INTERNATIONAL LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R001701630004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 29, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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NOV 2 9 1984
SUBJECT: International Launch Competitiveness Study
Per your request we have reviewed the letter from Peggy Finarelli
regarding suggestions for the International Launch Competitiveness
Study.
Point by point comment to the letter is inappropriate and not
provided since we disagree with the majority of substance
presented and certainly the suggested approach. The points raised
by Ms. Finarelli were discussed by the working group as early as
August 1984 and resolved to the satisfaction of a majority of the
working group. This consensus is reflected in the working group
draft of October 2, 1984.
We believe it is clearly unproductive to continue to debate
minority positions when the working group has reached a consensus
as to the scope and approach of the study. Attempting to
accomodate the minority opinions with anything more than
appropriate footnotes in the text, produces a document not
supported by the majority of the principals and will fail to
provide the alternatives necessary in the decision-making process.
Tom Mauljesby, DOD
STAT
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
Nov 2 0 X984
NOTE TO: WORKING GROU ON INTERNATIONAL LAUNCH COMPETITIVENESS
STUDY Jl C
FROM: DAN TAFT vj
Attached for your review and comment is a letter from Peggy
Finarelli providing suggestions for the International Launch
Competitiveness Study. I would appreciate receiving any comments
on this letter by COB November 29.
Distribution
/Karlyn Daube, DOT
Tom Maultsby, DOD
Ray Kammer, DOC
George O7alehto, State
Maury Roesch, OSTP
Rob Williams, OSTP
Gil Rye, NSC
Emery Simon, USTR
STAT
STAT
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IWIbIX
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546
November 23, 1984
Mr. Dan Taft
NSIA/SSD
Room 10007
New Executive Office Building
Office of Management and Budget
Washington DC 20503
As you go off to prepare a new draft of the study on the
ability of the U.S. private sector and the STS to maintain
international competitiveness in the provision of launch
services, we have some thoughts we would like you to consider.
First, a parametric analysis of a number of variables is
clearly warranted and appears to be the approach desired by the
Working Group. There appears to be consensus, and we agree,
that the variables considered should include the worldwide
supply of launch services, the worldwide demand for launch
services, and a range of possible prices for ELVs, the Shuttle
and Ariane. We feel most strongly that, with respect to any of
these variables, any value desired by any agency must be
included in the parametric analysis. Each agency has to
provide for its principals the data he will need for the next
step in our process (i.e., the SIG(Space) review of post-1988
Shuttle pricing). Thus, if we are to prepare a resource
document useful for each of our principals, we must consider
all cases requested. The ranges of variables NASA wants to see
analyzed are discussed in enclosed papers.
Second, as regards ELVs, we believe it is intuitively obvious
that the viability of an ELV company is a function of its
ability to operate on a "production line" basis. We believe
ELV viability can be viewed as a spectrum. At one end, we have
a viable "production line" company; the demand for launch
services is stable and predictable enough that the company
regularly produces and launches a minimum of 4-8 vehicles per
year; and the company's costs per flight are low enough to
compete profitably with Shuttle and Ariane even at the current
prices of these two. At the other end of the spectrum, we do
not have a viable ELV company; there is an oversupply of launch
services relative to an uncertain demand so the company cannot
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produce and launch at a sustained rate of 4-8 vehicles per
year; and the company's costs per flight are so high
that--without substantial USG subsidies--it cannot compete with
Shuttle and Ariane regardless of the prices that these two
charge. Where in this spectrum viability crosses into
non-viability is a decision that must be made by the ELV
companies themselves and cannot be made by the Working Group.
Third, in looking at the market available to U.S. ELV
companies, because the existing U.S. ELVs under consideration
in this study have such different capabilities, we must avoid
aggregation. The industry is comprised of a small number of
individual companies. For an individual company to he viable,
the particular demands for its particular capabilities must be
such that the conditions described in the above paragraph are
met. In other words, the "ELV industry" is an artificial
construct. We need to look at the viability of the individual
companies in the context of their individual capabilities and
the specific demands for those capabilities.
Fourth, as regards the Shuttle, we believe that a balanced
study should make clear to our principals that selling Shuttle
flights to foreign and commercial. customers is consistent with
and supportive of all Presidential policies extant. In fact,
that is the premise of both this study and the President's
charge to NASA to develop a full cost recovery price for
Shuttle operations. U.S. private sector upper stage
manufacturers represent an existing healthy industry and every
reimbursable Shuttle satellite launch puts millions of dollars
into their pockets and into this country's economy.
Furthermore, under the full cost recovery pricing policy which
will apply to the Shuttle after 1988, a portion of Shuttle
fixed operating costs will be covered by the customer thus
further decreasing the government's cost of maintaining the
Shuttle program.
Fifth, for purposes of balance, in reference to NASA's 24
flights per year flight rate, we can live with a formulation
along the following lines:
NASA projects a flight rate of 24 flights per year
beginning in 1989. This flight rate can be achieved with
NASA's currently funded facility and Orbiter investment.
These flights include manifest projections made by NASA and
DOD for USG flights. Historically, DOD projects of flight
needs have been overstated. However, NASA and DOD have
concluded that NASA's maintaining a flight rate of 24
flights per year is an essential part of achieving an
operational and cost-effective STS. As mandated in the
National Space Policy, NASA holds the development of an
operational and cost-effective STS as its highest priority.
Sixth, the Working Group has expressed its interest in
commenting on a fifth Shuttle Orbiter in its analysis. As I
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noted at last week's Working Group meeting, continued Orbiter
production is an issue with impacts reaching far beyond the
.international competitiveness of various launch services. Any
analysis relating to a fifth Orbiter must therefore make clear
that the issue is not being considered in the broad context
necessary for any decision. And certainly, the frame of
reference of this study is too narrow to permit any overall
conclusion on continued Orbiter production, as the present
draft purports to do.
Beyond the above points and the written submissions I have
already passed to you at Working Group meetings, there are a
number of additional points which we think need to he made in
the Working Group study. We present these in the enclosed
papers.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
Margare_ 6.' Finarelli, Chief
International Planning and Programs
International Affairs Division
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NASA agrees with the Working Group that a parametric analysis
of a range of Shuttle prices is appropriate.
The prices which NASA wants to see analyzed in the study are
$87 million, $83.3 million, $80 million, $75 million, and $70
million.
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NASA proposes the following changes to the section on U.S.
Commercial ELV Capacity which is on page 28 of the current
draft.
U.S. Commercial ELV Capacity -- A range of values for this
parameter has been considered. The low end of the range
represents nominal, near-term production rates for each
potential commercial launch vehicle. These numbers are based
on production capacity as provided by the individual
companies. The high end of the range represents maximum
possible production rates if current facilities are used.
These numbers are based on U.S.G. experience operating these
systems.
1987-1994
Delta 8-18 per year
Atlas 8-12 per year
Titan 4- 8 per year
Total ELVs 20-38 per year
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U.S. STS CAPACITY
NASA proposes that the following changes to the section on U.S.
STS Capacity which is on page 27 of the current draft:
U.S. STS Capacity -- The nominal baseline assumption of STS
flight rates for this study is the NASA FY 1986 budget
submission to OMB through 1991. NASA projects a steady state
flight rate of 24 flights per year to be achieved in 1989. The
outyear projections reflect use patterns consistent with those
in the preceding years. These projections do not reflect
changes in use patterns which may or may not occur because of
the Space Station program; it is far too early to quantify such
projections with any validity.
TABLE I
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92-94
U.S. Government
NASA
3.8
6.7
7.8
6.1
7.2
9.3
8.3
9
DOD
2.0
2.3
5.7
8.0
10.3
8.3
9.0
9
Available for
foreign and
commercial
5.2
4.0
3.5
4.9
6.5
6.4
6.7
Budgeted STS*
11.0
13.0
17.0
19.0
24.0
24.0
24.0
24
*NASA has established 24 flights per year after 1989 as a
planning baseline for budgetary purposes. The currently funded
facility and Orbiter investment and continued improvement in
launch processing timelines could support launch rate
capability estimates up to 28 flights per year.
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Benefit to the U.S. Treasury of Shuttle Usage by Foreign and
Commerical Customers
The NASA appropriation request for support of Shuttle
Operations is affected by the amount of reimbursable revenue
generated by non-NASA users of the STS. Foreign and commercial
usage of the STS reduces the amount of tax revenue required to
carry out Shuttle flights. The difference over the marginal
costs of providing a flight provides a return to the U.S.
Treasury for each STS flight flown by non-U.S.G. communications
spacecraft. This difference amounts to $54 million at the $87
million full cost recovery price proposed by NASA for 1989-91.
Increasing the Shuttle's dedicated flight price above this
price will without question decrease the revenue return to the
U.S. Treasury if that price level causes potential customers to
select an alternative launch vehicle. The marginal costs of
adding a flight are relatively constant in an environment where
the Shuttle is used by NASA and the DOD to meet the majority of
launch requirements.
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Ariane - Without Shuttle In Commercial Launch Market
Ariane Launch Capacity
In April 1984, Ariane projected a 1985 flight rate of eight launches,
and they have indicated that higher rates are possible if justified
by market demand. Hence, with completion of their second launch pad
in early 1986, Ariane has said they have a launch capability of at
least 16 a year. With resonable additional investment, they could
undoubtedly push their capability to 20 or more launches each year
if the demand for launch services could support more. The Ariane-b
launch vehicle will also be available in 1986--a launch system with
a lift capability equivalent to one-half the Shuttle. Thus, there
is very little doubt that after 1986 Ariane could launch the equivalent
of at least ten Shuttles worth of payloads each year.
Launch Service Demand (Excluding NASA, DOD, and other payloads noted)
There are many different demand projections from which to choose. Most,
if not all, have historically overstated the demand for launch services
in the last decade, including those made by Battelle's Columbus Laboratories
(BCL) which are used in this paper.
Each year BCL makes a high and a low model demand projection of payloads
expressed in terms of equivalent Shuttle flights. In the process of
translating payloads into equivalent Shuttles, BCL assumes a 75 percent
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Shuttle load factor. In other words, the demand, when expressed in
equivalent Shuttle, is overstated by perhaps as much as one third.
Excluding all NASA, DOD. Soviet-block countries (except China), materials
processing, science development, and Spacelab payloads, BCL's high
model projections through 1991 never exceed eleven (11) equivalent
Shuttle flights per year; and, the low model projections approach seven
(7) equivalent Shuttle flights.
To summarize these demand projections, it is unlikely that a demand
of eleven full equivalent Shuttle flights will be realized by (1991).
Since the projections are overstated by as much as one third (75 percent
load factor) and the fact that even the BCL low model has historically
been high, a demand as high as seven full equivalent Shuttle flights
in any single year through 1991 may not be realized.
Conclusions and Summary Comments
Given the above description of the Ariane launch capabilities and demand
projections, several conclusions and summary comments can be made:
(1) From 1987 through at least 1991, Ariane's launch rate capability
exceeds the free world's likely payload demand for launch services.
(2) Increasing Shuttle's recommended launch price, as TCI and others
have suggested, will not alter conclusion (1) above.
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(3) On the other hand, raising the Shuttle price will almost certainly
be detrimental, if not disastrous, for those private commercial
operations that provide upper stages and facilities for the Shuttle
Program. These privately financed activities represent investments
totaling several hundred million dollars. Most, if not all, of
this would be lost if Shuttle were to lose its commercial business
through increased launch prices.
(4) If the Shuttle were not in the commercial launch market because
of its high price, would Ariane capture all of the market?
From a capacity point of view, Ariane could capture all of the
market. In the first few years after 1988, that would most likely
be the case (for reasons dicsussed below). How long Ariane would
maintain a market monopoly position would depend on a number of
factors, many of which are controlled by Ariane.
If, for example, Ariane's strategy were to eliminate the threat
of competition from U.S. commercial ELV's, they would have a reasonable
chance of achieving that goal through price bidding designed to
do just that. If and how long they might maintain such a posture
no one knows. But, Ariane would clearly have that option.
(5) If U.S. commercial ELV's were only in competition with Ariane,
would the U.S. ELV's be able to capture some of the launch market?
The record to date suggest that U.S. ELV's may not be able to
capture any of the market. Some have explained or blamed this
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situation on low Shuttle prices. This view, however, is not supported
by the facts. So far (with one possible exception--the GD/Rainbow
case) U.S. commercial ELV's, while under pricing both Ariane and
Shuttle in a number of specific bidding situations, have not been
able to secure customers. In part, this reflects the fact that
price is not the only issue of concern to customers. While price
is an extremely important factor, customers are also placing high
priority on reliable and credible service (along with other factors).
The U.S. commercial ELV organizations have yet to establish themselves
in this arena. Removing Shuttle from the competition through
higher prices will not solve this problem for the U.S. ELV's.
(6) Even though customers of launch services want the benefits of
competition, it would take some time for a new commercial launch
servicing organization (even of an existing ELV) to gain the confidence
of those in the market place. This consideration further supports
the conclusion that Ariane would have a monopoly position for
several years if Shuttle were not in the market.
(7) Given the high national prestige associated with space, other
foreign governments (e.g., Japan and China) would have a strong
incentive to accelerate their plans to provide launch services
if Shuttle were not in the market place. While there are serious
questions about U.S. commercial ELV's being able to compete with
just Ariane, that they could do so against other governments as
well raises even a more serious question.
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(8) NASA's budget and U.S. tax payers cost for the Shuttle program
would increase if Shuttle is removed from the commercial market.
In the 1989 through 1991 period five commercial Shuttle flights
each year are shown in NASA's FY 1986 budget. At the recommended
$87M price per dedicated flight, approximately $50M of that covers
costs that NASA incurs whether or not that flight takes place.
Therefore, if Shuttle does not fly five commercial flights, NASA's
budget and U.S. tax payers costs for the Shuttle are increased
by $250M (1982 $) each year--one billion dollars over four years.
(9) Since nearly all commercial payloads that fly on Shuttle require
a U.S. commercially provided upper stage, this U.S. commercial
space industry would be heavily impacted, if not destroyed, if
Shuttle were not in the commercial market. Five Shuttle flights
of commercial payloads, represent approximately $200M in U.S. commercial
upper stage business.
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EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES
The future (1988 -) launch requirements of the non-European competitive
commercial communications satellite market, in our opinion, is probably
on the order of 10 to 12 missions per year--i.e. 4 to 8 STS missions per
year--depending on future satellite sizes. This estimate is predicated on
the assumption that by 1988 the equator could be essentially saturated with
communications satellites--electromagnetically not physically, i.e., the
uplink/downlink beams of the satellites would overlap each other such that
additional units will increase the interference from such overlap to
intolerable levels. Such a situation would lead to a steady-state traffic
in primarily replacement units only--which means a launch rate that reflects
essentially the launch rate of the units being replaced--most of them launched
7 or 8 years earlier--at a rate of 10 to 12 per year or less. Further, we
assume that any mission that opts for PAM-DII is one less mission on PAM-D--
or perhaps even one less mission on Atlas/Centaur--i.e., PAM-DII will be a
different, improved capability servicing essentially the same market, not
adding to the market. This assumption recognizes the reality that the subject
launch requirements are generated by paying customers on the ground, not
available launch support in space.
The first question in assessing the future ELV market--how many of these
future communications missions are truly potential Delta/PAM-D, or Delta/PAM-
DII, Atlas Centaur missions requiring vehicle performance within the range of
these vehicles. Current projections (see the current Shuttle Manifest) are
that 75% of future "Delta-class" missions will require PAM-DII capability.
This consideration could be critical to the future of a commercial Delta
Program since PAM-DII is targeted at spacecraft weighing 3,000 to 4,200
pounds. This is beyond the current capability of Delta 3920 which is limited
to spacecraft weighing 2,850 pounds. Even the simple completion of
integration of the Castor-IVA capability (higher performance solid fuel in
the nine booster strap-ons) by a commercial operator will increase that
performance to only 3,100 pounds.
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Another key consideration is that some, if not most, of future communication
satellites should be expected to grow in diameter as well as weight to
maximize efficient, cost effective utilization of Shuttle unique capability
as well as maximize use of the shrinking number of sychronous equatorial
locations discussed above (uplink/downlink beam limitations).
If some satellites being designed now (which will be ready for launch starting
in 1988) are designed to take maximum advantage of Shuttle (referred to as the
"tuna-can" shape) rather than retaining earlier designs that took maximum
advantage of ELV's (referred to as the "lipstick" shape) they will soon grow
beyond Delta's 8-foot diameter--and eventually even Atlas/Centaur's 10-foot
diameter. It should be noted that Atlas/Centaur currently has the capability
to insert satellites weighing up to 5,200 pounds into transfer orbit and
potentially up to 5,600 pounds. Since this vehicle needs no perigee stage
each gain by the Atlas/Centaur commercial operator is a loss by the commercial
producer of PAM--McDonnell Douglas. This concept of launching two "Delta PAM-
DII class" satellites on an Atlas/Centaur as the Ariane-3 does is obviously
not feasible since two satellites would weigh 6,000 to 8,000 pounds and the
mounting adapter (what Ariane calls "SYLDA") is several hundred pounds more--
much beyond the vehicle's performance. The Atlas/Centaur prime contractor,
General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) is also the selected commercial operator of
the Atlas/Centaur vehicle and we understand that options being considered by
them include Atlas boosters with a variety of upper stages (including the
Delta second stage) that would efficiently launch a wide range of payload
weights including those being designed for PAM-DII launch on Shuttle weighing
3,000 to 4,200 pounds. GD/C is considering both dual and single launch
capabilities.
With Ariane offering launches of "Delta-class" missions for $25M to $35M and
"Centaur-class" missions for $45M to $65M, commercial, U.S. ELV's will have to
compete by offering prices at least equal to and probably below (as an added
inducement) Ariane prices. Considering the sensitivity of launch costs to
flight rate, we believe such competition for any extended period of time by
U.S. ELV's is contingent upon establishing a business base of 6-8 launches per
year; this will be very difficult without some form of U.S. Government
subsidization being assigned to these launchers.
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COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL SATELLITE MARKET
Delta
The information contained in Table IV, page 29, regarding PAM-D/PAM-DII
projected market is approximately 20% higher than is envisioned by NASA
for the combination of those payload-assist-modules in satisfying demands
of users, including the U.S. Government. Additionally, the table's
projections on the mix of PAM-D's vs PAM-DII's indicates a higher demand
for PAM-D's (48) than PAM-DII's (31) in the 1988 to 1994 time frame.
This is contrary to the projections of the manufacturer (MDAC) of the PAM-
D/PAM-DII payload assist modules since MDAC anticipates that the demand
for PAM-DII class spacecraft launchings could be several times that of PAM-D
class spacecraft launchings in the same time frame. Also, a quick review of
the August 1984 Space Shuttle payload flight assignment for missions planned
in the 1988-1994 time frame would verify this assessment. In reviewing Table-
IV, it may be construed that PAM-DII class satellites can be targeted for
launch both on a commercial Delta or Atlas/Centaur vehicles. With respect to
the Delta vehicle, the current version of the highest performing Delta 3920
vehicle does not have the performance capability or design characteristics
to launch PAM-DII class satellites for several reasons:
The PAM-DII was not designed for launch of payloads on Delta. A new
configured version would have to be developed at a significant
investment as the current PAM-DII is not adaptable to Delta or does
not meet its interface requirements. The size of the current PAM-DII
restricts its fit within the standard Delta spintable and attach fitting
and the weight (assuming appropriate interface) would severely degrade
the performance of the Delta vehicle for missions requiring
geosynchronous transfer orbit--a massive trade-off in spacecraft weight
would have to occur which would render the Delta ELV noncompetitive in
terms of cost and payload performance.
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The standard Delta fairing is approximately an 8' diameter fairing.
The diameter of most, if not all, PAM-DII class payloads is expected
to exceed that and would proabably require new fairing designed in the
9' to 10' diameter range. It is estimated that such a fairing would
require a minimum investment of $7.OM to $10.OM investment (nonrecur-
ring). Assuming that such a new fairing is developed, it would
certainly change the flight dynamics of the Delta vehicle, the
additional weight and size would cause more performance drag, and would
require even more vehicle performance to offset expected losses or
degredation in spacecraft weight because of the heavier and wider
fairing. It would probably be impractical to develop such a fairing
for use on Delta for PAM-DII class payloads without making a substantial
investment in upgrading the Delta first stage engine (Rocketdyne RS-27)
and/or the Delta second stage engine (Aerojet AJ-10).
The standard Delta Castor IV motors along with the standard RS-27 first
stage engine, the AJ-10 second stage engine, and the PAM-D payload
assist module are capable of accomplishing launch of a 2,800 pound
payload in a geosynchronous transfer orbit--a PAM-D class payload.
In order to accomplish the same orbit for a larger payload up to 3,100
pounds, at the low end of the PAM-DII class, the Castor-IV motors would
have to be upgraded/modified requiring an investment of $3.OM--$5.OM
(nonrecurring). Additionally, once the modifications have been
accomplished a recurring cost of approximately $0.7M per vehicle launch
is estimated to add to the cost of launch.
Lacking major investments in a new PAM-DII type payload asssist module, new
fairing(s), and upgrading of Castor-IV motors, it is highly unlikely that any
of the PAM-DII payloads would be launched by the Delta vehicle. On the other
hand, even if new investments are made in the development of a new size
fairing and upgrade of the Castor-IV motors, only payloads of 3,100 pounds
or less could be launched on a commercial Delta. Since most of the out-year
payloads (1988-1994) are expected to be heavier than 3,100 pounds the only
other commercial vehicle capabilities would be the Atlas/Centaur and Titan
vehicles.
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ATLAS CENTAUR
Table IV projects a launch requirement of (24) Atlas/Centaur class payloads
for the FY88-FY94 time frame. This estimate exceeds past actual Atlas/Centaur
activities (payloads in the 5,000 pound range), by at least 60-70%. On the
other hand, General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) who is the selected commercial
operator has developed market projections (for payloads between 3,500 and
5,600 pounds), that are triple those in Table IV. Since Shuttle PAM-DII
performance estimates reach up to 4,200 pounds for geosynchronous transfer
requirements, and since GD/C's projections include payloads starting at 3,500
pounds as the Atlas/Centaur class, a major portion, if not all, of the PAM-DII
projections in the table could probably fall within the Atlas/Centaur
commercial market. Except for a few payloads, more than 90% of PAM-DII class
payloads are anticipated to exceed 3,500 pounds to geosynchronous transfer
orbit--well within the capability of the Atlas/Centaur and certainly
outside/above the performance capability of standard Delta vehicles or any
affordable upgrade of Delta. Although they can be launched on the
Atlas/Centaur vehicle, their weight precludes launching more than one payload
at a time which results in a significant underutilization of the Atlas/Centaur
capability. Therefore, by today's standards and cost projections, single
payloads in the PAM-DII class range (3,100-4,500 pounds) that could be
launched on the Atlas/Centaur vehicle would probably not be competitive in
price (cost of launch) when compared to Ariane which would, perhaps, be able
to more fully match lift capability to payload requirements. Accordingly,
customers with payloads in the PAM-DII weight category would more likely than
not choose a launch source other than Atlas/Centaur. For payloads above 4,200
pounds up to the expected capability of 5,600 pounds, there would appear not
to be a sustaining commercial market of any reasonable size to allow
competitive launch costs. Combining, however, all payloads depicted in
Table IV for PAM-DII and Atlas/Centaur categories would provide a much larger
base (average 8 launches per year) to prorate costs and would probably
generate competitive launch costs with Ariane's assuming Ariane's pricing is
not adjusted to reduce the available Atlas/Centaur base.
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2
An option which could be available to the GD/C would be to mix two (2) smaller
payload combination at the same time as is done with Ariane. This would cut
costs to users on the single flight. Although combining two PAM-DII class
payloads would be in excess of the Atlas/Centaur vehicle performance
capability estimated to be no more than 5,600 pounds, a potential combination
could be to mix two PAM-D's classes or one PAM-D and a PAM-DII class and thus,
this may prove to be feasible.
Nonetheless, for Atlas/Centaur vehicle launchings to be cost competitive with
Ariane, one must assume that this vehicle would have to capture the PAM-D,
PAM-DII and Atlas/Centaur class markets achieving a launch rate of at least
12 or more spacecraft per year. A constraint to overcome, however, would be
to develop a launch capability which could react to such high launch demand-
inconsistent with past Atlas/Centaur practices.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/23: CIA-RDP92B00181 R001701630004-9
Titan-III Launch Capacity
The Titan family of launch vehicles was developed for USAF requirements to
launch heavy payloads into low Earth orbit. NASA utilized the highly capable
Titan-IIIE/Centaur to launch several planetary payloads in the 1970's. In
order to provide assured launch capability to compliment the Shuttle, the USAF
is considering development of a Titan 34-D/Centaur configuration to launch
geosynchrorous payloads of about 10,000 pounds. In addition, modification
of the Titan-II ICBM's is being considered for west coast launches of Defense
Meteorological Satellites in the 1990's. Currently there are 56 Titan-II's
which could be used. The Titan-II represents the core stage of the Titan-IIIC
without the strap-on boost phase solids the Titan-IIIC uses for additional
lift capability. The non-recurring costs of modifying the existing Titan-II
ICBM's and Vandenberg launch pad is estimated as about million, with
modification and launch support costs on the order of million per
launch. (The prospective availability and non-recurring costs of the Titan-
II ICBM's for east coast commercial launches are unknown since there is no
existing Titan-II capability at ETR and the Titan-III complex would have to
be modified to accommodate the Titan-II version).
The east coast launch capability of the Titan/Centaur is projected to be
about 3-4 launches per year. This launch rate is constrained by the capacity
of the vehicle assembly building. Expansion of the 3-4 launches per year
is conceivable, but the investment costs required are probably considerable,
i.e., in excess of million. Assuming that the USAF selects the Titan/
Centaur alternative for providing assured launch capability, two launches
per year would be utilized by the USAF for national security payloads.
Availability of the residual capacity for launch of heavy commercial payloads
is conceivable, with the major consideration being price competitiveness with
the Ariane. Additional development would be required to provide a multiple
payload capability that would enforce the competitiveness of the Titan for
conclusive PAM-DII class payloads.
The price for Titan-III commercial launches is probably in the million
range.
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