IG(SPACE) MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 77
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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FROM:
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
25 March 1986
DD/PPS (Policy
SUBJECT: IG(Space) Meeting
Cover memo (Tab A) contains
recommendations on the Issues.
- Report (Tab B) has a more recent
version of the Executive Summary,
- Tabs C and D contain 170d_Pla.pers
prepared separately b3 If
you have time, they woulde worth
reading.
INFORMATION
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STAT
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Table of Contents
IG(Space) Meeting (3/25/86)
A - (IG) Space Meeting, 3/25/86.
B - Interagency Group on Space Recommendations for
the US Space Launch Program.
C - Aide-Memoire for 3/25/ IG(Space) Meeting
D - Recommend ?? e Aftermath of the Challenger
Accident
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STAT
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IG(Space) Meeting (3/25/86)
Draft report is almost fully coordinated and ready for SIG(Space)
consideration:
Executive Summary not yet coordinated.
Appendices missing.
Minor editing needed.
Cost figures must be checked.
Draft NSDD needs to be written.
- Report calls out four issues that are likely to be
of these is discussed on the following pages.
discussed. Each
Recommendation:
Concur with conclusions and recommendations in report subject to
Working Group clean-up.
Point out that Issues and Executive Summary need more work.
Point out the need for the IG(Space) to consult with the Rogers
Commission on the following technical points.
o Is basic orbiter design sound? (Can Commission
recommendations on orbiter be accommodated within the 1990
production schedule?)
o Can anomaly resolution be accomplished within 12 months and
within NASA funding estimate?
o Will Commission recommendations impact orbiter turn-around
time? (This will affect realizability of "NASA-planned"
vice "conservative" flight rates.)
Rogers Commission consultation is also important to ensure that
there is no political disconnect between these two
administration efforts.
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Funding
Report:
- OMB advises offsets are required.
- No offsets identified.
- Administration decision on funding approach needed.
Discussion:
- Report does not give the information needed to resolve the issue such
as:
)o
? Pros/cons
o Alternatives(f
o Process
We have previously stated that our space budget is already very tight
and offsets are not available.
o We, therefore, favor treetf
supplemental.
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STS Competition for Commercial and Foreign Launches i I ,(C-
Report:
- Agreement on policy reached.
- Issue over timing and definition.
-- NASA: Must honor commitments.
- DoT : Earliest practical transition.
Discussion:
We favor a healthy commercial ELV industry to off-load Shuttle so it (
can be devoted to its best and highest priority uses.
Report does not contain sufficient information for choice between
NASA and DoT alternatives:
o Task Working Group to include this information in report.
o If this can't be done, we should go ahead and reserve this
decision for further study.
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Report:
Timing of Decisions
Consolidated strategy is advantageous.
- Rogers Commission recommendations could delay NASA recovery plan
submission.
ELV capability must be available in 1988-89 and must start in next
few months.
Discussion:
- We need to start on ELVs and payload transition now to have them
available by 1988-89.
- As a minimum, DoD part of supplemental and NASA anamoly resolution
part cannot be delayed to wait for Rogers Commission recommendations.
- We doubt that Rogers Commission
affect our recommendations.
recommendations will significantly
Should have IG(Space) consult with Rogers Commission to
confirm this.
- We, therefore, favor supplemental ASAP.
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Flight Rate Planning
Report:
- NASA--planned flight rates (consistent with Presidential policy).
- Conservative flight rates.
Discussion:
More realistic for overall planning purposes.
Provides reserve capacity for contingencies.
think conservative rates should b used in near-
t24 fligh s year p awing goa s ould be e iminated.
- - it 24
this issue can be resolved-with_compromise language./i/
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DRAFT
March 24, 1986 3:07 AM
INTERAGENCY GROUP ON SPACE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE U.S. SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAM
March 25, 1986
NOT FOR RELEASE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE NSC
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FOREWORD
This draft report has been prepared in response to the directives
received from the National Security Council Interagency Group (Space) per
memorandum dated February 7th 1986, Rodney B. McDaniel to Donald P.
Gregg and al., subject: IG (Space) Actions. The following members of the
IG(Space) Working Group participated in the preparation:
Otho Eskin / Col. Malehy
Robert H. Brumley IC. Stadd
M. Johnson / Karlyn Daube
D. Taft /J. Struthers / A. Wu
T. J. Bishop / M.L. Hunter
L. Nosenzo/ V. Teplitz
Department of State
Department of Commerce
Department of Transportation
Office of Management and Budget
Intelligence Community Staff
Department of Defense (OJCS)
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
M. Roesch / R. Johnson Office of Science and Technology
C. 0. Forsythe National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (Co-Chairman)
T.P. Rona /T.E. Maultsby Department of Defense
(Co-Chairman)
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COORDINATION
Department of State
Department of Commerce
Department of Transportation
Office of Management and Budget
Intelligence Community Staff
Department of Defense (0.1CS)
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Office of Science and Technology
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Department of Defense (OSD)
Concur Non-Concur*
* Please See Page Number as Shown
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NOTICE
This report is for official U.S. Government use only. It shall not
be reproduced or released without the authorization of Col.
G. May, Executive Secretary of the IG (Space), National Security
Council.
III
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INDEX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
PAGE
1
I. BACKGROUND 3
A. The CHALLENGER Accident 3
B. U.S. Space Program 3
C. National Space Goals and Objectives 4
D. The Space Transportation System 5
E. Expendable Launch Vehicles 5
II. IMPACTS
A. Introduction 7
B. Impact on Launch Capability 8
C. Impacts during the Accommodation Period (FY 86-88) 11
III. RECOVERY OPTIONS
A. Objectives 12
B. Criteria 12
C. Common Assumptions and Considerations 15
D. Options 19
1. Return to Pre-Accident Baseline 20
2. Three Orbiters With Expanded ELVs 23
3A Four Orbiters With Expanded ELVs 27
36 Four Orbiters (delayed delivery) With Expanded ELVs 30
IV. ISSUES 34
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 36
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX III RECOMMENDED STRATEGY ao
S.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following the CHALLENGER accident on January 28, 1986, the National Security Council
directed an Interagency Group to develop the recommendations for actions to be taken in re-
gard to the U.S. space program. This draft report, developed under joint NASA - DoD chair-
manship, is the current summary of the Group's findings and recommendations.
The loss of the CHALLENGER has serious bearing on the Nation's ability to implement
the President's space policy as promulgated in NSDD-42. It disrupts the planned timetable for
national security and for civil Government missions. The disruption threatens to delay
during the 1989-1995 period the transportation support for the Space Station and for the
Strategic Defense Initiative-related experiments. It forces reconsideration of the role of the
space shuttle in flying commercial and foreign customers' satellites.
Beyond the schedule disruptions, the CHALLENGER accident highlights the vulnerability
of all space launch systems regardless of their degree of sophistication and reliability. It de-
monstrates the risk of relying on a single system for all U.S. space programs. The accident
thus raises broader questions in regard to the Nation's means for gaining access to space
with the requisite degree of assurance, flexibility and surge capability. Actions need to be
efined and implemented in order to improve these attributes at an affordable cost and to
enhance the public perception of these improvements.
In the absence of recovery actions, the CHALLENGER accident will cause a backlog of
space missions in all sectors of the space program (military, civil and commercial). Based on a
possibly optimistic 12-month stand-down period before the current 3-orbiter STS resumes
operations, and assuming the planned NASA flight rates thereafter, this backlog could reach
approximately 70 shuttle-equivalent payloads by FY 1995. Should the stand-down period be
extended, or should the planned flight rates not be achieved, the backlog could be signifi-
cantly larger. While some of the planned missions can be cancelled or delayed, many of them
are time-critical and a significant fraction is vital to the Nation's security posture.
The only recovery action for the immediate future, where new launch resources cannot
be introduced, is to cancel or delay missions judged less critical to the U.S. space goals. Be-
yond 1989, some of the critical national security related payloads will be reassigned from
the shuttle to expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), and more effective use will be made of the
combined STS and ELV resources then available by replacing the orbiter equipment lost in the
accident, by making the payloads compatible with both types of launchers whenever pos-
sible and by providing East and West Coast launch facilities for both. With all these actions
-ombined, the impact on the Nation's critical military and civil space missions can be held to
)Ierably low levels.
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Decisions taken now, or in the immediate future, could result in significant improvements
the U.S. space launch posture projected for the period beyond 1989-1990. First, the lost or-
oiter can be replaced, at a total cost of approximately $ B, adding both inherent ca-
pacity and increased assurance of maintaining the scheduled flight rates. Second, additional
ELVs can be made available by accelerating and/or augmenting the current Government
procurement. Third, by explicitly encouraging the private sector, commercially produced ELVs
could become available in roughly the same time frame. The combination and timing of these
actions define the several options for longer-term recovery and reconstitution.
Two objectives are to be achieved by all these options: (a) to accelerate recovery from the
interruption of space launch operations; and (b) to rebuild a more balanced and flexible na-
tional space launch posture that will support the U.S. space goals in all three sectors (national
security, civil and commercial) while being largely independent of failures in a given system.
Four options have been examined by using the criteria of capability / risk, ability to reduce the
mission backlog or the lost mission opportunities, affordability, and impact on the private
sector.
The assessment and comparison of the four options results in the following:
Option 1. Return to Pre-accident Baseline - Procure the fourth (replacement) orbiter with no
hange in STS goals or objectives and with no additional ELV procurement. This option will
restore the lost assets but does not provide for improved diversity or flexibility of the U.S.
launch posture. It will not meet the requirement for launch capability essentially independent
of single launch system failure.
Option 2. Three Orbiters with Expanded ELVs - Do not replace the fourth orbiter; use the
remaining three orbiters as efficiently as possible and augment launch capability with USG
and commercial ELVs. This option provides adequate nominal capacity, with launch diversity
beyond that planned prior to the CHALLENGER accident, and it satisfies the requirement for
assured access to space. However, it provides inadequate flexibility in terms of responding to
changes in payload schedules and delays. In the event an orbiter (of the three in service) was
out of service for any extended time, the remaining two orbiters could not satisfy the manned
space, the shuttle-unique and the national security mission requirements. With the ap-
propriate declaratory policy, this option will support and encourage the development of U.S.
private launcher and launch services industry.
Option 3A. Four Orbiters with Expanded ELVs - Replace the fourth orbiter by 1990 and aug-
ment launch capability with USG and commercial ELVs. This option provides adequate nominal
capacity, with launch diversity beyond that planned prior to the CHALLENGER accident, and it
would retain the U.S. commitment to the STS, while satisfying the requirement for assured ac-
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r-vn vrrm.u.n. %Jac ?JIIILT rage t5 -
!ss to space. It provides adequate flexibility in terms of responding to changes in payload
schedules and delays. With the appropriate declaratory policy, this option will support and
encourage the development of U.S. private launcher and launch services industry.
Option 38. Fourth Orbiter by 1992 with Expanded ELVs - This option is identical to 3A, but
the delivery of the fourth orbiter would be delayed until 1992. The merits of the option are
the same as those of 3A, but the planned capacity becomes available two years later. The
purpose of the delay is to reduce the'procurement outlays in the early years of the program.
Additionally, there might be more and better opportunity to incorporate in the replacement
orbiter design all the recommendations derived from the Presidential Commission on the
causes of the CHALLENGER accident.
Under the criterion of "affordability", these options compare as follows:
IBUDGET
YEARS
1986
GRH
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
BTC
TOTAL
WI years)
OPTION 1
Budget Authority
494
934
1114
590
72
277
0
3481
Outlays
177
906
1081
1147
364
185
102
OPTION 2
Budget Authority
798
947
1061
835
368
683
373
5064
Outlays
280
1115
1098
1085
440
595
464
OPTION 3A
Budget Authority
1055
1679
1970
1295
721
1039
373
8131
Outlays
370
1763
1951
1691
818
972
566 -
OPTION 3B
Budget Authority
988
1047
1826
1667
966
1016
373
7882
Outlays
310
1200
1810
1892
1089
999
582
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The quasi-unanimous position of the Working Group favors Option 3A. While the
,orresponding budget outlays are significantly larger than those for the other options , the
latter do not satisfy the needs of the space program developed to support the U.S. space policy
goals. If the replacement orbiter is not procured, this is tantamount on planning to operate
with the 3-orbiter STS until the late 1990's. The Nation's manned space program and many
shuttle-unique national security missions can ill afford the significantly higher level lof risk
associated with a 3-orbiter fleet.
The Office of Management and Budget takes the position that, whether or not the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget constraints apply, the imperatives of budget reduction
mandate a relatively slow procurement. The OMB's preference would be for Option 3B; which
in addition would also afford the time required to incorporate in the program the
recommendations of the "Rogers Commission". The Office of Science and Technology Policy
tends to support a less hasty decision on the procurement of the replacement orbiter until
broad agreement is reached that the design of the STS (not only that of the orbiter) is sound
and that further investment in the STS is warranted. The Department of Transportation
agrees with the recommendation in support of Option 3A, provided that NASA be directed to
publicly and unambiguously commit to a policy of not competing with private industry for
ELV-based launch services.
The Working Group is unanimous in accepting the view that advanced technology space
launchers, such as the National Aerospace Plane and other concepts currently being studied by
the Space Transportation System Architecture Study under NSSD 6-85, will not contribute to
the U.S. space launch posture before the early years of the 21st century. The Working Group
recognizes, however, that the furthering of these advanced space transportation technologies
will call for substantial and sustained investments, in addition to those associated with the
options discussed above.
' A few unresolved issues pertinent to the subject have been identified. Among these, the
following should be addressed by other groups or in a follow-on effort:
o Mechanism for providing the funding for the recommended additional outlays
o Specific timing of the formal decision in relation to the Rogers Commission report
o Modalities and timing of NASA's new policy on commercial launch services
o STS flight rates for planning purposes as contradistinguished from "target" rates.
A draft NSDD is forwarded under separate (classified) cover to embody the recommenda-
tions of Option 3A.
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INTRODUCTION
This Interagency Group (Space) draft report responds to the National Security Council
directive dated February 7, 1986 on the subject of recovery from the accidental loss of the
STS orbiter CHALLENGER on January 28, 1986.
Three specific objectives have been set forth for the study reported here. First, consider,
and report on, the expected impacts on the nation's capabilities to implement the national
space policies. Second, summarize the recommendations made by the cognizant agencies
on the ways to mitigate the immediate impact of the CHALLENGER accident on the on-
going programs in the three sectors of the U.S. space activities: national security, civil, and
commercial. Third, develop and assess the measures to be taken for reconstituting the U.S.
means for providing assured access to space in order to accommodate the President's
broad space policy objectives. The Group was encouraged to identify any longer-term
policy issues that may require future consideration in the light of the CHALLENGER
accident.
In broad terms, the several tasks have been completed. Two essential ques-tions have
not been answered: how will the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the
causes of the CHALLENGER accident ("Rogers Commission") impinge upon the schedule
and the cost of regaining operational status of the Space Transportation System; and are
there sound approaches for providing the resources recommended for the reconstitution.
The Interagency Working Group has made assumptions on the effects of the Rogers
Commission's recommendations and has limited its work to the identification of the
funding requirements associated with the recommendations.
The main body of the report contains the essential facts, suppported by background,
approach and argument. Detailed qua ntitative background and supporting information
is provided in Appendices.
Chapter I recapitulates the background of the situation addressed by the Working
Group in the period immediately following the CHALLENGER accident.
Chapter ll discusses the impacts on policy implementation and the means for mitigating
the impact on our immediate space launch capability prior to resumption of operations
and in the following period when the 3-orbiter STS fleet is operational. Chapter III defines
and assesses the options available to recover and reconstitute the U.S. space launch posture
to a level adequate to support the U.S. space policy goals for the mid-to late 1990's.
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ChapterIV briefly identifies the issues pertinent to the recovery / reconsti-
tution, but which have not been explicitly addressed or resolved by the Working
Group.
Chapter V summarizes the conclusions and recommendations.
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11 I. BACKGROUND
A. The CHALLENGER Accident. In January of this year, the twenty-fifth STS mission
suffered a tragic accident that resulted in a fatal explosion that destroyed
CHALLENGER and its crew. The CHALLENGER accident highlights the vulnerability of
all space launch systems regardless of their degree of redundancy, sophistication, and
reliability and demonstrates the vulnerability of relying on any single space launch
system for all U.S. access to space.
While the Presidential Commission is investigating the cause of the CHALLENGER
accident, the Interagency Group (Space) has been separately charged with assessing
the impact on scheduled satellite deployments and identifying appropriate launch
capability recovery options. This report was requested on an accelerated schedule to
support the President's option of submitting an FY86 supplemental budget request for
implementing recovery actions.
B. U.S. Space Program. The U.S. space program is composed of three independent, but
highly interactive sectors -- national security, civil, and commercial. The national
security and civil space programs are the direct responsibility of the U.S. Government.
The commercial space activities are the responsibilities of the private sector; the
government encourages and assists the commercial space sector by developing
technology and providing a sound investment environment for commercial space
activities. Administration policy specifically encourages the development of a U.S.
commercial space launch industry.
The national security space program is principally oriented toward deploying and
operating satellite systems that provide information and support to the National
Command Authority (NCA) and operational military forces. These space systems
provide critical functions such as attack warning, strategic communication, global
navigation, and treaty monitoring.
Civil space systems provide opportunities for basic scientific research, planetary
exploration, research and development, technology applications, including
operational monitoring of the earth and its atmosphere, and manned spaceflight.
These systems provide technology spinoffs that enable new commercial products and
services, and advance our understanding of physics, astronomy, meteorology,
environmental and life sciences. The U.S. manned spaceflight program is a part of the
civil space program. These programs are a visible demonstration of U.S. technological
leadership and offer opportunities to share space exploration with our international
partners and allies.
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Commercial space systems provide services to both the public and government.
These ventures exploit private capital and augment government investments in space
activities. Services are sold both domestically and internationally and contribute to the
image of American leadership in space and technology.
Each sector of our space program relies on basic space services -- command and
control, tracking, and launch services. To date, the government has been the sole
provider of space launch services; until recently launch services were based on
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) developed by the government for primarily
government use. Early this decade, the space shuttle entered operations and NASA
began to phase out the use of ELVs; commercial satellite operators that had previously
relied on NASA's ELVs for launch began to transition their payloads to the space
shuttle.
The European Space Agency (ESA) developed an ELV and spun off its production
and operation to the world's first quasi-commercial space launch system. This French
company, Arianespace, began offering commercial launch services in competition with
other launch systems, principally the shuttle.
The Department of Defense, while transitioning the majority of its payloads to
the STS, established a policy of assured access to space and is procuring a limited
number of ELVs as a complement to the shuttle. This effort was specifically designed to
avoid total dependence on a single space launch system for all national security
satellites.
C. National Space Goals and Objectives. The U.S. has established space policy goals or
objectives which provide a focus for the activities in the individual space sectors. These
goals are as follows:
1. Maintain U.S. space leadership.
2. Assure critical space system support to the NCA and operational
commanders.
3. Provide a more assured access to space.
4. Provide routine, cost effective space transportation.
5. Establish a permanent manned presence in space.
6. Maintain a vigorous and balanced space research and development
program.
7. Encourage U.S. private sector involvement and investment in space
activities.
8. Encourage commercialization of U.S. ELVs.
9. Continue international cooperation in space.
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D. The Space Transportation System. The STS was developed to be the workhorse of
the U.S. space launch capability. The original concept called for a fleet of five reusable
orbiters, providing 60 launches a year, and reducing space transportation costs well
below the costs of ELVs. During the decade that the STS was being built, its costs
increased, the number of orbiters was reduced, and the projected number of launches
dropped to around 24 per year.
While the concept was based on high usage, rapid turnaround, and frequent
satellite recovery and refurbishment, none of these have yet fully developed. Plans for
intensive usage have not materialized; turnaround is more complex and time
consuming than originally planned; and satellite recovery and refurbishment have
gained slow acceptance by system designers. A reluctance to commit all U.S. space
assets to sole dependence on a single launch system has led DoD to maintain an ELV
capability in addition to the STS. Each of these factors combine to undermine the
economic premise that encourages flying every spacecraft on the shuttle and flying the
shuttle as frequently as possible to reduce the cost per flight.
The spacecraft deployment capability of the STS is only one of its features; the
other major capability of the shuttle is its ability to carry man into space and support
experimentation there for several days. This is the truly unique capability of the STS
that cannot be matched by ELVs or any current foreign competition other than the
Soviet Union. This capability has never been accounted for in the economic arguments
of the STS concept. All costs were attributed to the cargo mission, and the importance
of manned presence was not assigned a cost. Despite the emphasis on cargo carrying,
the STS has been the centerpiece of the U.S. manned space program following
Apollo/Skylab and is an essential element in satisfying the national space objectives.
E. Expendable Launch Vehicles. As the STS became operational in the early 1980s,
national security and civil space systems were planned to transition from ELVs to the
shuttle. Civil missions, and foreign and commercial missions launched by NASA have
essentially completed this transition; the DoD and NOAA usage of ELVs was planned to
continue into the 1988 timeframe.
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The current DoD inventory of ELVs consists of seven (7) T34D, one (1) T346,
sixteen (16) ATLAS vehicles, and nine (9) THOR vehicles in inactive storage. NASA has
four (4) completed DELTA vehicles, three (3) partially built vehicles, as well as long-
lead materials for eight (8) more.
The DoD has implemented an assured access to space strategy which calls for a
limited number of ELVs to augment an otherwise complete dependence on the STS.
This effort included ten (10) Complementary ELVs (CELVs), which are capable of
launching Shuttle-size and weight payloads. The first of these will be available in the
fall of 1988. In addition, thirteen (13) TITAN II ICBMs are being refurbished to launch
selected small payloads; these will first be available in the spring of 1988.
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II. IMPACTS
A. Introduction. The recent STS failure has two principal effects on the U.S. space
launch capability. The first is the loss of the reusable flight hardware. The second is the
disruption of all STS flight operations until the cause of the CHALLENGER accident is
determined and corrected. This will create a backlog of missions that will have to be
worked off in addition to the normally scheduled flights. The size of this backlog will
be directly proportional to the length of time the STS is grounded. Once flight
operations resume, both the normal schedule and the backlog will have to be
accommodated with only 75% of the planned orbiters.
The types of actions that can be taken as well as the options available to decision-
makers vary with time; five timeframes have been identified and considered by the
study group.
The first timeframe is the grounding period defined by the length of the accident
investigation and the time required to correct the cause of the STS failure. At this time,
the most optimistic estimate of the grounding period is one year.
The second timeframe is the accommodation period. This period begins with the
resumption of STS flight operations and continues until that time when additional
launch assets (either additional ELVs or a replacement orbiter) can be brought into
service. This period is characterized by reprioritizing missions and most effectively
using the limited launch assets that are available. The earliest that a replacement
orbiter could be available would be 1990 and the soonest that additional ELVs could be
available would be 1988.
The third timeframe is the recovery period. This period could begin around 1988
when the first additional ELVs become available to assist in reducing the growing
backlog of STS missions. The length of the recovery period will be determined by the
operational capability of the orbiter fleet, the quantity of ELVs available, and any
reduction in demand that may have resulted from payloads that have been canceled or
lost to foreign competition during the disruption of STS launch operations.
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The fourth timeframe is the nominal operations period. The period begins when
the combination of U.S. space launch assets, both the STS and ELVs, are capable of
handling each year's operational demand for launches.
The fifth timeframe is the next generation period. This period begins when new
technology enables new launch systems and they enter operational service. This
period is judged to be post 1995-2000.
B. Impact on Launch Capability. The CHALLENGER represented one fourth of the
total STS fleet. It was one of two orbiters configured to carry the CENTAUR upper
stage. This reduction in the number of available orbiters will significantly impact the
nation's space launch capability. The remaining orbiters will be grounded pending
the determination of the causes of the accident and the subsequent repairs. The
current baseline assumption is that the STS fleet will be grounded for 12 months.
Based on a 12-month grounding, the same pre-accident demand for STS flights, a
three-orbiter fleet, and the previously planned NASA STS flight rate, and no
procurement of additional ELVs, the following backlog of missions would develop:
TABLE II- 1 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
FISCAL YEARS
Equivalent
Payloads
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9*
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
18
18
18
18
18
18
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-33
-39
-45
-51
-57
-63
-69
* Does not include the five missions previously flown in FY 1986,
including 51L (CHALLENGER)
If more conservative flight rates are assumed, the resulting backlog is
correspondingly increased:
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TABLE 11-2 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
FISCAL YEARS
Equivalent
Payloads
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
.
,
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
Conservative
0
4
8
10
12
12
12
12
12
12
Flight Rates
(three orbiters)
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-46
-58
-70
-82
-94
-106
-118
The Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle (CE LV) being developed by the
DoD could accommodate a shuttle-sized payload. Increases in production and launch
rates could be achieved with additional capital investmentThe first CELV will be
delivered in the fall of 1988. By that time the STS is already 24 to 32 shuttle equivalent
missions (depending on the flight rate assumptions) behind pre-accident demand.
The FY 1986-89 backlog consists of existing payloads, whose launches will be
delayed by reduced STS launch capacity. The FY 1990-95 backlog is better
characterized as "lost flight opportunities" for missions not yet funded or completely
defined that could not be launched as a result of the CHALLENGER loss.
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Until additional ELVs can be made available in 1988, the nation will have to
operate with essentially the launch capability that now exists. Therefore, the
remaining orbiters, once they are released from grounding, will provide the only
resources that can be reallocated to accommodate the highest priority launches over
the next two years.
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C. Impacts During the Accommodation Period (FY 1986-88). If the current
assumption that the STS fleet will be grounded for 12 months is valid, high priority
national security missions will not be significantly impacted. DoD is in the midst of
transitioning its payloads to the STS; the number of DoD payloads still on ELVs lessens
the impacts of the STS grounding on defense, but some of the DoD payloads will have
to be flown on the shuttle, as soon as practical. Civil and commercial missions will be
impacted to a greater extent. Individual missions will be slipped on the order of 3 to
15 months. Initial manifest impact charts are provided in Appendix I and a preliminary
manifest, based on a 12-month grounding is provided in Appendix II. If the STS is
grounded for longer than 12 months, the impact on national security missions will
become more serious and commercial and foreign customers might try to reschedule
on Ariane or another ELV. Foreign partners cooperating in scientific missions may,
when faced with lengthy or unknown delays, may elect to develop cooperative
agreements with the U.S.S.R. or China, causing complex technology transfer and
foreign policy problems. No efforts were made in this study to quantify the schedule
impacts for downtimes longer than 12 months.
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III. RECOVERY OPTIONS
A. Objectives. Before attempting to identify possible recovery options, a basic
statement of the objectives of the recovery plan should be made. Simply stated the
objective is twofold -- (1) to recover from the interruption in launch operations as
efficiently and quickly as practical, and (2) to rebuild a more balanced and flexible
national capability largely independent of failures in a given system.
B. Criteria. The following general criteria were selected for evaluating and
comparing possible recovery options.
(1) Capability/Risk.
The U.S. space launch capability must offer a high degree of operational
availability and be able to reliably satisfy the diverse requirements of all three sectors
of the space program.
Time critical national security missions require assured access to space and need
launch diversity to avoid total reliance on a single launch system. The majority of civil
missions have become highly dependent on manned interaction and recovery of
experimental equipment; they, therefore, require the unique STS capabilities.
Commercial satellite operations are concerned with launch schedule availability and
costs.
The unique manned capability of the shuttle must be explicitly considered in
addition to its ability to support launching routine cargo. Routine cargo delivery not
requiring manned capability may be more effectively allocated to expendable launch
vehicles. STS-unique capabilities will be required to support programs such as space
station, materials processing, and other space commercialization activities;
revisit/resupply missions like the Hubble Space Telescope; as well as selected national
security missions, including SDI.
Civil missions, including some with time-critical constraints (i.e., NOAA weather
and remote sensing satellites) and many requiring the unique STS capabilities, are
required to maintain U.S. leadership in space, in scientific research and exploration, in
advanced space technology and applications and in manned space systems; to foster
international cooperation in space and to facilitate and encourage private sector
developments in space.
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Each option is assessed on its ability to provide a balanced space launch posture
throughout the rest of this century.
The risk associated with each option's launch capability is a measure of the
consequences if this capability is again perturbed or interrupted. The risks posed by
this possibility of interruption are different for each sector of the space program.
Elements of this risk assessment include diversity of launch capability versus
reliance on a single launch system; adequate reserve capability beyond anticipated
demand to accommodate interruptions in launch operations without creating an
unacceptable backlog of missions; the ability of a private sector expendable launch
vehicle industry to augment government launch capacity on either a routine basis or in
emergency situations; adequate capacity to accommodate growth in specific
requirements. Risk is especially critical for those missions that must have manned
interaction and must rely solely on the shuttle.
2. Backlog/Lost Flight Opportunities.
Backlog is a measure of reduced flight capacity -- the difference between the
fr flight projections before the accident and current post-accident flight projections.
Backlog can be divided in two general categories:
Near-term (FY 1986-89) consisting of existing payloads whose launches will
be delayed by reduced launch capability.
Mid-term (FY 1990-95) consisting of lost flight opportunities for planned
missions not yet built.
The size of this cumulative backlog and the time required to eliminate it are
indicators of the recovery capacity of each option.
A launch capability that is unable to eliminate the mid-term backlog would
reduce the scope and extent of the U.S. space program in the 1990s.
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3. Affordability.
The Balanced Budget Act (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) and Presidential policy
mandate that specific deficit reduction targets be met. The President's FY 1987 budget
meets the targets from FY 1986-91. OMB advises that Administration policy requires
any funding requests to Congress be accompanied by offsets.
This criterion addresses the ability to fund the required costs within each budget
year.
The magnitude of the required budget authority and outlays projected for FY
1986-91, and the total costs will be shown for each option, and the ability to fund each
each option in the currently constrained fiscal environment will be discussed.
4. Private Sector Launch Capability.
The availability of a privately funded U.S. ELV industry could represent an
important element in developing a balanced U.S. space launch strategy. Even a limited
commercial ELV launch capability could effectively augment government launch
capacity for selected missions.
This criterion assesses the extent to which the individual option specifically
encourages or discourages the private investment critical to developing a domestic,
commercial ELV industry, consistent with existing Presidential policies.
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C. Common Assumptions and Considerations
(1) Flight Rate Assumptions.
Throughout this report, two flight rates are consistently used for all assessments.
The NASA planned flight rates were used as a baseline; this planning builds to a rate of
6 flights per orbiter per year or a total of 24 flights a year with 4 orbiters.
A more conservative flight rate was assumed by the majority of the IG(Space)
Working Group to be more realistic for planning purposes in this post-accident
environment. This planning builds to a rate of 4 flights per orbiter per year, or a total
of 16 flights a year with 4 orbiters.
These two flight rate assumptions represent a reasonable range of boundary
conditions for the purpose of this study. In the current circumstance, conservative
planning assumptions are crucial. Once new flight rate schedules are established, any
significant shortfall in achieving these rates, will increase the already large backlog
created by the accident. Costs to the government will also increase due to program
delays -- costs that can be avoided now by conservative planning.
These planning assumptions are not a ceiling; higher rates may be achieved and
would permit backlogs to be reduced more quickly. Rather, they represent prudent
nominal capacity to be used for more conservative program and budget planning.
For the space shuttle program, the flight rate target of 24 per year by 1989 was
based on detailed plans consistent with expected technical achievements in production,
launch processing, and in-flight operations.
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While the Working Group recognizes that such flight rate schedules may be
technically feasible, they would not provide the conservative margins that are essential
to reduce the risk of further serious disruption of the U.S. space program.
(2) NASA Salvage Operations and Corrective Action.
All options include all actions necessary to restore the remaining three orbiters to
a safe operational status in as short a time as possible. This includes salvage operations,
redesign, procurement, and requalification of flight hardware, and additional flight
instrumentation. While it is assumed that orbiter performance will not be significantly
reduced as a result of these post-accident modifications, a nominal decrease in payload
lift capability is expected. The costs for these necessary actions are included in every
option considered.
(3) Cost Estimates.
Because of the limited time available to assess the programatic implications
resulting from the STS backlog created by the loss of CHALLENGER, the costs presented
for each option focus on launch system assets, such as vehicles, facilities, and payload
impacts.
Effects of the near-term backlog were addressed, where possible, in terms of
changes in reimbursables, STS flight savings due to post-accident flight rates, and
program adjustments through FY 1991. These effects tend to increase the total costs
and are included with each option.
Additional effects due to delays in future programs or offsets from future
reductions or cancellations, were beyond the scope of this effort. These unidentified
costs are generally believed to lower the cost impacts identified in each option and
were not addressed due to the limited time available.
OMB advises that Administration policy requires any funding requests to Congress
be accompanied by offsets. No offsets were identified by the individual agencies and
none were assumed by the IG (Space). Estimated costs are used to compare the options
and are not meant to preempt the responsible agencies efforts to finalize their
preliminary estimates.
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(4) Next Generation Technology.
Consistent with the NSC tasking to the Working Group, advanced technology,
such as the National Aerospace Plane, was reviewed. The operational availability of
these next generation launch systems was judged to be no earlier than 1995. Since the
recovery / reconstitution period covered by this report extended only through 1995,
these new systems were not considered viable candidates.
A specific study of second generation space transportation systems, the National
Space Transportation and Support (STAS) Study, is being conducted in response to
NSSD-6-85. This study and the other ongoing NASA and DoD technology programs
must reflect the strategy adopted to solve the near and mid-term launch problems.
This can be done within the normal coordination/ budget process to ensure a coherent
long-term plan.
(5) U.S Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicles.
In May 1983, a Presidential policy was established to encourage and facilitate
development of a U.S. commercial ELV industry. This policy was based on the premise
that the existence of a viable commercial ELV industry would add to the general
economic vitality of the U.S. and provide it with a robust space launch capability. The
policy was not fully implemented; low STS prices for commercial and foreign payloads,
set in order to compete with Arianespace, precluded domestic ELV companies from
gaining a share of this market.
Several of the options considered in this paper assume the availability of a U.S
commercial ELV industry given proper government encouragement. The following is
the status of this industry and vendor estimates of production and launch rates that
could be achieved in the 1989-1990 timeframe without major capital investment in
new facilities:
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TITAN - 14 TITAN vehicles per year of various configurations.
ATLAS - 16 CENTAUR upper stages and 17 ATLAS vehicles per year of various
configurations.
DELTA - 10 DELTA vehicles per year.
These quantities clearly exceed the available commercial and foreign market but
provide strong assurance that a U.S. ELV industry could develop from existing
resources. Both General Dynamics and Transpace Carriers, Inc. (TCI) have been
negotiating with NASA for nearly two years, for commercial production, marketing,
and launch responsibilities for the ATLAS and DELTA vehicles, respectively.
Commercialization of the TITAN launch vehicles is also possible.
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D. Options
The options described in this paper represent the spectrum of alternatives
considered by the Working Group. Each option is described and assessed in relation to
the preceding criteria.
The options addressed are:
1. Return to pre-accident baseline - replace the fourth orbiter with no change in
STS goals or objectives and with no additional ELVs.
2. Three orbiters with expanded ELVs - do not replace the fourth orbiter; use
the remaining three orbiters as efficiently as possible and augment launch capability
with USG and commercial ELVs.
3A. Four orbiters with expanded ELVs - replace the fourth orbiter, and augment
launch capability with USG and commercial ELVs.
3B. Four orbiters (delayed delivery) with expanded ELVs - the same as Option 3A
except the delivery of the replacement orbiter is delayed to ease the near-term
funding impact.
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Option 1 -- Return to Pre-Accident Baseline (Four Orbiters - No Additional ELVs)
This strategy represents the baseline option in that it would attempt to return
to pre-accident conditions. The lost orbiter would be replaced using existing
structural spares and the spares would be replaced. The replacement orbiter would
be operational in 1990. Under this option, the shuttle would be the nation's primary
space launch system.
National security and critical civil missions would be given highest priority;
commercial and foreign customers would be given the next highest priority; other
civil missions would be the lowest priority.
The Vandenberg STS facility would be activated on schedule and, until the
delivery of the fourth orbiter, used only for those missions that require orbit
inclinations unattainable from Kennedy. The existing three orbiters are thus
essentially dedicated to Kennedy usage to reduce the STS backlog.
No additional ELVs beyond those currently approved (i.e., ten CELVs and 13
TITAN Ils) would be procured. NASA's commitment to three STS equivalent
commercial and foreign flights per year would be retained.
The following tables show the STS backlogs under two assumptions of flight
rates ( i.e., NASA planned rates of six flights per orbiter per year and conservative
rates, i.e., four flights per orbiter per year):
TABLE III - 1 OPTION 1 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION ( NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Eq uivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
22
24
24
24
24
24
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-33
-35
-35
-35
-35
-35
-35
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TABLE III - 2 OPTION 1 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
Conservative
0
4
8
10
13
16
16
16
16
16
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-46
-57
-65
-73
-81
-89
-97
For the NASA planned flight rates, the backlog/lost opportunities remains
constant at 35 for the early 1990s.
For a conservative flight rate, the backlog continues to grow and almost
doubles in the first half of the 1990s.
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Assessment.
Capability/Risk. This option includes only the launch capacity from a restored four-
orbiter fleet (16 to 24 STS flights a year). The option restores the assets lost in the
accident, but does not improve the diversity and flexibility of our national launch
posture from the posture planned prior to the accident. It further does not meet the
national security requirement for a launch capability essentially independent of failures
in a single launch system. However, two four-orbiter fleets provide increased flexibility
in responding to changes to payload schedules and events. The replacement orbiter
ensures that the STS fleet would not be reduced to two orbiters in the event that one of
the three remaining orbiters was out of service for an extended period of time.
Backlog. As shown in Tables III - 1 and III -2 this option does little to reduce or eliminate
the STS backlog under either the optimistic or conservative flight rate assumptions.
Because this option returns to the launch posture that existed prior to the
accident, it leaves the nation just as susceptible to future outages and does not provide
the ability to recovery quickly.
The decision to replace CHALLENGER must consider that elements of the shuttle
fleet will inevitably experience downtime for repairs. Furthermore, it would be
prudent to recognize the possibility of another major shuttle accident and to protect
the nation's capability to support critical programs requiring man, like SDI and space
station, in the wake of such an accident. In addition, a four-orbiter fleet provides
increased flexibility in response to launch schedule changes from payload and weather
delays as well as maintenance and refurbishment.
Affordability. Table B.1 shows the fiscal impact of Option 1. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions, replacement orbiter,
Integral Upper State Airborne Support Equipment (IUS ASE), and replacement
structural spares) is estimated at $2.8 billion. Total NASA costs (including replacement
items) considering flight savings, lost reimbursables, and program adjustments, are
estimated at $3.8 billion. DoD impacts consist of program adjustments of about $0.3
billion and STS reimbursable credits of about $0.6 billion resulting in a net savings of
about $0.4 billion. Total USG cost for Option 1 is about $3.5 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $493 million in FY 1986 and $882 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $177 million in FY 1986 and $867 million in
FY 1987.
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DoD would require budget authority of $1 million in FY 1986 and $52 million in
FY 1987. DoD outlays are projected at less than $1 million in FY 1986 and $39 million in
FY 1987.
Option 1 is the least costly of all options in terms of total costs with a total outlay
impact in FY 1987 of $0.9 billion with the least fiscal impact to the FY 1987 deficit
reduction target required by Gramm-Rudman legislation. Option 1 is the least difficult
to fund with accompanying offsets.
U.S. Commercial Space Industry. Since the STS continues to fly commercial and foreign
payloads, a U.S. commercial ELV industry would fail to develop.
Option 2 - Three-Orbiter/ Expanded ELVs
This option does not replace the fourth orbiter, but relies on expanded use of
expendable launch vehicles. The STS would provide for all manned missions and other
civil and national security missions which most effectively use the capabilities of the
shuttle. The option also assumes the availability of a U.S. commercial ELV industry.
The DoD would increase its procurement of CELVs and expand existing ELV
production to maintain the full spectrum of launch capability required in addition to
that offered by the U.S. commercial ELV industry.
An ELV launch capability would be maintained on both eastern and western test
ranges. The Vandenberg STS facility would be activated on schedule and, until the
delivery of the fourth orbiter, used only for those missions that require inclinations
unattainable from Kennedy. The existing three orbiters are thus essentially dedicated
to Kennedy usage to reduce the STS backlog.
No commercial or foreign communications satellites beyond [those committed
through FY 19881 [existing contractual/legal commitments] would be flown on the
shuttle, although the shuttle would be used to fly commercial and foreign experiments
requiring manned intervention to help explore new space applications. Approximately
three STS equivalents would be offloaded from the STS and would be available for
launch on commercial expendable launch vehicles. A U.S. commercial ELV industry,
created through private investment, would compete with foreign ELVs. The
government could buy U.S. commercial launch services for selected government
missions.
This offload, when combined with the DoD offload, would result in the following
revised demand:
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.
TABLE III -3 OPTION 2 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION ( NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
NASA Planned
Flight Rates
0
6
14
15
18
18
18
18
18
18
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-28
-28
-29
-28
-26
-24
-22
TABLE III -4 OPTION 2 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
Conservative
Flight Rates
0
4
8
10
12
12
12
12
12
12
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-41
-47
-54
-59
-63
-67
-71
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Assessment.
Capability/Risk. This option includes launch capacity from a three-orbiter fleet (12 to 18
flights per year), additional DoD ELVs (three to five STS-equivalents per year), and
commercial ELVs (three STS-equivalents per year) resulting in a total national capability
of 18 to 26 STS-equivalents a year, starting in FY 1989. This provides additional launch
diversity beyond that planned prior to the CHALLENGER accident and satisfies the
national security requirements for assured access to space for critical national security
payloads. The launch vehicle diversity in this option reduces the risk of dependency on
a single launch system. A three-orbiter fleet provides less flexibility in responding to
changes in payload schedules and delays. In the event an orbiter was out of service for
an extended period of time, a two-orbiter fleet would be inadequate to satisfy manned
spaceflight, shuttle-unique, and national security requirements.
Backlog. Offloading some DoD missions from the STS and not flying communication
satellites beyond [those committed through FY 1988] [existing contractual/legal
commitments] results in an adjusted demand which is depicted in Tables III -3 and III -4.
Under these assumptions and NASA planned flight rates, the backlog would stabilize
by 1989 at about 28 flights and would be reduced by approximately 2 shuttle
equivalents per year beginning in 1992. If conservative flight rates are used, then the
backlog continues to grow by approximately four STS-equivalents a year through 1995.
Affordability. Table B.2 shows the final impact of Option 2. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions and IUS ASE is estimates at
$0.4 billion. Total NASA costs (including replacement items) considering flight savings,
lost reimbursables, and program adjustments, are estimated at $1.9 billion. DoD costs
include program adjustments, launch recovery plans estimated at $4.1 billion, and
reimbursable credits of about $1.1 billion for a total DoD cost of about $3.2 billion.
Total USG cost for Option 2 is estimated at about $5.1 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $236 million in FY 1986 and $150 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $87 million in FY 1986 and $219 million in FY
1987.
DoD would require budget authority of $562 million in FY 1986 and $797 million
in FY 1987. DoD outlays are projected at $193 million in FY 1986 and $896 million in FY
1987.
Option 2 is the next higher cost option above Option 1 with a total outlay impact
in FY 1987 of $1.1 billion. Option 2 is less difficult to fund with accompanying offsets
than Option 3A and about the same as Option 3B.
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U.S. Commercial ELV Industry. This option supports the development of a U.S.
commercial ELV industry. Without direct competition from the government for
routine commercial and foreign communications satellite launches and with proper
government encouragement, this industry should be competitive in the world market.
DoD could buy commercial launch services for those classes of defense missions that do
not have high security requirements. Potentially, some civil satellites could also use
commercial ELV launch services. This government business would enhance a sound
economic base and contribute to competitive commercial prices. This option would
implement the President's ELV commercialization policy by enabling the establishment
of a U.S. commercial launch industry to augment government's launch systems. This
industry could provide emergency relief in those cases when government launch
systems were grounded for protracted periods of time; with no direct government
funds required to maintain the option. A U.S. commercial launch industry could also
maintain and enhance the U.S. competitive position in the international market,
particularly if the dollar/French franc exchange rate remains favorable.
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Option 3A -- Four-Orbiter by FY 1990 / Expanded ELVs
This option replaces the fourth orbiter and delivers it by August of 1989,
increases the DoD procurement of ELVs, and reserves the STS essentially for
government use and those missions requiring unique STS capability. The option also
assumes the availability of a U.S. commercial ELV industry.
Beginning in FY 1989, routine commercial and foreign satellite deployments not
requiring manned presence would not be deployed by the shuttle. New commercial
exploitation requiring manned interaction (i.e., materials processing and
experimentation) would be encouraged on the STS.. DoD would continue to use the
STS for those high priority missions where the payloads cannot be effectively
reconfigured for ELVs or where man's presence is required as well as in contingencies
when ELVs are grounded. National security missions would rely equally on both the
STS and ELVs.
Civil missions tend toward designs that take advantage of the unique manned
capabilities of the orbiters and therefore rely heavily on the use of the STS. However,
both government or commercial ELVs would be available for civil use.
An ELV launch capability is maintained on both the eastern and western test
ranges. The Vandenberg STS facility would be activated on schedule and, until the
delivery of the fourth orbiter, used only for those missions that require inclinations
unattainable from Kennedy. The existing three orbiters are thus essentially dedicated
to Kennedy usage to minimize the STS backlog.
Commencing in FY 1989, Defense would launch additional ELVs ranging from
two to five STS-equivalents per year (see Tables Ill - 5 and III - 6). This offload, when
combined with the elimination of three equivalent STS flights a year for commercial
and foreign customers, beginning in FY 1989, would reduce the demand for shuttle
flights to about 16 a year by FY 1993.
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TABLE III -5 OPTION 3A STS BACKLOG PROJECTION ( NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
22
24
24
24
24
24
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-28
-24
-19
-12
-4
+4
+ 12
TABLE III -6 OPTION 3A STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
Conservative
0
4
8
10
14
16
16
16
16
16
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-41
-45
-48
-49
-49
-49
-49
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Assessment.
Capability/Risk. This option includes the launch capacity for a restored four-orbiter
fleet (16 to 24 flights per year), additional DoD ELVs (three to five STS-equivalents per
year), and commercial ELVs (three STS-equivalents per year) resulting in a total national
capacity of 22 to 32 STS-equivalents per year starting in FY 1991. The combination of
replacing the fourth orbiter and expanding government ELV usage achieves a more
diversified launch capability. This option satisfies the requirement for assured access to
space and the need to avoid dependencies on single launch systems. The emphasis on
assuring mission capability for critical national security missions can best be satisfied by
the diversified launch capability. This option allows the ability to select from various
strategies (e.g., dual compatibility, mixed scheduling) to assure minimum interruption
of critical national security functions, despite possible future launch vehicle outage. A
four-orbiter fleet provides increased flexibility in responding to changes in payload
schedules and events. The replacement orbiter ensures that the STS fleet would not be
reduced to two orbiters in the event that one of the three remaining orbiters was out
of service for an extended period of time.
Backlog. This option, assuming NASA planned flight rates, could support all manned
missions, including space station and other civil and national security missions, while
eliminating the STS backlog by 1993. Under more conservative flight rate assumptions,
the backlog would be stabilized by 1992, rather than eliminated. Assuming that NASA-
planned flight rate projections could be achieved, this reduction in combination with
the availability of a replacement orbiter would allow the elimination of the backlog by
1994 (see Table III - 5). If more conservative flight rates are assumed, however, the
backlogs would not be reduced (see Table III - 6).
Affordability. Table B.3 shows the fiscal impact of Option 3A. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions, replacement orbiter, IUS
ASE, and replacement structural spares) is estimated at $2.8 billion. Total NASA costs
(including replacement items) considering flights savings, lost reimbursables, and
program adjustments, are estimated at $4.9 billion. Total DoD costs for program
adjustments, launch recovery plans, and STS reimbursable credits are about $3.2 billion.
Total USG cost for Option 3A is estimated at about $8.1 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $493 million in FY 1986 and $882 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $177 million in FY 1986 and $867 million in
FY 1987.
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DoD would require budget authority of $562 million in FY 1986 and $797 million
in FY 1987. DoD outlays are projected at $193 million in FY 1986 and $896 million in FY
1987.
Option 3A is the most costly of all options and has the highest total outlay impact
in FY 1987 at $1.8 billion. Option 3A has the greatest impact to the FY 1987 deficit
reduction target required by Gramm-Rudman legislation and would be the most
difficult to fund with accompanying offsets.
U.S. Commercial ELV Industry. This option supports the development of a U.S.
commercial ELV industry. Without direct competition from the government for routine
commercial and foreign communications satellite launches, with proper government
encouragement, this industry should be competitive in the world market. DoD could
buy commercial launch services for those classes of defense missions that do not have
high security requirements. Potentially, some civil satellites could also use commercial
ELV launch services. This government business would enhance a sound economic base
and contribute to competitive commercial prices. This option would implement the
President's ELV commercialization policy by enabling the establishment of a U.S.
commercial launch industry to augment government's launch systems. This industry
could provide emergency relief in those cases when government launch systems were
grounded for protracted periods of time; with no direct government funds required to
maintain the option. A U.S. commercial launch industry could also maintain and
enhance the U.S. competitive position in the international market, particularly if the
dollar/French franc exchange rate remains favorable.
Option 36 -- Fourth Orbiter By FY 1992 / Expanded ELVs
This option is the same as 3A except that the fourth orbiter delivery is delayed
until January of 1991. The additional orbiter procurement would proceed on a slower
schedule to ease the impacts in meeting the deficit reduction targets imposed by the
Gramm-Rudman legislation and Presidential policy.
With this option, the backlog under NASA planned flight rate assumptions, would
be eliminated by 1995. More conservative flight rate assumptions would allow
stabilization of the backlog by FY 1992.
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TABLE III -7 OPTION 3B STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
18
18
22
24
24
24
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-28
-28
-29
-24
-16
-8
0
TABLE III -8 OPTION 3B STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
Conservative
0
4
8
10
12
12
14
16
16
16
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-41
-47
-54
-57
-57
-57
-57
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4ssment.
Capability/Risk. Because of the capacity provided by an additional shuttle, manned
flights, and unmanned payloads requiring the unique capabilities of the shuttle would
have greater flight opportunities. The overall U.S. launch posture would be
strengthened by the purchase of additional ELVs for DoD missions and the availability
of a U.S. commercial ELV industry. Greater diversity and flexibility would be provided
for the U.S. space launch program due to the replacement of the orbiter, increased
DoD use of ELVs, and a strong market incentive for private investment in commercial
ELVs. Increased risk would result from operating a three-orbiter fleet for two
additional years.
Backlog. This option, assuming NASA planned flight rates, could provide for all
manned missions, including space station, and other civil and national security missions
while eliminating the backlog of planned missions by FY 1995.
As with Option 3A, at conservative flight rates, this option would stabilize the
backlog of lost flight opportunities by the early 1990s. Under this option some civil
lovernment payloads may be further delayed as a result of delivering the fourth
irbiter two years later.
Affordability. Table B.3 shows the fiscal impact of Option 3B. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions, replacement orbiter, IUS
ASE, and replacement structural spares) is estimated at $3.1 billion. Total NASA costs
(including replacement items) considering flight savings, lost reimbursables, and
program adjustments, are estimated at $4.7 billion. Total DoD costs for program
adjustments, launch recovery plans, and STS reimbursables are about $3.2 billion.
Total USG cost for Option 3B is estimated at about $7.9 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $426 million in FY 1986 and $250 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $117 million in FY 1986 and $304 million in
FY 1987.
DoD would require budget authority of $562 million in FY 1986 and $797 million
in FY 1987. DoD outlays are projected at $193 million in FY 1986 and $896 million in FY
1987.
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Option 3B has a total outlay impact in FY 1987 of $1.2 billion, reduces the NASA
outlay impact in FY 1987 of Option 3A by $0.6 billion with a nine-month delay,
reducing the fiscal impact to the FY 1987 deficit target required by Gramm-Rudman
legislation. Option 3B, would be less difficult to fund with accompanying offsets,
about equal in difficulty to fund Option 2.
U.S. Commercial ELV Industry. This option supports the development of a U.S.
commercial ELV industry. Without direct competition from the government for
routine commercial and foreign communications satellite launches, with proper
government encouragement, this industry should be competitive in the world market.
DoD could buy commercial launch services for those classes of defense missions that do
not have high security requirements. Potentially, some civil satellites could also use
commercial ELV launch services. This government business would enhance a sound
economic base and contribute to competitive commercial prices. This option would
implement the President's ELV commercialization policy by enabling the establishment
of a U.S. commercial launch industry to augment government's launch systems. This
industry could provide emergency relief in those cases when government launch
systems were grounded for protracted periods of time; with no direct government
funds required to maintain the option. A U.S. commercial launch industry could also
maintain and enhance the U.S. competitive position in the international market,
particularly if the dollar/French franc exchange rate remains favorable.
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BUDGET SIIIMAEY FOE OPTIONS
1986 1987 Total
Current Budget All
Year 6R1 Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 ITC Years
Option 1. Late 1986 Orbiter Buy (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
DOD Budget Authority
Outlays
NASA Budget Authority
Outlays
Total Bulget ATAINerv:y
Outlays
1 52 106 ?363 ?240 81 0 ?364
0 39 79 119
493 882 1008 953 312 196 0 3844
177 867 1002 1147 364 185 102 3844
494 7,24 1114 590 72 277 0 2,.c1
177 906 1081 1147 364 185 102
Option 2. No New Orbiter with Offloads
DOD Budget Authty
Outlays
NASA Budget Authority
Outlays
CO-
562 797 924 103 84 342 373 3185
153 898 911 310 129 286 464 3133
236 150 127 727 284 341 0
87 219 187 775 311 309 0
Total Budge: Authority 798 547 1061 835 368 683 373 0(0b
Outiays 280 1115 1098 1085 440 595 464
Optior, 3A. Gate 1986 Orbiter Buy with Offloads (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
DOD Budget Authority
Outlays
NASA Budget Authority
Outlays
562 797 924 108 84 342 373 3189
193 896 911 310 129 286 464 21E5
493 882 1046 1187 637 697 0 4942
177 867 1040 1381 689 686 102 4942
Total B;dget Authority 1055 1679 1970 1295 721 1039 373 8131
Outlays 370 1763 1951 1691 818 972 566 8131
Option 3B. Early 1987 Orbiter Buy with Offloads (4/87 Start, 1/91 Delivery)
DOD Budget Authority
562 797 924 108 84 342 373 3189
Outlays 193 896 911 310 129 286 464 3189
NASA Budget Authority
Outlays
426 250 902 1559 882 674 0 4693
117 304 899 1582 960 713 - 118 4693
Total Budget Authority 988 1047 1826 1667 966 1016 373 7882
Outlays 310 1200 1810 1892 1089 999 582 7882
---------
Nctes:
See fiscal data each option
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1 Aeut 15,1
ir oi64 r,
Option 1. Late 1986 Orbiter Buy (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
DOD
1986
LU:ZE:t
Year 6RE
1987
Budget
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
ITC
Total
Tears
Program Adjustments/1
1
52
106
45
24
30
0
25a
Lam:h RE:overy Plan/2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
STS Reimbursable Credits/3
0
0
0
-408
-264
51
0
-621
DK:D Budget Authaityl6
1
52
106
-363
-240
81
0
-354
Outlays/8
39
79
NASA
Frog:am Ad3ustments/1
67
179
259
214
218
239
0
1276
Replacement Items/4
493
882
895
365
115
55
0
2805
Flight Savings/Reimb L0s5/2,5
-67
-179
-146
274
-21
-98
0
-237
PEA Budget Authority/6
492
882
1008
953
312
196
0
3844
Outlays/7
177
867
1002
1147
364
185
102
3844
Total Budget Authority
494
934
1114
590
72
277
0
3481
Outlays/9
177
906
1081
1147
364
185
102
ocig
Notes:
1) Ad7'.ustments to programs based upon 12 month STS Standdovn,
NASA adjustmen:s include ::ESE Follow-oo, Spartan, EIS changes Including reliability i quality
assurante, Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and RON
2) Dt:al compatitilitylayload integration. ELT's, launch facility modifications
and support
3; NASA/DO: reimbursables changes in negotiation
4) Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions, Replacement Orbiter, IUS ASE,
and Replacement Structural Spares
5) Flight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
6) Budget Authority amounts provided by agencies
7) Budget Outlay amounts provided by NASA
8) DOD Outlay amounts not estimated beyond 1988
9) Total Outlay amount does not include DOD outlays beyond 1988
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
II I
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
logot.ir .2.
Optiori 2. No New Orbiter vith Offloads
DOD
i9ao
Current
Year 698
15a:
Budget
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
BIC
iotal
All
Years
Program Adjustments/1
1
52
106
45
24
30
0
258
Launch Recovery Plan/2
561
745
819
694
421
465
273
4077
SE 2eimtu:sib1e Cr:edits/3
0
0
0
-621
-361
-153
0
-114E
DOD Budget Authority/6
562
797
924
108
84
342
373
2189
OutlaysIS
193
896
911
210
129
286
464
3189
NASA
Froam Adjustments/1
67.0
179.0
259.0
314.0
218.0
229.0
0.0
1276
Replacement Items/4
236
150
0
0
0
0
0
386
Flight Savings/Reimb Loss/3,5
-67.0
-179.0
-122.0
413.0
66.0
102.0
0.0
213
NASA Blip': Authority/6
226
150
127
727
284
341
0
1875
Outlays/7
87
219
187
775
311
309
0
------- ----
? ?
? - ? ?
- ?
? ? ?
Total Budget Authority
798
947
1061
835
368
683
373
5064
Outlays
280
1115
1098
1085
440
595
464
? ? - - ?
Notes:
1) Austments to programs based upon 12 month STS Standdovn,
NASA adjustments include TDRSS Follov-on, Spartan, STS changes including reliability & quality
assT.Tance, Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and R&PM
2) Dual compatibility/payload integration, ELlus, launch facility modifications
and support
3) NASA/DOD reimbursables changes in negotiation
4) Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions and IDS ASE
5) Flight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
6) Budget Authority amounts provided by agencies
7) Budget Outlay amounts provided by NASA
8) DOD Outlay amounts estimated
22-vx-St
r Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
II
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
Tikue 3ft
23-Mar-86
Option 3A. Late 1986 Ortiter Buy vith Offloads (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
DOD
1986
Cur,:e.-.t
Tear 611H
1987
Budget
Tear
1988
1989
1990
1991
ITC
Total
All
Years
Program Adjustments/1
1
52
106
45
24
30
0
258
Launch Recovery Plan/2
561
745
819
694
421
465
373
4077
STS Reimbursable Credits/3
0
0
0
-631
-361
-153
0
-1145
DOD Budget Authority/6
562
797
924
108
84
342
372
3189
Outlays/8,
192
896
911
310
129
286
464
3185
NASA
Program Adjustments/1
67
179
259
314
218
239
0
1276
Replacement Items/4
493
882
895
365
115
55
0
2805
Flight Savings/Reimb Loss/3,5
-67
-179
-108
508
304
403
0
861
NASA Budget Authority/6
492
882
1046
1187
637
697
0
4942
Ottlays/7
177
867
1040
1381
689
686
102
4742
-- -----
----
Total Budget Authority
1055
1679
1970
1295
721
1039
373
813:
Outlays
370
1763
1951
1691
818
972
566
813i
--
Rotes:
1: Adjustments to programs based upon 12 month STS Standdovn,
NASA adjustments include TDRSS Follov-on, Spartan, STS changes including reliability & quality
assurance, Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and R&PM
2) Dual compatibility/payload integration, ELT's, launch facility aodifications
and support
3) RASA/DOD reimbursables changes in negotiation
4) Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions, Replacement Orbiter, IDS ASE,
and Replacement Structural Spares
5) Flight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
6) Budget Authority amounts provided by agencies
7) Budget Outlay amounts provided by RASA
8) DOD Outlay amounts estimated
r Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
moue' .315
23-Mar-E
Option 38. Early 1987 Orbiter Buy vith Offloads (4/87 Start, 1/91 Delivery)
DOD
1986
Current
Year 688
1987
Budget
Year 1988
1989
1990
1991
ITC
Total
Ail
Years
Program Adjustments/1
1
52
106
45
24
30
0
258
LauAch Re:ovary Flan/2
561
745
81q
694
421
465
373
4077
BIS Eembarsable Credits/3
0
0
0
-631
-361
-153
0
-1145
KT) B7:dge: Autt,uity/6
562
797
924
108
84
342
373
3189
Outlays/8
193
896
911
310
129
286
464
NASA
Erc,grar Adpistmeas/1
67
179
259
314
218
239
0
1:76
Replacement Items/4
426
250
765
830
575
180
0
3026
Flight Savings/Reimb Loss/3,5
-67
-179
-122
415
89
255
0
391
?!-
NASA Badge: Autbority/6
426
250
902
1559
882
674
0
4693
Outlays/7
117
304
899
1582
960
713
118
4693
Total Budget Authority
988
1047
1826
1667
966
1016
373
7882
Outlays
310
1200
1810
1892
1089
999
582
7882
Notes:
1) Adjustments to programs based upon 12 month STS Standdovn,
NASA adjustments include TDRSS Follov-on, Spartan, STS changes including reliability & quality
assurance. Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and RUM
2) Dual compatibility/payload integration, ELV's, launch facility modifications
and support
3) NASA/DOD reimturcables changes in negotiation
4) Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions, Replacement Orbiter, IDS ASE,
and Replacement Structural Spares
5) Flight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
6) Budget Authority amounts provided by agencies
7) Budget Outlay amounts provided by NASA
8) DOD Outlay amounts estimated
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03 : CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181.
1R001501430001-6
I I I
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
&CAPE Z.C. d.
OPTION ONE
CU MULATIVE SACO:LOGS
90
....?
00
70
80
..-Ae.'......-"e'e.--
....'"
50
40
.7
A
/
30
4
e B 9I
.1 --a
20
""a"...".
10
.
O.
. . .
.
. . .
as
87
158
OPTI MIST C RATIE2
Vol( i.e. 3.
90
90
70
290
50
5 40
a0
20
10
59 *0 1 92
FISCAL YEAR
CONSERVAIIVE RATES
93
OPTION THREE-A
CU MULATIVE 9AC)2.00S
*4
95
86
87
88
OPTI MISIIC RAT=
89
90 *1 *2
93
PISCAL YEAR
CONSERVAIIVE RATES
94
Parts Z.e-2.
100
90
50
70
90
50
40
30
20
10
OPTION TWO
CUMULATIVE IIACIP3-00S
7/.7
as
87
88
0 OPT bms-nc AT
ta
Pear, X.C. ?
2
In
1
89 *0 *1 92
PISCAL YEAR
4. CONSERVATIVE MT=
93
94 9
OPTION THREE-S
CU MULATTVE BACKLOGS
_
90
SD
?
70
50
50
4
t
I
40
...'..1.
3:I
..-.'"'.
..."-
......11.,..
0
?
?
? 1
1
?
?
?
87
OPTIMISTIC RATES
59 90 *1 92
FISCAL YEAR
4 CONSERVATIVE RAMS
93
114
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95
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/03: CIA-RDP92B00181R001501430001-6
CUMULATNE STE', FUGHTS
1 riD
90
70
60
50
40
20
I'D
0
OPTION 1
1 OD
a:i
70
50
50
40
3D
20
I'D
OPT1ON 1
NASA PLANNED FLIGHT RATES
CU MU...AWE BACKLOGS
0
a
D
0
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?....-
,
.
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