WORLD WAR II DEMONSTRATED THE DECISIVE ROLE THAT AIR POWER CAN PLAY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00478R000800340004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 22, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/23: CIA-RDP92B00478R000800340004-3
I I ?
OFFICE' OF A:S:S1STANr SCWARY OF EFENSt PUBLIC
WASHINGTON, D C 20,3 01
PLEASE NOTE DATE:
HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL AFTER
12:30 P.M. NEWS CONFERENCE
FRIDAY, AUGUST 22, 1980
NO.351-80
OX 5-0192 (Info.)
OX 7-3189 (Copies)
STATEMENT BY WILLIAM a. PERRY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
World War II demonstrated the decisive role that air power
can play in military operations. It also demonstrated the
potential of radar as a primary means of detecting aircraft and
directing fire against them. On balance, though, the advantage
clearXy was with the aircraft. Subsequent to World War II,
defensive missiles -- both' ground launched and air launched --
were developed and "married" with radar fire control systems.
This substantially increased the effectiveness of air defense
systems, shifting the balance against aircraft. For the
last few decades we have been working on techniques to
defeat such air defense systems. At present, our military
aircraft make substantial use of electronic countermeasures
(jamming) and flying low to place themselves in "ground
clutter," both of which degrade the effectiveness of air
defense radars. By these means we have maintained the
effectiveness of our military aircraft in the face of radar-
directed defensive missiles.
However, the Soviets continue to place very heavy emphasis
on the development and deployment of air defense missiles in an
attempt to offset the advantage we have in air power. They have
built thousands of surface-to-air missile systems, they employ
radars with high power and monopulsP tracking circuits which are
very difficult to jam, and in the last few years they have developed
air-to-air missiles guided by "look-down" radars which are capable
of tracking aircraft flying in "ground clutter."
Because of these developments and because of the importance
we attach to maintaining our air superiority, we have for years
been developing what we call "penetration" technology: the
technology that degrades the effectiveness of radars and other
sensors used by air defense systems. A particular emphasis
has been on developing that technology which makes an aircraft
"invisible"* to radar. In the early 60's, we applied a particular
* "invisible" is of course a figure of speech
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/23: CIA-RDP92B00478R000800340004-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/12/23 : CIA-RDP92B00478R000800340004-3
version of thiltechnology to some::of ourekconnaissance aircraft.:
In themid-70s 'e applied it to the -cruise missiles then being .
developed -(Tomahawk and ALCM). By.the summer of-1977 it became
clear that this technology could be considerably extended in its
effectiveness and could be appliectto a wide class of vehicles
including manned aircraft. We concluded that it 'was possible
to build aircraft so difficult todetect that they could not be
successfully engaged by any existing air defense Systems. Recognizing
the great significance of such a development we took three related
actions: first, we made roughly a ten-fold increase in our.
investment to advance this technology; second, we initiated a
number of very high priority programs to apply this technology;
-and third we gave the entire program extraordinary security
protection, even to the point of .classifying the very existence
of such a program.
Initially we were able to limit knowledge of the program
to a very few Government officials in both the Executive and
Legislative Branches and succeeded in maintaining complete
secrecy about the program. However, as the program increased
in size -- currently the annual funding is 100 times greater than
when we decided to accelerate the program in 1977:.-- it became
necessary to brief more people. .-The existence of a:stealth
program has now become public knc5wledge. But even as we acknowledge
the existence of ,a stealth. program, we will draw .a new security
line to protect that information about the program which could
facilitate a Soviet countermeasures program. We will .continue
to protect at the highest security level information about:
a. the specific techniques which we employ to reduce,
detectability;
b. the degree of success of each of these techniques;
C.
:
characteristics of specific vehicles being developed;
d. funds being applied to specific programs; and
e. schedules of specific programs.
With those ground .rules, I think you can see that I am
extremely limited in what I can tell you about the program.
will say this. First, stealth technology does not involve a.
single technical approach, but rather a complex Synthesis. of-'
many. Even if I were willing to describe it to you, I could not
do it in a sentence or even a paragraph. Second, while we have
made remarkable advances in the technology in the last three
years, we have been building on excellent work done in our ?
defense technology program over the last two decades. Third,
this technology -- theoretically at least -- could be applied
to any military vehicle which can be attacked by radar-directed
fire. We are considering all such applications and are moving
with some speed to develop those applications which are the most
practical and which have the greatest military significance.
Fourth, we have achieved excellent success on the program,
including flight t?.Fts of a number of different vehicles.
END
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/23: CIA-RDP92B00478R000800340004-3