INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S. SPACE POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R001801680006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 3, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

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UtF'Att I MEN I 01- I HE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM FOR
MEMORANDUM
May 26, 1982
IC STAFF
-
Returned for your information..Lei
1 Attachment
JIMMEY R. MOR LL
Lt Col, USAF
Deputy for National
Security Council Affairs
STAT
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International Aspects of U.S.
Space Policy
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I. Policy Framework 1
Program IssueS 11
Cooperative Science and
Application Program 12
Space Station 18
Launch Services 22
Telecommunications 27
Remote Sensing of Land Resources 33
Meterological Remote Sensing 37
Defense Related Space Program 47
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INTEL .A727CNAI, 2.5PECTS Or U.S. SPACE PetIcy - 7,7-7 ASSM"
One of the basic objectives of U.S. space pollay is to
conduct our visible civil programs in a manner which creates an
international climate of legitimacy and acceptance thus
allowing ?the U.S. more freedom. to conduct all of its space ?
activities (military as well as civil) With Minimal
international interference._ This is one of the reasons why the
has .carefully developed and maintained worldwide .user
? communities in areas of launch assistance, remote sensing.
weather service, telecommunications, and space sciences.
International involvement in these programs has also proved
valuable from both the economic and the technioal points of
view. The ongoing review of U.S. space policy should consider
current. practices as they serve all of these goals and should
consider any new policies in these contexts among others.
I. Policy Framework
A. Legal Climate
U.S. activities in space are conducted within the context
of a body of domestic and international law anti policy. The
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the United Nations
Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and numerous Presidential policy
decisions provide consistent guidance encouraging the
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widespread use of space for "peaceful purposes." This
encouragement applies to private as well as public entities,
with the requirement that the activities of non-governmental
organizations be placed under the supervision of their
governments. There is considerable latitude for policy
flexibility within this minimal regulatory regime. It is
acknowledged internationally that this body of jurisprudence is
not intended to inhibit non-aggressive military activity in
space, civil or military remote sensing programs, or private
sector activity in space.
B. Foreign Policy
While the space program is not an instrument designed for
foreign policy ends, its contributions to our foreign policy
are substantial. First, foreign policy benefits accrue because
of the role of military space systems in promoting foreign
policy objectives. Space systems are key to our ability to
constrain Soviet misconduct through deterrence, which is vital
to our relationship with nations which look to the U.S. for
political leadership. Space assets are critical elements in
our military command and control functions and our ability to
communicate rapidly and reliably with our forces and with our
allies. U.S. and allied arms control negotiations and policy
positions in START, TNF, MBFR, ASAT, CW/BW and non-
proliferation negotiations and agreements depend on
intelligence information for Compliance verification and
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assurance. Our capabilities to detect missile launches,
accidental or otherwise, contribute to strategic stability.
In addition, a robust and durable space program
demonstrates the scientific and technological capabilities of
the United States, thus contributing to our image as a world
leader. Furthermore, to the extent that capabilities developed
for the space program can contribute to American economic
viability and competitiveness, they strengthen the coun':ry.
Perceived and actual U.S. strength clearly undergirds all U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
Lastly, opportunities for international participation in
civil portions of our space program can assist our foreign
policy goals. Few nations have the capability to operate in
space themselves; our provision of access to space for
qualified foreign partners permits them to share in highly
visible and attractive programs. It also shows U.S.
willingness to conduct joint programs tO solve joint problems.
This mutually beneficial cooperation contributes to positive
overall bilateral relations with these countries. Furthermore,
our willingness in general to provide to the world the results
and benefits of our science and applications programs provides
a positive element to our relations with a much larger number
of countries. More generally, specific space programs with
? clear development potential--such as Landsat--strengthen the
U.S. position in the constant debate over proper North-South
relationships.
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C. Space Cooperation
In the tight budget times that all of the industrialized
democracies are now facing, no nation can afford to dominate
all areas of scientific accomplishment. Collaboration on
large-scale, high-cost programs provides us the opportunity to
pursue programs that would otherwise be unaffordable.
Carefully constructed cooperative programs can yield the
benefits of access to foreign scientific and technological
expertise, foreign R&D facilities, and foreign funds.
Historically, this strategy has been successful for the US:
foreign expenditures for the development of spacecraft for
joint programs, construction of hardware for U.S. spacecraft,
and support of scientific experiments on joint missions have
thus far exceeded $2 billion. This strategy has not involved
the setting aside of money specifically for international
cooperative projects. Cooperation is carried out through
foreign participation in domestic projects competitively
selected on their own merits and funded under domestic funding
lines.
Cooperation can also be a factor in minimizing competitive
pressure. Foreign agencies' alignment of their space programs
with ours--as for example, in developing Shuttle-compatible
systems--has the first order effect of supporting our system
and the second order effect of diverting foreign resources from
competitive programs.
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There is yet another benefit of international cooperation
in our, space projects which, although less tangible, is real.
Meaningful participation by our fliends and allies in high
visibility programs confirms the openness of our programs.
This very effectively counters Soviet and other attempts to
cast suspicion on our national intentions in space. Widespread
support for U.S. space programs such as remote sensing has
developed over the years--despite early vociferous
objections--because of the availability of the program to all
foreign nations. This general acceptance of U.S. activity in
space has served to protect our freedom of action for all our
desired routine uses of space, including civil, military and
commercial uses.
D. Competition
Waning U.S. leads in space technology areas in the face of
increasingly stiff foreign competition argue for new strategies
to enhance U.S. competitiveness. We are seeing aggressive
pursuit of the market by Europe and Japan in areas such as
launch services, remote sensing and telecommunications
satellites. Foreign governments support competitiveness across
the board in funding R&D, price subsidization and financing;
development of attractive package deals; and creation of
quasi-governmental marketing organs.
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Industry to government relationships in many other
countries differ radically from those in the U.S. Although the
private sector is active, foreign government intervention
acknowledges limitations on the ability of the private sector
to support the high R&D and operational costs of aerospace
projects. .Aggressive pump-priming by European and Japanese
Governments have ensured these countries' effective competition
in the world market place against other space powers,
particularly the U.S. In France, elements of the aerostJace
industry have been heavily government-supported--and government
involvement is increasing under the Mitterand Government which
is nationalizing much of the private aerospace industry. A
close relationship between many foreign governments and foreign
industry, particularly in high technology areas, is
traditional; the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (nITI) forms partnerships with Japanese industry on
high risk, high technology R&D projects. Furthermore, the
Japanese Government, like many others, actively promotes the
international marketing of domestic products and technology;
this marketing assistance takes many forms including the
formation of government-supported sales promotion organizations
and the provision of extremely attractive package deals and
financing arrangements for foreign customers.
In the area of launch services, European salesmen are
moving aggressively into a traditional U.S. preserve, the
provision of reimbursable launch services. Barring a greatly
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improved U.S. marketing posture, the European launcher, Ariane,
with its aggressive marketing, low prices, and attractive
financing will be able to capture a share of the world market
for reimbursable satellite launches limited only by its total
launch capacity, The Europeans have already begun to offer
extremely attractive package deals for the launch of
communications satellites built by European veneors. Thus, if
this approach proves successful, the economic loss to U.S.
industry, particularly the U.S. telecommunications industry,
may far exceed the revenue loss for launch services alone.
In the area of remote sensing, there is a rapidly growing
competition to the U.S. monopoly. France and Japan in the near
term are motivated by the prospects of worldwide commercial
sales to benefit their industries. (In fact, France expects
the U.S. to develop into 50% of its market.) Some developing
countries, including India and Brazil, are motivated by the
political prestige of operating their own systems.
Furthermore, aggressive foreign competition has developed in
the market for ground station hardware. Canadian, German,
French and -Japanese firms have well developed lines of ground
receiving hardware and Processing equipment. Non-U.Se firms
have even acquired a significant portion of the market for
supplying ground staticn equipment to countries receiving
Landsat direct read-out. A number of foreign firms also off #r
data analysis and other value-added services, an area which
until recently was dominated by the U.S.
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Foreign international sales efforts often rely on
comprehensive government foreign aid assistance packages and
concessionary financing. Although French, Canadian, German,
and Japanese foreign assistance funding is active in support of
their remote sensing industries, it has been the practice of
the U.S. Agency for International Development not to fund
foreign acquisitions of remote sensing ground station
hardware.
In commercializing the French remote sensing
satellite system, SPOT, the French Government has made a
ten-year commitment to data continuity and has concluded that
considerable subsidies will be needed, at least through this
decade, for continued government R&D, support for operation of
the space and ground segments, and assistance in the worldwide
marketing effort.
In the area of telecommunications, the ability of U.S.
industry to continue to provide needed domestic and
international telecommunications services depends on its
ability to meet rapidly expanding demands. The worldwide
multibillion dollar market for telecommunications equipment is
being served by European and Japanese firms as well, however.
In those countries, government-industry teams and direct
government-sponsored R&D serve to reduce perceived program
risks and spur domestic industry in effective international
competition. The competitiveness of U.S. industry will depend
on its participation in R&D, particularly in advanced
satellites and the yet to be developed 30/20 GHz (Ka) frequency
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band. These competitive factors should be considered in any
future study of government participation in advarced
communications satellite technology.
? It is relevant to note that in the area of research and
development specifically, a recent OECD report reviewed trends
in industrial R&D in selected OECD countries and noted that
aerospace R&D is characterized by a very high degree of
government funding and it is, in fact, the only manufacturing
industry in which private funds are not the major source in
most countries.
E. Competition vs. Cooperation
Ever-increasing capabilities simultaneously make foreign
nations more effective competitors and more desirable
partners. To reap the benefits of cooperation without
jeopardizing the competitive position of U.S. industry, care
must be exercised in selecting, defining and implementing joint
programs. Projects or pieces of projects leading to the
development of commercially useful technology are not usually
? open for international participation. In projects where there
is foreign involvement, that involvement is structured so as to
avoid technology transfer. Control of overall project design
generally remains with the U.S. and participation in one
element of a project-does not entitle a participant to
technical information on other elements; generally, only the
minimum amount of technical information necessary to ensure
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effective interface among the various elements of a project is
exchanged.
In all of the competitive areas cited above, ongoing NASA
programs involve interactions with foreign partners and/or
customers. In the area of launch services, foreign cUstomers .
must be provided information necessary to design their payloads
to interface with the launch vehicle and withstand the launch
environment. However, they are provided no information
regarding the major operating systems of the launch vehicles
themselves. In fact, recognizing the commercial and national
. security sensitivities of advanced U.S. launcher technology,
NASA conducts no cooperative programs in the launch vehicle
technology area. In the area of remote sensing, foreign ground
station operators must be provided with orbital parameters and
data transmission characteristics necessary to operate their
ground stations. But, they are provided no U.S. technological
information related either to the remote sensing satellite or
to the construction of ground stations. ' In the
telecommuniCations area, U.S.-built satellites purchased by
foreign customers have usually been delivered on-orbit thus
facilitating control of the technology. Regardless of
technology area, the normal export control procedures are
maintained in all transfers of technical information and
equipment; these procedures work to ensure that U.S. commercial
viability and U.S. ilational security not be jeopardized through
the transfer of inappropriate technology. Current practices
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protecting U.S. technology should be reaffirmed in any
guidelines resulting from the broad space policy study.
II. Program Issues
Following are a number of separate issue papers focussing
on the international implications of the broad space policy
issues under discussion in the ongoing review of U.S. space
policy. These papers are intended as an initial discuE3ion of
these issues. Further careful assessment, in the context of
the overall policy review, is recommended for each topic.
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COOPERATIVE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS
Since NASA's inception, NASA programs have been open to
foreign participation. Foreign partners have assumed financial
responsibility for contributions ranging from flight instru-
ments to ground-based support and scientific and technological
expertise in many fields. This mutually beneficial foreign
involvement has clearly extended NASA resources and provided
scientific and technical, financial and foreign policy gains.
We are, furthermore, entering a new era in space activities
when many countries are coming of age in areas which were
previously dominated by the US. Foreign technology
developments and ambitious foreign space programs have led to
significantly increased capabilities abroad which open up new
vistas for international space cooperation. Because of this,
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NASA no longer needs to play the role of funding the major
share of all cooperative projects, with foreign partners
playing a more minor role with regard to total mission costs.
In many recent missions, foreign partners have sought a
larger, more important role. An example is Infrared .
Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), where the foreign involvement
(the Netherlands is providing the spacecraft and the UK the
ground operations center) is almost equal to the US costs
(infrared telescope assembly and launch). The same is true of
the Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorers (AMPTE)
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where Germany and the US each provide one spacecraft,
scientific instruments and ground operations support, with NASA
additionally providing the launch.
We can take this scenario one step further and essentially
reverse the roles established in earlier experience allowing
our foreign partners to provide the spacecraft, launch, and
tracking and data acquisition operations. This new mode of
cooperation, where US instruments would fly on a foreig,1
satellite, could permit NASA to gain maximum returns for
minimum expenditures. Early possibilities for this arrange-
ment include the European Space Agency ocean remote sensing
mission, ERS-1, on which NASA is considering flying a coastal
zone color scanner. This opportunity would satisfy an
important NASA objective for its broad ocean science program.
Other opportunities for the flight of U.S. instruments on
foreign spacecraft are presented by two Canadian missions:
Mobile Satellite Communication System and Radarsat.
Negotiations are underway in all three areas.
Where nations decide to go it alone on missions with
similar objectives, it can be beneficial to develop an
arrangement for coordinated or complementary measurements. In
this manner countries with similar programs can pursue their
independent interests and at the same time expand their data
bases from one another's Pro,7rems. For example-. NASA's
Dynamics Explorer satellites and the Bulgarian 1300 spacecraft
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are independently pursuing investigations of the interactive
coupling of the Earth's magnetosphere and ionosphere; an
exchange of related observations has been agreed in order to
enhance the scientific results of both sides. Similarly, close
coordination is 'underway between Europe, Japan, the USSR and
the US to assure the maximum return from both sraceborne and
ground-based observations of Comet Halley in 1985-86.
NASA has always had a policy of open data disseminaion
under which the results of NASA scientific research are
available to the world scientific community. The US should
encourage foreign space agencies to pursue the same policy for
missions under their control so that all scientists have access
to such data whether their nations are directly involved or
not. In an era of constrained budgets, open data dissemination
by others is critical to permit US access to important new data
generated by foreign missions.
Just as the U.S. stands to gain substantially from
international space cooperation, we risk a correspondina
penalty when a commitment is terminated in an untimely
fashion. Deep cuts in NASA's budget recently forced the
cancellation of a significant portion of a large cooperative
program with the European Space Agency (ESA) on the
International Solar Polar Mission (ISDM). While legally
justified under the terms of the joint agreement, the decision
to cancel the U.S. portion of the ISPM was made without
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consultation with ESA at a point when ESA had already obligated
the greater part of its share of the funding. The elimination
of the U.S. spacecraft from the two spacecraft mission led to
extensive protest from Europe and gave rise to sericus concerns
about the reliability of the U.S. as a partner in large scale,
long term cooperative programs. Regaining the confidence of
our foreign counterparts should be a major and immediate goal.
The costs to the U.S. of curtailing a cooperative Project,
other than those inherent in the loss of the opportunity,
includes loss of prestige and strained relations that could, if
the venture were large enough, conceivably spread beyond the
scientific sphere. A would-be partner might also be more
reluctant to accept--or offer--a proposal for a future joint
mission, thus depriving the U.S. of a bene-ficial foreign
contribution or a chance to contribute to and share in the
results of a foreign space mission. These losses are
potentially serious in financial as well as other terms.
In order to reap maximum benefit from foreign countries'
aggressive pursuit of their own space programs, the following
approaches should be incorporated into U.S. policy on
cooperation in space activities:
-- The US should continue to seek the type of international
cooperation in space activities which has proven beneficial in
the past by serving budgetary, scientific and technical and
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foreign policy interests. Such cooperation should continue to
be structured in a manner which maintains U.S. technological
leadership and in no way jeopardizes U.S. national security and
economic interests.
-- In areas of programmatic compatibility, the US should seek
to fly US instruments on foreign spacecraft, thus allowing the
foreign partner to shoulder the bulk of mission expenses.
-- Where independent space projects with similar scientific
objectives are undertaken, the US should seek coordinated or
? complementary observations to enhance the independent program
objectives.
-- The US should encourage foreign space agencies to adopt open
data dissemination policies for foreign space missions
commensurate with US practices.
-- NASA should consult with foreign space agencies with regard
to long-term program planning. Such consultation should aim
towards the development of complementary, non-reduneart
activities and programs with cooperation in areas where mutual
benefit will result.
-- The U.S. derives many benefits from long-term projects
requiring funding over many years. NASA,- together with the
Department of State, OST? and OMB, should attempt to develop
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funding policies and mechanisms which will provide greater
assurance of U.S. reliability to foreign partners. Multi-year
authorizations and appropriations for programs having major
foreign involvement should be one of the mechanisms seriously
considered. At .the very least, all concerned agencies need to
reach a common understanding of international implications
involved in abrogating international agreements.
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SPACE STATION
The U.S. has seen substantial foreign interest in NASA's
future plans for establishing a space station. Much of the
foreign countries' interest flows from previous commitment to
the Shuttle; much of it comes from a combination of
long-standing successful cooperation with NASA and recognition
that they will not have the resources to pursue such a program
on their own. The European Space Agency contributed th,! $1
billion Spacelab system (52% of this money came from the FRG);
Canada presented us the $100 million Remote Manipulator System
(Canadarm). Italy has proposed joint development of a tethered
satellite system at a cost to them of $27 million (40% of total
program cost). ESA has just approved funding to study the
development of a ShUttle-launched, free flying, retrievable
space platform for science and applications purposes. All of
these foreign programs have tied the participating nations to
utilizing U.S. space systems, with the secondary effect of
diverting resources from competitive programs. Interest in
joining the U.S. in the next step is thus logical--aerived both
from this linkage of their programs with ours and from a desire
to expand upon technology and systems already developed for the
STS.
The decision as to whether the U.S. will proceed with the
development of a space station has, of course, not been made.
A variety of faster-or slower-paced, manned or unmanned options
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for developing a permanent presence in space are currently
under consideration. International involvement in any U.S.
development of a space station would serve broad U.S. interests
by:
Extending U.S. resources available for the program by
accepting potentially large foreign contriutions to the
program.
-- Providing access to foreign science and technology relevant
to the program.
-- Providing foreign policy benefits by allowing our partners
to share in a highly attractive and visible program.
-- Helping the U.S. obtain international acceptance of a U.S.
space station, rather than have it viewed with suspicion.
-- Promoting foreign utilization of U.S. space services thus
assisting U.S. competitiveness in the face of growing space
launch capabilities abroad.
At the same time a study of the desirability of
international participation in a space station must recognize
that anticipated national security community uses of a space
station could argue -against foreign involvement in the
program. The study must evaluate the seriousness of these
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concerns and present workable solutions wheie potential
problems are acknowledged. To this end recommendations should
ensure that:
-- Foreign participation is properly structured to avoid
technology transfer and interference with national security
objectives for the program.
-- Control of the overall station design and development
remains with the U.S., however, other countries' capabilities
and end-product utilization requirements should be considered
in the early planning stages.
-- All partners will accept full financial responsibility for
carrying out their Portions of the proaram.
To minimize technology transfer problems, participation in
one element of the program will not entitle a participant to
technical information on any other portion of the program.
-- To avoid managerial and technical interface problems:
-- Obligations and responsibilities of each cooperating
partner will be 'clearly defined on a case by case basis.
-- Foreign contributions shou13, insofar as posSible, take
the form of discrete hardware packages that lend themselves
to clean managerial and technical interfaces.
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-- Involvement of foreign participants in management
decision-making will be restricted to that necessary and
proper for the effective fulfillment of their
responsibilities.
Because of the high level of foreign interest and the
potential benefits to the U.S. of foreign contributions,
current early planning activities related to a U.S. space
station, should proceed on a basis that does not foreclose
international cooperation.
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LAUNCH SERVICES*
With Ariane now operational, Arianespace salesmen are
moving aggressively into a traditional U.S. preserve, the
provision of reimbursable launch services for communications
satellites. By 1985 and thereafter, at least 10 Ariane
vehicles will be launched annually; after ESA scientific and
other payloads are accommodated, at'least 10-15 Delta-class
communications satellite launches will be available for
commercial customers. Through a combination of lower prices
and concessional financing (mostly the former), Ariane appears
' likely to fill this capacity and more; already, only a few open
slots remain in Arianespace s launch schedule through 1985.
In both 1985 and 1986, STS commercial slots will be
available for no more than 10 Delta-class communications
satellites (or the equivalent) each year; Delta ELVs will
accommodate 10-11 per year on the basis of present production
assumptions, and Atlas/Centaur is currently expected to be ?
phased out in 1987, with only four launches planned in 1985 and
one each in 1936 and 1527. Availability cf STS launch slots
for commercial purposes may improve after 1986, but is unlikely
* This subject will be addressed in greater detail in NASA-led
"National Space Transportation System" study being conducted in
the context of the Space Policy tYorking Group.
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23
to reach even 20 per year (Delta-class or eq.uivalent) much
before 1998.
Meanwhile, there are about one hundred communications
satellites currently manifested on NASA vehicles, and the
bestavailable projection of demand shows a requirement for 24
Delta-class (or equivalent capacity) launches in 1987, rising
to about 32 annually by the end of the decade. Although this
analysis suggests that by 1986 or 1987 the world supply of
launch capacity may begin to exceed the demand, estimates of
demand for launch services have historically proven overly
conservative. Unless plans to phase out NASA expendable launch
vehicles are reversed and their use continued at least through
1990, a significant deficit in available launch capacity will
probably develoo. In the meantime, this assumed phase-out
forecloses significant procurement economies; at least partly
as a result, these vehicles are too expensive to be a viable
alternative to Ariane. Only the STS appears, under today's
pricing policies, capable of matching or beating Ariane prices,
and even that advantage is likely to erode sharply after FY
1985 when prices will go up. If only STS is available after
1987, Arianespace will be strongly tempted to fill the
resulting capacity gan.
If it is likely that both NASA and Arianespace rill be able
to fill their launch schedules for the remainder of the decade.
it might be argued that price and financing are inconsequential
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in such a seller's market. Indeed, most U.S. domestic
communications satellite companies operate in a regulated
common carrier mode which permits them to pass such costs on to
the end-user. Moreover, their operation has proven extremely
profitable, so that reliability of service, leading to
assurance that satellites will be orbited on schedule and begin
Producing revenue, is of paramount importance.
This assumption cannot be made, however, in the case of
non-U.S. customers. Many of them are in developing countries
which seek to realize development benefits rather than profits
from satellite communications. Revenues are likely to be
relatively limited, and often in non-convertible currencies,
while costs (for launch services and the satellites themselves)
are in hard currency. Price and financing may be of critical
importance in these cases.
The impact Of .competition from Ariane is unlikely to be
limited only to the loss of launch business. If Ariane's
aggressive marketing, low prices and attractive financing
enable it to operate at full capacity in the post-l85 period,
it may capture over 30 percent of the world market for
reimbursable communications satellite launches. Arianespace
has already begun to offer both communications satellite and
launch services. in a single package. ,The attractive price
break offered by. Ariane launch services .can be used to
advantage in pricing such packages to compete with U.S.
satellite makers.
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Under current policies, U.S. launch capacity will probably
be too limited and priced too high to prevent significant
Ariane market penetration by the mid-80s. This penetration
promises significant balance-of-payments effects, both directly
and because of its impact on the European competitive position
in the satellite construction market. Decisions must be made
soon on what measure the U.S. wishes to take and what costs it
is willing to bear in order to meet this challenge.
Pricing and financing issues aside, it is Important to note
a positive element of U.S. policy which has served to make U.S.
launch assistance attractive and reliable. U.S. policy
?regarding space launch assistance dating from the early 1970's
provides that the U.S. will launch spacecraft for foreign
countries and organizations on a non-discriminatory basis.
this launch assistance is available for spacecraft projects
which are for peaceful purposes and are consistent with U.S.
obligations under relevant international agreements. For
reimbursable launch services, foreign users are charged on the
same basis as comparable non-USG users. Furthermore, foreign
spacecraft are given the same treatment as non-USG users with
regard to priority and scheduling.
Changes in the U.S. approach which could improve our
competitive posture in the launch services area would include:
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-- A launch vehicle capability suited to the demands of the
international marketplace. This implies a number and mix of
launch vehicles adequate to assure foreign customers and
partners, as well as all domestic users, that the U.S. will be
reliable in meeting its commitments, both as to capability and
schedule. In particular, the role of ELV's should be
re-evaluated, with a particular eve to potential economies that
could make them more competitive with Ariane.
-- A launch vehicle policy which is sufficiently flexible
on price and other conditions such as financing to permit it to
be comoetitive with other launching organizations. Such policy
should also provide for an aggressive marketing effort.
-- Maintenance of a non-discriminatory launch policy which
provides reasonable assurance to foreian customers and partners
that they will not be unfairly or arbitrarily treated vis-a-vis
equivalent U.S. commercial and government users.
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27
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The major international issue in satellite telecommuni-
cations technology is the relative vigor of U.S. and foreign
R&D to meet future demands. Traffic projections between now
and the end of the century illustrate the economic magnitude of
the issue. Total worldwide demand in the year 2000, for_all
types of service, is estimated to be. over 10,500 equivalent
transponders; this compares with a 1980 demand for 311
equivalent transponders. This amounts to about $43 billion in
total market potential, over $19 billion of which is focused in
North American demand. Of the total to the turn of the
century, the demand for U.S. domestic services alone is
expected to be about 2,700.
Continued use of current satellite telecommunications
technology could result in saturation of satellite communi-
cations capacity by 1990 or 1902. Full utilization of current
technology C- and Ku-band satellites for'U.S. domestic use,
with the required 4o orbital separation, will permit about
800 equivalent transponders in orbit and result in orbit
saturation by about 1985; reduction to 30 separation on orbit
will allow VO to 1,200 transponder equivalents, sufficient to
meet projected demand only throuoh about 1190. The use of
advanced technologies, princinally incorporating the 30/20 CHz
or Ka-band, will allow these demands be met, an assessment
which has not been lost on Japanese and European competitors.
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U.S. carriers will still be able to meet high priority service
expansion demands, but perhaps only through the purchase of
this foreign technology currently under development. However,
a penalty will be imposed in the loss of worldwide exports of
all types of telecommunications equipment, in the loss of the
jobs required to produce that equipment, and in the consequent
further deterioration of the U.S. balance of payments with the
rest of the world.
During the mid-1970's, the U.S. Government withdrew to a
large extent from an active civil communications satellite R&D
role. An off-setting, broad-scale R&D activity was not assumed
by the private sector. The principal reasons cited for this
lack of involvement include the large finarlcial outlays
required (exacerbated by the fact that many critical systems
can only be tested through a demonstration program on orbit)
and the risk involved. A typical flight R&D program is likely
to cost in excess of $60 million per year over a four-year
period. By comparison, even the largest U.S. commercial
communications satellite organizations can only sustain R&D
expenditures of about S5-10 million per year. Foreign
competition, meanwhile, has grown apace, particularly in Japan
and Western Europe. In those countries, government-industry
teams or direct government-sponsored technology development in
industry, together with meaningful long-term planning and
steady funding levels, are the vehicles for reducing perceived
program risk, shortening the effective period of high risk
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?
29.
exposure and supporting domestic industry in international
competition.
The potential market for advanced communications satellite
technology is large. Western Union (June 1981) has estimated
that the global market for communications satellites and
related earth stations between 1981 and the year 2000 will
total between 38 and 49 billion dollars (1981 dollars).
Because of the growing orbit and spectrum saturation in the
currently used C and Ku frequency bands much of the increase in
demand after 1990 must be met through use of the yet to be
developed 30/20 GHz frequency band.
There continues to be keen competition from foreign
governments involved in the development, demonstration, and
planned operation of advanced communications technologies. The
Japanese communications satellite program includes the use of
Ka-band, with additional advanced technologies (multiple beam
antennas and on-board switching) planned for the 1985-86 time
frame; Japanese operational direct broadcast at Ku-band is
expected in 1383-84, with a follow-on exPectee in 10Pg. The
European L-Sat, recently approved, calls for multiple frecuencv
use, including Ka-band, incorporating advanced technologies for
both broadcast and fixed communication services. The Italian
ITALSAT will also investigate advanced Ka technologies. Fach
of these Programs is the beneficiary of strong government
support.
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The competitive position of U.S. prime spacecraft
production industry in this technology is eroding. There are
several reasons but the most important of them are the
following:
-- At least a 7 to 10 year development period is required
before new communications satellites operating in the 30/.",0 GHz
band can be brought into commercial operations. Investment
requirements are large and in the range 200-300 million
dollars, with return on investment about 4.3% (1981), less than
the national average. Significant revenue returns from that
investment cannot be expected for perhaps 10 years. Even at
rates much lower than the current 16 1/2 - 17 1/2% prime rate,
the present worth of revenues which do not start to flow until
10 years in the future is almost zero. The current cost of
money to the carrier compels the spacecraft production industry
to operate with short planning horizons and to require payback
to begin no more than 2 to 3 years following the initial
investment. This mitigates the attractiveness of risky R&D
programs.
-- The second factor recognizes that the technology required to
open the 30/20 GHz frequency band and to realize the spectrum
conserving potential of that band is high risk technoYogy with
relatively long term development times. Modification of
discounted carrier revenue projections to reflect these
perceived risk levels further reduces the present worth of
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31,
possible future revenues, and again serves to deter the
production industry from undertaking such programs.
-- The third factor is the non-monolithic and highly
competitive nature of the U.S. communications satellite
industry. Maintaining that competitive position requires these
companies to concentrate their limited R&D resources on ne.ar
term developments in order to match the efforts of their U.S.
competitors. This is especially true in recent years u:',en even
the largest and strongest of U.S. corporations have seen
substantial declines in the general level of profitability, and
reported profits are unrealistically raised by the failure to
fully reflect the impact of inflation.
-- Finally, a number of foreign goVernments provide marketing
support to sustain and enhance the position of their spacecraft
industry. Apart from the investment support provided by MITI
and other Japanese government organizations in development of
advanced technologies per se, we have noted instances of
multi-national European financing consortia designed to Provide
attractive packages for proposal. to a number of Third World
customers. These packages add European launch services
(Ariane) to specific satellite contracts--to the simultaneous
benefit of both the European satellite builders and
Arianespace. Such arrangements enhance the competitiveness of
these bids and build a perception of foreign su2eriority and
confidence.
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ZA
Normal business management considerations and practices
will probably not permit the U.S. communications satellite
industry to undertake a long-term research and development
program of the scope and magnitude required. Industrial
investment concentrates on relatively modest enhancements with
immediate utility in current satellite systems. This
concentration on near-term pay-off is consistent with U.S.
business practices in other sectors.
The appropriate role of the U.S. Government in meeting
foreign competition in space-based telecommunications should be
reviewed in the context of the broader space policy study.
Such a review should consider:
-- the advisability of USG support for long-range, high-risk
research and development in telecommunications, particularly
considering the effects of an absence of government support
since 1973 on the worldwide competitiveness of the U.S.
satellite communications industry.
MID MOD
the development of creative financing arrangements and
procedures to make U.S. satellite builders competitive with
foreign firms which have the advantage of government
subsidization of financing.
-- the development of mechanisms to improve the marketability
of U.S. satellites, including package deals enabling customers
to arrange for launch services along with the purchase of
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J.,
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2/8/82
REMOTE SENSING OF LAND RESOURCES
A. NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Since the mid-1960s when planning began for civil land remote sensing
activities, the U.S. has pursued several national and foreign policy objectives,
including:
o Fostering international receptivity to and acceptance of U.S. space
remote sensing activities--both civil and those critical to our
national security.
o Maintaining U.S. leadership in the development and use of space technology.
B. COOPERATION
In pursuing the above policy objectives, NASA established programs to encourage
foreign use of data from its experimental Landsat and Skylab programs and
concluded agreements with more than a dozen foreign agencies involving direct
reception of Landsat data. These cooperative activities:
o Helped demonstrate the commercial potential of satellite land remote
sensing activities by helping establish foreign markets for sales of
ground equipment and analysis services and through initiation of access
fees paid by the foreign Landsat ground stations.
o Supported U.S. foreign policy and development assistance activities, par-
ticularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. During the past decade
Landsat has become known internationally as a valuable tool countries
can use to assist national development and resources management. U.S.
willingness to "share the benefits" resulting from this technology has
been favorably received by the vast majority of developing countries
and has assisted U.S. efforts to promote economic and political ties
with these states.
o Helped minimize serious consideration of restrictions on U.S. space
remote sensing activities in general and on the acquisition and distri-
bution of space-acquired data in particular. Such restrictions have
been under discussion in U.N. fora since the early 1970s.
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C. FOREIGN COMPETITION
The success of the Landsat program and the widespread international par-
ticipation in and acceptance of it have also stimulated the development of com-
petitive foreign activities.
1. Satellite Systems: Beginning in. 1984, foreign agencies will be
launching satellites with sensor technology which is more advanced than
that being used in the Landsat-D system. The foreign satellites will
also compete in selling data to the international user market which,
while embryonic and not well defined, offers considerable long-term
potential.
o France is developing a two-satellite polar orbiting remote sensing
system called SPOT which will use multilinear array sensors to
acquire 20-meter multispectral and 10-meter panchromatic data. The
first SPOT will be launched in 1984 with the second spacecraft
available for launching a year later. France has recently
established SPOT-Image--a private entity, partially awned by the
French government, which has already begun to market SPOT data
aggressively and to promote the sale of related French commercial
equipment and services. The French government is funding (and will
operate) the SPOT space segment and is giving assurances of SPOT
data continuity through the 1980s.
o Japan is planning an Earth Resources Satellite (ERS) program with
the first spacecraft to be launched in 1987. ERS-1 is expected to
carry both mechanical scanning systems (comparable to Landsat) and
multilinear array sensors. Japan may also fly an imaging radar
sensor for all-weather, day/night observations on an early ERS
satellite mission. In addition, Japan plans to launch a Marine
Observation Satellite (MOS-1), in 1986. While its plans concerning
marketing ERS data are not known, the Japanese government is acti-
vely promoting the sale of Japanese-made ground equipment for
reception and analysis of data from current land remote sensing satellites
o The European Space Agency is developing an earth resources
satellite program, the first spacecraft of which is planned for
launching in 1987. This spacecraft is expected to carry both an
altimeter and a scatterometer/imaging radar and will be used for
land and ocean observations.
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The Soviets are experimenting with various space remote sensing
techniques including multilinear array systems capable of acquiring
30-meter data. To date, the USSR has not operated a dedicated
Landsat-type satellite system and has not made the data it acquires
from its experiments available except under bilateral arrangements,
usually with Eastern bloc countries.
In discussing the above, it should be noted that U.S. industry has
the capability to build multilinear array sensors similar to those
planned for several foreign satellite missions.
2. Ground Systems: As noted above firms in Canada, France, Japan, and West
Germany offer well-developed lines of groria?Ticei;774?and processing
equipment for Landsats 2, 3, and D. Foreign firms also offer data ana-
lysis and other value-added services--an arena which just a few years
ago was dominated by U.S. companies.
D. COMMERCIALIZATION
Since 1979, the U.S. has formally pursued the goal of commercializing civil land
remote sensing satellite activities. Foreign organizations using Landsat data
are well aware of this effort and, thus far, have not raised serious objections.
Instead, the principal foreign concern has been whether the U.S. will assure
continuity of Landsat-type data. In the future, foreign concerns may also be
raised over increases in the price of data products (especially if these
increases are not accompanied by assurances of a continued service), changes to
the longstanding practice of public availability of Landsat data, and incom-
patibility among data products generated by competing national satellite
systems.
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In view of the above and in developing U.S. space policy, the
following points should be considered:
- -
Ci.? MN*
eoll? 1M,
Lack of commitment to continuity of future U.S. operational
land remote sensing satellite services will seriously under-
mine U.S. technical leadership internationally and will erode
the current beneficial patterns of foreign reliance on U.S.
remote sensing technology. Without such a commitment, the
U.S. will forfeit to foreign competitors it leadership role
and the associated commercial gains. Accordingly, it should
be national space policy to pursue continuation of the Landsat
program through vigorous U.S. governmental and commercial
activity.
From a foreign policy standpoint, commercialization of
land remote sensing satellite services poses no serious
obstacles. It is important to note, however, that an early
decision on the form such commercialisation will minimize
negative speculation and facilitate continued international
acceptance to our national remote sensing activities.
As the U.S. proceeds with commercialization, the private
sector (both prospective investors and data users) will
want and should have a national policy statement concerning
availbility of data from future privately-operated sytems.
Such a statement should be formulated to take into account
both the goal of non-regulation of commercial marketing
activities and the value of the current public non,Idis-
criminatory availability approach in bolstering U.S. efforts
to resist international restructions on the conduct of
current and future remote sensing activities. Given a policy
of public non-discriminatory availability of Landsat-type
data in an operational era, the U.S. Government can still
provide for exceptions which are determined to be in the
national interest. Commercial satellite proposals involving
highly specialized data needs which can only be met by
launching a satellite on a "subscription basis" might con-
stitute such an exception.
In pursuing commercialization, the U.S. should note and
build upon the positive working relationships which exist
between NASA and the eleven foreign agencies operating
Landsat ground stations. These relationships can work to
the U.S.' foreign policy benefit as similar relations did
more than a decade ago when communications satellite
activities were first commercialized. Foreign Landsat ground
stations can also promote sales of data from future remote
sensing satellite systems--a fact which has not gone unre-
cognized by the French who are actively pursuing SPOT satel-
lite marketing arrangements with current Landsat station
operators. -
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?
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2/8/82
METEOROLOGICAL REMOTE SENSING
A. NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As with land remote sensing, the U.S. has since the 1960s successfully pursued
the objectives of international acceptance and technological leadership in connec-
tion with its civil meteorological satellite activities. A further policy
objective has been to support the cooperative international framework for
exchange of weather information which significantly assists U.S. civil,
commercial, and military forecasting activities.
B. COOPERATION
In pursuing the above policy objectives, NASA and NOAA early on discussed the .
benefits of satellites for meteorology in international fora and encouraged use
of U.S. meteorological satellite data received either directly from the satellites
or through other established channels. U.S. meteorological satellite data
were considered to be a supplement to data gathered through traditional
means and, like other meteorological data (which have been freely exchanged for
over one hundred years), were made available internationally at no charge.
NOAA and NASA also encouraged widespread international participation in
their meteorological satellite activities. This has included:
o encouraging the establishment of ground facilities in more than 120
countries for direct reception of NOAA polar orbiting satellite data.
o arranging with France and the United Kingdom for these countries to
provide instruments at no charge to be flown on NOAA's polar orbiting
satellites. The provision of these instruments has resulted in cost
savings and programmatic benefits for NOAA and the U.S.
o arranging for informal coordination among operators of the current and
planned geostationary meteorological satellites (the U.S., Japan, The
European Space Agency, India, and the USSR) in order to encourage the
development of compatible systems and data output products. This has
considerably enhanced the usefulness to U.S. forecasters of data from
the foreign geostationary spacecraft.
As a result, the U.S. has become the keystone in a highly cooperative and
complex international data exchange network based on the premise that no country
can ever meet its needs for weather services without utilizing data acquired by
agencies in other countries.
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C. COMPETITION
In contrast to land remore sensing, there is essentially no inter-
national competition assiciated with the provision of meterological
satellite data. This is largely ude to the cooperative international
approach introduced by the U.S. and followed by other meterological
satellite operators during the past two decades. Spacecraft and ground
equipment capabilities equivalent to those of the U.S. do exist in
other countries, and there is some resulting competition in sales of
ground and space system equipment. For the most part, however, foreign
industries have not been encouraged by their goVernments to engage in
aggressive international marketing. As a result, the U.S. has retained
commercial leadership. For example, the two most recent foreign pro-
curements of meteorologidal satellites went to U.S. firms. (The Japanese
GMS-2 satellite was built by Hughes and the Indian INSAT is being built
by Ford-Aerospace). -
D. COMMERICALIZATION
As a result of a proposal made by a U.S. firm earlier this year, the
U.S. government is currently considering commercialization of its civil
meterological satellite activities. In concept, such commercialization
need not directly affect the free exchange of meteorological satellite
data since the U.S. could purchase data from a commercial operator and
subsequently make these data available to the international community
at no charge. It is highly unlikely, however, that, should commerciali-
zation occur, the complex international data exchange network would
continue unchanged.
Instead, a decision to commercialize would likely result in a curtailment
in the provision of no-cost meterological satellite data by the U.S.
This almost certainly would cause reciprocal changes in the ways other
countries collect and provide data at no charge to the,U.S. For example,
it could impair the U.S.' ability to provide long-term weather forecasts
which rely heavily on foreign derived data and which are critical to both
civil and military activities. Cutbacks in services, such as those pro-
vided by Canada in the Arctic, could affect our ability to provide reliable
forecasts for civilian and military aviation. In addition, these U.S.
actions could provoke foreign reactions in other arenas such as the con-
tinuing UN consideration of internationally-operated-satellite systems.
If foreign satellite and non-satellite data either were no longer avail-
able or were available at a cost the U.S. Government could not afford,
the U.S.' capability to make weather forecasts for civil, commercial,
and military purposes would be seriously imparied. In view of the severe
national security and -international ramifications commercialization of U.S.
meterological satellite activities raises serious concerns and may not
be in the national interest.
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? In the meteorological satellite arena the followinn nnints should he taken
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1. The pattern of international cooperation and data exchange associated
with the U.S. meteorological satellite system is quite different than
that associated with the U.S. Landsat prograM. Meteorological
satellite data have, since they were first acquired two decades ago,
been freely exchanged on a world-wide basis both bilaterally and under
the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization. This data
exchange is just another facet of the traditional free international
exchange, of weather information which has occurred for more than one
hundred years. This tradition recognizes the fact that no country can
effectively provide weather forecasting services without data acquired
by other countries.
2. The commercialization of U.S. civil meteorological satellite services,
as recently proposed by one U.S. company, is likely to result in the
introduction of charges for U.S.-acquired meteorological satellite data
as well as cutbacks in the provision of U.S. satellite data to other
countries. Such changes in the way the U.S. disseminates meteorologi-
cal satellite data internationally will likely provoke reciprocal deve-
lopments in other countries and, accordingly, disrupt the current -
pattern of free international exchange of weather satellite data.
3. In view of the above and from a foreign policy standpoint, changes to
the long-standing tradition of free, widespread distribution of
meteorological satellite data do pot appear to be desirable. The
U.S. is a primary beneficiary of this t,orld-widelidata exchange-.
4. In contrast to land remote sensing, commercialization of
civil weather satellite services does appear to pose sig-
nificant foreign policy, as well as national security, pro-
blems. Accordingly, commericalization- weather satellites
should be considered separately from commercialization of
land satellites. Viewed separately, from considering the
above-mentioned foreign policy and national security factors,
although substantial cost savings could lead to a different
p conclusion, foreign policy and national security factors
raise serious concerns and argue that commericialization may
not be in the national interest.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The major international issue in satellite telecommuni-
cations technology is the relative vigor of U.S. and foreign
R&D to meet future demands. Traffic projections between now
and the end of the century illustrate the economic magnitude of
the issue. Total worldwide demand in the year 2000, for all
types of service, is estimated to be over 10,500 equivalent
transponders; this compares with a 1980 demand for 311
equivalent transponders. This amounts to about $43 billion in
total market potential, over $18 billion of which is focused
North American demand. Of the total to the turn of the
century, the demand for U.S. domestic services alone is
expected to be about 2,700.
?
Continued use of current satellite.telecommunications
technology will result in saturation of satellite communi-
cations capacity by 1990 or 1992. Full utilization of curren
technology C- and Ku-band satellites for U.S. domestic use,
with the required 4? orbital separation, will permit about
800 equivalent transponders in orbit and result in orbit
saturation by about 1985; reduction to 30 separation on orbit
will allow up to 1,200 transponder equivalents, sufficient to\
meet projected demand only through about 1990. Only through
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-----------, J.Lat...wswviat-1.119 LI-le zufzu lanz
or Ka-band, can these demands be met, an observation which has
not been lost on Japanese and European competitors. /U.S.
carriers will still be able to meet high priority servi-ce
expansion demands, but perhaps only through the purchase of
this foreign technology currently under development. However,
a penalty will be imposed in the loss of worldwide exports of
all types of telecommunications equipment, in the loss of the
jobs required to produce that equipment, and in the consequent
further deterioration of the U.S. balance of payments with the
rest of the world.
During the mid-1970's, the U.S. Government withdrew to a
large extent from an active civil communications satellite R&D
role. An off-setting, broad-scale R&D activity was not assumL
by the private sector. The principal reasons cited for this
lack of involvement include the large financial outlays
required (exacerbated by the fact that many critical systems
can only be tested through a demonstration program on orbit)
and the risk involved. A typical flight R&D program is likely
to cost in excess of $60 million per year over a four-year
period. By comparison, even the largest U.S. commercial
communications satellite organizations can only sustain R&D
? expenditures of about $5-10 million per year. Foreign
competition, meanwhile, has grown apace, particularly in Japan
and Western Europe. In those countries, government-industry
teams or direct government-sponsored technology development in
0
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steady funding levels, are the vehicles for reducing perceived
program risk, shortening the effective period of high risk
exposure and supporting domestic industry in international
competition.
The potential market for new 30/20 GHz satellite technology
is large. Western Union (June 1981) has estimated .that the
global market for communications satellites and related earth
stations between 1981 and the year 2000 will total between 38
and 49 billion dollars (1981 dollars). Because of the growing
orbit and spectrum saturation in the currently used C and Ku
frequency bands much of the increase in demand after 1990 must
be met through use bf the yet ?to be developed 30/20 GHz
frequency band.
There continues to be keen competition from foreign
governments involved in the development, demonstration, and
planned operation of advanced communications technologies. The
Japanese communications satellite program includes the use of
Ka-band, with additional advanced technologies (multiple beam
antennas and on-board switching) planned for the 1985-86 time
frame; Japanese operational direct broadcast at Ku-band is
expected in 1983-84, with a follow-on expected in 1986. The
European L-Sat, recently approved, calls for multiple frequency
use, including Ka-band, incorporating advanced technologies for
both broadcast and fixed communication services. The Italian
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...?ITALSAT W111 also investigate advanced Ka technologies. Each
of these programs is the beneficiary of strong government
support.
The competitive position of U.S. prime spacecraft
production industry in this technology is eroding. There are
several reasons but the most important of them are the
following:
-- At least a 7 to 10 year development period is required
before new communications satellites operating in the 30/20 GHz
band can be brought into commercial operations. Investment
requirements are large and in the range 200-300 million
dollars, with return on investment about 4.3% (1981), less than
the national average. Significant revenue returns from that
investment cannot be expected for perhaps 10 years. Even at
rates much lower than the current 16 1/2 - 17 1/2% prime rate,
the present worth of revenues which do not start to flow until
10 years in the future is almost zero. The current cost of
money to the carrier compels the spacecraft production industry
to operate with short planning horizons and to require payback
to begin no more than 2 to 3 years following the initial
investment. This mitigates the attractiveness of risky R&D
programs.
--,The second factor recognizes that the technology required td)
open the 30/20 GHz frequency band and to realize the spectrum
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conserving potential of that band is high risk technology with
relatively long term development times. Modification of
discounted carrier revenue projections to reflect these
perceived risk levels further reduces the present worth of
possible future revenues, and again serves to deter the
production industry from undertaking such programs.
-- The third factor is the non-monolithic and highly
competitive nature of the U.S. communications satellite
industry. Maintaining that competitive position requires these
companies to concentrate their limited R&D resources on near
term developments in order to match the efforts of their 11.S.
competitors. This is especially true in recent years when even
the largest and strongest of U.S. corporations have seen
substantial declines in the general level of profitability, and
reported profits are Unrealistically raised by the failure to
fully reflect the impact of inflation.
-- Finally, a number of foreign governments provide marketing
support to sustain and enhance the position of their spacecraft
industry. Apart from the investment support provided by MITI
and other Japanese government organizations in development of
advanced technologies per se, we have noted instances of
multi-national European financing consortia designed to provide
attractive packages for proposal to a number of Third World
customers. These packages add European launch services'e
(Ariane) to specific satellite contracts--to the simultaneous
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zduLyy=all auILuers ana
Arianespace. Such arrangements enhance the competitiveness of
these bids and build a perception of foreign superiority and
confidence.
Normal business management considerations and practices
will probably not permit the U.S. communications satellite
industry to undertake a long-term research and development
program of the scope and magnitude required. Industrial
investment concentrates on relatively modest enhancements with
immediate utility in current satellite systems. This
concentration on near-term pay-off is consistent With U.S.
business practices in other sectors.
The appropriate role of the U.S. Government in meeting
foreign competition in space-based telecbmmunications should be
reviewed in the context of the broader space policy study.
Such a review should consider:
-- the advisability of USG support for long-range, high-risk
research and development in telecommunications, particularly
considering the effects of an absence of government support
since 1973 on the worldwide competitiveness of the U.S.
satellite communications industry.
-- the development of creative financing arrangements and
procedures to make U.S. satellite builders competitive with
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subsidization of financing.
the development of mechanisms to improve the marketa.bility
of U.S. satellites, including package deals enabling customers
to arrange for launch services along with the purchase of
satellites.
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Pr-- zi 7
, . I
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,
Defense-related Space Programs
Our military structure relies increasingly on spade systems.
Many operations related to national defense are carried on in
space, which are also vital to maintaining a credible deterrent,
and to the monitoring of arms control agreements. Policy decisions
affecting civilian and military programs cannot ignore this link.
A major program requirement is a flexible, assured launch
system. The Space Shuttle will enhance our capabilities by ex-
panding payload capacity, and by providing manned support for
satellite service and recovery. In time, by allowing replenish-
ment or repair or costly satellites, the Shuttle may evantually
reduce operating costs. At the same time, total dependence on
the Shuttle for all military launch services may be unwise, as
the Space Transportation System (STS) may be unavailable for
critical payloads at short notice, particularly in times of
crisis or conflict. It may be necessary to retain at least
a minimum capability in expendable launch vehicles.
Most of our low-altitude military space systems are vulner-
able to countermeasures or direct attack from the Soviet low-
altitude ASAT, which has been tested for over a decade and to
which we attribute a limited operational capability. This
vulnerability should be reduced or eliminated where possible,
by a program conbining rapid replacement, in-orbit spares,
hardening, etc.
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A
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2
Our ground-based facilities to detect, track, and identify
space objects at low and high altitudes are being expanded.
Improcements are being made in our information processing cap-
ability for better orbital predictions, ASAT targeting, and
strike assessment. R&D in space surveillance technologies
is continuing as well.
The President has directed that, in the absence of an agree-
ment limiting antisatellite weapons and inthe- face of an already
tested Soviet ASAT system, we develop a US ASAT capability and
work vigorously to make our satellites survivable. A study on
ASAT capability is now being done by DOD. R&D on a miniture'
air-launched direct-access ASAT weapon has been underway for some
time; tests are scheduled for 1983. In addition, high-energy
lasers and. particle beam concepts are being considered for possible
far-term application.
do not per se decrease
The integral role
It should be noted that N/A/AT capabilities
the survivability of military satellites.
of space systems in our military force
structure increases the contribution they make to
our national
security. To maintain and improve our security, the US should
reconsider the merits of an anti-satellite system, and maintaining
back-up capability in expendable launch vehicles. In this regard
the improved capability and flexibility provided by a second
launch site at Vandenbug AFB is an essential factor. In
addition survivability enhancements to assure satellite operation
in a hostile environment must be judged with the context of
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