LETTER TO MALCOLM BALDRIGE FROM JAMES L. BUCKLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R001801680028-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 10, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/25: CIA-RDP92B00181R001801680028-7~S-T 1'
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UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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February 10, 1982
Dear Mr. Secretary?
The Cabinet Council in its meeting of December 16
considered the proposed transfer to the private sector
of earth resources and meteorological satellite programs
currently operated by the U.S. Government, and I under-
stand that the issue will be discussed again shortly.
Space remote sensing is of considerable interna-
tional interest. In the United Nations, draft '
principles governing remote sensing have been debated
for a number of years. Many developing countries and
the Soviet bloc propose restrictions on the use of space
remote sensing and on the dissemination of remote sensing
data. United States success in resisting these efforts
to date has been due in large measure to the fact that
data from our civil LANDSAT and meteorological satellite
programs have been made. readily available to, and have
been useful in the national development programs of these
same developing countries. We have defended the right to
collect and disseminate data and, as an important element
in this effort, we have promoted public non-discriminatory
. access to such data on reasonable terms. .The maintenance
of an international climate in which we can continue to
conduct all of our space programs -- both civil and those
dedicated directly to national security -- without facing
.burdensome international restrictions and regulations is
an important objective of the Department of State.
The Honorable
Malcolm Baldrige,
Secretary of Commerce.
:~T~i~~N T I n r
GDS 1 22 87
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CONFIDENTIAL
In the civil land remote sensing area, the Depart-
ment considers it of great importance to maintain the
continuity of our non-discriminatory data policy which
was established by President Nixon in 1969. Any
reversal of this policy would no t~only have adverse
political repercussions but also could encourage devel-
oping countries to apply more restrictive practices in
their dealings with U.S. firms interested in resources
exploration and extraction.
A related foreign policy concern is the need to
move ahead with planning for continuation of U.S.
-land remote sensing satellite services beyond those
~to be provided by Landsat-D. The U.S. was once the
unquestioned technological and commercial leader in
the land remote sensing field. We now~face serious
competition from .France and Japan which are currently
building Landsat-type satellites, and from a host of
foreign firms which-offer related ground hardware and
services. With no plans for further government space-
craft to follow Landsat-D and considerable uncertainty
as to when arrangements for initiation of private sector
satellite services could be put into place, our country
is faced with the growing likelihood that our foreign
policy and commercial gains of the past two decades will
be lost to aggressive foreign interests. The French,
promising long-term continuity for their program, are
aided by the uncertainty of our own. Their direct
governmental support for the French commercial remote-
sensing entity also affects the prospects for purely
private competition. The Department of State believes
that this threat to our national and commercial leader-
ship and, potentially, to our national participation
in civil remote sensing by satellite, must be carefully
assessed as the Administration considers how best to
proceed .with Commercialization'of this important national
program.
It has also been proposed that the civil weather sat-
ellite system be simultaneously transferred to the private
sector. The United States is the principal user and chief
beneficiary of global meteorological data. U.S. meteoro-
logical data including that obtained by our own weather
.satellites is made available at no cost to-the world
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community both directly and through the-World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO). In return, the U.S. re -
ceives satellite and ground-based weather data .acquired .
by other countries from their own sensors. These
arrangements have been highly successful.
Considerable international concern has been ex-
pressed to the Department as a result of press reports
of the U.S. government's intention to commercialize
our weather satellite program. In particular, other
countries anticipate that commercialization will lead
to charges for and cutbacks in the availability of U.S.
weather satellite data which were previously available
at no cost. If charges for U.S. satellite data .are
instituted, countries which have provided data free
to the U.S. through WMO or bilateral arrangements will
likely institute reciprocal charges, with resulting cost
implications to the U.S. In addition some countries may
forego some of their weather data gathering activities,
if U.S. commercialiaztion results in cost increases for
them. This could have serious consequencies for U.S.
forecasting activities -- both civilian and military.
For example, Canada has noted that such cost increases
could result in a cutback of its artic weather data
collection activities which in turn could critically
affect U.S. civil and military aviation.
A most unacceptable outcome for U.S. foreign policy
iri either land or meteorological satellites would be a
United Nations initiative to .operate and manage such re-
mote sensing systems -- where U.S. costs ~rould still be
25$ but with significantly deminished U.S. influence.
International support for the the UN role in space
systems i"s continually growing .as several nations are
now able to supply and launch such systems. We believe
that disregard for these international sensitivities
would increase pressure for such UN systems.
A further consideration is the potential impact of
commercialization on future ,. co operative programs such as
those in which France and the U.K. provide, at no cost to
us, instruments which are flown on NOAA's polar orbiting
weather satellites.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL'
In view of the above; the Department of State believes
that the international and national security implications
of weather satellite commercialization -- short .and long
term -- are critical and should be fully considered before
a decision to proceed with commercialization is taken. ..
? Sincerehy,
James L. Buckley
?CONFIDENTIAL
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