased by awareness that economic conditions are
generally better in free areas than in the Viet Minh zones,.
Consolidation of Communist control has proceeded despite some discontent*
There have been no effective uprisings in areas firmly held by the Viet Minh.
It is clear that the Communists rely on a combination of coercion and persuasion
to maintain loyalty, or at least effective control, but the extent of voluntary
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Rogno AM IP IRO, ewe IN*
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cooperation is not clear. Political controls involve the sanctions imposed
by operation of the standard Communist system of public denunciation,
confession, and uguidedn re-dedication, augmented by Party penetration of
All organizations and by police controls. It is not known just what role the
Viet Minh military arm plays in the maintenance of internal order. Economic
controls seem to be relatively effective as they relate to the organization
of production for war purposes and the collection of taxes from the population,
although it is apparent that there has been considerable resistance to the
method of collecting taxes in kind and to the magnitude of the levies. In
fringe areas, which are often controlled by French forces by day and by the
Viet Minh at night, Communist exactions represent double taxation, which is
undoubtedly resented but often complied with as a form of protection.
There are clearly many Vietnamese who still believe that the Viet Ninh
represents the true nationalist force in Indochina, and who therefore support
the regime despite possible dissatisfaction with the deprivations which the
war demands, The longer effective Viet Minh occupation of large areas continues,
the more successful will be the Communist program of indoctrination and re-
education. These efforts are being directed primarily at youth, and it appearep
that, in general, the most enthusiastic support for the Viet Minh comes from
younger elements in the population.
intra-Elite Relationships of the Regime
Eon-Communist elements within the leadership of the Viet Minh appear to
exercise very little effective power. The Democratic and Socialist Parties
have been maintained, apnarently to preserve the appearance of an opportunity
for non-Communist political activity, but in fact the programs of these parties
coincide completely with the official tr.Linen of the Viet Minh. The extent to
which this support and cooperation is voluntary cannot be ascertained. Non-Party
officials appear to be effectively controlled by their Communist associates.
36-
S-E-C-Re:-I
WM OM varm aele War
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r;EC IIET
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