RESEARCH AND PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01361R000100110047-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: October 31, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optional)
Research on Propaganda Analysis
Methodology
Broadcast
EXTENSION
NO.
FBIS-0254-88 F.
FROM.
Acting Director, Foreign
Information Service
DATE I
14 November 1988 F.
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line ocross column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1. ADDSU
Jim:
This is ST
2. DDSU (FYI)
methodology paper that I
briefed during last week's
Monthly. I think most of
her findings and proposals
will have some long-term
gains for FBIS (and maybe
the analytical community at
large). I hope you and Evan
find it as interesting as
I did.
/5/
AD/ FBI S
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
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11131 October 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Chief FBIS Analysis Group
Special Assistant for Methodology
Research on Propaganda Analysis Methodology
From July 1986 to September 1988, under the sponsorship of
the Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program, I investigated
the theory and practice of propaganda analysis for intelligence
purposes. My research was aimed at accumulating material for a
study that would: survey the history of propaganda analysis in
the Intelligence Community, primarily within the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); examine propaganda
analysis methodology, appraising various techniques used inside
and outside the government; and offer recommendations for new
approaches to improve analysis and utilize the full potential
of automated data systems.
My research as an Exceptional Intelligence Analyst followed
three basic tracks:
(1) I explored the history of FBIS analysis to determine
how our methodology was developed and identify experiences that
might point the way to the development of new, more effective
analytical techniques.
(2) I investigated contemporary academic sources, in the
social sciences in general, but particularly in the field of
communications studies, to determine whether work outside the
government might help inform and improve our work.
(3) I sought insights from less directly related fields--
psychology, philosophy, semantics, etc.--in an effort to
develop a more fundamental understanding of how propaganda
analysis works and the reasons for its explanatory power.
In my new position, as a Special Assistant for Methodology
in the FBIS Analysis Group, I propose to use the results of my
research to formulate methodological guidelines to deal with
the growing diversity in communist media, conduct experiments
applying computer technology in FBIS research and analysis,
Investigate ways FBIS can help analysts cope with an overload
of material from media sources, and draft training manuals and
basic research reports that will assist analysts inside and
outside FBIS. I also would like to expand contacts with
scholars who can offer insights and assistance in all these
areas.
This report reviews some of the highlights of my findings
and suggests some of the specific projects that will result
from my research.
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REVIEW OF EXCEPTIONAL ANALYST PROJECT
FBIS History
I discovered that the history of FBIS analysis--spanning
nearly 50 years--can help us today to understand our work and
do it better. Without my research project, much of that history
and the lessons it contains would have been lost. Some of the
key documents I tracked down had not been unearthed before and
might eventually have disappeared entirely, and many of the
people I interviewed will not be here to tell their stories in
a few years. By identifying both the changes that have taken
place in FBIS analysis over the years and the remarkable con-
tinuities in the work and the experience of the Analysis Group
I was able to develop a much clearer understanding of our analy-
tical methodology and its application in different situations.
Past experience is helpful, for example, in meeting the
present challenge created by the growing diversity in communist
media, particularly the changes in Soviet propaganda under the
policies of glasnost. Similar problems of creating and
evaluating techniques to analyze different propaganda systems
were faced at the outset when FBIS analysis began in 1941 and
they arose again in 1947, when FBIS began post-war analysis of
Soviet media. The impact of changes in Soviet media on
analysis was also faced before under similar circumstances
during Khrushchev's rule. As one former FBIS analyst recalled,
Soviet media behavior in 1956 caused FBIS analysts to speculate
whether they would soon be out of work. Instead they found
that their systematic examination of the media was even more
important under such changing conditions. Strategies to meet
our current challenge, particularly techniques to help identify
new rules and patterns governing the media, can be found in
documents from these earlier periods and in testimony in
interviews with the analysts themselves.
During the 1940's propaganda analysis was a central subject
for research by scholars in the burgeoning field of communica-
tions studies and FBIS analysts were pioneers in the field.
Analysts in FBIS examined not only the controlled media of
totalitarian states, but also the less restricted media of
allied nations, an area of study that we did not return to for
many decades. Their need to break new paths was reflected in
their eclectic experimentation. A handbook for analysts
compiled in 1942 noted that analysts could employ "any method
of analysis which produces results which are useful to policy
makers. . . . Content analysis, ideological analysis,
political interpretation, semantics, all have their place."
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It was a periWof very basic exploration. Harold Graves,
who headed a radio monitoring and analysis project at Princeton
University before he was brought to Washington to organize
FBIS, recalled in an interview that he had no idea how to begin
to analyze foreign propaganda until someone suggested that to
be scientific the analysts should classify and quantify. After
applying this advice, analysts soon began to identify propaganda
patterns and draw inferences from the broadcasts without the
counting. Although serving as the Senior Administrative
'Officer in FBIS, Graves continued his involvement in analysis
in FBIS--reviewing the weekly analytical report and writing its
introductory summary.
Some of the FBIS analysts were influenced by the content
analysis techniques of Harold Lasswell, who headed a parallel
analytical effort at the Library of Congress. Lasswell's
quantitative methods were found to require too much simplifi-
cation and to be too cumbersome to use under the tight dead-
lines of current intelligence analysis, however, and were not
assimilated into the FBIS methodology. A complex coding and
counting system developed within FBIS by Harvard.psychologist
Jerome Bruner and others during the early days at FBIS was also
abandoned. One of Lasswell's colleagues noted years later that
although the approach of the FBIS analysts was "much more
intuitive" they had "considerable success" in anticipating
German actions.
Hans Speier, who came from a propaganda analysis project at
the New School for Social Research to head the FBIS Analysis
Division's German section, developed many of the concepts that
are-still successfully applied today, including the requirement
that analysts classify and differentiate between levels of
authority in commentary. He found the roots for his approach
to propaganda analysis in the work of another refugee German
scholar, Leo Strauss, who--in a 1941 essay, "Persecution and
the Art of Writing"--explained how to read between the lines of
texts written in repressive environments.
The work of the World War II German section was evaluated
in a study, published in 1959, by one of the wartime analysts,
Alexander George. By comparing inferences drawn by FBIS
analysts with revelations in captured German documents, partic-
ularly the diaries of German Minister of Propaganda Goebbels,
George concluded that the analysts had been accurate in
81 percent of their inferences. His study provided a simple
model for FBIS analysis that can still be used today for the
study of any controlled mass media:
Elite Policy Behavior Communications Behavior
Situa- Esti- Expecta- Policy Propa- Tech-Propaganda
tional-? matev?tions --> ganda-->niques Content
Factors tions Goals
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111
The analysts, George explained, used theilidetailed
knowledge of past media behavior to,reason backward from the
content of broadcasts to infer the propaganda goal behind it
and then to account for the goal in terms of elite estimates,
expectations, policy intentions and/or situational factors. No
comparable study has been published examining the work of FBIS
analysts who studied the media of other countries during World
War II or the specific techniques--files, coding, indexing,
etc.--that they used.
By the mid-1940's FBIS analysis had been all but abolished
by budget cuts and Congressional efforts to restrict FBIS's
mission. At the same time, communications scholars moved away
from the sort of propaganda analysis done by FBIS and focused
more on the effects of communication rather than the intentions
or circumstances that prompted it.
In 1947 the FBIS analysis function was revived with analysts
concentrating on the examination of communist media. FBIS
analysts were again among the pioneers in developing techniques
in this field. Along with analysts in the Foreign Documents
Division (now Production Group), they played an important role
in recognizing early signs of the conflict between China and
the Soviet Union and made major contributions to the analysis
of Soviet leadership politics. A new model for deciphering
communist communications was offered by FBIS analyst Myron Rush,
in a book published after he left FBIS, who hypothesized that
the Soviet elite communicates in the media with sub?elites
through the use of "esoteric communications"--"texts whose deep?
est meanings can be grasped only by a part of their audience."
During the first postwar decade analysts in FBIS also devel?
oped most of the valuable research aids, including the Key Theme
and Elite Statement files, that still provide an indispensable
foundation for our analysis of the media. At the same time
important management decisions were made that helped establish
the Analysis Group's unique potential to systematically exploit
communist media, including the creation of the Research Staff,
with its disciplined files to support the entire office, and
the institutionalization of the Group's role in guiding FBIS's
collection effort in key areas.
Academic Research
Increasingly following World War II, FBIS analysts' contacts
with the academic community concentrated on area studies pro?
grams: The growing field of communications studies had little
impact on our work. My survey of academic research in commun?
ications sciences suggests that FBIS would benefit by renewed
contacts with this field from which we grew. Fortunately, there
is also increased interest in propaganda studies among many
communications scholars, reflected in the publication of new
texts on the subject and the establishment of a new journal
devoted to it.
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Communication studies offer both potentiarlmodels to assist
us in refining our methodology and experiences in the use of
computers in research that might help us in our new automated
environment. The following examples are only suggestive of the
areas where we might usefully focus attention:
--In refining our methodology and developing strategies to
deal with changes in communist media we might learn from models
.offered by Hans Speier after he left FBIS. For example, in an
essay first published over a decade ago, entitled "The Commun?
ication of Hidden Meaning," Speier systematically examined
several of the kinds of communication that propaganda analysts
commonly have used to derive intelligence judgments, including
allegories, messages calculated to impart different meanings to
different audiences, writings using contentious historical
symbols, and silence or omissions. Drawing on a broad range of
examples--from literature, history, psychology, and philosophy--
he demonstrated the general relevance of such forms, not only
in communist countries. According to Speier, "in preliterate
and literate societies, and particularly, though not exclu?
sively, in illiberal regimes; among those who wield power as
well as those who live under its sway; among victims, critics,
and detached observers--in all of these circumstances and all
of these groups we encounter efforts to convey hidden meaning
to certain recipients."
--Leon Festinger's concept of cognitive dissonance--
demonstrating the human inclination toward consistency in
actions and communication--provides a theoretical basis for
assumptions FBIS analysts make about media behavior and its
relationship to policy and intentions. Festinger's ideas help
explain why propaganda tends to reveal the source's policy
decisions, even though the source is aware that its words will
be analyzed for intelligence purposes. His model is relevant
to understanding a wide range of behavior--from the flood of
self?justification that followed the Soviet shootdown of the
KAL passenger plane in September 1983 to the tortuous course of
CSPU policies toward Stalin and his legacy. Turned on its
head, the theory provides a basis to look at propaganda not
just as a tool for the policy maker, but also as a set of
belief statements about the world that will constrain the
policy options of the state that initiated the propaganda.
--Similarly, Kurt Lewin's concept of the "gatekeeper,"
focusing on the processes that determine what material is
carried by mass media, can help us construct research
strategies to identify the rules governing Soviet media
practices under Gorbachev. In order to be able to draw
inferences about media behavior in the new situation, we must
define the instructions or implicit rules that are applied by
the media gatekeepers in selecting and rejecting material.
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--Other communications studies, on diffuse of innovation
and new information technologies, for example, can help us
understand the problems faced by Gorbachev in his drive for
reform and modernization and the development of new information
policies. Familiarity with academic literature on the implica?
tions and impact of Western nations' transformation into "infor?
mation societies" can help us understand Soviet discussions of
the same transition in the USSR.
The Methodological Model
In the final segment of my research I attempted to under?
stand and clarify the conceptual framework that allows analysts
to make valid political inferences from the media. In approach?
ing this issue I wanted to resolve several problems I had
encountered as an analyst that I thought might have a common
source: Why was it so hard to teach new analysts how to do
their job and why were some never able to learn?. , Why, when we
drew conclusions from the media that seemed "obvious" to us,
was our evidence often unpersuasive to some of our consumers?
How could I explain the role of the standard tools that AG
needed from FBIS to do its job--a defined, consistent data base
of elite statements, for example--in such a way that it would
be clear that their maintenance was not an unjustified burden
on collection resources? Why are FBIS analysts using the sole
source of propaganda frequently more successful in drawing
correct inferences from the media than all?source intelligence
analysts? Propaganda analysis, while demonstrably effective as
an intelligence tool, seemed to involve a way of looking at the
world that was not common or easily explained or accepted.
Why?.
A conceptual model to address my questions was provided by
Richard Wich, in his book Sino?Soviet Crisis Politics, in which
he makes a distinction between analysis of media content and
context. Wich explains that contextual factors define the
meaning of political messages, and that all relevant intelli?
gence evidence--political signals--is "constituted by both the
communication as such [the content] and the context in which it
acquires its operative meaning." In Wich's terms, propaganda
analysis was not content analysis but "contextual analysis."
I found intriguing support for this approach in a communi?
cation theory associated with psychological studies, by Gregory
Bateson and others, that produced the double bind explanation
of schizophrenia. The theory posits that all communication
contains within it two orders of information--content and
relationship--the equivalent of Wich's content and context.
The content of communication (words or actions) cannot have
meaning outside of a frame of reference (the context or the
relationship in which the communication takes place). The
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context can be viewed, in Bertrand Russell's terms, as a
different Logical Type than the content; it is communication
about communication or metacommunication. Errors in inter?
preting communication tend to develop when the metacommunication
is misunderstood or ignored. The hardest job an analyst faces
is to correctly identify the context of the propaganda.
These two levels of communication can be seen clearly, for
example, when their confusion creates a paradoxical situation,
as in the injunction "Be spontaneous!"--where the content
contradicts the context/metacommunication.
The two levels are also
apparent in humor, as
illustrated in this
cartoon, in which the
bank teller deliberately
ignores the frame of
reference or context
that the bank robber is
attempting to impose.
"nn sorry, our bank went broke this morning."
Everyone analyzes their personal interactions using both
aspects of communication, but the analysis of the context is
normally done unconsciously. We are unaware of our analysis,
at least as long as we do it successfully. For example, if
someone tells us to "go jump in a lake," we note the person's
hostility (the metacommunication or context of the words) and
do not harbor any illusion that we have been asked to go
swimming. We are not analyzing the words, but responding to
other contextual signals that tell us their meaning.
Harold Graves offered a similar commonplace example in
explaining FBIS analysis to Congress in 1944:
Let us suppose, for instance, that young Junior has
been in a fight. We ask him who won, and he replies
that Jimmy, his opponent, didn't fight fair. We know
without any further questioning that Junior lost the
fight. In much the same way, when the German radio
circulates atrocity propaganda, it is a possible
indication that the military situation is unfavorable.
The problem with these examples is one we still face today.
The congressmen would understand the first example because they
shared unconscious assumptions about the context of the conver?
sation with the young boy. They would not necessarily draw the
same inference from the second example, however, unless Graves
made its context explicit, perhaps by citing previous instances
in which German media used allegations of atrocities to draw
attention away from battlefield losses.
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Similarly todl! analysts infer the conteltual half of a
communication by looking at past practice to find patterns that
provide clues to the context of1 the message content. Thus, when
the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 1971 issued the 496th "serious
warning" denouncing an alleged intrusion by a U.S. plane into
Chinese airspace, an analyst could safely assume that no
retaliatory action might follow, since that had been the
pattern following the 495 previous such warnings since 1958.
By contrast, in December 1978, when a check of AG Research Staff
files revealed that Chinese warnings to Vietnam contained
threatening statements that had not been used since the Chinese
invasion of India in 1962, it was not rash to anticipate the
Chinese incursion into Vietnam that occurred two months later.
Returning again to my questions, with this two?part model
of communication in mind I reached several tentative conclusions
and recommendations:
--It is hard to teach analysts to apply techniques of
propaganda analysis because its most important aspect--the
identification of context--is normally an unconscious function
and has received little explication as part of the research
process. Training of analysts should focus specifically on
this function and we should bear it in mind in our recruiting
and testing of potential new analysts.
--Our consumers are naturally unconvinced by our
conclusions when they do not already share our assumptions
about the communication context. We should address the
question of context more directly in our analysis.
--We should also be clearer and more explicit in explaining
our collection requirements and how contextual analysis must
have a large, complete, systematic data base to allow the
analyst to identify explanatory patterns. At the same time, we
should make sure that analysts are well trained in the use of
these resources.
--It is not surprising that analysis of the media alone is
often the best way to understand the context (and therefore the
content meaning) of communications, since the context is, by
definition, embedded in the communication itself. It must be
unearthed through the systematic examination of past communica?
tion, the search for patterns that can be done nowhere as well
as in AG.
In addition, I have come to suspect that the particular
mental perspective that allows analysts to "see" contexts where
others do not is fairly unusual and may have some relevance to
what has come to be known as the AG "culture." In my study of
FBIS history I was struck by the unchanging nature of this
culture, manifest since 1941 in the antibureaucratic,
democratic spirit of the office and in an undeniable history of
misunderstandings or conflicts between AG and other components.
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My hypothesis Ilk buttressed by studies ollersonality
types described in a book by Donald MacKinnon, one of the
psychologists who was a part of the World War II OSS
Assessments Staff, tasked with assessing the qualifications of
new recruits. In similar research after the war, MacKinnon
found overwhelming evidence to demonstrate that individuals
involved in work such as that of FBIS analysts--the creative
identification and solution of difficult conceptual problems--
consistently display a combination of rare personality traits
that cause them to see problems where others don't. MacKinnon
notes this attribute probably explains the unpopularity of such
individuals, since "a constantly questioning attitude is not an
easy one to live with."
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?
FUTURE PROJECTS
As the AG Special Assistant for Methodology I propose to
undertake a series of projects that will utilize my work in the
,Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program to define and expand
propaganda analysis techniques, examine the recent changes in
communist media behavior and their implications for propaganda
analysis methodology, create training aids for analysts, and
suggest ways in which automation can be used to augment and
improve intelligence analysis. The outline below identifies
general areas which I would like to investigate and possible
reports that might result from my work.
1. Implications of Glasnost: Analysis in New Circumstances
Propaganda analysis in the Intelligence Community has
focused primarily on the government/party?controlled media of
totalitarian regimes. The traditional analytical methodology
has assumed that inferences can be drawn from these media about
leadership intentions and policies because the media are
controlled by the leaders and used by them as purposeful
instruments to advance their policies. As a consequence,
deviations from established propaganda themes have been
interpreted as signals of a change in policy, controversy over
policy, a reaction to a change in circumstances, or an
alteration in propaganda tactics.
As communist regimes in the Soviet Union and elsewhere
allow or encourage the expression of greater diversity of
opinion in their media, and controversial or anomalous media
commentary becomes more commonplace, the assumptions and
application of this analytical approach have been called into
question. The answers to these questions can be found in a
program of research on Soviet media practices built on the
assumptions of the model of content?contextual analysis
outlined above and an examination of the history of FBIS
experience in analyzing less controlled media.
As a first step, I propose to draft a report (or series of
reports) that would attempt to define the new rules that govern
Soviet media content and behavior. In addition to examining
Soviet media for evidence, I would review past AG publications
for citations of propaganda techniques that appear to be part
of the new pattern and would encourage analysts to be more
explicit in the future about their assumptions about what hypo?
thetical rules might guide the media in specific situations.
The resulting reports would be comparable to ones written in AG
in 1949-1951 that laid out fundamental assumptions about Soviet
media behavior that were necessary to provide the context for
analyst inferences.
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Separate repo", could be written drawinglitssons from our
experience with the analysis of other communist media, such as
those of Poland, that have been relatively diverse for several
years. The special cases of FBIS analysis that did not deal
with typical controlled media--particularly the analysis of
allied propaganda during World War II and several years of
experience with the analysis of Middle East media--can also
provide case studies to address the methodological questions
,raised by glasnost. It might prove useful, in a second phase
of study, to review that experience in a separate report on the
applications of propaganda analysis.
2. Annotated Bibliography: A Resource for Analysts
During my Exceptional Intelligence Analyst project I have
identified a wide range of academic literature from many
scattered sources that could be valuable for intelligence
analysts examining the media. So that this material can be of
general use, I propose to produce an annotated bibliography
covering such topics as the history of FBIS analysis,
propaganda analysis methodology, related methodologies drawn
from other fields, applications of communications studies to
propaganda analysis, and applications of computer technology to
communications analysis.
3. Tools of the Trade: Guides to FBIS Research Tools
FBIS analysis rests on a foundation of carefully structured
central research files. The files, maintained by the AG
Research Staff, extend over a long period of time--covering 40
or more years of communist public statements in some cases--and
rigorous guidelines ensure their acduracy and completeness.
They are tailored to help analysts overcome the problems
presented by the size of the FBIS data base and ensure that we
can respond rapidly and accurately to new developments,
particularly in crucial foreign policy areas. Without the
structure provided by the central files it would be unrealistic
if not impossible to provide well grounded evaluations of
Soviet public statements in some areas--for example, on defense
and disarmament issues--where Moscow's track record extends
back over several decades. Other files, such as the commentary
lists, provide raw material for more technical examinations of
Soviet and Chinese media behavior and propaganda strategies.
FBIS analysts need to have a thorough understanding of
these files and how to exploit them and must have close
interaction with the Research Staff to ensure that analytical
needs are efficiently met, particularly during a period when
new challenges are presented by changes in communist media and
FBIS is dealing with resource pressures and the problems and
opportunities that come with the transition to automation.
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To facilitatellich cooperative interactiollPand encourage
the maximum utilization of our research resources I propose to
produce a series of reports on the major segments of the AG
research data base. Each report would provide background on
the origin and evolution of the file, its role in our
methodology, and examples of its use. Taken together, the
reports, supplemented by descriptions of other holdings and
including information on new automated files, could be used as
a handbook on AG's research resources. No such handbook has
'been published for 30 years.
The reports could be used for training analysts in the use
of the files and would provide background for making decisions
on automation and resource allocation. In addition, such a
systematic explanation of the files would be a necessary first
step to support any future program to share the files in auto?
mated form with other offices in the Intelligence Community.
By providing Community analysts access to our structured data
base, FBIS would facilitate search and retrieval on important
'issues and make a valuable contribution toward solving the
problem of information overload.
5. Automation: Aiding the Transition to the New Environment
Automation will provide Analysis Group with powerful new
tools, but there will also be problems as we adjust to the sys?
tem and adopt new approaches to our work. As Special Assistant
for Methodology I will monitor the impact of the transition on
our-work and attempt to develop strategies and recommendations
that give us the maximum benefit from automation. In addition
to observing analysts' use of the new system, I would like to
investigate certain specific processes--such as the production
and exploitation of the Commentary Lists--where automation may
have the greatest potential for streamlining and improving our
work. I also would like to evaluate possible strategies to
provide greater assistance--through automated files or
indexes--to analysts outside FBIS as well as in AG.
4. The History of FBIS Analysis: Learning from The Past
While addressing the current needs of media analysis,
inside and outside FBIS, I would like to continue work begun
during my Exceptional Intelligence Analyst project to write a
history of the development of government propaganda analysis.
The story has never been chronicled, although the history of
FBIS analysis now stretches back nearly 50 years. Many lessons
are buried in the past that should not be lost--much time and
money can be wasted if we are unaware of the work that preceded
our own--and the history can provide perspective and inspiration
to young analysts. I will need some additional interviews to
complete this project, but I have finished most of the research
that would be required. I would like to complete my study in
time for the 50th FBIS anniversary.
12.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP92-01361R000100110047-8