LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMATION - STEALTH AIRCRAFT REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00478R000800340001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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96th Congress
2d Session
COMMITTEE PRINT { No. 30
LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMATION-STEALTH
AIRCRAFT
REPORT
OF THE
INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FEBRUARY 3, 1981
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-3550 WASHINGTON: 1980
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INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
SAMUEL
S. STRATTON, New York, Chairman
ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West V
DAN DANIEL, Virginia
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., Texas
ANTONIO B. WON PAT, Guam
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama
.`m?-?
irginia ROBIN BEARD, Tennessee ?
ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR., Virginia
ROBERT E. BADHAM, California
FLOYD SPENCE, South Carolina
LARRY J. HOPKINS, Kentucky
JOHN F. LALLY, COUR8e/
MARY ANN GH.LBECE, Counsel
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, D.C., February 3, 1981.
Hon. MELVIN PRICE,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Attached is a report of the Investigations
Subcommittee 96th Congress, entitled, "Leaks of Classified National
Defense Information?Stealth Aircraft." A quorum being present,
the report was approved without objection by the Subcommittee
Members on February 3. This report is based on hearings held by
the Investigations Subcommittee on August 27, September 4 and 16,
and October 1, 1980.
I shall appreciate your early approval of the report so that it may
be printed.
Sincerely,
Approved for printing:
MELVIN PRICE, Chairman
Date: FEBRUARY 3, 1981.
SAMUEL S. STRATTON,
Chairman, 96th Congress.
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LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL DEFENSE
INFORMATION?STEALTH AIRCRAFT
On August 20, 1980, the Committee on Armed Services was briefed
by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development
on a highly classified research program, the so-called "Stealth"
technology or "ghost" aircraft. During that briefing the members
of the committee were cautioned on the sensitivity of the information
and reminded that absolute secrecy was essential for the protection
and preservation of the program. That same evening a national
television news program, ABC, devoted a segment several minutes
in length to a discussion of the Stealth program, complete with charts,
graphs, and drawings of the aircraft. In the words of one committee
member, "The Nation's viewers were given clearer information
than members of the House Armed Services Committee."
Two days later the Secretary of Defense, accompanied by the
Under Secretary for Research and Development, held a press con-
ference at which he officially exposed the existence of the Stealth
program. He described it as "a major technological advance of
great military significance. This so-called 'Stealth' technology enables
the United States to build manned and unmanned aircraft that cannot
be successfully intercepted with existing air defense systems," he
said. The Secretary justified his disclosure of the program by referring
to several leaks in the press and television news coverage. He said,
"In the face of those leaks, I believe it is not appropriate or credible
for us to deny the existence of this program."
The sudden shift of this program from a secrecy which prevented
even the mention of its name, to a press conference in which it was
unveiled to the whole world, caused committee members to question
the Secretary's claimed basis for the decision to reveal the existence
of the program. If the rationale for the disclosure, as suggested by
the Secretary of Defense, was the leaks which had occurred early in
August, we wondered how those leaks had occurred and what, if
anything, had been done to determine their sources; and if not,
why not?
While occasional leaks of defense information have always been a
problem, several recent events have suggested that leaks are now
approaching cascade proportions. Moreover, it appeared that little
action was being taken within the Pentagon to identify the source
of those leaks and take disciplinary action against the individuals
responsible. These leaks thus raised serious questions concerning the
effectiveness of the Government's program for , protecting vital
national defense information.
No modern state can survive unless it can protect its defense and
national security plans, techniques, and other vital secrets. Therefore,
in an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of American programs for
protecting classified national defense information, the subcommittee
(1)
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began a series of hearings on August 27, 1980. Those hearings con-
cluded on October 1. As a result of those hearings, the subcommittee
has made the following findings, conclusions, and recommendations:
SUBCOMMITTEE FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Stealth program, advanced research and development of
aircraft that would have minimum detectability by radar, was
specifically designated as a "compartmentalized secret" program
within the Pentagon in 1977. Without going into further classification
details, that designation means that the program was of the highest
security classification, required very special handling, and was re-
garded as so sensitive that very few, if any, Members of Congress
were aware of it, and only a few congressional staff people with top
security clearances.
2. From 1977 until the summer of 1980 the Stealth program received
very little attention in the press?as should, of course, be the case
with any such highly classified program. Much of the credit for no
press disclosure during that period, however, rests with an outstanding
act of press responsibility in the national security field by the editor
of the Armed Forces Journal, Mr. Benjamin Schemmer, who, at the
request of the Pentagon, withheld publication of a fairly detailed
article on the Stealth program he had written in June 1978 from
unclassified sources.
3. During the week of August 10, 1980, a magazine (Aviation Week),
a newspaper (The Washington Post), and a national television news
report (ABC) all contained items relating to Stealth, and particularly
to a "Stealth bomber" being developed by the United States. At
least one of these press references also suggested that the Carter
administration was deliberately planning to make public the exist-
ence of this new program in an effort to combat the impact, in a Presi-
dential election campaign, of Mr. Carter's 1977 decision to terminate
production of the B-1 bomber at a time when the Soviets were already
heavily engaged in series production of their own slightly smaller
Backfire bomber.
4. On August 18, 1980, Mr. Schemmer was contacted by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Dr. William
Perry, who advised him that since he had withheld the earlier article
on Stealth, the Secretary was prepared to give him a personal update
on the progress of that program which would include some, but not all,
of the information contained in Schemmer's earlier article. Dr. Perry
told Mr. Schemmer that this information was to be for publication and,
in fact, he seemed anxious, Mr. Schemmer testified, that it be in print
and out for distribution no later than August 21. The information
was thereupon provided to Mr. Schemmer and he was urged to print
it, although Mr. Schemmer told Secretary Perry that it was his
"strong conviction that it was irresponsible to let this information
out at this time."
5. On August 22, Secretary Brown and Under Secretary Perry held
a formal press conference at the Pentagon at which they officially con-
firmed the existence of the Stealth technology., and in fact hailed it as a
major technological advance of great military significance, with a
direct bearing on the military balance between the Soviets and our-
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selves. Throughout the press conference Secretary Brown's comments
referred repeatedly to a Stealth "bomber."
Moreover, in his press conference, Secretary Brown justified his
decision to make this hitherto highly classified information public
becuase of certain "leaks." Secretary Brown claimed that these
"leaks" had made it "not appropriate or credible for us to deny the
existence of the program." And in his subsequent testimony before
the subcommittee on this point both he and Secretary Perry described
their decision to confirm publicly the existence of Stealth as solely
motivated by a desire to 'limit the damage" caused by. the earlier
press "leaks and the press speculation which was certain to result
from them.
6. When Adm. Daniel Murphy, USN, the top Defense official
charged with protecting highly classified security material within the
Department of Defense?including the "compartmentalized" secret
program known as Stealth?testified before the subcommittee, his
apparently indifferent reaction to those leaks which had allegedly
triggered the public disclosure by the Secretary of Defense of one of
the most highly guarded secrets of the Defense Department, proved
most difficult for the subcommittee to understand.
For example, no investigation of the source of these leaks to Aviation
Week and to the Washington Post had been requested, either by
Admiral Murphy, or by the Department, until Aguust 26, well after
the subcommittee inquiry had been announced, and only 1 day before
our actual hearings began. Moreover, the procedures existing within
the Department for insuring the protection of classified material, the
primary mission with which Admiral Murphy is formally charged,
appear?at least on the basis of his sworn testimony before the sub-
committee?to be casual in the extreme. In fact the admiral testified
that he did not really have control over such information. The respon-
sibility for safeguarding it and declassifying it was really up to the
individuals who had classified the material in the first place, or who
were currently handling it, he said, and he had no direct coordination
over these matters. In fact, he did not even have a list of which matters
were classified and which were not. Moreover, the first person to be
notified, under current DOD rules, in the case of the leak of classified
information, the subcommittee was advised, is not the Deputy Under
Secretary for Policy Review Admiral Murphy, but the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs, Mr. Thomas Ross. And he, we are ad-
vised, handles these sensitive matters by referring to his files to see
what has and what hasn't been publicly announced.
Admiral Murphy testified his only function was to set policy relating
to security. But it was quite impossible, either from the admiral's own
sworn testimony or the documents he later provided to the subcom-
mittee, to fathom precisely what that policy was.
Based on his own testimony, a reasonable person could conclude that
the top Defense Department official charged with protecting
Americans against damaging military security leaks was clearly not
devastated by the fact that such a highly prized item within his
jurisdiction should have somehow slipped out into the public domain,
and was thus made available to any potential enemy of the United
States; nor did he appear to be even curious about how this tragedy
might have occurred.
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7. Highly instructive in these circumstances is the basic philosophy
which this uniformed keeper of the Defense Department's highest and
most valuable military secrets espoused to the committee in connection
with the capability of the U.S. Department of Defense to prevent leaks
of vital classified material. Admiral Murphy told us that he believes
such leaks are "not unexpected" and "sometimes could be very impor-
tant to our country." He believes they will develop because of "the
current state of our law, our regard for the rights of the press to freely
gather information without harassment and without curtailment by
the Government," and "the human propensity in all branches of Govern-
ment to share tidbits of information with inquisitive reporters and influence
public opinion on certain national security initiatives" (italic added).
As for how to deal with this problem, Admiral Murphy had this
further observation:
I don't think the solution is prosecution or a more re-
pressive climate of probes and checks and harassment of
the news media * * * What I am trying to point out
to you is that there are certain limitations that you face in
a democracy like we have in the United States that make
it very difficult to track down leaks of the kind we are
talking about.
8. Retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, a former Chief of Naval Operations
and member of the JCS and now a syndicated columnist, testified
under oath that sources within the Pentagon and the White House
had told him that a decision had, in fact, been made by the President
to leak certain information about Stealth so there would be an excuse
for a fuller, official disclosure about the existence of Stealth, ostensibly
as a "damage-limiting" operation, but in reality to enhance the image
of the Defense Department, under political attack for having done too
little to strengthen our military defenses.
Admiral Zumwalt further testified that, according to two officials
in the White House to whom he had spoken, Mr. David Aaron,
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
was the person who passed along the information that served as a
basis for the article that appeared in the Washington Post on August
14. Mr. Aaron filed an affidavit with the subcommittee denying that
he was the source of any information contained in the Post article.
Efforts by the committee to get Mr. Aaron to testify in person and
under oath before the subcommittee were frustrated, however, by
a dispute with the White House over the matter of executive privilege,
prior to the recess of Congress for the 1980 election on October 3.
As for the President's own participation in this process, in response
to a written inquiry by the subcommittee, the President denied that
he, or anyone on his staff, had disclosed classified information to
unauthorized sources: and he also said he had not initiated, but had
? approved, Secretary Brown's decision to go public with Stealth in
an effort at "damage-limiting" of the previous 'leaks" on the subject.
9. Ultimately, of course, it is the Secretary of Defense who has the
responsibility for protecting the Nation's top military secrets
within the Department of Defense. It is, therefore, instructive to
have the rationale of the Secretary of Defense in going public with
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Stealth in a formal press conference, thereby lending official con-
firmation, plus some additional details, in response to the limited and
unconfirmed information that had appeared earlier in the press, as
he testified before the subcommittee:
We had three options in dealing with this problem. The
first was to say nothing. In the context of our overriding ob-
jective to stop the flow of further leaks, this was a totally
unworkable option. A no comment in the face of a spectacular
news story by a reputable reporter in a major newspaper is
tantamount to confirmation, and this would have been an
implicit conformation, with no new line of restraint imposed.
It would have resulted in a rash of competitive reporting
and a cascade of new leaks, some of them containing much
more damaging information about the technical details of the
program.
A second suggested option was to try to discredit the story.
But I rejected any effort to deceive the press and the public
as both wrong and not feasible.
As the Nation learned to its bitter regret in the Watergate
era, a policy of deceiving the public undermines the basic
link of trust between the Government and the people.
Moreover, as the members of this committee well know,
Aviation Week and the Washington Post are read closely
in the Soviet Embassy and are viewed as authoritative
publications.
In those circumstances, I decided that the only truthful
and effective course of action would be to acknowledge what
has already been disclosed to the Soviets in the leaks and to
lay down strict new security guidelines to prevent any
further disclosures. By so doing we have, in effect, created a
"firebreak" to prevent the spread of the technical details
which, because they are at the heart of operational effective-
ness, may remain highly classified.
10. Secretary Perry also testified in a somewhat similar vein on the
rationale behind the decision to hold a formal press conference on
Stealth:
The first published security break in the program occurred
on June 28, 1980, in a Washington Post article which de-
scribed a new secret bomber under development which was
"invisible to enemy radar." I discussed this article with
Admiral Murphy to determine whether we should request an
investigation of the source of the information. We both agreed
that it would be better to ignore the article in hopes that the
story would not be picked up.
Shortly thereafter, I met with the Secretary of Defense to
discuss security aspects of the Stealth program. I advised him
that we should not respond to the June 28 leak, but that I did
not believe that we would be able to conceal the existence of
the program much longer. I told him of the necessary increase
in the number of people we had briefed in the Defense Depart-
ment, in the Congress, and among the contractors, and noted
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that further increases were in store. I summarized by saying
that I believed program existence already was starting to leak
out and that I believed that a controlled announcement would
be better than a series of leaks. I was concerned that if the
program started to leak, a flood might ensue, and that some
of the really sensitive information might be disclosed along
with the program's existence. I recommended that we con-
tinue to classify program existence but that we should be
prepared to respond quickly to more leaks. He accepted that
recommendation and asked me to begin the preparation of
revised security guidelines to be used if necessary * * *.
The major security break occurred on August 14 in the
Washington Post article, and irretrievably compromised the
existence of the program. But this only accelerated by a few
months what I had already considered to be inevitable; my
major concern was that there was an imminent danger of
having really damaging information come out, particularly
in view of the details that already had been obtained (in
1978) by Armed Forces Journal. On August 14 I sent the
Secretary of Defense proposed new security guidelines which
declassified program existence but drew a new line protecting
sensitive techmcal and operational details. I recommended
to him that we should implement the new security guidelines
immediately as a damage-limiting tactic. He accepted that
recommendation in prmciple, asked me to prepare imple-
menting plans and meet with him on August 16 for his final
review. (At the same time he asked the Secretary of the Air
Force, Dr. Mark, for his recommendations.) * * *.
Everyone advising the Secretary of Defense agreed that
the Washington Post article was a serious matter that could
not be ignored. General Ellis, SAC Commander, cabled
General Allen that he believed that this leak threatened the
viability of the program and that the story should be dis-
credited. My advice, and that of Dr. Mark, was that the
damage could not be undone; to deny the story would be
infeasible as well as improper and a "no comment" would
not stop the inquiries but rather stimulate them. However,
we did believe that what had been revealed in no way
threatened the very great value of the program to our
national security. Our real concern was centered on the
potential revelation of technical details which could facilitate
Soviet countermeasures. No such information had been re-
leased at that time, but there was a risk that it might. Both
Dr. Mark and I recommended implementing the new security
guidelines as the best way of minimizing this risk.
11. The fact is, however, that the so-called "damage-limiting" press
conference did not in any way abate the interest of the news media in
Stealth. It only focused attention on it; and it is hard to see how any
greater attention could have been paid to the subject, or any greater
damage done to the national security, had the Secretary merely
replied "no comment."
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12. There appears to be a very sharp divergence of opinion within
the Pentagon on how to handle these security leaks, as well as the
relative seriousness of them. Generally most, if not all of the top
uniformed officials do not share the casual, live-and-let-live attitude
toward vital security leaks exemplified by Secretary Brown, Secretary
Perry, and (on the record at least) Admiral Murphy.
But only one uniformed officer had the courage to express a sharp
open dissent with the Pentagon when he learned what Secretary
Brown and Secretary Perry were up to?Gen. Richard H. Ellis, the
Commander of the Strategic Air Command, which would, presumably,
be using any Stealth bombers that might eventually be produced.
Here is the message which General Ellis sent, through proper military
channels, to Gen. Lew Allen, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, when he
learned of the Washington Post leak of August 14th:
Today's Washington Post story on the possible develop-
ment of an advanced technology bomber brought the hair
up on the back of my neck. I don't have to tell aiiiressees
that giving the Soviets [ ] years advanced warning of a new
technology system they must counter is to sound the death
knell of that system. As the current Commander of the
combatant command that would eventually operate such a
system, I ask that you take immediate action at the necessary
levels to discredit the story and otherwise defuse the
situation.
General Ellis testified to the subcommittee that General Allen
shared the view expressed in this message. "Very much so," as General
Ellis put it.
N. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs is the officer
who determines initially whether there has been a breach of security
in the release of classified information. Incredibly, his determination is
based upon whether the classified information has already been
released, rather than by checking into which matters are currently
under security classification.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
1. It is the conclusion of the subcommittee that the release of
information about Stealth in the formal press conference was done
to make the Defense Department and the administration look good
in an election year, and not, as claimed, for purposes of damage-
limitation.
2. The release of this information in a formal press conleirence was a
serious mistake and did serious damage, as General Ellis has charged,
to the security of the United States and our ability to deter or to
contain a potential Soviet threat. The press conference gave the Soviets
information of far more value than was contained in the earlier leaks.
It amounted to official confirmation, which is far more helpful to the
Soviets in making their own decisions about where to make their
responses than are unconfirmed rumors. Since a Stealth bomber is
still at least a decade away, the Soviets have, as General Ellis pointed
out, been given a long lead, not only in duplicating what we have
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done, as they did with the atom bomb, but also in developing counter-
measures before the projected new aircraft would be operational.
3. Not enough evidence was presented to the subcommittee to
enable it to determine the truth or falsity of the reports to which
Admiral Zumwalt testified, viz, that the preliminary leaks of Stealth
information was actually orchestrated by the administration in order
to justify a formal press conference which would acknowledge the
existence of Stealth under the guise of damage-limitation. However, the
only alternative explanation is equally damaging, namely, that the
world's greatest military power is powerless to protect its most vital
military secrets while the ability to utilize these secret technologies
operationally is still years away.
Further evidence tending to support the Zumwalt report has sur-
faced subsequent to the subcommittee's hearings in the Govern-
ment's own investigation of the Stealth leaks, which the subcommittee
had prodded the administration into undertaking. In its January 1981
issue, the Armed Forces Journal reports that 23 months after the
Justice Department began its investigation it is still only in "the
preliminary stages," because, "we're still trying to resolve whether
this was an authorized or an unauthorized leak." In other words,
even the FBI has been unable to determine positively that the infor-
mation which appeared in Aviation Week and the Washington Post
before the Brown press release was not given to these publications
deliberately by official administration sources, acting pursuant to
competent authority.
4. The status of the machinery for protecting secrets in the Pentagon
is in deplorable shape and desperately needs a total overhaul. The idea
that a democracy is constitutionally inhibited in protecting those
secrets vital to its defense as well as its survival is utterly false and
totally unacceptable.
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
1. A total revamping of Defense Department procedures for the
protection of classified security information must be undertaken at
once. This revamping should involve the establishment of a clear-cut
procedure in which some one official has a complete record of those
programs, papers, and issues regarded as being of the highest security
classification. This official should also be fully informed as to which
persons are privy to this kind of information; and he must maintain
a clear documentary record of when, under what circumstances,
for what reasons, and by whose authority whenever such informa-
tion is declassified.
Secretary Brown pointed out to the subcommittee that since he
had originally designated Stealth as a compartmentalized secret
project he had, under existing DOD security rules, exclusive author-
ity to declassify that project at any time he choose?as in effect
he did when he held his press conference. There is, however, no
document that the subcommittee has been provided which indicates
at what time and date this declassification took place, who directed
it, for what reasons it was directed, and what alternate security
procedures, if any, were substituted for the original classification.
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2. Before any effective security system can be established, the
Pentagon must totally disabuse itself of the philosophy which its top
officials repeatedly testified to before the subcommittee, that in a
democracy there is really nothing the Department can do to prevent
security leaks, or track them down when they occur.
3. In order to prevent any repetition of the unfortunate and costly
decision of Secretary Brown to declassify existence of the Stealth
program, it is recommended that the new security program recom-
mended by this subcommittee include a provision that no declassi-
fication of the Nation's most vital military secrets can be made by
any single official?even the Secretary of Defense. Rather, procedures
should be devised to insure that any such decision must be made
only after a thorough review by a special panel, which would include
top Department intelligence officials, the Department's top security
official, and the full membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. It is further recommended that henceforth Pentagon security
officials proceed on the assumption that any damage caused by the
leak of vital security information can never be 'limited" by the
release of still more information on that particular subject. The best
response in such circumstances should be 'no comment." As Speaker
Rayburn used to say, "Nobody can ever blame you for something
you didn't say."
5. The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs should be taken entirely out of the process for protecting
classified matter, or initiating Pentagon investigations into security
leaks. In other words, in determining whether there has been any
"authorized" release, or declassification of classified matter, that
should not involve any action by the public affairs office.
6. The appropriate committees of Congress should begin at once,
with the assistance of Defense and internal security officials, to de-
velop and enact legislation to provide for: (1) the designation, by
appropriate authorities, of those military secrets regarded as being
the most important and vital to the security of the Nation; and (2)
along lines similar to those set forth in the Official Secrets Act of the
United Kingdom, prevent, by the establishment of appropriate
penalties, the publication of such secrets; or, in the alternative,
require that any publication of such information by the media be
accompanied by the name of the source of such information.
0
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