SOVIET BLOC, NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED AND NATO COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) 9 JUNE - 28 AUGUST 1987 VOLUME II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 480
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
/
Directorate of Seeret
Volume II
Soviet Bloc, Neutral/ Nonaligned
and NATO Country Statements
at the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament (CD)
9 June - 28 August 1987
IR 87-10031L
December 1987
022
Copy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9 )X1
Directorate of Secret
Soviet Bloc, Neutral/ Nonaligned
and NATO Country Statements
at the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament (CD)
9 June - 28 August 1987
Volume II
Secret
IR 87-10031L
December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV. 411
9 June 1987
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 9 June 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)
GE.87-61461/8964E
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 411th plenary
meeting and the second part of the 1987 session of the Conference on
Disarmament.
At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welc ane among us to
His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, who is addressing the
Conference today. Ambassador Petrovsky is a distinguished career diplomat who
is well-known to all of us as an expert on disarmament questions. I am sure
that the members of the Conference will follow his statement with particular
interest, and I wish him a successful visit to Geneva.
Please allow me to express, on behalf of all of us, our gratitude to
Ambassador Vejvoda, head of the delegation of Czechoslovakia, for the capable
and outstanding manner in which he directed the meetings of the Conference
during his chairmanship in the month of April 1987, and for his repeated
endeavours and numerous initiatives to overcome the obstacles impeding the
progress of its work.
I have pleasure in welcoming Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new head of
the delegation of the United States of America to the Conference. I wish him
every success in his task. I would also like to welcome Mr. Jan Martenson,
Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, who is attending our
meetings today in his new capacity, although Mr. Martenson is already well
known to the Conference in his previous capacity in which he participated in
the work of the Conference on Disarmament.
It is an honour for me to preside over the meetings of the Conference
during the month of June. I promise you that I will exert my utmost endeavour
to discharge this task in the best possible manner and to further the work of
the Conference. However, although I am aware of the responsibilities borne by
the President of the Conference in this respect, I believe that these are
joint responsibilities to be shared by all of us. Accordingly, I am confident
that you will grant me your unstinting co-operation and assistance for the
achievement of this objective.
I wish to express briefly the extent of the concern that I feel with
regard to the progress achieved in the work of the Conference. Regardless of
differences of opinion concerning the evaluation of the Conference's
achievements, there are some facts that cannot be ignored or disputed by any
fair-minded person. During the nine years since its establishment, the
Conference has failed to reach any agreement on disarmament, which was the
reason for its establishment as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the
field of disarmament. After an active beginning, we now find an evident
diminution in the topics that the Conference is dealing with, and its work has
became characterized by a state of relative inertia. The improvement'in the
international climate, and particularly in the relations between the
Soviet Union and the United States, which have resumed their arms control
negotiations, has not helped to give the expected stimulus to the Conference
on Disarmament, in which the prevailing attitude is one of "wait and see"
pending the outcome of the bilateral negotiations, and the Conference is
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
3
(The President)
apparently unable to generate the spontaneous impetus needed to accomplish the
tasks assigned to it and to fulfil the hopes that have been pinned on its
work. In fact, the Conference on Disarmament provides a unique framework for
a comprehensive discussion of disarmament issues; its membership includes all
the nuclear-weapon States, and it constitutes a forum through which all States
can exercise their legitimate right to participate in disarmament endeavours.
Consequently, it is a framework that we should diligently endeavour to
preserve and strengthen in order to give it every chance of success.
Therefore, although we are today beginning the second part of the session
of the Conference and have only a few weeks left before its conclusion, this
should not deter us from making every possible effort to overcome the
obstacles that are preventing us from dealing effectively with all the items
on the agenda. The most important of these is undoubtedly the nuclear-test
ban. You are all aware of the stage that has been reached in the
consultations concerning the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on that
item. I am willing to continue those consultations although, in order for
them to produce the desired results, delegations must be prepared to respond
to those endeavours. Accordingly, I hope that the groups will soon finalize
their positions so that we can seek a formula for conciliation that will break
the deadlock that has marked the discussion of this item for the last four
years.
Through informal meetings, we have succeeded in overcoming a major
obstacle by agreeing to continue discussing the question of halting the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. There was every indication that we
were about to reach agreement on a series of concepts to define this framework
in the light of the experience of the last session. I therefore appeal to all
delegations to show sufficient flexibility so that we can reach agreement on
those aspects and hold the first of the informal meetings at an early date
during this summer session.
Numerous delegations have expressed their concern that insufficient
efforts are being made to reach agreement on the establishment of a subsidiary
body to discuss the question of the prevention of nuclear war. I share their
concern, and believe that there is a need to push ahead with the consultations
on this question without making them dependent on any other agenda item. It
is regrettable that agreement has still not been reached in this respect,
notwithstanding the fact that we have been on the verge of such agreement at
several stages of the work of the Conference in previous sessions.
I also hope that the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will continue
its negotiations during the second part of the session in the same serious and
positive spirit that characterized its work during the first part, so that the
Committee can deservedly become an example to be followed for all the other
agenda items. I have no doubt that Ambassador Ekeus, the representative of
Sweden, will ensure this through his-capable chairmanship of that Committee.
There is also an urgent need for an intensification of efforts to
finalize the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, particularly since
this is the last opportunity that we will have to submit it to the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
4
(The President)
General Assembly of the United Nations, as required, before the end of its
forty-first session. The Ad hoc Committee is certainly capable of doing
so by virtue of the capable chairmanship and long experience of
Ambassador Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, and the painstaking
work that has been accomplished over the last few years.
I also hope that the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race
in outer space, chaired by Ambassador Pugliese, the representative of Italy,
on security assurances, chaired by Ambassador von StUlpnagel, the
ogical
representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, and on will
weapons, chaired by Ambassador Meiszter, the representative of Hungary,
succeed in achieving progress in their substantive discussions of the agenda
items with which they are concerned, in order to compensate for the time lost
in the discussion of procedural aspects during the first part of the session.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany.
I now give the floor to His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky.
Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
(translated from Russian): Mr. President, I should like first of all to
express my gratitude to you for your kind words about us, and to congratulate
you on taking up the office of President, while at the same time expressing
the hope that, under your leadership, the Conference on Disarmament will move
forward along the path charted in its agenda. I should also like to associate
myself with your very favourable assessment of the work of your predecessor as
President of the Conference, the distinguished representative of
Czechoslovakia, Comrade Milos Vejvoda, and the good wishes addressed to the
new representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf.
This summer session of the Conference on Disarmament is meeting at an
extremely important time. Nations have come close to a point when they will
have to make a historic choice: either they will rise to an understanding of
the prime importance of common human values, and the concomitant need to reach
agreement with one another, or they will let their differences, which are
admittedly serious, plunge humanity into the nuclear abyss.
Today, a real chance has emerged of transforming the moral and political
potential of declarations and resolutions on disarmament into practical
deeds. There are prospects for immediate agreement on the elimination of
Soviet and United States medium-range missiles and shorter-range INFs in
Europe; the holding of concrete negotiations on shorter-range INFs deployed
in the eastern part of the Soviet Union and in the United States; a solution
to the issue of tactical nuclear systems in Europe, including tactical
missiles; and a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms with concurrent
strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime.
362
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
5
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
I am pleased to note that the negotiations on the conclusion of a
convention to eliminate chemical weapons, conducted at the Conference, have
entered the home stretch. How soon final success at the negotiations will be
achieved depends on the collective wisdom and will of the representatives
gathered today at the Palais des Nations.
The solution of another major problem, the cessation of nuclear-weapon
tests, will also to a large extent depend on the Conference on Disarmament.
The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty
Member States, which was held a few days ago, set the task of achieving the
complete prohibition of nuclear tests as a priority step towards ending the
development, production and improvement of nuclear arms, and bringing about
their reduction and elimination. The meeting proposed that full-scale
negotiations should begin at once to achieve accords in this area. The same
goal was proclaimed in the statement on the military doctrine of the
Warsaw Treaty Member States adopted at that meeting.
The Soviet delegation has an important task before it today: to submit
to the Conference for its consideration a document entitled "Main provisions
of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests",
a document sponsored jointly by the group of socialist countries, including
the Soviet Union. All the delegations have copies of the text.
In putting forward this initiative, the sponsors are guided by a desire
to stimulate an early start on substantive full-scale negotiations at the
Conference. The document we submit can form the basis for such negotiations.
At the same time we are prepared to discuss constructively any other proposal
or suggestion that may lead to the early conclusion of an effective treaty on
the complete and general cessation of nuclear tests. To carry out all this
work, we firmly insist that an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test ban
should be set up without delay.
Prior to a joint presentation of the "Main provisions", we agreed with
the other sponsors that each of our delegations would express its views
regarding this document during the discussion, in an appropriate form.
Accordingly, I would like to dwell on the motives that have prompted the
Soviet Union to take part in this joint initiative.
The basic factor that guides us, not only in the work of the Conference
but also in the efforts made outside the Conference with a view to putting an
end to nuclear tests, is our profound conviction that the prohibition of
nuclear-weapon tests constitutes an important independent measure in the area
of curbing and halting the arms race.
First, it would be a major military and technological measure opening up
a direct and effective path towards releasing the stranglehold on the entire
area of nuclear and space weapons.
Second, it would be a serious political step leading to genuinely
tangible material consequences and introducing an element of predictability in
the development of international relations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
6
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
Third, it would be a substantial international legal undertaking whose
implementation would involve strengthening the existing system of treaties and
agreements in the field of disarmament as a legal basis for relations between
States.
Fourth, it would be a measure of high moral import. Our planet is being
crushed by the burden of nuclear arms. Soon there will be no space left on
Earth to store mountains upon mountains of ever more sophisticated devices
designed to wipe out the human race. And where there are mountains, there
also occur landslides and avalanches. There is no need to describe the
psychological atmosphere surrounding an international community which is
constantly threatened by a nuclear avalanche. We must realize that each new
nuclear-arms system denies bread to the hungry, shelter to the homeless and
schooling to the illiterate, and deprives peoples of the possibility to
channel all their resources to the needs of development.
By putting forward together with socialist countries the new initiative
aimed at prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Union reaffirms its
commitment to the purposes and principles of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has effectively halted the spread
of the nuclear threat across our planet, as well as its readiness to implement
fully in practice all the obligations that follow from it, including those
contained in article VI.
1k discussion of the issues involved in a nuclear-test ban,
A business- 1
which we propose should be held at the Conference, should start not from
ference has
C
h
on
e
scratch but on the basis of the wealth of experience t
already gained.
Indeed, the problem of nuclear testing is inseparably linked with the
entire history of our forum and its predecessors, starting with the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Over many years, various documents on
the subject have been submitted to this forum, including several draft
treaties. The trilateral talks between the Soviet Union, the United States
and the United Kingdom have a place in the history of this problem; the
participants regularly informed the Committee on Disarmament of the
encouraging progress made, but, unfortunately, the talks never produced a
final agreement.
Speaking of the past, I would like to recall not only the squandered
opportunities, of which there were quite a few, but above all the fact that
during the process, the outline of a possible agreement on the complete and
general prohibition of nuclear tests, verification methods and techniques
began to take shape. In 1974 and 1976 the Soviet Union and the United States
concluded agreements on yield thresholds for underground nuclear-weapon tests
and peaceful nuclear explosions, which, however, never entered into force
because of the United States position. The decade-long efforts of the Group
of Scientific Experts on detection and identification of seismic events have
produced some significant and useful lessons. The series of international
experiments covering Level I seismic data exchanges is of great practical
importance. At present, the Group is working on a new important aspect of
;64
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
7
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
seismic verification of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions, which is
designed to upgrade the verification mechanism -- the exchange of Level II
seismic data.
The 18-month-long unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions
has generated immense moral and political potential in favour of ending
nuclear tests and demonstrated in practice that it is indeed possible to adopt
measures capable of ending nuclear-weapon tests once and for all. We are
pleased to note the Conference's positive assessment of and response to the
moratorium.
The document which has been submitted today -- further evidence of our
resolve to make new efforts to achieve a general and complete ban on nuclear
tests as soon as possible -- brings together the positive experience of many
years of joint efforts to solve the problem of nuclear testino and new ideas
and proposals recently advanced by many other nations, above all the
six countries from four continents. At the same time the draft treaty is not
just a collection of previous proposals but a qualitatively new document. It
is imbued with the ideas and the spirit of new political thinking, which
requires that diplomatic practice should be brought into line with the
realities of the nuclear and space age.
This may be seen first and foremost in the issue of verification and
control. We believe that verification is indispensable for affective
implementation of real disarmament and confidence-building measures,
especially when there is an acute lack of such confidence. The new document
therefore includes large-scale verification measures ranging from declaring
the location of test ranges to participation by international inspectors in
verifying that no nuclear-weapons tests are conducted at these test ranges.
For the purpose of effective verification we propose that an international
inspectorate should be established, something which was not provided for
either in the 1982 Soviet proposal on treaty provisions, or in the tripartite
reports submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union, the
United States and the United Kingdom. The joint experiment by Soviet and
United States scientists in Semipalatinsk has demonstrated vividly that such
forms of verification are realistic and possible. With their equipment
installed in the area of the Soviet nuclear-test site, United States experts
performed effective verification of the non-conduct of explosions, thus
performing, in fact, the functions of an international inspectorate.
In the document submitted today the question of creating an international
seismic monitoring network is being developed in a new direction. Seismic
stations with standard characteristics which would function with the
participation of observers from an international inspectorate are to be a
basic component of such a network. The implementation of this proposal would
contribute significantly to creating a climate of,mutual trust among States.
The same purpose is served by a special section on international exchanges of
data on the radioactivity of air masses.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
8
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
Within the system of verification that we propose, major importance is
attached to on-site inspections. Their purpose, as we see it, consists in
settling problems which give rise to doubts as to compliance with the Treaty
and which cannot be eliminated by means of the other verification measures
envisaged in it. I would also like to stress that the State which has
received a request for an on-site inspection will be obliged to allow
unconditional access to the location designated in the request. In other
words, the inspections will be mandatory, not voluntary. Obviously, the
criteria and procedures governing requests for inspection and verification and
their conduct, including the rights and functions of inspection teams, have
yet to be developed. But this task is quite within the power of the
Conference on Disarmament. Besides, experience in other nuclear weapon test
ban negotiations is available in this area.
The content of the specific provisions of the document which has been put
forward today proves once again that for us there is no problem of test ban
verification. But I want everyone to have an absolutely clear understanding
regarding the political meaning of this sentence. It does not at all mean
that there is nothing more to discuss and elaborate. Quite the contrary: we
stand for thorough elaboration of all the necessary specific arrangements, and
we shall go as far in this direction as our partners will be prepared to go.
We are also ready to consider other measures to verify the non-conduct of
tests. In this context, I would like to confirm the positive attitude of the
Soviet Union towards the proposals in this regard which have been put forward
by the six countries from four continents. We have in mind sending Soviet
experts to a meeting with experts from those countries to discuss the question
of a aeneral nuclear weapon test ban, as well as our readiness to take up the
proposal made by those countries concerning assistance in nuclear weapon test
ban verification, including on-site inspections. Certainly, we continue to
consider verification not as an end in itself but as a means to ensure
effective functioning of the treaty, which in turn must become a major
self-contained measure facilitating progress in the limitation, reduction and
complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in a
nuclear-weapon-free world, the Treaty and the strict control envisaged
therein, together with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should become a guarantee
against the reappearance of this type of weapon, and a major part of the
supporting structure of a comprehensive system of international peace and
security.
There is no doubt in anyone's mind that the cessation and prohibition of
nuclear-weapon tests depend first and foremost on the USSR and the
United States, which, in accordance with the Final Document of the first
special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, bear
particular responsibility in attaining the goals of nuclear disarmament. We
therefore propose that the treaty should provide for the possibility that,
initially, not all nuclear powers but only the USSR and the United States will
participate it in.
Involvement of the Conference on Disarmament in the process of practical
elaboration of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests does not in any way
conflict with the current bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations. On the
366
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
9
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
contrary, it is designed to support the bilateral efforts with multilateral
ones. This is all the more essential since the bilateral talks are
unfortunately stalled. For our part, we want these talks to be full-scale,
purposeful and productive, so that with every passing day they bring us closer
to the complete cessation of nuclear tests under strict international
control. Being realists, we agreed at the bilaterial Soviet-United States
talks in Geneva to proceed in stages, on a step-by-step basis. The Soviet
approach to full-scale negotiations on the nuclear-weapon test ban embodies
our readiness to agree on a gradual solution of the problem through the
introduction of intermediate limitations on the number and yield of nuclear
explosions. The immediate declaration of a bilateral moratorium could be a
first step in this respect. Although we would prefer a complete moratorium,
nevertheless, taking into consideration the United States position, we would
be ready to agree with the United States to limit the yield of nuclear
explosions to one kiloton and reduce their number to a minimum. In our
opinion, this might be done through appropriate legislation to be adopted by
the United States Congress and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The ball is in
the United States court.
At the same time it is obvious that even in the most favourable
circumstances, the Soviet-United States negotiations, by virtue of their
bilateral character, cannot provide a final solution to the problem -- the
conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests everywhere
and by everyone. Hence our conviction that the elaboration of agreements at
the Soviet-United States negotiations and the elaboration of a comprehensive
treaty in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should proceed in
parallel.
In general, our approach to the organizational aspect is as follows: the
Soviet Union is ready to participate in any bilateral, trilateral or
multilateral forum in order to work for a radical solution to the problem of
nuclear tests. We would like not only to set the existing machinery in
motion, but also to ensure that it produces practical results at an early
stage. We confirm our readiness to work within the Conference for the purpose
of broadening the ban laid down in the 1963 Moscow Treaty -- which,
incidentally, would be fully consistent with the intentions expressed and
obligations undertaken by the parties at the time of its signature.
The experience of many years of negotiations and discussions having to do
with the problem of nuclear weapon testing, the technology which is available
today for verification purposes, and many other factors, give grounds for
believing that the conclusion of a treaty is perfectly feasible.
Today nothing stands in the way of a halt to nuclear-weapon tests, except
for the stubborn attempts of the Western nuclear powers to cling to the
concept of nuclear deterrence. Some "students" have mastered the course of
nuclear deterrence so well, and have become so rigid in the dogmas of that
concept and their reluctance to part with the nuclear bomb, that they have
surpassed their "teacher" in that respect.
1f)7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.411
10
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
The notion of ensuring security through military force, which no longer
corresponds to present-day requirements, is standing in the way of a dynamic
rapprochement of negotiating positions. Because of the dogmatic tenets of
nuclear deterrence, which picture nuclear weapons as a blessing for mankind, a
patent medicine for preserving peace, an elixir of security, the inherent
positive potential of negotiations as an instrument for achieving mutual
understanding and promoting co-operation among States has yet to be fully
realized.
This alone allows us to see the need to transcend the ideology of nuclear
deterrence that underlies NATO policy. Yet the problem, of course, is broader
in scope and more profound in nature than the success or failure of the
negotiations.
We in the Soviet Union have recently carried out a very thorough review
of all aspects of this approach. Our conclusion was that its proponents,
apparently, have learned nothing from Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The lessons of
Chernobyl, apparently, are also fading from memory. While upholding nuclear
weapons its apologists are doing all they can to improve them; they are
drawing up programmes for their use specifying at what stage of war particular
types of these weapons could be used against specific targets, on what scale,
etc. They want to get people used to the idea that this is a natural thing to
do and is indispensable for the sake of security. In reality the concept of
"nuclear deterrence" is false, dangerous and profoundly immoral.
It is our profound conviction that nuclear deterrence is nothing other
than a concentrated expression of militarist intentions, an unwillingness to
remove the nuclear threat, a short-sighted and narrowly self-centred approach
to the problem of national and international security. It is no accident that
this concept, being a point of focus of dogmatic views, is in itself a
breeding ground for all that is ossified and dogmatic. The doctrine of
nuclear deterrence turns States into targets for a nuclear strike.
Nuclear deterrence means a runaway arms race in pursuit of military
superiority, a constant threat to strategic stability.
Nuclear deterrence means perpetual international tension, hopeless
confrontation, and the maintenance of distrust.
Nuclear deterrence means the cultivation of the image of a "potential
adversary", promotion of the ideology and psychology of antagonism and enmity.
Nuclear deterrence means subordinating politics to the dictates of
militarism and further militarization of man's thinking.
Nuclear deterrence means encouraging others to acquire the most
destructive of all weapons, to seek nuclear Power status and the ability to
threaten others.
3c;p
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
11
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
Finally, nuclear deterrence means unpredictability, uncertainty -- in
essence, brinkmanship, which objectively heightens global psychological
stress. Nuclear deterrence means a precarious and illusory security
structure, a fragile and unreliable pseudo-peace susceptible to the
destructive effects of fear and mutual mistrust, i.e. of all those things that
permeate this concept.
To rely on nuclear deterrence is to rely on blind fate, to accept the
risk of a nuclear catastrophe which can be brought about not necessarily oy
evil designs but by a technical malfunction or human error, the likelihood of
which will inevitably grow with the continued build-up and increasing
sophistication of military technologies.
The concept of nuclear deterrence is yesterday's thinking. Nonetheless,
it continues to exist in today's politics, preserving its deadly thrust while
threatening the foundations of durable peace and stability. It is
particularly dangerous in a situation when, as a result of decisions taken in
Washington, such constraints on the arms race as SALT I and SALT II are being
removed, the ABM Treaty regime is being eroded, and the real threat of arms
appearing in space is growing.
New political thinking, which requires first and foremost that both the
need for and the possibility of a nuclear-free world should be acknowledged in
the interests of the survival of mankind, presupposes a firm renunciation of
the concept of nuclear deterrence. This new thinking is based on the premise
that relations between States should be regulated by political and legal
mechanisms, international organizations and bilateral and multilateral
negotiating bodies.
New political thinking addresses in a novel and urgent manner the issue
of enhancing the role, dynamism and efficiency of all international forums,
including the Conference on Disarmament. The introduction of the "Main
provisions" of a treaty reflects our profound belief in the potential of the
Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum on
disarmament, as well as our willingness to work together with other members of
the Conference with a view to enhancing its prestige and effectiveness. Many
of those present in this hall believe that the prestige and effectiveness of
the Conference depend to a significant degree on whether it will at long last
be able to begin practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We, at all
evehts, are profoundly convinced that this is so. We see that the majority of
participants are ready to engage in serious negotiations. This is a hopeful
sign. It is to these sound forces that we address ourselves.
On our
part,
we see our task at the Conference as that of strict
adherence to
the
"commandments" of the Final Document, which in its time was
aptly called
"the
Bible of disarmament"; of honest, unprejudiced, committed
co-operation
and
team-work with all those who seek disarmament not in words
but in deeds. We have a right to expect reciprocity on the part of our
negotiating partners. "There is a time to live, and a time to die ... a time
to cast away stones and a time to gather stones together." Every tiny brick,
even a small stone, laid by the participants in the Conference in the
foundation of a common edifice of security will serve to guarantee its
durability.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
12
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)
This is especially important now when the moment of truth has come, when
clear-sightedness, an effort to break the fetters of the militaristic
mentality, and joint efforts in building a nuclear-free, non-violent world are
becoming a categorical imperative.
The President (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind
words addressed to the President. Before giving the floor to the
representative of Sweden, I should also like to welcome again among us,
Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin.
Mrs. Theorin (Sweden): Mr. President, may I express my delegation's
pleasure at seeing you, Ambassador Alfarargi, in the Chair as President of the
Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. My delegation is looking
forward to working with you. I assure you of the full support and
co-operation of my delegation in your important task, and I wish also to
extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, my sincere
thanks for the skilful way in which he guided the Conference during the
closing of the previous session and up to the opening of this session. My
delegation has listened with great attention to the important statement of the
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Petrovsky,
and the document he presented on behalf of the Soviet Union, and will study it
with great attention. And on this occasion it is also my pleasure to welcome
among us the new representative of the United States of America,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf.
A year from now the General Assembly of the United Nations Vill meet for
its third special session devoted to disarmament. Its main task should be to
look ahead, not to look back. But it cannot avoid taking stock of six years'
development in the disarmament and armaments field.
In the recent period, the dialogue between the major world Powers has
recovered. They/are on speaking terms, though it is obvious that mutual
suspicion and lack of trust have not been easy to remove.
In the recent period, the disarmament agenda has rapidly expanded.
Proposals have proliferated. Perhaps never before has such a wide range of
topics been dealt with, in one way or another, by multilateral or bilaterial
forums. New proposals and a new debate have raised new expectations. They
have yet to be met. Today is a time of both great opportunities and risks.
If the obvious opportunities at hand are lost, we run the risk that
political conditions for substantial agreements will not improve but
deteriorate. Time is by no means certain to bring the parties closer to each
other. Negotiations may instead get bogged down in a sludge of brackets,
technicalities and political complexities. As Martin Luther King put it:
"Beware Of:
Justifiction of procrastination
Paralysis of anlaysis."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
13
(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)
In bilateral and multilateral negotiations alike, the challenging task is
the same -- to seize the opportunity and conclude those agreements that are
already within obvious reach. Both bilaterally and multilaterally, the
challenge is not to stop at that, but to move decisively closer to other
agreements where further sustained efforts will be needed. There should be no
reason not to move urgently towards an agreement on United States and Soviet
nuclear weapons in Europe. The time is ripe.
A "zero option", a "double zero" or a "triple zero" will strengthen, not
endanger, European and international security. It should be a point of
departure for further nuclear disarmament in Europe, for substantial and
balanced reductions of conventional forces, for far-reaching measures to build
confidence and security.
The prospect of an agreement on missiles in Europe stands out in glaring
contrast to the sombre picture in other areas of the bilateral negotiations.
The two super-Powers have so far failed convincingly to show us, and each
other, how they aim to approach the prevention of an arms race in space, the
termination of the arms race on Earth and the ultimate elimination of all
nuclear weapons.
Here in the Conference on Disarmament, there should be no reason not to
move urgently towards an agreement banning all chemical weapons. The time is
ripe. A chemical weapons convention should secure the complete elimination of
an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. To achieve this is a
common priority of all delegations here present. It requires purposeful and
speedy action.
But the concentration of efforts in the Conference on these negotiations
cannot excuse its inability.even to begin substantive work on priority items
on its agenda.
The nuclear-test ban is a case in point. Nuclear testing continues.
Only one out of the five nuclear-weapon States, China, has refrained from
carrying out any tests over the last two years. As this year's session of the
Conference opened in February, the Soviet Union abandoned its 18-month-long
unilateral moratorium and embarked upon what appears to be an intensive
testing programme. The United States maintains a programme of 20 tests on
average per year. And French nuclear testing still goes on unabated in the
South Pacific.
My Government regrets and deplores this state of affairs. It amply
illustrates the relevance of continuing efforts to achieve a comprehensive
test ban. The intensity of ongoing nuclear weapon testing confirms its
essential role in the development of nuclear weapons.
This is precisely why we have to press on. The long-term impact of a
comprehensive test ban would be to reduce the ability of nuclear-weapon States
to develop new types of nuclear warheads or to substantially modify existing
nuclear designs. A brake would be put on the qualitative nuclear arms race.
371
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
14
(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)
A test ban would also have important immediate effects. It would mark a
political turning-point of the highest order, and it would significantly boost
the non-proliferation regime.
Our present efforts here in Geneva are hardly commensurate with the
importance of the issue. The Conference on Disarmament remains the
appropriate forum. It has a responsibility to deliberate on issues and
arrangements that may prove crucial, once the political conditions for
concluding a treaty are at hand.
In the forty-first General Assembly the political climate of the test ban
issue was clearly improved. There have also been signs of greater openness on
the matter at this Conference. Valuable work is being performed by the Group
of Seismic Experts, as they now prepare for a second global data collection
and analysis test in 1988.
Against this background, it is ever more urgent to reach agreement at the
current session of the Conference to set up an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear
Test Ban. It should deal with important aspects of a test ban such as the
scope and content of a treaty, as well as verification and compliance.
The wording of a mandate will be of little importance to the actual work
of the Committee once that work is under way. To lose more time on further
procedural futilities will be a major disservice both to the cause of a
comprehensive test ban and to the multilateral disarmament process.
In their current bilateral talks on nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and
the United States are apparently discussing the possibility of gradual
reductions in the frequency and maximum yield of nuclear tests. A definite
end to all nuclear weapons testing is long overdue, and from this perspective
any agreement that leaves room for continued testing is clearly insufficient.
Such agreements must include a clear commitment to reach a complete and
comprehensive test ban at an early, specified date. They can serve as steps
in the right direction only if reductions are substantial and impose real
constraints on the ability of the parties to develop nuclear weapons at will.
Under the second item on the agenda of the Conference, cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, my_delegation welcomed the informal
consultations of last year. They should in our opinion be made a regular and
well-structured part of the work at the Conference.
Under the agenda item on negative security assurances, renewed efforts
must be made to make progress. Sweden attaches particular importance to the
right of non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain legally binding, unambiguous and
unconditional undertakings from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.
Last year's deliberations in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space produced results, though modest ones. It was noted
that a gradual militarization of space has been taking place for close on
25 years. It was found that the legal regime for arms limitation in outer
space raises certain barriers to the arms race in that environment, but that
in some crucial areas this regime is far from complete.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
15
(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)
Sweden welcomes the re-establishment of the Committee this year and the
commencement of its substantive work. It is indeed of the utmost importance
to build upon the common ground that has been created in order to achieve
progress in the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.
Undoubtedly the key to solving some of the fundamental issues involved is
to be found in the bilateral talks between the United States and the
Soviet Union on strategic and space weapons. But the deployment of
space-based strategic defence systems would also affect the security of other
countries. Indirectly, as such deployments might alter the strategic
relationship and thus have consequences for overall stability. Directly,
because possible defence systems could, at least in theory, be provided with
an additional capacity to be used against targets other than strategic
weapons, in space or on Earth. For this reason, the deployment of space
weapons is a source of concern for the whole international community. There
is a strong case for multilateral involvement.
Another aspect of the further militarization of outer space that might
constitute a direct threat to the vital national interests of many States is
the development of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Many States other than the
two major nuclear Powers have developed considerable space programmes and have
made large investments in peaceful space activities. It is legitimate for --
yes incumbent on -- members of the CD to address, in a substantive way,
questions related to the protection of peaceful activities in outer space.
The Ad hoc Committee should explore the possibility of verifiable and
legally binding instruments prohibiting ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A ban
on ASAT weapons should include a prohibition on development, testing and
deployment as well as use. Existing ASAT systems should be destroyed.
However, in order to consider concrete measures to prevent an arms race in
outer space, further work is called for. The review of the legal framework
has to be completed, and the Conference must seek to define and identify the
technologies and weapons systems to be addressed.
In February this year, I mentioned the possibility of setting up a group
of technical experts to deal with these issues. Such a group of experts could
assist, inter alia, by working out technical definitions of space weapons,
specifying the relevant technologies, and addressing the technical aspects of
verification.
The Swedish proposal in 1984 for a draft treaty on radiological weapons
expressed the priority we attach to banning the release of radioactive
material through attacks on nuclear facilities. The unitary approach --
combining the prohibition of radiological weapons with the prohibition of
attacks against nuclear facilities causing mass destruction -- was introduced
in the Swedish proposal. Much to the disappointment of my delegation,
differing views on issues often not directly linked to the question of
protecting nuclear facilities have blocked the way for the Committee.
In order to prevent strongly felt procedural viewpoints from blocking
substantive efforts in this item too, my delegation is ready to work
separately on the issues of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
16
(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)
facilities. An effective prohibition of such attacks is an indispensable part
of any radiological weapons treaty. We are at the same time ready to take
part in discussions about radiological weapons in the traditional sense.
The foremost challenge today to the Conference on Disarmament is to
accomplish the early and successful conclusion of a comprehensive chemical
weapons convention. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 has not sufficed to halt a
chemical weapons arms race. We have had reports on the use of chemical
weapons in various parts of the world, most recently in the Gulf, where its
use by Iraq has been effectively substantiated by United Nations experts.
Such reports add to a growing concern that chemical weapons are for the
present and the future and not only the past. Chemical warfare is a growing
danger.
There seems to be universal recognition that the only effective response
possible is the creation of an international disarmament regime for chemical
weapons. Negotiations in this Conference have made steady progress. The most
recent updating of the "rolling text" of late April this year is thus in many
respects hardly recognizable compared with the modest first draft of 1984.
The flexible and positive approach of delegations to the negotiations is
particularly gratifying for my delegation, as it facilitates the difficult
task of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. This approach has brought a
number of key problems closer to their solution. Progress has been made in
the direction that all chemical weapon stocks should immediately be declared
and, within a 10 year period, eliminated by destruction only. The initial
declaration of stocks shall be verified and the stockpiles thereafter
systematically monitored. What remains to be done is to agree on an order of
destruction up to the end of the tenth year after the Convention has entered
into force. Consensus on a broad outline of the order of destruction is
growing. it is vital for trust in the convention that all States parties to
At be obliged from the outset to declare all weapon stocks.
A regime for the elimination of chemical weapon production facilities is
also taking shape. Understanding has been reached on the verification of
declarations of such facilities and their closure, as well as international
systematic monitoring and verification of the elimination of facilities.
To prohibit future production of chemical weapons in a verifiable manner
is a major concern. Over the years more negotiating efforts and intellectual
energy have been devoted to this part of the convention than to any other
problem. It is unavoidable that the chemical industry will be affected by a
system of non-production. As the outline of a generally acceptable
verification regime is now emerging from the negotiations, it can, however, be
stated that the industry, already subject to intrusive environmental and
health regulations would assume a modest additional burden when the convention
enters into force.
Some differences on details in the regime remain. But they should not be
impossible to overcome. Trust in the convention will depend on the means
provided to investigate also non-declared activities which could constitute
374
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
17
(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)
violations of it. A challenge inspection system is indispensable. The core
of the system should be international on-site challenge inspection. It would
deter violations, if effectively designed.
Informal consultations on this matter during the spring session have been
encouraging. Support is growing for the idea that a team of inspectors should
be automatically dispatched following the request of a party. There are still
differences of opinion as to whether the inspectors should have unimpeded
access to the location or facility concerned, in accordance with the original
request, also in the event that the requested State proposes an alternative
arrangement.
An area where discussions have only recently begun are provisions on
assistance and on economic and technological development. And the
institutional arrangements of the convention must be elaborated. Outstanding
issues must now be vigorously addressed. Progress already made shows that a
convention is clearly within reach. Compromises will now have to be made, and
even compromises hard to enter into. Crucial decisions will eventually have
to be taken, and also decisions difficult to take. As negotiations hopefully
draw closer to a decisive stage, I am confident that no member of the
Conference will spare any effort to make possible the accomplishment of our
common task: an urgently needed chemical weapons convention. With such a
convention we should secure that all chemical weapons are destroyed -- once
and for all.
Despite efforts over several years to reach agreement on a comprehensive
programme of disarmament, a number of issues are still outstanding. With the
co-operation of all delegations, the Conference should conclude its work on
this item before the third special session." We should be firm in urging the
nuclear Powers to act now. We should be equally firm in ensuring that this
Conference is able to act -- now.
It is commonplace nowadays to speak of many worlds: the Old World and
the New World, the industrialized world and the third world. In matters of
international security, however, there is only one world. In the age of
nuclear weapons, security cannot be accomplished in narrow regional terms,
much less in strictly national ones. The economic well-being and the security
of all nations is linked, and destined to become progressively more so.
There is an absolute need for conversion: from a system of international
risk to a system of international security; from production for death and
destruction to production for life and development; from the rule of the
barrel and the muscle to the rule of international law, of sense, reason and
compassion. All States have a stake in disarmament. And we all have a role
to play in making disarmament a,reality.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of
Sweden for her statement and for the kind words she expressed to the
President. i now give the floor to the representative of the German
Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.
375
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
18
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, allow me to convey
to you the best wishes of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on
your assumption of the important office of President of the Conference on
Disarmament. Our two countries have for many years been linked together by
bonds of close co-operation. Through your personal share in the activities of
the conference, you have distinguished yourself as an excellent and successful
diplomat. Let me assure you of my delegation's all-out support in the
discharge of your responsible duties. Our heartfelt thanks go to your
predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda. He did an admirable job chairing the
Conference with a deep sense of commitment and purpose. His extraordinary
endeavours to overcome obstacles preventing progress in the nuclear field,
notably his efforts to set up a workable ad hoc committee on item 1 of our
agenda, deserve our particular recognition. I should like to take this
opportunity to welcome the new representative of the United States,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, in our midst, and I wish him good luck and all
the best.
On 28 and 29 May, a session of the Political Consultative Committee of
the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual
Assistance was held in Berlin, at which the leaders of these countries adopted
significant documents. The Communique and the Statement on the military
Doctrine of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, published after that
meeting, deal with many issues of extreme relevance to the work of the
Conference on Disarmament. Both are available to you as document CD/755. I
wish to express my special thanks to the secretariat for having produced and
distributed the material so quickly.
The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Petrovsky,
whom we welcome very warmly in our midst, and to whose statement we have
listened with great interest, has already made reference to that session. The
proposal of socialist States he had just put forward represents a specific
contribution, inspired by the Berlin meeting, towards coming to grips with one
of the tasks that are uppermost on the Conference's list of priorities, a task
which should long since have been tackled.
The leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have reaffirmed their
nations' fundamental foreign policy goals, which consist in warding off the
nuclear threat, stopping the arms race and safeguarding peace for all times.
Faced with the first real opportunity in many years for acheving progress in
the disarmament area, they have demonstrated their earnest desire to do
everything in their power to ensure that this historic chance is seized. For
that reason, they call for concerted efforts and a new way of thinking, a
fresh approach to the issues of war and peace, disarmament and other complex
global and regional problems.
It is certainly no'accident that the Communique stresses in particular
the need to conclude an agreement on eliminating Soviet and United States
medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The improved conditions for such an
agreement, which are mainly the result of the Soviet Union's flexible stance,
have given rise throughout the world to great hopes of achieving early success
in negotiations. Those hopes must not be dashed. The liquidation of entire
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
19
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
weapon categories would signal a breakthrough and set the stage for further
steps aimed at removing nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction
from the face of the Earth and preventing an arms race in outer space.
To ban all nuclear weapon testing remains a task of the highest priority
for reasons which have been amply explained by Deputy Foreign
Minister Petrovsky. The proposal setting forth the basic provisions of a
nuclear-test-ban treaty gives a convincing answer to the question of what role
our conference can play in tackling that task. The initiative takes into
account the current status of the debate and ought to get practical work
started. My delegation expects that a lively exchange of opinions and
negotiations will develop on that proposal. What the Conference badly needs
is a committee on agenda item 1, so that all relevant issues can be addressed
in a concrete fashion. It is high time to apply to nuclear topics the often
quoted principle that multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiations
should complement each other. All countries, not least all the members of our
Conference, have a responsibility to fulfil in pushing open wide the door to
nuclear disarmament.
The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have underlined the need for the
earliest possible elimination of chemical weapons. Our conference should
complete the pertinent convention by the end of this year. For that reason,
the socialist countries will continue to participate actively in the efforts
to draw up its text and its annexes. The Soviet Union's announcement that it
has stopped producing chemical weapons and that it is building a facility for
the destruction of existing stocks has had a particularly favourable impact on
the atmosphere at the negotiating table. We trust the other side will respond
in kind and refrain from any action likely to hamper the negotiating process.
Those who demand that more attention should be paid to conventional
disarmament are kicking at an'open door. The States parties to the
Warsaw Treaty reiterated in Berlin the proposals contained in the
Budapest Appeal adopted a year ago. Also, in view of the attempts to answer
nuclear disarmament with increases in conventional weaponry, they have
emphasized that cuts in nuclear arms must give the impetus to radical
reductions in other categories of weapons. In order to dispel the misgivings
expressed on the other side, they are prepared "to have the imbalance that has
arisen in certain elements redressed in the course of the reductions". That
means that the side which has an advantage will make appropriate cut-backs.
Apart from conventional armaments in Europe, this approach should also find
ready acceptance in other cases where the conclusion of disarmament agreements
is being jeopardized by measures designed to increase arsenals under the
pretext of disparities in armaments and forces.
The allied countries attach great importance to regional steps to
eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons, and continue to lend strong support to
the relevant proposals tabled by the German Democratic Republic,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.
377
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.411
20
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
Verification occupies a central place in the decisions adopted by the
members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. What must be created is an
effective system to verify the implementation of disarmament steps in the
strictest way possible so that the security of all parties may be ensured.
The principle that genuine disarmament presupposes genuine verification
applies in a very special way to the measures discussed at our forum. Do we
not know all too well how much progress in the field of disarmament can be
slowed down if divergencies persist on this particular subject?
The participants in the Berlin meeting have vigorously declared
themselves in favour of overcoming any confrontational approach and asserting
civilized standards and an atmosphere of openness, transparency and trust in
international relations. There are many ways to achieve this. An important
step, in this context, would be for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO to
enter into consultations in order to compare the military doctrines of the two
alliances. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States is in every
respect subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or
conventional. Hence the conclusion that many weapons are not synonomous with
more security. Dependable security can only be attained by disarmament and
arms limitation measures. That is why the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty
are convinced that their military security will best be ensured by concrete
disarmament steps on the basis of equality and equal security. This is the
lesson to be learned from history if we are to preserve our fragile world in
this nuclear and space age, and if any military doctrine is to be labelled a
"peace doctrine". We must arrive at a situation where international disputes
are settled exclusively'by political means and peace is made enduring by a
comprehensive system of international security.
The Berlin documents before you bear the mark of all those who strive to
remove war from human life.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished
representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for his
kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the
distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Ambassador von Stilpnagel.
Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, may I
first congratulate you on the assumption of your important office of President
of the Conference, and promise you the complete co-operation of my
delegation. At the same time I would like to thank your predecessor,
Ambassador Vejvoda, for his achievements and his dedication in the post of
President and for the results*he obtained. May I also welcome the new
Ambassador of the United States, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, and extend my
best wishes for his future work in this Conference.
Mr. President, in response to remarks made this morning, and especially
the very forceful remarks of Deputy Minister Petrovsky which clearly pointed,
among others, to the Federal Republic of Germany, I would like to correct the
perspective which, in my view, was partially out of focus. I would like to
remind the Conference that the paramount political precept of the Government
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
21
(Mr. StUlpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)
of the Federal Republic of Germany, to which the entire North Atlantic
Alliance fully subscribes, is that of reliably preventing any war in Europe,
be it conventional or nuclear. Every Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany is therefore under the obligation not to examine decisions concerning
security and disarmament exclusively from the point of view of reducing
nuclear weapons. There is no alternacive within the foreseeable future to the
defence strategy of flexible response developed by the North Atlantic
Alliance; this strategy serves to prevent war. For the implementation of
this strategy the Alliance remains dependent on a balanced arsenal of
conventional and nuclear forces. The role played by nuclear weapons in this
context must be reduced to the absolute minimum in quantitative and
qualitative terms. And in this context of disarmament we see prospects for a
nuclear test ban (as item 1 of our agenda is called) as different from a
nuclear-weapon test ban.
Our security policy has always consisted of two complementary elements:
an assured capacity for defence and deterrence, not only nuclear deterrence,
and efforts towards arms control and disarmament in all areas, with a view to
achieving a stable military balance at the lowest possible level. The common
objective of our defence and disarmament policy must be to increase the
security of our country and the whole Alliance. Disarmament cannot be an end
in itself. on no account must it lead to less security. Eliminating
individual weapon systems does not necessarily mean a gain in security. It
was this link that particularly concerned my Government in respect of
disarmament decisions in the field of intermediate-range nuclear forces.
Our decisions on security matters would be incomplete without a renewed
affirmation of the second pillar of the Alliance concept: the extension to
our Eastern neighbours of the offer of intensive political dialogue and
comprehensive co-operation in all fields. East-West antagonism canrct be
defused and overcome with lasting effect solely by means of agreements on
security matters or disarmament accords.
Arms reductions are facilitated if political confidence-building visibly
precedes or accompanies the process of disarmament. It is not weapons by
themselves that pose a threat.
The Soviet proposal tabled at the INF negotiations in Geneva does not
constitute a truly satisfactory solution of the INF problem from our point of
view. In the case of longer-range INFs, the Soviet proposal envisages the
retention of 100 warheads each in the United States and the Soviet Union. The
100 warheads of SS-20 missiles thus remaining in the Asian parts of the
Soviet Union would, owing to the possibility demanded in the Soviet draft
treaty of transferring these systems to the European part for training
purposes, continue to constitute a factor of insecurity for all Europeans.
Moreover, such an arrangement would pose serious verification problems.. For
these reasons, the Federal Government prefers -- as do its partners -- the
global elimination of this category of weapons. We hope that the Soviet Union
will show flexibility on this point.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
22
(Mr. Stilpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)
After resolving other questions concerning verification, an agreement on
long-range INFs could, in the Federal Government's opinion, be reached within
the next few months. It would prove that tangible disarmament steps are
attainable on the basis of the equitable reconciliation of both sides'
interests.
As for shorter-range intermediate missiles, i.e. missiles with ranges of
between 500 and 1,000 km, the Soviet proposal, which has still not been
submitted in writing, likewise envisages a "zero option" confined to Europe.
This solution has a serious drawback: the overwhelming preponderance of the
Soviet Union in the range below 500 km, particularly in the form of the
583 Scud missiles, for which the West has no equivalent, is to remain intact.
The preponderance must also be seen against the background of clear
Warsaw Pact superiority in the conventional field. In Central Europe and on
the European flanks the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, especially its
land forces, are clearly superior to those of NATO. The main battle tank
ratio between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, including the
augmentation forces on both sides, is roughly one to three.
Massed armoured forces are a traditional means of attack, being
particularly well suited to the rapid seizure of foreign territories. This
explains their political weight.
There can be no question of the Federal Government's unconditionally
accepting the Soviet proposal of a "zero option" in the 500-1,000-km range.
Removal of the ground-launched missiles in the 500-to-1,000-km range will
increase German concern about the imbalance in the systems with a range below
500 km. It is difficult to accept such a situation in the long term, and we
are therefore pressing for the continuation of the disarmament process.
The 72 German Pershing Ia missiles with their American warheads cannot be
included in a US-Soviet "zero option". These missiles have never been the
subject of negotiations. The considerable superiority of the Soviet Union in
terms of missiles with a range below 500 km, as well as the unilateral
withdrawal by NATO between 1980 and 1988 of 2,400 nuclear warheads, which are
not being replaced, should make it possible to accomplish successfully the
negotiations on this point. By withdrawing 2,400 nuclear warheads, NATO has
removed more nuclear weaponry from Europe than is now under negotiation in
Geneva.
The Federal Government stands by its view that the Geneva negotiations on
intermediate-range nuclear forces must remain part of a comprehensive
disarmament process covering all weapon systems and must lead to further steps
towards disarmament. We regard the following steps towards disarmament as
necessary and possible.
Firstly, in the super-Powers' disarmament process, the Federal Government
expects an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive
potentials of both sides. Such an agreement would provide for the elimination
of a total of some 10,000 nuclear warheads. Both sides must strive to find a
380
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
23
(Mr. StUlpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)
co-operative solution to the problem of the relationship between offensive and
defensive weapons which makes allowance for the security interests of both
parties. This applies especially to the application of the ABM Treaty.
Drastic reductions in offensive weapons must inevitably influence the need for
and the extent of defensive systems.
Secondly, my Government seeks the earliest possible conclusion of a
convention on the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons. The
negotiations at our Conference on Disarmament are so far advanced that the
outstanding matters of verification should no longer be an obstacle to the
final world-wide abolition of this category of weapons. It is encouraging
that the final communique of the Warsaw Pact summit last week reiterated the
view that the negotiations could be completed before the end. of this year. We
all now hope for further flexibility and purposeful negotiating. In view of
the state of these negotiations, this is not the time to introduce new or
geographically restricted approaches. It is essential to bear in mind
Germany's particularly vulnerable position and the special threat which
chemical weapons present to us. We therefore expect our primary interest in
such a convention to be respected.
Thirdly, the next step in the disarmament strategy of the Federal
Government and its allies is to establish a verifiable, comprehensive and
stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels in the whole of Europe.
In Vienna preliminary talks are going on between the members of the two
alliance systems on a mandate for a conference on conventional arms control.
The central purpose of such a conference is to eliminate the imbalances which
are detrimental to us. We therefore welcome as a step in the right direction
the willingness expressed in the Warsaw Pact communique of 29 May 1987 to
remove "the imbalance that has arisen in certain elements".
The main concerns of the'Federal Government are: to initiate a
step-by-step process of negotiation which guarantees the undiminished security
of all concerned at every stage; to eliminate the ability to conduct surprise
attacks or launch large-scale offensives; to establish further
confidence-building measures aimed at improving the openness and
predictability of military behaviour; to take account of regional
imbalances) to provide reliable guarantees against circumvention; and to
develop effective verification rules, including on-site inspections.
In addition, a second phase of the Conference on Confidence- and
Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe remains necessary.
In view of the particular threat posed to the Federal Republic of Germany
by the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, which will be further
increased by moves in the field of nuclear disarmament, the Federal Government
is pressing for an early agreement to clear the way for the necessary
disarmament negotiations.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished
representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for
the kind words addressed to the President. And now I give the floor to the
distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Morel.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
24
Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President.
First of all, may I extend my congratulations to you on your taking the chair
for the month of June, and pledge to you the full co-operation of the French
delegation. Personally, in the course of the last few months, in the
framework of co-ordination of space activities, I have had occasion to work
closely with you at important moments during the work of our Conference, and I
am pleased to see you assuming these responsibilities.
I should also like to thank Ambassador Vejvoda for so effectively
chairing the Conference, as we have all appreciated, during April and May. I
should also like to welcome Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new
representative of the United States, and to pledge to him the full
co-operation of our delegation. Finally, I followed with keen interest the
statement by the Deputy Minister of the USSR, Mr. Petrovsky, and particularly
the crux of his statement -- the proposals relating to a comprehensive nuclear
test ban.
Mr. President, our analysis is different. It is well known: I will
recall it in a few words. We believe that the complete prohibition of nuclear
tests is not a prior condition for disarmament, but rather one of its
components. Now, I would not have taken-the floor today to recall these
well-known facts if the representative of the USSR had not taken this
opportunity to make what I would call ironic remarks about other nuclear
Powers, drawing a distinction between certain teachers and certain students,
in a way which my country cannot leave unanswered. I will simply recall that
in the past, in these matters, my country has not shown any particular
readiness to be anybody's student, and it does not intend to do so in the
future. What we have seen and what we can still see is the propensity of
certain countries to set themselves up in a way as teachers of the truth of
the moment -- their truth of the moment -- teachers of deterrence through the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement or.
the prevention of nuclear war. In yet another manner today we hear the
teachers of denuclearization; the subject changes but the teacher remains.
For our part we were not students yesterday, any more than we will be
students today. Denuclearization in our view is not an end in itself; the
goal to be attained is security. And what are we offered today? To a slight
extent it is "Don't do what I do, do what I say". In explanation, I will
simply recall that Soviet and United States nuclear armaments continue to be
.modernized with new prototypes, new models, new tests, new offensive systems.
Reykjavik appeared to mark a significant step by identifying the true problem,
namely, the absurd and dangerous redundancy of a strategic system which is
largely superfluous, largely redundant. Six months later, what do we find?
Priorities have changed. Today, we are told, the objective is
denuclearization, to begin with in Europe, by means of the INF agreement,
which certainly has its own potentialities to offer. Yet this Europe which is
to be denuclearized would continue to be threatened by thousands of other
strategic offensive nuclear weapons. We thought that it would be more
credible to begin with these strategic offensive nuclear weapons. And if the
objective is denuclearization, what substitute are we offered? Inevitably,
through a simple shift in the centre of gravity, conventional weapons would be
382
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 411
25
(Mr. Morel, France)
assigned a major and decisive role. Of course, collective security is the
ideal. But those who seek a priori to criticize a so-called dogma of
deterrence, do they not run the risk of forgetting the lesson of two world
wars which were conducted with'conventional weapons, as well as the lessons of
the inter-war period with its well-kno?m failures in the area of collective
security? In seeking negotiations, we seek better security. But my country's
position in these matters will always be not to tie itself to any dogma,
because we have no feeling of obeying any dogma of nuclear deterrence. We are
not interested in dogma, we are interested in facts.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the representative of
France for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the chair. That
concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish
to take the floor? It seems that this is not the case.
As members are aware, the President of?Argentina, Mr. Raul Alfonsin, will
be the first speaker at our next plenary meeting, on Thursday 11 June. As you
know, this is the first time that a head of State will be addressing the
Conference, and I wish to stress-the significance of this fact. I am counting
on all of you to see that the plenary starts precisely on time. On this
special occasion, I will invite President Alfonsin to speak from my right on
the podium.
You will recall that, in accordance with the timetable for meetings to be
held this week, the Conference is to hold an informal meeting immediately
after this plenary meeting. During that time, I intend to submit for your
consideration a draft programme of work in accordance with rule 28 of the
rules of procedure.
- I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting and immediately convene the
informal meeting.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Thursday 11 June at 10 a.m. sharp.
The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV. 412
11 June 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 June 1987, at 10.a.m.
President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
C;D/PV.412
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 412th plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
Distinguished representatives, I am deeply honoured to extend a warm
welcome among us today to His Excellency Raul Alfonsin, President of the
Argentine Republic, who is the first head of State to address the Conference
on Disarmament and its organs. My presentation of President Alfonsin will be
an expression of esteem, since he needs no introduction. The fame of his
actions and his ideas have preceded him. He is the leader who placed
democracy on a firm footing in Argentina. He is a staunch believer in freedom
and human rights and, having re-established rule based on law and order, is
now engaged in the struggle for development. In spite of the magnitude of the
internal responsibilities that he is shouldering, his ideas and his actions
have transcended the confines of his own country. He has worked actively for
peaceful solutions in Latin America and, within the framework of the
Non-Aligned Movement, has endeavoured to-turn that Movement into a
constructive instrument for the maintenance of international peace and
security and the promotion of development. At the United Nations and
international organizations, he has endeavoured to make the fabric of the
international community stronger and more cohesive. His statement yesterday
before the International Labour Conference -- which he, as a democratic
leader, called the World Labour Parliament -- bore further testimony to those
endeavours. Today, as he addresses the Conference on Disarmament, let us
remember President Alfonsin's prominent international role as a member of the
New Delhi Six which is dealing with vital issues relating to disarmament. His
ideas and proposals in this field have earned him the respect and appreciation
of all.
Today, Mr. President, while speaking in Arabic, I cannot but recall the
time when, centuries ago, the Arab and Spanish cultures met, intermingled and
interacted in spite of the difference between the two languages. In fact,
there are many common elements between them. As a representative of Egypt, I
believe that, notwithstanding the geographical distance between my country and
Argentina, they have much in common by virtue of their cultural background,
their membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, their struggle for development
and their representation at the Conference on Disarmament. Accordingly, I
look forward to listening to you today since, in a way, I will be hearing a
perspicacious view of questions that are also of concern to my country, Egypt,
whose approach to international issues is similar to that which is being
pursued by Argentina. I am confident, Mr. President, that all the members of
the Conference on Disarmament appreciate the endeavours that you are making
and will follow your statement with particular interest. I now have great
pleasure in giving the floor to His Excellency President Alfonsin of the
Argentine Republic.
President ALFONSIN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): "lank you for
your kind words, Mr. President. I accept them as a tribute to tie nascent
democracy in Argentina, and I attach special value to them beciuse I know they
come from a true fighter for the cause of peace. You referred to the presence
of the Arab World in Argentina through the presence of Spain. What you say is
true, but in addition this presence has spread the length and breadth of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.412
3
(President Alfonsin, Argentina)
Argentina through two million descendants of Arabs who have enriched Argentine
society with their labour and their intelligence. I am also grateful for the
honour accorded to me by being invited to address this Conference.
We all know that mankind could be annihilated if a nuclear war were to
start. We also know how little has been achieved towards eliminating that
threat. There is an enormous disproportion between the magnitude of the
danger we face and the meagre capacity to neutralize it that we have shown so
far. This is one of the most dramatic features of our times, one that the
Conference on Disarmament, indeed, faces every day.
I believe it is essential that we should all help to overcome this
problem: peoples and Governments should actively work to ensure the survival
of mankind. Our lives and those of our children are at stake.
That is why the democratic Government of Argentina, from the moment it
took office, has sought to state year after year the importance it attaches to
the work of this Conference, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating
forum. Today, I am pleased and honoured to attend the Conference in person in
order to reiterate the commitment Argentina has undertaken regarding the cause
of peace in the world, and the success of the work being carried out here.
For the same reasons, we have been engaged since 22 May 1984 in a common
effort, together with Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, in favour of
disarmament and peace. By joining our voices we wanted to show that, in spite
of geographical distance, linguistic diversity, cultural differences and
varied social and political regimes, we share among ourselves and with other
nations the need and the determination to fully recover the right to live,
that sacred right of every human being and every nation which has been cast
into the category of a merely conditional and inevitably short-lived right by
the terrible weapons manufactured today by man.
I cannot mention the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament
without evoking the memory of Indira Gandhi and Olof Palme, pioneers in this
effort for the defence of life that unites several continents, indefatigable
fighters for harmony and tolerance among men and the victims of blind and
senseless violence.
There are those who think that violence and the will to destroy are part
of human nature and that, therefore, all efforts to consolidate peace and
achieve disarmament are simply futile and pointless.
History, as we know it, tends to bear them out, since until this day men
have methodically and bloodily devoted a significant part of their energies to
killing one another, while attempts to stop this deplorable situation have
been of little avail.
It would be naive to claim that of late human nature has undergone
changes that would modify these ancestral tendencies. But it would also be
suicidal not to take account of the fact that scientific and technological
386
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 412
4
(President Alfonsin, Argentina)
advances have given us an immense power which would destroy life on Earth in a
matter of seconds if it were used in a manner similar to that witnessed -Ln
past wars.
It is precisely because of this that we are living through a crucial
period. If we continue to act as in the past with the power at our disposal
today, we will have no future. If mankind wishes to have a future, it will
have to change.
I think that, generally speaking, there is agreement on this.
Disagreements begin when we examine what ought to be changed or what is said
to have changed already.
Let us, for instance, take the doctrine of deterrence, accepted by many
as an indisputable truth. According to this doctrine, the arms race, and
particularly the nuclear arms race, is by no means dangerous but, in fact, a
healthy phenomenon. The rationale behind it lies in the formidable
destructive capacity of nuclear weapons: none of the prospective contenders
would dare to unleash a war for fear of the enormous damage the enemy's
nuclear reprisals might cause. Those who subscribe to this doctrine claim
that nuclear deterrence has so far prevented any war between the super-Powers
from breaking out. Therefore, in order to preserve peace, the arms race has
to continue, since the balance of terror is upset and re-established
dynamically and continuously.
This theory has never convinced me. Indeed, I have always found it to be
incomprehensible and dangerous.
In the first place, it is not original. A little more than a century ago
the European big Powers, the world's strongest States of the time, laid down
the doctrine of "armed peace" on these same foundations of fear and
deterrence. The result was the bloodiest war ever fought, the
First World War, and its near-inevitable sequel, the Second World War.
Moreover, the theory of deterrence is suspiciously convenient. It does
not compel anyone to exert himself in the difficult task of changing
traditional behaviour, but on the contrary encourages him to continue and even
promote it, since the only essential change -- fear, the deterrent against
launching a war -- would already have been accomplished.
However, this change engendered by fear is doubtful and unprovable. The
fact that no war has broken out between the super-Powers does not necessarily
confirm the theory of deterrence: other reasons based on expediency or
advantage may have weighed just as much, or more. Memories of awful past
experiences may in fact have been more significant than potential future
damage. Let us also remember that at the beginning of the second decade of
this century boastful statements could be heard about armed peace having
ensured four decades of peace and prosperity in Europe.- Proof that fear of
destruction was not enough to prevent war came very soon, since the dynamics
of a defence system based on purely military considerationsiautomatically led
to a conflict, outside the control of the leaders of the time.
387
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 412
5
(President Alfonsin, Argentina)
But if we are not certain that fear of nuclear war has so far been a
decisive factor in preventing it, we do know that on several occasions the use
of nuclear weapons was advocated in conflicts where only conventional weapons
were being used. It was held in these cases that the limited use of nuclear
weapons would not be challenged for fear of an escalation of retaliations and
counter-retaliations. Although those arguments were finally discarded, the
fact remains that the question of the threshold of deterrence was considered,
and that it could be discussed again. Will we one day witness an insane
escalation of estimates about the number of deaths necessary to make someone
fear retaliating with more nuclear weapons?
There is yet another reason for contesting the doctrine of deterrence.
The nuclear arms race, apart from causing arsenals to expand, has reduced and
continues to reduce the time span in which a decision to unleash war will be
taken. Today it is only a matter of a few minutes; tomorrow, maybe a matter
of seconds. As a result, the decision depends more and more on data
processing by computer. I see no reason why fear that we, mere human beings,
would be destroyed should lead these machines to stop processing information
and taking actual decisions.
We do not know, actually, whether fear of destruction has been the
decisive factor in avoiding the outbreak of nuclear war. But we do know other
provable effects of the theory of deterrence.
In the first place, as I have already mentioned, it has been the main
cause of the world's arms race. It is enough for one of the parties to give
credence to the doctrine of deterrence, and the others will be trapped in the
logic of the balance of terror. And since the balance of terror is inherently
unstable, each party is constantly encouraged to ensure that it is not upset
to its own disadvantage, or tempted to secure advantages. In this way, the
arms race inevitably tends to reinforce itself and to grow indefinitely. That
is also why it has ceased to be a mere consequence of political tension
between the super-Powers, and has become one of its main causes.
Today we can see that, although the critical areas of confrontation are
much more peaceful and stable than was the case in the early post-war years,
and even the marginal areas are calmer than they were 20 years ago, nuclear
weaponry is continuing to increase in magnitude and complexity to levels far
greater than during those periods.
The nuclear arms race is also one of the main sources of mistrust between,
the super-Powers, and therefore one of the main obstacles to the
implementation of more constructive ways of ensuring peace.
In the meantime, vast economic, human, scientific and technical resources
are being assigned to the arms race. With only part of these resources, the
most pressing problems facing mankind could be solved. Meanwhile, the size of
defence expenditure has already started to produce dangerous effects on the
world economy.
388
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 412
6
(President Alfonsin, Argentina)
These are merely some of the consequences of accepting a doctrine which,
essentially, we do not believe will ensure peace.
If life on Earth can be destroyed today in a few moments, this is because
man has acquired immense power over nature. The same power that could
liberate mankind from all of its pressing problems has been harnessed to
threaten its survival. This is irrational. This is unacceptable.
Bertrand Russell once said that in this modern world, human beings have
increased their knowledge enormously, while their wisdom has made very little
progress, if any at all. We have now reached an extreme situation in which
the survival of mankind depends on our ability to change traditional, or even
ancestral, behaviour. To face and overcome that challenge -- as Russell would
have said -- is not a matter of technical knowledge but rather of greater
political wisdom.
In my view, this is the crucial question of our times. I do not believe
the arms race or the doctrine supporting it provide us with an adequate
answer. Rather, I think that they engender greater risks in so far as they
have placed us in a vicious circle of negative consequences that feed upon
each other and increase every day the danger of eventually unleashing a
nuclear war.
That is why we must, first of all, break that vicious circle. This is
the essential purpose of adopting practical measures such as the moratorium on
nuclear tests and the non-militarization of outer space, which we have
demanded and continue to demand through the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace
and Disarmament. We are convinced that if these measures were adopted, they
would halt the current arms race, creating the best possible conditions for
the initiation of an effective disarmament process.
For the same reasons, we have welcomed hopefully and supported certain
encouraging events of recent years: the resumption of the dialogue on
disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union, the meetings
between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, their solemn joint
statement to the effect that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought. From this perspective, we have considered that the conclusion of a
treaty to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces in Europe would constitute an
important step forward. For the first time, nuclear weapons already deployed
would be eliminated by mutual agreement, thus showing that it is possible to
initiate an effective disarmament process.
Contrary to what has happened in the past, breaking the vicious circle in
which we have been placed should be the first step in fostering a system of
mutually supportive constructive relationships that progressively create
greater security and not greater risks.
If, in order to survive, we have to change, why should we trust an
ostensible change based on fear, instead of working for real change based on
reason? We cannot accept, we cannot understand that the survival of human
389
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 412
7
(President Alfonsin, Argentina)
beings on Earth should be subject to a system which is grossly vulnerable to
the probability of error, or to the insufficiency of terror. In order to
survive we must tread another path, one which is admittedly difficult and
unexplored. But only in this way will we be able to respond to the magnitude
of the danger threatening us, with solid and meaningful progress. Only in
this way will we succeed in overcoming that tragic helplessness which I evoked
at the beginning.
In speaking of Mahatma Gandhi, Andre Malraux says in his Anti-Memoirs
that one of the characteristics of a prophet is that he reveals what is
obvious. I think that we need a few prophets to make us abandon once and for
all the theories that require us to comprehend the incomprehensible, to accept
the unacceptable, so that we may embark, simply, on building a world of peace.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank President Raul Alfonsin,
President of the Argentine Republic, for his important and comprehensive
statement. In view of the close attention with which it was received, I
believe that, when it is published as a document of this Conference, his
statement will constitute an important source of 'reference for our future
work. I also wish to thank him for the kind words that he addressed to
myself.
Distinguished representatives, I now intend to suspend the meeting for
10 minutes so that I can accompany the President of the Argentine Republic on
his departure from the building. The meeting is suspended for 10 minutes.
The meeting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 10.55 a.m.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare the 412th meeting of
the Conference on Disarmament reconvened.
Distinguished representatives, we shall now resume our work for today.
The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has requested the floor.
I therefore give the floor to Ambassador Nazarkin, the representative of the
Soviet Union.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Mr. President, first of all I should like to emphasize on behalf of
the Soviet delegation that we have listened with tremendous attention and
interest to the important statement which has just been made by His Excellency
President R. Alfonsin of Argentina. The address by President Alfonsin here in
this room, the ideas he put forward, are unquestionably of enormous importance
for all of us -- all the more so since President R. Alfonsin is very well
known as the Head of State of Argentina, but also as an outstanding fighter
for peace and disarmament. Together with the other leaders of the
Six Nations, he is responsible for major initiatives which have without fail
received the support of the Soviet Union.
At the previous meeting of the Conference the Deputy Foreign Minister of
the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, congratulated you on your assumption of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.412
8
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
presidency of the Conference and expressed gratitude to your predecessor
Ambassador M. Vejvoda, for having guided the work of the Conference in April.
I fully associate myself with Mr. Petrovsky's statement.
In connection with the statement made on 9 June by the representative off,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stulpnagel, I should like to
make a number of observations. Ambassador von Stulpnagel expressed the
concern of his Government about the elimination of Soviet and United States
medium-range missiles in Europe, stating that the elimination of individual
types of weapons does not necessarily enhance security. I should like to
point out the following: firstly, although today the question of medium-range
missiles has taken pride of place from the standpoint of the possibility of
achieving agreement very soon, the Soviet Union considers that questions of
strategic offensive weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and
the cessation of nuclear testing are also of high priority. This is
demonstrated by our new proposals on all the above-mentioned aspects of
nuclear and space weapons. Secondly, the elimination of Soviet and
United States medium-range missiles and shorter-range INFs in Europe would
undoubtedly be of historic significance.. In fact, for the first time an
agreement would have been achieved on real reductions in nuclear arms. This
would give a powerful impetus to negotiations in other areas of arms
limitation and disarmament. In connection with Ambassador von StUlpnagel's
statement I should like once again to clarify the position of the Soviet Union
on medium-range missiles. We have repeatedly stated our readiness to settle
the problem of medium-range missiles on a global basis. There would be no
obstacles to such a solution if the United States were to agree to the
elimination of its nuclear systems in Japan, the Republic of Korea and the
Philippines, as well as the withdrawal of its aircraft carrier fleet within
agreed boundaries. And of course the United States would have no medium-range
missiles on its own territory. We are proposing that a start should be made
now towards the elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia.
The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany based his disagreement
with our proposed "zero option" for shorter-range INFs on the claim that the
Soviet Union enjoys superiority in missiles with a range of below
500 kilometres, and that the Warsaw Treaty Organization enjoys superiority in
conventional armaments. I should like to clarify this issue as well. We are
also proposing the complete elimination of this class of Soviet and
United States missiles in Europe, and thus the elimination of any side's
superiority in them. As for the linkage between the question of eliminating
medium-range missiles and shorter-range INFs and the problem of conventional
weapons, this ignores a well-known fact -- our readiness to accept the most
radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in the process of
eliminating existing imbalances and asymmetries in individual types, by means
of reductions by the side which is ahead. These are issues we propose to make
the subject of consultations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.
We have heard today with great interest the assessment of the concept of
nuclear deterrence which was put forward by President R. Alfonsin. With great
eloquence, accuracy and cogency he showed the destructiveness of this concept
for mankind and the extremely dangerous consequences of its application in
391
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 412
9
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
practice, as well as its role in stimulating the arms race. At a Conference
meeting as recently as 9 June, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the
Soviet Union, V.F. Petrovsky, set out our assessment of the concept of
deterrence in detail. From what President R. Alfonsin said today, it is clear
that our assessments coincide. This is a source of great satisfaction to us.
As regards the statements by the representatives of France and the
Federal Republic of Germany at the previous meeting regarding the concept of
nuclear deterrence, I should like to say the following: the Soviet Union is
not proposing that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe should simply
be followed by a return to the situation which prevailed on this continent
50 years ago. We are proposing that, after eliminating nuclear weapons, we
should create a comprehensive security system which would rule out the very
possibility of conducting war in Europe -- and not just in Europe -- using any
type of weapon.
The Soviet Union and its allies are proposing a reduction of armed forces
and conventional armaments in Europe to a level where neither of the parties,
while ensuring its defence, would have the means for a surprise attack on the
other side, or for offensive operations in general. I should like to remind
you that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty and each of the parties to
it is subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or
conventional. It is set forth in a document which has been circulated at the
Conference on Disarmament (document CD/755 of 2 June 1987). Our doctrine is
strictly defensive, and it is based on the concept that under present-day
conditions recourse to military means to'resolve any dispute is inadmissible.
The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty will never under any circumstances
initiate military action against any State or alliance of States unless they
are themselves the target of an attack. They will never be the first to
employ nuclear weapons. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have no
territorial claims on any other State, either in Europe or outside Europe.
They do not view any State or any people as their enemy. Rather, they are
prepared to conduct their relations with all the world's countries, without
any exception, on the basis of mutual regard for security interests and of
peaceful coexistence. It is not the purpose of the States parties to the
Warsaw Treaty to maintain armed forces and armaments beyond the scale required
to repel attack from outside. So they will strictly keep to the limits
sufficient for defence and for repelling any possible aggression.
I agree that it is essential to combine the processes of arms reduction
and the creation of a political climate of trust. It is precisely such an
approach which underlies the concept of comprehensive security put forward by
the socialist States. It is precisely the organic links between measures in
the military, political, economic and humanitarian areas that serve as a basis
for our policy in the field of security. In particular, we regard the
continued division of Europe into opposing military blocs as unnatural; we
appeal for their simultaneous dissolution and, as a first step, the
elimination of the military organizations of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. Such
a move would make an important contribution to eliminating the antagonism
between East and West referred to on 9 June by Ambassador von StUlpnagel.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 412
10
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
Finally, in connection with the French representative's reaction to the
statement by Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovsky, I should like to point
out that Deputy Minister Petrovsky did not name any State in that part of his
statement which prompted the reaction. We were surprised to hear such an
interpretation of this statement, in which France was apparently included
among the "students".
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Nazarkin for
his statement, and now give the floor to the distinguished representative of
Japan.
Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, may I first of all express my
delegation's congratulations to you, Sir, on assuming the important office of
President for this month. I would also like to express my delegation's
appreciation to Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia for the excellent
guidance he gave in the month of April. I would also like to extend our
heartfelt welcome-to the new representative of the United States of America,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, to our Conference.
In the statement just delivered by the distinguished Ambassador of the
Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, there was a reference to the existence of
United States nuclear weapons in Japan. May I take this opportunity to say
that Japan adheres to a non-nuclear policy, and I can categorically state that
there are no nuclear weapons of any State in Japanese territory.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished
representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words. Are there
any requests for the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the
distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Mr. BOLEWSKI (Federal Republic of Germany): Thank you, Mr. President.
My delegation reserves the right to reply to the observations made by the
Soviet delegate at an appropriate time and in an appropriate way. For the
time being, it suffices to point out that the position of my delegation as
well as of many others on the doctrine of deterrence is widely known and need
not be repeated at the present time. We shall resort to those points in
detail at the given moment.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished
representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. Are
there any further requests for the floor? Apparently not.
Distinguished representatives, I have requested the secretariat to
circulate today the usual timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference
and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable is, of
course, purely indicative and subject to changes or additions, if necessary.
If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adop.s the draft
decision.
It was so decided.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 412
11
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): As you are aware, consultations
are taking place concerning the programme of work for the second part of the
annual session. I understand that the groups will meet for consultations
immediately after this plenary meeting, so that we can expedite agreement on
that programme. I have been informed that the Group of 21 will meet in this
roan with the usual facilities. If there are no further comments, I shall
declare that the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be
held on Tuesday, 16 June, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.413
16 June 1987
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 June 1987, at 10. a.m.
President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)
GE.87-61671/6906e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 413
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 413th plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates,
consultations as you know are still going on on the programme of work for the
second part of the 1987 session. I intend in the light of those consultations
to convene as soon as we finish our list of speakers an informal meeting of
the Conference in order to consider that question. We shall then resume the
plenary meeting in order to formalize any agreement which may have been
achieved at the informal meeting. I have on my list of speakers for today the
representatives of Hungary, Bulgaria, France and Pakistan. I now give the
floor to the first speaker on my list, His Excellency Ambassador
David Meiszter, head of the delegation of Hungary to the Conference on
Disarmament.
Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Let me, at the outset of my statement,
congratulate you on the assumption of the responsihle post of President of the
Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. In wishing you success in
guiding the proceedings for this auspicious body, I would like to assure you
that my delegation will fully co-operate with you in any of your efforts to
move the work towards tangible results. May I be permitted to express the
thanks and appreciation of my delegation to your distingusihed predecessor in
the chair, Ambassador Milos Veivoda, for his genuine efforts in reaching real
advance in high-priority tasks. I would like also to welcome in our midst our
new colleague, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, head of the delegation of the
United States of America. I am looking forward to co-operating with him as I
did with his distinguished predecessors.
The session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties
to the Warsaw Treaty held at the end of May in Berlin, the documents of which
were presented to the Conference the other day by Ambassador Harald Rose,
rightly drew the attention of world public opinion time and again to the
overriding need for urgent, tangible results in the field of nuclear
disarmament. The communique issued by the session placed particular emphasis
on a new way of thinking, a new approach to the issues of war and peace,
disarmament and other complex global and regional problems, and the
abandonment of the concept of "nuclear deterrence", which supposes that
nuclear weapons are the guarantee for the security of States. Specific
details of the new thinking were highlighted by Deputy Foreign Minister
Vladimir F. Petrovsky of the USSR in his statement to the Conference to which
my delegation fully subscribes.
To translate those goals into reality, practical steps need be taken in
the field of nuclear disarmament. One such step could be to proceed as soon
as possible to the conclusion of an aqreement on eliminating all medium-range
missiles in Europe, coupled with the elimination of shorter-range missiles.
Another step in that direction could be a radical reduction in offensive
strategic weapons along with strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime. One
cannot but welcome and render unconditional support to the efforts under way,
and hope that the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States will
produce tangible results in the very near future.
I have listened with interest to positions explained by some delegations
concerning the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament
in the context of the elimination of all European medium-range nuclear
3y6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
3
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
missiles. Although the issue of conventional disarmament is not one of the
subjects actively dealt with here in this body, I find it appropriate to
recall that several proposals have been made to this effect by the Warsaw
Treaty Organization. Just to mention some of them:
Last June my delegation submitted to the Conference the Budapest
Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization concerning the reduction of
armed forces and conventional armaments. That proposal still stands;
The Berlin session of the Warsaw Treaty Organization discussed ways of
implementing the programme submitted by its States parties with a view to
achieving a 25 per cent reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments
in Europe during the early 1990s. The reductions are scheduled to take place
simultaneously with and in conjunction with reductions in tactical nuclear
systems;
Furthermore, the Berlin session, responding to the concerns raised,
expressed its awareness of the asymmetric structures of the armed forces
maintained by the two sides in Europe, and stated its preparedness to have the
imbalance that has arisen in certain elements redressed in the course of the
reductions, proposing that the side which has an advantage over the other
should make the appropriate cut-backs.
May I draw attention to the fact that thereby not only has this concern
been addressed, but this has been done using the very term "redressed" that
may be familiar to those raising the concern.
Nuclear disarmament as a complex of specific disarmament issues has been
from the beginning a top-priority task of the Conference on Disarmament tpo.
The fact that promising efforts are being undertaken in the USSR-United States
bilateral talks does not relieve this body of its responsibility to make its
own contribution as envisaged in its mandate. On the contrary, the progress
in talks between the USSR and the United States should be a factor prompting
this body to prove that the Conference itself is not outside the mainstream of
international trends towards a safer world.
During the first part of this year's session, efforts were made by the
presidents of the Conference as well as by individual delegations or groups of
delegations, in plenaries and in informal, consultations alike, to find a way
to proceed, but in vain. In assessing what the Conference on Disarmament has
accomplished so far, it should be noted that the steps taken fall far short of
the task inscribed in our mandate, without mentioning the even more ambitious
proposals found in abundance in the Final Document of the first special
session of the General Assembly or the proposals made by the USSR on
15 January 1986, or in several other documents.
The least we should be able to do here is to specify the areas where we
could'contribute to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear
disarmament. There is a wide range of possibilities for that, starting with
working out a phased programme for eliminating nuclear weapons and ranging up
to the initiation of practical work on such particular issues as the cut-off
of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
4
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
The central issue in proceeding towards nuclear disarmament is the
comprehensive cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. It is the, well-known
position of my delegation that the eventual aim of a CTB should be to prohibit
all test explosions by all States in all environments for all time, and to
work out effective measures to prevent circumvention of the ban under the
pretext of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. A CTB could be one step
capable of greatly contributing to advancing the limitation, reduction and
eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
Partial steps towards a full scale CTB -- such as reducing the number and
yield of nuclear explosions -- might facilitate reaching the above goal,
provided such measures are not offered as a substitute. At the same time one
may agree that working out such practical steps is better suited to the
ongoing bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States.
During its spring session the Conference invested an enormous amount of
work to create the necessary procedural framework for commencing negotiations
on the issue, but it failed. My delegation is aware of the conflicting views
as far as the substance and the appropriate procedure are concerned.
Nevertheless, I cannot agree that this is enough reason to put off the
commencement-of work. Even though a State or States may for the time being
consider the CTB as a long-term objective, that should not exclude the
commencement of practical work. The time needed to work out a treaty is not a
matter of months. Take the example of the prohibition of chemical weapons
with its decades-old negotiating history.
My delegation strongly urges all those concerned to out aside stereotyped
positions, show flexibility and start practical work. To set up an Ad hoc
Committee on a CTB without further delay is indispensable. The scope of a
future CTB should not cause too many difficulties, since it is almost
self-evident. On that understanding our practical efforts might be
concentrated on other crucial aspects, among others verification.
In the view of my delegation, the proposal presented by
Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskv of the USSR on behalf of the group
of socialist delegations contains all the necessary major elements that
provide a solid basis for sensible work. Whether a CTB is a short-term or
long-term objective may well prove to be of less importance once the work has
been started.
As one of the sponsors of the "Basic provisions" of a comprehensive
test-ban treaty, I would like at this stage to highlight some of its features
we find especially important. An outstanding feature of the proposal is that
it provides for a ban on nuclear-weapon testing as far as the scope of a
future treaty is concerned. As a first step the ban would apply to the two
major nuclear Powers for a period of five years. The proposal leaves no
doubt, however, that the final aim is a universal ban on nuclear-weapon
testing by virtue of subsequent accession to it by the other nuclear Powers.
This approach to the scope of participation is meant to accommodate well-known
positions held by some of the nuclear Powers.
The most remarkable feature of these provisions is undoubtedly the part
dealing with verification of the test ban. It provides for the application of
39s
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
5
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
national means of verification, and access to the results of such verification
for other States. Another provision for verification is the establishment of
a network of international seismic stations, including the exchange of
Level II seismic data and the measuring of atmospheric radioactivity and the
exchanqe of the data obtained from such measurements.
Radical provisions are proposed for on-site inspection in cases when
suspicions or doubts emerge concerning strict compliance with the treaty.
Under its terms all parties would have the right to demand, and the challenged
party would be obliged to Provide access for, an on-site inspection to clarify
events givinq rise to suspicion on the basis of an appropriately substantiated
request, throuqh procedures to be elaborated.
We continue to hold that strict compliance with a future treaty is a must
to ensure the effective functioning and authority of a CTBT. A verification
regime on the lines Proposed could meet that requirement. It could greatly
contribute to dispelling long-held reservations to the effect that finding the
appropriate verification mechanism may cause-insurmountable difficulties.
There is a further specific item in the vast domain of nuclear
disarmament I would like to dwell on: the question of negative security
assurances. Strengthening of the security of States, and particularly those
which have renounced the nuclear option, has been an issue ever since the
world was divided into nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Amplified by
the emergence of the NPT and its review conferences, this task is coming more
and more to the forefront. It is not an exaggeration to say that assuring
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear
weapons has become a permanent subject of any multilateral conference held on
nuclear issues.
This question was actively dealt with at earlier stages of the work of
this Conference, in plenary and in working bodies. However, it was
progressively moved to the periphery of attention, not without an unfounded
sense of scepticism. This in our view is a deplorable development, especially
if we add that the Conferences's performance in other nuclear fields has been
meagre to say the least. It is a matter of consolation that this year the
ad hoc committee set up to deal with the subject will start substantive work
under the chairmanship of Ambassador von StUlpnagel.
The question of assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or
threat of the use of nuclear weapons has mainly been considered so far in the
context of unilateral undertakings assumed by the nuclear-weapon States.
Efforts to merge these undertakings -- different in substance and wording to a
large extent -- into a single international instrument of legally binding
character turned out to be a futile exercise. Not that the final aim was
wrong, but perhaps the approach pursued or the political conditions were
unfavourable. We continue to hold that States which have renounced the
nuclear option are entitled to enjoy firm, unconditional assurances that they
will never be subjected to the use or the threat of the use of nuclear
weapons. We are still of the view that the appropriate form for such
assurances would be a single international instrument of legally binding
character.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
6
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
An approach to the subject from the narrow angle of unilateral
undertakings by the five nuclear-weapon States may rightly be considered
obsolete now. Recent developments in international politics provide a
reliable substantive basis to seek and find a broader, fresh approach better
suited to the prevailing political circumstances.
During their summit meetinq in Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and
President Reaqan reached a historic political understanding to the effect that
"a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought". The USSR has
repeatedly declared that it strictly adheres to the policy of non-first-use.
Documents of the Berlin session of the Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization contain numerous elements relating to this issue.
As far as the East-West aspect of the question is concerned, the Stockholm
Conference also contributed a significant element to the issue of neqative
security assurances: the participants made a firm political commitment to
refrain from the use of military force, be it nuclear or conventional. One
could qo on with the enumeration of the favourable elements providing the
substantive basis for a fresh approach based on new thinking.
My delegation feels it appropriate that the ad hoc committee, when
resuminq its work this year, should survey the latest developments relevant to
its work -- includinq those mentioned a minute ago -- and take advantage of
the new situation created by the latest favourable developments in
international politics. Given goodwill on the part of all, the Committee
should find a way out of the impasse regarding the problem of negative
security assurances.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency
Ambassador David Meiszter for his statement and for the kind words he
addressed to myself and to my predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda. The next
speaker on my list today is His Excellency Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov,
head of the delegation of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, may I express my pleasure at
seeinq you, the representative of Egypt, with which my country enjoys friendly
relations, in the chair as President of the Conference for the month of June.
Your personal abilities which you displayed as Chairman of the
Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and of
other United Nations bodies, make me confident that you will discharge your
important duties in a most efficient manner. I assure you of the full support
and co-operation of my delegation in your task to give a good start to the
work of our summer session. I also wish to extend to your predecessor,
Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, my delegation's sincere thanks for the
efforts he made and for the skilful way in which he quided the Conference
during the month of April and in May. I would like to seize the opportunity
to welcome in our midst Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new head of the
delegation of the United States of America. We are looking forward to
co-operating with him as we did with his predecessor.
The Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the
Warsaw Treaty reaffirmed in its Berlin Declaration that the military doctrine
of the Warsaw Treaty, being a defensive one, is subordinated to the task of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 413
7
(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. It is not my intention to
dwell in detail on the constituent elements of the Declaration, since its text
has been circulated as an official document (CD/755) and was very well
introduced by Ambassador Harald Rose on 9 June.
My delegation would like to emphasize, however, that the States parties
singled out in their communiaue the need for renewed efforts to agree upon
practical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. They are calling for:
Immediate conclusion of an agreement to eliminate all United States and
Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe;
Simultaneous elimination of the Soviet and United States shorter-range
missiles in Europe and openinq of negotiations on such missiles stationed in
the eastern parts of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the
United States;
Settlement of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, including tactical
missiles, in Europe through multilateral negotiations;
Conclusion of an agreement on radical reductions in offensive strategic
weapons coupled with a strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime;
Conclusion of a total ban on nuclear testing.
The negotiations between the USSR and the United States on intermediate
nuclear forces are now at a crucial Point. The States Parties to the
Warsaw Treaty have made.their contribution in order to facilitate the reachinq
of agreement at the negotiations. In the course of his recent visit to the
Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the State Council of Bulgaria,
Todor Zhivkov, stated, inter alia:
"The USSR and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty went far
beyond the well-known 'zero option'. This unique chance for European
nations should not be missed. Reaching an agreement would not just have
major political importance. It would change to a significant degree the
psychological atmosphere on our continent. And this would open the way
to other important agreements in the field of disarmament."
Mr. President, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been the most
powerful booster of the arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race in
the aftermath of the Second World War. The States Parties to the
Warsaw Treaty reject the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as amoral and
dangerous. Nuclear weapons are not and cannot be a Guarantee of security.
Quite the contrary. The more nuclear weapons are piling up in the arsenals,
the more the risk of nuclear catastrophe grows. My delegation shares the view
expressed in this hall by the President of the Argentine Republic that it is
high time "to abandon once and for all the theories that require us to
comprehend the incomprehensible, to accept the unacceptable ...".
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
8
(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
An agreement on intermediate nuclear weapons can and must be a first step
towards a higher goal: the gradual reduction and total elimination of nuclear
weapons everywhere. To make more tangible the prospects for achieving this
goal, two important measures are needed: a halt to all nuclear testing, and
the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
The Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee stressed once
again the importance of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear testing
as a measure to halt the development, production and refinement of nuclear
arms and achieve the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of these
weapons, as well as to prevent an arms race in outer space. Being deeply
convinced of the urgent necessity for the Conference to begin substantive work
on item 1 of its agenda, my delegation is co-sponsorinq document CD/756,
"Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of
nuclear-weapon tests". This document was presented by the Deputy Foreian
Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, in a most detailed and eloquent manner.
The nuclear-test ban is not an end in itself. This is a problem which
has been examined for more than 30 years now, and on which the
General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions. It is generally
recognized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect
on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons than a nuclear-test
ban. It is obvious that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing intensifies
the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war. The
Secretary-General of the United Nations was undoubtedly right in pointing out,
at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that the readiness to negotiate
a comprehensive test-ban treaty was "the litmus test of the real willingness
to pursue nuclear disarmament".
In 1963 the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook, in
article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent
banning of nuclear testing. This undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the
preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Furthermore, article VI of this Treaty embodied a legally binding commitment
to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race and
to nuclear disarmament.
In a report submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 30 July 1980,
the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR stated, inter alia, that
they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of
nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have", as well as
"conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions
to the remaininq'problems". Against this background it is unacceptable today
to hear that some countries regard the nuclear-test ban as a long-term
objective.
In co-sponsoring document CD/756, my delegation hopes that it will impart
new viqour to the efforts aimed at commencing practical work on item 1. The
document puts in a single perspective the positive stock of many years of
efforts; it contains ideas and proposals advanced by many countries,
including the Six States from Five Continents. The content of the draft'
402
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
9
(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
treaty is imbued with the spirit of new political thinking which, as
Deputy Minister Petrovsky stressed, "requires that diplomatic practice should
be brought into line with the realities of the nuclear and space age".
The issue of verification and control is a case in point. For years it
was argued by a number of delegations that this problem is the main
stumbling-block on the road towards an agreement. The joint proposal of the
group of socialist countries is clear proof of their readiness to explore all
avenues with a view to establishing a solid system of verification and control
to be embodied in an agreement on a nuclear-test ban. Use of national
technical means of verification, establishment of an international system of
seismic verification, international exchange of data on atmospheric
radioactivity, ensurinq the non-functioning of nuclear-weapon test sites,
on-site inspection: no idea has, in our view, been forgotten in the document
tabled by the socialist countries. And it is worth mentioning again that the
Group of socialist countries puts forward the idea that an international
inspectorate should be established, something which was not envisaged either
in the 1982 USSR proposal or in the tripartite report submitted to the
Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union, the United States and the
United Kingdom.
At the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly the
political climate of the test ban issue was a bit improved, and a trend
towards convergence of views emerged. There were also clear signs of greater
openness on the matter during our spring session. Valuable work is being
performed by the Group of Seismic Experts, which is preparing a second global
collection and analysis test in 1988. There is no doubt in our mind that it
is long overdue for the Conference to begin substantive work immediately on
its agenda item 1.
My delegation would like to make very briefly some points about the work
of the ad hoc committees.
In the communique issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Treaty organization in Berlin recently, the States parties reiterated
"their preparedness to complete the preparation of an international convention
banning chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of the stockpiles
of such weapons and the industrial basis for their production by the end of
this year". In this regard they recalled their Moscow Declaration of
25 March 1987.
The "rolling text" entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a
Chemical Weapons Convention" registers the progress achieved so far. The
Ad hoc Committee took the only logical decision: to use the "rolling text" as
a basis for negotiations during the summer session of the Committee. My
delegation would like neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the
problems that remain'to be resolved by the Ad hoc Committee. It seems to us,
however, that there is a trend towards convergence of views with regard to the
outstanding political problems: issues pertaining to non-production of
chemical weapons, fact-finding, including challenge inspection, the
organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and its organs, just
to mention, perhaps, the most important ones. The task of negotiating
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 413
. 10
(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
solutions to those problems could be carried out provided that there is a
clear political will not to artificially complicate the negotiations, not to
become bogged down in never-ending discussions on technical details.
For three years now discussions have been going on in the
Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. There are
different views as to what has been done and what needs to be done. It is
clear that the present legal regime raises some barriers to an arms race in
outer space, but that in many crucial areas this regime is far from complete.
Hence, on the one hand, existing agreements, both bilateral.and multilateral,
must be strictly adhered to. On the other hand, the work of the
Ad hoc Committee must be broadened and deepened with a view to considering
specific measures and undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an
agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its
aspects.
At its forty-first session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
by consensus a decision providing for the Conference to conclude the
elaboration.of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first
part of its 1987 session. Although some progress was registered, one has to
recognize that the finalization of the draft Programme continues to elude the
Conference. It is clear that time is running out, because the third special
session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is
coming closer and closer. Therefore, we believe that the summer session of
the Conference is duty-bound to do what the spring session failed to achieve
on item 8.
At the end of the spring session an exchange of views took place on how
best to proceed further with item 7. Having worked over the last few years on
the basis of a unitary approach, the Ad hoc Committee decided to discuss the
two tracks -- "Radiological weapons in the traditional sense" and "Prohibition
of attacks against nuclear facilities" -- separately in two contact groups.
One must not, however, overlook the fact that procedural devices oer se do not
produce concrete results unless they are coupled with more flexible positions
on substance. In other words, the challenge to make headway on item 7 remains
as great as ever.
Before concluding, I would like to point out that my delegation welcomes
the setting up of a working group to examine ways and means of improving the
work of the Conference. We believe that the group should, among other things,
recognize the need for the Conference to work on all issues included in its
agenda and consider them in a substantive manner, regardless of whether an
ad hoc committee has been established or not.
If now my delegation does not dwell on items 2 and 3 of the agenda, it is
due to the fact that our position was laid out on 28 April.
On the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted
to disarmament we should try to move forward on as many issues on the agenda
as possible. The work of the Conference is going to be reviewed. Therefore,
the best possible thing for the Conference to do is to make progress and begin
producing concrete results. After all, we must give the international
community what it has asked us to do. We have a chance, so let us take it.
404 _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
11
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency
Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov of the delegation of Bulgaria to the Conference
on Disarmament for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the
Chair and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda, as well as for having reminded
us of the close relationship binding Egypt and Bulgaria. The next speaker on
my list is His Excellency Ambassador Pierre Morel, representative of France to
the Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, in
introducing the French document on the maintenance of a security balance among
all the parties to the convention during the 10-year period of the destruction
of stocks of chemical weapons, which will be distributed to members of the
Conference under the number CD/757, I wish to emphasize the paramount concern
underlying this paper, that is the search for security within the framework of
the convention. I will elaborate on the various practical applications before
I come to the indispensable complement, that is verification. I now turn to
the first part, the security imperative and its consequences.
Having already set out our general concerns at the end of the spring half
of the session, on 28 April, suffice it this time for me to recall that in our
view the convention, in order to be credible, must guarantee all parties to
the convention security from the very moment of its entry into force, and not
/ only a future security once all chemical weapons have been eliminated. The
10-year period must not be a period of diminished security. It is the first
phase of the application of the convention, the development of which, in
conditions of security acceptable to all, is indispensable in order to reach
the second and final phase of the convention.
-The order of destruction of stockpiles, as has already been pointed out
by many States, is in this regard of decisive importance. But this is not
simply a technical problem. The matter is eminently political since it is a
question of establishing, for the whole of the 10-year period of stock
destruction, a security balance based on security stocks which are limited,
homogeneous and verifiable. Let us look more closely at these two concepts.
First of all, security balance. The future convention must be'based on
strict equality between all parties. No signatory country can claim special
treatment at one moment or another. This is indeed the final goal, since the
aim is a final ban on possession and production by all the States parties to
the convention. But this equality must also be the rule during the 10-year
period. Otherwise, in the initial stages, the convention will follow in the
steps of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a treaty for the disarmament of
disarmed countries, organizing maintained armaments for some and disarmament
for others.
The provisions of the convention will play a decisive role in this
respect. One must start from two observations which very seriously complicate
the smooth course of the 10-year period.
First observation: stockpiles will be declared only 30 days after the
entry into force of the convention. The precise state of affairs as regards
chemical warfare will not therefore be technically known or politically
recognized until after the accession of most States.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
12
(Mr. Morel, France)
Second observation: we already know, but in a very unclear way, in the
absence of declarations on the part of the major chemical-weapon States, that
the capacities are very unequally distributed and that a single European State
alone possesses considerable resources. Whatever the order and volume of
destruction of stockpiles, the linear or stage-by-stage schedules which have
been contemplated so far would in fact lead, in the early years of the
convention, to an oligopolistic situation in stock-holding until the end of
the 10-year period, with small stockpiles cut down to insignificant volumes in
the very first years.
In our view, this pattern cannot be considered a temporary drawback.
Ten years is a very long period for the security of a State. For the sake of
the credibility of the convention, and thus in order to ensure full accession
by all States, we cannot go from everything to nothing because of an uncertain
and profoundly inequitable mechanism.
Nor can.one rule out the risk of delay due to technical reasons, or a
crisis in the implementation of the agreed timetable for destruction of stocks
during this 10-year period. Everything must be done to avoid this, but we
cannot altogether set aside the possibilities that could arise. Here aga.n
one or two States might be in a position to deal with such a situation,
whereas all the others would be taken unawares. In. order to remedy this major
drawback of lack of balance in the implementation of the destruction
programme, and to ensure the fairness and therefore the full credibility of
the convention, there is a need to establish a security balance which will
enable all States that feel it is necessary to have a minimum chemical weapon
capacity. Obviously this would not involve a sort of quantitative levelling
out, but, for the period required, 10 years, guarding against any attempt to
use or threaten the use of chemical weapons, thus affording a serious
guarantee of a smooth transition from the present situation to the final
regime of elimination and total prohibition.
Other approaches to the transition could in theory be contemplated to
ensure security balance. They are set out in the French document. One would
consist of a prior Soviet-United States agreement which would enter into force
immediately to bring the stocks held by the most heavily armed Powers into
line with those of the others, the entry into force of the convention being
delayed correspondingly. The other possibility would be to arrange the
10-year period in such a.way that the first half would apply only to the
United States and the USSR.
For practical as well as political reasons, the drawbacks of these
options are clearly greater than the advantages, if only because they delay
the entry into force of the convention at a time when the possibility of
chemical weapons becoming commonplace must be seriously considered. We
therefore set them aside, and cast our vote for the full application of the
convention and recognition of the right to maintain limited security stocks
during the 10-year period.
Now to the security stocks themselves. In the document before the
Conference today, France suggests that a distinction should be drawn, in the
declaration made on the thirtieth day after the entry into force of the
convention, between stockpiles other than security stocks, which fall under
406
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
13
(Mr. Morel, France)
the general regime already being developed, and security stocks as such,
subject to a specific regime, which would remain unchanged until the end of
the eighth year, and would then be destroyed in simultaneous and very
carefully defined phases during the two last years of the 10-year period.
These stocks should meet specific criteria, and the following are the
main characteristics.
They should be optional: the establishment of a security stock may
appear necessary to one party or another to the convention, which might
consider at the time the convention enters into force that it needs to ensure
security balance vis-a-vis other Powers holding chemical weapons. But it goes
without saying that the convention cannot impose this on any party. It is
thus an option open to all member States for a period of 10 years, subject to
very strict constraints which will be set out in detail later on.
The stocks should be limited; we suggest a level which is very low but
still of military significance, that is, in our view, between 1,000 and
2,000 tons. In order for the stocks to remain credible until the last year of
the 10-year period, we propose an amount equal to at least twice the minimum
volume regarded as militarily significant. The exact level would have to be
determined by agreement among the parties before the entry into force of the
convention. But at all events the proposed range makes it possible to
appreciate the difference between this stockpile and the present capacities of
the major Powers, which are measured in tens of thousands of tons on the one
side, and hundreds of thousands of tons on the other. This gap on its own is
sufficient to show that security stocks can only have a purely defensive role
against the possiblility of a chemical weapon attack. There is therefore no
conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
The stocks should be identical for all parties, that is to say at the
same level for all countries, in accordance with the reasons just given above.
The stocks should be homogeneous, in other words made up exclusively of
munitions containing V-nerve agents. Monitoring would thus be simplified, but
also the inevitable maintenance of protection programmes against an attack by
chemical weapons during the 10-year period.
The stocks should be verifiable from the entry into force of the
convention right up until complete destruction. This particularly sensitive
point will be elaborated on in the second part of this statement.
The stocks should be backed up by a single production facility for the
countries that so desire. This provision may be surprising in a prohibition
convention, but it meets two considerations which stem from technical
constraints on the one hand and respect for the convention on the other.
From the technical point of view, provision should be made for
maintaining the security stock in condition or renewing a portion of it over
an eight-year period: it is not possible to rule out the possibility of
storage accidents, defective munitions or, more generally, the need for
maintaininq the level of part of the security stock. In a broader context,
associating a production facility with the security stock should go a long way
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 413
14
(Mr. Morel, France)
towards deterring any party to the convention which might be tempted to cheat,
and also persuading non-signatory States that they cannot gain a clear
advantage by staying outside the convention.
The corollary of this particular provision is of course that this single
production facility must be declared from the date of entry into force of the
convention and placed under international control until its destruction at the
end of the 10-year period.
The main characteristics of the security stock having thus been set out,
I will merely add that our document describes the setting-up arrangements when
the two distinct regimes come into force: the regime for security stocks, as
just outlined, and the regime for stockpiles other than security stocks, in
accordance with the provisions at present being negotiated in the draft
convention. It also sets out how, after eight years, when all other stocks
and related facilities have been destroyed, a start would be made on the
simultaneous destruction of security stocks and each single production
facility.,
Let me now turn to verification, which is obviously one of the essential
elements of the system proposed. Since this is a transitory regime and one
which is at odds with the ultimate aim of the convention, it is indispensable
to ensure that it cannot be diverted from its final purpose. Verification is
of decisive importance for the whole of the convention, but it is of course
particularly significant for security stocks.
I will not return here to the production facility which is under
permanent international control and which will be closed down during the
ninth year and destroyed before the end of the tenth year. This is a
relatively simple case of complete verification - "unlimited", one might
say -- whereas the definition of the verification regime for the security
stock is inevitably a matter of greater complexity. As a matter of principle
the security stock must be subject to challenge inspection. But, as can be
seen from the current work of the Conference on this subject, access to
storage facilities has led to the search for balance between security
considerations (and confidentiality) on the one hand, and the need to ensure
full respect for the convention on the other. Our latest exchanges of views
have shown that there is no ready-made a priori formula, but that it should be
possible to establish a regime which is both strict and balanced and which
will ensure effective and realistic verification.
We believe therefore that the verification regime for security stocks is
simply one special case within the more general framework of verification of
the convention, and that it does not merit special treatment. That is why we
have refrained in this document from defining a single and therefore final
formula, and have set out, together with the formula we prefer, other options
which are less satisfactory in our view. The choice to be made between these
various options will of course depend on the answers to three major questions.
The first, a particularly sensitive one, is that of location. In our
wish to take part in an open exercise which would make it possible to
appreciate, before choosing, the advantages and drawbacks of the various
possible formulae, we are ready to envisage the declaration of the location of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 413
15
(Mr. Morel, France)
a security stock as from the very entry into force of the convention. This
undoubtedly offers an advantage with regard to verification. But at the same
time, we must appreciate the real and serious drawback as regards security,
since declaring the location might also encourage a pre-emptive attack in the
the event of a crisis. That is why our preference falls on the option under
which the location would not be declared publicly, but recorded in a sealed
envelope which would be opened in the event of a challenge inspection. The
possibility of transfer to another location would naturally have to be kept
open, but this would then be subjected to the same conditions; that is to
say, with the new location indicated in a sealed envelope.
The second question concerns the number of locations for security stocks,
whether the location is declared or not. Here again, security considerations
would lead us to believe that several locations would be preferable; but if
the monitoring is to be effective, agreed limits are required, which we would
suggest be set at five locations.
The third difficulty which should be pointed out here is the question of
direct access in the case of challenge inspection. I raise this matter here
for the record; the solution to be chosen with regard to security stocks will
in the final analysis be the same as that decided on for the general regime.
Whatever the final balance determined for the monitoring of security
stocks, we must recall that this will be carried out within a strictly defined
framework, which will place heavy burdens on all the parties to the convention:
Initial declaration within 30 days of.the entry into force of the
convention, specifying the volume, composition and location of the place
of storage, either publicly or in a sealed envelope;
During the first eight years, regime of challenge inspection which varies
according to whether the location is known or not;
At the end of the eighth year, opening of the sealed envelopes where
appropriate, and in any case placing of stocks under international
control preparatory to phased destruction. The challenge inspection
regime thus remains the indispensable instrument for verification.
This very brief recapitulation of the verification mechanisms enables us
to emphasize that we do not intend to leave any escape clause in drawing up
the regime which will be finally adopted.
There is still one point which can be linked to verification. This is
what has been presented -- wrongly -- as the risk of CW proliferation which it
is claimed would stem from the approach adopted by France. Some have stated
that, by providing for the possibility of constituting a limited security
stock for a period of 10 years, this would at least indirectly sanction
CW proliferation. This is a complete misunderstanding. The risk of
CW proliferation can be defined only in relation to a ban; it necessarily
exists in any convention arrangement simply because sovereign States cannot be
forced to accede to a convention. Everything which, like the security stocks,
will help to enhance the effectiveness, the non-discriminatory character and
the equality of all parties in the course of the 10-year period, will
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
16
(Mr. Morel, France)
strengthen the credibility of the convention and encourage States to accede.
But let me add above all that the provisions related to verification, and the
destruction of security stocks and the sole production facility referred to
above, clearly show that these provisions do not in any way encourage
acquisition of a CW capability. The limited option proposed contains binding
and very stringent provisions. Far from encouraging proliferation, the
instrument we have suggested introduces clarity and equity in the relations
between all the States parties in the decisive period of the first 10 years of
implementation of the convention.
Having thus set out the principal reasons which led us to put this
document before the Conference, we are aware of the fact that the provisions
suggested for security stocks may have certain relatively new elements. But
we would also like to recall that France put this question before the
Conference for its attention as much as two years ago. To date it has not
been possible to embark on a detailed discussion of this issue, and so it is
essential to do so today, because the problem cannot be avoided.
We also know that security stocks are not the only important issue that
has not been dealt with so far: much remains to be done, for example, in
defining super-toxic lethal substances, on guarantees, which have been wisely
raised by the delegation of Pakistan, or on the strictly industrial aspects of
the convention.
None of these issues in our view is of such central importance in the
structure of the convention as that of security stocks. Without constantly
assured security there will be no stable, credible and lasting convention. It
would be better to deal with this issue before concluding negotiations and do
this in an open-minded way, with great clarity of approach, so as to arrive at
a workable mechanism which will be the best guarantee of the success of the
convention, rather than leaving it until afterwards, in an atmosphere of
uncertainty and distrust.
And in order to dispel misunderstanding, in order to avoid the repetition
of unfounded allegations such as those that have appeared in the press
recently, I would like to conclude by reiterating vigorously that our goal is
the complete elimination of chemical weapons, as our Prime Minister recalled
recently in Moscow: "The day when there is a verified diappearance of
chemical weapons, we will be the first to destroy our own: I can make this
formal commitment: we will be at zero level at the same time as the others."
This is the best way to sum up the proposal we have just made, which we
hope will be considered by the Conference with all the attention it deserves.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Pierre Morel,
the representative of France to the Conference, for his statement. Now I give
the floor to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, the representative of Pakistan to the
Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, permit me first of all to express
my pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the
month of June. Pakistan and Egypt are bound to each other by many ties and
work closely together in international forums. May I therefore assure you
410
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 413
17
(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)
that in the fulfilment of your responsibilities as President of the
Conference, you will have the full co-operation of my delegation. Your
diplomatic skill and experience are known to all, and I am confident that
under your guidance the work of the Conference will be conducted in a most
able manner. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to compliment
your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, who presided over the
Conference in April with great distinction and skill.
I should also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who
have joined us since I took the floor last time, the distinguished Ambassadors
of Indonesia and the United States, and to wish them a successful tour of duty
in Geneva.
In my statement on 16 April, I gave the views of my deleqation on the
nuclear and nuclear-related items of our agenda. It is gratifying that, since
then, the Conference has appointed Ambassador Stulpnagel of the Federal
Republic of Germany as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on item 6. It is our
hope that substantive work on this important question will commence at an
early date and will lead to positive results.
While I do not intend today to dwell at any length on issues which I
touched upon in my last statement, I cannot help expressing a strong sense of
disappointment that the Conference has yet to come to an agreement on an
appropriate organizational framework for dealing with the first three items on
its agenda, relating to several priority questions in the area of nuclear
disarmament. The address by the President of the Argentine Republic,
His Excellency Mr. Raul Alfonsin, to the Conference last week was an eloquent
call for nuclear sanity, and we hope it will be heeded by those who seem to
believe that the only way of assuring their own security and that of their
allies is to hold mankind hostage to the threat of a nuclear holocaust.
I would now like to turn to items 4, 5 and 8 of our agenda. Pakistan has
always supported a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on
chemical weapons. My delegation is therefore gratified at the progress which
is being.made under item 4 of our agenda in negotiating a convention on the
prohibition of chemical weapons. Last year and in the inter-sessional period,
the Ad hoc Committee was able to elaborate the text of several important parts
of the convention under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the
United Kingdom. Further significant progress was recorded during the spring
part of the current session under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekeus of
Sweden, notably in the agreement that elimination of stocks should take place
only through destruction, and towards drafting texts concerning verification
of declarations on production facilities, their interim monitoring and the
verification of their elimination, modalities for the revision of lists under
article VI and some details of the institutional structure to be established
under the convention.
We are confident that the momentum of the negotiations will be maintained
during the summer part of the session. A complete ban on chemical weapons now
seems to be within our reach, and we would urge all parties to join in an
effort to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion before the third
special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament
next year.
411
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
18
(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)
We are not unmindful of the outstanding issues, some of them of
considerable complexity, which have yet to be resolved. Foremost among them
are the questions of challenge inspection and of non-production of chemical
weapons in civil industry. At the heart of both these issues lies the same
consideration, that of effective verification. There has been no dearth of
proposals on the question of challenge inspection. My delegation too
submitted one such proposal last year in an attempt to bridge the differences
which have prevented an agreement so far. We have been heartened by
indications of a gradual convergence of views during the spring part of the
session. It is evident, however, that considerable work remains to be done
before this convergence is translated into treaty language. The issue of
challenge inspection raises two considerations: one the one hand, the need
for a stringent verification regime which would make it extremely difficult
for any violation of the convention to go undetected, and on the other hand,
the right of a State to protect installations of a highly sensitive nature
having relevance to its supreme security interests from unreasonable and
unjustified scrutiny. In our view, these two considerations are not
irreconcilable, and we are confident that it would be possible to work out a
mechanism which takes due account of both. One way of doing so would be to
entrust the Executive Council with decision-making authority in disputed cases
under an appropriate voting mechanism which guarantees that such differences
are settled with all possible dispatch.
In the context of challenge inspection, some concern has been expresssed
about the possibility of what are described as "frivolous" challenges. My
delegation feels that these fears are largely exaggerated. We do not
subscribe to the view that some States or their leaders act responsibly while
others do not. In any event, more harm would be done by placing undue
impediments on the right of a State to request inspection than would result
from a resort to "frivolous" challenge.
My delegation has consistently taken the view that declarations regarding
chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities should be made at the
earliest possible stage, and should be comprehensive and detailed in order to
be fully verifiable. We therefore welcome the flexibility shown by the Soviet
delegation earlier during this session on the question of the declaration of
locations of chemical weapon stocks and their verification. We hope that the
Ad hoc Committee will soon be able to finalize the relevant provisions of
article IV of the convention.
Despite encouraging progress in several areas, a number of important
questions remain open besides those I have already mentioned, including
questions relating to scope, the definition of chemical weapons, the
definition of production facilities and measures to be taken for their
elimination, and organizational questions. Nor should we forget articles X
and XI dealing retrospectively with assistance and with economic and
technological development. The importance of the final clauses
(articles XII to XVI) should also not be underestimated. Articles X and XI
are of great interest to the developing countries, and we are happy to note
that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee envisages their being taken
up during the current session. My delegation has submitted a proposal on the
question of assistance which we hope will receive consideration when work on
article X commences.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
19
(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)
An important subject to which the Conference should address itself is
that of adeauate follow-up action to established violations of the
convention. In this context, the question of sanctions to be taken against a
State which has been found to have acted in violation of its obliqations under
the convention deserves serious examination. To withdraw from such a State
its riahts and privileges under the convention can hardly he regarded as a
response commensurate with the gravity of an act posing a threat to the
objectives of the convention. The States parties to the convention ought to
co further and undertake collective action to remedy the situation.
My delegation has noticed a tendency to enter into too many technical and
procedural details in drafting the convention. We feel that many of these
details could be left to the international authority and its organs which will.
be established under the convention. In trying to settle all these matters at
this staqe by including them in the text of the convention or its annexes, we
run the risk of unduly delaying its conclusion. There is also a more
pragmatic reason why we feel this should not be attempted. It is quite likely
that, after the entry into force of the convention and with the benefit of
actual experience, a need might be felt to improve some of the technical and
procedural details relating to implementation. If all these details are
contained in the text of the convention, the necessary modification may be
extremely difficult to bring about in view of the obvious difficulties in
amending a multilateral international agreement. My delegation therefore does
not favour introducing into the convention such an element of rigidity which
may not be in the interest of its effective implementation.
Before I pass on to other items on our agenda, may I say that my
delegation has been dismayed at the statement just made by the distinguished
Ambassador of France. The proposal that parties to the Convention should he
permitted to maintain secret security stockpiles of chemical weapons would
negate the main objectives of the ban. It would also seriously undermine
confidence in the observance of the convention, and only deepen mutual
suspicion amonq States parties with all its perilous consequences. It comes
at a particularly inopportune time in view of the progress that is being made
in the negotiations taking place in this Conference.
The question of prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on th-
agenda of the CD since 1982. It has been identified by the General Assembly
as a priority item. However, the discussions which have been held in the
plenary, and since 1985 in the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, have been
largely confined to an academic discussion of some of the issues which this
problem raises. This is so largely because of the inadequacy of the mandate
of the Ad hoc Committee, which does not permit it to embark upon the practical
work of negotiating an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms
race in this zone. As long as a suitable mandate which would enable the
Committee to exercise its negotiating responsibility is denied to it, the
prospects of making meaningful progress will remain limited. The Pakistan
delegation therefore regrets that the efforts made by the Group of 21 at the
beginning of the session to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee were
not fruitful because of the inflexible position taken by one group. My
delegation is, however, prepared to work constructively and make its modest
contribution to the consideration of this issue in this Committee under the
Chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
20
(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)
Mankind today stands at the threshold of an important turning-point.
Outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind, is today being used
extensively for military purposes. The majority of the space objects now in
orbit serve military functions. There is a growing threat of the emergence of
active space weapons and of ASAT and ABM weapons. Unless effective measures
are taken to avert this danger, outer space will become yet another area of
military competition and confrontation, severely restricting its use for
peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development
of all countries.
Competition in the military uses of outer space would have grave
consequences. It would exacerbate the current state of instability inherent
in the deployment of global nuclear arsenals, give the arms race a
qualitatively new dimension, undermine existing disarmament agreements and
jeopardize the disarmament process as a whole.
The imminent threat of "weaponization" of outer space which faces us
today underscores the urgency of initiating negotiations in the Conference.
While it is relatively easy to stop the development of a weapon in its initial
stage or before it is actually tested and deployed, it becomes much more
difficult to prohibit after its production and deployment. The Conference
must not therefore delay shouldering its important responsibility in this
area; otherwise it may soon be too late to reverse this dangerous trend.
It is sometimes pointed out that the question of an arms race in outer
space is best left to the two super-Powers, which are already engaged in talks
on the subject in Geneva. My delegation finds this argument unconvincing.
While we are prepared to admit that, by reason of their actual or potential
military capabilities, the two super-Powers, which are also the two principal
space Powers, have a special responsibility in this connection, questions
relating to outer space are no longer today of concern only to them but
equally to other members of the international community. Bilateral talks
therefore do not diminish the need for multilateral negotations. Only
multilateral negotiations in the Conference can fully protect the rights of
the international community. The super-Powers also have a responsibility to
keep this Conference, and through it the General Assembly, informed of the
progress of their talks.
The current legal regime regarding outer space is clearly inadequate for
the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The rapid technological
developments which have been taking place in the area of outer space have
revealed serious' deficiencies and loopholes in existing agreements. There is
no agreement on such basic terms as "peaceful purposes" or "militarization".
Agreements currently in force leave considerable room for various military
activities, including deployment of a wide range of weapons, in particular
ASAT weapons. Further developments in space technology could erode the
existing space law and make it completely irrelevant.
The goal that we must set for ourselves is the complete prohibition of
all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space such as
ASAT systems, weapons which interfere in the functioning of space objects, and
space-based ABM systems. Such a ban must also provide for effective
verification provisions, including on-site inspection. Pending the
414
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
21
(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)
achievement of a comprehensive ban on space weapons, certain interim or
partial measures could also be profitably negotiated. Priority in this regard
could be given to the questions of a moratorium on the development, testing
and deployment of ASAT weapons, and the immunity of space objects.
The United States-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972 imposes important thouqh
limited restrictions on the development of space-based ABM systems. There
have recently been disquieting resports that the restraints imposed by this
agreement may be weakened. Such a development would be fraught with extremely
serious consequences. Without these restraints, there would be an
unrestrained arms race in both offensive and defensive systems. We therefore
call upon the two parties to adhere strictly to its terms. Pakistan's
proposal last year for an international instrument to supplement the
ABM Treaty was made with the objective of strengthening the restraints
contained in this treaty and making them applicable to all technologically
advanced States.
There are some who maintain that the functions performed by many
satellites have a stabilizing effect as they contribute to crisis management,
early warning, communication and the verification of arms control agreements.
My delegation does not wish to quarrel with this argument, except to point out
that information gathered by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites has
also been used in support of military operations. However, if the functions
performed by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites are as benign as they
are sometimes made out to be, one may well ask why this capability should
remain the monopoly of the space Powers. Should we not entrust surveillance
and reconnaissance activities by satellites to an international agency in
order to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements? In this context, the
proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency
deserves serious consideration. Such a multilateral verification capability
could supplement and support bilateral arrangements and national technical
means of verification.
The Registration Convention of 1974 provides a useful instrument as a
confidence-building measure. The present system of declarations could be
strengthened and, if properly implemented, could give greater transparency to
outer space activities. So far the space Powers have not described the
military functions of their satellites, although it is a well-known fact that
most of these are performing such functions. The Review Conference of the
Registration Convention which is to be held in 1989 could provide a useful
opportunity for strengthening this Convention.
Mr. President, I will now turn to the last item on which I would like to
express the views of my delegation, namely the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament. The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament did some useful work during the spring part of the session under
the dedicated leadership of Ambassador Garcia Robles, but was unable to
complete its work in accordance with General Assembly decision 41/421. While
we recognize the complexity of some of the remaining issues, we do not think
it is impossible to resolve them if the necessary good will and flexibility is
demonstrated by all sides, especially some nuclear-weapon States.
Regrettably, this spirit does not seem to be much in evidence on the part of
some of the delegations which have begun to question parts of the Programme
earlier agreed upon by consensus and to reopen issues which appeared to have
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.413
22
(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)
been settled. My delegation will not, however, fail to make its due
contribution with a view to the elaboration of a meaningful Programme before
the third special session on disarmament.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency
Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, head of the delegation of Pakistan to the Conference
on Disarmament, for his statement. I also thank him for having paid tribute
to the close relationship between Eaypt and Pakistan. I thank him for the
kind words addressed to me and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda. As I
announced at the openinq of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold a
five-minute informal meeting to consider the draft programme of work for the
second part of the 1987 session. After we conclude our consideration of that
subject, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any
consensus that emerges at the informal meeting. The plenary meetinq is
suspended.
The meeting was 'suspended at 11.45 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): The 413th plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament is resumed. As a result of our exchange of views at
the informal meeting, I intend to out before the Conference for decision a
draft programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session. The draft
programme of work is contained in document CD/WP.282, as amended at the
informal meeting. I intend now to repeat those amendments for the record.
First, agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons", and item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and
new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", will be considered in
plenary meetings during the period 27 to 31 July. Secondly, agenda item 8,
entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", will be considered during
the period 3 to 7 Auqust. Thirdly, reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies and
the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly will be taken up from
10 to 28 August, which would then become the closing date for the
1987 session. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference
adopts the programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session, as
contained in document CD/WP.282, with the amendments that I have read out. If
there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference is agreeable to
that.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): This concludes our business for
today. I intend now to adjourn the plenary. The next plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 June at 10 a.m. sharp.
The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 12.06 p.m.
416
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV. 414
18 June 1987
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 June 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 414
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 414th meeting
of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, in accordance with
its programme of work the Conference will consider today agenda item 1,
"Nuclear-test ban", and item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race
and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules .,f
procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject releva;:t to
work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today tr
representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, and I now give him th'E FLOC~.
Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, it is indeed a great pleasure
for my delegation to see you, Sir, representative of a brotherly non-aligned
country with which Indonesia has always enjoyed a warm and cordial
relationship, presiding over the Conference's deliberations for the first
month of its summer session. In congratulating you, I am confident that under
your wise leadership and long experience, our deliberations will reach a
fruitful result. For my part, I would like to pledge my delegation's
assurances in rendering its support and co-operation in the discharge of your
duties.
Since this is the first time that I am taking the floor, may I take this
opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Vejvoda of
Czechoslovakia for his skilful leadership in guiding the Conference's
deliberations last April, and to convey my gratitude to the distinguished
representatives who have extended kind words of welcome to me in their
previous interventions. I pledge to them my delegation's continued readiness
and co-operation in striving for the goal of the Conference on Disarmament.
Let me also have the pleasure of joining the previous speakers in welcoming
the distinguished representative of the United States of America,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, representative of a country with which Indonesia
also enjoys close and friendly co-operation.
Next year, the General Assembly will hold its third special session
devoted to disarmament, where, among other things, it will review the progress
that has been achieved during the past nine years in the field of disarmament,
since the adoption of the Final Document of its first special session. Thus
one hardly needs to over-emphasize that this summer session, as well as next
year's session, will be crucial and of utmost importance for the Conference on
Disarmament, since the work of the Conference will also be reviewed in that
special session.
Nine years ago, members of the United Nations solemnly declared and
committed themselves in the Final Document of SSOD-I to a set of objectives
and principles leading to the realization of the ultimate objective -- general
and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the sa-r,e
time, we also made recommendations concerning the international machinery for
disarmament negotiations. We agreed that the then existing disarmament
machinery should be revitalized, and then we welcomed and recognized what is
now the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum. Furthermore, paragraph 121 of the Final Document states
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 414
3
(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)
that bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an
important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in
the field of disarmament.
After taking stock of what we agreed in 1978 on some objectives and
principles regarding disarmament, it is only natural, Mr. President, that my
delegation should arrive at a conclusion similar to that in your previous
statement as the head of the Egyptian delegation -- that bilateral and
multilateral, or for that matter regional negotiations are not alternatives to
one another, but complement and sustain each other. The results of the
negotiations in each of these forums will serve as a mosaic forming the
general and complete disarmament that we are striving for. Accordingly, it is
our obligation not to construe negotiations in one forum as preventing the
work in other forums. Indeed, all the peoples of the world have a vital
interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States
not only have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations but also
have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament.
It is within this context that my delegation is happy to note that
important multilateral and regional efforts have achieved fruitful and
concrete results. The Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention
and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe are some of the examples. My delegation is especially
happy and encouraged by the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga,
turning the South Pacific into a nuclear-free zone. In our own region,
Indonesia, together with other ASEAN countries, has for some time been engaged
in important steps in drafting a treaty to establish the region of South-East
Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, an essential component of the Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). My delegation hopes that all nations,
and especially nuclear-weapon States, will accept such a contribution. I
believe that this is not too much to ask for, since through paragraph 33 of
the Final Document, we have agreed that the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely
arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with
those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely
free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon
States, constitute an important disarmament measure.
The negotiations in Reykjavik, despite their failure to result in a final
consensus, also made an important contribution to the process of disarmament.
From the meeting permeated the truth that a deep reduction in nuclear weapons
and the eventual elimination of those weapons is possible. We, like others,
take encouragement from the current initiatives taken by both sides to follow
through and build upon what has been achieved at Reykjavik.
However, in spite of these results, it is by no means certain that those
achievements have brought us closer to the goal of general and complete
disarmament. Most unfortunate is that, after all these nine years, the
Conference on Disarmament has yet to realize a single draft treaty on a topic
419
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 414
4
(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)
on its agenda. Therefore, during the run-up to the United Nations
General Assembly third special session devoted to disarmament, my delegation,
compelled by its conscience, appeals to all member States to make all to
necessary efforts to prove that our Conference is able to live up to its tasks
and deliver what is expected by the international community. With this
spirit, and if reason dictates that producing agreements on all ite:1S in `l-s
relatively short period of time is too ambitious a target to asp r=- to, 1^t '.:3
then, at least., exert all those efforts needed to finalize the drat treat^/ or.
chemical weapons which we have been negotiating for many years. Hopef?J11y,
further steps could be taken that would bring us closer to negotiating draft
treaties on other items which we have also been discussing for many years.
As we are aware, at the beginning of the spring session, negotiation on
the chemical weapons convention reached a promising stage and gave rise to
justifiable optimism. We hope during this summer session the Committee will
take up other remaining important issues. At this juncture, I would like to
congratulate Ambassador Ekeus and the co-ordinators of the three working
groups for their skilful and commendable efforts which have enabled the
Committee to achieve remarkable results. My delegation is also very
appreciative of the constructive and flexible approach shown by delegations
during the negotiations.
Item 7 is another issue in which my delegation believes that, given the
necessary political will and sufficient flexibility, the Conference on
Disarmament will be able to achieve concrete results. We have been engaging
ourselves for many years in open debates covering the issues in track A and
track B. It is about time now that the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological
Weapons should be spared from the ordeal of a procedural debate and allowed to
start its substantive considerations in order to produce a "rolling text", as
proof that the Conference is capable of registering further progress.
It was four years ago that our Conference for the last time established a
subsidiary body on its very first item -- the nuclear-test ban. The mandate
given to this body, as seen by my delegation, was to undertake work aimed at
making negotiation on a CTBT a possibility. Like many others, my delegation
has long considered that the mandate has been fulfilled and that we have
already reached the stage where negotiation toward formulating the draft
treaty should commence immediately. Thus, it is distressing to witness that
lack of consensus on the question of a new mandate during these past
three years has prevented the Conference from establishing a committee in
order to set serious substantive work in motion.
Clearly, these past-three years have provided ample evidence that nothing
could be expected in the absence of an ad hoc committee. Such a situation has
benefited neither the Conference nor the international community, and thus we
must not let this situation continue end-essly. This bitter reality has
confronted us with the choice of either maintaining the present situation,
which does not produce a single result, or accepting a mandate that would
enable the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee with the objective of
420
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 414
5
(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)
carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a CTBT. I am aware that some of
us have deemed that such a mandate is inadequate, but this would nevertheless
permit the Committee to start its substantial work and therefore open up the
possibility of achieving results. It is under such circumstances that my
delegation is ready to choose the latter course, since it offers the
possibility of putting an end to this dire situation and, hopefully, will
bring us closer to carrying out the negotiation that we all have been waiting
for.
Before concluding, I do not have the slightest doubt that all of us
gathered here have, in our common quest for peace, been imbued by a noble and
ultimate mission. Einstein once said that "Peace cannot be kept by force, it
can only be achieved by understanding".
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency
Ambassador Tarmidzi, head of the delegation of Indonesia to the Conference on
Disarmament, for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the
President and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda. I reciprocate his
feelings concerning the close relations between our two countries, and I wish
him every success in his task at this Conference.
Distinguished delegates, I have no other speakers for today and
accordingly I wish to ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the
floor at this stage. If there are no requests for the floor, I would like as
usual to ask you to adopt the timetable for meetings to be held by the
Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. Of course the timetable is
merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. The chairmen of the
subsidiary bodies have been consulted. If there is no objection, I shall take
it that the Conference adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): The co-ordinator of the group of
non-aligned neutral countries has asked me to announce that the group is going
to hold a meeting immediately after this plenary meeting in this conference
room. This brings us to the end of our work at today's session. The next
plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday,
23 June, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.20 a .m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE' ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.415
23 June 1987
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 June 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. S. Alfararqi (Eqypt)
GE.87-61808/6945e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release-2-012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.415
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 415th plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, in
accordance with the programme of work, the Conference will consider today
agenda item 1; "Nuclear test ban", and item 2; "Cessation of the nuclear
arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of
the rules of procedure of the Conference, any member wishing to do so may
raise any subject relevant to the work of this Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Mexico,
Ambassador Garcia Robles, and it is my pleasure to give him the floor now.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you
Mr. President. It is a source of special pleasure for me to take the floor in
a meeting during the month in which you are presiding over the proceedinqs of
the Conference. We are all aware that you have thorough knowledge of the
subjects which we are here to analyse. We are also fully aware of your
impartiality, and, what is more infrequent, that you have faith in the task
which we have to discharge. You may be assured, Sir, in carrying out your
important functions, of the unreserved co-operation of the delegation of
Mexico.
On 22 May 1984 the leaders of six States from different parts of the
globe issued a joint statement in which, after noting that their countries
differed in religion, culture and political systems, they underlined that they
were united in "the conviction that there must not be another world war",
adding that
"on this, the most crucial of all issues, we have resolved to make a
common effort in the interests of peace. Agreements which merely
regulate an arms build-up are clearly insufficient. The probability of
nuclear holocaust increases as warning time decreases and the weapons
become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. The rush towards global
suicide must be stopped and then reversed."
Two of these leaders, the heads of Government of India, Indira Gandhi,
and Sweden, Olof Palme, were to fall victim to assassins' bullets, the first
in 1984 and the second in 1986, and be replaced by those who are currently
discharging the functions of prime ministers in their respective countries.
The six heads of State or Government -- Raul Alfonsin, President of Argentina,
who just a few days ago made an outstanding statement to this very
Conference; Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece; Rajiv Gandhi,
Prime Minister of India; Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico;
Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden; and Julius Nyerere, First
President of Tanzania -- who have frequently reiterated the appeal made in
1984 not to jeopardize the chance of initiating a process of nuclear
disarmament, and who held a second summit meeting in my country last August
(you will recall that the first took place in New Delhi in 1985), wished to
commemorate the third anniversary of the appeal to which I have just referred.
Accordingly, on 22 May this year they issued a joint statement in which,
after noting that they welcomed the resumption of the dialogue on nuclear and
space issues between the two super-Powers, as well as the fact that, at the
summit meeting held in this city of Geneva in November 1985, between
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev declared that "a nuclear war
cannot be won and must never be fought", they hiqhliqhted the importance of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9 1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.415
3
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
the immediate adoption of a number of specific nuclear disarmament measures
for which, as was seen in Reykjavik, only political will is required. In this
connection I can do no better than quote three of the paragraphs of the joint
statement, the full text of which has been distributed today with the symbol
CD/758. These paragraphs read as follows:
"Disarmament negotiations are now at a crucial point. There is a
real possibility for an agreement in at least one important area. A
breakthrough on the issue of nuclear arms in Europe appears to be within
reach.
"An agreement to eliminate all intermediate nuclear forces from
Europe would be of considerable significance and would constitute the
crossing of an important psychological threshold, since, for the first
time, it would lead to mutual withdrawal and destruction of fully
operational nuclear weapon systems. We, therefore, urge the
United States and the Soviet Union to conduct their current negotiations
with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion during 1987.
"However, an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces would be only
the first step towards our common goal: the total elimination of nuclear
weapons everywhere. In the Delhi and Mexico Declarations, we had called
for two important measures -- a halting of all nuclear testing and the
prevention of an arms race in outer space. We reiterate the crucial
importance of these measures."
The authors of the statement are very well placed to prevent the absence
of adequate procedures to verify compliance with the obligations entered into
from being cited to justify a negative attitude, since on 7 August last year,
at the second summit meeting held in Mexico, they adopted a document on
verification measures which is reproduced in its entirety in Conference
document CD/723 of the 15th of the same month and year, whose seventh
paragraph reads as follows:
"In connection with a mutual halt in nuclear testing, our six
nations are prepared to establish promptly and in co-operation with the
United States and the USSR, temporary monitoring stations at existing
test sites and to operate them for an initial period of one year. All
data should be available to the six nations, the United States and
the USSR. Data analysis could be a joint undertaking and preliminary
analysis would be done at the sites. Monitoring of test sites by
instruments installed on site would provide an extremely high sensitivity
down to small fractions of a kiloton and even tons of explosives."
Obviously this is what the authors of the joint statement have in mind
when they conclude their statement by alluding to it in the three last
paragraphs, which I will now read out by way of rounding off my own statement:
"In Mexico, we made a concrete offer on verification of a halt to
nuclear testing. That offer remains.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.415
4
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) \
"For too long, fear and mistrust have prevented progress in
disarmament. Arms and fears feed on each other. Now is the time to
break this vicious circle and lay the foundation for a more secure
world. The present momentum should not be lost.
"We urge President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to live up
to this challenge so that future generations are spared the niqhtmare of
a nuclear holocaust."
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador
Garcia Robles, the distinguished representative of Mexico, for his statement
and for the kind words he addressed to me, which I consider a courtesy to me
personally. I have no other speakers on my list for today, and accordingly I
should like to ask whether any other member wishes to take the floor. I see
none.
Distinguished delegates, as you know, for some time now there have been
active consultations on an appropriate framework to deal with agenda item 2,
entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". I now
suggest that we suspend the Plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of
the Conference so that I can report to you on the staqe reached in those
consultations. If I see no objection, we shall proceed accordingly. It is so
decided. The plenary meeting is therefore suspended.
The meeting was suspended at 10.40 a.m. and resumed at 10.50 a.m.
The PRESIDENT (spoke in English): The 415th plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament is resumed. As a result of consultations which have
been held on an organizational arrangement to deal with aqenda item 2, I wish
to out before the Conference for decision the following text:
"The Conference on Disarmament decides that informal meetings be
held on the substance of item 2 of its agenda, entitled 'Cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', during its 1987 session, and
that the discussions at those informal meetinqs be duly reflected in the
annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the
United Nations."
If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the
proposed text.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (spoke in English): I should like now to turn to another
subject relating to the forthcoming informal meetings. Under the rules of
procedure, the President of the Conference has the responsibility, in
accordance with the normal duties of any presiding officer, to ensure that
discussions at plenary or informal meetings are conducted in an orderly way.
Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have taken upon myself the initiative
of preparing a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured
discussion at informal meetings on the substance of agenda item 2. That list
425
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.415
5
(The President)
is my own, and therefore does not bind any delegation. Furthermore, it is
understood that members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the
agenda item, as is the normal practice of the Conference. I shall now read
out that list of topics:
"Interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of
the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race
and nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament.
"Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first
special session devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I).
"Interrelation between measures for the cessation of the nuclear
arms race and disarmament measures in other areas.
"Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of
agreements.
Is there any comment at this stage? I give the floor to the
representative of France.
Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Sir. The
delegations which are members of the group of western countries are ready, as
they were last year, to play a full part in the informal meetings on item 2 of
our agenda. We would like to maintain the informal nature of this debate,
which we feel is the appropriate way to have a useful debate in this area. We
take note, Sir, of what you have said, after the decision just adopted by the
Conference, on the list of topics which in your opinion should be discussed
during informal meetings on item 2. As you pointed out, this list has been
submitted under your sole responsibility and is binding upon no deleqation.
We would also like to stress that we do not see in your statement any
precedent whatsoever for decisions relating to the activities of this
Conference.
The PRESIDENT (spoke in English): I thank the distinguished
representative of France for his statement. Is there any comment at this
stage? There seems to be none. Distinguished colleagues, allow me on this
occasion to express, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, our
gratitude to the presidents of the Conference who preceded me, in particular
Ambassador Vejvoda, the representative of Czechoslovakia, for the efforts they
exerted with regard to the organizational framework of item 2 which we have
just formalized.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.415
6
(The President)
If there are no other comments, I intend to adjourn this plenary
meeting. Before doing so, I wish to inform you that the date of the first
informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2 will appear in the
timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week which we will
consider at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 25 June at 10 a.m.
Another announcement I would like to make is the following. The slot
reserved for the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on Friday, 26 June
at 3 p.m. will be used by the Contact Group on track A of that Committee. And
now I declare the plenary meeting adjourned until Thursday at 10 a.m. The
meeting is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV. 416
25 June 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 June 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)
GE.87-61933/9212E
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 416th plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished representatives, the
Conference continues today, in accordance with the programme of work, its
consideration of agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", as well as agenda
item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any
member wishing to do so may also raise any subject relevant to the work of the
Conference. I should like to inform you that at my meeting with the
co-ordinators yesterday, new seating arrangements for non-members invited to
participate in the work of the Conference were discussed. As seating
arrangements for the Conference were agreed upon at an informal meeting held
on 23 January 1979, any change would have to be agreed upon at another
informal meeting. Accordingly, may I suggest that we hold a brief informal
meeting immediately after this plenary in order to consider this matter? T
see no objection.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I have on my list of speakers
for today the representatives of Morocco, Mongolia, the German Democratic
Republic and China. I give the floor to the first speaker, His Excellency
Ambassador El Ghali Benhima, head of the Moroccan delegation to the
Conference.
Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Thank you,
Mr. President. May my first words be addressed to you, Mr. President, to
congratulate you on the occasion of your accession to the Presidency of the
Conference. My delegation is doubly pleased with this state of affairs.
You represent a country, Egypt, whose name calls to mind a civilization
which since remote antiquity has constituted an important part of the cultural
heritage of mankind. You also represent a country to which Morocco is linked
by the same language and the same culture, and with which it shares the same
aspirations.
The fact that you are a skilled diplomat, the depth of your thinking and
your fine judgement, along with a wealth of experience, constitute appreciable
assets to continue the impetus given by your predecessors, in the chair,
Ambassadors Fan, Lechuga and Vejvoda, and to stamp the work of the Conference
with new vigour.
At this crucial time, when the fear of a nuclear apocalypse has not yet
abated and the hopes for a collective leap forward are reawakening, I should
like to recall Morocco's interest in the work of the Conference, which is
prompted by a two-fold conviction: that the cause of disarmament is universal
and represents a legitimate aspiration of the entire international community
whatever the size of its members' territories, whatever their economic power
and whatever their ideology. This faith in the universality of the cause and
in collective responsibility for ensuring that this cause triumphs, was
expressed by His Majesty King Hassan II over a quarter-century ago at the
first Non-aligned Summit in 1961 in Belgrade. My sovereign stated then in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
3
(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)
essence that, given the growing danger of the arms race threatening the world,
the cause of disarmament was becoming a concern of all mankind, and all
countries were duty-bound to step up their efforts to find a global solution.
The second conviction lies in the historic mission of the Conference on
Disarmament and its competence to consider all disarmament-related questions
and contribute solutions to them in conformity with its mandate and with the
broadest possible consensus.
This is an arduous mission, it is true, bearing in mind the complexity
of the issues and the difficulty of reconciling divergent approaches to
security, which bear a strong imprint of accumulated distrust arising from a
still recent past where security was almost exclusively based on strike-back
capability. None the less, the mission of the Conference is not an impossible
one, because all the members of the international community, despite our
ideological, political and socio-economic differences, aspire to live in
peace. But to succeed in this, a contribution is required from everyone and
our political will must be real. To be lasting, peace and security in the
world -- our ultimate goal -- should not be based on the power of arsenals.
Yet, we cannot but recognize that despite our common conviction, despite
our commitment, the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the arms race,
and particularly the nuclear arms race, remains firmly rooted in our
collective consciousness.
To justify our fears one need only mention the astronomical sums,
amounting to several thousand billion dollars each year, being spent on the
manufacture, development, stockpiling or acquisition of weapons, particularly
in the nuclear field. And as if existing arsenals were not sufficient to
destroy our planet several times over, their proliferation, vertical and
horizontal, is continuing imperturbably, together with their upgradinq and
refinement. Indeed, the constant progress in strategy as well as in
technology has led to a new generation of nuclear weapons which are indecently
called "clean", since they cause the deaths of human beings without damaging
the environment. But of equal seriousness is the fact that at the beqinning
of this decade, the unrestrained arms race shifted into outer space, which for
us is a matter of grave concern. The militarization of space increases the
dangers weighing on our planet and undermines the efforts of the international
community, which aspires to make outer space a res communis.
A year and half ago, the meeting between President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev prompted great hopes in the world, presaging the freeing
of mankind from the spectre of nuclear war. The proposition that "a nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought" constitutes the central foundation
of these hopes.
The blossoming of what is now called "the spirit of Geneva" appears to
lie at the origin of the repudiation of confrontation and the inception of a
dialogue of trust, of which the Reykjavik summit offers a happy illustration.
The bilateral negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons, as well as
the numerous proposals related thereto, are the expression of a new perception
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
4
(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)
of disarmament and security problems. We welcome it, and express the hope
that the reluctance persisting as to the content of these negotiations will
disappear to enable the speedy conclusion of agreements leading to the
dismantling of nuclear arsenals and guaranteeing the security of all parties,
particularly on the European continent.
Because of its geographical position so close to Europe, within the
Mediterranean basin, and on the shores of such an important maritime route as
the Strait of Gibraltar, Morocco is following with great interest the current
negotiations for the elimination of short-range and medium-range missiles. In
this connection, we are convinced, bearing in the mind the interaction of
geography and politics, that detente, peace and security in Europe will
inevitably have beneficial repercussions in the Mediterranean, because
Mediterranean security cannot be dissociated from security in Europe. My
country spares no effort to transform the entire Mediterranean region into a
crossroads of co-operation and dialogue, free from tensions and
confrontations. Each year since 1981, the United Nations General Assembly,
has unanimously adopted a resolution stressing the importance of this
interdependence.
In a year's time the third special session of the United Nations
General Assembly devoted to disarmament is to be held. Its first task will be
to take stock of efforts undertaken since the first special session in 1978 to
implement the principles and objectives which were unanimously accepted in the
Final Document.
Without wishing to anticipate its work, I should like to join many other
delegations in reviewing the results of eight years of work within this body.
The results cannot be said to be null or negative. However, like all of you,
I must acknowledge that so far no agreement, no international instrument,
indeed, no partial disarmament measures, have been forthcoming to crown many
years of negotiations.
Immediately following the first special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament, the international community vested great hopes in the
Committee on Disarmament -- now the Conference -- for the building of the new
world order in the field of disarmament, and hence of security and peace.
Unfortunately, we must recognize that much remains to be done for the
achievement of the objectives which have been assigned to it. This delay,
which must be ascribed to a lack of political will, has prevented this
Conference from performing the task entrusted to it.
How else can we explain the three-year-long deadlock on the nuclear test
ban, the first item on the Conference's agenda?
The drawing up of an international treaty banning all nuclear tests has
always been considered by my country as being very important, as there can be
no nuclear disarmament without?a halt to nuclear tests. At a time when the
number of nuclear tests.is rising every year and when the nuclear capabilities
of an increasing number of countries have been of concern to the international
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
5
(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)
community, such a treaty would be the key element of any programme designed to
limit the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the threat of a nuclear war.
An internationally monitored nuclear test ban would considerably restrict
the operational capacity of countries to manufacture or use nuclear weapons.
It would also hold back the race to develop new weapons, and would stem the
rivalry between the Powers in the atomic club.
Finally, such a treaty would offer these Powers an opportunity to honour
the commitments entered into under the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty,
thus taking a decisive step towards a world where nuclear weapons will no
longer be the dangerous guarantees of international security and peace.
Only two atom bombs have been used in wartime. None the less, according
to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1,570 nuclear tests
were conducted between 1945 and the end of 1986, despite the partial nuclear
test ban treaty which dates back to 1963. The General Assembly, gravely
concerned about the ever more rapid continuation of this testing, has never
ceased to appeal to all States to refrain from nuclear testing and to urge the
drafting of a treaty prohibiting all tests. Unfortunately, the proliferation
of resolutions is paralleled by a constant increase in the number of tests.
More than ever the negotiation of such a treaty is a matter of high
priority, and there is no need to underline its urgency. The ways and means
of achieving this objective have already been set by the United Nations
General Assembly. In its recent resolution 41/46 A, the Assembly requested
the members of the Conference on Disarmament to create at the beginning of
1987 "an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral
negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test
explosions". It also recommended that "such an ad hoc committee should
comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following
interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and
verification".
In this connection, we may note that the terms of the mandate as defined
by the General Assembly already contain elements of compromise likely to meet
the wishes of certain delegations to study further the question of
verification. In our view, the difficulties of greater or lesser seriousness
linked-to verification have done all too much to prevent the Conference from
negotiating seriously.
I should like to recall in this connection a statement by the
United Nations Secretary-General 15 years ago, recognizing that all technical
aspects relating to the verification of a nuclear test ban have been amply
examined. We may add to this observation the results of the painstaking and
laudable work carried out by the Group of Scientific Experts. The technical
test comprising data exchange and analysis which the Group undertook a year
ago demonstrated the reliability of national means of seismic event detection.
May the sense of the responsibility of each and every one vis-a-vis the
international community and our loyalty to the ideals that bring us together
432
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
6
(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)
here enable positions to be brought closer together so that this treaty, which
has been awaited for over three decades, finally becomes a reality.
Such a treaty is not an end in itself, but the beginning of a process of
drawing up other instruments or other measures for disarmament. There is no
doubt that the first consequence of a nuclear test ban would be the cessation
of the arms race followed by nuclear disarmament, which constitutes the second
subject of concern to this Conference.
It was not without good reasons that the entire international community,
at the first special session of the General Assembly, recognized that nuclear
weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, and that it is essential to halt
the nuclear arms race.
In order to put an end to this perilous escalation of the arms race,
paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session stresses that
"the achievement of nuclear disasrmament will require urgent negotiation of
agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification".
However, to date the Conference has still not begun negotiations on this
item, nor even responded to the many appeals of the General Assembly for the
setting up of an ad hoc committee to implement the above-mentioned
recommendation.
To justify the lack of a negotiating body on this item, the argument has
been advanced that nuclear disarmament is currently the subject of bilateral
negotiations. While recognizing the validity of this argument, we cannot fail
to note that the Geneva negotiations relate only to the arsenals of the two
major Powers. But achieving a general halt to the nuclear arms race will
require multilateral negotiations to include the stockpiles of all the nuclear
powers.
Moreover, we continue to believe that bilateral and multilateral
negotiations are in no way mutually exclusive. Rather they complement each
other, and each has an impact on the dynamics of the other.
The recent decision of the Conference to discuss this agenda item 2 in
informal meetings is not likely to meet the above considerations. None the
less, my delegation welcomes the decision, whilst remaining convinced that the
appropriate context for this debate can only be an ad hoc committee.
Since the beginning of the atomic era, and more particularly since the
Hiroshima episode, one of the goals of the international community has been
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons -- the main condition to prevent a
nuclear war.
Awareness of the dangers constituted by nuclear arsenals should, in our
view, facilitate the drawing up of measures likely to prevent a nuclear war
which could be unleashed as a result of a technical incident, human error or
the escalation of a local conflict. This is why the international community
should protect itself against these frightening eventualities through
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
7
(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)
agreements or measures which the Conference on Disarmament is entrusted with
negotiating under paragraph 20 of the Final Document and the relevant
resolutions of the General Assembly, in particular by setting up an ad hoc
committee with an appropriate mandate.
With the conquest of outer space, which has opened up new horizons for
mankind, the arms race has taken on an even more dangerous dimension. While
this advance has greatly increased man's potential in the area of cartography,
weather forecasts, remote sensing of natural resources and also verification
of the implementation of disasrmament agreements, it also offers considerable
military possibilities.
Thus the great Powers have been quick. to take advantage of these
possibilities by using space for military purposes -- surveillance, early
warning or rapid communication. However, the progress of science and
technology, as well as the striving for military supremacy, quickly gave rise
to more dangerous military activities in space. Thus, since the end of the
1970s we have been following with profound concern the military activities of
the great Powers which are aimed at setting up an operational system capable
of destroying satellites in certain orbits.
Worse -- according to scientific and political circles, these Powers are
planning for the near future other military uses of space which would be even
more threatening for our planet. It is no secret that new systems of
anti-missile missiles are already at a very advanced state of design. These
space weapons, which no longer deserve to be called weapons of the future are
the product of a new space technology. Thus, space offers a further
confirmation of the theory of the arms race spirab, whereby the development of
space weapons prompts new refinements of anti-satellite weapons.
In the face of these activities in space, we cannot but acknowledge that
the existing.array of international instruments, particularly the 1967 outer
space treaty, the 1979 agreement governing the activities of States on the
Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the ABM Treaty of 1972, have not
been able to prevent the militarization of space. This is why we share the
conviction of the General Assembly in its resolution 41/53 that "further
measures are urgently needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer
space".
We are pleased that the United States and the Soviet Union are working to
this end in their negotiations in Geneva. We express the fervent hope that
their efforts, as well as the efforts of the Conference, which is also
actively involved in this area through its ad hoc committee under the
competent chairmanship of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy, will be crowned
with success.
As early as 1959 the General Assembly planned to make "general and
complete disarmament under effective international control" the ultimate goal
of its efforts. Thus, one of its main decisions at its first special session
on disarmament in 1978 was to undertake the drawing up of a comprehensive
programme of disarmament as an agreed framework for sustained international
action on specific disarmament measures.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
8
(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)
Almost a decade later, the implementation of this programme is
considerably delayed, without any foreseeable prospect that it will be finally
completed and approved by all. The perseverance of Ambassador Garcia Robles
of Mexico, who for many years has been chairing the ad hoc committee,
entrusted with this task, is equalled only by his confidence in the capacity
of the members of this Conference to overcome their differences to arrive at a
consensus text. In this connection, we should like to appeal for maximum
efforts so that the definitive text of this comprehensive programme of
disarmament can be adopted before the third special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Its submission to that session would
constitute not only the culmination of many years of negotiations, but would
also provide proof of the efficiency of this Conference.
Our optimism regarding the ability of this Conference to meet the
expectations of the international community by negotiating international
disarmament agreements is also prompted by the recent stepping up of the work
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the presidency of
Ambassdor Ekeus of Sweden.
Chemical weapons have always prompted universal horror, yet their
manufacture and stockpiling, and new research for the production of still more
dangerous nerve gases, continue. We are aware that current negotiations on an
international convention banning chemical weapons involve complex problems,
delicate political questions, as well as economic and trade interests. This
new interest in this type of weapon is of profound concern to us. We,
nevertheless venture to hope that the impetus given to negotiations in the
Ad hoc Committee on prohibition of the development, manufacture, transfer,
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons Vill continue until the final adoption
of the treaty in question. Such a treaty would undoubtedly constitute a
landmark in the continual efforts of this Conference to discharge its duties.
The tragic accident at Chernobyl showed, if there was any need to do so,
that. nuclear plants are potential radiological bombs. The dissemination of
radioactive fallout which followed the accident spread death and desolation
all around the immediate area, and also carried waves of radioactivity across
frontiers. The Chernobyl accident reminded us of the imperative need to speed
up negotiations on an international treaty on radiological weapons. Although
these negotiations began several years ago, they are now deadlocked as a
result of differences regarding the scope of the convention. As far as we are
concerned, we continue to believe that traditional radiological weapons are
the weapons of tomorrow, while recognizing the vital need to negotiate a ban.
However, the question of attacks on nuclear facilities constitutes a daily
concern for the international community because of the threat arising from the
mass destruction-they can cause, particularly through radioactive fallout.
We hope that the approach chosen this year to discuss these two aspects
of radiological weapons will be promising. The merit for this choice devolves
upon the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador David Meiszter of
Hungary, to whom we wish all success, together with the co-ordinators.
435
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
9
(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)
I cannot conclude this examination of the various items on the agenda
without saying something about the question of effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons. My country believes that the undertakings given in
declarations by the nuclear Powers in respect of non-nuclear-weapon States are
important but not sufficient, as they do not provide a complete guarantee.
The most effective guarantee against the use or the threat of the use of
nuclear weapons remains the conclusion of effective international
arrangements, including nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons.
This goal can be achieved only if the nuclear-weapon Powers show greater
boldness in negotiations conducted within the Ad hoc Committee in order to
agree on a common approach to these negative security assurances. In this
connection, we hope that the work of this Committee, re-established at the
beginning of the session, will very soon begin, and will be expedited by its
new chairman, Ambassador von Stilpnagel.
In a remarkable work entitled L'heure de s'enivrer (Time to get drunk),
the Canadian writer and philosopher Hubert Reeves makes a disenchanted comment
on the arms race. Observing that mankind is feverishly preparing for its own
suicide, he writes:
"Everything is happening as if our species were prompted by a death-wish,
driving it to take as rapidly and intelligently as possible, the steps
leading it to its own destruction."
It is up to all of us to ensure that this apocalyptic image is for ever
banished from our minds.
I should like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, the
Ambassadors of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Romania, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Indonesia and the United States
of America.
It is also a pleasure for me to express my Government's gratitude to the
Canadian Government for the workshop on outer space organized in Montreal last
May. This workshop was devoted to one of the items on the Conference's agenda
to which we attach paramount importance. It is our hope that the workshop
will contribute to the implementation of the mandate entrusted to the Ad hoc
Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador El Ghali
Benhima, head of the Moroccan delegation, for his statement and the kind words
that he directed to me, as well as his affirmation of the fraternal and close
relations which link Egypt and Morocco, and his kinds words to my predecessor,
Ambassador Vejvoda. I now give the floor to Ambassador Bayart, the chief of
the Mongolian delegation to the Disarmament Conference.
43,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
10
Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, since
this is the first time that I have taken the floor since you took over the
post of President of the Conference on Disarmament in June, allow me to
congratulate you most heartily as you carry out this important and responsible
function, and assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation.
Being aware of your competence and great diplomatic experience, we are
convinced that under your wise leadership the Conference on Disarmament will
effectively continue its work in order to achieve practical results.
I would also like to take this opportunity to express our thanks to your
predecessor in the chair, the distinguished representative of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, Ambassador Vejvoda, for his effective and able leadership
of our work during April and in the inter-sessional period.
We note with appreciation that Ambassador Vejvoda spared no effort to
allow the Conference to get down to practical work in resolving the tasks
before it, especially on item 1 of its agenda.
I endorse the words of welcome to the new representatives of Indonesia
and the United States of America, Ambassadors Agus Tarmidzi and Friedersdorf,
and I would like to assure them of our readiness to maintain the same links of
co-operation which we had with their predecessors.
On 9 June this year, speaking on behalf of the Group of Socialist
Countries, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, submitted
for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament a document entitled
"Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of
nuclear weapon tests".
In submitting this document, its authors are pursuing a single goal -- a
rapid start of practical work in the Conference on this subject, and the
stepping up of multilateral efforts to create an international legal regime
which completely prohibits nuclear weapon tests.
The document is a qualitatively new proposal reflecting new political
thinking and fundamentally new approaches to the key issues of a nuclear
weapon test ban, and in particular the questions of verification. It has been
compiled on the basis of throughgoing analysis of the wide-ranging discussion
of the subject of a nuclear-test ban which has taken place within our
multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and at sessions of the
United Nations General Assembly. It takes into account the opinions and
wishes of many other States, and in particular, the specific ideas and
opinions of the "Delhi Six". Hence it should be stressed that the document
submitted by the socialist countries is not simply a collation of their own
proposals, but also the proposals of other countries.
Thus, by bringing together the positive results of many years of joint
work on the problem of nuclear tests, as well as the new ideas and proposals
made recently by many States, the document which has been submitted might
become the basis for work on detailed elaboration of a future treaty
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
11
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. At the same time, we would welcome any
other proposals which would help in the search for mutally acceptable
decisions and rapid agreement on the text of a treaty.
Although the question of a nuclear test ban has been on the agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament for a long time, in recent years there has been much
stronger awareness that, as regards concrete actions to halt such tests, there
are no difficulties of a technical nature; there is no verification problem.
This question, together with other matters related to the cessation of the
nuclear arms race, were placed on a practical plane in particular as a result
of the action of the Soviet Union in imposing a unilateral moratorium on
nuclear explosions which lasted for a year and a half. This fine example for
the other nuclear Powers had an exceptionally important impact in
international life. The moratorium showed that it was really possible to
adopt measures which could effectively block the nuclear arms race.
A joint Soviet-United States moratorium would now be invaluable in
underpinning the work of the Conference as regards the nuclear test ban. We
know that the Soviet Union is ready to take such a step at any time.
Agreement on the part of'the United States of America here would undoubtedly
enjoy the approval and support of the whole international community.
The significance of the Soviet moratorium also lies in the fact that at
the same time, a number of methods of verifying the non-conduct of nuclear
tests were themselves subjected to tests in which specialists and equipment
from the United States were involved at the non-governmental level. It seems
to us that these methods could be incorporated in a future nuclear test-ban
treaty.
In the document submitted by the socialist countries, questions of
verification are among the central issues. The document proposes a clearly
defined system providing for a combination of three types of
verification -- national technical means, an international system of seismic
monitoring and on-site inspections.
The Mongolian delegation is convinced that the use of these three types
of verification together could provide the parties with a full assurance that
not a single suspicious wave-form event would pass unnoticed.
Indeed to a significant extent this is already a reality as a result of
an extensive network of seismological stations in many States. Moreover,
practical experience has confirmed this. According to information published
by Soviet specialists, in April 1986 the seismological station in Obninsk in
the USSR easily detected a nuclear explosion with a yield of 1.3 kilotons
which was conducted in Nevada. In their opinion, 20 Soviet stations provide
sufficient information on nuclear tests world-wide. It may be assumed that
the 200-odd similar stations near the socialist countries, either installed by
the United States of America or operating under their control, work just as
well as the 20 Soviet ones.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
12
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
In Mongolia we learned with satisfaction that the leaders of Argentina,
Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, in their joint declaration of
22 May this year, reaffirmed their proposals for nuclear test ban verification
addressed to the USSR and the United States. We must make use of these
proposals.
As we know, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to send
representatives to meet experts from the six States to participate in a joint
search for mutually acceptable solutions which might then form the basis of
reliable verification machinery for a complete and general nuclear-weapon test
ban treaty. We would like to express the hope that the United States has not
yet said its last word on the proposals made by the six States.
In reply to the joint declaration of the six States, the General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
M.S. Gorbachev, again called upon the United States to begin full-scale talks
on the complete cessation of nuclear tests under strict international control,
including on-site inspections, and referred favourably to the possibility of
using the proposals put forward by the Delhi Six in the context of measures
which might be agreed at such talks.
It is important now not to let a single opportunity slip, and to bring
the whole negotiating machinery into motion without delay, in order to prepare
a draft treaty on a complete nuclear test ban. Efforts here should cover all
the various aspects; one set of negotiations should not rule out or replace
other negotiations, but rather complement them.
Whilst giving due weight to the efforts being undertaken in particular at
the Soviet-United States expert talks on the cessation of nuclear tests, and
attaching great importance to the Soviet proposal for the implementation of
practical interim measures which will bring us closer to the main aim of a
complete nuclear test ban, as contained in the reply from M.S. Gorbachev to
which I just referred, at the same time the delegation of Mongolia considers
that the.. Conference on Disarmament should play a central role in this issue,
since what is involved is a multilateral comprehensive nuclear weapon test
ban. For that reason we are in favour of the rapid commencement of practical
work on all the issues related to the problem of a nuclear test ban, and the
creation for that purpose of an ad hoc committee on item 1 on the agenda of
the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of General Assembly
resolution 41/46 A.
I do not think it would be superfluous to emphasize that many of the
States members of the Conference are parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which
unequivocally refers to a desire "to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", and a determination "to continue
negotiations to this end".
Now I would like to say a?few words on the question of a chemical weapon
ban. During the first part of the Conference's session, substantial progress
was made in agreeing convention provisions on the declaration of stocks of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
13
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
chemical weapons, plans for their destruction, international verification of
declarations, and verification of chemical weapon storage facilities. This
created the necessary conditions for the completion of work on this important
problem -- the problem of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks. The
final solution depended on the elaboration of an order of elimination.
At the end of the first part of the session, the delegation of Mongolia,
guided by a desire to promote the rapid solution of this problem submitted for
consideration in the Ad hoc Committee working paper CD/CW/WP.162 on an order
of elimination of chemical weapon stocks. The order we are proposing provides
for comparison between various categories of stocks on the basis of mass. For
this purpose we think that stocks should be grouped in such a way that each
group includes categories of like effectiveness. With such an approach it is
necessary to give major emphasis to the grouping of chemicals within the
categories.
When proposing the inclusion in each separate group of various chemicals
which have similar properties as chemical warfare agents, we would at the same
time accept that States possessing chemical weapons would have a certain
freedom of action when destroying stocks within the groups, as far as the
sequence of destruction would be concerned. This takes into consideration the
positions of certain delegations on this subject.
Turning to the subject of working out comparative equivalents, in
principle and on the whole, we do not reject the idea contained in such an
approach. However, careful analysis shows that working out an objective and
effectively applicable equivalent, would in practice be extremely complicated
and would require a great of deal of time. We should obviously bear this fact
in mind and try to avoid making the negotiations unnecessarily complicated and
perhaps delaying them at a time when efforts to agree on the text of a
convention have entered the final stage.
We in no way, claim that our proposal for the order of elimination of
chemical weapon stocks indicates the only correct solution to the problem.
However, it is quite obvious that the order we propose, in essence, is
extremely simple, and at the same time, it could be applied very effectively.
In proposing this for consideration by other delegations, we are guided by the
aim of achieving the rapid development and conclusion of an international
convention which would immediately bring to an end the development and
production of any chemical weapons, and would provide a timely and
comprehensive declaration of all existing stocks and production facilities, as
well as placing them under stringent international control and then providing
for their steady and proportional elimination down to zero -- the same zero
for each State party to the convention, regardless of whether it now possesses
chemical weapons or not, because only thus is it possible to ensure real equal
security for all States in this area. On the basis of these principles we are
ready to co-operate with all interested delegations.
The Mongolian People's Republic warmly welcomed the results of the
regular session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties
to the Warsaw Treaty, which was held at the end of May in Berlin. We note
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
that the documents of the meeting, not only contain a thorough analysis of the
basic yet interrelated trends in the world today, and an outline of
philosopical approaches to the challenges facing us today, but also put
forward a programme of practical steps towards disarmament, the strengthening
of confidence and security, and the development of constructive relationships
among States in the widest variety of areas.
In our view, one of the distinctive features of the new initiatives put
forward in Berlin lies in the fact that they respond to the concerns voiced in
the past by representatives of the West, not least here in this room. I am
thinking in particular of the readiness expressed by meeting participants to
have the imbalance in certain elements redressed in the course of the
reduction of military confrontation in Europe. What is important is that this
should be done by means of appropriate reductions by the side which is ahead,
and not by a further build-up of arms.
We also note with satisfaction that many of the provisions put forward at
the Berlin meeting are directly related to the work of the Conference on
Disarmament, including such important issues on its agenda as the nuclear test
ban and the chemical weapon ban. In our view, the document on the military
doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty merits special attention,
since it shows clearly that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty and
that of each State party, is subordinated to the task of preventing war,
whether nuclear or conventional.
Mongolia considers this provision to be of exceptionally great and
fundamental importance. The same could be said of another provision in the
same document, to the effect that the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty will
never under any circumstances initiate military action against any State or
alliance of States unless they are themselves the target of an armed attack,
and that they will never be the first to employ nuclear weapons.
The Mongolian People's Republic again expresses its full support for the
constructive policy of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in promoting a
rapid political settlement of crisis situations in various parts of the world,
including Asia, on the basis of respect for the principles of independence and
national sovereignty of peoples.
In conclusion, I would like to inform the Conference that, in accordance
with the decision of the Soviet leadership and in agreement with the
Government of my country, the previously announced withdrawal from Mongolia to
the Soviet Union of one motorized rifle division and certain individual
components of the Soviet forces temporarily stationed in Mongolia was recently
completed.
We are convinced that this act of good will by the Mongolian People's
Republic and the USSR in substantially reducing the numbers of Soviet forces
temporarily deployed in our country will help to strengthen mutual
understanding and trust and promote relations of good-neighbourliness and
co-operation amongst the States and peoples of Asia and the Pacific.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
15
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency
Ambassador Bayart, head of the Mongolian delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament, for his statement, and for his very kind words addressed to
myself and to my precedessor Ambassador Vejvoda. The next speaker on my list
is His Excellency Ambassador Harald Rose, head of the delegation of the German
Democratic Republic to the Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, in the message
which United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar sent to the Conference
on Disarmament at the beginning of the year, he said that "a most important
and urgent matter of disarmament is the complete cessation of nuclear weapon
tests and no efforts can be spared in the elaboration of a comprehensive
nuclear test ban. To that end, fresh and perhaps innovative proposals are
needed which would lend a decisive impetus to your efforts and complement
other endeavours in this field."
The socialist countries share this view. What is more, the documents
issued following the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was held
in Berlin on 28 and 29 May, show that the members of this alliance regard
readiness for an early conclusion of a general and complete test-ban treaty as
a gauge of the defensive character of military doctrines, and that they call
for negotiations to this effect right now. There are many reasons for that.
Suffice it to mention the following:
First, a comprehensive test ban would make impossible the development,
production and deployment of new generations of nuclear weapons, especially
those possessing a first-strike capability.
Second, such a ban would be an effective step towards putting up a
barrier to the arms race in outer space, one of the most serious threats to
international security.
Third, in conjunction with further agreements on the elimination of
certain nuclear weapon categories, the ban would impede or at least render
considerably more difficult any nuclear arms race in other fields.
Incidentally, this is a most important reason why a comprehensive ban must
remain a priority task in its own right, and why my country cannot accept the
concept that nuclear arms need to be reduced and eliminated before a test-ban
treaty can be concluded.
The debate at the Conference on Disarmament reflects unanimous agreement
on the significance of a test ban. CTB advocates and opponents alike are
perfectly aware of its far-reaching consequences for the cessation of the
nuclear arms race, for confidence-building and for the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The inferences they draw are different, however.
The discussions in the CD have also revealed in this case that the
doctrine of nuclear deterrence in its most extreme interpretation is being
invoked to foil any effort to achieve progress in working out an agreement.
On the other hand, even many champions of that doctrine regard a global
test-ban treaty as a task of topical importance. This seems to be true, for
example, of the majority of members of the United States Congress.
442
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
16
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
Here is how my delegation sees the present situation at the Conference:
views differ widely as to when negotiations should begin. The majority's
demand for an early start contrasts sharply with the "long-term objective"
approach and the strings attached to it. No delegation, however, is opposed
to an exchange of opinions and a search for agreement on major elements of an
accord banning nuclear weapon tests.
There may be different perceptions of the role this forum is supposed to
play in the process of drafting a test-ban treaty, but no side is actually
disputing the need for the Conference to get involved. The CD can and must
set the ball rolling for a global solution, parllel to bilateral efforts and
negotiations.
It would be dishonest to hide the fact that essential differences of
opinion persist about the approach to be chosen and about matters of
substance. Yet, at the same time, real prospects for joint action are
emerging. For them to come to fruition, the parties concerned will have to be
prepared to seek a compromise.
In my delegation's view, there are opportunities for the Conference to do
practical work, provided all the sides involved are committed to meeting the
others half-way in procedural and substantive matters.
Opinions on the mandate of a committee are not all that far apart. Given
good will, an understanding ought to be possible. As far as the Group of
Socialist Countries is concerned, it has demonstrated a great deal of
flexibility. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the renewed efforts of
the Group of 21 to forge a compromise, and is ready to take part in that
endeavour. What matters most to my country is that practical work should get
under way in a committee as quickly as possible.
Proposals and ideas on how to start business-like work in a committee do
exist. In this context, my delegation would like to say a word or two about
the joint proposal of the Group of Socialist Countries, entitled "Basic
provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear
weapon tests" (CD/756).
As Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky stressed on 9 June, what we
have before us now is an entirely new approach to the issue. The proposal
does not confine itself to a mere elaboration and supplementing of old
positions. Rather, it fuses together and develops further ideas and
suggestions put forward by representatives of different groups in previous
years.
In all its parts, the document advances new, concrete ideas. To give you
an example, it spells out the obligation of the USSR and the United States, as
the Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals, to be the first to discontinue
their testing programmes. The sponsors are very interested in learning what
the other participants in the Conference think about the various elements of
the proposal. In fact, a concrete exchange of views in a committee would be
even better.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
17
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
Today I intend to draw your attention specifically to some aspects of the
verification procedures contained in CD/756. Firstly, for the first time
ever, verification provisions are presented in their complexity, reflecting
circumstances and possibilities as they really exist. Properly combined,
national technical means of verification, international verification measures
and on-site inspections can ensure sufficiently reliable verification.
Clandestine tests involving militarily significant yields would thus be
practically ruled out.
Secondly, the parties to the treaty which have the necessary national
technical means would make available to the relevant organ to be set up under
the treaty any pertinent data obtained by those means. Both the establishment
of an organ pursuant to the treaty and the obligation to provide information
are new elements.
Thirdly, the parties to a future accord are called upon to create an
international system of seismic verification, for which they would have to
allow the establishment of stations on their territory in order to ensure the
continuous exchange of level II seismic data. Monitoring stations would
operate with the participation of observers from an international inspectorate.
Fourthly, every State party would undertake to participate in the
international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity and to allow
aerosol monitoring stations on its territory.
Fifthly, international inspectors would be present at test ranges to
verify that no nuclear explosions are conducted there, so that those sites can
no longer be used to explode nuclear devices.
Lastly, on-site inspections would be mandatory. Here again, States would
have equal rights and duties.
Consequently, the measures elaborated upon in the "Basic provisions"
document would ensure (a) strict observance of a comprehensive ban on nuclear
weapon testing; (b) utilization of effective and modern technical means for
the verification system; (c) virtually global coverage; and (d) verification
on a democratic basis, with equal rights for all parties to the treaty.
The sponsors of CD/756 are prepared to look into any other verification
proposal made during CTBT negotiations. Clearly, the socialist countries know
no taboos when it comes to verifying compliance with a comprehensive test-ban
treaty. They will go as far as the other negotiating parties are prepared to
go.
My delegation is convinced that the new proposal bf the socialist
countries offers a chance to work out all the details of the required
verification provisions and the other parts of a treaty.
The other day, the President of the Argentine Republic, His Excellency
Mr. Radl Alfonsin, observed in his important statement:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
"We have now reached an extreme situation in which the survival of
mankind depends on our ability to change traditional, or even ancestral,
behaviour. To face and overcome that challenge ... is not a matter of
technical knowledge but rather of greater political wisdom."
My delegation fully subscribes to this view. What is more, it regards
President Alfonsin's words as an appeal to apply new thinking to all areas of
disarmament and, in doing so, to start the long-overdue negotiations on the
cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Harald Rose,
the head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the
Conference on Disarmament, for his statement. The next speaker on my list is
Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic
of China to the Conference on Disarmament. I give him the floor.
Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, it
gives me much pleasure to see you, a well-respected diplomat with rich
experience in multilateral diplomacy and disarmament negotiations, in the
chair of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. Both Egypt and
China were once cradles of world civilization, and under the new historical
conditions, the friendly relations and co-operation between our two countries
are developing steadily. Please accept my sincere congratulations.
Your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, who also has long
and many-sided experience, has won admiration from all of us for the
outstanding skills and initiatives he displayed in promoting the work of
the CD.
I
I wish also to take this opportunity to warmly welcome
Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Friedersdorf of the
United States of America, who have newly participated in the work of the CD.
I am confident that we'll maintain and develop good relations of co-operation.
The Chinese delegation wishes to make a statement on nuclear
disarmament. With incessant regional conflicts, continuous escalation of the
arms race and sharp confrontation between the two major military blocs of the
East and the West, the present world situation is volatile, the danger of war
still exists and the shadow of a nuclear war looms over our world.
Achievement of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war have thus
become a strong demand of people throughout the world who desire peace and
development.
China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons. We maintain that the Soviet Union and the
United States, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, have a special
responsibility for curbing the nuclear arms race and carrying out nuclear
disarmament. They should take the lead in halting the testing, production and
deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing and
destroying on the spot all types of nuclear weapons possessed by them at any
localities both inside and outside their respective territories. Thus,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
19
(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)
conditions will be created for the convening of a broadly representative
international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all
nuclear-weapon States to discuss steps for further nuclear disarmament as well
as the thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.
On 3 December 1986, the forty-first session of the United Nations
General Assembly adopted as resolution 41/59 F a proposal on nuclear
disarmament submitted by the Chinese delegation. In the resolution the
Assembly "urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States
of America, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to discharge
their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in
halting the nuclear arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to
reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear weapons";
and it "expresses its deep concern that negotiations on nuclear disarmament
should yield concrete results at the earliest possible time". The fact that
this resolution was adopted by consensus, with the support of all the
United Nations Member States, including the Soviet Union and the
United States, shows that China's reasonable and rational proposal aimed at
promoting the process of nuclear disarmament enjoys popular support, and it
also proves that the correct and effective way to realize nuclear disarmament
is for the two major nuclear States to take action first in this regard.
For some time now, the trend of the Soviet-United States disarmament
negotiations has drawn extensive attention from the international community.
Their recent negotiations and various proposals on medium-range nuclear
missiles have been a subject of ever greater attention. It is only natural
that the people of the world are concerned about what actions the States
possessing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads will eventually take.
The position of the Chinese delegation is: dialogue between the
United States and the Soviet Union is better than confrontation; and
relaxation is better than tension in the relations between the East and the
West, and between the two military blocs locked in confrontation. The
principle contained in the United Nations Charter on seeking settlement of
disputes through peaceful means should be supported by all United Nations
Member States. We sincerely hope that the United States and the Soviet Union
will, at an early date, through negotiations, reach disarmament agreements
conducive to the relaxation of international tension and without detriment to
the interests of other countries. The nuclear weapons covered by the
United States-Soviet negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles are but a
very small portion of the huge nuclear arsenals possessed by the two major
nuclear Powers. Nevertheless, if the Soviet Union and the United States take
the step of eliminating all medium-range missiles in real earnest, it will be
a welcome event.
In the issue of nuclear disarmament, world peace and the security of all
countries are at stake. All countries have an equal right to participate in
its discussion. and settlement. Whether and how the Soviet Union and the
United States will eliminate all their medium-range nuclear missiles in both
Europe and Asia is an issue that not only concerns the two countries
themselves, but also has a direct bearing on the security of European and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
20
(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)
Asian countries. Therefore, the positions of these countries deserve full
respect and serious. consideration. After repeated consultations, the
West European countries not only support the United States in reaching an
agreement with the Soviet Union on the "zero-zero" formula for the elimination
of medium-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe, but also urge
the global elimination of all medium-range nuclear missiles possessed by the
Soviet Union and the United States.
It is known to all that the security of Europe is important, and that the
security of Asia is equally important. Why should 100 INF warheads be kept in
Asia while such weapons are reduced to zero in Europe? Militarily, they pose
a threat to the security of Asian countries; politically, it is not fair, and
the European countries will not be at ease about them either. In the final
analysis, such a solution will not necessarily be advantageous to the
United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, we hold that the medium-range
nuclear missiles deployed by the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe
and Asia should be reduced according to the same principle, simultaneously and
in a synchronized and balanced manner, until their total destruction -- hence
a simple and straightforward "zero option" in both Europe and Asia.
As I have shown, it is possible for the two major nuclear Powers to reach
temporary and partial agreements in their disarmament negotiations, because
the world's people have a strong demand and the two major nuclear Powers both
have such a need. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament and the international
community should urge them to actually take the first step of nuclear
disarmament at an early date by eliminating all medium-range nuclear missiles
in Europe and Asia, including missiles, launchers and nuclear warheads.
Meanwhile, we must not fail to see that there has been no change in their
respective basic strategies, and that no substantive progress has been
achieved so far in their negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and space
arms. The people of the world must remain vigilant against the continued arms
race in various forms. For the sake of a genuine relaxation of the
international situation, we have every reason to insist that the two major
nuclear Powers should not only eliminate all their medium-range nuclear
missiles, but also drastically reduce all types of their nuclear weapons at
any localities both inside and outside their territories, and halt the
testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.
To accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament is the common desire of
the people of the world. At the same time, we wish also to note that the task
of general and complete nuclear disarmament can by no means be accomplished
overnight. It is the consistent proposition of China that, as a practical
measure for prevention of nuclear war, all nuclear States should undertake not
to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstance and not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free
zones. On the very first day that China possessed nuclear weapons, the
Chinese Government solemnly declared that at no time and under no
circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. And on many
occasions, China has declared that it unconditionally undertakes the
commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
21
(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)
nuclear-free zones. China also favours the conclusion, through negotiations,
of an international convention prohibiting the use or the threat of the use of
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States.
China respects and supports the efforts made by the States concerned for
the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the actual
conditions in their own regions and on the basis of consultations. In our
view, nuclear-weapon States should respect their proposals and the status of
nuclear-free zones, and should accordingly assume relevant obligations.
Proceeding from this position, China supports the proposals for the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the
South Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula.
China has signed protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
The Chinese delegation intends to submit a working paper containing a
comprehensive presentation of China's position on nuclear disarmament. I have
just dealt with some points contained therein.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy are playing an increasingly important
role in the economic and social progress of various countries. However,
nuclear energy has been used to manufacture weapons which have become a tool
in the hands of the super-Powers in seeking military superiority, thus posing
a grave threat to the entire human race. This reminds me of an ancient legend
in China: "Hou Yi shoots down the suns". As the legend has it, once upon a
time, there were ten suns in the sky. All the crops, forests and grassland
were scorched. An archer by the name of Hou Yi valiantly shot down nine of
them, leaving only one in the sky. From then on, normal growth of farm crops,
grasses, trees, etc. became possible and tranquility and stability reigned
under heaven. We, as members of the CD, should follow the example of Hou Yi
and make positive contributions to the realization of nuclear disarmament, the
prevention of nuclear war and the maintenance of international peace and
security.
As early as 16 October 1964, when China possessed its first atomic bomb,
the Chinese Government issued a statement calling for the complete prohibition
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. We solemnly expressed in the
statement our sincere hope that nuclear war will never break out. And we are
deeply convinced that nuclear war can be prevented so long as all the
peace-loving countries and peoples of the world make common endeavours and
persevere in the struggle. We firmly believe that as nuclear weapons are made
by men, they can certainly be eliminated by men.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency
Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, head of the Chinese delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament. I thank him for his statement, and I also thank him for the kind
words to my person, in which he affirmed the friendly relations between Egypt
and China, and I also wish to thank him for his kind words addressed to my
predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 416
22
(The President)
We have concluded the list of speakers for today, but does any other
member wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to
His Excellency the Ambassador of France.
Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President.
I should like to inform the Conference that my delegation intends to take the
floor at the next meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space, on Tuesday 30 June, on item 2 of its agenda, namely
legal issues. With the assistance of experts.in space questions who have come
from Paris on this occasion, we should like to deal more specifically with
questions of definition and terminology which, as the Conference knows, have
occupied the attention of our Committee for several years.
In specifically tackling terminological and lexicological problems in the
area of space matters and considering the technical constraints related
thereto, we wish to derive some pointers regarding useful methods for all
matters related to the definition of activities in space. In our view, one
may conclude that, rather than proceeding from categories defined a priori, in
a theoretical, abstract manner, we should follow a pragmatic approach on the
basis of actual data which we know are continuously changing. I might add
that on this occasion we shall be pleased to provide each delegation with a
copy of a dictionary of space studies which has recently been published by the
French National Centre for Space Studies.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Morel, the
Ambassador of France, for his statement.
Distinguished delegates, I have requested the secretariat to circulate an
informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the
Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the next week. As I announced
during last Tuesday's meeting, arrangements have been made to hold the first
informal meeting to discuss the substance of agenda item 2 on Tuesday 30 June,
immediately following the plenary meeting. As usual, the timetable is merely
indicative and can be changed if necessary. If there is no objection to this,
then I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): As I informed you at the opening
of this plenary meeting, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the
Conference to deal with the question of seating arrangements for non-members
participating in our work immediately after this plenary meeting. Before
announcing the date of the next meeting, let me inform you that as far as the
work of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological weapons is concerned, informal
meetings will be held on track B today, following the informal consultations
on track A which will be held at 4.15 p.m. in room 1. The next plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 30 June,
at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.417
30 June 1987
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 30 June 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. S. Alfarargi
GE.87-62133/9327E
r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 417th meeting
of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, at the outset I
should like to extend a cordial welcome to the Director-General for Security
and Disarmament Affairs in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
His Excellency Ambassador Kristvik, who will be our first speaker at this
plenary meeting. I would also like to extend a cordial welcome to
Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, who will preside over the Conference during
the coming month of July. His experience in what used to be known as the
Committee of Disarmament, over which he presided, and his well-known
diplomatic ability, will undoubtedly be of great benefit to the Conference on
Disarmament during the month of July.
In conformity with its programme of work, our Conference will today begin
its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in
outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure,
any member wishing. to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the
Conference. I have on my list of speakers this morning the representatives of
Norway, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
first speaker is Ambassador Kristvik of Norway. I give him the floor.
Mr. KRISTVIK (Norway): Mr. President, may I take this opportunity to
congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Egypt, on your
assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We have
appreciated the efficient manner in which you have guided the work of the
Conference during the month of June. I would, in particular, like to
congratulate you on the decision taken at the plenary meeting on 23 June that
informal meetings should be held on the substance of item 2 of the
Conference's agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament".
For several years, Norway has participated in the work of this important
negotiating forum and all its subsidiary bodies. Norway has also been since
1984 the candidate of the Western Group for full membership, and hopes that
this question will be solved in connection with the third special session
devoted to disarmament. In two areas -- chemical weapons and a comprehensive
nuclear test ban -- we have initiated research programmes which are relevant
to the deliberations of the Conference. Today I have the honour to introduce
three documents which concern the results of recent research in Norway.
My country is committed to doing its utmost to contribute to the
multilateral negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, which would ban
chemical weapons world-wide. In 1987, the negotiations are being ably guided
by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus. We
highly appreciate his dynamic leadership and his continuous search for
solutions to the sensitive political and complicated technical issues still
outstanding.
One of the main problems concerns the question of on-site challenge
inspection. It is the view of the Norwegian Government that it is absolutely
necessary to dispatch the inspection team to the site concerned within
48 hours after the issue of a request for an on-site inspection. The
investigation at the site should be detailed and comprehensive. We have taken
note of the idea which was presented by the United States at the recent
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
3
(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)
Holmenkollen Symposium in Oslo, that when an inspection takes place,
provisions should be made to protect sensitive types of installations and
facilities. Norway believes that this notion of "managed conduct" is a way in
which to address security concerns related to the challenge inspection issue.
In this context, I should like to point out that on-site challenge
inspection would occur only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, it would
represent the "safety net" to the convention, which would already contain an
elaborate system of routine on-site inspections. In fact, an effective
chemical weapons convention will necessitate more comprehensive monitoring
systems than any existing disarmament treaty.
The solution to these questions will require the flexibility of all
parties concerned. Against this background, Norway welcomes the fact that the
United States and the Soviet Union are continuing their bilateral talks on all
aspects of a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification.
These consultations, which were initiated after the meeting between
President Reagan'and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985, have had a
positive effect on the negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament.
My country is of the opin~/on that both the multilateral negotiations and
the bilateral talks should be //intensified with a view to solving the main
outstanding questions. The international community expects these abhorrent
weapons to be eliminated as.soon as possible.
Chemical weapons have recently been used in violation of the Geneva
Protocol of 1925. The incorporation in the global convention of a prohibition
of the use of chemical weapons is therefore necessary. The Norwegian reseach
programme on verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons should be
seen against this background. As a result of six years' research at the
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, procedures have been developed for
verification of alleged use. Today, I take pleasure in introducing
documents CD/761 and CD/762.
The first document summarizes the results of research undertaken in 1986
and 1987, when the procedures were tested in two field exercises. These tests
confirmed that the methods we have developed can be used on an all-year basis.
The procedures, which are outlined and described in document CD/762,
cover the following phases of an investigation; establishment of the
inspection team, survey of the alleged contaminated area, collection of
samples, field analysis, preparation of samples for transport to laboratories,
analysis in laboratories and preparation of the report of the inspection
team. In elaborating this system we have consulted a number of countries, in.
particular Canada.
Document CD/762 provides that the international inspectors should conduct
their mission in the least intrusive manner necessary to accomplish their
task. On the basis of the field exercises, my country proposes-that on-site
inspection should take place within 48 hours after a request has been received
by the Technical Secretariat. A proper investigation requires efficient
methods for carrying out the inspection, with special emphasis on sampling and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
4
(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)
sample analysis. Within 10 days after the completion of their on-site
inspection, the international inspectors should present their findings in a
report to the Technical Secretariat.
In presenting these proposed procedures, I should like to stress that the
work undertaken at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment during 1986
and 1987 shows that some aspects of verification of the alleged use of
chemical weapons need to be further examined. We shall continue our research
programme with that in mind, and shall also take into account that some of
these procedures could be applied to other situations concerning fact-finding.
Norway's development of procedures for on-site inspection on the basis of
field experiments, which provide realistic and reliable data and avoid the
artificial conditions of a laboratory, will contribute to the effective
implementation of the convention. The wealth of research results will, no
doubt, facilitate the work of the Executive Council and the Technical
Secretariat. In addition, the general aspects of the procedures should be
incorporated in an annex to article IX of the Convention. Canada and Norway
will therefore table a joint proposal for such an annex on 7 July.
A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would contribute to the promotion of
nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We are therefore
of the opinion that a test ban, which should include a prohibition of both
nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, should be
concluded as soon as possible. This necessitates, however, that the
Conference on Disarmament should resume its work on practical and interrelated
issues, which in any case need to be addressed in detail prior to the
conclusion of a test-ban treaty. Such issues include compliance, verification
and the scope of a test ban. Two years ago, Norway and nine other Western
countries outlined a suitable programme of work for these issues (document
CD/621 of 24 July 1985). Against this background, my country regrets that the
Conference on Disarmament has not yet agreed on a mandate for an Ad hoc
Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban.
However, the United States and the Soviet Union are conducting bilateral
talks on testing issues. Norway hopes that these two countries, prior to the
seventh session of these talks next month, will agree on an agenda for
initiation of bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing, based on a
step-by-step approach. In this context, joint United States-Soviet
experiments designed to improve verification measures would be of particular
interest. Norway has also taken note of the inclusion of a system of
mandatory on-site inspections in the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" which the
Soviet Union introduced on 9 June (document CD/756).
In the field of seismological verification, the Group of Scientific
Experts is preparing for the international experiment for the exchange and
processing of seismic wave-form data (level II data). NORSAR, being one of
the world's largest seismological observatories, will take an active part in
this experiment. Its implementation will, no doubt, represent a further step
towards the establishment of a future global system for the international
exchange of seismic data.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
5
(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)
Norway has consistently maintained that such a global system must take.
advantage of the rapid and ongoing technological developments in seismic
instrumentation, data communication and computer systems. This is the general
thesis of document CD/763, which also describes the recent operation and
associated research activities at the large-aperture Norwegian Seismic Array
(NORSAR) and the small-aperture Norwegian Regional Seismic Array System
(NORESS).
Drawing on the experience gained in the operation of these two arrays,
document CD/763 contains three concrete proposals concerning principles for a
modern seismic data exchange system. Firstly, the global seismic network
should, to the extent it is practically possible and otherwise appropriate,
incorporate the establishment of small-aperture seismic arrays along NORESS
principles. Secondly, seismic data exchange by dedicated, high-capacity
links, such as satellite channels using small dedicated ground stations, would
form a convenient, efficient and reliable method for the needs of the
envisaged global data exchange system. Thirdly, it must be possible, through
an international data centre in the global seismic network, to request and
obtain any level II data from any participating station.
The preparation of these three documents is a reflection of the
considerable resources which Norway devotes to its participation in the work
of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also an indication of the
significance which the Norwegian Government attaches to the Conference on
Disarmament, as the single negotiating forum for global disarmament questions.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Kristvik of
Norway for his statement, and for the very kind words that he directed to me.
I now give the floor to Ambassador Friedersdorf, the representative of the
United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, as the new-
United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to thank
you for the very warm, courteous and hospitable manner in which you and your
colleagues have welcomed me. The representatives, delegates and members of
the secretariat whom I have met have all made me feel very much at home. I am
grateful for the assistance and friendship all of you have extended to me, and
I look forward to working with all of you.
I am most impressed, Mr. President, with your dedication and attention to
the work of the Conference, with the diligence and energy you bring to your
important responsibilities, and with your impartial and fair approach. It is
a pleasure to take up my duties during the presidency of the representative of
a country and an ancient and wise people with whom the United States enjoys
close and friendly relations.
My delegation also extends a warm welcome to the new representative of
Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, and wishes him well as he takes up his new
responsibilities in Geneva. My delegation also welcomes the representative of
Norway, the Conference's old friend Ambassador Kristvik, who has returned to
Geneva to address us again today. By the introduction today of additional
working papers, Norway continues its important contributions to our work.
4cd
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
6
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
It is very reassuring for a newcomer to this forum to witness, at first
hand, the seriousness with which delegations apply themselves to the critical
tasks of disarmament negotiations. The results may not be as far-reaching or
timely as we would wish, but I believe the peoples of the world can rely on
the dedication and skill of those individuals representing the countries at
this Conference to do their utmost to achieve real and lasting results in the
field of disarmament.
The approach of my Government to our work here has often been
articulated. But it may be useful to set it out again at this time.
United States arms control objectives are integrated with its defence and
foreign policies to strengthen deterrence and stability; to reduce the risk
of all war, especially nuclear war; and to support the security of the
United States' allies. Since the beginning of his Administration,
President Reagan has followed these fundamental principles: We seek only
those agreements which contribute to our security and that of our allies; We
seek agreements which reduce forces, not simply limit them; To this end, we
seek agreements on broad, deep and equitable reductions in offensive arms;
Within the category of offensive nuclear arms, we give priority to reducing
the most destabilizing weapons, that is, fast-flying, non-recallable ballistic
missiles; We also seek equitable arms control agreements in the areas of
nuclear testing, chemical weapons and conventional forces; We insist on
agreements that can be effectively verified. Arms control agreements without
effective verification provisions are worse than no agreements at all. These
principles form the basis for our efforts to bring renewed integrity to arms
control.
Let me turn now to the first items on our agenda: a nuclear test ban,
and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. These two
agenda items, and their interrelationship, are matters that the United States
delegation has addressed in this Conference on many occasions, most recently
in plenary statements by the acting United States representative on
24 February and 23 April of this year. However, more recent interventions, in
particular the plenary statement by the distinguished Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, make it important to ensure that there is no
misunderstanding on the part of others as to United States views.
I want
to
begin with the subject of deterrence, specifically nuclear
deterrence.
In
his statement of 9 June, Minister Petrovsky delivered a litany
of alleged
ills
and evils of nuclear deterrence, laying this heavy burden at
the feet of
the
West. He ascribed to the West dogmatic tenets, wrongly
picturing our view of nuclear weapons as "a blessing for mankind", and claimed
that nuclear deterrence is "nothing other than a concentrated expression of
militarist intentions".
I hardly need to say that the United States strongly rejects this
mischaracterization of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is not a matter
of a blind, inflexible doctrine. Nuclear deterrence is a policy designed to
support Western security. The Western States, including those which make up
the NATO alliance, rely on nuclear deterrence in 1987, as they have relied on
nuclear deterrence for decades, not because of some obstinate devotion to an
abstract concept. No, the United States and its allies live in a real and a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
7
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
dangerous world -- one torn by violations of the United Nations Charter's
fundamental prohibition against the use or threat of use of force. In this
world it is clear to anyone who chooses to examine the facts that nuclear
deterrence is a matter not of theory, but of security. Nuclear deterrence is
designed to prevent the outbreak of war -- be it conventional or nuclear -- by
ensuring that a State possessing massive forces armed with conventional and
chemical weapons -- in addition to nuclear weapons -- has nothing to gain, and
much to lose, by initiating an attack.
If nuclear deterrence is tantamount to being unwilling to remove the
nuclear threat, then the Soviet Union may look to its own position more
critically, in the light of its unwillingness to adopt a truly o-zer "
approach in the bilateral negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces, and to
agree to ban all such forces, including those outside Europe.
To pursue real progress on the issues of arms control -- bilaterally;
between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization; and among members of the
Conference on Disarmament -- the Soviet Union should take into account what
the views of my Government and of United States allies really are, and not
create false issues on the relevance of deterrence.
In its statement of 24 February in this Chamber dealing with nuclear
deterrence, the United States delegation stressed the absence of general
conflict in Europe since 1945; recalled the agreement of
General Secretary Gorbachev with President Reagan that a nuclear war cannot be
won and must never be fought; addressed the role of nuclear deterrence in
Soviet military thinking; and spoke of the final essentiality that the
international community, over time, find other means to ensure international
security. The United States, for its part, understands full well what a
tragedy any use of nuclear weapons would be, as it understands what a tragedy
the widespread use of conventional weapons, and now even chemical weapons, has
been over the past 40 years, and continues to be even today.
At their 12 June meeting in Reykjavik, just 18 days ago, the foreign
ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a statement that
included an important reaffirmation of the policy of deterrence. I quote that
document:
"Serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear field,
and the persisting build-up of Soviet military power, continue to
preoccupy us. We reaffirm that there is no alternative, as far as we can
foresee, to the Alliance concept for the prevention of war -- the
strategy of deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of adequate and
effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being
indispensable."
I would invite my-colleagues around this table to consider what the
situation would be in Europe today without the consistent implementation of
this deterrent policy. And I would pose this further question: If the
nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union is not for the purpose of deterring
attack, what is its purpose?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.417
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States) i
I have referred to the security situation in Europe. One important
United States effort, designed, in part, to improve security thereby reducing
the number of nuclear weapons, is the intermediate nuclear force negotiations
that are continuing here in Geneva. On 16 June, the United States formally
presented its position in those negotiations, calling for the global
elimination of all shorter-range INF missile systems of the United States and
the Soviet Union. The United States INF delegation also took that occasion to
call attention to the benefits to the United States, the Soviet Union and the
world at large were the Soviet Union to join the United States in agreeing now
to the global elimination of all United States and Soviet longer-range
INF systems. The global elimination of these systems would increase
confidence in an agreement by greatly simplifying verification and making
questions of compliance less ambiguous. The appearance of a single SS-20
missile would be an unambiguous violation of the agreement. Given the range,
mobility and transportability of these systems, they are a threat wherever
they are deployed.
Let me turn now specifically to the first item on our agenda, a nuclear-
test ban. This Conference is well aware that representatives of the
United Sates and the Soviet Union have been meeting in Geneva since July 1986
in a series of discussions known as the nuclear testing experts meetings. The
most recent session ended on 29 May, and the next is scheduled for mid-July.
Within the context of those meetings, the United States has proposed to the
Soviet Union a process whereby the two countries initiate negotiations on the
subject of nuclear testing. The Soviet Union has, thus far, rejected the
United States proposals.
At the October 1986 Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev, and in the recent discussions in Moscow between
Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, both sides agreed that a
comprehensive nuclear-test ban is a long-term objective which must be
approached via a step-by-step process. The first order of business in this
step-by-step process will be the negotiation of verification improvements to
the threshold testing treaties of 1974 and 1976, i.e., the threshold test-ban
treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty.
Agreement on such improvements would lead to the ratification of those
treaties by the United States. The United States has agreed that, in parallel
with reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both countries, a subsequent step
could be to proceed to negotiations on intermediate limitations on nuclear
testing. For its part, the United States has consistently affirmed its
position that the ultimate goal of ceasing nuclear testing can only be reached
through a series of steps in conjunction with a parallel programme to.reduce
and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.
In apparent harmony with its understanding that this is a step-by-step
process, the Soviet Union has proposed joint experiments on improved
verification that would allow a demonstration of both direct hydrodynamic
yield measurement techniques, advocated by the United States, and indirect
seismic methods, favoured by the USSR.
457
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.417
9
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
This, in the United States' understanding, would be related to the first
step, i.e., the negotiation of verification improvements for the threshold
test-ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty. The United States
has regarded this proposal as a potentially useful initiative; it is being
addressed by representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.
At no time during the bilateral discussions has there been serious
discussion of any kind of testing moratorium. Proposals to make a moratorium
the first step in the process must be regarded as an appeal to emotions rather
than good sense. Such an approach undermines the work already accomplished,
and if pursued, would ensure that a first step is never taken. it is ironic
that a first-step testing moratorium is inconsistent with the Joint
verification activities proposed at the highest levels of the
Soviet Government.
The United States stands prepared to pursue the understandings which form
the basis of the discussions now being conducted in the nuclear testing
experts meetings. My Government reiterates its proposal that the
United States and the Soviet Union immediately initiate bilateral negotiations
on nuclear testing in accordance with the understandings which have been
reached between the two sides at the highest levels.
The United States agrees with the importance of the Conference on
Disarmament as the'single forum of world-wide scope for multilateral
disarmament negotiations, and acknowledges the interest of the States
represented here in this important subject. Therefore, my Government has
called upon this body to undertake actions which would complement, not compete
with, the bilateral efforts I have described. And my Government insists that
a multilateral negotiating body only conclude agreements which entail
multilateral obligations. My delegation once again expresses willingness to
support an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban based on a non-negotiating
mandate.
Let me turn briefly to one matter related to items 1 and 2, and,
moreover, 3 of our agenda. That matter is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty of 1968. My delegation takes this opportunity to congratulate the
Parliament of the Spanish State on its ratification of this important measure
of nuclear arms control. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an agreement
that has been a truly stabilizing force in the prevention of war, including
nuclear war, and in bringing about a cessation of the nuclear arms race and
nuclear disarmament.
I would like to conclude today by noting with satisfaction that our
chemical weapons negotiations have resumed in earnest. My delegation looks
forward to registering real advances, both on the basic issues that remain to
be resolved, and on the many key details that need to be worked out. To
facilitate understanding of chemical weapons verification issues and to assist
our efforts here, the United States has invited the distinguished
representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, and appropriate
Soviet experts to visit the United States chemical weapons destruction
facility in Tooele, Utah. This would include a visit to a chemical weapons
bunker. I want to say to Ambassador Nazarkin today that this invitation
remains open, and that I hope he can accept it.
455
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
10
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
General Secretary Gorbachev, in a statement made in Moscow on 23 June,
noted that the Soviet Union is building a chemical weapons destruction
facility. Secretary of State Shultz had suggested, earlier this year, that
the two sides exchange visits to the sites of their destruction facilities.
These visits would be practical examples of confidence-building in the field
of chemical weapons arms control. They would add to other encouraging
achievements in confidence-building. One of these is the recent
United States-Soviet agreement on a draft joint text to establish nuclear risk
reduction centres in their capitals. This agreement, which is a direct result
of a United States initiative, is a practical measure that will strengthen
international security by reducing the risk of conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident,
misunderstanding or miscalculation.
Another positive development in confidence-building, of course, was the
adoption by the Stockholm Conference, in September 1986, of a set of
confidence-building measures, based largely on proposals made by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, designed to increase the openness and
predictability of military activities in Europe.
With these successes in mind, let us approach our own work in the
Conference on Disarmament with optimism and confidence that we shall ourselves
be successful.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Friedersdorf,
the representative of the United States of America to the Conference on
Disarmament, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the
Chair, including his reference to the close relations between Egypt and the
United States of America. I would now like to welcome His Excellency,
Dr. L-arijani the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Islamic Republic
of Iran. I give him the floor.
Mr. LARIJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I would like at
the outset to express my pleasure and gratitude for the opportunity which has
been given to me to address this august forum. May I also express my sincere
wishes for the success of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament.
The items on the agenda of the current session of the Conference on
Disarmament are all of importance to the future of mankind and international
peace and security. The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great significance
to, and follows with keen interest, the deliberations in this Conference.
However, due to time limitations, I cannot take up all the issues, but will
confine myself to the important issue of chemical weapons, hoping that we can
contribute in some way to this important issue. The issue of chemical
weapons, the discussion about this topic, is a matter of urgency at this time.
Nuclear weapons were twice used in the course of the Second World War.
Fortunately, they have not been used since. Chemical weapons, on the
contrary, have been deployed continuously and used on an increasing basis over
the past three and a half years. The main characteristics of chemical
deployment over this period includes the ever-increasing sophistication of the
chemical weapons and the chemical agents which have been used, making the cure
of the injured people more difficult and the provision of help much more
459
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
11
(Mr. Larijani, Islamic Republic of Iran)
complicated. At the beginning of this tragic period chemical warfare was
directed against military objectives and targets mainly, but recently the use
of chemical weapons on civilian targets has been increased and intensified.
The pattern of progress among these characteristics should indeed be
considered alarming to the human community. Should this horrible trend
continue, the day will soon arrive when criminal elements may try to use
chemical bombs and explosives against airports and cities of other countries.
It seems very unreasonable to watch these developments passively and merely
feel content with recommending to the civilian populace to carry gas masks in
their handbags during their normal shopping and daily work. We think this is
a historic moment in the Conference on Disarmament to be more realistic.
There is a point of urgency to the matter.
Thanks to the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General, in
March 1984, the United Nations produced its first report on the use of
chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. In April 1985, a second report
confirmed the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers. A third
report prepared in March 1986 concluded that chemical weapons had been used by
Iraqi forces against Iranian positions. But the last report of 8 May 1987,
prepared by the team of specialists dispatched by the Secretary-General to
both Iran and Iraq, shows a new dimension as regards the violation of
international law. In this report the use of chemical weapons against the
civilian population is explicitly cited. The specialists report that they
visited a whole family, incuding young children as well as old members of the
family, injured by such weapons. The same team also reports on their visit to
a two-year-old baby, a victim of mustard gas, who died in front of their very
eyes. Needless to say, these are only the incidents known to the team.
Numerous others have just slept in history; no cameras present, no team to
depict the tragedy of their suffering for future generations, not to mention
for the future deliberations of the politicians of the world. The state of
ignorance on such an important manner seems to be beyond expectation.
Along the same current of events, just two days ago, on 28 June 1987,
Iraqi forces attacked the city of Sardasht. Four residential areas in the
city were the target of chemical bombardment. Th first report shows more than
10 deaths and more than 650 injuries, mostly children who happen to be more
vulnerable and defenceless once exposed to the green and yellowish clouds
generated by mustard gas.
It is very essential that we should all for a moment imagine how a child
would behave when he cries hard for survival, and with each cry, lumps of this
lethal gas are pumped into his lungs. We should also imagine what the
desperate mother could do -- prevent the child from breathing, I mean
suffocate him, or let her dear one die of mustard gas.
Mr. President, please don't recommend that all children should carry a
gas mask in their back-pack; don't recommend that children should stop
breathing for a few hours. No, Mr. President, we should do something serious,
and right now.
Orin
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
12
(Mr. Lari'ani, Islamic Re ublic of Iran)
should expect a criminal government, a defeated aggressor which
Nobody
recognizes no boundaries to actionr oflourblives tow the whimsaandn?
But are we justified in leaving the
wishes of such criminals?
I hope I have been able to demonstrate the urgency of the matter, and why
we should act right now, for toorrow Weinsanityshould
serious concrete and practical ways
conduct. Firstly, we should try to strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
and commitment t the Protocol
for example through reaffirmation
res.ponsesbtotany
signatory States. SecondlY any Thirdly, all
violation of the Protocol should be concrete, strong and prompt.
re on the vio possible ways and means shodbuoflsuch crimesrt Tpres hissshould includelaamong.
in order to prevent the repetition
other things, the imposition of a total arms embargo nand a varietyatfons and
sanctions, as well as suspension of its membership the
ehtthat
atginsthe presentocaIe, if rraq
other international organizations. reesure
these ideas are materialized and implemented,
further use of chemical weapons.
will definitely be prevented from continuing
for humanity, peace
It simply does not make sense that countries crying saptrtipe such
and stability are generously arming, assisting and politically
sao fy this
a ciuaefine, regardless of its violation of shameless crimes. No politicaltambitionncanljwutn
continuation o of such h s s
ignorance! Any assistance to the violator with the knowledge of its
continuous violations is in itself a crime and constitutes participation in
the crime.
Finally, it is our earnest hope that this session
neof the Conferenceoon
Disarmament will produce the necessary machinery and s
strengthening the ban on the use of chemical weapons, effective implementation
and
and substantial
of regulations
Considering field,
international law and
mankind. in
stability and d the future the
progress made in the course of the past year in that the it preiplaraattion finalized of
the at the
convention on chemical weapons, while hoping recittth
would AdhoceCommitteeaontChemicalaWeapons, and
torAis possible
to Ambassador or Ek6 keuS , groups.
his colleagues in the working g
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Dr. Larijani, the
Deputy Foreign minister of Iran, for his statement. Distinguished
representatives, wethus
floorntouthetrepresentativeaofrtheoUr SSR today's
meeting -- I give the f rom
Mr. NAZpgF(IN (Union of Soviet welcome
r
Russian): Thank your Mr.
the presence in our midst today
ssadoreKDistvikr whoseastatementMwelhave just
Foreign Affairs of Norway, Amb
heard with great attention and interest. Statesr the
first statement by the distinguished
representative like Ambassador Friedersdorf. In connection
the issuemoftdeterrence whichthe
make a number of comments. First
461
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.417
13
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
referred to. The advocates of the concept of nuclear deterrence refer to the
alleged deterrent nature of nuclear weapons and assert that this is what has
ensured and continues to ensure peace.
A deep analysis of the concept of nuclear deterrence was provided on
11 June at the meeting of the Conference by President Alfonsin of Argentina.
The Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, dwelt on this in
detail in his statement to the Conference on 9 June, to which
Ambassador Friedersdorf referred today. In the course of the spring session I
had occasion to take the floor on this subject as well. This is why today I
do not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis, and I shall simply confine
myself to a few brief comments.
The vast destructive power of nuclear weapons is indeed a fundamentally
new characteristic of modern weapons. On the one hand this quality can be
described as that of a deterrent -- that cannot be denied. On the other hand
it means that nuclear weapons leave no hope for any State to defend itself by
means of military technology. This was clearly recognized in the
Soviet-United States statement concerning the results of the Geneva summit
meeting in November 1985. "A nuclear war can never be won and must never be
fought". But if you recognize that there can be no victors in a nuclear war,
then how can you plan a first nuclear strike? Over four decades since the war
the world has more than once teetered on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.
True, no catastrophe has occurred so far. Maybe this was due in part to the
deterrent nature of nuclear weapons. But is there any assurance that this
deterrent factor will continue to operate in the future? To base plans for
the future on the sole fact that the catastrophe has not yet occurred is in
our view absurd.
Let us imagine an old person who is ill but doesn't want to go to the
doctor, offering the following explanation: "I have lived for 70 years. I've
never tried to be cured and I haven't died a single time, so I will live for
70 more years." The more sophisticated nuclear weapons are, the greater the
role played by computer technology and automation then the less time remains
to take decisions on which the existence of human civilization depends. If we
recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be guarantors of peace, if we agree
that, on the contrary, they represent a tremendous danger to the world, then
we will inevitably be led to a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, the
reduction and then the elimination of nuclear arms.
As for the approach taken by the Soviet Union to security issues, I
should like to draw your attention to the following. But before I do that I
should like to respond to Ambassador Friedersdorf's statement regarding our
position at the negotiations on intermediate-range missiles. He appealed to
us to look more critically at our position concerning Soviet missiles in this
class in Asia. In this connection, I must point out that the United States
has been steadily increasing its military strength, primarily in the nuclear
category, in the Asia-Pacific region, especially close to the frontiers of
socialist States in Asia. The number of delivery systems, mainly airborne, is
being increased, and nuclear stockpiles are being enlarged on the ships of the
United States Seventh Fleet and at United States bases in this area. It is
striking, for instance, that deployment has begun in South Korea of
United States "Lance" tactical nuclear missiles. And there is no guarantee
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
14
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
that the infrastructure created for these missiles cannot be used in future
for other nuclear missile systems which are capable of striking the
territories of the USSR, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the
People's Republic of China.
Bearing in mind the nuclear threat from the United States, and also the
fact that the disarmament process has yet to go beyond discussions into
practical actions, we are bound to keep a group of intermediate missiles in
the Asian part of the USSR, which we are prepared to reduce to the level of
100 warheads. In a certain sense these intermediate missiles are intended to
guarantee the security of more than the Soviet Union. At the same time, the
Soviet Union is not doing anything, nor will it do anything, over and above
what is dictated by the minimum requirements of its own security and the
defence interests of its allies and friends.
In its desire to give impetus to nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union is
prepared, should an agreement be achieved with the United States on
intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, to come to an agreement on the
elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles outside the European continent
too. We have repeatedly stated that we are prepared to settle the question of
the elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles on a global basis. We would
have no difficulty in giving up the right to have 100 warheads on intermediate
nuclear missiles in Asia if the United States were to accept the elimination
of its nuclear arsenals in this area, as well as the withdrawal of its .
aircraft carriers beyond recognized limits. Of course, the United States
would have no intermediate nuclear missiles on its own territory. As far as
shorter-range missiles are concerned once agreement is reached on intermediate
nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union is prepared to settle this on a global
basis. United States Secretary of State, G. Shultz was told about this in
April this year in Moscow. As matters turned out, it was the United States
side itself which was not ready to consider a practical solution to this
issue. We had to take this circumstance into account in drawing up our draft
treaty on intermediate nuclear missiles. In the final analysis, the
Soviet Union, as is well known, is in favour of the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which presupposes a "global zero" solution
to the problem of intermediate nuclear missiles and shorter-range INFs. This
is what I wanted to say regarding the specific issue of intermediate nuclear
missiles and shorter-range missiles.
Now I should like to revert to our approach to the problem of nuclear
deterrence and nuclear security in the broader context. As is well known, the
session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the
Warsaw Treaty had recently in Berlin adopted a document on the military
doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. It was issued as a
document of this Conference (CD/755). From this document, it is clear that
the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty adhere to a strictly defensive
doctrine. This doctrine is subordinated to a single task, that of preventing
war, whether nuclear or conventional. The strictly defensive nature of the
doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty is manifested in their
resolve never under any circumstances to initiate military action against any
State or alliance of States unless they are themselves the target of an armed
attack. It may be seen in their firm intention not to be the first to use
463
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
15
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
nuclear weapons; in the absence of territorial claims on any other State,
either in Europe or outside Europe; and in the fact that they do not view any
State or any people as their enemy.
The document adopted in Berlin is no mere proclamation of principles, but
a sort of programme of action for the development of military forces. The
basis for this programme is the principle of sufficiency, whereby the allied
States maintain their armed forces in a state of operational readiness that is
sufficient to ensure that they are not caught unawares. Should they, however,
be subjected to attack they will repel the aggressor. The allied socialist
States do not intend to maintain armed forces and armaments beyond the scale
required to meet these objectives.
In the document they adopted, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty
proposed to the member States of NATO that they should enter into
consultations in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances,
analyse their nature and jointly discuss the patterns of their future
development so as to reduce the mutual suspicion and distrust that has
accumulated over the years, to ensure a better perception of each other's
intentions and to guarantee that the military concepts and doctrines of the
two military blocs and their members are based on defensive principles.
Unfortunately, the North Atlantic Alliance has so far not reacted to this
proposal. .
I will not now compare the military doctrines of the two blocs. This is
the task of the proposed consultations. But I should like to draw your
attention to one fundamental difference: our military dcictrine contains the
principle -- and the Soviet Union has assumed the corresponding obligation --
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The other side rejects this
principle, substituting for it the concept of deterrence, which allows for the
first use of nuclear weapons at an early stage of the conflict.
Now I should like to say a few words about the issue of the cessation of
nuclear testing, which was also referred to by Ambassador Friedersdorf today.
The Soviet Union proposes a start to negotiations in any forum on a complete
ban on nuclear-weapon tests. This proposal is rejected by our opponents. We
are also prepared to agree to intermediate measures. Quite recently the
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, put forward a proposal for a ban on explo.iQr.s
of over one kilotonne and the establishment of an annual quota of two or three
explosions. We have not received a positive response to this proposal either.
Essentially, what the United States is proposing, and this was mentioned
by Ambassador Friedersdorf today, simply boils down to a review of the system
.for monitoring compliance with the 1974 and 1976 agreements, one of which
provides for a yield threshold of 150 kilotonnes. We do not oppose the
ratification -- the earliest possible ratification -- of these treaties, but
we must not lose sight of the ultimate goal which these negotiations should
pursue: a complete and general ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.
The United States claims that it is impossible to embark on such
negotitions on the grounds that it needs testing in order to perfect nuclear
weapons, to verify their reliability, and it links the continuation of testing
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
16
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
once again with the concept of nuclear deterrence. In this connection I have
a question which I should like to put to the delegation of the United States.
We all know that the concept of deterrence has been the basic concept in
United States policy for over 40 years. None the less, until the beginning of
the 1980s, the United States agreed to consider banning the testing of nuclear
weapons not as a long-term but as an immediate goal, and without linking a
test ban with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. And this was
something that they did not only in theory but also in practice. Up to the
1980s they participated in the trilateral negotiations on the nuclear-test
ban, which made considerable headway, and all in all were close to a
successful conclusion, until they were unilaterally broken off by the
United States.
My question is the following. What happened at the beginning of the
1980s that forced the United States to change its position sharply? Up to the
1980s agreement was not achieved because verification difficulties were
cited. Now there are no such difficulties. Now reference is made to
something else: apparently nuclear testing can be halted only after the
elimination of nuclear weapons. But then what is the point of this measure?
Of course, when you have no nuclear weapons there will be nothing to test. We
consider the cessation of nuclear testing as an important measure leading to
the curtailment of the arms race, and this is precisely why we are already
proposing to initiate negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear testing.
Unfortunately -- and this was confirmed once again today by
Ambassador Friedersdorf -- the United States is prepared to have only a
non-negotiating mandate for the ad hoc committee of the Conference on
Disarmament.
One further brief comment in connection with today's statement by
Ambassador Friedersdorf, regarding his invitation to me to accompany some
experts to a chemical weapon destruction facility in Utah. As I understood
him, he stressed that this invitation, this visit is considered as a
confidence-building measure. In fact it can certainly only be considered as a
confidence-building measure, because if I do go to that facility I'm hardly
going to derive anything useful there for the negotations on banning chemical
weapons. In any case our experts say that they have no difficulties with the
destruction of chemical weapons. They know how to do it. Consequently, this
can hardly be anything other than a confidence-building measure. But I think
that there are, in fact, considerably more effective confidence-building
measures. As I see it, the main point which undermines confidence at the
negotiations on chemical weapons are plans to develop binary weapons. Tell
me, why participate in the preparation of a convention to ban and eliminate
chemical weapons and at the same time take practical steps to develop a new
generation of chemical weapons? Do such steps demonstrate the sincerity of
the participants in the negotiations? I think that shelving these plans,
these steps, would be a true confidence-building measure.
My brief comments have turned into a statement which was not all that
brief, but on this note I will conclude.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
17
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished
Ambassador of the USSR, Ambassador Nazarkin, for his statement. Are there any
members of the Conference who would like to make a statement? I see none. In
this case I move to the second part of our meeting today, and as the
distinguished representatives know, we have received requests from two
non-member States to participate in the informal meetings on the substance of
agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament", which we will start discussing today immediately after this
plenary meeting. In order to consider those requests before we start our
informal discussions, I intend to suspend this plenary meeting briefly to
consider informally according to our custom the two requests that I have just
mentioned. If there are no objections, I shall now suspend this plenary
meeting.
The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 11.50 a.m.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): The meeting of the Conference on
Disarmament is resumed. I should like to put before the Conference for
decision working papers CD/WP.283 and 284 containing requests received from
Finland and Norway to participate in the informal meeting devoted to the
substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament". If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference
adopts the draft decisions.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): Distinguished delegates, allow
me now to make a brief statement to mark the conclusion of my period as
President of the Conference during the month of June. The statement is a sort
of progress report regarding the consultations that we have held on the
procedural aspects of a number of pending topics on the agenda of the
Conference. In doing-so, I continue the tradition that has been established
by a number of previous Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament. Although
it is a relatively new tradition, nevertheless I believe in its usefulness as
an affirmation of a joint responsibility between the President of the
Conference and its members regarding the procedure and the process of work,
with-its negative and positive aspects, and also an affirmation of the ongoing
nature of whatever consultations the President of the Conference undertakes in
continuation of the process begun by his predecessor and up to the stage at
which his successor will start, since this is made necessary by the very
nature of the monthly presidential term.
The special consultations regarding the nuclear-test ban have been
resumed on the basis of the draft mandate which was proposed by the neutral
and non-aligned countries, and while some have welcomed this draft there are
others who continue to study it. Some delegations still consider that the
draft mandate which was proposed by the President of the Conference for the
month of April constitutes an excellent basis for the consultations on this
topic. I hope that we can reach agreement to re-est
bli
a
sh the Ad hoc
Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban as soon as possible. Without trying to reach
any prejudged conclusions, I believe that the solution must be a compromise
one, which would reconcile the positions of the various groups without
detriment to any of them. In spite of my awareness of the difficulty of
reaching such a composite solution, nevertheless I believe that we can reach
it by exerting further efforts and manifesting the political will to do so.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
18
(The President)
At all events the Conference must avoid continuation of the current deadlock
which surrounds the consideration of this topic, and any withdrawal from the
framework of the Ad hoc Committee in which it has been examined.
It proved possible to reach an agreement regarding the holding of
informal meetings of the Conference to examine the item on preventing the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Undoubtedly the arrangements and
the understanding that we have reached in this context are a step forward in
comparison with the previous session of the Conference. I hope that the
discussions that we will start today on this subject will help to establish a
framework through which this topic will be examined to a larger extent during
the next session in keeping with the mandate of the Conference as a
multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.
In spite of the obvious desire to reactivate the consultations concerning
.the topic of the prevention of nuclear war and what I have learnt of the
manner in which some groups have assessed their positions, unfortunately we
have not been able to translate this into a concrete reality. I feel sure
that my successor, Ambassador Terrefe, the distinguished representative of
Ethiopia, will continue these consultations during his presidency of the
Conference, taking into consideration all the previous proposals regarding the
most appropriate framework for the examination of this subject.
The positions of the groups regarding new types of weapons of mass
destruction as well as new systems of these weapons remain unchanged. Nor
have I noticed any change in the positions of the groups regarding the
question of expansion of the membership of the Conference, and therefore I saw
no real point in beginning intensive consultations on the subject. However,
this subject should be a matter of concern for you during the next few weeks
in order to avoid a situation in which the Conference would find itself once
again obliged, when drafting its annual report, to record its inability to
reach a decision on the subject and to respond to the membership applications
presented to it.
This concludes my progress report for the period of my presidency. I
would now like to wish my successor Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia every
success for the period of July during his presidency of the Conference.
Before I conclude, please allow me to wish farewell to a highly esteemed
colleague, a dear friend and brother, on the occasion of his departure after
many years of distinguished activity at the Conference. Ambassador Jayantha
Dhanapala of Sri Lanka has carried out his duties as representative of his
country with great ability and efficiency, and he has helped the Conference on
Disarmament to reach compromise solutions on thorny questions during difficult
periods through which it has passed. He will be sorely missed by his
colleagues and friends, but I am sure that he will continue his close
relationship with us in his new post as Director of UNIDIR, and I wish
Ambassador Dhanapala every success in his new assignment and in the mission in
which he believes, namely disarmament.
In conclusion I would like to express to you all my sincere gratitude for
your co-operation with me during this month, and particularly the
co-ordinators of the groups, with whom I had the honour of dealing closely. I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
19
(The President)
would also like to thank my dear friend Ambassador Komatina, the Special
Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General
of the Conference, and Ambassador Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General of
the Conference, and all their colleagues for all the sincere efforts they have
exerted to help me, and I would also like to thank all the staff working
behind the scenes, whose voices we hear although we do not see them, the
interpretation services who through their efforts have enabled us to carry on
a fruitful dialogue and who have conveyed to us all the opinions regardless of
linguistic differences. This concludes my statement. Before adjourning this
meeting, does anyone wish to take the floor? Ambassador Fan, the
distinguished representative of China.
Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Thank you,
Mr. President. In your statement you mentioned that the outstanding
Ambassador Dhanapala is going to leave us, and today is the last day he is
with us in the meeting. Tomorrow he will take up the post of head of UNIDIR.
Mr. President, I fully agree with your appraisal of Ambassador Dhanapala.
Ambassador Dhanapala is an outstanding representative of the non-aligned
movement. At this forum and other forums on disarmament he submitted many
positive proposals, thus playing a positive role. Ambassador Dhanapala is an
outstanding representative of Sri Lanka, which maintains close relations with
China. He has made important contributions to the friendly relations between
the Chinese delegation and the Sri Lankan delegation.
The Chinese delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its
gratitude for his co-operation and his contribution to the work of the CD. I
personally also wish to thank him for his co-operation and help in my work.
Although he is leaving the CD, and his departure means that we will lose a
friend and outstanding colleague, to our regret, Ambassador Dhanapala will
continue to display his talent and_wisdoin in another post. I am glad about
this and wish him every success.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Fan,
representative of China to the Conference for his statement. I now give the
floor to Ambassador Richard Butler, the representative of Australia to the
Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President. I did not intend to
take the floor on this occasion, and will do so only very briefly because of
the exceptional character of this occasion. Let me start first of all by
saying that I did not find it necessary to make a statement in the formal
plenary during the month of your presidency, and that deprived me of the
opportunity of expressing what pleasure it causes my delegation to see you in
the Chair, but as this is the end of your term as President, I think the most
appropriate thing for me to say is our very deep debt of gratitude for the way
in which you have conducted our affairs this month.
The exceptional occasion to which I referred is the departure from the
Conference of Jayantha Dhanapala, a person I have known for in excess of
20 years, representative of a country with which mine has immensely close
links. I won't belabour the point, but I want to make it clear that I
consider the departure of Jayantha Dhanapala from this Conference a very
468
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
20
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
severe loss to the Conference, and I feel it personally. The only
consolation, and I think it is a more than adequate one, is that
Jayantha Dhanapala will not be lost to the cause of disarmament.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Richard
Butler for his kind words addressed to me and to our friend
Ambassador Dhanapala. I now give the floor to the distinguished
representative of France.
Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you Mr. President. I
merely wish to associate myself with the regrets and good wishes that mark the
last day on which our colleague and friend Ambassador Dhanapala is performing
his tasks as representative of his country to the Conference on Disarmament,
and to add, because of the special interest that France has had from the
outset in the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR, that
we are convinced that under his guidance, with his remarkable competence, with
the authority he has acquired in disarmament circles and which is clearly
perceived by us all here -- we are certain that the Institute itself will
recover the authority and influence I feel it needs in the interests of the
international community as a whole. Thus I should like to wish him every
success. These are my personal wishes, and the wishes of the French
Government.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Morel,
representative of France, for the words he addressed to our dear friend
Ambassador Dhanapala, and now I give the floor to the Ambassador of the Soviet
Union.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): First of all, Mr. President, permit me, on the occasion of the
conclusion of your term of office, to thank you for the very useful
contribution you have made to the work of our Conference. As we know, the
Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Ambassador J. Dhanapala, is leaving his post, and I
should like to state the following. We regret to have to part from
Ambassador J. Dhanapala, with whom we have built up relations of close and
business-like co-operation. He is an outstanding diplomat with a deep
knowledge of disarmament issues. At the same time, as Ambassador J. Dhanapala
is moving to a new and important post, I should like to wish him great success
in his new field and to express the hope that the relations of close,
business-like and friendly co-operation that we have built up here at the
Conference will continue in the future.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank distinguished
Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR for his kind words addressed to
Ambassador Dhanapala and to me personally. Are there any other speakers who
wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative
of Yugoslavia.
Mr. CULAFIC (Yugoslavia): Thank you Mr. President. Allow me in the name
of Ambassador Rosin and the whole Yugoslav delegation, as co-ordinator for the
Group of 21 for the month of June, to express our great satisfaction at having
had this opportunity to work closely with you under your very versatile
guidance. I take this opportunity also to repeat the high appreciation of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
21
(Mr. Culafic, Yugoslavia)
work of Ambassador Dhanapala already expressed by Ambassador Kosin in the name
of the Group of 21, and I wish to associate the Yugoslav delegation also, as
co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for the month of June, with all the
appreciation expressed here in this room today. I also wish to express our
great satisfaction that we will have Ambassador Dhanapala in a very
responsible job devoted to the cause of disarmament.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished
representative of Yugoslavia for his statement on behalf of the Group of 21
and for his kind words addressed to Ambassador Dhanapala and to me, and I now
give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.
Mrs. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you,
Mr. President. I am certain that the head of my delegation,
Ambassador Garcia Robles would have wished to be present today in order to
leave on record his thanks to Ambassador Dhanapala for the work he has
accomplished in this Conference. However, in his absence, it falls to me to
speak, and it is for me an honour to address these words to
Ambassador Dhanapala, since it has been my privilege to work closely with him
and I have always learnt something from him, I have always gained something
new from him, something that has remained with me and something that will be
greatly helpful to me in my future career. I am convinced that
Ambassador Dhanapala will discharge the duties entrusted to him with great
success, and f should like to tell him that we shall miss him in this
Conference. We shall miss his advice and his wisdom. We are nevertheless
happy to know that he will continue to devote himself to the subject to which
we ourselves are devoting this period.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank the distinguished
representative of Mexico for her statement in tribute to
Ambassador Dhanapala. I now give the floor to Ambassador Dhanapala.
Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Thank you, Mr. President. I had not intended
to take the floor on my last appearance in the CD, but I have been deeply
touched by the very warm and generous references made to me by you personally
and by so many of my friends and colleagues in the Conference. I am conscious
that my intervention is delaying a very informal meeting on an important
subject, item 2 of our agenda, and I would not want to be the cause of
delaying work on this very important issue.
Let me very briefly begin by congratulating you on your successful tenure
of office as President, in particular the achievement that you have registered
in having successfully arranged an agreement to have an informal meeting on
item 2. I would also like to acknowledge the presence here today of two
distinguished visitors, Ambassador Kristvik of Norway and the Deputy Minister
of Iran, whose contributions my delegation has listened to with great interest.
As has been noted today marks my final appearance in the Conference on
Disarmament as head of the Sri Lanka delegation to this single multilateral
negotiating body, to which Sri Lanka was admitted as a result of a decision of
the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to
disarmament. In the three and a half years that I have been here, I have
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 417
22
(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)
benefited greatly from the contributions made by so many delegations, from the
co-operation and especially from the lesson in dedication and commitment to
the ideal of disarmament that I have seen amongst the participants whose
friendship and co-operation I have been privileged to have in the period I
have been here. Physically my position has moved from, I think, the seat
where the Federal Republic of Germany sits to where I am now, almost directly
opposite you. And in that odyssey, if I may call it such, I had the privilege
of occupying the seat which you occupy, Mr. President, in the month of
April 1984, and again, as I said, of enjoying the co-operation and friendship
of my colleagues.
In my diplomatic career, I think it is true to say that there are few
other bodies as august as this where I have been privileged to work with so
many distinguished and talented people dedicated to such a lofty goal as
disarmament. That we have made little progress in achieving our goal I think
is no reflection on the dedication of our efforts and the sincerity of our
motives. It is, as in the case of all United Nations endeavours, the
reflection of our times.
I would merely like to conclude by wishing you all success in your task,
and expressing my thanks to all of you for having given me your friendship and
co-operation. It has ben noted that I do not leave the field of disarmament,
and I will continue to associated with you in that field, although not
directly in the Conference on Disarmament. I have no doubt that my successor
will be able to count on the same friendship and co-operation that you have
extended to me.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Dhanapala for
his statement, in which I believe he has expressed many of the ideas that lead
us to believe that Mr. Dhanapala has fulfilled his duty in the best possible
manner. Accordingly, I believe that he will carry out his new functions with
the same ability and with the same enthusiasm.
On behalf of all of you, I express to him our best wishes for success,
and we shall always share with him our common aim of full and complete
disarmament.
Before I adjourn this meeting I would like to inform you that
His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands,
Mr. Hans van den Broek, will be addressing the Conference at its next plenary
meeting on Thursday, 2 July. May I suggest that, on that occasion, we start
our plenary meeting at 10.30 a.m., and not 10 a.m., in order to facilitate
arrangements relating to the visit of the Minister? I see no objection, so we
shall proceed accordingly.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Thursday, 2 July, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed in the timetable of meetings for
this week, the Conference will hold the first informal meeting on the
substance of agenda item 2 after I adjourn this meeting. I intend to open the
informal meeting in five minutes' time. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.
A71
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV. 418
2 July 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 July 1987, at 10.30 a.m.
President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.418
2
the 418th meeting of the Conference on
The PRESIDENT: I declare open
Disarmament.
At the beginning, I should like to extend a warm welcome in the
e Minister for Foreign
Conference to His Excellency Mr. Hans van den Broek, th
the Conference today as our
Affairs of the Netherlands, who will be addressing involved in
first speaker. Mr. van den Broek was adisting ishad Membedeof Parliament
until 1981 and is a well-known public figure.
the field of foreign affairs and for more than five years has been entrusted
already covering,
iver0ed an
nection he that field
by his Government with high responsibilities
l
983. I
9 Mar
course, disarmament matters. In .on Di
1 important statement in the then C~lheeis visitingsarmameusnagaint on Icam with
should like to express pleasure that
that all members of the Conference winfollow his statement of today
particular interest.. I am also happy note pr of
Mr. Jan Martenson, Director-General of the United Nations office at Geneva,
who is with us here today.
Allow me now to make a brief opening statement.
On behalf of the members of the watmeapPreciatDonato AmbassadornAlfafathe
behalf, I should like to express our he provided as President o
of Egypt for the efficient and able leadership
ief rcontainedemaining in perhisiod of closing this
Conference for the month of June. His contribution
statement will guide us in our work during
session. CD.
It is an honour for me to preside once c pagain pleasant over experience work k of of the le working with
ased
seven years in August 180,
the outstanding members o of this Conference. A few ?fdethem'I dicatedmsevery rvice to the
to see in this conference hall today, still devoting
cause of disarmament, international peace and security. I look forward to
working again closely with them and other members of the Conference on
Disarmament.
79DisTh~nuclearstestabana tess heefirstlitis
The agenda of the Conference on
unchanged since its inception in 1979. res and yet it
on the agenda, is an area where CD has made the least poe Final docent is
an issue to which the highest priority was attached by
the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
Even before that the international community had been vigorously urging the
nuclear-weapon States to end nuclear testing.
roved impossible to re-establish an ad hoc committee
Since 1983, it has proved and initiatives which,
pro
on a nuclear-test ban. In fact, numerous
been rejected, including the
pursued, could have achieved that goal Since 1945, over 1,600 nuclear
The need
18-month moratorium on nuclear testing.
saes and
searching have been rgfo thkableemechanismfigure ro ppoosal sitive
explosions
may
initiatives avhsng in the CD
initdirected towards a nuleteThisanl could be bexamined and
responses could be elicited, is urgent.
wish to pursue.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
3
(The President)
I shall make every effort to continue the informal consultations which
have already started on this item, with a view to reconciling the positions of
the various groups. With regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and
nuclear disarmament, informal meetings of the Conference have already
commenced.
With regard to the other items of the agenda where the Conference has
established subsidiary bodies, I am sure that progress is being made by the
Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of
Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden. Concerning the finalization of the draft
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) for submission to the resumed
forty-first session of the General Assembly, I hope that what has been
achieved so far will be preserved and enhanced under the capable and dedicated
chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles. The Ad hoc Committee on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, chaired by Ambassador Pugliese of
Italy, the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances, chaired by
Ambassador von StUlpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, and. the
Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, chaired by Ambassador Meiszter, the
representative of Hungary, will, I hope, succeed in their specially difficult
task of harmonizing the various positions.
That concludes my statement.
In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today
with its discussion of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in
outer space% However, in accordance with Rule 30 of the its Rules of
Procedure, any member wishing to so do may raise any subject pertinent to the
work of the Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of
the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Hans van den Broek, Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
Mr. van den BROEK (Netherlands): Mr. President, I am happy to be the
first today to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency for this
month. I thank you for your very kind words addressed to me and I am sure
that in this crucial month of the summer session the Conference will benefit
from your guidance -- guidance from an experienced man who also in the
early 1980s left his mark here in this very room. May I also thank
Ambassador Alfaragi of Egypt for the able and balanced way in which he
presided over the Conference last month. My delegation also wishes to welcome
the newcomers to the Conference, Ambassador Tarmidzi, from Indonesia, and
Ambassador Friedersdorf, from the Unit(' States, to whom we wish a speedy
recovery.
It is a privilege and a pleasure for me to be in your midst for the
second time. Since 1983, when I last addressed the Conference, the
international situation has undergone significant changes. We have put up
with disappointments and have gone through times of tension.
474
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
4
(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)
I greatly value this opportunity to address the Conference on
Disarmament, particularly at a time when the arms control horizon is
brightening. There are now real prospects for the long-sought breakthrough in
the bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which are
held, as we all know, in this very same city of Geneva. A first sign that
things might be taking a turn for the better was the successful outcome of the
Stockholm Conference last year, followed by the broadening of perspectives at
the Reykjavik Summit. And I have the impression that in this body too there
is a quickening of pace, at least in some areas. The negotiations on chemical
weapons are a case in point.
In my view, this certainly does not mean that we can afford any
complacency because it should be admitted that progress in this Conference on
a number of issues has been disappointingly slow. Too much time is often hat devoted to procedural matters at the expense of substance. I hope tfatler use
through a joint effort, we will be able in the period
of the unique negotiating mechanism with which this forum provides us. The
tasks ahead of us are indeed formidable.
Before going into the substance of these tasks, allow me to make a few
general remarks. There seems to be a tendency to focus solely on weapons,
nuclear weapons in particular. This is understandable in view of the dilemmas
posed by their destructive nature. My own country is acutely aware of this.
But it will be clear that armaments must be seen in the broader context of
relations between countries and between groups of countries. not primarily so-called
arms race, with which we are trying to come to grips,
autonomous self-propelling process. As we see it, armaments are the result of
political tensions and not the other way round. Of course, if a country's
armaments are well in excess of any reasonable defence needs, this will in
turn cause further mistrust.
Just as arms control cannot be divorced from political tensions, neither
can arms control be divorced from security policy. Arms control is not an end
in itself. It should contribute to the preservation of stability and peace.
In the East-West context this is best served by establishing a stable balance
at the lowest possible levels of armaments. Such a balance is in the interest
of peace in the world as a whole. Under present conditions, which include a
serious conventional imbalance in Europe, nuclear deterrence is an
indispensable element of a strategy that has kept the peace on this continent
for over four decades. I should like to stress that the only purpose of
deterrence -- dissuasion might be a more proper expression -- is to prevent
war, as is also clearly spelled out in a recent United Nations study on the
subject. At the same time we should make every effort to bring down the high
levels of armaments on both sides. But it would be irresponsible to discard
the present structure of peace, before a better alternative is firmly within
our grasp.
If you allow me, I will now deal with a number of specific issues
concerning the arms control process. The first point is the important role
that confidence can play in the whole process. Greater mutual c nffidenceiwill
make it easier to reach arms control agreements. Incidentally, r
also works the other way round: once a solid and verifiable agreement is
reached, this will contribute to further confidence. Especially in those
475
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.418
5
(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)
situations where real arms control is difficult to achieve, confidence-
building measures can be most useful in preparing the way. They can,
moreover, also serve as a complement to actual arms control.
The basic idea of the concept of confidence-building measures, as
developed in the European context, is to create more openness -- or
"transparency" if you like. One can thereby reduce the fears and mistrust
which too much secretiveness with regard to military matters can engender on
either side. In Stockhom, 35 countries reached agreement on a set of measures
including notification and observation of various military activities, as well
as provisions for on-site inspection. It will be a challenge for all of us to
work out confidence-building measures applicable in other parts of the world
as well, particularly in regions where tensions occur, and it would seem that
such measures, tailored to the specific situation, could play a useful role as
a first step forward towards political accommodation. The Netherlands has
advocated before such confidence-building measures in the areas of
Central America and the Middle East.
The second point concerns verification. It is increasingly recognized
that asking for on-site inspection is reasonable and legitimate. As we all
know, verification has been a stumbling-block in many arms control
negotiations in the past. The growing consensus on the need for strict
verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in
general. But let us bear in mind that verification is a matter where the
details -- the fine print -- are all-important.
The third point I would like to touch upon is that of deep cuts.
Reductions in nuclear weapons on.a scale we,dared not hope for at the
beginning of the decade now appear feasible. It is towards the goal of
banning long-range INF missiles that most progress has been made, a subject to
which my country attaches particular importance. We equally welcome the fact
that the United States and the Soviet Union are in agreement on the principle
of a 50 per cent cut in their strategic arsenals. It is clear that we have
come a long way, if we compare this to the much more modest limitations
contained in the SALT treaties of the 1970s. However, somewhere down the road
towards nuclear disarmament, one reaches a point beyond which the negative
impact of the conventional imbalance in Europe becomes untenable.
This brings me to the fourth point, the increasing need for arms control
in the conventional field.. As you know, we have been struggling with this
issue in the MBFR talks in Vienna for many years. This is an example of a
negotiating process that has been blocked by the twin problems of insufficient
transparency and disagreement over verification provisions. I do mean that
efforts to achieve meaningful results in that forum should be continued.
We are now also embarking on a new endeavour. The 16 NATO countries and
the 7 Warsaw Pact countries are preparing new negotiations with regard to
forces and armaments in the area from the Atlantic Ocean up to the Urals. Our
aim in those negotiations will be to remove the destablizing asymmetries
existing at present and to bring about a stable conventional balance at lower
levels. I am pleased to note that Eastern countries have now acknowledged
that asymmetries do exist and that they should be redressed. In our view, the
negotiations on conventional stability will have to devote special attention
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
6
(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)
to those elements of current forces that represent-a capability for surprise
attacks or massive offensive operations. Progress towards these goals would
be a major contribution to peace and security on this continent and could at
the same time increase the scope for further reductions in the nuclear field.
Of course, the emphasis on conventional arms limitations should in no way
be limited to Europe alone. Since the Second World War the world has come to
bear the scars of many grave conflicts, all of them involving conventional
arms, with devastating consequences for man and his environment. Eighty
per cent of world military expenditure is spent on conventional weapons. The
quickest rise in such expenditure is occurring in the developing world, where
poverty is greatest. Awareness of this sad truth seems to have led to a
growing recognition, in United Nations bodies as elsewhere, of the need for
greater attention to conventional disarmament. These are matters that deserve
serious consideration at the forthcoming Conference on Disarmament and
Development.
My fifth point concerns the trend in arms control towards the complete
elimination of whole categories of weapons. The biological weapons convention
provides a first example and it will, we all hope, be followed by a
comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. In the case of chemical
weapons we are moving from a prohibition of use to a complete ban on
development, production and possession. The example of the Biological Weapons
Convention shows that a third phase might be contemplated as well, in which
further confidence-building measures, notably the exchange of information on
research, might help further to ensure that no development of a certain type
of weapons is taking place.
As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, we surely are still far from
negotiating these weapons away. However,.as I pointed out, we are moving to a
possible ban on virtually a-whole category of these weapons, and we hope that
progress will soon be made on other categories as well.
An important condition for success in arms talks is that the forum one
chooses should be well suited for negotiations on the weapon system
concerned. This particular forum, the Conference on Disarmament, has a long
agenda. A realistic assessment of the agenda, its achievements and prospects
shows that chemical weapons offer the best chance of success. The
CW negotiations therefore deserve, in our view, the priority they receive in
the practical day-to-day work in Geneva.
Agreement on a ban on chemical weapons, would serve as a unique
illustration of the role the Conference on Disaramament can play as the single
world-wide multilateral negotiating body. Given the long-standing abhorrence
of these weapons shared by the world community, the CD now faces the historic
task of bringing about a treaty banning the production, possession,
development and use of these weapons. This task is a great challenge, but
certainly not an insurmountable one. Negotiating history shows great
creativity and perseverance toward this end. As in the past, the Netherlands
is anxious to make its contribution on that score. _
477
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.418
7
(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)
Determination should guide us in a joint effort to bring the chemical
weapons treaty within sight. In defining the essential characteristics of the
treaty, some basic facts are to be borne in mind.
Firstly, the convention must, by its very nature, be detailed so as to
cover all essential requirements; on the other hand, we must realize that not
every single detail can be foreseen or taken care of. Technological
developments will not come to a halt. The treaty should therefore provide for
a continuous review, among other things, of the lists of chemicals to be
covered under the different regimes of control and prohibition.
Secondly, verification remains a key component of every credible and
solid arms control treaty. That applies in particular to the chemical weapons
convention. There, verification requires essentially a three fold structure:
declaring and dismantling of stocks and production facilities; strict
verification provisions including routine inspection of the relevant part of
the chemical industry in an equitable but adequate way; and finally an
appropriate regime for consultation, fact-finding procedures and challenge
inspections.
The effectiveness of challenge inspections is closely related to the
efficiency of the routine part of the verification regime -- verification of
destruction and verification of non-production. A very stringent system of
challenge inspection, and that is what we need, will prove acceptable only if
it is reserved for exceptional cases of serious concern about compliance. The
first condition for an effective challenge-inspection regime is therefore an
effective system for routine inspection. The second condition in my view, is
that when a party colzsiders a challenge inspection to be necessary, no
obstacle whatever should be able to prevent the inspection from taking place.
The third condition is that an inspection should always and under all
circumstances lead to a quick and clear answer. The challenged State party
should therefore be under a stringent obligation to disprove the allegations
contained in the challenge request.
I am perfectly aware that meeting these conditions is not possible
without paying the price of a certain openness. I am, however, convinced
that, upon close consideration, this price is relatively small and is
convincingly outweighed by the common goal of an effective world-wide ban on
chemical weapons. Important work on this subject has been done in the recent
past, especially by the United Kingdom (see document CD/715) and by the
Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Netherlands will
consider making a further contribution to the discussion on this most
important subject when appropriate.
Recent reports on renewed use of t ise horrendous weapons in the war
between Iran and Iraq have once again ur. erlined the urgency of our work to
bring about agreement on a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention.
The chemical-weapons negotiations surely gained momentum this year. Let
us use the remaining two months of the summer session to the maximum, as well
as the later part of the year when the CD is not in formal session. Even if
the CD is not in session between September and January, this should not
prevent us from pursuing the work with vigour.
478
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
8
(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)
A topic on which the Conference on Disarmament can, I feel, do further
useful work is that of nuclear testing. You, Mr. President, mentioned it in
your introductory remarks. For too long we have been waiting for the
establishment of an ad hoc committee in which a great deal of concrete work
can be done. I think on this subject we would be best advised to keep in step
with the enhanced pace of nuclear arms negotiations. Now that strict
verification seems politically acceptable and in essence technically feasible,
it is only logical that, in parallel with a programme to reduce and ultimately
eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons, a step-by-step programme of
limiting -- and ultimately ending -- nuclear testing should be carried out.
Fewer nuclear weapons, fewer nuclear tests. I feel encouraged by the fact
that recent developments appear to confirm the validity of this approach,
which I have advocated on several occasions before.
For my Government, reaching a comprehensive test ban remains an important
goal. In combination with other measures, it would serve the useful purpose
of managing and containing nuclear arms development. Maybe in the past we
equated in too simple a manner the halting of nuclear tests with ending the
so-called nuclear arms race. What in the 1970s was labelled a "suffocation
strategy" did not, in my view, do justice to the role of nuclear weapons in
preventing war through deterrence. Having witnessed the intellectual and
political stalemate on this question, I venture to say that in these last few
months prospects for making steps in the direction of a test ban are not as
unfavourable as they seemed to be. We hope the States concerned will further
explore the possibilities of confidence-building measures in this area.
Observing each other's tests on a basis of reciprocity and exchanging
information on verification techniques are examples of measures that would
strengthen that desired confidence.
Turning to the realm of outer space, it is undeniably true that space
holds out great promises of scientific co-operation and achievements for the
benefit of all mankind. The world community should take care that military
competititon and destabilizing military.. activities will not take their place
as prime characteristics of this vast expanse surrounding our globe. Various
military functions in outer space are of a stabilizing nature, like satellites
for observation, early warning and also, in many respects, those for
communication. A call for the demilitarization of outer space, as sometimes
heard, is therefore, in my view, not only politically unrealistic but, in
fact, also damaging to stability.
The question of military developments in outer space is often associated
with research by the United States, and the Soviet Union too, with regard to
ballistic missile defence. Allow me two remarks on this. The first is that
the whole matter relates as much to Earth as to space. In fact the only
operational missile defence at this moment is ground-based. My second remark
is that the issue of defensive systems cannot be seen in isolation from the
so-called offensive systems. We have been witnessing some destabilizing
first-strike tendencies in this field over the past decade. We attach great
importance to an approach which seeks to counter such developments as part of
the 50 per cent cuts, in conjunction with an extension of the period required
for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
9
(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)
I have referred to the stabilizing nature of many satellites. Of course,
this is not the case for all satellites: in particular? some of those in low
orbit can be used for targeting. Banning all anti-satellite weapons would
therefore pose serious problems. Moreover, it would hardly seem feasible
because there are so many ways to destroy a satellite. But maybe it is not
too late to seek some way of protecting satellites in high orbit, which are
generally of a stabilizing nature. At a time when more countries are
gradually acquiring satellites, at least for civilian purposes, this is
becoming an issue for which a multilateral forum such as the Conference on
Disarmament clearly has a role to play in addition to ongoing bilateral
efforts.
It is time to look ahead to next year's third special session of the
United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. That session will offer us an
opportunity to take stock of how the world community has fared in matters of
arms control and disarmament since the session in 1982. The Netherlands
intends to play a constructive part at this Conference. I think that the
special session should learn from past disappointments. In particular, a
realistic approach aiming at practical progress can be more productive than
the grand designs often favoured in the past.
There is no need to convince delegations in this room of the very
important role the CD has to play. As I said before, the work of the
Conference has too often been diverted to fruitless quarrels on procedures. I
hope a common awareness will lead us on the road to improved working methods.
I believe that the annual resolution to be adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on CD activities could well benefit from a willingness to
apply the mechanism of consensus, which is so valuable in these cases.
Being here in Geneva, in this Palais des Nations, makes one even more
conscious that arms control is an extremely complex and long-term
undertaking. But despondency is out of place. This Conference on Disarmament
needs all the patience, determination and perseverance one can muster, because
the work to be done has everything to do with building a safer, a more stable
and-a more peaceful world.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Mr. van den Broek, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, for his important statement and for the
kind words that he addressed to the President.
I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative
of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.
Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me welcome you, the
representative of friendly Ethiopia, to the Chair of the Conference on
Disarmament. We are confident that you will guide our work in July skilfully,
so that at least some results will start to emerge from this session. It is a
pleasure for me to see you again in Geneva even if for a short period after
your years of absence. It was a pleasure for me to hand over the presidency
of this Conference for the month of June to Ambassador Alfarargi, the
experienced representative of Egypt, a country with which Czechoslovakia has
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
10
(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
extensive and friendly co-operation. Ambassador Alfarargi proved again by the
results of his presidency that he knows well how to use his experience and
diplomatic skill in order to bring about positive results to our so often
blocked and difficult negotiations.
Allow me to express our welcome to the minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Netherlands, Mr. Hans van den Broek, whose statement my Government will
study with the greatest care and interest. We'would like also to welcome new
members of our small disarmament Geneva community, namely, the Ambassadors of
Indonesia and the United States.
Allow me at the very beginning of my statement to express my thanks to
the Government of Canada for organizing an outer space workshop in Montreal in
May. As a participant in that workshop, I would like to stress that it was a
lively and very useful gathering which again drew attention to the necessity
to prevent an arms race in outer space, to achieve relevant agreements and to
ensure their effective verification. Especially as far as verification is
concerned, the workshop proved that there are ways to explore how it could be
done. New ideas were brought out and the exchange of views was sincere and
valuable. Our thanks and appreciation go also to Ambassador Beesley of
Canada, who was the master-mind of the workshop and served as leader of our
deliberations there with the famous Beesley approach, his skill at getting
everyone to speak his mind openly.
In fact, it is my intention to start my statement today with the problem
of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Czechoslovakia's approach
to the military aspects of activities in outer space proceeds from the
military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was published after
the Berlin meeting of its Political Consultative Committee on 28 and
29 May 1987. This military doctrine is strictly defensive in nature. In full
conformity with this defensive nature, the military doctrine of the
Warsaw Treaty calls simultaneously for the gradual-reduction and final
elimination of nuclear weapons and for the prevention of an arms race in outer
space.
That goal, on which there seems to be general consensus, is becoming more
urgent with each passing day, more acute with each specific step towards the
direct militarization of outer space. But the consensus is still not quite
general, since some States continue to act in accordance with the words of
former United States President L.B. Johnson "A State with clear superiority in
space science and technology will have enormous superiority at the
politico-military negotiations over the States without results in that field."
Realizing that outer space is now widely used for communication,
navigation, observation and early warning activities, we nevertheless consider
that there is one important circumstance which makes it possible to prevent
outer space from being completely militarized in the true sense of the word.
I mean the fact that to date, 30 years after the first man-made satellite was
launched into outer space, no weapons have been placed in orbit. No matter
whether it is a result of the existing treaties concerning outer space, or an
effect of the insufficient stage of development of the relevant military
technology, this state of affairs is highly favourable and worth preserving.
481
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
11
(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
We-maintain that all basic categories of weapons should be prevented from
being developed and deployed: weapons hitting targets in space from the
,Earth, space-to-space weapons and those we are most interested in,
space-to-Earth weapons. As a relatively small country, we cannot afford an
effective defence against attack from above. But not only small or
medium-sized countries have this problem. Even large countries with huge
military potentials cannot create a reliable defence against attack coming
from outer space above their territory. Thus, the permanent deployment of
weapons in outer space would represent, for all countries without distinction,
a permanent and highly destabilizing threat.
We recognize today the two tendencies which represent a clear and
mutually connected threat in this regard: on the one hand, an effort to
introduce weapons into outer space under the guise of a defensive shield and,
on the other, continued efforts to develop and deploy anti-satellite weapons.
Both of these activities should be prohibited, since even if only one of them
is continuing, there will be enough room for developments in both.
Anti-ballistic and anti-satellite systems would have many common features.
The aim of both these types of system is to act against objects moving through
space. From the technical point of view, both types of system have a number
of elements which fulfil id(ntical or similar functions. Anti-satellite
weapons will thus have certain anti-missile capacities, and vice versa. This
applies, for instance, to objects armed with sufficiently strong lasers. Such
objects could be used for attacks against satellites as well as against
missiles. The fast development of sensors is another field which is common to
anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons. The dual-use possibilities are also
apparent in the case of radar systems used for detecting and tracking missiles
and artificial Earth satellites. It may safely be presumed that with the
intensified development of SDI, efforts aimed at integrating military
functions in one space object will necessarily lead to an increase in such
dual-use elements. One might conclude that today anti-satellite and
anti-missile activities and their prohibition can hardly be considered in
complete separation.
In this connection, we highly appreciate the Soviet moratorium on the
testing of ASAT weapons which has been in force since August 1983. A certain
moderation in this regard has also been imposed on the United States
Government by the United States Congress. But the United States
Administration seems to be unhappy with this moderation, and recently we have
been witnessing efforts to resume ASAT testing. It would be deplorable if the
testing resumed and a promising period of calm at ASAT proving-grounds was
brought to an end.
As the United States SDI programte advances, there is clearly an
uncomfortable obstacle in its way, whi h is the Soviet-United States
ABM Treaty of 1972. We are being offer d a so-called "broad interpretation"
of the Treaty, which in fact means its liquidation. Just acouple of days ago
we marked the fifteenth anniversary of the conclusion of that Treaty, and it
was a good opportunity to ponder its significance. Had it not been concluded
15 years ago, the development of anti-ballistic systems would have continued
unabated. And it seems quite probable that by now, anti-missile weapons, able
482
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
12
(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
to strike not only missiles but a whole panoply of targets, would have been
deployed in outer space. The ABM Treaty, which prevented all this, certainly
deserves better treatment than its dissolution through a "broad
interpretation".
Much has been said and written about the destabilizing consequences of
the deployment of weapons -- irrespective of whether we label them defensive
or offensive -- in outer space. Any measure will lead to a countermeasure,
all advantages gained through the introduction of certain weapons will be
nullified by the other side, and not necessarily by the deployment of the same
weapons. We presume that all countries actively involved in outer space are
clearly aware of the inevitability of this process of action and reaction. It
is confirmed for instance by the fact that the United States is intensively
increasing the resistance of its space systems against the effects of laser
weapons, electronic jamming, electromagnetic impulses created by nuclear
explosions, etc. The spiral of the arms race in outer space would continue
steadily, as it did on Earth, and no country would ever be in a position to
achieve decisive and permanent superiority. Besides, even the most rosy and
rather illusory theories about the effectiveness of a multilayer anti-missile
defence admit that the penetration rate will amount to at least 0.4 per cent,
which, with today's arsenals, represents a huge destructive potential. It
would inflict immense damage, especially on civilian populations, and no
responsible Government should gamble with such numbers or engage in a course
of action that would increase the probability of "testing" defensive shields
in practice -- especially not in the hope that after the first nuclear strike
the retaliation will be bearable.
It will be very important to evolve appropriate methods of verification
which will ensure that outer space is not being used for aggressive military
ends. The Montreal workshop I mentioned a while ago dealt with one of the
possible approaches, that is verification through satellites. Another
possible approach -- inspection of objects launched into outer space -- is
reflected in the proposal advanced by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of
the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, at the beginning of our spring session. It is our
feeling that a combination of the two approaches, that is verification "from
below and from above" might lead to the establishment of an effective and
viable verification system for outer space. Much still has to be discussed,
especially how practically to combine the use of national satellites with
their possible international use for verification purposes. My delegation
would be only too happy if the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space could also discuss these important problems.
We are following with keen interest the Soviet-United States negotiations
on nuclear and space weapons. We find it encouraging that progress has been
achieved at these negotiations and there are now real prospects for most
dangerous nuclear weapons to be eliminated from Europe. The conclusion of
agreements on these matters and their subsequent implementation would
undoubtedly be facilitated if the nuclear Powers confirmed their readiness to
eliminate the nuclear threat, starting with a halt to the further qualitative
and quantitative build-up of nuclear arsenals. An important step in this
direction would be the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon
tests.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.418
13
(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
Our Conference can be considered a multilateral body with considerable
experience in the area of a CTB. it was actively involved in the negotiation
of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty; later it received reports from the
participants in the trilateral negotiations on a CTB, the USSR, the
United States and the United Kingdom; it supports the activities of the group
of scientific experts on seismology; it discussed verification and compliance
aspects of a CTB in an ad hoc committee in 1982 and 1983. Moreover, we keep
on discussing the problem widely at plenary meetings, where a number of
important proposals have already been made. One of them, of which my country
is a sponsor, came right at the beginning of the present summer session.
The document in question, entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", was submitted by
the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovsky, on 9 June. It
reflects the firm readiness of the socialist countries to 'negotiate in order
to achieve the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. The proposal is
envisaged as a platform for negotiations within our Conference, but not as the
only one, since we have repeatedly reaffirmed our readiness to discuss any
constructive proposals. In our opinion, the substance of all existing
proposals could be discussed in an ad hoc committee on the CTB with an
appropriately formulated mandate.
Today I would like to draw the attention of the distinguished
representatives to section D of the proposal, entitled "Ensuring compliance
with the Treaty". It is clearly stipulated here that verification of the CTBT
would be assured through both national and international means of
verification, including on-site inspection. Important information gained
through national technical means will be placed at the disposal of the
appropriate organ established under the Treaty and, where necessary, may also
be placed at the disposal of other parties. We believe that such a provision
rightly combines the national nature of the technical means at the disposal of
some countries with the contribution they may make to all the participants to
the treaty.
International verification will be based on the continuous international
exchange of level II data in accordance with agreed guidelines which will form
an integral part of the treaty. For this purpose, a network of seismic
stations with standard specifications will be established. We consider that
members of the international inspectorate should be allowed to participate in
the operation of these stations. In addition, the exchange of data on
atmospheric radioactivity would also be carried out.
After the treaty enters into force, it would be necessary to ensure that
no nuclear explosions were being carried out at the former test ranges. For
this to be reliably ensured we again propose the participation of both
national personnel and international inspectors. Procedures for such
verification will have to be agreed in advance.
Should national or international measures be insufficient to provide an
assurance that the treaty is being fully complied with, an event whose status
is unclear might be clarified through an on-site inspection. Each State party
would have the right to request such an inspection in the territory of another
State party. We maintain that the request for an on-site inspection should
a84
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
14
(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
cite grounds for the request, and that the requested State would be obligated
to grant access to the locations specified in the request. My delegation is
not going to suggest complete and detailed guidelines on how to handle the
requests, how to conduct on-site inspections or how to define the rights and
functions of the inspecting personnel. We have a number of ideas in this
regard, but the best way to proceed in formulating criteria and procedures for
on-site inspections will be through common efforts in the relevant
ad hoc committee, so that the interests and preoccupations of all future
the
participants in the CTBT are duly taken into account. The same applies to
treaty organs, especially the international inspectorate, for which the
functions and rules of procedure could be mutually agreed and specified in an
annex to the treaty.
Our delegation welcomes the fact that the CD has decided to hold a number
of informal meetings to discuss item 2 of our agenda. We consider this a step
in the right direction, since the elimination of .the nuclear threat and the
initiation of a process of gradual nuclear disarmament is the highest priority
on the agenda of this Conference. Let me in conclusion express the hope of my
delegation that we will adopt a similar constructive attitude with respect to
agenda item 1 and establish, before the end of this summer session, an
appropriate framework for further urgent work in this regard.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda for his statement and for the
kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give, the floor to the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Comrade President, first of all I would like on behalf of the
Soviet delegation to welcome you as the President of the Conference for the
month of July. July is the central period in the work of the Conference,
whose outcome to a great extent influences the results of the year as a
whole. We are confident that you will successfully guide our work during this
intense period because we know you as an old colleague who successfully
represented his country at the Conference (at that time the Committee) on
Disarmament in 1980-1983. Moreover, those who participated in the work of the
Committee on Disarmament seven years ago remember very well your able
stewardship of the Committee in August 1980. It is also a pleasure for me to
welcome you to this post because you represent a country with which we have
long had traditionally good and friendly relations.
I would like to take this opportunity to express our delegation's
gratitude to the 'distinguished representative of Egypt, Admbassador Alfarargi,
for his skilful guidance of the Conference during the previous month.
Today the Soviet delegation would like to share some views regarding the
progress of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is our
understanding that at present all participants in this forum unanimously
consider these negotiations the most promising direction in the work of the
Conference on Disarmament. The position of the Soviet Union and the other
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
15
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
Warsaw Treaty States regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons is well
known. Let me just recall the communique on the Session of the Political
Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty States held in Berlin on 28 and
29 May this year:
"The States participating in the session favour the earliest possible
elimination of chemical weapons. They reiterate their preparedness to
complete the preparation of an international convention banning chemical
weapons and providing for the destruction of the stockpiles of such
weapons and the industrial basis for their production by the en;i of this
year."
During the summer session of the Conference the Soviet delegation intends to
work resolutely for accelerated progress towards this goal.
At the plenary meetings of the Conference many representatives have also
emphasized the need to speed up the preparation of a chemical weapons
convention. We note with satisfaction the desire of Norway to do its utmost
to contribute to the multilateral negotiations on the chemical weapons
convention, which was expressed by Director-General for Security and
Disarmament Affairs in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Bjorn Kristvik, in his statement on 30 June this year.
The Soviet delegation shares the view expressed early last month by the
representative of Sweden, Mrs. M.B. Theorin, that the progress already made in
the negotiations shows that a convention is within reach and that compromises
will now have to be made and difficult decisions taken. We have studied with
interest the analysis of the situation at the negotiations contained in the
statement by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad,
on 16 June, as well as his ideas and assessments on specific aspects of the
convention which is being drafted. Neither did we ignore the statement by the
NATO member States at the June 1987 session of the NATO Council to the effect
that those countries are determined to reach in the very near future an
agreement on a comprehensive, global, and effectively verifiable treaty
providing for a complete destruction of the existing arsenals within agreed
time limits and the prevention of continued production of these weapons. We
hope that this stated determination will be translated here, at the
Conference, into concrete deeds, into real policies, into a search for
compromises, into agreements.
It was with particular interest, therefore, that we learned several days
ago that the newly appointed head of the United States delegation would
address the Conference on 30 June. We expected Ambassador Freidersdorf to
outline the United States' attitude towards what is taking place at the
chemical weapons negotiations, and to make his own contribution to their
successful advancement. I will not conceal the fact that we were a little bit
puzzled by his words that the United States was seeking "equitable arms
control agreements in the areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons and
conventional forces". Puzzled, because the issue of banning chemical weapons
has been put on the same footing as the problem of nuclear testing, towards
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.418
16
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
which the United States Administration's negative attitude is well known. We
would like to hope that this formula does not mean that the United States
approaches the chemical weapons negotiations in the same way it is approaching
the issue of multilateral negotiations on banning nuclear weapon tests.
We were also surprised by the fact that, without reacting to all the
numerous questions under consideration at the negotiations, the distinguished
United States representative concentrated solely on inviting Soviet
representatives to visit a chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele.
Is this really the key to success at the multilateral negotiations on banning
chemical weapons? Would it not have been more useful to concentrate on those
crucial questions which are currently holding back progress at the
negotiations?
On many such questions the United States position still remains unclear.
This also refers, in particular, to such a field as challenge inspections.
The present United States views, in our understanding, presuppose that a
challenge without the right of refusal should cover all sites and facilities
on the territory of a State party without distinction as to the form of
ownership or the degree of Government control thereof. Such was the
United States interpretation of article X of its draft convention in CD/500.
And what, in this connection, would its interpretation be of article XI of the
same document? Is this article deleted or not? And if it?r Rains, tthenhin
what cases does the United States side propose to apply
issue of challenge inspections depends to a considerable degree on the answer
to this question.
There is another problem -- that of responsibility for the actions of the
subsidiary of a company registered in one of the States parties to the future
convention. In this case, two situations may arise: when the subsidiary
operates on the territory of another State party, and when it operates in a
State not party to the convention. A third situation is also possible: that
in which an international company registered in the territory of a State party
operates in the territory of such a State. Such transnational corporations
sometimes operate on the territory of other countries as a "State within a
State", refusing to allow the activities of their subsidiaries to be
monitored. The question of which State should be responsible for ensuring
that these corporations observe the provisions of the convention is therefore
of practical importance. Answers to this question would seem to be called for
not only from the United States but also from other States in whose economic
systems companies with considerable networks of affiliates on the territory of
other States play an extensive role.
I have already touched upon the problem of confidence as applied to the
negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are in favour of
confidence. But we do not understand how the goal of confidence-building on
the eve of concluding a convention can be combined with attempts to start at
all costs the production of new types of chemical weapons, in particular
binary weapons. If the conclusion of the convention is considered to-be such
a long-term objective as a nuclear test-ban, the production of chemical
487
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.418
17
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
weapons has its own -- although peculiar -- logic. But if the plan is still
to conclude it as early as possible, which means that all chemical weapons
will be destroyed, then why expand their production? Why waste money and
material resources?
Assessing the situation at the chemical weapons negotiations we note not
only the encouraging progress recently achieved, in particular at this year's
spring session, but also the disturbing fact that at present the negotiations
are clearly marking time. The discussion of a number of questions resembles
walking in circles rather than moving ahead. Take, for example, article VI
(Activities not prohibited by the Convention). When we were leaving in April,
a number of participants promised to analyse their positions and come back
with concrete answers. But we continue to hear from them nothing but
questions. Moreover, attempts are beginning to be made to disavow compromises
achieved through arduous efforts, to delay agreement on the convention. Can
we not see behind all this a fear of the possible early conclusion of the
convention, that has become so obvious of late?
We may be told that, now that a number of major questions of principle
have been settled, the time has come for meticulous technical work on certain
details. This, I agree, is also necessary. But here too, not all the
opportunities are used. For example, a start could already have been made on
drafting a concrete text for annex IV, section V, on verification of the
elimination of chemical weapons stocks, as was agreed upon in the Group on
Cluster I at the very beginning of the session. Unfortunately, there has been
no progress here either.
At the same time the main task at the current session of the Conference
as far as chemical weapons are concerned would seem to consist in finding
solutions of principle to those few issues where there is as yet no general
political agreement, and above all the problem of challenge inspections and
non-production of chemical weapons by commercial industries. In this context
we note with satisfaction the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc
Committee, Ambassador Ekeus, who during the spring session organized working
meetings and consultations on some of these questions.
The present advanced stage of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical
weapons imposes on the participants yet another responsibility. The consensus
parts of the "rolling text" -- which, by the way, make up the bulk of it --
are the result of complex, prolonged negotiations and represent a package of
delicate interrelated compromises. They lay down the conceptual basis of the
future ban on chemical weapons which must be comprehensive and include not
only all stocks but also the development and production of such weapons; this
ban must be observed in the process of "non-prohibited' activities and must be
guaranteed by the most effective controls, ranging from systematic
verification to the challenge inspection mechanism.
For these reasons the results of many years of efforts should be
approached with care, if, of course, one's basic starting-point is the need
for the rapid conclusion of the convention. A very alarming situation has
arisen, in our opinion, as regards reaching agreement on the order of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
destruction of chemical weapon stocks. Article IV of the "rolling text" and
its annex contain a set of important provisions which seemed to have received
general support. However, the introduction of document CD/757 by the French
delegation may, however, cause considerable difficulties in the negotiations.
We naturally proceed from the premise that the order of destruction must
be based on the principle of undiminished security of States during the entire
destruction process, as has already been agreed in annex IV, section II.
However, the specific conclusions drawn from this general premise in
document CD/757 lead us neither to the conclusion of a convention, nor to the
ensuring of security.
What does the French document actually suggest? It provides that the
States parties to the convention will have the right to retain production
capacities and manufacture chemical weapons, and also acquire such weapons,
for at least eight years and possibly longer after the convention enters into
force. Moreover, this right would be granted not only to States possessing
chemical weapons but also to those without them. As a result, the States
possessing chemical weapons could renew their stocks (within the limits of the
"security stock"), while those without could establish such "security
stocks". This constitutes, in essence, a call for the legalized build-up and
proliferation of chemical weapons. This suggestion leads not to equal
security, but to increasing equal insecurity.
The security of the parties to the convention could, in our view, be
ensured immediately after its entry into force through the implementation of a
number of measures which would safely freeze stocks at current levels until
they are destroyed, and would rule out preparations for their use as well as,
naturally, their actual use. This would involve, first and foremost, the
declaration of all the existing stocks, their placing under systematic
international control with the help of on-site inspections and continuous
monitoring with instruments, and the adoption of measures to ensure that the
chemical weapons are not removed from the store except to a destruction
facility. The relevant provision contained in paragraph 2 of article IV of
the "rolling text" has been agreed upon by all delegations, and only one
delegation has reserved its position. Moreover, the removal of chemical
weapons from the store to a destruction facility should be conducted under
international control. This provision, contained in the annex to article IV,
section V, paragraph 6 (b), has been agreed upon by all participants in the
negotiations.
The implementation of the above measures, which would in essence place
chemical weapon stocks under "international arrest", would put all parties in
an equal position in terms of their security.
The authors of document CD/757 consider that the security of all States
parties may be called into question either gradually (e.g. as a result of
delays in the timetable for the destruction of the stockpiles as a result of
material difficulties) or suddenly (e.g. the exit from the convention of one
of the States parties or its refusal to continue with the elimination of the
remaining stocks). We agree that theoretically such situations may arise.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.418
19
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
However, the response to them should be different from that recommended by the
authors of this document. If a State begins to experience material or
technical difficulties in the process of destroying its stocks, it should be
granted assistance in order to ensure compliance with the schedule of
destruction.
It is another matter when a State refuses to continue destroying the
stocks. This is a flagrant violation of the convention, with all the
consequences that follow. This problem should be solved by creating an
effective mechanism which would ensure compliance with the convention.
Let us suppose, finally, that a State possessing chemical weapons
withdraws from the convention and unfreezes its chemical weapon stocks. This
will result in an exceptional situation. The paradox of the French proposal,
however, lies in the fact that while calling for equal security for States
parties to the convention, it may objectively increase the likelihood that
such an exceptional situation will arise because the number of States
possessing chemical weapons will grow after the convention enters into force.
It is one thing when all chemical weapon production facilities are closed and
secured, and quite another when even one such facility remains. On the basis
of this facility and its infrastructure it will be an easy and rapid task to
exceed the limits of "security stocks". Hence, the dangerous consequences of
a State's withdrawal from the convention will also increase, since it will
possess not only reactivated stocks but also the potential for their rapid
build-up, renewal and upgrading.
Approaching the problem of chemical weapons soberly and realistically,
one should proceed from the fact that there are States which possess such
weapons and States which do not. As was shown above, the conclusion of a
convention should eliminate this difference, and this would happen immediately
after the convention enters into force. However, document CD/757 is based on
the premise that the status quo existing before the convention enters into
force can be changed to the advantage of those States that do not possess
chemical weapons or would like to increase their stocks, with all the
dangerous consequences I have already mentioned..
The French document, in our opinion, runs counter to the essence and
spirit of the convention being prepared and the entire consensus approach in
chemical disarmament. I will not even mention the fact that the approach
contained in this document would seriously hamper the monitoring of chemical
weapon stocks. In the final analysis, a contradictory scheme for the
legitimizing of chemical weapon industries -- and the most dangerous aspects
of them -- is placed in opposition to the concept of consistent chemical
weapons elimination.
As a result, not only will there not be an increase in confidence among
the parties to the convention, but new sources of concern will appear which
may divide the States that have signed the convention. In our view this
cannot either ensure security for the parties to the convention, nor encourage
them to join it on a large scale.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 418
20
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
The Soviet delegation considered it essential to set out frankly here the
results of its analysis of document CD/757, in order to encourage
business-like negotiations and enhance mutual understanding between the
participants.
Although the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament has justime
begun, there is not a great deal of time ahead. We consider that biding t
is quite inappropriate at the present stage in the negotiations, and call upon
all participants at the Conference to make efforts to expedite the process of
drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin, for his statement and for the kind
words he addressed to me and to my country.
That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish
to take the floor? I see none.
As usual, we need now to adopt the timetable for meetings to be held by
the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. Of course, the timetable
is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. The Conference will
hold its second informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2 on
Thursday, 9 July, immediately after the plenary meeting. This is noted in the
timetable. I should like to add that the Ad hoc Committee re-established
under item 6 on the agenda entitled "Effective international arrangements to
,assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons" will hold its opening meeting next Tuesday in this conference room,
immediately after our plenary meeting scheduled for that day. This is also
n agrees to
shown in the to thebtimewhich table,aI shalldtakeiittthat?theuCotoday. nferencef there is
no objection
It was so decided
That concludes our business for today. The next plenary 10e a.m. of the
Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 July,
plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.419
7 July 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 7 July 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. T. Terrefe
GE. 87-6?rrn /QA- .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
2
The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 419th plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament.
In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins its
discussion of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including
all related matters". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure
however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject pertinent to the
work of the Conference.
At the outset, I wish to extend my warm welcome to His Excellency
Ambassador Kahiluoto, Director for Political Affairs of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Finland, who is addressing us today as first speaker. I am
sure that all members appreciate the contributions made by Finland to our work
and will follow his statement with particular interest.
I should also like to cordially welcome to the Conference today the
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who is
present at this plenary meeting.
I would also like to welcome the participants present today in this
conference hall in the 1987 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme.
We wish them well and success in their work.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland,
Norway, Japan and Poland. In accordance with the decision taken by the
Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the first
speaker, the Director for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Finland, Ambassador Kahiluoto.
Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating
you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for
the month of July. I am sure that the work of the Conference this month will
greatly benefit from your experienced guidance. I am also very grateful for
the warm words of welcome which you just addressed to me when giving me the
floor.
I shall devote my statement to the issue of chemical weapons. A complete
ban on chemical weapons is one of the foremost goals of international
disarmament efforts. It is, to us, a priority item on the agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament, and the subject of intensive negotiations..
This is rightly so. Chemical weapons are repugnant weapons of mass
destruction. Innocent and unprotected civilians are at particular risk in the
event of their use. Yet, chemical weapons are perceived to be militarily
useful. A number of States are believed to possess chemical weapons, although
only two States have so far openly acknowledged that they do. Moreover, many
States, in the developed and developing world alike, possess the required
industrial capabilities to manufacture lethal chemicals for weapons purposes.
Clearly, the danger of proliferation exists. Indeed, it will grow unless
effective steps are taken.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.419
3
(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the use of chemical weapons in war. Yet
this funadamental norm of international law is being violated. In the
Iran-Iraq conflict, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has been demonstrated
by the team of experts repeatedly dispatched to the area by the United Nations
Secretary-General. Persistent reports that chemical weapons may also have
been used elsewhere add to our deep concern.
Finland condemns the use of chemical weapons. Their use in the Gulf war
threatens to undermine seriously the authority of the Geneva Protocol to the
detriment of the security of each and every one of us.
Such a serious breach of international law underlines the urgent need to
terminate the Iran-Iraq conflict by peaceful means as soon as possible.
Finland supports the efforts by the United Nations Security Council to bring
this about and urges the two belligerents to co-operate with the Council to
this effect.
Finland has consistently supported a complete and verifiable prohibition
of chemical weapons on a global basis. At this Conference, we have sought to
contribute to the achievement of this goal primarily through our technical
expertise on verification of various aspects of the future convention. I
shall return to this contribution in somewhat greater'detail later on in my
statement.
We have noted with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the
negotiations on a chemical weapons convention lately, particularly towards the
end of last year and this year. We are grateful to the Chairman of the
Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, for the firm guidance he has
given and continues to give to this important and highly complex negotiation.
Despite progress, a number of difficult problems remain to be solved.
Some are simply difficult in tecnhical terms. Others require difficult
political decisions. We are encouraged by the fact that both major military
alliances have, in their recent statements, reiterated their determination to
achieve early agreement on a chemical weapons convention.
Let me briefly mention three outstanding issues relating to the
convention which we consider to be of major significance.
First, there is the issue of existing stocks and their destruction.
There is by now widespread agreement that all chemical weapon stocks and their
locations should be declared very soon -- 30 days -- after the convention
enters into force for the State party concerned. We welcome this progress.
In our view, it is of cardinal importance to the credibility of the convention
that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning, and that their
destruction be promptly initiated according to an order of destruction yet to
be agreed upon. In our view, such an order of destruction needs to foreclose
any possibility for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention
enters into force.
494
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
4
(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)
Second, verification of the fact that no new chemical weapons will be
produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance.
Arrangements concerning non-production, unlike those concerning destruction of
existing stockpiles, do not have a fixed time-limit.
Arrangements concerning non-production must avoid unduly hampering the
legitimate operations of civilian chemical industry. There seems to be
general agreement on this point. At the same time, we feel, like many others,
that the additional supervision of the industry stemming from the verification
regime of non-production will not prove to be too burdensome. The civilian
chemical industry is already heavily regulated because of the potential
hazards it poses to health and the environment.
Third, challenge inspection undoubtedly remains the major unresolved
issue at this point. Sensitive security concerns of States are intimately
involved here. It is encouraging, however, that a reasoned dialogue on this
issue seems to have begun. Differences are being narrowed. In view of the
grave conequences which suspicions of undeclared stocks or production
facilities, if not promptly and satisfactorily allayed, would have for the
convention and international security in general, an effective system of
challenge inspections is clearly a necessity.
It has been quite clear from the very beginning that effective
verification of compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons
convention is essential for the parties to have any confidence in it.
Verification involves not only working out the necessary procedures in the
convention itself, but also development of reliable technical methods and
instruments to carry out specific verification tasks that those procedures
entail.
It is precisely this latter aspect of chemical weapons verification to
which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our
research project, conducted by a team of scientists from a number of Finnish
universities and funded by the Finnish Government, develops instrumental
methods for the detection, analysis and identification of chemical warfare
agents. Since 1977, the results of the work have been presented to the
Conference on Disarmament (and its predecessor) in the form of handbook-type
annual reports, the so-called Finnish Blue Books.
Altogether, 11 Blue Books have been published so far, including this
year's report. The latest report (CD/764) was introduced in the
Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this past Friday. It is our hope that
once a chemical weapons convention is concluded and enters into force, the
Finnish Blue Books will constitute a kind of technical verification data base
from which all States parties, and the Technical Secretariat in particular,
may benefit.
Let me now briefly summarize the work done so far. The first 10 years of
the project were devoted to developing analytical methods for three types of
laboratories -- portable detection kits, trailer-installed field laboratories
and stationary central laboratories -- as well as for collection of
identification data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors, and
degradation products. The findings were drawn together in the 1984 report.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
5
(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)
In the 1985 report, attention was turned to air monitoring of chemical
warfare agents. The report describes in detail various techniques for
collecting and analysing low-volume, medium-volume and high-volume air
samples. The two latest reports describe how these techniques were tested in
practice by means of large-scale field experiments. Kilogram amounts of
harmless simulants of warfare agents were released into the atmosphere as
finely dispersed aerosols. Air samples were then collected as far away as
200 kilometres downwind. At all distances, all the simulants released could
be detected and identified.
This is significant in two ways. First, the experiments prove that the
techniques developed really work in actual field conditions and are highly
selective and sensitive. Second, the experiments prove that even very small
releases of chemical warfare agents can be discovered at great distances if a
network of detection stations is available.
While verification of compliance with the convention will be primarily
based on data reporting and inspections, it is, in our view, important to have
available, as a complement, methods which can reliably detect and identify
atmospheric releases of chemical agents regardless of source.
Since air monitoring facilities are also needed for surveillance of
ambient air for reasons of environmental protection, it would not, in our
view, be necessary to establish a monitoring network solely for the purpose of
chemical weapons verification provided that the facilities are designed with
both purposes in mind. We will shortly present a working paper to this
Conference on this aspect of air monitoring.
Another important subject recently addressed by the Finnish Project on
Verification of Chemical Disarmament is automatic monitoring. In February
this year, the project organized a workshop in Helsinki for the purpose of
studying the potential applications of automatic monitoring systems in the
context of verifying a chemical weapons convention. Twenty-odd qualified
experts from a number of countries involved with the chemical weapons
negotiations participated. The proceedings of the workshop have just been
circulated to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/765. They were
introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last Friday.
We in Finland appreciate the work done on various aspects of arms control
verification in many countries, members and non-members of the CD alike. We
have followed with interest the Norwegian research programme of verification
of alleged use of chemical weapons since it was initiated in 1981. We are
also aware of the important work on this and other subjects of verification
carried out by Canada.
May I take this opportunity to thank the Governments of Canada and Norway
for the valuable meetings they organized for our benefit among others, in the
month of May. We found the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal as well as the
Oslo Symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention most informative on the
issues concerned.
496
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
6
(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)
At this advanced stage of chemical weapons negotiations, a certain amount
of co-ordination among the various national-level chemical weapons
verification projects might be in order. After all, they do have a common
goal: the rapid conclusion and effective functioning of a chemical weapons
convention. Specifically, we have in mind a division of labour where
outstanding technical verification issues would be apportioned among the
various interested projects for in-depth study.
The Ah hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would, in our view, be the most
competent body to help to identify such outstanding technical issues for this
purpose, perhaps even indicating an order of priority for their examination.
Based on such guidance, representatives for the various interested projects
could then agree among themselves on which of them would do what.
Today I have addressed only one item on the agenda of this Conference.
As you are surely aware, my country attaches great importance to the other
items as well.
We note with particular interest the fact that this Conference has, after
a certain pause, re-established an ad hoc committee for the consideration of
the question of negative security assurances. This is an issue to which
Finland has devoted several statements in the past. We continue to regard it
as very important and wish the Chairman, Ambassador von Stilpnagel of the
Federal Republic of Germany, every success in his difficult task.
We remain ready to participate in the discussion of this and the other
items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Hopefully, we can do so
as a full member of this important body in the not too distant future.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement
and for the kind remarks he addressed to the President. In conformity with
the decision of the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the
floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Huslid.
Mr. HUSLID (Norway): Mr. President, permit me at the outset to
congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, on your
assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of
July.
I have asked for the floor today to introduce -- and I consider this as a
special honour -- to introduce on behalf of Canada and my own country, Norway,
a concrete proposal in connection with the negotiations on the chemical
weapons convention. These negotiations have also just been extensively dealt
with by my Finnish colleague, and I am grateful for the positive comments he
made on the research made by the two countries. The proposal I have the
honour to introduce is contained in document CD/766, of 2 July 1987, which
concerns procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.419
7
(Mr. Huslid, Norway)
We know that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical
and biological weapons in war. That Protocol is?adhered to by more than
100 countries. It has, however, no verification provisions. For this reason,
an understanding was reached in this Conference in 1983 to incorporate in the
convention on which we are now negotiating a prohibition of the use of
chemical weapons. It is, of course, necessary to see to it that this is done
in a way which does not erode the status of the Geneva Protocol, which is one
of'the oldest arms control treaties. The incorporation of a prohibition of
the use of chemical weapons in the chemical weapons convention could, in fact,
reinforce the Geneva Protocol.
It is therefore necessary to devise a proper verification mechanism which
could be included in the new convention and applied in cases of allegations of
use of chemical weapons. In order to contribute to this, both Canada and
Norway initiated research programmes on verification of alleged use of
chemical weapons in this field in 1981. The results of this research have
been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. It follows from the
documents which have already been submitted that Canada and Norway have
studied all phases of the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons,
i.e. from establishment of an inspection team and the team's investigation to
submission of its report.
Against this background and taking into account the advanced phase of the
negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, Canada and Norway have
jointly elaborated a draft treaty text concerning general procedures for the
verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.
Any allegation of the use of chemical weapons would, of course, be a
matter of the most serious concern to the States parties to a convention
banning chemical weapons altogether. Immediate on-site inspection, whether at
the invitation of the State party on whose territory the alleged use of
chemical weapons occurred or at the request of another State party, would be
necessary for the purpose of maintaining the effectiveness and authority of
the convention. Thus provisions in article IX concerning consultations,
co-operation and fact-finding have relevance to verification of alleged use of
chemical weapons, and the procedures applicable for verifying such an event
should be included in an annex to article IX. We have thus elaborated a
proposal for such an annex. In drawing up this proposal we have consulted a
number of countries.
I cannot here go into any detail as to the concrete content of this
proposal, and I refer to the paper, but I would like to mention a few salient
points. The proposal requires that, upon receipt of a request from a State
party for an inspection, the International Authority shall immediately notify
the State party (or States parties) concerned of the requirement to conduct
on-site inspection within 48 hours. The State party (or States parties) so
notified shall make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the
inspection team. The team should comprise a number of International
Inspectors with the necessary qualifications, experience and training, as well
as supporting staff with special skills or training, who may be required to
assist the International Inspectors.
498
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.419
8
(Mr. Huslid, Norway)
The International Inspectors shall be permitted to take with them the
necessary equipment and supplies and have unimpeded access to the site or
sites. They shall collect enough samples so that a reliable conclusion may be
reached as to the allegation of the use of chemical weapons and also interview
people who may have been affected by the alleged use.
The samples shall be analysed by at least two designated laboratories.
The Technical Secretariat shall draw up a list of certified laboratories,
which must be in possession of standardized equipment for the type or.types of
analysis to be conducted. The Executive Council shall approve this list. The
Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analyses of
samples so that these results may be taken into account with the report of the
inspection team.
The report of the International Inspectors shall be.submitted to the
Technical Secretariat within 10 days of the completion of the inspection. The
report shall be factual in nature and contain the findings of the
International Inspectors. The Technical Secretariat shall provide a copy of
the report to the State party that requested the inspection, to each
State party that received the inspection, to the State party alleged to have
used chemical weapons, and to the members of the Executive Council.
Finally, Mr. President, I would like to add that the proposal contains a
clause which states that the Technical Secretariat, under the supervision of
the Executive Council, shall elaborate, and revise as necessary, technical
procedures and interview questionnaires for the guidance of International
Inspectors in the conduct of an on-site inspection.
The proposal tabled by Canada and Norway is based on six years of
research by our two countries in the field of verification of alleged use.
Canada and Norway submit this proposal as a basis for negotiations on the text
for an annex to article IX concerning general procedures for verification of
alleged use of chemical weapons. We hope that the content of this proposal
can be included prior to the beginning of the 1988 session of the Conference
on Disarmament in the rolling text, which will reflect the status of the
negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at that time.
The proposal which I have presented today, should be be seen in light of
the commitment of both Canada and Norway to contribute to an early conclusion
of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. It concerns a
question which so far has not been dealt with in detail in the negotiations.
In fact, the proposal is the first full-fledged text covering all phases of
the procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We
commend the proposal for your constructive consideration.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement
and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and I now give the floor to
the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.
Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like first of all to express
our warm welcome to you upon your assumption of the presidency for the month
of July. I am certain that under your eminent leadership we will make still
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
9
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
further progress in our deliberations. Japan and Ethiopia, though located far
apart, enjoy close and friendly relations. When we learnt in 1984 of the
hardships that had befallen your people, the Japanese people responded in the
spirit of solidarity by assisting your people in their brave efforts to
overcome the tragic situation. May I also express our sincere gratitude to
Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt for guiding us in the month of June.
I am happy to see Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General in charge
of the Department of Disarmament, at the rostrum today. Of my compatriots, he
occupies the highest post in the United Nations and I wish him every success
in his new assignment.
I would also like to welcome the United Nations Disarmament eil~ws who
are here with us today. I hope that they all gain valuable exp ie: c tt.r ;u;
the programme, including the visit to Japan sponsored by my Go er;:c,ent.
Today, I would like to address the question of outer space. while Japan
has been improving space technology for peaceful purposes, it has always
maintained the view that we should examine thoroughly the prevention of :;r;
arms race in outer space. We share the common wish that outer ;~e, t,_,_ last
frontier for mankind, should not become the means or arena of are;;-.i
conflicts. This wish is expressed in the United Nations General rs, iy's
resolution 1884 (XVIII), in which the Assembly "solemnly calls .:,11 its
to refrain from placing in orbit around. the earth any objects cs= :-uclea
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, nstai:.ir:: sac;
weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in ~,pacal and,
other manner".
To date, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the n to rates
of America have possessed by far the largest share of the technical ability to
make practical use of outer space, for example, in communicating via
electro-magnetic waves transmitted outside the atmosphere and in transporting
various hardware or at times men into outer space. In this context, my
delegation welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have
been engaged since 1985 here in Geneva in comprehensive bilateral arms control
negotiations, including negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space. Furthermore, my delegation especially appreciates the
resolution, with the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee at the
spring session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1985, of the problem, which
had been pending since 1982, of a subsidiary body on the prevention of an
arms race in outer space. In the Ad hoc Committee last year we examined a
wide range of substantial issues and, above all, exchanged concrete views on
the legal issues, including the question of definitions.
I would like to make a few remarks on the relationship between the
United States-Soviet nuclear and space talks and the discussions on the
prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament.
My delegation holds the general view that there is an organic
interrelationship between the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations and
the multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. Given also the
fact that the United States and the Soviet Union play a predominant part in
current space activities, the progress of their bilateral negotiations has a
r, nn
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part -.Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9 I
CD/PV. 419
10
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
critical impact on our discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan
therefore urges both the United States and the Soviet Union to make yet
further efforts for early progress in their negotiations. At the same time,
outer space is open to all and is not a possession of any country.. An
arms race in outer space would directly affect the security not just of the
two Powers but of all other countries in the world as well. We cannot afford
to be indifferent to this important issue. In view also of the rapid progress
in space development recently made by countries other than the United States
and the Soviet Union, we should proceed with . our work in the Conference on
Disarmament to examine fully what kind of multilateral agreements would be
useful.
What concrete approach should we take in the Conference on Disarmament to
the question of that prevention of an arms race in outer space? Arms control
and disarmament have a direct and important bearing on the security of each
country. My delegation's approach to the work of the Conference on
Disarmament is therefore based on the recognition that our disarmament
objectives should be realized in a manner which will ensure and enhance the
security of each country. We feel that we should work towards effective and
realizable goals, instead of preoccupying ourselves with political
declarations. This is how we should approach the question of the prevention
of an arms race in outer space as well.
First, we need to know fully and objectively how outer space is actually
being used. For example, early-warning satellites no doubt have military
functions, but they may also play a useful role in preserving strategic
stability. On the other hand, meteorological satellites collect
meteorological data over vast areas of the earth and serve important
non-military purposes -- in agriculture, fisheries and transport -- but they
may also be used for a military purpose. These factors need to be seen in
perspective.
We should endeavour to find what measures would eventually best ensure
our security in consideration of these many aspects. It would not be in
consonance with reality'to take, without delving into such issues, a sweeping,
generalized approach in the name of the non-militarization or the prevention
of the militarization of outer space. To do so would not ensure our
security. Instead, the approach we should take is to intensify our efforts to
gain an accurate grasp of exactly how outer space is being used in many
areas. It is only on the basis of a solid grasp of the facts that we can
formulate an objective judgement as to what kinds of activities in outer space
may endanger international peace and security. We may then proceed to
consider what measures may be mutually acceptable, effective and realizable on
a multilateral basis.
Based on the concept of our approach that I have just described, I would
like to make some observations on the main issues being discussed in the
Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
11
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
Mutual trust among States is a key element in arms control and
disarmament efforts. This applies in outer space as well. To strengthen
mutual trust, it is indispensable that all States should adhere strictly to
the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the principles of
international law concerning the maintenance of international peace and
security. It is also necessary to free disarmament discussions from political
propaganda.
The necessity for objective information for confidence-building among
States is set out in the first operative paragraph of last year's
General Assembly resolution 41/59 B, in which the Assembly "reaffirms its
conviction that a better flow of objective information on military
capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to
building of confidence among States on a global, regional, or subregional
level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements". It goes
without saying that our deliberation on the basis of objective information is
a prerequisite for fruitful results. Above all, the United States and the
Soviet Union, the leading States in space developments, have a very important
role to play in providing information. We note in this context that the
substantive information provided thus far by the Soviet Union is, in our view,
far from sufficient. It is hoped that this situation will be remedied.
The proposal to formulate a code of conduct as one of the
confidence-building measures touches on the fundamental issue of how we go
about regulating or controlling the activities of States in outer space, which
is singularly different from the Earth. It would entail highly complex
problems to try to apply an order or rules based on the relationships among
States on the Earth to activities outside the atmosphere or even beyond the
solar system, where physical conditions are quite different from those on the
Earth. We need to proceed carefully and thoughtfully in examining the
adequacy or limits of such application in the context of reviewing the
international laws on arms control and disarmament in outer space.
In connection with the necessity for objective information, the
deliberations on the expansion or strengthening of the reporting requirement
under the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space
are of considerable significance. My delegation supports the basic idea
behind such a proposal. As is clear from General Assembly
resolution 1721 B (XVI), entitled "International co-operation in the peaceful
uses of outer space", article IV of the Convention was drawn up on the basis
of the understanding that the independent judgement of each country should be
respected and taking into account how information was actually provided by the
countries concerned in accordance with the General Assembly resolution.
The items listed for obligatory reporting under article IV are therefore
limited to the minimum necessary for the identification of space objects. It
is true that such a registration regime based on the Convention is not
necessarily complete, but on the whole it has probably been effective with
respect to the peaceful use of outer space. My delegation believes it
necessary for us to examine fully from various aspects whether this proposal
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.419
12
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
would lead to concrete and pragmatic measures of arms control and
disarmament. There seem to be many difficult problems involved, especially as
regards the acceptability of the obligation to report military information,
which relates to the problem of verification.
I would like to touch upon the protection of space objects and their
activities. As the number of States that participate in space development
increases and their activities become more sophisticated and diversified in
the future, the need to protect space objects and their activities will become
more urgent. Up to now, Japan has launched 36 satellites for such purposes as
experimental launching, weather forecasting, communications and broadcasting.
We are planning to launch about 10 more satellites by 1990. Japan thus has a
keen interest in this issue of satellite protection. My delegation believes
that space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be
attacked and should be duly protected.
In this context, it is highly significant that a proposal has been made
to grant immunity to satellites in order to exempt them from attack. If the
purport of this proposal lies in non-interference with those satellites which
play an important role as NTM (national technical means) of verification, it
will contribute to greater stability between the East and the West, and my
delegation can support it. However, we should be very careful to make sure
that satellite immunity would not in fact protect some activities which might
endanger the outer space activities of other States. Much will need to be
done to determine what satellites should be granted immunity. At this point,
we should pay special attention to the fact that the purpose of protecting
satellites cannot be achieved solely by concluding a declaratory international
convention on the non-use of force.
Finally, I would Pike to touch upon a few basic legal issues which are
under discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space.
In reviewing the international law related to arms control and
disarmament in outer space, we cannot bypass the basic issue of definition of
a "space weapon". There are a number of complex problems which would make an
abstract definition quite inadequate. For example, how do we deal with
dual-purpose technologies? How do we set the criteria for defining a weapon?
Which should be regarded as more important, the purpose of use or the
objective function? It would seem much more practical to seek, through our
work to grasp how outer space is being actually used, to identify the
instances of military use, to categorize them, and to consider such measures
as may be called for.
As measures to secure compliance with article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, which prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons or other types of
weapons of mass destruction in space and other celestial bodies, we may recall
article XI of the same Treaty, which stipulates for the provision of
information on space activities and was later developed into the Convention on
Registration, and article XII, which stipulates for the opening of all
stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the on and other
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.419
13
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
celestial bodies to representatives of other States parties on a basis of
reciprocity. However, as I said earlier, the information to be provided under
the Convention on Registration is limited. Article XII of the Outer Space
Treaty, which was one of the key provisions seriously discussed in negotiating
the Treaty, stipulates for nothing with respect to outer space other than
celestial bodies. Therefore, those provisions are of only limited relevance
in relation to verification. We need to see if these limited provisions are
adequate to cope with the verification needs that arise from current space
activities.
There have been truly remarkable developments in space technology
compared to 1967 when the outer-Space Treaty was concluded. A large-scale
space tracking radar can provide crucial information and a satellite in itself
can apparently play an important role as a means of verification. Based on
these changes in circumstances, it would be useful to examine what kind of
technical verification means would be applicable to a multilateral
verification system. Conversely, if we can identify available verification
means, we may also be able to go on to see what kind of prohibiting provisions
can be agreed on multilaterally.
One important proposal in this regard relates to the establishment of an
ISMA (international satellite monitoring agency). There will be a number of
legal, financial, and technical problems to be resolved on this proposal.
However, my delegation shares the hope that such a proposal can contribute
towards the solution of the verification issues, and it is keenly interested
in seeing how the proposal is dealt with and developed in the future.
I have tried to set forth briefly the views of my delegation on the
issues before us. As a country devoted to technological development for the
peaceful use of outer space, we wish to continue to contribute to the
deliberations in the CD on developing a sharper focus on verification and
other problems, bearing in mind the technologies available to us.
I am hopeful that we will make substantial progress in our considerations
this year under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, the
Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Government of Canada
for organizing a very useful workshop on outer space in Montreal in May. As a
participant, I would like to say how grateful I was to Ambassador Beesley for
his personal attention to us.
Ever since the seventh century, the star festival has been observed all
over Japan in July, that is today. The festival owes its origin to the old
Chinese legend that the star Vega (the Weaver), who is separated by the Galaxy
from the star Altair, her lover, is allowed to meet him only once a year, on
this evening. The children make their wishes, while looking up at shooting
stars. Let us keep our sky ever beautiful and romantic.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement,
for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and for the reference he made
regarding the friendly relatinship and very fruitful co-operation that exists
between our two countries.
I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the
representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.
Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): It gives me pleasure to welcome you,
Ambassador Terrefe, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, a country
with which Poland enjoys friendly relations of close co-operation. Let me
congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on
Disarmament in July, which is usually a month of intensive work. I am sure
you will preside over the Conference's work in a most efficient and effective
manner and I pledge my delegation's support and co-operation in your
endeavours to achieve progress in our work. ?I also wish to use this
opportunity to express my delegation's sincere gratitude to your precedessor,
Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, for his skilful presidency in June. It is also
my pleasure to welcome the new head of the United States delegation,
Ambassador Friedersdorf. I wish him a successful stay in Geneva and we look
forward to the continuation of the co-operative relations we usually had with
his delegation and, of course, I wish him a speedy recovery. May I as well
warmly welcome in our midst today Mr. Akashi, the Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs.
For some time now, developments in international relations have been
marked by a particularly intensive search for disarmament. The multi- and
bilateral dialogues on security and disarmament have been intensified and a
number of important initiatives and proposals have been put forward. Of
particular significance in this respect are the Soviet Union's proposals of
15 January 1986 and their follow-up. Attempts are being made to establish a
new forum for disarmament talks in Europe, the region where the military
potentials of the two alliances are of particular density and magnitude.
All these efforts have a common source -- the feeling that the world is
really at a crossroads, that present actions will determine the future for
many decades to come, that every State, large or small, non-aligned or member
of an alliance should make its contribution toward barring the way to a
continuation of the arms race.
From this feeling of common responsibility for common security there also
follow Poland's recent proposals concerning nuclear and conventional
disengagement in Central Europe. The plan was first outlined by
Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish
People's Republic in his statement on 8 May 1987; permit me, in this
connection, to call to your attention document CD/754, which contains that
outline. Later, Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Orzechowski,
elaborated upon the plan at the Vienna CSCE meeting. Let me briefly discuss
the main ideas of the plan.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
15
(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
The plan aims at curbing the threat of armed conflict in Europe. It
provides for reducing armaments, both nuclear and conventional, qualitative
and quantitative restraints on the arms race, and the building of confidence
in the heart of the continent. The implementation of the plan should, on the
basis of equal security for all parties, result in assured military stability
at a relatively low level.
The territorial scope of the proposed measures would cover an extended
region of Central Europe (the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland), with a possibility of its extension to
cover the entire continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.
The measures proposed involve both nuclear and conventional armaments,
military doctrines and security-building and confidence-building. The plan
contains four main elements.
Firstly, the gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed
operational and battlefield types of nuclear arms. he aim is to commence the
withdrawal and reduction of mutually agreed types of nuclear arms -- not only
rockets, but also nuclear payloads, including those delivered at distances
under 500 km. All types of nuclear weapons should be covered by international
negotiations so that no "grey area" can emerge in this sphere.
Secondly, the gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed kinds
of conventional weapons, in the first place those with the greatest power and
precision of destruction, suitable for use in a surprise attack. In other
words, conventional weapons with remarkable striking power and precision which
are capable of use in offensive operations should also be subject to an
agreement. We are prepared to jointly specify the types of such weapons and
negotiate their withdrawal and reduction.
Thirdly, evolution of the character of military doctrines so that they
are mutually recognized as strictly defensive. A reorientation of military
doctrines so as to render them strictly defensive, in the mutual perception of
the parties, would facilitate the application of the proposed measures. It is
our view that both the content of military doctrines and the role they play
take on increased significance within the context of disarmament
undertakings. The consideration of a concept of non-offensive defence could
be of substantial importance.
Fourthly, a continuous search for, and agreement on, new
confidence-building and security-building measures and on a mechanism for
strict verification on the commitments undertaken. These confidence-building
and security-building measures should be both political and military in
character, and should be associated with measures for verification of
compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific provisions for observation
and inspection, mutually considered as effective, will have to be worked out.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.419
16
(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
The plan forms a comprehensive entity. However, every one of its
four elements may be seen as an autonomous offer as well. It is also a
flexible proposal, as we are ready to modify, complement and broaden its
particular elements. The details of the plan are being elaborated, and will
be presented in the near future.
The Polish plan has a common denominator with the 1986 Budapest
communique of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, as well as with the
other concepts of European disarmament on a subregional scale, for instance
the initiative of three political parties -- the German Socialist Unity Party,
the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia -- concerning a nuclear-weapon-free corridor. In drafting the
plan we have been inspired by experience going back to the Rapacki and Gomulka
Plans, by the ideas of the Palme Commission and by other concepts. Their
shared philosophy has been that of a search for reduced armaments and gradual
disengagement of the military potentials of military alliances in the centre
of Europe, the region of crucial importance for the security of the entire
continent and for the relationship between the two alliances.
This new Polish proposal is based on our unchanging conviction that
regional solutions can not only bring security to specific regions but, by
increasing confidence and enhancing political stability, also facilitate the
global construction of an infrastructure of peaceful co-existence.
The measures proposed in the plan are of direct and significant relevance
to at least three agenda items of the Conference on Disarmament. They could
be taken into consideration during the Conference's work on item 2, "Cessation
of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", item 3, "Prevention of
nuclear war, including all related matters", and item 8, "Comprehensive
programme of disarmament".
All the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament contain
problems of great importance and complexity. The highest priority, however,
is generally accorded to a broad range of problems of nuclear arms and nuclear
disarmament. Is it not a paradox that this is exactly the area where the
Conference has done so little?
Poland, like the majority of States represented here, is not a
nuclear-weapon Power. We do not feel, however, released from the sacred duty
of persistent activity in all international forums in support of halting the
growth of nuclear arsenals and starting the process of their elimination.
We believe that the Conference on Disarmament has not only the right but
a moral duty to tackle the problems of nuclear disarmament more deeply and in
a more concrete, business-like way.
While acknowledging the particular responsibility of the big Powers and
the need for the process of nuclear-arms reduction to be initiated by them, we
can hardly agreed with the unfortunate reality that a Conference attended by
all the nuclear Powers still devotes much more attention to procedural
disputes than to working out concrete measures. The bilateral talks between
the USSR and the United States will continue to play a significant role in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
17
(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
stopping the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear arsenals, but full-scale
nuclear disarmament can only be achieved as a multilateral undertaking with
the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, despite the
efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist States, as well as many other
States, the existing political realities, and especially the position of some
nuclear Powers, are not conducive to such business-like negotiations. In our
mind this should not, however, be regarded as a justification for the
situation, but, on the contrary, as an incentive to search for tentative or
partial solutions which are possible in the existing circumstances. It is
rather rare in any disarmament negotiations that it is possible to achieve an
ultimate solution in one step.
The May 1987 session of the Political Consultative Committee of the
States-Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Berlin, stressed the overriding
need for urgent, practical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. One
of the measures singled out in the communique of the session is a
"comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons testing as a high-priority measure
designed to put an end to the development, manufacture and refinement of
nuclear arms to bring about their reduction and elimination".
For years the nuclear-test ban has been the first item on the agenda of
this Conference, which after all has all the predispositions to begin
concrete, business-like work leading to a treaty banning nuclear-weapon
testing. As has been stressed in this hall time and again, all arguments
invoking the need for continued testing for reasons of strengthening of
security are now unwarranted. The Soviet Union, by its moratorium on nuclear
testing, which lasted more than a year and a half, demonstrated both goodwill
and much political courage. They have not, however, been reciprocated.
The socialist countries have come forward with yet another significant
initiative and submitted for the Conference's consideration a document
containing "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general
prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". This approach of ours is a flexible
one. The "Basic provisions" outline apossible framework for goal-oriented
work for a long overdue ad hoc committee. We are ready, however, to consider
any other proposal that will offer a basis for work leading to a conclusion of
a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests.
The "Basic provisions" do not contain, in our opinion, ideas unacceptable
to other groups of countries at the Conference. On the contrary, in drafting
this document its authors broadly took into consideration the views of other
States and their security concerns. The document also contains new ideas and
develops some concepts already raised at this or other forums.
In short, it is a product of new political thinking. But thinking, no
matter how progressive, will remain only a philosophical concept unless
supported by common action. We need such common action at this Conference if
we are to deal seriously with the nuclear-test ban. The "Basic provisions"
are an open invitation to common thinking and common action. We would very
much welcome the opinions of other delegations, as well as their own
proposals. Stimulating an exchange of views can only lead to more
goal-oriented work.
508
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
I listened with great interest to this morning's statements by the
distinguished representatives of Finland and Norway devoted to chemical
weapons. Those statements are still further proof of their countries' deep
and active interest in, and important contributions to the negotiations on the
chemical weapons convention. Before I finish my statement, I would also like
to touch briefly on the work of the Committee on Chemical Weapons.
My task is easier today as Ambassador Y.K. Nazarkin of the Soviet Union,
in his statement on 2 July 1987, gave an evaluation of the present stage of
the negotiations with regard to a chemical weapons convention and expressed
his delegation's uneasiness at the slowing down of the pace of work of the
Committee. My delegation fully shares his analysis and conclusions. In our
opinion, if we are to achieve decisive progress this year, as is professed to
be the desire of all, we have to concentrate our efforts more on the still
outstanding priority aspects of the convention rather than on issues of lesser
importance or urgency.
In particular, more goal-oriented and intensive work should and can be
done with regard to the finalization of articles IV, V and VI, including the
definition of a production facility, the order of destruction of chemical
weapons and regimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals remaining outside
schedule (1]. Moreover, challenge inspection, usefully dealt with by the
Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee during the spring session, should be taken up
by the Committee more vigorously.
We are grateful to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus,
and to the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Krutzsch, Mr. Macedo and
Mr. Nieuwenhuys, for their strenuous efforts, but real progress can only come
as a result of the common endeavours of all delegations and their genuine will
to make such progress.
Poland, being a country which does not produce, possess or intend to
acquire chemical weapons, is doing its best within its power to contribute to
the prompt finalization of the convention. The destruction of existing
chemical weapons and their elimination from military arsenals for ever will be
a long and difficult process, demanding strict and so far unheard-of
international control. It is therefore in our common interest to begin the
process as soon as possible. We support all initiatives which may be helpful
to eliminating chemical weapons, including regional solutions.
On the other hand, we are deeply concerned with some States' activities
leading toward the initiation of production of a new generation of chemical
weapons. Likewise disquieting are proposals put forward at our Conference
which would allow for the production of chemical weapons after the process of
destruction has started. Such an attitude, in our opinion, runs against the
spirit and the letter of the future convention. Indeed, we hope that the
authors of CD/757 will reconsider their position in favour of our common
goal -- an effective convention on a chemical-weapons ban.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9 1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 419
19
(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
We strongly believe that the remaining part of the summer session of the
Conference, as well as the time available before the beginning of the 1988
session, will, as in previous years, be used to the benefit of the
convention. We are glad to note that a similar view was expressed by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency
Hans van de Broek. We hope other delegations will be able to demonstrate a
similar approach.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement
and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes my list of
speakers for today. Is there any other member wishing to take the floor at
this point? I see none.
Members will recall that immediately after this plenary meeting the
Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
will meet in this conference room.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Thursday, 9 July, at 10 a.m. After that plenary meeting, the Conference will
hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2. The plenary
meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.420
9 July 1987
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 9 July 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)
(:F._R7_6;7#; AS/QSnw
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.420
2
The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 420th plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament. In conformity with its programme of work, the
Conference continues its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention
of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with Rule 30 of
its Rules of Procedure however, any member wishing to do so may raise any
subject relevant to the work of the Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Canada
and France. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada,
Ambassador Beesley.
Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, as this is the first opportunity
that I have had to take the floor under your presidency, I should like to
express, on behalf of Canada, my pleasure and my government's pleasure at
seeing you, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, assuming the
important role of President of our Conference for the month of July. I would
also like to take the opportunity to express my appreciation for the fruitful
and constructive work done by your predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi, to move
the work of this Conference forward and, although it may seem a little late to
be reiterating something I have said before, I hope that you, like
Ambassador Alfarargi, will be able to continue to build upon the extremely
useful foundations laid by Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.
The purpose of my statement today is to express the views of the
Canadian Government on the current state of our efforts to negotiate a
comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons and to announce our
intention to place before this body further results of Canadian research
relating to the investigation of allegations of use of chemical weapons. I
will-also make some brief comments on document CD/766, which proposed an annex
to article IX of the draft convention, dealing specifically with procedures
for the verification of allegations of use. We have been pleased to join with
Norway in tabling this document in the Conference on Disarmament.
The earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive, adequately
verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains one of the priority arms control
objectives of the Canadian Government. Such a convention should, in our view,
provide for the immediate cessation of all chemical weapons production and for
the systematic destruction within a specified period of all existing stocks of
chemical weapons. The legitimate concern for security should be addressed in
a way which ensures that implementation of the convention will not create any
new kinds of imbalance which might undermine the security of any State party.
However, the convention must not just constitute an arms limitation measure,
but be seen from the outset to be a real disarmament measure, involving the
complete elimination of an entire class of weapon of mass destruction.
The successful conclusion of such a convention would make a direct and
lasting contribution to international security. It would, moreover, go a long
way toward reviving public confidence in the relevance and efficacy of the
multilateral arms control process in general and the authority of this
negotiating forum in particular. This we see as indispensable to the
long-term effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament.
512
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.420
(Mr. Beesley, Canada)
For these reasons, the Government-of'-Canada takes some considerable
satisfaction from the serious, constructive and business-like approach to the
negotiation which chOacterized our work during the 1986 session and which has
persisted in the present one., Progress,, indeed, continues . to: be made. The
presence here this week of a., number. of industrial experts from several
countries, including Canada, indicates the practical emphasis of our current
endeavours. I would like to express special appreciation to Ambassador Ekeus
for the energetic but sensitive.way in which he is presiding over our work.
All delegations of the Conference are now working with a.seriousness of
purpose which augurs well for. prospects for continuing and significant
negotiating progress.
Such progress is all the'more urgent when seen against the distressing
fact. that chemical weapons continue to be used. Moreover,, there is strong
evidence that an increasing number of countries have acquired or may be
seeking to acquire a chemical warfare capability. The Canadian Government was
dismayed at the most recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General
which again confirmed .the repeated use of chemical weapons in the
Iraq-Iran War. Canada abhors and condemns this use of chemical weapons in
clear breach of the legal obligations embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
to which both Iraq and Iran are parties. We again laud the Secretary-General
for his initiative in launching an investigation and bringing its results to
the attention of the Security Council.. It is a matter of, regret that,.thus
far
no effective means h
b
,
as yet
een found, not only to prevent the.repeated
use of chemical weapons,. but to bring an end to that tragic conflict. We
again call on all parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to adhere to their
obligations, and we urge the combatants in the Gulf war to seek, through
negotiations, a termination of hostilities.in accordance with.Security Council
resolutions 582 and 588.
The implications of this repeated use of chemical weapons, and of the
reported interest of a number of countries in acquiring a chemical warfare
capability, are alarming in several respects. They reinforce mutual suspicion
and insecurity. They undermine the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
prohibiting the use of chemical. weapons. They also.constitute an all too
tangible reminder that the chemical weapon threat is not confined to one
particular region or to one arena of potential conflict. They underscore that
chemical weapons are a global problem which must be addressed. on a global
basis. This should reinforce our sense of urgency and our determination to
persevere in the negotiation of an agreement. to ban these weapons from the
military arsenals of all countries.
It was against this background that the.Canadian Government decided that,
pending'the conclusion of a chemical weapons 'convention, certain practical
steps should be taken with a view to limiting the danger of the misuse of
chemicals.. for weapons purposes. Beginning. in 1984, and in-co-ordination with
a number of other countries, Canada has placed export controls on several
chemical compounds considered particularly useful for the manufacture of
highly toxic chemical weapons. Canada has recently:.increased the number of
chemical compounds whose export is controlled. The Canadian Government has
been pleased to note that a number of other countries have acted similarly and
have placed controls on the export of certain chemicals. We consider it would
be useful if still more countries were also to do so.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.420
4
(Mr. Beesley, Canada)
As part of our effort to facilitate these most important negotiations,
Canada has regularly assembled and made available to all of the delegations to
this Conference compendiums of all relevant plenary statements and working
papers. These, I hope, have proven to be of value as working tools in this
highly complex negotiation. I am pleased to report today that compendiums
comprising the documentation from the especially busy 1986 session are now
available and will be distributed to all delegations in the very near future.
If I may interject a personal comment, a number of us have found it
difficult to develop an overview of the negotiations in spite of the expertise
?of members of our respective delegations and in spite of the excellent work of
the Chairman of the subsidiary body, and we hope that these compendiums will
assist in the process of enabling delegations to develop an overview.
Canada's long-standing interest in the broad issues of verification is by
now well known. In the context of chemical weapons, we have devoted special
attention, and considerable research effort, to questions relating to the
verification of allegations of chemical weapon use. Last year, I tabled in
this forum a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of
Chemical or Biological Weapons, which had earlier been presented to the
United Nations Secretary-General. I am pleased to inform the Conference that
we will be shortly submitting to the Conference on Disarmament a report
entitled verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for
the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples. It was conveyed to the
United Nations Secretary-General on 20 May 1987. In his letter to
His Excellency the Secretary-General, Canada's Secretary of State for External
Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, said the following:
"The recent confirmed use of chemical weapons, in violation of
international law, underlines the need to add to the body of knowledge
which will contribute to the efficacy of a future treaty banning chemical
weapons altogether. Such a treaty will, of necessity, make provision for
the verification of allegations of the use of these weapons, with a view
to deterring their use".
In referring specifically to the portable sensor kit, Mr. Clark pointed
"This research project was undertaken as a case-study, to develop a
better understanding of the technical problems associated with the
provision of appropriate sensors to an investigating team. The speedy
collection and subsequent analysis of samples pose many problems to an
investigating team. These problems are compounded if the allegation
relates to a 'novel' agent, that is, a chemical substance not previously
used for or associated with hostile purposes".
The report which I will soon be submitting, while documenting two years of
work, still leaves many questions unanswered. Nevertheless, we wish to share
this work with other members of the international community who are also
concerned with these matters.
514
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.420
5
(Mr. Beesley, Canada)
There is general agreement that, in addition to providing for cessation
of the production of chemical weapons and for their destruction, the
convention we are negotiating should also expressly ban the use of such
weapons. The inclusion of such a provision will not only reaffirm the ban on
use as set out in the 1925 Geneva Protocol but, by doing so in a context which
includes specific provision for the verification of any allegations of use,
will significantly strengthen the authority of the Protocol. We must ensure,
of course, that nothing in the convention undermines the continuing authority
of the 1925 Protocol - the point raised by my distinguished colleague,
Ambassador Huslid of Norway, earlier this week and a point which has regularly
been raised by the French delegation, to whom we are indebted as the guardians
of that Protocol.
Canada was therefore particularly pleased to join with Norway in
preparing a proposed annex to article IX entitled "General procedures for
verification of alleged use of chemical weapons". It attempts to set out a
practical, workable framework for verifying allegations of use. We are
indebted to Ambassador Huslid for the clarity with which he introduced this
joint proposal for our collective consideration. Norway, although not yet
officially a member of the CD, has consistently contributed most usefully to
our work over many years. Like Canada, Norway has devoted special attention
to questions relating to chemical weapons use. This has proved invaluable in
the formulation of the proposed annex to article IX. Yet I suggest that the
full value of the Norwegian and Canadian research efforts in these areas, much
of which is of a highly technical nature, may come to be appreciated only
after a convention is concluded and a technical secretariat has been set up to
implement the convention and all its verification requirements. The same
point could be made about the valuable work which Finland has shared, over the
years, with the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors.
The proposed annex reflects our view that any type of use of chemical
weapons would constitute the most serious kind of breach of the convention and
that the verification requirement must be of a rigour that reflects the
gravity of any such allegation. It takes cognizance of what seems to be an
emerging consensus within this forum that the investigation of an alleged use
must involve short-notice, on-site inspections. As formulated, the proposed
annex aims to include provisions relating to procedures, techniques and
allocation of responsibility at appropriate levels of both generality and
precision, while allowing for the reality that many procedural and technical
details will need to be worked out, by the Technical Secretariat under the
supervision of the Executive Council. The annex aims to provide the necessary
framework and guidance within which the more detailed procedures and
techniques can be devised and effectively implemented. We join with the
Norwegian delegation in commending it to the attention of the Conference for
inclusion in the rolling text of the convention.
Earlier in my comments, I made a generally positive appreciation of the
manner in which our negotiations are now proceeding. I also cited concrete
events which underline the importance and urgency of our making progress. In
concluding, I would like to register a cautionary note. We are embarked upon
some of the most politically sensitive, legally intricate and technically
demanding multilateral arms negotiations ever undertaken. If we are
515
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.420
6
(Mr. Beesley, Canada)
successful, this will be the first time in the history of multilateral arms
control that a major disarmament agreement has been coned thatialsonstitution
involves the creation from scratch of an elaborate, permanent
to oversee the implementation of such an agreement (we might usefully recall
that the International Atomic Energy Agency preceded the conclusion of the
nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and that its responsibilities continue to
embrace other than arms control questions). Moreover, the implementation of
this agreement will necessarily involve an unprecedented degree of
intrusiveness into both military and civilian sectors of our societies. We
therefore need to proceed with care and deliberation. Several important
for
issues remain unresolved. On the question of challenge inspections,
example, while some considerable progress has been made, we have not yet been
able to reach agreement with the required degree of precision. There also
remains much detailed work to be done not only on technical questions but also
on matters relating to the establishment, operation and governance of the
international authority which will be responsible for overseeing the
implementing of the convention.
I emphasize these points not for the purpose of inducing pessimism or
despair. We have already achieved very much and we should not be daunted by
the heavy work-load that remains. It is essential, however that we get it
right. No useful purpose can be served, therefore, by the invocation of
unrealistic and artificial deadlines. Let us proceed expeditiously, by all
means, but let it be with care and deliberation toward the creation of a
convention whose authority will be self-reinforcing due to its demonstrable
workability and efficacy.
In closing, may I just express appreciation to those delegations which
have thanked Canada for hosting two workshops recently directed towards trying
to make a practical input into the work of the Conference on Disarmament.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement
and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to
the representative of France, Mr. de la Baume.
Mr. de la BAUME (France) (translated from French): As this is the first
time for it to take the floor in this month of July, the French delegation
would like to begin by offering you, Mr. President, its warmest
congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for
this month. We are convinced that you will be able fruitfully to guide our
efforts. Your experience as your country's representative to the Conference
from 1980 to 1983 and, in particular, as President of the Conference in
August 1980 seems to us a very favourable omen for the continuation
natfoous
work. May I also express to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt my
heartiest congratulations for the skill and the competence with which he
chaired the Conference during the month of June.
When he spoke on 2 July last concerning the negotiations under way on the
prohibition of chemical weapons, the representative of the Soviet Union
devoted a very substantial part of his statement to a critical scrutiny of the
working paper submitted by the French delegation on 16 June last in
document CD/757 and entitled "Working paper on the maintenance of a security
balance among all the parties to the Convention during the 10-year period of
r,1h
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 420
7
(Mr. de la Baume, France)
the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons". The reservations and
questions put forward by the representative of the USSR seem to us above all
evidence of a certain misunderstanding about the interpretation to be placed
on our proposals. It would seem, therefore, that a few clarifications are
required.
First of all, in his statement the representative of the Soviet Union
said, and I quote, "We naturally proceed from the premise that the order of
destruction must be based on the principle of undiminished security of States
during the entire destruction process, as has already been agreed in annex IV,
section II". And he added, "the specific conclusions drawn from this general
premise in document CD/757 lead neither to the conclusion of a convention, nor
to the securing of security".
For our part, we proceed from the idea that, to be credible, the
convention must guarantee security to all States parties from its entry into
force, and not just future security once all chemical weapons have been done
away with. The order of destruction of stocks is, everyone agrees, of crucial
importance in this regard. But the timetable must not lead to a situation
where the countries possessing the greatest quantities of chemical weapons
were entitled to keep a stock of such weapons for at least 10 years whereas
others would be prohibited from possessing such weapons from the moment the
convention came into force.
Moreover, it is clear that nothing guarantees that the States which are
the main possessors of chemical weapons will not cease destroying their
stocks. Regrettable as it may be, such an eventuality cannot be ruled out.
We must therefore bear in mind the consequences that would stem for the
security of States parties both from a withdrawal of the aforementioned States
from the Convention and from a breach on their part that, if unredressed,
would lead other parties to exercise their right of withdrawal.
To avoid such a situation, which would evidently be extremely detrimental
to security interests, we, as you know, propose keeping virtually until the
end of the 10-year period -- the extension of which cannot, moreover, be
absolutely ruled out -- a militarily significant but minimal stock. That
stock would not in any event represent more than a very small fraction of the
stocks currently held by the countries possessing the greatest quantities of
chemical weapons and the convention provides that these will be kept until the
tenth year.
Later in his statement, the representative of the Soviet Union said that
he saw in our proposals, and I quote, "a call for the legalized build-up and
proliferation of chemical weapons". This criticism seems to us to be
groundless.
Why? Because, if we analyse the situation, we find that, as the draft
convention now stands, there is, in fact, no incentive for countries wishing
to keep open the option of a chemical capability to accede to the convention.
The fact that stocks would be destroyed only after the 10-year period could
even encourage them to defer their own accession for that long.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.420
8
(Mr. de la Baume, France)
The French document, on the other hand, proposes that a State that
continues to possess or wishes to possess chemical weapons for the 10-year
period alone should be compelled to say so and to open its entire territory to
inspection, with the security stock -- and the production unit -- being
subject to more detailed verification.
These provisions, far, as we see it, from encouraging proliferation,
should lead all States to forsake ambiguity; that is a restraint on
proliferation. In this connection we must reject the idea that our proposals
would be tantamount to changing the existing status quo in a manner conducive
to proliferation. The current reality is indeed that there exist States which
possess chemical weapons on the one hand and States which do not on the
other; but nothing proves that, as the representative of the Soviet Union
contends, the entry into force of the convention would Aso facto result in
the elimination of this difference. We believe that that will be true only
when all arsenals and all means of production have been destroyed -- and that,
if everything happens as envisaged in the convention, will only be the case
10 years after the convention comes into force.
Those are a few comments that the French delegation wished to make at
this juncture.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement
and for the kind words he addressed to the President.
That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any other member
wishing to take the floor? I see none.
The secretariat has circulated today a working paper containing a draft
decision on a request received from a non-member to participate in the
informal meeting on the substance of item 2 of the agenda, '"Cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The draft decision appears in
document CD/WP/285. In accordance with the practice usually followed by the
Conference, we might need to convene a brief informal meeting to consider that
working paper. However, since the request was circulated on Wednesday last
week and no objections have been raised, and keeping in mind that the
non-member concerned has already been invited to participate in other
activites of the CD, I suggest that we take its request up immediately at this
plenary meeting. As I see no objection, I put before the Conference for
decision working paper CD/WP/285, containing a draft decision on the request
received from New Zealand to participate in the informal meetings on the
substance of item 2. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the
Conference adopts the draft decision.
It was so decided.
. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.420
9
(The President)
May I now turn to the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference
and its subsidiary bodies next week. As usual, the timetable is merely an
indication and subject to change, if necessary. In addition to the regular
plenary meetings, an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2 is
scheduled for Thursday, 16 July, immediately after the plenary meeting.
Meetings of the subsidiary bodies have been included after consultations with
their chairmen. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference
adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
Before we adjourn, I should like to recall that the Conference will hold
an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of
the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after this plenary
meeting.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Tuesday, 14 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 10.45 a .m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.421
14 July 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 July 1987 at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. T. Terrefe
GE.87-62756/9620E
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
2
The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 421st plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament.
To begin with, I should like to welcome
the
. e of State a
C.,
this plenary meeting. I am very happy
Foreign and Commonwealth Office forttheKfirstmtime.sDncedheetook/ Q.C.,
M.P., who is addressing the Mr. Timothy Renton, contributed
his important functions. His predecessor, ited us. effectively to our substantive States with specialafinterest
that the Conference
and I wish him a successful visit to Geneva.
His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam, Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, is addressing the Conference in
connection with agenda item entitled
alsoomnrthenConferenceafor the first
I am
ork.
disarmament". The Deputy Minister time, and I wish to thank him
the shows w
v listen to
amthe ongst interest
will
us e and he
today for
him
very happy to see
him with interest.
In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference today continues
its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemicawevel Iber wishing
accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, hor, any
to do so, may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of the
United Kindom, Viet Nam and
State at now give
on my list, the Minister of
the United Kingdom, Mr. David Mellor.
Mr. MELLOR (United Kingdom): Mr. President, may I begin by saying that
it is a very real honour for townaddress
experience of disarmament, distinguished your presidency, knowing of your
back to the predecessor of this Conference and, indeed, to the first
some
experts upon with some
United Nations special session on disarmament. I approach my task
humility, knowing that I am in the presence of so many
subject and that I myself have only come to these responsibilitiesfafterin my
nearly five years as a Minister carrying responsibility in Home s
country, so I feel a little like the minor Italian composer who was much r compose moved by eatdooftthis greatnmanathatyheucomposedea funeralrodenwhich was
movved b my the death he wanted
torkn at a t madogssovheewentRtossee.onefofrhisecolleaguescwho had been
to know ow how it had gone,
in the audience, anothmcomposernlookedaadlittlelembarrassedyoshuffledohis
it?" and the fellow Italian said, "Well, perhaps it might
feet, but, being at heart a diplomat, finally shave been better if you had died
written letimef of
you feel that way about my speech,
congratulate you, Mr. also your immediate
presidencyeofctheoConference.
Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt,
Perhaps I could also say what a pleasure it was for me to meet so many of
the Ambassadors and other senior figures here at our of
evening. If I may say so, it creates a very good
the shared endeavour that is the keystone of the work of this Conference that
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
3
(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)
people meet together in a friendly spirit at receptions like these. I am sure
that the personal relationships that are forged in such receptions do aid and
assist the detailed work that has to go in within this hall and elsewhere, and
I take away, if I may say so, an extremely favourable impression of the spirit
of co-operation that plainly exists around this table.
The British Government began its third term of office following our
General Election last month and, of course, I welcome this opportunity to tell
the Conference once again, as I know my predecessor will have done last year,
that the British Government will continue to attach the highest priority to
arms control. All of us face a demanding challenge: not just to reduce the
world's massive stockpiles of weaponry, but also to increase and enhance
mutual security. No challenge is greater. No challenge is more important,
and I am pleased and honoured to have the chance to make my own contribution.
I hope that I can begin, and carry with me everyone around this table,
when I pay a particular tribute to Dr. Ian Cromartie, who is, of course, as
you will all know and sadly, retiring as Head of the British delegation. It
is no idle compliment to praise his efforts at this Conference over the past
five years, not least his sterling work in the chemical negotiations as
Chairman in 1986. He will be much missed by this Conference, and by none more
than my own colleagues. The experience and expertise that Dr. Cromartie built
up over the years set high standards for the rest of us. I will try to live
up to those standards today, when I shall be introducing a new British
initiative in the field of chemical weapons.
May I first of all try to set out Britain's overall approach to arms
control. We seek enhanced security, at lower levels of armaments and forces,
through mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable agreements. Those may be
familiar objectives. But I want to restate them at the-outset. Sometimes we
read statements, implying that the Governments of the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe have a special devotion to peace, a special understanding of
what peace means. That remains to be proven. A peace race may be preferable
to an arms race. But in the search for security and lasting peace, the
British Government takes second place to no one.
At our recent General Election, the British people voted, as they will
continue to vote, overwhelmingly for peace. Of course they want peace. But
they also want security, from threats or bullying or blackmail. Of course the
British people want nuclear stockpiles reduced, to make Europe safer. But
they do not want just to make Europe safer for conventional war. Of course
the British people want relations between East and West to improve. But not
at any price -- and certainly not if it implies compromising their basic
beliefs in freedom and justice. In short, the British people take a very
straightforward view of the basic issues of East/West relations and arms
control and they have again endorsed the British Government's approach. It is
practical, steady and realistic and, I hope, it is also energetic, positive
and ambitious.
But arms control is not an isolated endeavour. It cannot proceed on some
elevated plane, divorced from all that happens in the rest of the world.
Success in arms control is, and must be, linked to the much wider climate of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
4
(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)
international relations. And, above all, to relations between East and West.
Divorce can be fatal. And even separation can be damaging. Our basic aims in
arms control must depend on the general climate of East/West relations.
The British Government has played its part in improving that climate.
For instance, our Foreign Secretary has made a point of visiting every country
in Eastern Europe (except Albania) to stimulate dialogue and to exchange ideas
and his efforts paved the way for the Prime Minister's highly successful visit
to Moscow at the end of March. Such political contacts are invaluable. They
can provide clearer views of the hopes and intentions of each side. They can
help to replace confrontation with co-operation. They can increase confidence
and trust. But the building of trust and confidence takes more than contacts
alone. Today's huge stockpiles of weapons do not exist because of mistrust
alone. They exist because of profound differences between two very different
systems.
The Warsaw Pact Communique issued in Berlin last month stated that "the
initiative of the socialist countries is designed to overcome any
confrontational approach and to assert civilized standards and an atmosphere
of openness, transparency and trust in international relations". Very fine
words. But what is the reality? Abroad we see some 5 million people driven
out of their own country of Afghanistan. Within the countries of the
Warsaw Pact we cannot ignore those actions which directly threaten trust and
confidence and which seem designed to emphasize the differences between us.
To give you an example, this year people living in Britain will make over
25 million visits abroad. Those who prevent their citizens leaving their own
country must understand the effect of such controls on mutual confidence.
So I believe that we in the West want to get across to such countries a
fundamental message: Yes, we want peace; Yes, we do not reject co-operation,
but trust is an indivisible element in our relations. Confidence cannot be
created in isolated stages. Like security, it is a seamless robe. And every
time we find cause for mistrust, that re-emphasizes the need for adequate
defences; that weakens the basis for co-operation; and that delays progress
in arms control. But yet progress does come. And at present, and I welcome
this, we do seem to be on the verge of some important developments.
Last month, the North Atlantic Council confirmed the priorities that were
set last December; and they are these: to achieve an Intermediate Nuclear
Forces agreement in the near future; to reduce United States and Soviet
strategic offensive 'weapons by fifty per cent; to eliminate all chemical
weapons completely; and to establish conventional security in Europe by
redressing imbalances in this area which are a particular concern to NATO. We
also agreed to consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of
arms control. This will, I hope, help to identify how best to make progress
in these and other areas -- again, towards that basic goal of strengthening
security at lower levels of arms and armed forces. This programme is
ambitious and far-reaching. If it could be achieved, East/West relations
would be transformed for the better and I hope it represents common ground
between all of us here.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
5
(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)
May I deal in greater detail with the key issues as I see them, and I
want to take in turn nuclear, conventional and then chemical weapons. Each
can be treated on its own merits. But we cannot ignore the relationship
between them. Progress in one can help to promote success elsewhere. But it
cannot be allowed to damage our overall security.
On the subject of nuclear weapons, I will start with a fundamental truth,
about security. This Conference hardly needs reminding of the peace that we
have enjoyed in Europe for the past 40 years, compared with the 150 or so wars
that have occurred outside our continent over the same period. We continue to
believe that nuclear deterrence -- or nuclear security, as it is better
described -- has a role to play in preserving this peace. And for that we
need and will continue to need nuclear weapons. But we do not need them at
the current inflated level; we can do with many less. And, as we make
progress, we can discard the sterile and outdated arguments which have plagued
the international debate in the past. The unilateralist approach to nuclear
weapons has been consistently rejected by the British public and by Western
opinion. I doubt whether it ever had much attraction elsewhere. We are all
mutilateralist disarmers now. And we can all engage in the deeper debate --
not in slogans and flag-waving -- about what is crucial to ensure our mutual
security.
Let me turn to the nuclear negotiations now in train, which inevitably
lie beyond the direct control of this Conference, and whose pace and scope are
largely determined by events outside this hall. First and'foremost, we have
been encouraged by recent progress in the United States-Soviet Union talks
here in Geneva. The two super-Powers have between them some 95 per cent of
the world's nuclear weapons, as well as the greatest potential for expanding
military activity from outer space. We all have an interest in these
negotiations. We all look to their success.
The bilaterial talks are directed at major reductions in nuclear weapons,
on a scale never seen before. Make no mistake: an agreement to abolish Long
Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces and shorter-range systems down to 500 kms
would represent a great step forward in nuclear arms control. That is why we
accord it the highest priority. We welcomed the signs of Soviet realism last
year. Then they began to move towards a serious agreement on longer-range
INF. But let us keep the record straight. It was not the Soviet Union which
proposed a global zero-zero solution in 1981. It was the United States with
full suport from-their allies. Following the Reykjavik Summit, the prospects
for an agreement again improved. But we are still urging the Soviet Union to
agree to eliminate all Long Range INF missiles, and to accept global zero for
shorter-range intermediate nuclear systems. Not least because this would
greatly ease the verification problems. We have all heard Soviet rhetoric
which calls on others to reduce nuclear weapons. This is a first-class
opportunity for them to prove their sincerity. Let us hope that the agreement
is signed. Let us trust that it is implemented, and can be verified
effectively. That could well stimulate progress in other areas of arms
control.
S24
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
6
(Mr. Mellor, United Kin dom)
But we are not there yet. The momentum must be sustained and this is no
time for foot-dragging. But we now see signs of just that on the Soviet
side. We see a Soviet reluctance to arrange the necessary meetings to drive
the talks forward. And we must be concerned that the progress so far can be
stymied at this late stage. Such artificial obstacles imply a Soviet approach
which we, our allies and the rest-of the world would find hard to
understand -- and harder still to accept. I fervently trust that such
obstacles will be removed forthwith.
Turning to the Strategic Defence Initiative, I confirm our welcome that
the Soviet Union has dropped its earlier linkage between Long Range
Intermediate Nuclear Forces. The United Kingdom continues to see the
United States SDI programme as prudent. Mrs. Thatcher agreed with
President Reagan at Camp David in November 1986 that there was a need to press
ahead with the SDI research programme, which is permitted by the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But it is just that, a research programme.
And it matches the Soviet Union's activities in this field over many years.
I turn now to strategic nuclear arms. Both sides have accepted the
target in principle of cutting them by half. I spoke of this target earlier
as one of NATO's priorities. It remains that. Progress in INF should not
divert us from the need for equal, and now greater efforts in the strategic
field. We hope that the Soviet Union will now respond positively to the
United States draft treaty which lies on the table. Failure to do so, or even
further delay, would-be a damaging indictment of Soviet intentions.
If we were able to implement both such agreements, we could indeed be
proud of our success in bequeathing to future generations a less nuclear, but
still safer world.
Finally, I come to constraints on nuclear testing. A nuclear test ban
has long been one of the subjects on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda
and you all know far better than I that, following the 1977-1980 negotiations,
a committee of this Conference considereed the subject for two years. I
regret it has not been possible since then to agree a mandate for further
discussion.
Meanwhile, the group of scientific experts has continued its very
valuable work. I hope that this will continue free from any sort of
politicization. The scientific group demonstrates how the Conference on
Disarmament can best contribute to the discussion of nuclear testing
constraints. The 1977-1980 negotiations were not brought to a successful
conclusion. Nor is it useful to see those negotiations necessarily as the
starting point for what we now need to do. Instead, I believe that the
Conference on Disarmament should look to its own strengths, the sort of
discussions which resolve technical problems and expose remaining
difficulties. The present group does just this in the technical field. A
committee could perform the same role in relation to .other issues. Among them
is the need to address verification problems. These remain unresolved,
despite ill-informed claims to the contrary. Such a prospect was laid down in
the Western programme of work and, indeed, in the draft mandate proposed
earlier by the distinguished Czechoslovak delegate, Ambassador Vejvoda. Both
were acceptable to us.
57c
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
7
(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)
Progress in reducing nuclear weapons -- that is our aim. And we do not
exclude constraints on nuclear testing as well. Far from it. We very much
welcome the separate United States-Soviet talks on these. We hope they will
soon be able to ratify their two treaties from the 1970s, before moving on to
other constraints. This step-by-step process is the right way to make
substantive and lasting progress. It also takes full account of real security
concerns. And the Conference on Disarmament can make its contribution to this
process by deciding soon how to structure its own discussion.
May I turn now to conventional weapons. We do not want to see controls
on nuclear weapons -- as I have consistently emphasized -- but we cannot
ignore the threat and the damage caused by conventional weapons. We remember
only too well the history of Europe for more of the last 1,000 years. It is a
history of one appalling war after another. We are deteremined it shall not
be repeated. May I remind you of some wise words of Lord Carrington who said
last December, "So many arms control discussions seem concerned only with
nuclear weapons ... they almost seem to suggest that conventional warfare is
acceptable. But no one who lived through the last world war would agree".
I am young enough to have missed the last War in Europe. But let me make
one thing perfectly clear. The British Government and its NATO allies are not
in the business of making Europe safe for yet another conventional war. That
would be epic folly, a step backwards into darkness and despair. I have
already spoken of the role for nuclear weapons in preserving security in
Europe. As we move towards reducing nuclear weapons of different categories,
the need to do something about huge and costly conventional armies -- equipped
with ever more destructive weaponry -- becomes increasingly urgent. This is
why it is so important to redress the existing conventional imbalances. By
our estimates these favour the Warsaw Pact three to one in tanks; over three
to one in artillery; almost two to one in tactical aircraft. And since the
early 1970s we have seen the Warsaw Pact forces configured not for defending
Eastern Europen soil, but instead able to initiate a surprise attack and
all-out invasion of Western Europe.
For some months now in Vienna we have been discussing the possibility of
establishing a new negotiating forum for conventional arms control
negotiations, to cover the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. At
their Reykjavik meeting last month, NATO Ministers made proposals designed to
take this forward through two distinct negotiations, both within the CSCE
framework; one among all 35 European countries, on measures to build
confidence in the military field; and the other among the 23 members of NATO
and the Warsaw Pact, to achieve stability at lower levels of forces. A
Western mandate for further work on confidence-building was tabled in Vienna
on 10 July. And we hope in the near future to make formal proposals for the
conventional stability negotiations.
Stability and security mean eliminating disparities. We were encouraged
to note what Mr. Gorbachev said at a Moscow forum in February: "Should there
be inequality in any elements, we must redress the situation, not by letting
the one short of some elements build them up, but by having the one with more
scale them down". We endorse this approach whole-heartedly. But, of course,
526
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9 9
CD/PV.421
8
(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)
I say again, it needs to be translated into action, because action speaks so
much louder than words. However, so far there has been no agreement on the
size of inequalities. Warsaw Pact countries have not made available the
essential facts and figures about their forces and, if "glasnost" is to mean
anything in this area, this must be put right.
Meanwhile, Warsaw Pact representatives have proposed discussions aimed at
ensuring that military doctrine is essentially defensive. Now, as everyone
knows, NATO has declared for a number of years that none of its weapons will
ever be used except to respond to attack. It is self-evident, it is beyond
any semblance of doubt, that our forces and those of our allies are not
deployed or designed to invade anyone else's territory. These NATO
declarations can actually be tested. Information on our force numbers and
dispositions is freely available. But the Warsaw Pact does not provide the
same sort of information on its forces. If it did, we might be better placed
to assess their declared aim on doctrine. This is not an area for debate or
abstract theorizing. It requires practical and verifiable agreements
affecting actual forces on the ground.
These problems, of course, have been with us for many years. We will not
solve them overnight. But the disappointing lack of progress in the Mutual
and Balanced Forced Reduction talks in Vienna shows those obstacles all too
clearly. Nevertheless, we still hope for progress in that forum. This would
provide the best possible start for new negotiations on conventional stability.
Mr. President, I hope I am not outstaying my welcome and you will not
regret your kindness in inviting me to come here, but I did want my
contribution to be comprehensive, to set out the totality of our stance and to
conclude with an area that I think is well known around this table, is one
where we particularly want to see progress made and where we particularly feel
that in the United Kingdom we might have a role to play in bringing agreement
about, and so it is to chemical weapons that I turn finally and perhaps most
relevantly to the concerns of the distinguished Ambassadors around this table.
Chemical weapons are, of course, the classic example of the futility of
unilateral gestures. The United Kingdom gave up its chemical weapons
capability in the 1950s and the United States stopped making such weapons
in 1969. But it was only in April this year that the Soviet Union announced
they had finally ceased production. And even if this is so, the West now
faces a truly massive Soviet stockpile. Very few countries are prepared to
admit their possession of chemical weapons, but the reports of the spread of
such weapons are too frequent and too insistent to ignore.
I would like to pay tribute to the valuable work that has been done at
this Conference. Our aim for chemical weapons is particularly ambitious. It
is not to set limits. It is not to freeze existing levels. It is to abolish
them completely, in an effective, verifiable, global ban. You-were kind
enough, Mr. President, to mention my predecessor, Timothy Renton, and since he
spoke at this Conference last year we have seen encouraging progress:
substantial areas of agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons and of
their means of production; and acceptance of the importance of a verification
527
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
9
(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)
regime for civil chemical production. The momentum that developed last year
under Dr. Cromartie has been maintained under the able chairmanship of
Ambassador Ekeus and I was pleased to have the opportunity of an informal talk
with him yesterday. I am heartened by the warm reception for the British
paper on challenge inspection that we tabled last year and many problems of
principle seem set for resolution. Nevertheless, as the solutions to some of
our differences of principle become clearer, so it becomes more important to
think through all the practical implications. Permit me to mention two areas
in particular.
In the first place, we all accept the need to verify that chemical
weapons are not secretly produced and that precursors made in the civil
industry are not diverted or abused. But, at the same time, we recognize the
need to reconcile the objectives of the convention with the legitimate
concerns of civil industry if the convention is to be acceptable to all. This
inevitably means looking at very detailed issues. The seminar held here in
Geneva last week for representatives from many national chemical industries
gave an opportunity for detailed and practical discussions of this crucial
area. We must now build on this experience. We must agree among ourselves
such crucial questions as those chemicals we wish to see subject to
verifications; those levels of production which should concern the
convention; and how to update the overall regime to take account of advances
in science.
My second example has perhaps received less attention in the past. Once
all the negotiating problems have been resolved, we have to move quickly and
effectively from an agreed convention to implementing an actual global ban,
It which actually works in the way the negotiators intend. We in the
United Kingdom have in the past stressed the case for having an international
organization able to carry out this all-important task. of overseeing
implementation. Progress has been made. But we now need to give further
thought to how the organization can be set up, so that everything necessary is
done in good time.
That is why I am tabling today a new United Kingdom paper, which I think
has been distributed, entitled "Making the chemical weapons ban effective".
It contains our detailed ideas on what is needed. The paper suggests that
some aspects can be left in the hands of a Preparatory Commission. However,
the paper also notes that further work is needed here, in the Ad hoc
Committee. We must ensure that adequate verification technology is
available. And we have to obtain a clearer idea of the likely size and cost
of the permanent staff of the organization.
Once more, openness should not mean more rhetoric but more disclosure.
What we need is not more speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to
know what other Governments have, where they have it and what they do with
it. Now is the time, I believe, for all delegations, including those which
have declined in the past, to indicate their likely future declarations. Only
in this way can realistic estimates be prepared. And only in this way can the
crucial confidence in this mutual endeavour be established. The new
United Kingdom paper provides the framework within which, we hope, good
intentions can be translated into effective action.
528
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.421
10
(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)
Our negotiations on chemical weapons could lead to a treaty of both
immediate and historic importance. The use of these weapons by Iraq in the
Gulf conflict has emphasized how urgently a total ban is needed. These
weapons are a dreadful scourge that threatens the whole international
community. Let us get rid of them, once and for all.
In conclusion could I just say this:
"No man is an island", one of our poets said, and nor is any one area of
arms control an island unto itself. Lack of progress in one area can stultify
efforts in other areas. But the reverse is also true. One new breakthrough
can build up momentum in other negotiations. And, as I have already
described, this momentum has been generated in several of the current
negotiations. What we now need is not a vicious circle of ever-increasing
weapons stocks and obdurate rhetoric, but a virtuous circle of growing mutual
confidence and steady, sensible arms reductions. Public interest and hopes in
arms control are running high. Those of us who actually negotiate have a
responsibility to the international community to turn these hopes into
realities, to translate political opportunities into practical action.
I hope that what I have said today will make clear beyond peradventure
that the United Kingdom does not shirk its international responsibilities.
This British Government have played a full and active part in arms control.
And, as we enter our third term of office, that is what we will continue to do.
. May I thank you, Mr. President, and your distinguished colleagues for
their patience and may I say that I shall leave Geneva with the warmest
memories of the reception I have received and the valuable conversations I
have had and that I wish you, and all of your colleagues, nothing but success
in the vital work ahead.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his important statement and for
the kind words he addressed to the President.
I am sure that all members of the Conference have learnt with regret the
information given to us by the Minister of State concerning the departure of
Ambassador Ian Cromartie, C.M.G. Ambassador Cromartie not only represented
his country with outstanding diplomatic ability, but also served this
Conference with distinction, having contributed significantly to our work on a
number of delicate issues and, in particular, as Chairman of the Ad hoc
Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Conference will certainly miss him. I
should like to ask the Minister of State to convey to Ambassador and
Mrs. Cromartie our best wishes for their future.
I now give the floor to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Viet Nam, His Excellency Nguyen Di Nien.
529
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 421
11
Mr. NGUYEN Di Nien (Socialist Republic of Viet Nam): At the outset, I
wish to express my deep satisfaction at seeing the presidency for this month
of our very important Conference assumed by the representative of heroic
Ethiopia, with which my country maintains close fraternal relations. I am
convinced that, with your dedication and diplomatic skills, you will
facilitate the success of the negotiations that take place within the
framework of this Conference. I would also like to express my sincere
gratitude to the Conference for giving me the opportunity to speak today.
With regard to the question of the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament, our representative in Geneva has on various occasions presented
the views held by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. Allow me today to
elaborate our positions on a number of issues to which my country attaches
great importance.
On the threshold of the third millennium, we are faced with options for
the future: the survival of mankind or its destruction. And the answer is
not simple. To our dissatisfaction, a tense and complicated international
situation still prevails. In their continued search for military superiority,
some forces are accelerating the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race,
attempting to spread it to outer space. While it needs only one per cent of
the existing nuclear arsenals to make our Earth a dead and frozen planet
forever, more nuclear weapons and various other types of weapons of mass
destruction are being stockpiled. With the very high pace of development of
military technology, it is leaving less and less time for peoples, States and
politicians to become aware of the real danger and the limits of mankind's
possibilities for stopping the slide towards the nuclear abyss. The choice
for the future, therefore, must be made boldly and responsibly by all States
together, regardless of their social systems and levels of economic
development. The time has come 'for us all to make jointly the greatest
possible efforts towards ridding the world of nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction.
In the nuclear age, every State must adopt new thinking on security.
Experience of the past decades shows that the concept of security through
nuclear deterrence, the notions of war as a means of attaining political
objectives are outdated and if continued would only lead to an all-out
conflagration. Our concept of security is based on that of a comprehensive
security system providing for equal security for all States in a nuclear-free,
demilitarized world with non-violence in international relations. We share
the view of the Non-aligned Movement that the peace and security of a State
cannot be ensured through the accumulations of armaments.
The threat of a nuclear war can only be permanently removed by completely
abolishing nuclear weapons from our planet. We hold that it is incumbent on
all States, first of all, nuclear-weapon States, to contribute to this
effort. The all-embracing programme for total abolition of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century put forth by
the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
M.S. Gorbachev, constitutes an important contribution to the process of
radical and comprehensive disarmament, displays a new political thinking and
great responsibility for the destiny of mankind. The Eighth Summit Conference
of Non-Aligned Countries in Harare has welcomed this highly important proposal.
S3'0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
12
(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)
Facing the serious challenges constituted by the continued nuclear arms
race, an ever broader and stronger movement is developing the world over for
peace, against nuclear war and against the militarization of outer space. A
clear expression of this may be found in the Mexico Declaration of the leaders
of the six countries representing four continents, in the.Political
Declaration of the Eighth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and in
the New Delhi Joint Statement by the General Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of India on a nuclear-free world
with non-violence in international relations. The trend towards the
establishment of nuclear-free zones developing in many parts of our globe such
as South East Asia, Africa, Northern Europe, Central Europe and the Balkans
displays the desire and determination of the majority of countries to strive
for a nuclear-free world.
While sparing no efforts to contribute to the achievement of the final
objective, namely general and complete disarmament, we are in favour of
step-by-step disarmament and a realistic approach to that process. As viewed
by the overwhelming majority of nations, a halt to nuclear tests, which would
be most crucial and effective in checking the nuclear arms race, is a matter
of the highest priority. Regrettably, negotiations on a ban on nuclear tests
have remained deadlocked despite the fact that within the past two years
one nuclear-weapon State has four times extended its unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing. It is clear to all who are responsible for this deadlock.
In the continued tense situation, we urge all States, and first of all the
forty members of this Conference on Disarmament, to join efforts to bring
about a breakthrough on this extremely important issue.
Regional peace and security is inseparable from international peace and
security. The main problem confronting mankind today -- that of survival --
is equally acute and urgent for Europe, Africa, America and Asia and the
Pacific. The consolidation and strengthening of peace and co-operation in any
region would constitute a concrete contribution to the preservation of peace
and security at global level.
Asia and the Pacific remains one of the most turbulent regions of the
world. It is where for the past forty years the peoples have never really
known peace, but instead have had to undergo a succession of the longest,
bloodiest wars such as the Korean War, and especially the Indochina War and
the Viet Nam War in which the biggest quantity of bombs and toxic chemicals,
including dioxin, was used against the local populations. At present,
although Asia and the Pacific on the whole has not as yet been militarized to
the extent Europe has, the potential for its militarization is truly immense,
and the consequences are extremely dangerous. Major nuclear Powers are
situated here. Large land armies, navies and air forces have been built. In
this context, the will of the peoples of Asia and the Pacific for peaceful
co-existence, co-operation and friendship is growing stronger and stronger.
We join many countries in supporting the initiatives of the People's Republic
of Mongolia on non-use of force or threat of use of force between the States
of the region; we support every effort to make the Indian Ocean a zone of
peace, and South-East Asia, the South Pacific region and the Korean peninsular
nuclear-weapon-free zones. Viet Nam strongly supports the initiative of the
Soviet Union on the establishment of a general system of security in Asia and
the Pacific aimed at consolidating 'peace, security and co-operation on the
basis of equality and mutual benefits among States in the region.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 421
13
(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)
In South-East Asia, having suffered too much from war, the three
Indochinese countries, more than anyone else, treasure peace and desire
friendship and co-operation with other countries the world over, first of all
with their neighbours. While resolutely struggling for the preservation of
their independence and sovereignty, the three Indochinese countries have
spared no efforts to make South-East Asia a zone of peace, stability,
friendship and co-operation. We want to seek through dialogue political
solutions to the problems of this region, including the question of Kampuchea,
on the basis of equality, respect for each other's sovereignty and mutual
understanding. On this occasion, I would like to reiterate once again our
proposals to sign with all other countries in the region treaties of
non-aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. We
would also like to re-establish good relations with China.
We can recall that in 1978, at the first special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the international community achieved,
for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on
a.Programme of Action on disarmament and established a rather comprehensive
disarmament machinery with great importance attached to the Committee on
Disarmament -- now the Conference on Disarmament. The consensus embodied in
the Final Document of that special session reflects not only the improved
international situation of the 1970s but also the international community's
profound desire to attain far greater successes in the struggle to curb the
arms race, for peace and disarmament. Most regrettably, as is well known, for
the past ten years deadlock has prevailed in the field of disarmament and
mankind is today faced with a new dangerous spiral of the arms race --
unprecedented in its intensity and scope. As far as the work of our
Conference is concerned, it is a sad fact that no concrete agreement has been
reached so far on any disarmament issue under negotiations here and
negotiations on nuclear issues have not yet commenced under appropriate
working arrangements. The expressed will of the international community to
take the proper option for survival demands the utilization of all possible
channels to bring about a turn in the cause of disarmament. Viet Nam concurs,
in the overwhelming view concerning the complementary relationship between
bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament. The potential of the
Conference on Disarmament -- the single multilateral negotiating body with the
participation of countries from all political groups as well as from different
geo-political regions, including all the five nuclear-weapon States -- should
be further. explored. While the Soviet-United States bilateral negotiations on
the medium-range missiles in Europe are in progress, it is our hope that. the
Conference, acting upon its mandate and proceeding from the spirit of
pertinent General Assembly resolutions, most recently resolution 41/86 M
adopted at the forty-first session, will bring into full play its dynamism and
its very important role in order to contribute to bringing about a new and
lasting period of detente, effective disarmament, international peace and
co-operation not only in Europe, but also in Asia and the Pacific, as well as
in the rest of the world.
We have now before us a number of practical and reasonable proposals in
the nuclear and other fields to form the basis of the work of the Conference.
It is increasingly clear that compliance and verification are no longer
532
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
14
(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)
obstacles and should not be used as excuses to hold back or hamper
negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty or on a new convention
on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As shown by the past realities, the
effectiveness of the Conference and new breakthroughs demand the political
will of all the parties involved.
For several years, Viet Nam has applied for full membership in the
Conference on Disarmament. Viet Nam's activities in the Conference have
testified to its seriousness and its ability to contribute to the work of the
Conference. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our wish to
become a full member of the Conference and our hope that we will enjoy the
universal support of the Conference.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Viet Nam for his important statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to
the Chair and to my country. I wish to inform the Conference that there has
been a slight change in the list of speakers and I accordingly now give the
floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe.
Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): Thank you, Mr. President, but I can see that my
distinguished colleague, the Ambassador of Mexico was already inscribed on the
list. If the President has no objection, I will, of course, defer to the
distinguished Ambassador of Mexico.
The PRESIDENT: I recognize the Ambassador of Mexico.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico): Mr. President, I was told that the
distinguished representative of Nigeria has some important duties to attend to
and that is why I said to the Deputy Secretary-General that I had no.
difficulty on leaving my place to him.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Mexico. Would the
Ambassador of Nigeria now wish to take the floor?
Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): I thank you, Mr. President, and I apologize for
that little hitch. I must express my gratitude also to the distinguished
Ambassador of Mexico.
Last week the Nigerian delegation submitted a paper which has been
circulated among all delegations as CD/768, entitled "Proposal for the
immediate conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons". Before I present this paper in a brief statement, permit me, as
this is the first time I have taken the floor this month, to congratulate you,
Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on
Disarmament for the month of July. The combined force of your wide diplomatic
experience, your personal qualities and your outstanding professional skill
have been a source of energy and encouragement for delegations during the
first half of July. We have no doubt that you will continue to guide the
affairs of the Conference in the right direction during the remainder of your
tenure. May I also take the opportunity to pay tribute to your predecessor,
Ambassador Saad Alfarargi, who, in his usual discreet and effective manner,
presided over the affairs of this Conference in the month of June.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
15
(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)
The Nigerian paper which is before delegations was intended to take the
problem of negative security assurances out of the cooler and effectively put
it back on the table of the Conference. Within these two steps the
Nigerian delegation has naturally had to shake off' the crust of ice that had
neutralized the subject over the years and attempt to update the well-known
elements of a possible arrangement. In making its proposals, the
Nigerian delegation has also tried to face the issues, not run away from them.
We must try to be realistic and accommodating of the reconcilable views and
interests of all States and groups. Above all, we have sought in a modest way
to serve the cause of nuclear disarmament.
The majority of States represented at this Conference and, indeed, of
States members of the United Nations have renounced in an internationally
binding agreement their sovereign right to manufacture nuclear weapons. By
that singular act they have made an invaluable contribution to the cause of
international peace and security. They have improved the international
atmosphere and lessened international tension. It is only fair that those who
have made this supreme sacrifice and have entrusted their security to fragile
international discipline and the humanism of other States should at least have
an unequivocal and binding international guarantee that those who have nuclear
weapons will not use or threaten to use them against the former. In this
connection, some of those States which have not yet signed the
Non-Proliferation Treaty might decide to do so or to enter into a similar
arrangement. The non-nuclear-weapon States which belong to military alliances
including nuclear-weapon States or which have nuclear weapons stationed on
their territories will have to concede that their special situation would
require special arrangements and conditions. The Nigerian proposals do not
constitute a panacea. They do not pretend to answer all the questions, but
they should reactivate in a concrete manner the steps towards setting up an
internationally binding agreement to prohibit the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons against most non-nuclear-weapon States. Having said that, may
I say that, as the base of my assignment in Geneva and Switzerland will soon
come to an end, I would like to take the opportunity to say a few words about
our work here over the last three years; I will be extremely brief. The
Nigerian delegation believes that the problems of this Conference are well
known to all the delegations. Our positions have been well elaborated and
comprehensively enunciated in the past and I would not intend to go into all
of them. I would only say that during this period, three years, the
Conference on Disarmament has certainly provided a valuable forum for the
major military actors and other countries to state their positions. The
Conference has succeeded in keeping the subject of disarmament alive and
served as a pressure group which has had the desired influence on the attitude
of the main military rivals in their current multilateral and bilateral
negotiations.
There is nothing original in my saying that the Conference on Disarmament
has achieved little that is conclusive over the last three years, but we'
should not take that to mean that the areas'of usefulness of the Conference
which I have just enumerated are in any way eroded. The Conference must
continue to do what-it can. It must continue to enlighten international
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.421
16
(Mr Tonwe, Ni(Leria)
t the total public opinion. It must continue to preve nconsequencesbfortall bilateralization o the
It
urgent disarmament issues which grave its
must continue to search its own mind for the best way to accomp
enormous tasks.
As I leave Geneva, I would like to say'how much I have enjoyed my work in
this Conference and how much I have benefited from interaction with all the
distinguished Ambassadors here. I I thank youlall for yoIrlsupp rt, to
understanding and friendship. well rd
working with you again in other forums in the interests of international peace
and harmony. for his
sta The heEkIndNT: I thank the to the Chair. of
amisureathat the Conference
and for the kind words s addressed agrees with me in wishright 9lfrom thesuccess
start1offthiseConfe~encet25 yearslagoaand
contributed immensely I am sure he will be
it is with great regret that we seethe ulbmemberrofohis delegation to this
succeeded by an important and very helpf
Conference. I wish him luck and good success.
I now give the floor to my last speaker for today, the representative of
Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.
Spanish): Mr. President, to
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from
to appreciate your pertinent
those of us who, like myself, had the opportunity rom
qualities and your sound knowledge in the matter of disarmament during your
neotiaptullabody, Etcehofiopprofoundia in see
negotiating multilateral i
the you presiding now over our ddelegationnforntheosuccessyof youruimportant
co-operation of the e Mexican
duties.
We should by the same token like to take this opportunity to reiterate s of our congratulations to your preaed distingAmbasuished
so
Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi, an
skillfully presided over the work of the Conference on
months of June and April respectively. Finally, my nlD
endorses what you have just said concerning the forthcoming departure of the
distinguished representative of Nigeria, our esteemed colleague,
Ambassador Tonwe.
A little over 15 years ago, on 10 April 1972, in London, Moscow and
Washington, the Convention designed to eliminate biological ,an'ttoxinL?eacons
was opened for signature. In its preamble, the States parties o^?shrtned '-n
conviction
instrument placed on record their
the achievementrtiof another, much
it represented only a first step towards
broader agreement which was to be defined in article IX of the Convention in
the following terms, and I quote:
"Each State party to this
weaponsaffirms
chemicalConvention
andthtorthisnenda undertakes to
effective prohibition
continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early
agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 421
17
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate
measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed
for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes".
This is a difficult task to which our Conference has justifiably devoted
a good part of its time. Thanks to everyone's devotion since, in 1984, we
decided for the first time to give the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons an
authentic negotiating mandate, the pace, of its work has risen appreciably and
the political will of its members has enabled obstacles that appeared
insurmountable to be overcome. Considerable progress was achieved in 1985 and
1986, when the work of the Committee was led by Ambassadors Turbanski and
Cromartie respectively, to whom I should like to express my delegation's
sincere gratitude for the work done. At the same time, as regards the second
of them, I should like to express how grieved we were to hear the news of his
forthcoming retirement for health reasons.
We are now entering a decisive stage in our negotiations, one that has
rightly been described as crucial for the success of our work. Hence, it is a
source of particular satisfaction for my delegation that the job of presiding
over this has fallen to the distinguished representative of Sweden,
Ambassador Ekeus, who already gave proof of his exceptional diplomatic skill
when he occupied the same post in 1984.
To achieve the ambitious goal we have set ourselves, we have decided that
the scope of the convention should be as broad as possible. Consequently, we
have identified seven basic activities which would be prohibited: the
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, transfer and
use of chemical weapons. In addition to these, we have included the
obligation for current possessors to destroy their chemical weapons arsenals
as well as the facilities that produced-them, thus giving the convention its
nature as an authentic instrument of disarmament. There is general agreement
concerning these categorical provisions, which is something that my delegation
has welcomed with the greatest satisfaction.
In an attempt to cover all possible situations and taking into account
the scope of the subject-matter at hand, an effort has been made to draw up
all-embracing definitions. Thus, by chemical weapons are meant not only
munitions and means of delivery, but also substances which pose a risk for the
objectives of the convention, excluding substances produced for permitted
purposes in quantities compatible with the ends for which they will be used.
When the convention enters into force -- something we hope will not take
too long -- the States parties will have to tell the international authority
whether they possess or do not possess chemical. weapons and production
facilities. The possessors will then have as their first duty to provide data
in respect of their arsenals. My delegation deems it essential in this
respect that the State should describe the location of chemical weapons under
its jurisdiction or control so that the accuracy of its declaration can be
checked in situ. That is why we welcome the recent Soviet decision to agree
to give the location of their arsenals and, while we understand that this
involves delicate matters of national security, we hope that the State which
still believes that it is not appropriate to provide this information will
reconsider its position in the near future.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.421
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
Once the characteristics of the arsenals are known, the basic obligation
that the draft convention imposes on their owners is to destroy them. A
period of 10 years is proposed for the total destruction of the chemical
weapons currently in existence. My delegation has carefully considered the
reasons that have been set forth to justify the length of that period, such as
the capacity of destruction facilities and the precautions that will have to
be taken to preserve the environment, but, despite that, it believes that the
efforts to shorten that period as far as possible should continue. It seems
to us excessive to have to wait at least 10 long years after the convention
comes into force for the risk of a chemical war to disappear.
There is no agreement as yet on the order of destruction, a matter which
is under negotiation by the main possessors of chemical weapons. As a
position of principle, my delegation would like'to place on record that it
would prefer it if destruction began with the most dangerous weapons, so as to
do away speedily with the greatest danger, and the least lethal were left till
last. Unfortunately, this view is not shared by the possessors of chemical
weapons, who want to keep intact until the very last minute their capacity to
use the most toxic of such arms. We hope that they will reconsider this
attitude, which seems to us a selfish one, and that they will give thought to
the fact that confidence in the future convention depends largely on the rapid
disappearance of the most significant arsenals.
We regret that it has not yet been possible to reach an agreement on
production facilities. We know that the delegations concerned are continuing
to hold intensive consultations on this delicate matter, and we hope that very
soon they will be able to submit to us the solution they have agreed upon.
I shall now turn to two questions which, in view of their importance,
will be crucial to the success of our work: I refer to what is termed
"non-production" and to all that relates to verification.
As I said a moment ago, one of the paramount objectives of the convention
we are now negotiating is to prevent the manufacture of chemical weapons in
future. To achieve this objective, it will be inevitable to impose certain
controls on civilian industry, including some restrictions on industries
producing substances that might be diverted to prohibited purposes. This is
something which will undoubtedly affect all States parties, whether they are
possessors or not possessors of Chemical weapons, developed countries or
developing countries, and it has therefore been playing a preponderant role in
our discussions for some time.
The substances of interest have been divided into three basic categories
in keeping with the risk they entail. On the basis of this classification, a
number of verification systems involving measures of varying stringency have
been devised. Thus, the production of substances in schedule 1 -- mostly
neurotoxic agents -- in amounts exceeding one tonne per year will be
prohibited; the manufacture of compounds in schedule 2 -- key precursors --
will be subject to a strict regime of international inspections to avoid their
diversion for prohibited purposes; and, finally, the production and use of
the substances in schedule 3 -- those that could be used for the manufacture
of chemical weapons but are employed on a large scale for legitimate peaceful
activities -- will have to be declared as precisely as possible to the
international authority.
535
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 421
19
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
To complete this system, we must consider the problem posed by the
"commercial super-toxics", in other words, the highly toxic substances that
are used in civilian industry, for instance, in the pharmaceutical branch and
in the production of pesticides. It would appear necessary to set up for them
a special category, one distinct from the three already established, in order
to deal with them adequately. However, the differences of opinion that exist
concerning the compounds that could be considered and the type of measures
that would be applied to them have precluded our finding a solution to this
issue -- which, as all parties to the negotiations recognize, is both
necessary and urgent.
We all know that the present schedules cannot be exhaustive or
definitive. Their first review will take place when States possessing
chemical weapons declare the composition of their arsenals to the
international authority. Maybe these will include chemicals which have
been considered in the course of negotiations; consideration will then
to be given to the incorporation of those substances in the schedules.
on, if we want the convention to keep its full force, periodic updating
schedules in the light of the progress of science and technology will be
not
have
Later
of the
inevitable. That is why the importance has been recognized of a flexible,
expeditious and reliable mechanism for this purpose. It will thus be possible
to include a new chemical in the schedules, to withdraw it from them or to
shift it from one schedule to another. We have worked to this end during this
session and progress has been satisfactory.
My delegation considers that appropriate verification machinery is
essential if an international disarmament agreement is to function effectively
for all its parties. The convention on chemical weapons, of course, does not
elude this general rule. Ambitious in its objectives, the draft which is now
being drawn up also establishes a very broad system of verification designed
to guarantee full compliance with all its provisions.
An independent international body created by the convention itself would
be responsible for these very delicate tasks. This seems to us an optimum
solution for ensuring the credibility of the instrument. As you will all
recall, that was the course chosen by the Latin American States when, over
20 years ago, they negotiated the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the functioning of
the body that was set up has been entirely satisfactory.
The problems posed by the verification of the numerous obligations the
convention will impose are obviously considerable. To guarantee, on the one
hand, that chemical weapons will not be produced in future and that prohibited
activities will not be carried out, while taking into account, on the other
hand, the protection of trade secrets and the need not to interfere
excessively in national civilian activities makes the design of appropriate
verification machinery even more difficult. We are all aware of the great
difficulties this involves and we must strive to resolve them. Some
sacrifices will be inevitable for the sake of the greater interest.
536
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 421
20
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
The main body will be a consultative committee made up of all the States
parties. As it is hoped that the convention will have the greatest possible
number of adherents, it will not be easy for the committee to take expeditious
decisions and to intervene rapidly and effectively in case of crisis.
Consequently, it will be necessary to establish a subsidiary body of the
committee, of limited membership and called the executive council, which will
be formally subordinate to the committee and will discharge all its functions
while the committee is not in session.
Serious differences of opinion have arisen in regard to the composition
of the executive council. My delegation believes that the only valid
criterion for the selection of the members of that body is that of equitable
political and geographical distribution. Using this method, as happens in the
case of other bodies in the United Nations family, each group will freely
select its representatives, taking account of the parameters it deems
appropriate.
As for the difficult problem of decision-making, my delegation inclines
in favour of adopting the simple and unambiguous procedure of a two-thirds
majority of the members present and voting. We believe that to demand
consensus would seriously hinder the work of the committee and the council as.
it would give each of the parties a right of veto that it could exercise at
any time, to the detriment of the proper functioning of the convention.
The international verification machinery that is going to be entrusted to
the consultative committee and its subsidiary bodies contains two elements
that will ensure its full effectiveness: on the one hand, a system of
declarations and routine inspections that seeks to be as complete as possible
and, on the other, a "safety net" for use only in exceptional cases --
challenge inspection -- designed to remedy possible deficiencies in the normal
procedure.
In our negotiations, emphasis was, quite justifiably, placed on building
a system with no loopholes, a mechanism that would give everybody full
confidence that the provisions of the convention were being observed. A whole
series of measures to be applied to the activities of States parties has been
designed for this purpose, ranging from permanent verification of destruction
of arsenals to systematic inspections, without prior notice, of civilian
production facilities. My delegation is fully in favour of a strict regime in
order effectively to guarantee the complete disappearance of the chemical
threat.
"Challenge inspection" constitutes the essential complement to the
routine system. My delegation sees such inspection as an exceptional event
prompted by serious doubts about compliance with the convention that have not
been dispelled through normal channels. In view of the political damage that
it will inevitably cause, we do not believe that it will be frequent.
However, we do consider that a State's right to request such inspection if it
feels it to be necessary must not be limited.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 421
21
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
It has not been possible to reach agreement on reasonable procedures for
challenge inspection.' The excessive demands of some -- the immediate opening
of facilities -- together with the excessive hesitancy of others -- the
subjecting of inspection to the consent of the receiving State -- have
prevented the finding of an intermediate position that could satisfy one and
all. For its part, my delegation remains convinced that the text drawn up in
the intensive consultations held by the chairman of the relevant working group
last year and which could not even be included in the Committee's report
because of the opposition of one delegation constitutes an excellent
negotiating basis since it contains realistic proposals and limits to the
minimum the possibilities of refusing an inspection.
This is a crucial year in the preparatory work for the convention. We
regret that two States members of the Conference, the United States and
France, recently deemed it appropriate to take the decision to add new devices
of mass destruction to those they already possess, at a time when the
negotiations on the convention, in which they play a dominant role, are in
their final phase.
As a State which does not possess chemical weapons, Mexico attaches great
importance to the conclusion of the convention, which will definitively
eliminate this lethal category of weapons of destruction. As we always try to
do in similar cases, this interest of ours has been proven through facts, such
as the fact that, despite our delegation's being one of the smallest
accredited to the Conference on Disarmament, one of its members has this year
been devoting almost all his efforts to performing the task of co-ordinator of
one of the three working groups that makes up the basic structure established
by the Committee in 1985. We have been doing so because we are convinced of
the need to step up our efforts in order to be able to transmit to the
General Assembly as soon as possible an agreement as important as the
convention, whose purpose is forever to eliminate chemical weapons,
undoubtedly will be. Let us hope that, in the coming year, our efforts, which
began so many years ago in this negotiating body, which then bore the title of
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will be crowned with success.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement
and for the kind words addressed to the President. This exhausts the list of
speakers for today, unless we have someone else? I recognize the
representative of the Soviet. Union.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): First of all, I should like to welcome the contribution that the
distinguished Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam, Comrade Nguyen Di Nien, made to our work by his statement. I also
take note of the statement made this morning by the distinguished Minister of
State of the United Kingdom, Mr. David Mellor, and it is in connection with it
that I have asked for the floor. Before making my comments on that subject, I
should also like to express my best wishes to the Ambassador of Nigeria,
Ambassador Tonwe, who is leaving us, and to the retiring Ambassador of the
United Kingdom, Mr. Cromartie.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.421
22
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
I do not intend to comment on the whole of Mr. Mellor's statement; I
will merely limit myself to a few general remarks. The Minister of State of
the United Kingdom called upon us to match words and deeds. In itself, that
is correct: words and deeds should match. But I think that Mr. Mellor
addressed his call in this connection to what is clearly the wrong quarter.
Indeed, there is no shortage of fine words, and Mr. Mellor demonstrated that
today in his statement, but what we really need is to transform these fine
words into the corresponding action.
The Minister of State of the United Kingdom. reminded us of the fact that
NATO had declared that it would not have recourse to any of its types of
weapons except in response to an attack. We can only welcome that attitude.
As you know, there is a similar provision in the military doctrine of the
States parties to the Warsaw Treaty too. However, behind this NATO slogan
there is something entirely different from what we propose. Behind these fine
words uttered by the West we see the continuing accumulation of all these
types of armaments. As a result, the danger of war increases and stability
deteriorates.
Apart from the provision to the effect that they will not use their
armaments except in response to an attack, the military doctrine of the Warsaw
Treaty States contains other provisions, including that concerning the
non-first use of nuclear weapons. I would like to remind you that these are
not simply words, but a commitment that the Soviet Union has already taken
upon itself -- a unilateral commitment.
Now let us take the question of banning tests, to which the minister of
State of the United Kingdom also gave a certain amount of attention. The
question of testing is at present being linked by the Western Powers both with
nuclear disarmament and with the reduction of conventional weapons, so that
this question -- one of the top priority, most important questions -- is being
transferred into the category of long-term objectives. I think that such
deeds do not match the words which we hear so often on the matter.
Mr. Mellor also referred to the question of Afghanistan. I must state in
this connection that our words and deeds match completely. We have already
withdrawn six regiments from Afghanistan and will recall our entire military
contingent from there as soon as possible. But the solution of this problem
requires reciprocity from the United States and from Afghanistan's
neighbours; it requires international efforts too. The process of national
reconciliation is proceeding in Afghanistan and must not be impeded.
Mr. Mellor referred to the statement made by General Secretary
M.S. Gorbachev at the Moscow Forum, and in particular to his words to the
effect that, where there is inequality in any elements, we must redress the
situation, not through a build-up by the one who is behind, but through a
build-down by the one who is in front. He welcomed these words and said they
must be transformed into action. That is a question on which I would
particularly like to dwell.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 421
23
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
The question is truly an important one -- how to transform words into
deeds. Words can be used to criticize each other ad infinitum. Words are an
expression of intent. To transform them into deeds requires agreement. The
achievement of agreement, in its turn, requires dialogue. And we do propose
this dialogue, but regrettably, we do not always -- we far from always --
receive a positive response. This is also happening with the words of
General Secretary Gorbachev to which the United Kingdom Minister of State
referred. With a view to transforming these words into concrete deeds, the
States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have proposed to the NATO member States
the holding of consultations to compare the military doctrines of the two
alliances and, in the document on this subject which was adopted in Berlin, it
is stated, and I quote, "Other possible subjects for the consultations are the
existing imbalances and assymetrical levels that have emerged in certain
categories of armaments and armed forces, as well as the search for ways to
eliminate them through a reduction by the side which has an advantage over the
other, on the understanding that these reductions lead to ever lower levels".
Thus, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are proposing a concrete way to
transform words into deeds. But -- as I have just said, regrettably -- we
have not received the NATO countries' consent to the holding of such
consultations. I think that it is time for us to move from mutual reproaches
to a mutual dialogue on all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament. Only
such a dialogue, and not mutual reproaches, can lead us to measures, deeds,
that will strengthen general security.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union for his
comments. Are there any further speakers who wish to take the floor today? I
see none.
Before I adjourn the plenary meeting, I should like to recall that the
Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
will meet immediately afterwards in this conference room. The next plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 July, at
10 a.m. After that plenary meeting and in accordance with the timetable for
meetings to be held this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on
the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race
and nuclear disarmament". The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at noon.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.422
16 July 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 July 1987 at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. T. Terrefe
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.422
2
The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 422nd plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament.
To begin with, I should like to welcome, on behalf of the Conference,
a distinguished visitor: we have among us today the Director-General
of International Security and Disarmament Affairs of Spain,
Ambassador Carlos Miranda, who is addressing the Conference at this plenary
meeting. This is his first visit to the multilateral disarmament negotiating
body since he took up his important functions and I wish to thank him for the
interest that he shows in our work.
In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue
its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In
accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure however, any member wishing
to do so may take the floor on any subject relevant to the work of the
Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Spain and
Mexico. I have pleasure in giving the floor to the first speaker, the
Director-General of International Security and Disarmament Affairs,
Ambassador Carlos Miranda.
Mr. CARLOS MIRANDA Y ELIO (Spain) (translated from Spanish):
Mr. President, first of all I should like to thank you both for the very warm
welcome just extended to me and for this opportunity to speak in this Council
chamber dedicated to the Spaniard Francisco de Vittoria. Permit me to
congratulate you on your appointment as President of the Conference on
Disarmament for this month and to express the hope that under your expert
guidance we can continue making progress towards our common objectives. At
this Conference, observer delegations generally do not speak in the plenary as
frequently as its members and we lack the opportunity to greet and
congratulate all the distinguished persons who have occupied or will be
occupying the Chair during the many months in the year that it meets; permit
me, therefore, to express my gratitude for the efforts of your predecessors in
the Chair and to pledge our full co-operation to your successors.
Not long ago, the Spanish observer at this Conference, Ambassador Lacleta,
announced the decision of the Spanish Government to take the necessary steps
for Spain to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; at that time reference
was made to the Spanish Government's security and disarmament policy. I have
the pleasure to be in your midst today precisely for the purpose of setting
forth, albeit briefly, our views on this subject in the context of the items
appearing in the programme of work of this Conference. I am pleased to be
doing so at a time when the disarmament process seems to be receiving a truly
important impetus in the bilateral negotiations between the two major military
Powers of our age and when there is also a chance of this Conference entering
the final phase. of a new and very necessary multilateral contribution aimed at
achieving the elimination from the face of the Earth of an entire category of
extremely cruel weapons of mass destruction -- chemical weapons.
Spain's interest in, and concern with disarmament problems -- which are
of long standing -- have been given new impetus in the past few years through
a series of measures of which at this time I shall, at the risk of being
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
3
(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)
immodest, mention only one, that is the establishment of the'newest General
Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Directorate of
International Security and Disarmament Affairs, which I have the honour and
responsibility to head.
Security and disarmament are intimately linked. Thus, while it is true
that disarmament which is balanced in its results and achieved through
agreements compliance with which can be rapidly and effectively verified must
help to enhance security, it is also true that we cannot progress on
disarmament at the sacrifice of the necessary security, that is, the
possibility of defence in case of attack, or the capacity to deter a potential
aggressor.
According to paragraph 19 of the Final Document of the first special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, our ultimate objective
is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
But until it becomes possible to reach that ultimate objective, arms limitation
and reduction agreements can, and must, prevent arms races by maintaining
security at the lowest possible level of armaments and in an equilibrium
deterring all tendency to aggression. Since the end of the Second World War
the balancing capacity of nuclear weapons seems to have guaranteed that
deterrence, since the surplus of power of those weapons and their capacity to
generate a threat of total destruction are what enable us to dispense with
determining other, far more delicate balances.
But the highest authorities of the two major military Powers of our time,
General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, declared in November 1985,
in this very city, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.
We must draw the conclusions that follow from that assertion, which we all
share: we must make that war impossible and the only way to make it
impossible is, ultimately, the disappearance of nuclear weapons.
Now then, on the path leading towards that goal it is necessary to bear
in mind the essential considerations of balance and security. This can only
be achieved in a gradual process that takes account not only of nuclear
weapons, but also of all other weapons, including chemical weapons, and
conventional weapons, within the context of global consideration of that
balance and, obviously, bearing in mind the fact that the equalizing factor
should in principle not be an increase in the strength of the party that is at
a disadvantage at a given time or in a given category of weapons, but rather a
reduction in principle.of the forces of'the party that is in the situation of
superiority.
In this respect, it must be pointed out that the term "balance" does not
of itself ensure security or peace. A "balance", be it nuclear or
conventional, at the high levels of forces that are now current and without
having proceeded to the elimination of all possibility of a surprise or mass
attack is not enough. That is why this term has to be qualified, complemented
by the expression "at lower levels of forces". It is then when we reach
conventional stability. at lower levels, with no possibility of mass or
surprise attacks, that nuclear armaments will begin to lose their meaning. If
we want, and I think we do want, to make progress in the nuclear disarmament
process, we. must also strive to make'progress in the conventional field.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
4
(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)
In this connection, I should like to refer for a moment, to the informal
and exploratory discussions for the drawing up of a mandate on conventional
stability that are currently taking place in Vienna between 23 countries of
those participating in the CSCE process. These discussions must be viewed in
the light of the context of the process that began with the signing of the
Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and of the adoption at the Stockholm Conference
in 1986 of a whole series of measures to enhance security and confidence. May
I be permitted here to point to the essential link between the confidence
represented by these measures and the discussions, which have as their final
goal the adoption of disarmament measures: without a minimum basis of prior
confidence, it is unthinkable to make progress in the field of disarmament
proper. As regards the discussions to which I am referring, I should like to
emphasize that they involve the 23 States which, in view of the existence of
two political-military alliances, undoubtedly have major responsibility in the
matters affecting the security of this continent. Last Friday, 3 July,
Portugal submitted a proposal on questions of security in the CSCE that was
also sponsored by 15 other countries, among them Spain, participating in the
Conference. This proposal contemplates the holding of two distinct sets of
negotiations, but both within the context of the process of the CSCE: one to
expand on and deepen the confidence-building measures adopted in Stockholm and
possibly to adopt new such measures; the other to achieve conventional
stability in Europe at lower levels of forces, and which would take place
among those countries whose forces have the most immediate impact on the
essential security relationship in Europe.
Let us now turn back to the subject of nuclear disarmament. In this
process, the special responsibility of the major military Powers and the
importance of their bilateral relations cannot be disregarded. But that
reality should not lead us to conclude that the Conference on Disarmament, the
multilateral negotiating body in this matter, should confine itself to
awaiting the outcome of bilateral agreements between these Powers.. The
Conference on Disarmament has its own agenda and, without disregarding the
limitations imposed on it by reality, it should face up to its own
responsibilities. May I then say that in our view the Conference on
Disarmament should include in its agenda all the topics appearing on its
programme. At present, we are especially concerned about the fact that,
except to the extent to which it is included in the comprehensive programme of
disarmament -- and we should like to congratulate Ambassador Garcia Robles for
his unstinting efforts at the head of the Ad hoc Committee dealing with that
programme -- the Conference on Disarmament has not studied item 4 of this
programme, conventional weapons, for, despite its peculiarities in various
geographical zones, conventional disarmament constitutes an essential aspect
of the overall disarmament equation.
It is not just that conventional weapons are the weapons to have been
used in all the armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War, and it
is not just that 80 per cent of the huge sums spent on armaments throughout
the world are devoted to the perfecting or procurement of conventional
weapons. It is, rather, that the reduction of conventional armaments or, to
put it better, a reduction in such armaments that was balanced as to its
results would facilitate the reduction, or increase the possibility of our one
day achieving the disappearance of nuclear weapons. And I must add that it
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
5
(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)
was prudent and far-sighted to agree that, as paragraph 22 of the
Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted
to disarmament states, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament
measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of
armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of
undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing
stability at a lower military level -- a statement that is, moreover,
confirmed in paragraphs 45 and 46, in chapter III, of the Document with regard
to the Programme of Action.
The Spanish Government has repeatedly declared its intention to keep Spain
as a non-nuclear country, an intention which, moreover, is in keeping with a
popular decision expressed through a referendum. So far Spain has been a
non-nuclear country de facto. Soon now, before the end of this year, with the
deposit of the instrument of Spain's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
concerning which the Government already has the unanimous approval of Congress
and matters are in hand for the Senate to give its approval after the summer,
once the parliamentary recess is over, when we will then deposit this
instrument of accession, our country will renounce in international law the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. That will also strengthen the ban., which was
approved by the referendum of 12 March 1986, on the installation, stockpiling
or introduction of nuclear weapons within Spanish territory and will dispel all
possible suspicion that Spain has not renounced turning itself into a nuclear
Power. In this connection, I should like to add that Spain hopes that in this
field it will be subject to the same regime as the non-nuclear countries of
the European Community that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
With reference to the first item on the agenda of this Conference, it
cannot be a surprise to anyone that my country, which is a contracting party
to the Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests, is also decisively
irk favour of the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests. In
keeping with that desire, we are pleased at the successive Soviet moratoria
and we regret their recent interruption.
We also regret that this Conference has not yet been able to establish an
ad hoc committee entrusted with considering in all their aspects the banning
of nuclear tests and the problems of verification involved in the total
prohibition as well as in the limitation of testing. On the other hand, it is
with great interest and hope that we are following the current negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union, which, we hope, will pave the
way for a gradual advance towards the final objective through the acceptance
of a progressive reduction of the number and yield of the tests carried out.
It is obvious that there is also a link between the implementation of
certain nuclear tests and the fact that these weapons remain an element of
deterrence. I have referred to this matter before and I must point out that
my Government is aware of the role played by nuclear weapons, but at the same
time we also believe that that deterrence can be maintained and general
strategic stability can be improved by undertaking gradual, significant,
balanced and verifiable reductions in the nuclear weapons currently deployed
and that as a first step towards the ultimate goal of their final elimination.
545
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
6
(Mr. Carlos Miranda v Elio, Spain) /
Consequently, it is with great hopes that we view the development of the
negotiating process between the United States and the Soviet Union that is
taking place here in Geneva and will, we hope, because we consider success is
necessary, enable the medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe to be
eliminated rapidly and, if that is possible and, in addition, desirable --
because it is -- totally, without any missile of that description remaining in
the Asian part of the USSR or in the United States. Similarly, it is
necessary to realize the prospects that exist for a 50 per cent reduction of
Soviet and United States strategic nuclear arsenals by signing a treaty to
this end as soon as possible. We mean that both things should, if possible,
be signed this year.
So far I have referred to matters relating to items 1, 2 and 8 of the
Conference's agenda. I shall add a few words in the context of item 3, for
the consideration of which, as of items 1 and 2, it has not yet been possible
to establish an ad hoc committee, something we regret because item 3 also
deserves special development. It is true that the prevention of nuclear war
appears to be a broad question and one related moreover to the cessation of
the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear
testing, but it also has other specific facets. In our view, it is hardly
conceivable that a war could be exclusively nuclear from the outset -- except
in the case, which unfortunately cannot be ruled out, of a war that began
accidentally: the degree of sophistication of the systems involved and the
brief span of time that would be left for direct intervention by officials
make it impossible to discard that hypothesis. In any case, we are convinced
that the best way to prevent nuclear war is to forestall, to prevent all war.
Once again, we see the inescapable link between nuclear and conventional
armaments and the danger there would be in the beginning of a conventional war
between nuclear Powers that could turn into a nuclear conflict of universal
consequences.
I am pleased to express our satisfaction at the progress now being
achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It is well known that
Spain does not possess such weapons today and does not wish to possess them
and that it is in favour of the completion as soon as possible of a treaty
prohibiting not only the use but also the development, production and
stockpiling of these weapons and imposing the destruction of those that
already exist.
The 1925 Protocol, to which Spain is a contracting party and which meant
a large step in the right direction, none the less reserves the possibility of
possessing chemical weapons and the legitimacy of their use as a reprisal.
And, although these arms were not used in the Second World War, we have seen
with indignation that they have been used in other conflicts, and especially
in the conflict raging today between Iraq and Iran. Consequently, only the
radical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of these weapons will be
an absolute guarantee of the impossibility of their use. Of course, a treaty
of this kind requires in its turn rigorous procedures for verifying that its
terms are being respected by all its parties and also requires universal
participation and, first and foremost, the participation of the great military
Powers.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
7
(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)
Consequently, my country is in favour of rapid, effective and sure
verification systems and we believe that the necessary efforts should be made
to resolve the greatest problem still outstanding: in our view, the problem
of challenge inspection, whether in the case of chemical weapons storage
facilities or in the case of production facilities. We welcome the favourable
disposition that has been shown in the area of principles and we hope that it
will swiftly be transformed into texts that will ensure the necessary rapidity
and effectiveness in the functioning of this final "safety net" in the
implementation of the future convention. We continue to believe that the
proposal by the United Kingdom in document CD/715 provides an excellent basis
for this work.
As you know, our delegation is participating actively to that end in the
work of the Ad Hoc Committee, where, of course it is still necessary to
resolve other detailed questions, such as those of the schedules of chemicals
to be subject to various verification procedures, the declaration of arsenals,
obsolete weapons, the order of destruction, the institutional systems, and
also the sanctions or measures to be adopted in the event of proven violations
of the future convention. And I should like to stress that, if the
possibility of reprisals is excluded, it will be essential to guarantee
absolutely that the convention will be respected.
In connection with the order of destruction of existing chemical weapons,
the'Spanish delegation has submitted a working paper whose purpose is to
achieve a reduction through "equal gradients of risk" of each chemical in each
annual destruction period, taking as a basis for computation the median lethal
dose or the median incapacitating dose, which are the most significant
parameters in the military utilization of chemical'weapons. On that basis,
the equivalent masses of risk of each chemical can be determined, which
enables a comparison to be made of the chemicals to be destroyed, or the
substances to be replaced when that is necessary because of imperatives
relating to the handling of stocks, the capacity of the destruction facility,
or any other considerations, including political considerations, that make it
advisable to have a solid basis of comparison. Our proposal is compatible
with .others and we would be prepared to study any combinations capable of
yielding the desired result. However, we must point out as of now that we do
not deem it desirable to establish provisions designed to permit, even
temporarily, chemical rearmament in order to achieve a new equilibrium which
today does not exist or provisions that would imply an invitation to countries
which today do not possess chemical weapons to acquire them.
I should now like to devote a brief comment to agenda item 5, the
prevention of the arms race in outer space. In an agreement recently approved
by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Parliament, it is declared
that Spain advocates disarmament measures which, while preserving the
necessary levels of security and stability, will reverse the arms race on
Earth and prevent its extension into outer space. I am not going to discuss
the question whether there are armaments deployed in outer space or not, but
we do believe that there is no doubt that outer space is already being used
for military purposes. In many cases, this utilization, even though it is
military, has stabilizing, and hence advantageous consequences. However, we
are also convinced that the legal rules applicable in outer space are
inadequate to guarantee that space weapons will not be installed there.
47
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
8
(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)
My Government has grave doubts that new systems of weapons, whether
space- or Earth-based, that are designed to destroy space objects can
contribute to creating greater stability or security. Much the opposite, we
believe that such systems of armaments would inevitably initiate a new race,
this time in space, with the consequential weakening of strategic stability.
This, of course, a question where the main responsibility devolves on the two
major military Powers. Spain has already expressed in other fora, and I
reiterate it here, its support for the view that these two countries should
comply with the ABM Treaty in the terms in which it has been interpreted so
far, and that any other interpretation must be agreed by the contracting
parties and be without detriment to strategic stability and security.
Consequently, we are in principle opposed to any deployment of strategic
defences, be they based in space or on Earth, without an agreement in this
connection and without taking account of European interests.
Given the inadequacy of the existing legal order, which only specifically
prohibits the deployment in space or on celestial bodies of nuclear weapons
or weapons of mass destruction, we are concerned first and foremost about
the development of anti-satellite weapons and we are pleased that the
United States Congress has not authorized testing of this type of weapon
against real targets, and that Soviet testing in this regard has ceased. In
this situation, we think that an agreement should be possible and that it is
necessary to study the possible machinery for the verification of compliance
with that agreement, a subject of whose difficulties we are not unaware.
We are pleased that an Ad hoc Committee has been re-established which is
to complete the consideration of the diverse and difficult problems linked to
the-necessity of preventing an arms race in outer space. Likewise, we are
pleased at the resumption of work on agenda item 6 and we have taken note with
great interest of document CD/768 submitted by the distinguished delegation of
Nigeria, which we believe offers an excellent basis for the discussion of the_
assurances that States not possessing nuclear weapons ought to obtain against
the use or the threat of use of these weapons.
We are also pleased that the Ad hoc Committee dealing with agenda item
7,
new types of weapons of mass destruction, that is radiological weapons, is
continuing its work. On this matter I shall confine myself to saying that,
in
our view, the two questions at issue -- the prohibition of radiological
weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities -- are very
distinct questions linked only by a common characteristic, namely the
consequences for human lives and the environment of the dispersion of
radioactive substances. But the treaty mechanisms need to be so different
that, in our opinion, the trend towards separating the study of the two items
within the Ad hoc Committee is correct although that study can continue
simultaneously.
I have already referred in earlier passages in my statement to the
comphrehensive programme for disarmament and I made what is, to our mind, a
fundamental point concerning the priority items. I shall not repeat what I
have already said and I shall confine myself-now to expressing my hope that
there will be expeditious completion of a document which should,be submitted
no later than the forthcoming third General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
548
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
9
(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)
As you know, Spain does not possess nuclear weapons in its territory,
neither its own nor those of third parties. Nor does it possess chemical
weapons or any other type of weapon of mass destruction. In the programme of
peace and security as submitted by the President of the Spanish Government to
Parliament in 1984, a specific item devoted to disarmament was contemplated.
Also, the interest with which the Spanish people follow subjects related to
security and disarmament is great and is growing day by day, constituting in
terms of the public opinion that is so important in parliamentary democracies,
such as that of Spain, a considerable element in the resolve of the Spanish
Government to progress,in these fields.
Lastly, I should like to refer, even if only briefly, to the significant
role that the Conference on Disarmament has been playing throughout its
history and to the importance that Spain attaches to its work. We believe
that it is precisely this importance and significance which make it advisable
that States wishing to take part in its work should, as far as possible, be
able to do so. In this connection, Spain hopes that the question of the
forthcoming expansion, which today is blocked, will be resolved as soon as
possible and it would also like to reiterate here and now, once again, its
interest in becoming, and resolve to become a part of this Conference as a
fully fledged member as soon. as possible. Its political demographic, economic
and also military importance more than warrant this aspiration.
It is true that disarmament and military deterrence are not sufficient
goals to guarantee the peace and security of humanity: detente, the search
for peaceful solutions to conflict and the defence of human rights are
imperative needs and consequently also constitute a basic guideline in my
country's foreign policy. It is true that these questions go beyond the
sphere of competence of this Conference, but the contribution that the
Conference can make through the adoption of agreements containing disarmament
measures that are equitable, balanced in their results and verifiable is an
element of vital importance to progress in the relationship between
disarmament and detente, such that we can be confident that peace and security
will be guaranteed to our generation and to caning generations.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and
for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the
representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my
delegation subscribes with particular pleasure to the words of welcome you
addressed to Mr. Carlos Miranda, the Director-General for International
Security and Disarmament Affairs of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
Spain. I should also like to thank Mr. Miranda for the very kind reference he
has made to my modest contribution to the Ad hoc Committee on the
Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament.
On 3 December last year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by
the overwhelming majority of 135 votes in favour resolution 41/46 A. which is
entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". In that resolution, the
international community's most representative body recalled inter alia that
"the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for
r,49
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 422
10
i
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than
50 resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of
disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest
priority" and stressed that "on eight different occasions it has condemned
such tests in the most strongest terms" and that since 1974 it has stated its
conviction that their continuation "will intensify the arms race, thus
increasing the danger of nuclear war". In the same resolution the General
Assembly, after reiterating "once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon
testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of
Member States", appealed "to all States Members of the Conference on
Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
and of the Treaty on the Non-Profileration of Nuclear Weapons, to promote the
establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1987 session of an
ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral
negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions".
The delegation of Mexico, along with the delegations of the countries
which were the most active in promoting in New York the adoption of
resolution 41/46 A to which I referred a minute ago, has tried since the
beginning of the work of the Conference for 1987 to implement the
recommendation of the General Assembly. Regrettably, that was not possible in
what we call the spring session, nor has it been possible in what there has
been so far of the summer session, which is going to end very soon, as is the
session for this year.
Consequently, these delegations, the delegations of Indonesia, Kenya,
Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico, have decided
jointly to sponsor the draft mandate which has just been circulated today and
whose first paragraph faithfully reflects what was agreed by the Assembly
since the Conference would, through that paragraph, establish "an Ad hoc
Committee on item 1 of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the
multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty". I shall
venture to open a brief parenthesis here to say that, in the translation into
Spanish of the English original of this document, which bears the
symbol CD/772, a few errors have been made in paragraph 1; consequently, the
secretariat is going to circulate a new version of this draft.
We venture to hope that the objective study of this draft and its
comparison to those circulated between 1984 and now will highlight its
constructive spirit and its flexibility, which allows for interpretations that
are not in conflict with any of the points of view which can legitimately be
maintained in connection with this matter, a matter to which the Assembly has
quite rightly been giving the highest priority and which also takes pride of
place on the agenda of our Conference.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement.
That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there is any other speaker
who wishes to take the floor? I see none.
550
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.422
11
(The President)
I now turn to the timetable of meetings for the next week which has been
circulated by the secretariat. As usual, it is merely indicative and is
subject to change if necessary. Chairmen of subsidiary bodies were consulted
in its preparation. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the
Conference adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
I have one announcement to make. At the request of the Chairman of the
Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, I wish to inform the Conference of a
change in the announcement appearing in the timetable for this week. The
meeting scheduled for tomorrow, Friday, 17 July, at 3 p.m. will be preceded by
a short meeting of the Ad hoc Committee chaired by Ambassador Meiszter and
immediately afterwards the meeting of Contact Group A will be held as
envisaged in the timetable. In conformity with the timetable for this week,
may I recall that we shall hold immediately after this plenary meeting an
informal meeting on item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament".
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Tuesday, 21 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.05 a .m.
551
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.423
21 July 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 July 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. T. Terrefe
GE.87-62861/7307e 552
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.423
2
The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 423rd plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament.
In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue
its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In
accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, however, any member who
wishes to do so may take the floor on any subject relevant to the work of the
Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Australia,
Argentina, India, Canada, New Zealand and China. I now give the floor to my
first speaker for today, the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, it gives my delegation very great
pleasure at seeing you occupying the Chair of this Conference. We have
already deeply appreciated your guidance and we look forward to working
further with you for the month of July. I must, too, express our very deep
gratitude to the Ambassador of Egypt, your predecessor Ambassador Alfarargi,
for the immensely skilled and capable way in which he guided our work last
month.
Work towards a treaty which would ban all nuclear tests by all States in
all environments for all time -- a comprehensive nuclear.test ban treaty --
has been carried out in this Conference and in its predecessor bodies for a
number of years. That work has proceeded on two main fronts: the political
and the technical. It is no secret that work on the political front is, in
some respects, in an unsatisfactory state, but I will address that subject in
a later intervention. However, work on the technical front has proceeded and
proceeded well. Indeed, it has developed so positively that we Australians
believe that we are on the verge of a real leap forward.
I am referring to the fact that next week the Group of Scientific Experts
(GSE) will reconvene in Geneva and will work towards the second global
seismological monitoring experiment, an experiment which, for the first time,
will include the exchange of wave-form data. This will be a remarkable and
significant instance of international co-operation, not only for scientific
purposes, but to demonstrate that a comprehensive nuclear test ban will be
able to be verified. On the occasion of the first global experiment,
37 States participated, 75 seismological stations were linked. Clearly there
will be at least a similar number on this next occasion.
In the interval between the last global experiment, in 1984, and today,
work has not stood still, either nationally or in terms of international
co-operation, in the field of seismological monitoring. Allow me to describe
briefly Australia's own work, both nationally and in co-operation with others
as an example of-such continuing developments.
In view of its geographical position and because it is a large "quiet"
continent in terms of background noise, Australia is particularly well placed
to play a major role in seismic monitoring. This was recognized in the
decision of the GSE to designate Australia as-one of four International Data
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.423
3
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Centres (IDC) for the major network trial planned for 1988-89. The four IDCs
will fulfil the requirement for the framework of the international seismic
monitoring network. In 1984, the Australian Government decided, in keeping
with its support for the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive test
ban treaty, to upgrade Australia's own capacity to contribute to an
international seismic monitoring network. In September 1986, the Government
opened the Australian Seismological Centre (ASC) in Canberra which draws
together seismic information from seismic stations and arrays on the
Australian continent and in Antarctica. In June 1987, the Government
dedicated a new seismic array processor (ASPRO) that will provide enhanced
analysis of seismic data. This system is capable of detecting and identifying
nuclear explosions down to yields of a few kilotonnes at the main
United States, French, Soviet and Chinese nuclear test sites and, of course,
it is well known that the United Kingdom's tests are conducted at a
United States site. It is our intention shortly to commence publication, on a
regular basis, of an Australian Seismological Centre Bulletin which would give
all details of nuclear tests monitored by the Centre. We see this among other
things as in keeping with the spirit of last year's General Assembly
resolution 41/59 N on the notification of nuclear tests, in which we urged all
States, including the nuclear-weapon States, to comply by making available to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information they have on time,
location and yield of nuclear explosions.
Australia's own national seismic capability is derived in large measure
from international co-operation: with New Zealand; with the United States,
which jointly operates the recently dedicated Alice Springs Seismic Array
Processor; with other countries participating in the work of the Group of
Scientific Experts. Our co-operation with New Zealand has now been formalized
in the Australia-New Zealand Seismic Monitoring Agreement which was signed by
the two Prime Ministers in Apia on 30 April this year. I have the privilege
now, on behalf of the delegations of New Zealand and Australia, to circulate
to members of the Conference English-language copies of that Agreement. I
might mention that the Agreement is being issued by the Secretariat in all
languages as document CD/775.
With respect to this Agreement between Australia and New Zealand, I would
make the following main points. The Agreement complements the efforts being
made in the Group of Scientific Experts, in which both Australia and
New Zealand participate actively. The Agreement demonstrates the importance
both countries attach to the seismic monitoring of nuclear tests. The
Agreement reiterates Australia and New Zealand's strong and active commitment
to the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban
treaty. It demonstrates the importance we attach to early progress towards
the verification regime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban
treaty, both as a necessary task to be accomplished before such a treaty can
come into operation and as something the effective operation of which would in
itself enhance prospects for a treaty. We believe that bilateral co-operation
such as this, as well as being intrinsically positive, has a valuable
demonstration effect, stimulating interest in international co-operation in
seismic monitoring and, in particular, in the possibility of an international
monitoring network. We hope that the Agreement. will give added momentum to
the conviction that the time has come for the establishment of a global
seismic network.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
4
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Exactly one year ago, on 18 July 1986, I tabled in this Conference
document CD/717. It is the Australian proposal for the immediate
establishment of a global seismic network. A decision on this proposal was
not able to be taken last year, but the proposal was noted in the records and
report of the Conference. And, as already mentioned, events have moved on.
The reality is that the forthcoming global experiment will for all effective
purposes establish such a network for the period of the experiment. The
adoption of the proposal made in CD/717 would ensure that that network was
established permanently. We are asking that, before this 1987 session of the
Conference concludes, the Conference adopt our proposal. It is simple, it
makes sense, it is utterly consistent with the stated policy on nuclear
testing of all who sit at this table. It would represent a major concrete
achievement by this Conference.
Some may ask "Why do this now? or "What, at root, is at issue?" The fact
is that, while various bilateral talks are proceeding, while we are talking
here, while resolutions are being adopted at the Assembly, and important
declarations issued elsewhere by specific groups, such as the six-country
group, on the political level, it is clear that agreement to conclude a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has yet to be settled. That agreement
will come, and we believe it, because it is necessary. Even those who say it
is not ripe yet never say it will not come. What do we do in the meantime?
Do we simply wait? Our answer is no. We believe that we should follow what
is the only sensible course of action under such circumstances: build every
necessary piece of this structure -- the structure of a treaty -- so that,
when the last-piece is ready, no time will be lost in fitting it in and in
completing the treaty. It would be tragic if we were-unprepared, if we were
not ready when agreement comes. Building a global seismic network now will
mean that we will be ready. And, by demonstrating that a comprehensive treaty
can be verified, we will forge a positive interaction between the political
and technical aspects of the nuclear testing problem.
A central part of that positive interaction is the signal we will send to
testing States. They say verification is a problem. What does it mean to
them, what does it do to political prospects, if we deny that and say, "Let's
have the negotiation first and worry about verification later"? Surely it is
better to respond by saying, "If you have a problem with verification, then
let's fix that problem"? On a political level this would respond to
seriously-expressed concerns and would answer them. The establishment of a
global seismic network is precisely such a response, precisely such an
answer. We should give that response this year: we should adopt the proposal
outlined in CD/717. -
If we had an Ad Hoc Committee under item I of our agenda, the proposal
could be discussed there. But it can be discussed in the plenary, in the
Group of Scientific Experts. My delegation stands ready to discuss it in any
way. Let us take this step as a real advance in international co-operation,
as an essential step on the path towards an end to nuclear testing and let us
do it now, this year, in the name of this Conference.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement
and for the kind words he expressed to-the President and I give the floor to
the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Campora.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 423
5
Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish) Mr. President, the
Argentine delegation is pleased to greet you on the occasion of your return to
the Conference on Disarmament to preside over it during the current month of
July. Your renewed presence here after a number of years as representative of
your country gives us confidence and assurance that there will be progress in
our work in the penultimate month for the 1987 session. To that end, your
acknowledged. experience is a firm guarantee of better results within what it
is possible for us to achieve. I should also like to welcome the new
representative of the United States of America, Ambassador
Max L. Friedersdorf, with whom I certainly hope to entertain as close a
friendship and working relationship as I had with his predecessor,
Ambassador Lowitz, who remains unalterably in our affection. Unexpectedly, I
find myself in the situation of simultaneously bidding farewell to
Ambassador Cromartie, to whom we should like to extend our best wishes, to
Ambassador Dhanapala, to whom we wish every success in his new function, and
to Ambassador Tonwe, to whom we express our wish for the greatest possible
professional good fortune.
The Argentine delegation has put its name on the list for today's plenary
meeting in order to refer to agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in
outer space. The Ad hoc Committee is doing the job it was mandated to do.
Its deliberations are moving ahead gradually under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Pugliese, whose competence in the field is certainly up to the
measure of the antecedents of Italy, a country that has been a forerunner in
studies and research aimed at establishing a regime for the exploration and
peaceful use of outer space. The Ad hoc Committee has already completed
deliberations on the first and second items of its programme of work, which,
as we know, concern respectively issues relevant to the prevention of an arms
race and the legal regime established in the area of disarmament by the
treaties in force.
One of the issues of greatest interest which emerged in dealing with the
first item was that of determining whether outer space is currently free from
the deployment of weapons. The space Powers, which are few in number, have
not provided a clear-cut reply, declaring, for instance, that they have not
deployed weapons permanently in outer space. We believe that the
international community would be truly relieved to hear that so far there are
no weapons deployed in outer space. In our view, the means to be used to
inform public opinion of that situation, that is, that no weapons have been
placed permanently in outer space could well be the report that the Conference
on Disarmament submits to the General Assembly. It would be sufficient in
that respect for the Ad hoc Committee to include a paragraph stating that none
of the member States represented in the Conference on Disarmament has
permanently deployed weapons in outer space. That assertion avoids the
complex issue of defining what a space weapon is, since what is sought is a
simple statement to the effect that the member States represented in the
Conference on Disarmament have not deployed weapons of any nature or kind. It
is simply a matter of asserting that'there have been no weapons deployed. It
would then be enough, as we have said, for such an assertion to appear in the
report of the Conference on Disarmament, and we hope that.none of the States
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 423
6
(Mr. Campora, Argentina)
members of the Conference on Disarmament will refuse to include such a
paragraph. A declaration to that end could well constitute the point of
departure for more specific and binding initiatives in future with appropriate.
verification measures.
In dealing with item 2 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee,
which concerns the legal disarmament regime which has been established in the
sphere of disarmament by the multilateral treaties in force, we had occasion
to witness an interesting exchange of views that has, in our opinion,
clarified several aspects of the matter. Firstly, it is an accepted fact that
this legal regime establishes that celestial bodies can be used for
exclusively peaceful purposes and that, moreover, that regime excludes the
military use of celestial bodies as well as the testing and deployment of
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and also of other weapons
which are neither nuclear nor weapons of mass destruction. As regards outer
space, it is accepted that it cannot be the subject of testing or deployment
of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. It is also accepted that it is not
permitted to place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in Earth
orbit. Regrettably, there is no, agreement on the multilateral legal regime
governing outer space with respect to the testing and deployment of weapons
that are neither nuclear weapons nor weapons of mass destruction.
We must say that it worries us to hear from time to time that the legal
regime for outer space should draw on that for the high seas. We believe, on
the contrary, that this item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament
which has as its purpose the prevention of an arms race in outer space
corresponds to a basic goal, which is to avoid the legal regime for outer
space resembling in any way the regime for the high seas. We believe that,
were we to establish a regime for outer space similar to that for the high
seas, we would have failed completely in our aim of preventing an arms race in
outer space. It is enough to observe the situation obtaining on seas and
oceans permanently criss-crossed by military. fleets eauipped with all types of
weapons to conclude that there could be no more deplorable picture of outer
space than to conceive of it traversed by space objects of an offensive and
defensive military nature such as those that travel the high seas. The
phenomenon that characterizes the navel arms race must not be reproduced in
space.
The Ad hoc Committee has now begun its deliberations on the third item on
its programme of work, which concerns proposals and future initiatives for
preventing an arms race in outer space. It is obvious that, to prevent an
arms race in outer space, the first measure that must be taken is to avoid the
deployment of weapons, and that requires both a binding commitment in that
sense and the adoption of verification systems that will ensure compliance
with that commitment. The Conference on Disarmament is giving proof within
the context of other items that it is possible to draw up complex verification
procedures when there is the political will necessary to reconcile the goals
of disarmament with those of national security and industrial and commercial
secrecy. Why should it not be possible to establish a binding regime for the
registration of objects launched into space?' That is very simple to do given
political will. Regrettably, the space Powers wish to reserve a wide measure
of freedom of action for themselves in the military use of outer space and
557
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.423
7
(Mr. Campora, Argentina)
prefer to keep secret the nature of the vast majority of objects that they
launch into space. It is then inevitable that the secrecy of the activity of
some should generate a similar attitude in others.
The 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space provides an appropriate basis of rules that can be perfected, first of
all, by establishing their binding nature and then by incorporating in them
verification clauses enabling it to be checked that the information recorded
is reliable. The efficient operation of a register of objects launched into
space and a corresponding verification system would solve a series of problems
relating to the immunity of satellites intended for peaceful use, since it
would be possible, as a result, to ascertain the purpose of a space object
and, consequently, its right to enjoy immunity. Similar arrangements could be
made for the registration of those satellites which have special functions,
such as observation satellites, early-warning satellites, satellites for the
purpose of monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements, etc.
There is, perhaps today, no greater focus of attention among the issues
linked to the drawing up of disarmament treaties or agreements than that of
verification. For almost two years now -- to be precise, since the adoption
of General Assembly resolution 40/152/0 relating to verification, a resolution
supported by the two military alliances -- we have undoubtedly been
witnessing a real diplomatic competition as to who is more enthusiastic about
verification formulae. Verification is today the essential and preliminary
step for any disarmament agreement. Very complex formulae are being tested in
the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we are all aware
too of the situation with regard to the verification of nuclear-weapon tests
and to other items such as radiological weapons, negative assurances and so
on. Verification in the context of the items we have mentioned should provide
a solution to intricate situations such as, for instance, avoiding
non-permitted production of substances within an industry as common and widely
scattered as the chemical industry. None the less, gradually and with
admirable creativity and imagination, verification mechanisms are being worked
out.
But we cannot help feeling surprised at the fact that the analysis of the
item relating to verification within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on
Outer Space has not been the subject of greater attention despite the fact
that activity in outer space originates here on the Earth's surface in a very
limited number of places. The space Powers, which are few in number, also
have only a few places for launching objects into space. Verification of the
nature of the objects that are placed in space could be effected at the launch
sites themselves and that would entirely dispel all doubts as to the military
or peaceful nature of an object sent into space. It is obvious that the
implementation of monitoring and verification machinery at. the bases for the
launching of vehicles with cargoes of a military and strategic nature would be
resisted by the respective space Powers. It can be deduced therefore that the
opening of such sites for the verification, albeit only visual, of loads to be
placed in orbit would require a political decision by the space Powers, aimed
at achieving a certain transparency in their policy for the use of outer
space. To sum up and to conclude this statement, it just remains for me to
point out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space depends solely on
simple acts of political will by the space Powers.
558
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement
and the kind words he expressed to the chair and I give the floor to the
representative of India,'Ambassador Teja.
Mr. TFJA (India): Mr. President, permit me to take this opportunity to
extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the
presidency of the Conference for the month of July. We are happy to see the
distinguished representative of Ethiopia, a country with which India has
maintained long-standing and historical ties of friendship and co-operation,
preside over our deliberations. I should like to assure you of my
delegation's full co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. I
should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our
appreciation for the manner in which your predecessors, Ambassador Alfarargi
of Egypt and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, presided over the
Conference during the months of June and-April. Let me extend a warm welcome
to our new colleagues who have joined us, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi of
Indonesia and Ambassador Max Friedersdorf of the United States of America; I
look foward to working closely with them. We shall, of course, miss
Ambassador Tonwe, Ambassador Cromartie, and Ambassador Dhanapala, and I would
like to join others in wishing them well in whatever they may be doing. I am
sure that Ambassador Tonwe, who is returning to his country, will have a very
successful tour of duty in his new and important assignment. I should also
like to convey our thanks, through their respective delegations, to the
Governments of Canada for organizing the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and
to the Government of Norway for the Holmenkollen Symposium on Chemical Weapons
Convention organized in Oslo earlier this summer. These workshops were
extremely useful and have helped us in generating new ideas on two of the
major issues facing us in the Conference today.
I would like to devote my statement today to the subject of prevention of
an arms race in outer space. This new chapter in the unending race for
nuclear superiority is not only the most expensive but also potentially the
most threatening to the cause of disarmament as we see it. In the Conference
on Disarmament, we have a mandate to negotiate and while it is unfortunate
that we have been prevented from doing so in the critical area of the nuclear
arms race, it would be doubly unfortunate if we did nothing to prevent this
new threat that looms over the planet.
We are aware of the diplomatic skills with which Ambassador Bayart of
Mongolia, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space during 1986, addressed himself to his tasks. We are confident
that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy we will be
able to register substantial progress on this item during 1987.
Since 1983, there has been rapid progress in the development of
anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile defence systems. Yet in our
Conference, there is unfortunately little progress and the Conference seems
bogged down in peripheral issues. What lends urgency to our plea for
negotiations on this question is our apprehension that the pursuit of
space-based defence can lead to a breach of existing arms control agreements,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
9
(Mr. Teja, India)
thereby precipitating unrestrained competition and, in the process,
unravelling the entire web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements,
increasing the likelihood of a nuclear war, not?to speak of the enormous
resources deployed in this area.
The debate between offensive and defensive weapons is an old and
unresolved one. I would not like to enter into a discussion of the technical
possibilities and/or limitations of the ballistic missile defense systems
currently being researched. It would be sufficient to note that extending the
arms race into outer space will not lead us from mutually assured destruction
to mutually assured survival; the only logical means to achieve that is
nuclear disarmament.
The non-aligned and neutral countries have been sceptical of such
theories and exposed the dangers of basing doctrines of security on the
so-called logic of nuclear deterrence. We have consistently taken the
position that the development of space-based weapons and arms race in outer
space must be prevented. The Six-Nation Initiative has placed particular
emphasis on this issue. The Delhi Declaration calls for the prohibition of
the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space
weapons. The Harare Declaration adopted at the eighth non-aligned summit
calls upon "the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to
conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension
of arms race in all its aspects into outer space and thus enhance the
prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space." In
particular, the leaders of the non-aligned countries stressed the urgency of
"halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, the dismantling of the
existing systems, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapon systems
into outer space in order to ensure that the existing treaties safeguarding
the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and
extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances". It is
clear that, once the fragile web of existing arms control arrangements begins
to be unravelled and these treaties are violated, it will become progressively
more difficult to undertake any constructive disarmament negotiations.
The reasoning that there does not exist a specific agreement prohibiting
the introduction of a ballistic defence missile system is, in our view, no
justification; the fact remains that there does exist a corpus of
international law, adequate and coherent, though not comprehensive, which, if
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of the Treaties, cannot only prevent an arms race in outer space but also
indicate the areas which require strengthening in the form of additional legal
instruments to provide for a comprehensive legally-binding structure. At
present, the law in.relation to arms relations in outer space consists of
treaty provisions. These treaties are both bilateral and multilateral, the
most significant among them being the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the
bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972. The two have to be viewed against the backdrop
of other agreements. Until recently there has been uniform compliance in
keeping with the ultimate objective but, of late, differences of
interpretation have arisen. These differences can be reconciled if we
acknowledge that impartial interpretation is based upon compliance with treaty
obligations in good faith.
5(,0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.423
10
(Mr. Teja, India)
A number of detailed analyses have been made of the existing
international legal regime. Without going into details at this stage, I
should like to state that the most fundamental of these agreements is the
Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the "threat or use of force".
The Charter, which.is applicable to outer space in accordance with the
1967 Outer Space Treaty exemplifies the concept further by recognizing the
common interest of all mankind in the use of outer space for peaceful
purposes. The term "peaceful purposes" has been traditionally understood to
imply non-military purposes. Until the mid-1970s, this 'interpretation was
accepted by both the super-Powers, More recently a new, Qualitatively
different interpretation has been advanced by one of the space Powers,
according to which peaceful purposes is defined as "non-aggressive". This is
tantamount to sanctioning militarization of space. My delegation believes
that the reference to the Charter of the United Nations in the Outer Space
Treaty makes the interpretation of "non-aggressive" redundant. This view is
also strengthened by the understanding of the Antartic Treaty, where the term
"peaceful purposes" is still interpreted to imply non-military purposes.
Another significant treaty is the'bilateral United States-Soviet Treaty
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Certain technological
developments and on-going research programmes have led to divergent opinions
about the scope of this Treaty. These issues need to be resolved urgently
while keeping in view the basic objective of the Treaty, and, if need be,
through strengthening the provisions in the light of recent technological
advances.
Semantics will lead us to involved discussions on the meaning of research
and advanced research, development and testing, laboratory testing, field
testing or demonstration testing, but these exercises will not be conclusive.
Language is intended as a means of communication. We believe that the only
valid criterion for deciding when faced with such semantics is to accept that
which is compatible with the widest, broadest and universally acceptable
principle of peaceful purposes, in outer space. United Nations
General Assembly resolution 41/53, which was adopted with an overwhelming
majority of 154 votes, refers to the activities of "exploration and use of
outer space" as to be carried on "in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security and promoting international co-operation and
understanding". Given this criterion, which, we think, we can all accept as
reasonable, we feel that there need not be any dispute about interpretations
of what is prohibited and what is permitted.
So far I have alluded to the first two aspects of the mandate given to
the Ad hoc Committee of our Conference. An impartial consideration of the
technological aspect of the proposed BMD systems reveals its inherent
shortcomings, which in turn only confirm that development of such systems
cannot lead us away from nuclear deterrence, but merely heighten the
precarious edge of deterrence by leading us into a new cycle of the arms
race. Secondly, I have tried to bring together some of the strands of the
current international legal regime which, if seen in their complementarity,
clearly indicate its adequacy. There is, none the less, a need to make it
,more comprehensive. Before I move to suggestions in this sphere, I would like
to refer to another aspect of the arms race in outer space, namely,
anti-satellite weapons.
561
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
11
(Mr. Teja, India)
Satellites, for our country as for many others, are a part of an effort
to use technology for the benefit of our peoples. We are all aware of the
applications of satellites in telecommunications, meteorology, remote-sensing,
navigation and scientific research. At the same time, these very functions
also have another aspect: the verification of arms limitation agreements.
More recently, wartime combat. support functions have also been included in
satellite capability. While some may be indirect, i.e., in the areas of
communications and navigation, others may be more direct, such as radar-
location of targets and navigational guidance for attack missiles.
Perceptions of these attributes and their development have, side by side, also
spurred attempts to develop anti-satellite weapons. If satellites have been
accepted as an aid to confidence building by virtue of their role in
verification, then putting them at risk would only serve to exacerbate
tensions and have a destabilizing effect on any crisis.
In virtually all missile defence concepts, satellites are foreseen to
perform essential functions, either as sensors or as relay stations in the
attack, and they must, therefore, possess a defensive capability. This is the
close connection between the development of the BMD systems and the
development of the improved anti-satellite systems, in addition to the
inherent ASAT potential of many BMD systems. It is, however, the distinctions
between BMD systems and the ASAT systems which are more significant for us, as
these indicate the approach that can be adopted to develop a treaty banning
ASAT weapons. The significant ASAT methods like spacemines, jamming and
deception measures and attacks on ground stations, have no BMD analogue. The
levels of performance for a BMD and for attacking satellites are very
different. ASAT can be mounted from a friendly territory, its targeting is
relatively easier and can be undertaken over a long period of time, its
survivability is easier as it is likely to operate in a crisis situation
rather than in a hostility situation -- in short, while the technology is
similar, the technical differences between an effective BMD system and an ASAT
system are significant.
These distinctions are relevant in designing any ASAT ban -- which, to be
comprehensive and effective, must not only ban testing, development and
deployment of all ASAT weapons but also eliminate existing such weapons. Even
at present, the issues of verification and compliance are likely to reauire
considerable reserves of political goodwill and trust before they can be
resolved; with any delay in the undertaking of negotiations and'possibly if
faced with deployment, it would become that much more difficult. One possible
structure for such a treaty could be in the form of a general formulation,
with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites.
Evidently, the categorization of today may not remain as exhaustive for
tomorrow. This explains the necessity for separate protocols, which can be
derived from and placed under the umbrella of the general treaty
formulations. For the present, three categories for which specific protocols
could be relevant would be NEO (Near-Earth Orbits), HEO (Higher Earth Orbits)
? and GEO (Geosynchronous Orbits). However, this is merely indicative and not
an exhaustive listing. The formulation of the general provision would be an
indicator of the underlying political commitment. Elements of such a proposal
have already been tabled in this Conference and it is now necessary that we
take a comprehensive look at it.
562
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
12
(Mr. Teja, India)
Closely related to this, but wider in scope in terms of its applicability
to all objects launched into space, is the Registration Convention of 1975.
My delegation believes that this convention needs to be strengthened,
especially the provisions relating to article IV, which provide the
information about the characteristics of the objects launched. Such an
exercise is fully inconsonance with the objectives of the Convention, as
stated in the preamble, namely to "contribute to the application and
development of international law governing the exploration and use of outer
space". Under the existing scheme, while we know from independent reliable
sources that about three fourths of the satellites launched are used for
military purposes, the description most freauently provided under the
requirements of the Registration Convention read "Exploration of upper
atmosphere and outer space". Admittedly, the dividing line between military
and non-military uses is thin, but to be able to examine it and judge it
impartially, we need to be able to get close to it. My delegation would be in
favour of the idea that an expert group be convened to help the Ad hoc
Committee in such a task. To begin with, the mandate of the expert group.
would be to devise the necessary parameters on which information needs to be
provided under article IV of the Registration Convention. Such an activity
would not only further the objectives emphasized in the preamble, but also be
a significant aid to confidence-building.
A better understanding of this aspect would contribute to our discussion
on the proposal for a multilateral agreement conferring on space objects
immunity from attack or interference. Clearly, such an agreement would need
suitable verification, on which, too, proposals have been submitted to this
Conference.
We have the means to begin to consider specific provisions and measures
aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. It is the earnest desire of
the delegation of India that, with the wholehearted commitment and
co-operation of all other delegations, the Conference on Disarmament will be
successful in safeguarding outer space, as the common heritage of mankind, for
the generations to come.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and
for the kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to
the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.
Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, in an earlier intervention, I paid
tribute to you and your predecessors for the wise and skilful way in which you
have directed our deliberations. I will not repeat that, but I hope that it
is understood that I remain even more convinced of our wisdom. May I take
this opportunity, however, of associating myself with the views expressed by
so many of my colleagues who have made known their regrets at the retirement
of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, our British colleague, and the transfer to other
duties of Ambassador Dhanapala and Ambassador Tonwe. We will miss them all
and I hope that our paths will cross again.
May I also say, since the main topic of my comments will be verification,
how really encouraging it is to have heard so many references to verification
in each of the speeches we have heard this morning. I do not know if we have
had a previous occasion where that has proven true, and I doubt if it would
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
13
(Mr. Beesley, Canada)
have occurred a year ago, and this is extremely encouraging. Indeed, I have
asked for the floor today to table two documents. The first of these is a
summary report of the Outer Space Workshop which was held for heads of
Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations in Montreal on
14-17 May 1987. The second is a Compendium of Arms Control Verification
Proposals compiled by the Verification Research Unit of the Canadian
Department of External Affairs. Delegations may recall that in my comments to
the Conference on 30 April I drew attention to Canada's emphasis on practical
work towards arms control agreements. Consistent with this approach we have
undertaken continuing research on the verification of such agreements. The
two documents that I am tabling are both examples of this practical approach.
It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that
contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military
forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To
ask States to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as a
preferable way of protecting their security is to demand of them a very
serious and difficult decision. In effect, a State accepts a treaty in lieu
of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely
important undertaking, since a primary responsibility of all Governments must
be to protect the security, however defined or perceived, of their respective
countries. Given the traditional and contemporary concern with national
security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by
which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control
agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations, while at
the same time demonstrating its own good-faith.
It is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful
negotiation and drafting of adecuate and effective verification provisions is
essential to preventing a deterioration of confidence in an arms control or
disarmament agreement. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving
nuclear weapons and nuclear tests. In a world where there are relatively few
internationally effective sanctions, verification inevitably must play a
critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective, and does not
become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.
As pointed out during a seminar in Ottowa on 19 June at the Conference on
Nuclear Weapons and the Law, verification can be perceived to perform a series
of central functions, but there would seem to be four of particular
importance: deterrence of non-compliance; confidence-building; removal of
uncertainty; and treaty assessment.
Through its primary role in holding out a credible prospect of detection
of non-compliance with an agreement, verification serves to protect the
security of all the parties to an agreement. When adeauate and effective
verification increases the risk of detection that a prospective violator would
face, the temptation to seek advantage by violating an agreement is reduced
and deterrence is enhanced. There are political costs to a violator in being
exposed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
(Mr. Beesley, Canada) i 1
Second, verification also seeks to demonstrate compliance, not merely
non-compliance or possible non-compliance. Continued evidence of compliance
with an agreement can develop and maintain confidence in the intentions of
other parties. The concept of good faith is central to the law of treaties as
a whole, and arms control in particular, and is applicable both to the
fulfilment of treaty obligations and to their interpretation. Thus, increased
trust based on demonstrated good faith could have positive benefits for the
conduct of relations between the States in auestion as well as for
international relations generally. Equally so, the cynical assumption of the
automaticity and inevitability of bad faith on the part of the other side
negates the whole arms control process and risks becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Verification has.a third role, however -- perhaps even the most
important -- that of clarifying facts and removing uncertainty where doubts
arise. When an ambiguous activity is detected, an effective verification
system will counteract false alarms by producing clear evidence. If
uncertainty continues with respect to an activity's legitimacy, it may be an
indication of an inadequacy in a treaty provision, as much as an indication of
bad faith.
Finally, verification can provide a means of surveillance and appraisal
of the effectiveness of the treaty itself. By providing a broad range of
objective, operationally relevant data, verification provisions can provide an
invaluable information base for the continuing review and assessment of a
treaty's operation in practice and, perhaps, point the way to possible changes
in either the substance of the treaty or its manner of application, as well as
providing useful and instructive guidelines for future treaties.
It was with these considerations in mind that we invited heads of the
Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations to attend the Outer Space
Workshop in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The Workshop was intended to provide
tangible evidence that the Canadian Government takes seriously the
responsibility which the Conference on Disarmament has accepted "to examine,
and to identify, through susbtantive and general consideration, issues
relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be
recalled that the Canadian delegation has already submitted a series of
working papers to the Conference on Disarmament on this subject. We have
tabled three working papers dealing respectively with the stabilizing and
destabilizing characteristics of arms control agreements on outer space; with
international law relevant to arms control in outer space; and with
terminology relevant to outer space.
These working papers were not meant to propound a specifically Canadian
governmental viewpoint, but rather to build upon and contribute to the pool of
information in this area and to outline the issues as comprehensively as
possible. Consistent with this objective, the purpose of the Outer Space
Workshop in Montreal, and I thank the distinguished representative of India
for his kind comments, was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views,
in an informal setting, on a number of broad legal questions relating to the
prevention of an arms race in outer space, focusing in particular on the
current legal regime relevant to outer space. The Workshop also exposed
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
15
(Mr. Beesley, Canada)
participants to the presentation of some of the results of Canadian PAXSAT
research concerning the use of space-based remote sensing technicues for arms
control and disarmament verification.
Today, I would like to table a summary report on the Outer Space Workshop
as CD/773, together with its annex, the detailed report. The report seeks to
provide a distillation of the issues and viewpoints which emerged during
discussions at the various segments of the Workshop. In keeping with the aim
and atmosphere of the Workshop, the report does not attempt to draw
conclusions or recommendations from these deliberations, and we must apologize
if any delegate, any observer, feels that his or her views were not adequately
reported, but we have certainly done our best.
We are pleased that representatives of 35 countries, in addition to
Canadian officials, and an honourable representative of the Conference on
Disarmament secretariat, were able to attend the Workshop. The positive
response to the Canadian Government's invitation attests, in our view, to the
importance attached by all member and observer delegations of this Conference
to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Canadian Government
fully shares this interest and this concern. It is hoped that the Outer Space
Workshop has stimulated some new ideas and'approaches to this subject and
brought out the complexity and variety of viewpoints on many of the auestions
relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- complexities and
varieties which we must try to develop into common ground. Clearly, there can
be no "auick fixes" in this area. It is our hope that the Outer Space
Workshop has contributed, in a modest way, to our efforts to achieve progress.
I now turn to the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals. It
will be recalled that when I last spoke, I mentioned that I had carried
personally the message from the Prime Minister on the Peace Run. I am glad I
did not have to carry this particular Compendium with me on that occasion --
it's pretty heavy stuff. But one principle that underlies the Verification
Research Programme of Canada's Department of External Affairs is that
verification can be profitably examined independently of specific treaty
contexts. While the verification provisions of a particular treaty must be
determined by the purpose, scope and nature of that agreement, much valuable
work on general principles, provisions and technicues can be done well before
actual negotiations begin and, of course, during such negotiations. The work
of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which recently began examining
the auestion of "verification in all its aspects", is an example of a
potentially profitable international study of procedures to assist arms
control negotiators.
It is for the foregoing reasons that Canada has undertaken considerable
research work of a specific nature relating to verification. One aspect of
that research relates to the multitude of verification proposals now extant.
In the years since the Second World War, during which time arms control
negotiations have been almost continuously in progress, large numbers of
verification proposals have been put forward from many sources from which many
lessons can be drawn. Many proposals have been made by Governments in
connection with arms control topics that are still under discussion, if not
active negotiation; others have been developed by interested analysts and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
16
(Mr. Beesley, Canada)
published in open literature. Even those proposals which are several years
old may remain highly relevant to current conditions. It is for this reason
that the Canadian Government has compiled a Compendium which is intended to be
a quick reference catalogue to almost 700 arms control verification proposals
originating in publications and statements of Governments and
intergovernmental bodies as well as in academic literature on the subject. We
are making this Compendium available to the Conference on Disarmament so as to
ensure that all delegations have an opportunity to work from the same
comprehensive information base compiled in a readily available format. The
Canadian Government hopes that this will contribute to progress towards
developing arms control and disarmament agreements.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement.
I give the floor now to the representative of New Zealand, Dr. Graham.
Mr. GRAHAM-(New Zealand): New Zealand joins Australia in submitting the
Seismic Monitoring Agreement between our two countries to the Conference on
Disarmament for its information. This Agreement formalizes the co-operation
and exchange of information that has occurred between our two countries over
many years and which will continue to develop and expand in the years ahead.
Among other things this Agreement reflects the important part which seismic
technology can play in arms control-, especially a comprehensive nuclear-test
ban, something which both our countries take very seriously indeed. Pending
some breakthrough on the policy issue of a CTB, it is important that the
interim time be used productively to perfect a technical infrastructure which
will permit verification of a complete test ban when one is concluded. We are
.happy to play our part in that process. It is our belief that the wisdom of
concluding a CTB sooner rather than later will be accepted before very much
longer by all the parties involved.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his
statement and now I give the floor to the last speaker for today, the
representative of China, Ambassador Fan.
Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, not
so long ago I extended my congratulations to you and today I wish to express
warm congratulations to you on your outstanding achievements. I wish also
once again to express our gratitude to the Ambassador of Egypt for his work.
I wish also to express my respect to those outstanding colleagues who have
left or are leaving us, namely Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom,
Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria, who is leaving us soon, and the Ambassador of
Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, who has got another assignment. This is a
normal thing to happen in the Conference on Disarmament, people coming and
going. However, when I see so many outstanding colleagues leaving us, I feel
rather sad.
In my statement today, I wish to offer some comments on the prevention of
arms race in outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has
become an issue of increasing concern to the peoples throughout the world.
This is well justified. There is a Chinese saying, The tree leaves do not
rustle unless there is wind". With the intensified efforts of the two major
space Powers to develop space weapons, people cannot but worry about the dire
567
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
17
(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)?
prospect that weapons might be deployed in outer space. When the first
man-made Earth satellite entered into orbit and when the first Apollo
spacecraft made a successful landing on the Moon, the people of the world
warmly hailed these remarkable achievements as pioneers to the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space by man. At that time, people were not
concerned about an arms race in outer space.
However, today, 30 years later, outer space is congested with various
types of satellites and space vehicles for military purposes. Besides, as
land-based weapons capable of hitting objects in outer space appeared a long
time ago, the emergence of exotic space-based weapons is no longer something
inconceivable or remote. It has become a well-known fact that in recent years
the two major space Powers have increased their efforts to develop space
weapons. While one major space Power, investing huge amounts of financial and
human resources in developing space weapons, has claimed from time to time
that "breakthroughs" have been achieved, the other major space Power, not
willing to be outdone, has openly declared that it will never allow itself to
lag behind. Chasing each other, the two are locked in a fierce competition.
Naturally, people will not turn a blind eye to all this. Although the two are
conducting negotiations'on space weapons -- talks between them are better than
no talks -- they have not hitherto been able to make any substantive progress
in banning space weapons. At present, they differ only on. the speed and scope
of the development of space weapons. What they are seeking is a timetable
based on their respective needs for the development of space weapons rather
than a true prohibition of all types of space weapons. The stark reality that
the two major space Powers are vying with each other in the development of
space weapons has naturally aroused grave concern in the international
community. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament was able to establish
smoothly an Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
fairly early in 1987, is in a certain sense, a reflection of the sense of
urgency that the people of all countries have in their grave concern about the
arms race in outer space.
The international community has another reason for its concern about the
arms race in outer space, for it will lead to a qualitative escalation of the
arms race between the two super-Powers. Their strategic nuclear forces are
now in a rough equilibrium, with neither side being able to overwhelm the
other. An extension of the arms race into outer space is bound to bring about
new changes in the strategic stances of the two sides, make nuclear
disarmament even more complicated and difficult and exacerbate the spiral
escalation of the arms race, thus jeopardizing international peace and
security. The grave consequences of such extension of the arms race into
outer space affect more than the security of the two major space Powers. Many
countries are already worrying that the various types of missiles with nuclear
warheads produced by the two major nuclear Powers might fly to and fro over
their airspace. Once weapons are deployed in outer space, disaster may befall
any country at any moment. The peoples throughout the world are naturally
more worried about this. Therefore, prevention of an arms race in outer space
and of the weaponization of outer space is an issue of major importance that
concerns the security of the people of all countries.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
18
(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)
As already stated, the two major space Powers are at present the only
countries that possess and are continuing the development of space weapons.
They have naturally become the focus of attention of the international
community. They ought to assume special responsibility for halting the arms
race in outer space. If the two major space Powers truly have the political
will to stop the arms race in outer space, they should adopt practical
measures in undertaking not to develop, test or deploy space weapons, and on
this basis conduct negotiations with a view to concluding as soon as possible
an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons.
Resolution 41/53, on prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was
adopted by the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly,
also "urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in the constructive
spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer
space".
Since prevention of an arms race in outer space was placed on the agenda
of the Conference on Disarmament, auite a number of delegations have advanced
propositions and proposals on the subject, covering a wide range of elements
relating to the issue. The Ad Hoc Committee on outer space may address these
proposals in an orderly manner on the basis of a consensus view on their
priorities to be determined according to their relevance to the prevention of
an arms race in outer space. Attention should be focused on the study and
solution of the issues that are most directly related to the prevention of an
arms race in outer space. At present, there are already many proposals before
us on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Some delegations suggest
that an agreement on the prohibition of ASAT weapons should be reached first.
Since ASEP weapons are the space weapons that exist at present, to start with
their prohibition is of certain practical significance. The Chinese
delegation, therefore, can go along with this proposal.. However, I wish also
to point out that the prohibition of other types of space weapons should by no
means be ignored. These include the exotic ASM space weapons, such as
directed energy weapons, kinetic weapons and other types of space weapons
currently being developed by the two major space Powers. We should prohibit
all kinds of space weapons.
Last year, in my statement on prevention of an arms race in outer space,
I noted that the existing international agreements on outer space were reached
under respective specific circumstances at the time of their conclusion.
Therefore they all have certain limitations. With the development of space
science and technology, especially due to the fact that the two super-Powers
have been using new technologies to extend their arms race into outer. space,
These legal instruments, though of positive significance, no longer entirely
suit the present needs and are not adecuate for the prevention of an arms race
in outer space in a fundamental way. In order to attain the ultimate goal of
the "demilitarization of outer space", it is necessary to conduct negotiations
on new international agreements, with the "non-weaponization" of outer space
as the main objective at the present stage. If the arms race.is to be
prevented from extending into outer space, this work should no longer be
delayed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.423
19
(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China) '
Outer space, a common heritage of the whole of mankind, should be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes. China is opposed to an arms race in outer
space. We oppose it, no matter who conducts it. We have consistently
advocated that the exploration and utilization of outer space must be carried
out in the service of peace and of the economic, scientific and cultural
development of all countries and for the benefit of the entire human race.
China, the first inventor of ancient rockets, once made its contributions to
human civilization and progress. Today, the Chinese people are also engaged
in peaceful uses of outer space. Our space technology, though still at the
stage of research, experiment and initial application, has already started its
service in peaceful uses of outer space. China has already entered into
co-operation and exchanges with some countries and international organizations
in the peaceful. exploration and uses of outer space. China has launched and
is going to launch a variety of applications satellites covering geodesy,
geo-resources surveys, communications, broadcasting, meteorology, etc. They
have contributed and will continue to contribute vigorously to China's
economic modernization and to its economic, scientific and cultural exchanges
with other countries. The Chinese people will do their best to this end.
Thanks to the able guidance of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and the
active participation of many delegations, the 1987 Ad hoc Committee on Outer
Space has made some progress in its work. Through an extensive exchange of
views, some issues have been clarified. This has contributed to a better
understanding of the positions and views of all parties. This year, some
delegations have submitted new proposals on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space. Meanwhile, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme
of Disarmament has also conducted deliberations on the issue of outer space,
particularly on its priority position. There has been a deeper understanding
of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and a
willingness to work actively for the realization of that goal.
Before concluding my statement, I wish also to avail myself of this
opportunity to express my profound gratitude to Ambassador Beesley of Canada
and, through him, to the Government of Canada for the opportunity accorded to
me to participate in the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal. The valuable
efforts made by the Canadian delegation to promote the work of the Conference
on Disarmament on preventing an arms race in outer space are recognized by all.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement.
This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to
take the floor? I recognize-the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.
Mr. TEJA (India): I am taking the floor in my capacity as the
Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 on agenda item 3. I would like to introduce,
on behalf of the Group, the draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on agenda
item 3, as contained in document CD/515/Rev.3, dated 21 July 1987, which has
already been circulated. It is universally accepted that the subject of the
prevention of nuclear war,.as covered by this agenda item, is of critical
importance to the international community. This importance is also reflected
in the joint statement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev,
issued in November 1985, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be
fought. The Group of 21 believes that the establishment of an Ad Hoc
Committee with the proposed mandate would enable us to commence serious
570
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.4.23
(Mr. Teja, India)
discussions on.this subject in the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that
the draft will facilitate a discussion being taken in the Conference. I would
therefore request you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Group of 21, to put
this mandate to the Conference on Disarmament for a decision at the earliest
possible time.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambasador Teja for introducing this document.
In conformity with the timetable for this week, I should like to recall
that, immediately after this plenary, a meeting of Contact Group "A" of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will be held in this same room.
Before I adjourn today's plenary meeting, I should like to inform you
that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Leo Tindemans, will be addressing this
Conference as our first speaker. On that particular occasion, I should like
to announce that our plenary meeting will start at 10.30.a.m., instead of at
the usual time of 10 a.m., in order to accommodate the Minister's schedule.
If I see no objection, I shall take it that we can proceed accordingly.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will meet on
Thursday, 23 July, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.424
23 July 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOURTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 23 July 1987, at 10.30 a.m.
Presidents Mr. T. Terrefe.
572
(Ethiopia)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
2
The PRESIDENTo I declare open the 424th plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament.
Before I read the list of speakers for today, I would like to welcome the
Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Mr. Nihal Rodrigo.
I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives
esnof Belgium,
the United States of Ameriia, Japan, New Zealand and Hungary.
Minister for.Foreign Affairs of Belgium is coming a little bit later, I will
give him.the floor as soon as he comes. 'I now give the floor to the first
speaker on my list, the representative of the United States of America,
Ambassador Friedersdorf.
Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the
United States delegation welcomes you on your return to Geneva to preside over
Conference work this month. You have a long record
to this Conferences it is now being extended by your
during July.
I am also pleased to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency
Leo Tindemans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, whom we are
looking forward to hearing later this morning.
Our delegation also bids farewell to our departing colleagues,
Ambassadors Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Tonweof Nigeria. We wish them every
success in their new endeavours. In addition, I want to convey to
Ambassador Cromartie, through our friends on the delegation of the
United Kingdom, our deep regret at the announcement of his departure from this
Conference. Ian Cromartie worked long and hard with the delegations in this
Conference to advance our shared objectives. The significant progress
recorded in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under his
able leadership will stand as eloquent testimony to his dedication to the
cause of peace. To him and his family we send our heartfelt thanks and best
wishes.
Today I would like to devote my statement to the negotiations on the
prohibition of chemical weapons. Looking back for a moment, much important
and useful work was accomplished during the spring part of the 1987 session
under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden. -The Ad hoc
Committee developed text on the activities of verification and monitoring of
chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. Additional text was
developed outlining the makeup and functions of the technical secretariat,
preparatory commission and modalities for revision of lists. Work began on
elaborating the composition and tasks of an inspectorate. This new material,
along with other texts, was appended to the rolling text to serve as the basis
for 'further discussion. The rolling text itself was updated and revised in
April to reflect the work in the spring. This valuable, detailed work, and
important changes in the positions of some delegations, generated a sense of
momentum. The spring part of the session ended with an air of optimism.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/VV. 424
3
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
At the midpoint of the summer part of the session, the atmosphere has
somewhat changed. I have begun to hear from a number of delegations that
morale is low, and that people are pessimistic regarding the negotiating pace,
and unhappy at the amount of time required to achieve a convention. I am
concerned that such a perspective will have a negative impact on work
remaining to be done. I believe that unexpectedly rapid developments in the
spring raised unrealistic expectations that a chemical weapons convention
would be in hand by the end of this year. This unfounded optimism masked what
remained to be done.
This summer, as the negotiations have delved more deeply into key aspects
of a chemical weapons ban, new issues surfaced. Additionally, delegations
have begun to grapple with some of the difficult issues which had in the past
been set aside for future discussion to allow work on some less controversial
areas to proceed. These are natural developments in any negotiation as work
progresses from one level to the next.
I do not entirely share the pessimism expressed by others. We have been
doing some constructive work this summer. More delegations are participating
actively in the discussions. Difficult issues previously put aside are being
addressed, and this is a reason for encouragement. However, no one should
expect the negotiation of an effective chemical weapons convention to be an
easy task. It is a complex undertaking in which elaboration of certain
details is of great significance. To have an effective convention, we must
thoroughly think through the issues, work out our differences and develop the
necessary detail. We must,: throughout this process, keep our focus on what we
are trying to achieve -- not on artificial deadlines that could only yield a
worthless agreement, but on a convention which will provide us with security
and a true sense of confidence that the threat of chemical warfare will be
removed.
This effort requires constructive suggestions, not polemics. We need
ideas, not rhetoric. In this spirit, I would like to respond to some comments
made before this Conference on"2 July by the distinguished representative of
the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin.
The statement of 2 July mischaracterized my own plenary statement of
30 June to assert that the United States is not committed to the completion of
an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons as rapidly as possible. Let
me reassure all of the delegations to the Conference that the United States
remains committed to this goal. We introduced a comprehensive draft
convention in 1984 and have contributed numerous papers and proposals since
then to help advance the negotiations. However, development of a
comprehensive chemical weapons ban requires careful work and consideration,
and we should not and will not be pressed to proceed hastily at the expense of
ensuring the convention's effectiveness.
I was disappointed by the critical Soviet remarks about the United States
invitation'to visit the chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
4
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
a facility which many other CD delegation members visited during our
1983 workshop. I believe that, when Secretary of State Shultz and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in April to an exchange of visits to the
American and Soviet facilities, they saw this as an opportunity for the
United States and the Soviet Union to build mutual confidence by exchanging
information on the subject of the destruction of chemical weapons. This is,
after all, a vital part of a chemical weapons convention. I hope that the
Soviet Union will soon respond positively to the United States invitation.
Ambassador Nazarkin's statement also indicated that he felt that the
United States position on challenge inspection remains unclear. The
United States view that challenge inspection should cover all relevant
locations and facilities of a State party without distinction between private
property or government ownership was correctly noted. The United States
specifically amended its draft convention in April 1986 to make this position
even clearer, in response to Soviet concerns. If the Soviet delegation
continues to have difficulties, I would suggest that they propose alternative
language for consideration.
The Soviet statement of 2 July characterized the Ad hoc Committee's work
on Cluster III, concerning the non-production of chemical weapons, as "walking
in circles". I cannot agree with this characterization. The Committee has
made advances in this area this summer under the leadership of
Ambassador Ek6us and Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico. As examples, a successful
chemical industry experts' meeting clarified a number of issues and identified
areas of general consensus and areas needing further work. Another examples
discussions on commercial supertoxic lethal chemicals resulted in a text that
will serve as a basis for further discussions. Another examples for its
part, the United States tabled a well-received working paper on production
capacity.
In the Soviet statement of 2 July, the United States was criticized for
planning to produce chemical weapons while negotiations are under way in
Geneva. The recently announced cessation of Soviet production of chemical
weapons suggests that their production continued during the eighteen-year
period since the United States stopped production unilaterally in 1969. Our
delegation sees no reason why the long-overdue modernization of the small
United States stockpile is an obstacle to successful completion of the
negotiations under way here. Chemical weapons negotiations in fact began and
continued throughout the period of the large Soviet build-up of chemical
weapons stocks. There is no good reason why the negotiations should not
continue to progress as the United States responds to the large imbalance that
has been created since the United States ceased the production of chemical
weapons eighteen years ago. The massive Soviet stockpile of chemical weapons,
unmatched by any other nation, puts all our security at risk and requires
remedial action until the storage of chemical weapons can be eliminated from
all military arsenals by an effective, comprehensive, global ban.
Also on 2 July, the problem of activities taking place on the territory
of States not parties to the convention was raised. ?i'his is a serious issue
that.is much broader than the narrow question of multinational corporations.
In fact, the United States does not believe that production of chemical
5 75
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
5
weapons by multinational corporations on the territory of a State not a party
to the convention is a special problem. Any corporation incorporated under
United States law, wherever its activities actually take place, would be
prohibited from aiding a non-party in chemical weapons production. In the
United States view, the real question of relevance to all parties is
activities related to the convention taking place on the territories of States
that are not parties to that instrument, regardless of who is conducting
them. The source of the problem, in fact, is apt to be the Government of the
non-party State. In such a case, political pressure, including pressure to
join the convention, would be the appropriate response. The Soviet approach
to dealing with activities on the territory of non-party States is not at all
clear at this time. Our delegation would ask the Soviet Union to present its
own position so that we may study it.
To date; only two countries -- the United States and the Soviet Union --
have stated that they possess chemical weapons. There are approximately 15
other States that are believed to possess, or to be seeking to acquire,
chemical weapons. It is of considerable concern to the United States that
some of these States might remain outside the convention and continue to
possess chemical weapons after States parties destroy their deterrent stocks.
Such States would pose a risk to States parties. Clearly, such a situation
would affect the United States decision on ratification, and, I am sure, other
countries' as well. We should focus our attention here in this forum on
measures that can be taken to reduce this risk.
The United States statement of 23'April proposed that confidence-building
in this area start with greater openness on the part of all members of the
Conference on Disarmament. It expressed concern that some other States
participating in these negotiations have been secretive about their chemical
weapons programmes, and noted that confidence is seriously undermined when
countries possessing such weapons refuse to acknowledge such capabilities
during the negotiations.
Several countries have indicated that they do not possess chemical
weapons. However, many States members of this body have remained silent on
this issue. Our delegation calls upon its negotiating partners to indicate
whether or not they possess chemical weapons and chemical weapon production
facilities. We also request the Soviet Union, and others who may acknowledge
possession of chemical weapons', to provide detailed information on their
chemical weapons capabilities, as the United States has already done. The
United States raised this point with the Soviet Union three years ago, but no
response has been received. We are hopeful this information and data will be
forthcoming during current bilateral talks which began this week. Serious
intentions of progress on both sides have been expressed. We believe data
exchange can be the keystone of such progress.
Greater openness should also apply to commercial industrial information.
As the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Minister of State
David Mellor, remarked in his plenary statement on 14 July, "What we need is
not more-speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to know what other
Governments have, where they have it and what they do with it". My delegation
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
6
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
supports Minister Mellor's call for the Soviet.Union and other States to be
more open about their commercial chemical activities, as well as about their
chemical weapons capabilities.
Before I conclude, I would like to note that the Ad hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons has yet to take up challenge inspection this summer. As my
delegation noted on 23 April, informal discussions in the spring indicated
some areas where views appeared to be converging. I look forward to efforts
to record and build on these areas of convergence.
Finally, when the report on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons is adopted in August, it will likely reflect that much work
has been accomplished this year. It may also reflect that much remains to be
done, not only to resolve key issues, but also to develop detailed procedures
that are necessary to implement the convention. One particularly important
result of this summer's work will not, unfortunately, appear in the report.
That is the gradual convergence of views of delegations on many issues. Such
convergence will serve as the basis for the further development of text. We
have made progress this year and we have laid the groundwork for even further
progress. We should be proud of this accomplishment. It should cause us to
renew our commitment to pursue the work ahead.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of
America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I
now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.
Mr. YAMADA (Japan), At this half-way point in the work of the Conference
on Disarmament in the summer session, I wish to make an overview of the
current stage of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention and to
express the views of my delegation with the hope of contributing to the work
of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.
In the spring part of this session, under the able and active
chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, we adopted a new work formula
and achieved many concrete results. Amonq them are,
(a) Agreement on the destruction of all declared chemical weapons,
eliminating the possibility of diversion. Diversion would have complicated
verification,
(b) Agreement on the framework of the detailed procedures for
destruction of chemical weapons, with the exception of the issue of the order
of destruction,
(c) Detailed consideration for the first time of the destruction of
chemical weapons production facilities, in line with the framework for the
destruction of chemical weapons,
(d) Consideration, in the context of draft article VI on permitted
activities, of the modalities for revision of lists and of guidelines for
schedule (1) chemicals,
577
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424-
7
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
(e) Consideration, with regard to the organizational aspects, of the
preparatory commission and of guidelines on the international inspectorate.
I wish to express the high appreciation of my delegation for these
results which have opened new ground, to help us through this complex and
advanced stage of the negotiations. I wish to call upon all delegations to
maintain the momentum of the spring part of this session and to build upon it,
so that we may be able to conclude the convention at the earliest opportunity,
thus meeting the fervent expectation of the international community.
As the negotiations get more complex -- as they are at present -- it is
all the more important never to lose sight of what the basic objectives of the
chemical weapons convention are. These objectives are, first, "destruction",
namely the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related production
facilities) and second, "non-production", namely the prohibition of the
future development or production of chemical weapons. These two objectives of
"destruction" and "non-production" are inseparable, as it were the two wheels
of a cart. They must occupy balanced places in the convention regime. I must
also emphasize that our work is to ban chemical weapons. Nothing else. We
must not create impediments to the legitimate activities and development of
the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, which advances the welfare and
the standard of living of mankind.
My delegation attaches significant importance to the destruction-of
existing chemical weapons and related facilities. Japan possesses no chemical
weapons and has no intention of acquiring them. By adhering to the
convention, she legally binds herself as a non-chemical-weapon State, while
chemical-weapon States have 10 years to dispose of their chemical weapons.
For the security of my country, it is indispensable that all the existing
chemical weapons and production facilities be placed, from the beginning of
the entry into force of the convention, under strict international control and
be eliminated according to the internationally agreed formula.
As I have already stated, we were able to agree on a framework of the
detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons in the course of the
spring part of this session. I would like to note that we have the following
common understandings on this important issues
(a) The chemical weapons to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons
"under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location",
(b) All chemical weapons shall be destroyed "beginning not later than
12 months and finishing not later than 10 years",
(c) States parties may destroy their stocks at a faster pace,
(d) Chemical weapons shall be destroyed only at specifically designated
and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies).
And, with regard to the verification measures,
578
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
(a) States parties shall take such measures as they consider appropriate
to secure their storage facility(ies) and shall prevent any movement of their
chemical weapons,
(b) States parties shall provide access to any chemical weapons,
destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of
systematic international on-site verification,
(c) International Inspectors shall have unimpeded access to all parts of
the storage facilities and may request clarification of any ambiguities
arising from the inspection.
My delegation earnestly hopes that, taking due account of these common
understandings, we will bring our work to a successful completion.
Security of a State during the entire destruction stage is a legitimate
concern which we must attend to. While the procedures for destruction of
chemical weapons stocks should start simultaneously for all chemical-weapon
States, the mechanism of destruction at an accelerated pace for the State
possessing larger stockpiles should be explored in view of the considerable
imbalance in the size of existing stockpiles.
I should also like to call upon all chemical-weapon States to announce at
an early stage their possession, as well as the composition of, and other
factors pertaining to their stockpiles. Such actions on the part of
chemical-weapon States, as well as the announcement of non-possession by
non-chemical-weapon States, as is the case with Japan, will not only
contribute to our work for the solution of the problems facing us, but will
also help planning of the verification work at the outset of the Convention.
I sincerely hope that other States will follow the example given by the
United States in 1986 and provide the relevant information.
The other aspect with regard to destruction is the issue of chemical
weapons production facilities. Much has also been developed in the past on
the issue. We have the common understandings which we should not undermine.
They are,
(a) The chemical weapons production facilities will be declared and
destroyed within 10 years,
(b) Such facilities to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons
production facilities "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party,
regardless of location",
(c) Chemical weapons destruction facilities shall be declared within
30 days, which declaration shall be promptly confirmed through on-site
inspection,
(d) States parties shall immediately cease all activity at each chemical
weapons production facility and, within three months, close such facility,
579
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
9
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
(e) International systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as
possible after the closure of such facility and shall continue until this
facility is eliminated within 10 years.
As destruction of chemical weapons stocks proceeds and controls are placed on
the civil chemical industry, the prolonged existence of-chemical weapons
production facilities may increase the potential danger to the convention
regime. It is the desire of my delegation to see that such facilities are
dismantled at the earliest opportunity.
Next, I should like to deal with the issue of "non-production". I wish
to express our appreciation of the work done so far in identifying the
chemical substances to be controlled and the regimes to which they would be
subject under the convention. The recent meeting of the representatives of
the industry was also extremely useful. Despite the detailed discussions
which have taken place on this matter, I nevertheless feel that it is
important to place the issue in perspective so that the problems may be sorted
out and progress made towards final agreement.
The negotiations on the issue of non-production have dealt with two
different aspects
(i) the non-production of chemical weapons per se; and (ii) the
monitoring of the production, etc. of certain substances in the chemical
industry. The discussions to this date may at times have tended to confuse
these two differing aspects. Under article VI, those chemical substances
whose production is to be prohibited or subjected to other controls are
subdivided into three categories. They are listed in one of the three
schedules of the annex, on each of which methods of control are being
developed.
Schedule (1) relates to the first aspect, that is non-production of
chemical weapons per se, which is the main objective of the convention. On
the other hand, schedules (2) and (3) relate to the second aspects the
chemical substances listed in these schedules are intended for peaceful
purposes, but are placed under a monitoring regime to preclude their misuse
for weapon purposes. The aim is to enhance confidence in the convention
r?gime. We feel that there are distinct conceptual differences between the
two.
The lists and the control regimes developed to this date are, in our
view, generally reasonable. In order to expedite our work for final
agreement, we must have a clear idea of the correlation among the various
chemical substances in the schedules. We must also give due consideration to
the legitimate concerns raised at the recent meetings of representatives of
the industry.
We have not addressed ourselves to the issue of definition for some time
now. The existing wording in draft article II was formulated before the
recent development in our negotiations. We have now clarified many aspects of
the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities. We have
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
10
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
identified chemical substances to be controlled and the r6gimes to which such
substances will be subjected. In the_ light of these achievements, we should
re-examine the issue of definition, bearing in mind the general purpose
criterion.
The issue of challenge verification, the verification safety-net, is by
its nature a complex and difficult problem. I wish .to note that four areas of
common understanding identified by Ambassador Ian Cromartie on this issue
(CD/734) are.very relevant. The interrelated aspects of the procedure for
requesting challenge, the time frame for the dispatch of international
inspectors, their access to the site and facility, the safeguarding of the
legitimate security concerns of both the challenging and challenged States and
the necessary follow-up will all require much examination and careful
elaboration through businesslike considerations of the various aspects of the
issue.
The verification measures envisaged to ensure compliance with the
convention will comprise data exchange, routine inspections, the use of
monitoring equipment, and challenge inspections, etc. These verification
measures will be required to monitor the various declarations concerning
chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities, destruction facilities and
non-production, as well as the issues concerning "use", and clandestine
stockpiles and production facilities. They will require much manpower, and
material and financial resources. I feel that we should keep a realistic
perspective in our work on the convention in identifying the substances to be
controlled and the extent to which they will be so controlled so that a
practical, rational and cost-effective verification regime may be established
under this convention.
In the very crowded schedule of meetings at this advanced stage of
negotiations, we sometimes fail to see the wood for the trees. Let us always
remember the basic and original purpose of our work and the principles which
we have already agreed upon. We should also bear in mind that we are aiming
to draw up a convention which must enjoy universal acceptance, and which will
not be overly difficult to implement and thus not be too complex. The time
reamining in the summer part of this session is not too long, but I hope that
it will be put to good use in building common and tangible agreements one by
one.
In closing, allow me to thank the chairman of the Ad hoc Committee,
Ambassador Ekeus, and the three item Co-ordinators, Messrs. Nieuwenhuys of
Belgium, Macedo Riba of Mexico and Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic,
for their untiring efforts, and pledge my delegation's dommitment to the cause
of the early realization of chemical weapons disarmament.
11 would also like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the
United Kingdom for what he has done for us on our work in chemical weapons. -1
wish him an early recovery and a life in comfort. I also associate myself
with my distinguished colleagues in wishing Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka
and Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria every success in their new assignments. May I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
11
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
extend my delegation's warmest welcome to the new representative of Sri Lanka,
Ambassador Rodrigo, to our Conference. I am looking forward to working
closely with him.
The PRESIDENT, I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. I
now bid a warm welcome to the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Belgium, His Excellency Leo Tindemans, who will address this plenary
meeting at this time. Mr. Tindemans has held his high position since 1981 and
it was in that capacity that he also spoke in the then Committee on
Disarmament on 14 June 1983. He has had an outstanding role in public
affairs, having been a member of successive Governments in his country since
1968 and was Prime Minister between 1974 and 1978. I am sure that the
Conference will listen-to his statement with particular interest and wish him
a successful visit to Geneva.
Mr. TINDEMANS (Belgium) (translated from French)s Mr. President, first
of all I must thank you for your kind words of welcome. May I congratulate
you on your election as President of the Conference for the month of July.
You have a reputation as an experienced and shrewd practitioner of
multilateral disarmament and you have confirmed that reputation during your
presidency, an office you are not, in fact, holding for the first time,
because you were already in the Chair in 1981. You are, I know, admirably
assisted by the secretariat of the Conference under the direction of
Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui, whose diplomatic skills are known to all.
This morning I was the victim of an air traffic. controllers' strike,
that is why my plane arrived too late. I do apologize for that.
When Belgium became a member of the Conference when it was established in
January 1979 it entered, as stated by its Minister for Foreign Affairs at the
opening meeting, with the firm intention of pursuing through dynamic action
the common disarmament goals of the world community. Those goals had just
been set by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament. The Final Document of that session established the priorities.
It highlighted the universality of the cause of disarmament, which is the
responsibility of all Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear, and in this spirit set
up a single multilateral negotiating body that took over from the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament, which was too limited. These developments
came in the wake of the 1960s and 1970s, which had seen considerable effort
devoted towards limiting and eliminating arms. The atmosphere in
international relations was propitious and gave hope that the establishment of
a multilateral negotiating body would lend decisive impetus to the cause of
disarmament.
The Conference on Disarmament is indeed the only negotiating body that
brings together permanently a group of States representative of the entire
international community. As such, it bears within itself the legitimate
aspirations of all those throughout the world who, whether members of the
Conference or not, place their hopes in the strengthening of peace, the
halting of the arms race and gradual arms reduction.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
12
(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)
When we measure the modicity of the distance that we have covered since
1979 and the still greater modicity of the contribution the Conference on
Disarmament has made in the course of almost 10 years to the disarmament
process and-when we look at the reasons behind this, a number of inescapable
conclusions emerge that it would be wise to bear in mind for the future.
First of all, disarmament falls within the context of political reality and
its progress is dependent on the international situation, and not the
reverse. Next, disarmament cannot be reduced to the status'of a mere slogan
or a remote goal forming the subject of ritual, almost incantatory prayers.
But disarmament is not, either, an end in itself. It is an instrument in the
service of peace and stability. The goal must be to strengthen the security
of all, which implies a realistic approach, a gradual process, steadfast
effort, and the taking into account of the major political and military
balances, which it would be futile to ignore.
In addressing the Conference in 1983, I stressed how far the
deterioration of international relations that we witnessed at the start of
this decade was responsible for the sudden, almost total paralysis of
negotiations in the sphere of arms control and disarmament. There is now a
serious hope of'seeing the negotiations between the super-Powers lead to
concrete, perhaps even spectacular results. I say this all the more readily
as those results would not be without impact on Belgium, since the elimination
of INF is of direct concern to us. The other negotiations in
Geneva -- bilateral, as is only normal since they relate only to United States
and Soviet systems -- are, admittedly, outside the framework of the Conference
on Disarmament, but they will unquestionably have, by their repercussions, an
entrancing effect on its work. It will, after all, be the first time that an
arms control agreement leads to a significant reduction in capabilities in the
particularly sensitive area of the weapons known as weapons of mass
destruction. That will be an achievement that goes considerably beyond the
context of European security.
There is no doubt that a great deal remains to be done before we see the
treaty on the elimination of INF to which we aspire drafted and signed. I
would like to express the hope that the last few difficulties can be ironed
out in time for an agreement to be concluded before the end of the year. My
country will provide all the support it can to the negotiators. In
particular, it will, together with its allies concerned by deployment, strive
to ensure progress in the resolution of the problems linked to verification.
As of now I can declare that it is prepared to accept, for its part, the
application of strict measures in its territory..
Disarmament should be seen in terms of processes and priorities. The
indissociability of the constituent elements of security does not mean that we
should try to negotiate on everything at one and the same time. It is all a
matter of sequences and priorities.
Belgium, whose security needs fall within the specific context of the
East/West balance of power, sees its priorities as follows, first of all,
conclusion of the INF agreement that I have just mentioned and, if possible,
conclusion in the very near future of an agreement on the 50 per cent
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
13
(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)
reduction of the Soviet and United States strategic arsenals establishment
of conventional stability in Europe at a reduced level of forces (the opening
at the start of next year of a new conference on this matter would make an
essential contribution to the development of the efforts already being
undertaken in the sphere of arms control) early conclusion of an agreement
on the total prohibition of chemical weapons (at present, this is the main
activity and, I would even say, the main responsibility of the Conference on
Disarmament). These priorities, which should not be seen in a chronological
order, cover all the areas in which efforts at arms control will certainly
have to develop further. However, progress cannot be envisaged without first
securing the preservation of what has already been achieved. I am thinking in
particular of the ABM Treaty, an essential instrument if we wish to prevent
the development of an arms race in outer space. The ABM Treaty clearly raises
serious problems of interpretation that the parties will have to resolve among
themselves. It does not appear reasonable to us to seek to put a veto on
thinking about transition to a form of deterrence that would include more of a
defensive element than is the case today. It goes without saying that the
overall balance must not suffer from it and that stability must emerge
strengthened to the benefit of all, if possible at a reduced level of forces.
All these areas -- space, strategic, nuclear and, finally, conventional
weapons -- are closely linked, but each also has its own peculiar features and
therefore requires specific treatment. Each negotiation should therefore be
conducted in parallel as far as possible, without, however, giving rise to
disequilibrium such as would challenge the internal consistency of the
security system which each State is free to adopt in the light of its own
geostrategic context. Substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the
two super-Powers, beginning with the elimination of INF, are possible and
desirable without challenging that consistency. Similarly, we would all
welcome total elimination of the chemical threat. There remains the issue of
conventional weapons, which, in a way, is destined to dominate the arms
control scene in the coming years, especially if the objectives that,I have
just mentioned in the nuclear and chemical areas are achieved, as I hope.
The Western defence system is based on an interrelationship between
conventional and nuclear weapons. As the balance of forces now stands, for
the allies to subscribe to a proposal for total denuclearization would be
inconceivable. There is therefore a limit -- which I am not in a position to
identify -?- beyond which pursuit of reductions in nuclear capability would
have the effect of threatening their security. It would, indeed, call in
question the bases of the system of deterrence which for 40 years.has proven
that it continues to maintain peace.
I would now like to touch on issues which directly concern the work of
the Conference on Disarmament, the most important of them being, to my mind,
the prohibition of chemical weapons and the halting of nuclear tests. Belgium
is of the view that the possibilities of progress, even success, are now real.
It is high time, more than 70 years after the first use of chemical
weapons on Belgian soil, finally to put aside the mutual hesitations and
suspicions which have so far impeded progress towards the concretization of a
584
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
14
(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)
complete ban on this particularly inhuman type of weapon. Despite significant
progress in the negotiations that concern us here, the use and proliferation
of chemical weapons remain, sadly, a reality. These weapons are still being
used, particularly in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. This has been
observed by investigations organized by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. An escalation is in progress in which not even the civilian
populations are spared. Aware of the growing number of countries that possess
chemical weapons, Belgium is participating, together with its European
partners and., other countries, in an international system for controlling the
export of several important chemical substances so as to reverse this trend
and make it more difficult to produce such weapons. This system is only a
temporary measure aimed at ensuring compliance with the Geneva Protocol
pending the appearance of a universal convention.
My country has actively supported the attainment of this objective since
it entered the Conference on Disarmament this year. This year, Belgium is
chairing Working Group B, which has responsibility in'particular for preparing
the provisions of the future convention on chemical disarmament, especially
the destruction of existing stocks and of chemical weapons production
facilities.
The international verification of the storage and destruction of chemical
weapons has been accepted as regards its principles and numerous modalities
have already been defined. The same applies to monitoring of the closure and
elimination of production facilities.
The system for the verification of non-production is also under
preparation. The known combat agents and their precursors have been taken
stock of and it has already been agreed that they will be placed under
international surveillance because they can all be used for peaceful purposes,
if only for research. Significant progress has been made in this area that it
was essential to cover. We welcome the dispelling of the apparent confusion
between chemical weapons and chemical substances produced for non-prohibited
purposes." We also appreciate the fact that the need to avoid unduly impeding
the development of the chemical industry and of research is now beginning to
be recognized by all.
Whatever progress has been or may yet be made in the areas of
verification that I have just mentioned, they will none the less be incomplete
until a satisfactory solution has been found to the crucial problem of
challenge inspection. The very usefulness of the verification of
installations coming under the convention depends, in the final analysis, on
compliance with the obligation to declare them, whether they be chemical
weapons stockpiling facilities or factories making dual-purpose substances.
The regimes for systematic verification must, therefore, be complemented and
,strengthened by an effective and binding regime for challenge inspection so as
to form a coherent set of measures to discourage violations by making them
detectable wherever they may occur.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
15
(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)
The international organization to be set up will be the spearhead of
verification of chemical disarmament. It should be able to begin its
activities as soon as possible after the entry into force. We welcome the
fact that, as can be seen from the excellent working paper that the
United Kingdom introduced hereon 14 July last, there has been concrete
thinking on the subject. In this regard I am pleased to-be able to announce
that my country would give favourable consideration to hosting the
international organization if the Conference so requested.
The negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament aim at
ensuring lasting compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons
established by the Geneva Protocol of-1925. But it must be stressed that the
success of such an endeavour will depend on the support that it gets from the
international community in the form of accession and ratification by the
greatest possible number of countries. That implies broad participation in
the negotiating process. Each and everyone should be able to present his
proposals and describe his position with respect to the various aspects of the
draft convention.
Universal acceptance of the future convention will be encouraged if we
manage to take into account certain concerns. Of these, the need for
undiminished security is probably the most important and it should be resolved
in the context of the order of destruction of existing stocks of chemical
weapons. In this regard, it is clear that account will have to be taken of
the very marked differences, both quantitative and qualitative, between the
stocks that countries hold.
The universal character of the future convention could be jeopardized if
the convention is not legally consistent. It will be important for the future
convention to be structured logically around the fundamental principles
expressed in its first article so that the wording used lends itself as little
as possible to dubious or ambiguous interpretations.
Finally, it is essential that there should be no confusion as to the
actual definition of chemical weapons. My country advocates a legal
definition of the weapon itself and hopes that it will be possible to go
beyond a mere enumeration of the material elements of which such weapons may
consist. Suggestions have been informally advanced by the delegation of
Belgium to other delegations with a view to discussion of this matter.
Belgium has no chemical military capability and has no intention of
acquiring such a capability. The obsolete chemical munitions that are to be
found in a part of Belgian territory and which date from the First World War
pose specific problems. My country insists that the future convention must
not uselessly complicate the problems that these old chemical munitions
already pose for the countries that have inherited them.
The halting of nuclear testing is another priority topic for the
Conference on Disarmament. In this area, too, the need is to be realistic and
to proceed step by step. The total halting of nuclear tests is justified from
the point of view of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As far as we
586
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
16
(Mr. Tindemans, Beligum)
are concerned, I have said that such elimination seems to us unlikely in the
short or medium term. None the less, Belgium subscribes to the objective of
halting nuclear testing once the conditions have been met and significant
progress has been made beyond the 50 per cent reduction of the strategic
stockpiles of the two super-Powers.
Meanwhile, we must-tackle the problem of haltinq nuclear tests in the
form of a gradual process. Belgium welcomes the contacts and discussions
taking place between the super-Powers on this matter. Significant progress
seems to have been made in the area of verification. I am also pleased to
note that a more open and constructive attitude seems to be emerging. The
halting of nuclear tests can only be achieved on the basis of a verification
system that gives everybody the necessary assurances. The entry into force of
the TTBT and of the PNET would unquestionably mark a step in the right
direction. The development of a system for the exchange of information
concerning test programmes, their prior notification, and the invitation of
experts to monitor yields would also contribute to our objective. In the same
line of thought, the placing of a maximum limit on the number of tests and,
perhaps, the reduction 'of that number in the light of the progress made in
arms control and reduction of nuclear'capabilities would also be useful
measures. They would permit the initiation of a process that would lead to a
total halt, even if the time required for that cannot be set in advance. It
seems to me that this is the direction the work of the Conference on
Disarmament should take. I believe that realism compels us to see things in
this way if we are not to doom our. proceedings to sterile declarations.
I shall now briefly address two further points that the Conference on
Disarmament discusses, namely outer space and radiological weapons.
Belgium welcomes the examination by the Conference on Disarmament of a
number of concerns relating to the arms race in outer space. The problem of
the protection of satellites, the elaboration of an appropriate multilateral
regime and the drawing-up of an international code of conduct are, in
particular, the questions that the Conference on Disarmament could usefully
debate at the multilateral level. They are independent of the ABM Treaty and
the SD I, which, in our opinion, remain within the direct competence of the
two super-Powers concerned.
As regards radiological weapons, the new approach prevailing within the
Conference on Disarmament gives hope that it will be possible to negotiate the
convention on the abolition of such weapons without artificial linkage with
the negotiation of a convention prohibiting attacks on nuclear power
stations. That being so, a positive outcome should be possible in this area
too.
By way of conclusion, I should like to say that it is heartening to see
encouraging progress in our work. Permit me, also, to repeat, for the point
is essential, that Belgium considers the definitive elimination of chemical
weapons to be an urgent priority and will spare no effort to achieve it. To
587
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
17
(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)
that end, it readily endorses the-suggestions that have been made for a
possible prolongation of the work outside the official sessions of the
Conference on Disarmament.
I should like to make a strong appeal for the elimination, through
reciprocal political will, of everything that may still impede the conclusion
of a convention on chemical weapons. The credibility of the Conference on
Disarmament and, beyond that, the credibility of all the efforts in the sphere
of disarmament are at stake.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Belgium for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to
the President. I now.give the floor to the representative of New Zealand,
Ambassador Fortune.
Mr. FORTUNE (New Zealand): Mr. President, this is the first time I have
taken the floor as representative of New Zealand in the Conference on
Disarmament; it is indeed an honour, especially to follow such a
distinguished and important speaker as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, and also to speak during the period of your
Chairmanship. New Zealand's support for this body is well known. Our
observer status is something to which we attach a great deal of importance,
since it allows us to follow the work of the Conference closely. When the
opportunity arises New Zealand plans to seek full membership of the CD.
We believe small countries have a particular role to play in the
disarmament process. The CD, as the single multilateral body tasked with
negotiating arms control agreements, provides a vehicle through which small
and non-nuclear Powers can make a contribution.
It is important that the CD fulfil the expectation of the international
community that it will negotiate effective measures of arms control, and also
complement and support the steps being taken to this end by the nuclear-weapon
States, particularly the super-Powers. Nowhere is the need for urgent and
effective action more evident today than in the area of chemical weapons. My
delegation is reassured by the progress that has been made this year towards
agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and
use of chemical weapons, but much remains to be done.
The need for such a treaty is not in dispute. It-is only two months
since the Secretary-General issued the report of his mission of specialists
confirming that chemical weapons were continuing to be used in the conflict
between Iran and Iraq. As the Secretary-General noted, the unanimous findings
of the specialists -- that there has been repeated use of chemical weapons
against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, that civilians in Iran have also been
injured by chemical weapons, and that Iraqi military personnel have sustained
injuries from chemical warfare agents -- must add new urgency to the grave
concern of the international community.
We cannot too strongly condemn this continuing use of chemical weapons
and those repeated violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The message and
588
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
18
(Mr. Fortune, New Zealand)
law of the Protocol is that chemical poisons are cruel and barbarous, and that
their use in war can never be justified. That Iranian civilians, including
women and children, have been subjected to attacks with chemical weapons is a
new and abhorrent aspect of recent reports. It is of profound concern to us
that the appeals of the Secretary-General have been disregarded, as have the
demands of the Security Council that the provisions of the Protocol be
strictly respected and observed.
All this reinforces the need for a new convention that will strengthen
and extend existing prohibitions against chemical warfare. The New Zealand
delegation looks to the CD to give renewed impetus to its negotiations so that
a comprehensive chemical weapons convention can be adopted soon.
Just as there is reason for optimism that chemical weapon negotiations
can be brought to a conclusion before long, so are there grounds for hope that
negotiations towards the elimination of intermediate range missiles from
Europe -- perhaps even global elimination -- may be concluded even sooner. If
the outstanding issues can be resolved, there will be a very real prospect of
a summit later in the year and the signature by President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev of an intermediate range nuclear forces treaty.
It goes without saying that this would be warmly welcomed by New Zealand.
The significance of such a treaty cannot be over-emphasized. Granted,
intermediate range forces constitute only a small fraction of the nuclear
arsenal. But agreement on their elimination will be much more than a
confidence-building measure. As the first ever nuclear arms reduction
agreement, it will signal an about-turn in the arms race. It will prove that
security is not necessarily dependent on an ever-increasing number of nuclear
weapons but can be enhancedoby their reduction or, as in this case, by the
elimination of entire classes of weaponry. Such a major shift in thinking
about security is, in New Zealand's view, long overdue.
Like any arms race, the nuclear arms race had its roots in the search for
security and the need to deter aggressors through the assertion of power.
There is nothing new about deterrence -- it has provided the basis for
mankind's security for thousands of years. Although it was given a new
dimension with the comina of the nuclear age, and although that development
raised enormously the stake of all countries in not upsetting the balance of
deterrence, it is a theory that can never be proved successful. It remains a
paradox that, although one can be certain, when it is too late, that
deterrence has failed, one can never have absolute proof of its success.
Another paradox is this: in order to deter war you.have to be able to
convince potential opponents that you can win the war you are trying to
deter. But the power of nuclear weapons is so awesome that such calculations
of superiority are meaningless. Even a limited nuclear war would be
devastating to both combatants, and possibly the rest of the world as well.
As President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at their
November 1985 summit: "A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be
fought". The idea of "us" deterring "them" has, in the nuclear age, a new and
589
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
20
New Zealand has made a real move to break out of the cycle. The
Nuclear Free Zone Act, our commitment to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty, and our determination*to continue to meet regional security
obligations in conventional terms, all complement each other. They are the
end result of a serious analysis of New Zealand's security imperatives.
Having assessed the threats to our security, we have developed policies
appropriate to the level and nature of those threats. That analysis is no
different from that undertaken by every other country. The outcome -- a
non-nuclear South Pacific -- is a reflection of the particular strategic
circumstances which exist in our region.
We acknowledge that Europe has different security imperatives. That is
why we do not expect our policies to be replicated by countries in Europe.
Equally, however, New Zealand does not accept that western security must be
indivisibly reliant on nuclear weapons. We believe that alternatives to
nuclear deterrence do exist. As a responsible Western member of the
international community, we need to help promulgate that message. We do so in
a way that we believe does not compromise Western security interests. Indeed,
it would be short-sighted and ultimately self-defeating for us to push for
policies which had the effect of weakening the security not only of
Western countries but also of those neutral and non-aligned countries which
depend for their existende on a stable and secure world. Our policies
demonstrate that there are other than nuclear options and that these should be
seriously explored.
We take heart from the positive outlook of the current bilateral talks
that this is finally happening. It is the responsibility of every country,
and particularly those which are members of the Conference on Disarmament to
support the United States and the Soviet Union in their negotiations. If they
fail, we all fail. But if they succeed, the whole world will take new heart
in its efforts to achieve a more secure and certain future.
The PRESIDENT, I thank the representative of New Zealand for his
statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor
to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter.
Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary), Mr. President, I would like to take this
opportunity to express our congratulations and best wishes to you on the
occasion of your presidency. Being near to the end of your presidency, it is
not simply a compliment when I express our satisfaction for the calm manner in
which you have conducted our deliberations and our high appreciation for your
contribution to the substantive advancement of the work of the Conference.
The same goes to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi, who
guided our proceedings successfully and with remarkable devotion.
Let me also seize this opportunity to say how pleased my delegation is to
have seen in our midst, a few moments ago, the Foreign Minister of Belgium,
His Excellency Mr. Leo Tindemans, and to have listened to his interesting
statement. I would like at the same time, to extend a warm welcome to
Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, and may I assure him of the
590
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 424
19
(Mr. Fortune, New Zealand)
absurd meaning. It is now a case of the nuclear arsenals threatening the
security of all of-us. The search for security has, in the perception of
many, left the whole world less secure than ever before.
Despite this, reliance continues to be placed on nuclear deterrence. In
Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries confront each other with heavy
e concentrations of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. The theory of
deterrence has been used to justify this situation. But the size of the
nuclear inventory in Europe is clearly excessive. So, too, is the size of the
other arsenals. Effective deterrence would be.possible at a much lower level
of weaponry than exists today and, in the right circumstances, without nuclear
weapons at all. We can only be thankful that this has at last been
recognized, and that the move away from dependence on nuclear weapons to
preserve security has begun in earnest. Agreement on the elimination of
intermediate range missiles from Europe will be heralded everywhere as the
turning point in the arms race. We all welcome, in the words of
Sir Geoffrey Howe, "the prospect of a less nuclear world".
In such a world, it seems inevitable to New Zealand that there will need
to be a greater emphasis on regional, conventional security co-operation. In
Europe, a conahon defence posture, working through a revitalized
Western European Union, or a European defence force is, we understand, one
option being canvassed. Around the globe, similar reassessments of regional
commitments and obligations are being made. The goal must be a world freed
from the threat of nuclear annihilation.
Because of the huge arsenals of nuclear as well as chemical and
conventional weapons possessed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, it is
perhaps inevitable that perceptions of global security are coloured by
concerns about security in Europe. As a Western country in the South Pacific,
New Zealand has difficulty in accepting that security in our part of the world
is indivisible from that in Europe. Statements to that effect ignore the
reality of the situation.
The fact is that, in contrast to Europe, there are no nuclear weapons
deployed in the South Pacific. We in the region appreciate our good fortune
in living in an area free of great-Power confrontation -- let alone nuclear
confrontation. Security has already been preserved by a -- thankfully -- low
level of conventional forces. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,
which entered into force on 11 December 1986, is aimed at ensuring that the
existing balance is not upset through the introduction of nuclear weapons.
New Zealand's domestic anti-nuclear legislation, passed last month, fulfils a
similar purpose.
The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act
prohibits the entry into New Zealand of ships or aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons. As a serious restraint on the deployment of nuclear weapons, it goes
to the heart of what constitutes real arms limitations. For too long, nations
have proclaimed the importance of nuclear disarmament,. while the proliferation
of nuclear weapons has gone unchecked.
551
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
21
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
co-operation of my delegation. Among my words of courtesy, may I bid farewell
to our colleagues, to Ambassadors Tonwe, Dhanapala and Cromartie, who have
left us or are about to leave us, and wish them all the best in their future
activities. I would especially like to ask the delegation of the
United Kingdom to transmit to Ambassador Cromartie our wishes for his quick
recovery.
As the Conference on Disarmament gets deeper into the substantive
consideration of the disarmament issues on its agenda, a remarkable exchange
of views is unfolding around a subject which strictly speaking, may not be a
disarmament question, but which has a crucial bearing on the fruitfulness of
the efforts aimed at achieving results in this field. I have been following
with interest the views expressed in connection with the concept of nuclear
deterrence and its impact -- direct or indirect -- on the negotiations
on priority tasks of disarmament. Let me refer only to some of the
statements, for instance, to that of Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR,
Vladimir Petrovsky, on 9 June, to the statement made by President Raul
Alfonsin of Argentina on 11 June, or to that of Ambassador Fortune of
New Zealand a few minutes ago.
.It is commonplace to say in our days that efforts aimed at achieving real
measures of disarmament remain unfruitful. The question rightly emerges: is
there a direct interrelationship between professing and practising the concept
of deterrence and the fruitlessness of disarmament efforts?
Supporters of the concept of deterrence consistently profess that nuclear
weapons or, in a wider sense, credible military force is the guarantee of the
security of their States. They hold that the doctrine of deterrence has
prevented war for the last four decades between East and West. With the same
'effort, one can say that there has been no war in Europe against and
irrespective. of the operation of the doctrine-of deterrence. Such an opinion
may equally be true as far as the perception of causes of the absence of war
is concerned. If one adds to this that deterrence has not prevented war
elsewhere outside Europe, then the myth of the might of deterrence becomes
even less credible.
Supporters of the doctrine of deterrence assert that the guarantor of
peace is the force of arms. According to this line of thinking, there are
arms because there is mistrust among nations and not vice versa.
Nevertheless, the suggested remedy, instead of eliminating the causes of
distrust, is to uphold and strengthen the credibility of deterrence -- which,
it practical terms, means modernization and development of new weapons and
weapons systems, increasing their destructive power and precision, that is,
their credible and actual war-fighting capability.
Opponents of the doctrine -- and I am one of them -- hold that the myth
of deterrence is a self-deception, an effort to avoid facing the realities of
our world. Upholding the credibility of deterrence is the code-word for the
arms race. In a world where security of States depends on-deterrence based
on the lack of trust, the arms race inevitably becomes a self-generating
592
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424 -
22
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
process. It reproduces mistrust, because it produces the dubious substitute
for trusts ever more sophisticated weapons. The main' deficiency of this way
of thinking is -- even if I accept for the sake of theoretical analysis that
the starting point is right -- that this way of thinking is completely a
static one. It does not take into account that the end-products of this
process, the ever more sophisticated weapons, carry in themselves the seeds of
everyone's insecurity, including that of the owners of these weapons, and the
more, sophisticated they become, the more they are the inherent source of
insecurity, independently of the wish of the Governments in question. The
way out of this vicious circle in which lack of trust leads to an arms race
and the latter in its turn amplifies distrust is to identify and build-down
the causes of mistrust on the one hand. On the other, practical steps should
be taken for the gradual elimination of the means of war, which in its turn
will result in strengthening confidence. This may bring about a
self-sustaining, self-generating process -- like the arms race, but in the
opposite direction -- which is bound to lead to real comprehensive security
for all States. To bring about such a security system requires the joint
efforts of all the participants in international relations in the crucial and
interrelated areas of disarmament. Any result in this -- small or big,
partial or comprehensive, symbolic or sustantive -- is of paramount
importance. The first result that is achieved in this process will have a
special psychological significance in setting the ball rolling.
This is why we welcome and attribute the greatest importance to the
bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States of America on crucial
issues of nuclear disarmament and on preventioq an arms race in outer space.
This is why we attribute equally great importance to the achievement by the
Conference on Disarmament of tangible results on any of the items on its
agenda. The possibilities are there. While we recognize the weight of the
so-far-unresolved problems, a convention on the complete prohibition and
destruction of chemical weapons would be within reach given the firm political
determination of all parties concerned. A step towards a CTB would be of
paramount importance in curbing the nuclear arms race. And finally, there
are specific possibilities in the prevention of the arms race in outer space,
a subject I would like to dwell on in some detail. But, before turning to
the substance of the matter, I would not miss this opportunity to express our
thanks and appreciation to the delegation and, through it, to the Government
of Canada for arranging the Workshop in Montreal this May on issues related to
outer space.
The prevention of an arms race in outer space has a special place in the
line of thinking that I was expounding in the previous part of my statement.
Outer space is an area where the military technical means of a credible
deterrence has not yet been deployed although the existing aspirations are
well known. Consequently, any tangible result in preventing an arms race'in
outer space, even if concerning only a specific aspect of it, would be most
welcome.
The proceedings'of the Ad hoc Committee on outer Space under the able and
devoted chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese testify to a need for more
streamlined work directed towards working out specific measures to strengthen
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.424
23
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
the international legal regime Governing the activities of States in
outer space. Positions show a great divergence of views as far as the issue
of outer space as a whole is concerned. Statements made at the plenary
meetings or in the proceedings of the Committee, however, tend to converge on
the necessity to provide protection for the satellites in orbit around the
globe, that is to assure their immunity for the sake of their unimpeded
functioning. Statements made on this issue have generally declared this
wish, but delegations have not elaborated on the concrete ways and means of
providing protection for satellites.
In our opinion, this could be an aspect to which the Committee on Outer
Space should pav specific attention in its future work. Even during the
remaining part of the present session the Committee might consider if its work
could be focused on examining and perhaps outlining specific measures aimed at
ensuring the unimpeded functioning of satellites. In this regard, I listened
with great interest to.the statement of His Excellency Leo Tindemans,
referring to the possible steps in this field in connection with
outer space. Concerning this question some important questions may arise
which perhaps would merit serious in-depth consideration from the Committee.
Some of those questions are relatively easy to answer, for instance, the
one whether all the parties concerned are interested in providing immunity to
satellites. The answer, it seems to me, is an unequivocal yes. All States,
irrespective of whether they possess or do not possess satellites, are vitally
interested in the normal and safe functioning of satellites. It seems to me
that there is widespread recognition that the world would run into chaos
without them.
Sane other issues are not so simple to answer, although positions show a
convergence to a considerable degree. These questions are the following: Is
the present international legal regime sufficient to guarantee beyond doubt
the safe functioning of satellites in orbit, or are some further, appropriate
multilateral legal measures required to provide the necessary guarantees?
Should all satellites -- military and civilian -- enjoy adequate protection?
Is it necessary and possible to make a distinction between civilian and
military satellites, taking into account that none of them -- at least as of
now -- is equipped with weapons? Do the satellites with military assignments
perform functions vital enough for international security to make them
eligible for protection? Should the problem of the prohibition of
anti-satellite weapons be appropriately dealt with in this context? Can the
existence of ASAT weapons be considered compatible with the aim of
guaranteeing the normal functioning of satellites? Should the measures to be
worked out be of a legally-binding character? Is it desirable that the
measures to be worked out should be multilateral, with an appropriate
adherence?
These are but some of the fundamental questions to be addressed by those
taking part in the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space. The expert of my delegation will elaborate on
these questions in further detail in the forum of that Committee. I am sure
that thorough consideration of such issues would give a concrete and useful
direction to its proceedings.
594
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/P':'. "42
24
The PRESIDENTS I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement
and the kind words he addressed to the President.
That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member
wish to take the floor at this time? I see none.
May I now turn to the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference
and its subsidiary bodies next week. The timetable, which has been
circulated by the secretariat, is merely indicative and subject to change if
necessary. It has been prepared in consultation with the chairman of
subsidiary bodies, with whom I had a meeting yesterday. As a result of our
exchange of views, there may be a need to make further arrangements in the
timetable. If this is the case, a revision will be issued by the
secretariat. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference
adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
In accordance with the timetable for this week, I should like to recall
that immediately after this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an
informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled
"Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".
Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to inform the Conference
that the Group of '21 has requested that the draft mandate for an Ad hoc
Committee on agenda item 3 which is contained in document CD/515/Rev.3 be put
before the Conference for decision at our next p-lenary meeting on Tuesday,
28 July. I shall proceed accordingly. In accordance with existing
practice, we shall take up that question at the end of the list of speakers,
first at an informal meeting and then at a resumed plenary. There is one
further announcement. The Co-ordinator of Contact Group B of the Ad hoc
Committee on Radiological Weapons invites delegations for informal
consultations regarding issues presently under discussion in Contact Group B
on Thursday, 23 July 1967, at 4 p.m. in Room I.
As there is no other business for today, I intend to adjourn this
meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be
held on Tuesday, 28 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
595
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV. 425
28 July 1987
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 July 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. T. Terrefe (Ethiopia)
596
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
2
The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 425th plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament.
At the beginning, I should like to welcome the presence at this plenary
meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
His Excellency Ali Akbar Velayati, who is listed as the first speaker for
today. In that connection, I should like to note that Mr. Velayati has
already visited the Conference on several occasions to convey the views of his
Government on various questions relating to the work of the Conference.
I should also like to welcome among us the new representative of Brazil
to the Conference, Ambassador Marcos de Azambuja, who is joining us today.
Ambassador de Azambuja is a career diplomat with vast experience in
multilateral diplomacy who has also been involved in disarmament matters
during his career.
In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference begins today its
consideration of agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons . However, in conformity with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, any
member wishing to do so may raise any subject pertinent to the work of the
Conference.
As announced at our last plenary meeting, we shall today take up the
draft decision submitted by the Group of 21 concerning the establishment of an
ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference. That draft
decision has been circulated as document CD/515/Rev.3 and is on the table
today. As I informed you at that plenary meeting, once the list of speakers
is exhausted, I shall convene an informal meeting of the Conference to
consider that document. After that, we shall resume our plenary meet nc tD
take up again the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21.
I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic. 1 now
give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati.
Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The world is moving towards
arms proliferation and arsenal expansion with accelerated speed. The arms
race has been extended from land, sea and air to outer space, which can lead
to the extinction of humanity. In the current state of affairs, the
Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body sheds rays
of hopes to prevent the "doomsday.scanarios" from happening. The existence of
the risk is enough, for the worst only needs to happen once. This is why I
am delighted to be here among you once again today to rehearse the information
on the issues together.
As a country of great strategic significance, the Islamic Republic
of Iran is not only under constant and direct threat from conventional and
chemical weapons, but also faces the perils of nuclear weapons indirectly. As
a result, we accord special importance to the deliberations and endeavours of
597
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
3
(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)
the Conference. The continued and wide-scale use of chemical and toxic
weapons by Iraq at a time when negotiations on a new convention on chemical
weapons are under way has drawn our attention to the items being discussed in
this Conference.
You should recently have been informed about the terrifying reports
coming from the Iranian city of Sardasht, which seem to have numbed us with
their repetition. The residential areas in this city were subjected to the
most brutal chemical bombardments, causing the death of hundreds of innocent
people. This was not the first time that Iran was subjected to chemical
weapons attack and it was not the first time that civilian areas and
residential quarters were targets of chemical assault. But this was the first
time that a city in its totality was poisoned by the Iraqi forces. The use of
chemical arms was so vast that even several days later, when the
United Nations specialists despatched to the area arrived in the city, the
afflicted areas were still highly contaminated. A number of wounded
inhabitants are still in European hospitals. I strongly urge you who are
directly involved in important negotiations on the new chemical weapons
convention to visit these patients and see for yourselves the dreadful effects
of these destructive weapons. Among the injured there are individuals who
were witnesses to the loss of members of their families while they themselves
were chemically afflicted. I am confident that observing such crimes will
contribute to the redoubling of your efforts and the reaching of definite and
final agreement on a chemical weapons convention.
Despite achievements being made in these talks which have made an
agreement closer at hand, the non-compliance with the present instruments
reveals grim prospects for the future. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 may be
more primitive than the present convention and of less complexity than the
present deliberations. The undertakings of countries have, however, given
sufficient strength to the Protocol. In the meantime, it has not set concrete
measures for verification, compliance or use, which constitute the main part
of the new convention. Yet the confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraq
shows vividly that verification can be successfully conducted. But, in
the absence of firm political will, prevention of the use of chemical
weapons -- which is definitely less complex than prevention of production,
development and stockpiling of these weapons -- will not be possible.
We are formulating and preparing a convention in the Conference whose
application will in the end depend on the activities of other organs of the
United Nations, including the Security Council. It is, therefore, proper to
pose the question whether the Council has been able to reflect the necessary
capability and political will vis-a-vis the confirmed reports of the use of
chemical weapons. The answer is axiomatic. If the Security Council has been
faced with political considerations as regards the repeated violation of the
Geneva Protocol by Iraq and has not been able to take effective measures, it
is evident that no decisive decision can be expected of this body as regards
assuring compliance with the provisions of the new convention.
In the latest report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the
Security Council, it is declared that "technically there is little more that
598
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)
we can do that is likely to assist the United Nations in its efforts to
prevent the use of chemical weapons in the present conflict. In our view,
only concerted efforts at the political level can be effective in ensuring
that all the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide by their
deliberations and obligations. Otherwise, if the Protocol is irreparably
weakened after 60 years of general international respect, this may lead, in
the future, to the world facing the spectre of the threat of biological
weapons".. We can therefore conclude that there is no technical obstacle to a
political decision.
The Security Council, in response to this important report, issued a
statement on 14 May 1987 which contained nothing more than the statement of
21 March 1986. The Council knew well that the previous statements not only.
did not prevent Iraq from repeating such barbaric acts but, rather, encouraged
Iraq to violate the Protocol more flagrantly and freely. In fact, following
the 1986 statement, Iraq celebrated 1987 by generalizing the use of chemical
weapons to civilians. The toothless statement of 14 May 1987 proved that the
Security Council substantially lacks the capability for "concerted efforts at
the political level", despite the open request of the Secretary-General. And
the prevailing political atmosphere has prevented the Council from taking any
fundamental position, let alone any just decision. We warned the
international community at the time that such compromising and weak moves
would embolden Iraq to intensify its crimes and we desperately regret that it
so happened.
The Iraqi chemical attack on the city.of Sardasht was without precedent
in the history of contemporary wars. The name of Sardasht should castigate
the consciousness of mankind along with the names of Hiroshima ndNagasaki as
the first city in history whose inhabitants were massacred by poisonous
gases. Encyclopedias and history books should record the name of this
innocent 0city as a shame on humanity. Yet the Security Council remained
motionless and submissive and, even worse than that, discouraged the
Secretary-General from any future action or initiative.
The Iraqi regime, in a bid to justify its crimes, has announced that it
will halt its violation of international law only if the war is ended.
Ironically enough, the United States, which had previously condemned the use
of chemical weapons by Iraq, has now gone so far in supporting Iraq that it
even prevents the Council from discussing the subject and receiving the
technical report on the genocide of the people of Sardasht. In other words,
the United States is condoning deployment of chemical weapons in the war and
justifies its control only in peace time. The countries having clear stances
on the issue in the past are now following the United States.policy, due to
their bilateral political considerations.
While the NATO alliance considers a nuclear attack in'retaliation to a
chemical assault on cities possible, how can this indifference vis-a-vis the
Sardasht catastrophe be interpreted? Do not claim that the Council has not
ignored the fact and has condemned the use of poisonous gases in its latest
resolution. This has been the third consecutive year that such a showcase
position has been repeated while the Iraqi crimes are constantly increasing.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
5
(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)
The Council has not only refrained from concerted efforts at the political
level; it has not even made a binding call to Iraq to end its chemical
attacks. It is evident that the weak positions of the Security Council have
given carte blanche to Iraq to perpetuate its illegal and inhuman crimes.
It may be argued that these issues are irrelevant to the deliberations of
the Conference on Disarmament, but that is not so. What I have just stated is
an important matter dealing directly with the fate of the activities of this
Conference on this subject. I hereby call on the representatives of all
countries, particularly those of the permanent members of the
Security Council, to pose this question to the representatives at the
United Nations, and I quote, "Will the Council have the same approach towards
non-compliance with and violation of the new-convention?" If that is so,
another regime must be worked out to guarantee the implementation of the
provisions of the convention, particularly in the field of preventing the use
of chemical weapons. If the Council is faced with certain political
considerations vis-a-vis naked violations by Iraq, you should rest assured
that the same results will be derived from new endeavours and it will be
discredited in the same manner as the Geneva Protocol.
The, Islamic Republic of Iran is constantly and strongly calling for an
effective international regime for compliance with provisions on the use of
chemical weapons. Concerted, all-out action for strengthening the present
Protocol is a necessary prerequisite for fortifying the new convention. The
theoretical views on verification and prevention should be accompanied by
practical experiences of violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq. We have
started compiling these experiences and we hope that we will be able to
provide this Conference with the results at a convenient time.
The efforts of the Conference in the field of chemical disarmament are
noteworthy. The decisions of the Conference regarding the convention on
prohibition of the deployment, development, production and possession of
chemical weapons will be a litmus test of how far the Conference has been
successful in carrying out its obligations. The plans proposed by various
countries regarding the new convention reflect the comprehension by
delegations of the urgency and importance attached to the subject.
One of the positive elements in the draft convention is the destruction
of the present world arsenals of chemical weapons. We believe that the
expressed concerns regarding the prolongation of the time-limit for the
destruction of all chemical weapons are justifiable because, during the
10-year period proposed, the possibility of the use of such weapons will
continue to exist. Therefore it is advisable that the Conference-should
consider the reduction of this time-limit to the shortest possible and that
during this period of time all the stockpiles should come under international
supervision.
In the meantime, progress in the formulation of the chemical weapons
convention should not prevent us from progress in other areas of disarmament.
If the use of chemical weapons has given an incentive to expedite
600
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
-' \.L/rv.YG7
(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)
deliberations on the banning of chemical weapons, we hope that the
international organizations will not wait for the same experience to move
towards nuclear disarmament.
Technological and scientific advancements pave the way for new military
theories, and this by itself is a starting point for new scientific
development causing revision in military strategies. The gap between
technological progress and military doctrines constantly neutralizes the
disarmament measures and leads to quantitative and qualitative development of
nuclear weapons. This is at a time when the threat of accidental nuclear war
remains unchecked.
On the other hand, possession of nuclear weapons by Israel and
South Africa intensifies this peril. If the present trend continues unabated,
then other countries inevitably will resort to nuclear weapons to guarantee
their own security and, in a short while, any political or military tension
will be a recipe for nuclear confrontation. Despite all the warnings and
concern about the consequences, the world has on many occasions been dragged
to the verge of a nuclear war and catastrophe. The amount of nuclear weapons
present in the world is sufficient to annihilate the world several times
over. Yet the lunatic arms race is continuing unabated and, on the other
hand, the talks on nuclear disarmament between two major nuclear-weapon States
,are proceeding very slowly. Since between 1 and 2 per cent of the nuclear
arsenals is enough to erase civilization from the face of the globe,
disarmament by less than 95 per cent will not be effective. The
nuclear-weapon States, therefore, shoulder a very heavy responsibility to
arrive at the earliest possible agreement for comprehensive nuclear
disarmament. The prerequisite for moving towards this goal is denunciation of
nuclear deterrence through a balance of terror. The means of destruction of
human civilization should not serve as a guarantee of national security. she
constructive proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 has not
yet been translated into practical terms. The pledge of'some nuclear-weapon
States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any condition has not
received the consent of all parties although it by itself is not sufficient.
Under these circumstances, we hope that scrapping medium-range missiles from
Europe and Asia will be a first effective step towards universal disarmament.
We are of the opinion that a ban on nuclear tests is among the agenda
items which should receive high priority. The continuation of nuclear tests
has not only intensified the nuclear arms race but has also imperilled
human life. The studies show that, should nuclear tests continue till the
year 2000, the resultant radiation will cause the early deaths of
150,000 people in the world, of whom over 90 per cent will be from the
northern hemisphere.
Regarding the pledge of nuclear-weapon States not to threaten to use or
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, although the most
effective guarantee is a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the
nuclear-weapon States should meanwhile announce their adherence to this
decision through internationally-binding commitments. We hope that the,
ad hoc Committee dealing with this subject will be able to reach tangible
results.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
7
(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)
The unabated nuclear arms race has gained momentum in such a way that it
is going to contaminate outer space soon. It seems that the whole globe is
not vast enough for the super-Powers to fill it with terror. Outer space is
the common heritage of mankind and using it for any other than peaceful
purposes is a crime against mankind. The development of space weapons has
complicated the race qualitatively and has entangled the trend of nuclear
disarmament with more complexity and problems. We believe that strengthening
the legal regime for outer space can prevent the escalation of the arms race
in new domains.
There is nothing to substantiate the claim that military satellites have
a stabilizing role. If the presence of reconnaissance satellites is necessary
in space, this can only be acceptable under strict international observance
pending comprehensive disarmament. It is unfortunate to say that no sizable
progress has been made in any of these areas. I hope that, by finalizing the
convention on chemical disarmament the Conference will be able to gain
momentum towards solving other disarmament issues.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. I now give the floor,to
the next speaker on my list, the-representative of Bulgaria,
Ambassador Tellalov.
Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, since I have the floor for the
/ first time under your presidency, I wish to express the deep satisfaction of
my delegation in seeing you perform in such a successful manner the important
duties of President of our Conference. The relations between our two
countries are those of traditional friendship and close co-operation. It is
also my personal pleasure to have the opportunity to work with you once again
and to benefit from your vast professional experience, which you display anew
in guiding so skilfully and efficiently our work during the month of July. I
wish also to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi
of Egypt, for his able chairing of our meetings during the first month of the
summer session.
The Conference has been honoured today by the presence of His Excellency
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati. We have listened with interest to his statement.
We shall be missing our colleagues who intend soon to leave, or who have
already left the Conference, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom,
Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria. We wish
them every success in their important new appointments.
Today I wish to speak only on two items of our agenda, "Negative security
assurances" and "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".
As you know, Bulgaria has always considered the security of
non-nuclear-weapon States in the nuclear age as an important matter. My
delegation is also co-ordinator of the socialist countries on this agenda
item. Those countries have repeatedly reaffirmed their interest in advancing
602
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
the consideration of this subject. It is so because we believe that the need
to strengthen the security of non-noclear-weapon States in the present
circumstances has not decreased. Some negative developments have underlined
the urgency of arriving at international arrangements to effectively,
uniformly and, possibly unconditionally assure non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We believe, therefore,
that the Ad hoc Committee on item 6, working under the chairmanship of
Ambassador von Stilpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, should not give
up its efforts to find a meaningful common solution of the problem -- a
solution which is acceptable to all and could be vested in an international
instrument of a legally-binding character.
In the Ad hoc Committee, my delegation has pointed out that various
specific measures may be useful in seeking to increase the security of
non-nuclear-weapon States:
Non-use of nuclear weapons in general would best serve this purpose.
The CD has been requested to start the elaboration of an international legal
instrument to exclude the use of nuclear weapons;
Pledging of non-first use by all nuclear-weapon States, not by China and
the Soviet Union only. Such undertakings would have an important
confidence-building effect;
Regional security arrangements, either unilateral or multilateral,
providing for non-use assurances to States parties to agreements on
nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Tlatelolco Treaty and the Treaty of Rarotonga
now appear as two major elements of a future network of such arrangements that
have been opted for by many non-nuclear-weapon States in various regions of
the world. My country has, as you know, been actively pursuing this goal in
the Balkans. One week ago, Bulgaria and Greece adopted at top political
level a joint document aimed at undertaking practical actions to establish a
.Balkan nuclear-free zone. They appealed to all Balkan countries to take part
in this process and expressed their determination to make bilateral
contributions to this effect. We strongly favour also the conclusion of an
international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear
weapons on their territories against the use or threat of use of such weapons.
This "global approach" to the negative security assurances problem has
been discussed for several years already in the Ad hoc Committee on item 6,
still inconclusively. We regret that those States which practise a policy of
nuclear deterrence based on first use of nuclear weapons have not yet deemed
it proper to re-examine their position -- a fact which has appeared as a major
obstacle to completion of the negotiations. We recognize, however, that
there have been some -- perhaps still academic -- attempts to rethink the
security perceptions of at least some of those States. Suggestions to this
effect have recently been made by representatives of various schools of
strategic thinking. We look forward to seeing appropriate formal actions at
State level reflecting the growing need for fresh political and military
approaches to urgent security problems. Such a doctrinal reassessment may
help also this forum to arrive at a common solution on negative security
603,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In the search for a solution to the
NSA problem, priority should be given to the legitimate security concerns of
the non-nuclear-weapon States, which, by virtue of forgoing the nuclear option
and of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, have
every right to be most effectively guaranteed against thr? use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons. They do deserve this, since there is no way such States
can become a source of nuclear threat to other nations.
The socialist countries believe that the Ad hoc Committee on item 6
should try to solve the difficult problems relating to the substance of the
negative security assurances. It is our firm conviction that a fresh
approach is really needed if we are to find a meaningful solution. Recent
developments in international politics provide a reliable basis on which to
seek for and arrive at such an approach. I will confine myself to mentioning
the important political understanding between the Soviet Union and the
United States of America that "a nuclear war can not be won and must never be
fought", which should have positive impact on the subject of negative security
assurances as welly the non-first use tendencies at doctrinal level which are
slowly becoming a standard prerequisite of strictly defensive military
postures; the positive results of the Stockholm Conference in building
confidence between European States; the Berlin document on the military
doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. All these developments
may encourage us to explore new ways and means to resolve the problem of
effectively and uniformly assuring, in a legally-binding way,
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
An interesting new proposal has been tabled in document CD/768 by the
delegation of Nigeria. My delegation has extensively commented on it in the
Ad hoc Committee and will continue to take part in its future consideration.
We concur with the basic thrust of this proposal seeking to find a way out of
the present impasse and put the NSA problem back on the negotiating table.
The Ad hoc Committee will, however, need some time before being able to reach
a common solution which would be in line with the non-proliferation
commitments of many of the States represented in this Chamber and could be
submitted to the next United Nations special session on disarmament.
The Ad hoc Committee on item 5 has been discussing the subject of
prevention of an arms race in outer space for three consecutive years. This
session it is working under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of
Italy. In spite of the efforts of many delegations to move us closer to some
kind of agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the
current proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee are widely perceived as
repetitious in many respects of the Committee's work last year. The
decreased intensity-of the Committee's deliberations might well be indicative
of an already exhausted and apparently inadequate mandate. What we need now,
and maybe next year, is more concrete, purpose-oriented and structured work on
this item, with the eventual identification of points of convergence in the
positions. Elaboration of specific treaty language and mutually agreed
definitions on areas of generally recognized interest could well be the most
logical next step in our work. The proposals put forward would be a natural
focal point in this respect.
604
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
10
(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
A subject which already seems ripe for concerted action is an agreement
on an ASAT ban. The.existing legal regime for outer space places some
important restraints on the nature, deployment and possible use of such
weapons. These restraints do not seem, however, to be comprehensive
enough. Non-nuclear ASAT weapons, for instance, could well be developed and
deployed in outer space despite the established legal restraints.
We consider that there are available, at least currently, two important-
prerequisites conducive to concrete negotiation and early conclusion of an
ASAT ban agreement. Firstly, the two leading space powers now observe an
actual moratorium on testing and deployment of such weapons. Secondly, the
majority of the countries today favour an early agreement to ban all dedicated
ASAT weapons and dismantle the existing ones. Many CD delegations have
already tabled specific proposals on how to achieve such a-ban.
Appropriate measures, designed also to produce a confidence-building
effect, could lead us to the accomplishment of this objective. Ensuring the
immunity of satellites and, possibly, their associated ground stations, for
example, may be viewed as an important step towards attaining an ASAT ban in a
more comprehensive and realistic manner. Such an agreement could take care
of the need to prevent development, testing and deployment of new dedicated
ASAT weapon systems and to eliminate the existing ones. There could also be
a prohibition of the use of force against space objects. Such a provision
would have the merit of outlawing interference with the normal functioning of
space objects by systems which usually serve other purposes but could, in
principle, be used in an ASAT mode. This would address the problem of the
so-called dual-capability space weapon systems.
The view has been expressed in the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 that the
problem of dual-capability systems might present certain difficulties in
banning all dedicated ASAT systems. Such apprehensions do not seem, however,
to be justified. There are ways to overcome possible difficulties in this
respect. The key criterion to be used, for example, in assessing the actual
capability of a system to be a military significant ASAT weapon could be the
testing of such systems. Opponents of a CTB have insistently tried to
convince us that nuclear testing is of immense importance for ensuring the
military significance and reliability of new weapons designs. If we are
expected to believe such an argument regarding the CTB, I fail to see why we
should have to belive otherwise in the ASAT context. To be reliable, a space
system meant to perform ASAT functions should be tested extensively enough in
such a mode. Given the existing monitoring capabilities of each side, these
tests cannot remain hidden. Thus, military significant ASAT systems would
inevitably be known to the other side, something that would facilitate
verification of the ban on them.
Another reservation with respect to the suggested agreement on satellite
immunity contends that, under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the
United Nations, space objects are already protected against use of force. We
do not recognize the importance of the Charter in international law. A
careful consideration of Article 2, paragraph 4, in its entirety would,
however, reveal that its provisions actually prohibit the use of force against
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 42 5
. 11
the territorial integrity and political independence of States. It seems
very hard to imagine how the specific case of outer space -- this common
heritate of mankind -- could reasonably be linked with the notion of
"territorial integrity and political independence of States". A more
feasible alternative is the elaboration of a special agreement to provide
immunity for satellites, which would specifically complement and enhance the
general provisions of the Charter.
In my statement of 2 April this year, I dwelt in detail upon a valuable
idea relevant to all measures providing for the non-introduction of weapons
into outer space. I refer to the Soviet proposal of 3 February 1987 to
establish an international inspectorate for the purpose of verifying such
agreements. The concrete elements of this proposal deserve very careful
consideration. The suggested team of international inspectors could serve to
monitor the implementation both of an ASAT ban and of a comprehensive
prohibition of the deployment of any other type of space weapons. The
Ad hoc Committee should, in our opinion, take up the proposal seriously and
examine, in practical terms, its specific provisions.
All the Ad hoc Committees are entering now that final stage of their
proceedings in which delegations will start considering the respective
reports. We hope that these reports will reflect some progress reached'
during the current session. My delegation believes that such a development
could lay the ground for even more productive work in the following session of
the Conference, which may well be the last one before the next special session
of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement
and for the kind words addressed to myself and my country. I now give the
floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, to begin with, I
would like to congratulate you very warmly on the assumption of the presidency
of our Conference for the month of July. It gives me satisfaction to see
this important office entrusted to the representative of a country with which
the German Democratic Republic enjoys deep friendship and close
co-operation. We have already benefited from the valuable service you are
rendering to the Conference thanks to the many years of experience and your
diplomatic skill.
My delegation welcomes the presence at our Conference of-His Excellency
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We
listened with great attention to his important statement.
I regret very much, Mr. President, that your predecessor,
Ambassador Alfarargi, will leave the Conference. I take this opportunity to
thank him once again very sincerely for his work as President of this forum
and for his friendly way of co-operating. with my delegation. I wish him good
luck and all the best for his future activities. That is exactly what I wish
also to our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria. My
.delegation is also sorry that Ambassador Cromartie will no longer be present
606
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 425
12
at the Conference.
particular for his
Chemical Weapons.
friend, Ambassador
relations existing
ambassadorship.
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
I wish him good health and I shall always remember him in
dedicated work as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on
I take great pleasure in welcoming in our midst a good old
Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. I am certain that the excellent
between our two delegations will be maintained under his
Today I would like to make some observations on item
5
of our
"Prevention of an arms race in outer space". But, before
I
come to
me comment briefly on the most recent developments regarding the envisaged
elimination.of medium-range and operative-tactical missiles.
All relevant statements at this Conference have made it clear that we are
well aware of the far-reaching implications an, accord between the USSR and the
United States in that area would have for the entire disarmament process and
the strengthening of international security. Everyone is agreed about that.
The German Democratic Republic believes the successful conclusion of the
negotiations currently under way would literally constitute the key with which
the door to disarmament can be opened wide. The impact on the work of the
Conference would unquestionably be a positive one, since the mere commencement
of the negotiations brought about a significant improvement in the political
climate.
A few days ago, General Secretary Gorbachev granted an interview to the
Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, in which he presented a new offer aimed at
giving a fresh impetus to the negotiations and bringing them closer to a
conclusion. The Soviet Union is totally renouncing medim-range and
operative-tactical missiles, based on the concept of the double-zero option.
Given reciprocity, it will, therefore, no longer insist on retaining
100 warheads for medium-range forces in its Asian territory, as was agreed in
Reykjavik. Thus, it does appear comprehensible that the Soviet Union expects
the United States not to increase its nuclear presence in certain regions of
Asia. It is up to the other side now to remove the remaining stumbling blocks
obstructing progress in the bilateral negotiations. And this would have to
include the destruction of United States warheads for Pershing-lA missiles.
In making this new proposal, the USSR has met the wishes of Asian
nations. At the same time, it has drawn our attention to the need for, and
the concrete possibilities of, promoting disarmament security and confidence
in the Asian and Pacific region. Obviously, this is of special interest to
the countries in that part of our planet. The very discussion about the
global double-zero option has, however, seen all sides stress the worldwide
dimension of disarmament and security. That is why my delegation welcomes all
relevant efforts not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the globe.
Let me come back now to item 5. In a few months, it will be 30 years
since the signals of Sputnik 1 were first received, signals which ushered in
the space age. The striving to put weapons in outer space and to create
regional SDI offshoots is today casting shadows over the prospects space is
holding out in terms of peaceful uses. There is not much time left to ensure,
through international agreements, the exclusively peaceful use of outer space
including the immunity and protectin of satellites.
agenda,
that, let
607
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV. 42 5 ...... .
13
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
The Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, under the able leadership of
Ambassador Pugliese has been doing a useful job. A valuable set of ideas and
proposals has been accumulated and a rather good basis has been laid for
conrete, businesslike and goal-oriented work. To this end, working papers
have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament by, for example,
Italy (CD/9), the Soviet Union (CD/274 and CD/476), Canada (CD/678 and
.CD/716), Pakistan (CD/708) and Ilenezuela (CD/709/Rev.1). Item 3 of the
Committee's work programme, entitled "Proposals and future initiatives on the
prevention of an arms race in outer space", should really be used to conduct
discussions and, later on, negotiations on appropriate measures.
In the course of the debate, various delegations have addressed the
question of what a treaty banning ASAT weapons should look like and how the
immunity of satellites could be ensured in a legally-binding manner. At the
plenary session on 24 July 1986, my delegation described the principal
elements which it felt ought to form part of a future treaty. Today, I intend
to develop a number of ideas which concern the scope of a future accord,
verification of compliance, and the relationship between a ban on ASAT systems
and the peaceful use of outer space. In so doing, I will take into account
suggestions and proposals put forward by various other delegations.
Even though the Committee has not been able so far to agree on the
objects to be protected in outer space, it seems to us that a common
denominator is emerging on what the envisaged treaty should cover. The
assumption to proceed from, in this context, is that there are no weapons in
outer space and that, consequently, all objects in space must be protected:
Given this assumption, it should be within the scope of the treaty to:
,(a) ban the use of force against any space object, (b) prevent the deliberate
destruction or damaging of space objects, (c) prohibit interference with the
normal functioning of any space object, (d) proscribe the development,
production or deployment of ASAT weapons, and (e) provide for the destruction
under international control of any ASAT weapons that may already exist. It
ought to be possible on this basis to meet the concerns expressed by a number
of delegations, which have said that it would be difficult to distinguish
between dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities. "Rules of the road" or
a "code of conduct" could find their place under the type of scope I have
outlined just now. It-goes without saying that all these things require
in-depth study.
Ensuring compliance is undoubtedly one of the most crucial and thorniest
problems. Various options would be conceivable individually or in
combination: (a) broadening of information exchanges on trajectory parameters
and functions of space objects, (b) use of national technical means of
verification, (c) creation of a multilateral consultative mechanism
complementary to other forms of consultation, (d) establishment of an
international inspectorate provided with far-reaching powers, including the
right to conduct stringent on-site challenge inspections. The details of
these measures and methods need to be worked out.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
14
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
In this connection, allow me to comment briefly on the role an
international inspectorate could play. The USSR delegation has suggested the
establishment of such an inspectorate for the purpose of verifying that no
weapons are deployed in outer space. The proposed body should, for instance,
have the right to conduct on-site inspections of all objects designed to be
launched into and stationed in outer space. The creation of that inspectorate
would also be of major importance for ascertaining compliance with a future
ASAT accord. In fact, the inspectorate would serve to verify reliably the
non-deployment of whole classes of possible ASAT weapons. With this Soviet
proposal and the French suggestion that an international satellite monitoring
agency be set up, plus Canada's PAXSAT concept, a full-fledged system of
possible verification measures is shaping up. At this stage, it would seem
desirable to probe its potential. Therefore, the Ad hoc Committee should have
a closer look, in the near future, at'all the issues related to that matter,
preferably by enlisting the help of experts, who could function as a working
group of the Committee.
In view of the above-mentioned possibilities, an international
inspectorate would be quite capable of verifying the non-stationing of ASAT
weapons in outer space. As for verification in regard to ground- and
air-launched ASAT weapons, it may be a good idea to draw on the experience
gathered also in other disarmament negotiation fora.
There is another aspect of broad importance for the verification of
compliance with multilateral treaties. Their effective operation is in the
interests of every signatory. It is against this background that my
delegation believes it to be necessary to discuss how information on
compliance, obtained by national technical means could be made available to
all States parties, either directly or through a multilateral machinery.
We must seek not only to prohibit arms in outer space, but also to
advance co-operation in peaceful research into and use of outer space. Any
disarmament agreement will have to be a direct contribution to the
strengthening of international collaboration. This very endeavour is behind
the proposal the Soviet Union tabled on 10 June 1986 concerning the
establishment of an international outer space agency, which could be placed in
charge, among other things, of monitoring compliance with multilateral
treaties. This idea was pursued further in the Soviet proposal that an
international centre for joint space technology research for developing
countries should be set up with the assistance of the leading space Powers.
There is no denying that an intrinsic interrelationship exists between
the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its peaceful use by all
peoples. We should always think of that in our practical work.
Nobody is overlooking the problems negotiations on the prohibition of
ASAT weapons will be posing. To point them out is a legitimate thing to do.
The time is ripe, however, to proceed to their solution.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 425
15
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic
Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair
and to my country. This concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there
any other member who wishes to take the floor at this time? I give the floor
to the representative of the United States of America.
Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Just a comment on
Ambassador Rose's remarks: I appreciated his statement and found it very
interesting, but I would just rem:ed the Ambassador that the discussion of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces was a proposal that the United States tabled
five or six years ago, and Chairman Gorbachev's recent acquiescence on that
came after five or six years of deliberations. I would also point out that,
as far as the Pershings are concerned, that is a matter for the Federal
Republic of Germany. It involves their sovereignty, and not the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his
comments. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic
Republic.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I do not want to comment very
extensively on the remarks just made by the distinguished Ambassador of the
United States, but it was always my understanding that the warheads of the
Persing-lAs are in the ownership of the United States. Maybe I am in error?
The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
Mr. von STULPNAGE (Federal Republic of Germany): I wish just to remand
the Conference that my delegation set out the view of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany on this question a few weeks ago.
The PRESIDENT: May I now turn to another subject? As announced at the
opening of this plenary meeting, I intend to suspend this meeting and to
convene an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with the proposal of the
Group of 21 contained in document CD/515/Rev.3. Immediately after, we shall
resume our plenary meeting to continue our discussion of that document. The
plenary meeting is supended_
The meeting was suspenaed at 11.15 a.m. and resumed at 11.25 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
The PRESIDENT: the 425th plenary meeting of the Conference on
Disarmament is resumed.
I now put before the Conference for decision document CD/515/Rev.3,
submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled "Draft mandate for an
ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament".
I should like to know if there is any objection to the draft mandate.
I give the floor to the representative of Belgium.
Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) (translated from French): I wish to make a
statement on behalf of the Western Group. The Western Group is somewhat
disappointed to see draft mandate CD/515/Rev.3 proposed once again for
decision by the Conference. That has been done without consultation with the
Western Group, which cannot share the view that the submission of this draft
mandate will facilitate discussion on this agenda item. It will come as no
surprise, therefore, that we are once again unable to associate outselves with
a consensus on this draft mandate.
The Western Group attaches great importance to agenda item 3,
"Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". For many years,
we have repeatedly emphasized, both within this Conference and in the
General Assembly, that we are ready to have an indepth discussion and exchange
of views on this important issue. This year, too, we have shown outselves
willing to renew our efforts to define within this Conference an appropriate
framework for indepth consideration of this agenda item.
In conclusion, I should like to stress that my Group attaches the
greatest importance to concrete policies and actions aimed at preventing all
war, including nuclear war. We share the view expressed by the leaders of the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in their joint
communique of November 1985 concerning the importance of avoiding all war,
nuclear or conventional, between them.
The PRESIDENT: Are there any further speakers? I give the floor to the
representative of China.
Mr. FAN GUOXIANG (China) (translated from Chinese): Prevention of
nuclear war, an issue of universal concern to the peoples of all countries,
has all along been placed on the agenda of this Conference as a priority
item. For the past several years, delegations of all member States have on
numerous occasions conducted discussions and consultations on the
establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item. The Chinese delegation has
all along been opposed to the nuclear arms race and attaches great importance
to the issue of prevention of nuclear war. On many occasions the Chinese
delegation has stated its positions and views on this issue and it has
submitted its working paper, CD/691.
We maintain that the CD should intensify its work on this item, including
through the establishment of a relevant subsidiary body. In our view, the
Group of 21 has all along attached importance to this item and the draft
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
17
(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)
mandate submitted by this Group contained in document CD/515/Rev.3 is a
rational one for which we express our support. Meanwhile, we can also agree
to the CD carrying out its work on item 3 in other forms.
The PRESIDENT: I give the floor now the representative of Bulgaria.
Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): As everybody knows, the Group of Socialist
Countries considers the prevention of nuclear war an issue of the highest
priority. We believe that concrete negotiations can, and should be undertaken
to elaborate urgent measures to help prevent a nuclear war. The socialist
countries have always maintained that this issue should be addressed in a
comprehensive manner, considering all related matters. To this end, a number
of specific proposals have been put forward by our Group and by members of the
Group of 21. This underlines our firm belief that the solid uses for
-starting such negotiations do exist and an appropriate subsidiary body of the
Conference on Disarmament should be established for this purpose. The Group
of Socialist Countries fully supported the formal proposal for a draft mandate
for an ad hoe committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference as contained
in document CD/515/Rev.3 of 21 July 1987 submitted by the Group of 21. The
establishment , of such a committee would have permitted the Conference to
consider, as a first step, all proposals relevant to agenda item 3, including
appropriate practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. In a
United Nations General Assembly resolution, A/RES/41/86 G, the overwhelming
majority of the international community requested the Conference on'
Disarmament "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations
with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures which
could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war
and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the
beginning of its 1987 session".
I must reiterate the urgency of adopting measures on the prevention of
nuclear war. The socialist countries firmly believe that, as was stated in
the Berlin Declaration on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States in
May this year, "in the nuclear and space age, the world has become too fragile
a place for a war and politics of violence. ... A world war, notably a nuclear
one, would have disastrous consequences not only for the countries directly
involved in such a conflict, but for all life on Earth".
The Group of-Socialist Countries will continue to accord priority to
item 3 of our agenda and to insist on the establishment of an appropriate
subsidiary body of the Conference to deal with it in concrete and practical
terms. The draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 is realistic and has
taken into account other delegations' points of view. Thus, it could have
represented a meaningful basis for productive joint work. Consequently, we
regret all the more the unwillingness displayed by the Western delegations to
join in the consensus and to allow the Conference on Disarmament to make its
concrete contribution to the efforts in this area.
The PRESIDENT: We have listened to the representatives of the various
groups on this topic. In view of the exchange of the views held at this
plenary meeting, I have to state that there is no consensus at present on the
draft mandate contained in document CD/515/Rev.3. Does any other member wish
to take the floor at this stage?
?612
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
18
Mr. TEJA (India), Mr. President, earlier this month, I had the occasion
to congratulate you and to convey the assurances of our delegation's
co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. Today, as this month
draws towards an end, I would like to compliment you on the able and efficient
manner in which you have conducted the work of the Conference during this
month. Today, we have also had the privilege of listening to the Foreign
Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Ali Akbar Velayati.
We, the Group of 21, would like to express our deep regret at the
inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on
agenda item 3. We have shown ourselves ready to exchange views on this
subject here, or in the General Assembly, but some delegations have been
unable to accept'this view, perhaps because they attach different priorities
to this item.
I do not need to emphasize the importance that our Group attaches to this
subject. We believe that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of
destruction from a nuclear war and that consequently the removal of this
threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. While
nuclear-weapon States possess the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear
war, all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for the
prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that
such a war would have for mankind. The Harare Declaration adopted at the
eighth non-aligned summit also emphasized this point, and I quote: "use of
nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the
United Nations, would also be a crime against humanity. In this regard,
[we urge] the nuclear-weapon States to agree, pending the achievement of
nuclear disarmament, to the conclusion of-an international treaty on the _
prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".
It is a matter of grave concern for all delegations present here that no
progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate
item on the CD's agenda in accordance with General Assembly
resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated,
leading to the expansion and introduction of still more lethal warheads into
the nuclear weapon stockpiles. The United Nations General Assembly has
repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter
of the highest priority, negotations with a view to achieving agreement on
appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to
establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject.
During the 1986 session of the General Assembly, there were three
resolutions on this subject, which were adopted with overwhelming majorities.
Two of these resolutions, A/RES/41/60 F, entitled "Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", and A/RES/41/86 G, entitled
"Prevention of nuclear war", were introduced by members of the Group of 21.
I would like to recall here the results of recent atmospheric and
biological studies which indicate that, in addition to blast, heat and
radiation, a nuclear war, even a limited nuclear war, would trigger an arctic
nuclear winter, freezing the Earth into a darkened frozen planet. The
conclusions of the studies have already been compiled in a report by the
Secretary-General. In view of the irreversible consequences, it is clear that
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.425
19
(Mr. Teja, India)
conventional wars cannot, under any circumstances, be equated with nuclear
war, since nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. In view of this
unique destructive character, invoking the Charter to justify the use of
nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence against
conventional armed attack is neither legitimate nor justifiable.
We remain convinced that the shortest way to the removal of the danger of
nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending the
achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons should be prohibited. We have welcomed the declaration of
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that
"a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Now is the time to
translate this will into a binding commitment.
In deference to the position of the other delegations, the Group of 21
has put forward, in CD/515/Rev.3, dated 21 July 1987, a non-negotiating
mandate that will permit a thorough consideration of all aspects -- legal,
political, technical, military -- of all the proposals before the Conference.
We believe that such consideration will not only contribute to a better
understanding of the subject, but also pave the way for negotiations for an
agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be
achieved through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. We are
disappointed, therefore, that, despite the urgency accorded to this subject
and the flexibility displayed by the Group of 21, we are witness to the
spactacle of the CD not being able to justify its own mandate, which comes
from the General Assembly and is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final
Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament. We would like to hope that the gravity of the matter will lead
to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations
concerning the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement on
behalf of the Group of 21.
Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I should like to recall that the
Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances will meet in this conference
room immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting.
In accordance with the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference
this week, I should also like to recall that, on Thursday, 30 July,
immediately after our regular plenary meeting, we shall have an informal
meeting to consider the report of the Chairman of the Group of 7 on "Improved
and effective functioning of the Conference". That informal meeting will be
followed immediately by an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda
item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Thursday, 30 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.
614
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 ..nurrnr&,nr nfv f ICADUAIACNT t;u/rv.vto
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 July 1987, at 10. a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/FV.42b
2
The PRESIDENT, I declare open the 426th plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament.
In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its
consideration' of agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any
member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the
Conference.
May I recall that, as envisaged in the timetable of meetings being held
this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately after this
Plenary'Meetinq to receive the report of the Group of Seven on the improved
and effective functioning of the Conference. That informal meeting will be
followed by another informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda
item 2, entitled-"Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of
Yugoslavia, Australia, Czechoslovakia and the United States of America. I now
give the floor to my first speaker, the representative of Yugoslavia,
Ambassador Kosin.
Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, may I aaain congratulate you, the
representative of friendly Ethiopia, on your presidency for the month of July
and on your able discharge of high responsibilities during your to=, of
office. I would like, too, to express my appreciation to your distirc-wished
predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, for his dedication and wise
guidance of the Conference during the month of June.
I extend my best wishes to Ambassador Dhanapala in the di-sctorship of
the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Researc`: (UNIDIR). My best
wishes also qo to the departing Ambassadors of Nigeria and the United K.'_n?do-,
Ambassador Tonwe and Dr. Ian Cromartie. We are grateful for their
contribution to the work of the Conference.
I take this opportunity to warmly welcome amongst us the new head of t:'
United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new Ambassador of non-aligned Sri Lanka,
Mr. Nihal Rodrigo, and the new head of the delegation of Brazil,
Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. I wish them all success and fruitful
work, and they can count on my full co-operation.
This year's session of our Conference is drawing to a close. I do not
intend to discuss what has or has not been done in the Conference in the
course of 1987. It is clear that, notwithstanding some achievements, the
Conference has fallen short of the major objectives for which it was created,
in particular in the vital area of nuclear disarmament, which has not been
tackled in a substantive manner at all. Instead of reviewing the situation
with regard to individual agenda items,. I would like to dwell upon the role of
our Conference in the broader context of the dialogue on disarmament.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
3
(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
We are approaching a period in which it is realistic to expect
intensification of international efforts to reduce armaments and to move
towards disarmament. The international activities in the field of
disarmament, whether on the regional, bilateral or the global level, have
never been broader, more synchronized and more substantive than today. This
does not mean that we are entering an era of global understandings.
Nevertheless, the situation is changing for the better. At hand are the first
agreements in the last decade. The dialogue itself, no doubt, and
irrespective of the level on which it is conducted, is in essence an
expression of confidence.
Next month will see the International Conference on the Relationship
between Disarmament and Development in New York. The Conference is expected
to redress the negative impact of the arms race on the world economy and
welfare in an attempt to channel the vast resources away from armaments into
the growth and prosperity of developed and developing countries alike. Let us
hope the former will support it.
The forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly will
undoubtedly review a number of disarmament and security issues and add
momentum to negotiations. It should also set the date for the third special
session of the General Assembly on disarmament. SSOD-III is expected to give
political impetus to accelerating the disarmament process. Drawing on the
lessons of time, it should also strengthen multilateral negotiations and
incorporate them in existing tendencies in security and disarmament
policy-making in a changed environment, and work out realistic and
forward-looking objectives. What we need today are not new and
all-encompassing documents -- we have a lot of them -- but concentration on
international action and mobilization of all potential.
These global activities are accompanied by. regional ones, like those in
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), including
efforts to transform the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation,
the Raratonga Agreement on the South Pacific, etc.
Encouraging is the fact that conventional weapons are more and more
present in disarmament approaches. Due to technological evolution the
destructive and destabilizing effect of these weapons is close to other
weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the stockpiling and
development of these weapons poses a direct threat to the security of a number
of countries.
On the bilateral level too, developments in the negotiations between the
two militarily most powerful countries raise hopes that some agreements are
imminent. This is of wider significance, because nowhere in the world have
weapons of mass destruction been so densely concentrated in such a limited
space as in Europe.
617
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.4Zb
(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
Reassuring is the convergence of views on verification as a political
vehicle towards greater transparency, as well as the acceptance of strict and
binding methods. That would permit not only verification of compliance with a
treaty, but also the accumulation of experience for new treaties. Above all,
this is a test of political will and interest in a new method of negotiation
which is more political than technical in character.
Caning back to our Conference, how does the Conference as the single
multilateral negotiating body in the field of-disarmament fit into these
processes which entail a number of new approaches? This question has to be
posed, because our work will soon be thoroughly examined by SSOD-III.
The answer to this question is not an easy and simple one. There can be
no doubt that the Conference as the negotiating mechanism is more needed by
the international community than ever before. Perhaps there were some
unrealistic expectations, but it was not possible to make a move forward
without an optimistic vision.
In order to answer this question, we should critically evaluate the
conditions in which our Conference has deliberated, and the manner in which we
have conducted our work. Needless to say, the Conference on Disarmament
cannot alone change the strategies, perceptions and realities on which the
relationships between the arms race and the disarmament process are
estabished, and between the disarmament process and security. But what is
needed and required of us is to make our full contribution to the
clarification of this problem, to mutual information, and to preparatory work
in particular. Our primary goal, as set out in our "charter" (paragraph 120
of the Final Document of SSOD-I), is to negotiate and conclude an agreement.
Yet progress towards agreement is nowhere so incremental and complex as in
disarmament. In particular, it is hard to overcome the conccpts relying cn
force or the possibility of using force in a situation when the danger caused
by nuclear weapons loans large and when the military and political blocs act
as separate and opposed systems of security. In addition, there are many
political and technical issues that need to be clarified. For nowhere else
are the disparities between aspirations, needs and possibilities so apparent
as in the field of disarmament.
The foremost task of the Conference is to negotiate, but this requires
stimulation of other negotiations and generation of wider common interests and
broader understanding. My delegation favours direct negotiations on all
issues. But we are aware that the conditions are not similar everywhere, and
that not all actors in this process are equally willing to negotiate.
We have achieved significant progress towards the elaboration of a
convention banning chemical weapons. But this cannot replace our failures on
on other key issues. It is incumbent upon us to contribute to ways of
expediting the implementation of the international consensus where it exists,
and, of creating it where it is still non-existent.
618
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.426
(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
The functioning of the Conference shows that, despite good intentions, it
is often blocked by-insistence on procedural matters at the expense of the
Conference mandate as laid down in the Final Document of SSOD-I. The position
of my delegation is that we should strictly abide by this mandate and give it
precedence over organizational matters.
The efforts made so far to stop the "game of mandates" have been to no
avail. It was useful therefore that a group of seven experienced colleagues
was set up to examine the constitution of the Conference in the light of the
new needs and new experiences. They are on the right track, judging by
initial results. True, they addressed only two problems. But that is
understandable.
In order that the work of the Conference may be expedited and its
mechanism used in the best possible way for substantive consideration of the
issues on the Conference agenda, it is indispensable that the mandates of the
subsidiary bodies be based on the mandate of the Conference itself. Rather
than reformulating the tasks of the subsidiary bodies through separate
mandates, emphasis should be put, as my delegation has repeatedly stressed, on
substance. This, in turn, is better reflected through programmes of work than
through mandates. That is why we have always advocated the creation of
conditions in which every opportunity offered should be used to-deal with
substantive issues, instead of letting them be tackled elsewhere. We have to
actively participate in the solution of these problems.
It is high time that we looked as frankly into the roots of our
inefficiency. What is the point of going back at each session to the very
beginning, of agreeing on the agenda and re-establishment of the subsidiary
bodies which have already been established? We should do all we can to ensure
full continuity in our work, respect all that has been done thus far and move
forward.
The PRESIDENT, I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his
statement and for the kind words expressed to the presidency, and I now give
the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Australia,
Ambassador Butler.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia), Our next Plenary Meeting will take place in the
month of August -- the month in which substantive work comes to its end and we
begin the process of formulating our report to the General Assembly of the
United Nations. This year's report will be the ninth annual report of the
Conference on Disarmament in its modern form. It will be the last annual
report submitted to a regular session of the General Assembly prior to the
convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament.
619
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.426
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
No doubt a special report on the work of the conference will be drawn up
for submission to the third special session. But there is a clear sense in
which, during the next few weeks, we will be bringing to a conclusion the
first decade since the modern Conference on Disarmament was established. It
is because we are conscious of this turning-point that I propose today to
address a number of subjects on the agenda of the Conference and some other
aspects of our work. But there is another reason. Since I last made a
statement in the plenary session of this Conference a new Australian
administration has been established, and ministers have now been sworn into
office, following the conduct of national elections in Australia on 11 July.
In those elections a Government formed by the Australian Labor Party was
returned to office for an historic third successive term.
The Minister under whose portfolio responsibility falls for Australian
Government policy on the work of this conference remains Mr. Bill Hayden,
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Mr. President, as I have made clear in previous statements, the
maintenance of peace and international security, and a deep commitment to the
role that measures of disarmament must play in maintaining that peace and
security, remain policies of the highest priority to the Australian Government.
Within our disarmament policies it continues to be the case that we
attach amongst the highest priority to the forging of a treaty on a
comprehensive nuclear-test ban banning all nuclear tests by all States in all
environments for all time. We have pursued this policy both multilaterally
and bilaterally. At the General Assembly of the United Nations we have
co-sponsored, with New Zealand and others, a resolution calling for such a
treaty. Our resolution has been unique with regard to its scope and with
respect to the role that it has envisaged for the Conference on
Disarmament -- to carry out the practical work that is required to ensure
that, when such a treaty is able to be forged politically, it will be able to
operate immediately.
At last year's General Assembly there were a number of resolutions on the
nuclear testing issue. Our resolution attracted the highest level of
support. But I do not make this point in any sense competitively. It would
be wrong to have such a narrow outlook when what is at issue is so important.
There is in fact little difference between the numbers of votes cast on the
two main resolutions on nuclear testing.
My point, rather, is that our resolution provided the focus for the most
remarkable and significant degree of convergence of views on the nculear
testing issue seen at the Assembly during the last decade. States from all
political and geographical groups voted for the resolution. No one voted
against it, and the number of abstentions was also consistent with the
phenomenon of an extraordinary convergence of views.
A study of that resolution shows that what States were converging around
was the simple, central idea that we should waste no further time in this
Conference in formal dispute about mandate language or in other forms of
shadow play. Instead we should agree, without-delay,-that this Conference
resume practical work on the key issues involved in a nuclear-test ban treaty.
620
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.426
7
That resolution, 41/47, also called for the immediate establishment of a
global seismic monitoring network.
Nine months after the passage of that resolution, and just a few weeks
before the end of our work for 1987, no ad hoc committee has been formed and
another year of delay in practical work towards a treaty has occurred. Why
was the convergence demonstrated at New York in November last year not seized
by this Conference between February and August this year? Perhaps it is not
possible to be exact, and if it were,-it might be counter-productive to give
expression to an exact answer to this question.
But in general terms what is clear to every interested delegation in this
room is that the clear majority of members of the Conference on Disarmament
voted for our resolution, and were and are prepared to solve the mandate
question on a reasonable and flexible basis and then get on with practical
work.
I believe the implication of what I have just said is clear, but let me
be very clear. We in this Conference have been prevented from doing that work
by the smallest handful of delegations. Such a result is always possible in a
conference that works on the basis of consensus, and it would be pointless to
carp about that result because it is clear that the nature of work on
disarmament agreements, given their substance, requires that consensus be the
rule.
So what we have to do is build consensus. May I mention that, in the
MacQuarie Australian dictionary, consensus is defined as a "general agreement
or accord1 a majority of opinion". Now I admit that no dictionary is
perfect, even an Australian one But the point I am making is that the rule of
consensus should not in practice mean the rule of veto.
By the way, the MacQuarie dictionary provides four definitions of the
word veto, and perhaps the most apposite of them for our purposes here is "to
refuse to consent to".
Consent, consensus is what must be built, because even those who have
withheld consensus on the majority approach towards work in this Conference on
a CTB never say that they are against such a treaty.
It is perhaps irrelevant that an outsider could be forgiven for
interpreting their actions as constituting precisely such opposition. What is
important to us, in this Conference, is that they say they want a test-ban
treaty. What is deeply disheartening is that, in the name of that policy,
they in fact prevent us from working on the treaty in the only practical way
in which that work can occur in a Conference which operates on the rule of
consensus.
621
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.426
8
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
We must appeal again'to those who have withheld consensus from what is
clearly, in the words of the dictionary, the "majority of opinion", to
reconsider their position because of the importance of the test-ban issue as
such and in the life of this Conference.
Because there can be little doubt that the Conference's failure, once
again, to work directly on the test-ban issue will be judged harshly when the
work of the Conference is reviewed at the third special session.
I mentioned that we Australians have acted both multilaterally and
bilaterally on this subject. With regard to our bilateral actions, it is
sufficient to say that we have discussed repeatedly with other States our
concerns regarding an end to nuclear testing, and we have entered into
agreements such as our bilateral agreement with New Zealand on seismic
monitoring designed to advance work on the verification regime required for a
nuclear-test ban.
It will not be surprising to anyone to hear me report that in our
bilateral discussions we have found a deep and widespread conviction around
the globe that the promise to end nuclear testing, made three decades ago,
must be fulfilled as quickly as possible.
Finally, with regard to the nuclear testing issue, the Group of
Scientific Experts is at work this week and next and we expect that,
inter alia, consideration will be given to the Australian proposal for the
immediate establishment of a global seismic monitoring network.
The work of the Group of Scientific Experts is an example of how we can
proceed irrespective of the unresolved issue of a mandate. But we must
proceed on both fronts, the political and the technical, so that boil, of ti.e6e
aspects of a ban on nuclear testing can be joined together at the earliest
possible time and give us a treaty.
A comprehensive nuclear-test ban is not the only-item on our agenda
relating to nuclear weapons. Indeed, concern about nuclear disarmament is
more than adequately reflected in the agenda of the Conference. Our ability,
or some would say inability, tq work on measures of nuclear disarmament in
this Conference touches upon the fundamental issue of the role of the
Conference. Repeatedly in this Conference declarations and demands are
expressed with regard to nuclear disarmament.
Expressions of concern, statements of what is desirable, are always
important politically and morally, and this is surely especially the case with
regard to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons. The Australian
Government shares the view that nuclear weapons constitute a central problem
in the field of arms control and disarmament. We believe that radical
reductions in nuclear weapons should be achieved as soon as possible, and
therefore we welcome the commitment, made by President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev, to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.426
9
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
We certainly agree too that even though the overwhelming number of
nuclear weapons are held by only two States, all States are or must be
concerned with the issues of survival raised by the existence of the nuclear
arsenals.
It is therefore legitimate for non-nuclear-weapon States to express their
concerns about nuclear disarmament and to seek to work within the multilateral
disarmament machinery towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. What has been
made clear to us, however, is that the two major nuclear-weapon States prefer,
at least at the present stage, to conduct their nuclear-arms control and
disarmament negotiations bilaterally. We can understand the reasons for that
preference, and we have made that clear in both their capitals, just as we
have made clear in those capitals the urgency and importance we attach to the
implementation of their stated policies on nuclear disarmament.
These circumstances do mean a limitation upon the role that a Conference-
such as ours may be able to play, at present, in negotiating measures of
nuclear disarmament. But this is not to say that it is pointless for the
Conference to discuss nuclear disarmament in the way that it is presently able
to.
We believe that such a discussion should have two main outcomes, both of
which are important. First, it should serve as a means of making clear,
repeatedly, to the nuclear-weapon States the concerns of the world community
in the field of nuclear disarmament and chiefly, of course, our fervent wish
that such disarmament be brought about without delay. Second, it should
demonstrate that the multilateral machinery is available for the development
of treaties or agreements of a wider kind than might be encompassed by
bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, as and when
multilateral action is required.
Some might say that such an approach is merely to allow us in this
Conference the crumbs from the table. We would dispute that view, and say
instead that this approach holds out the prospect of a larger table at which
we can all be seated as we move towards a safer world, a world from which
nuclear weapons are disappearing.
But our participation will not be assured, or will not come early, if the
debate we hold on the nuclear issues in this Conference becomes a forum for
accusation, distortion of reality, or even abuse.
In the informal consultations under item 2 of our agenda, for example, we
have heard the extraordinary assertion by one major nuclear-weapon State that
the nuclear arsenal it holds, its strategic and targeting doctrine and its
alliance relationship in some way does not constitute deterrence, whereas the
nuclear-weapon posture and alliance relationship of its opponent does. Now,
apart from being intellectually unrespectable, such an argument hardly
encourages the future use of this forum, the future integration of. this forum
into the development and management of a non-nuclear world.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.426
10
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Other States have assigned priority to attacking the doctrine of
deterrence on the ground that it inevitably generates an arms race. Clearly,
what is had in mind here, but never stated, is the doctrine of nuclear
deterrence. Again, we wonder whether such a specious argument enhances
respect for the role and possible future role of this Conference.
Surely the distinction should be drawn between the unhappy reasons for
which nuclear arsenals have grown -- and those are substantially reasons of
mutual political apprehension and military and foreign policies -- and the
doctrine under which those arsenals have been deployed.
In addition, deterrence cannot be assigned a purely nuclear status.
There are key and disturbing instances of competition in arms on a regional
rather than a global level, and such competition has taken place typically in
conventional arms. In these cases too, surely the competition in arms which
we have witnessed is the product of mutual suspicion and military and foreign
policies, rather than the "automatic" mechanism of a deployment doctrine stich
as deterrence.
I do not wish to be misunderstood for a moment on this subject. My
Government believes deterrence is a flawed doctrine. And it certainly knows
that it is practised by all nuclear-weapon States, and indeed in certain
regional situations by States armed with conventional weapons.
Because we believe that nuclear deterrence is a flawed doctrine, because
we believe that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", we
believe that measures of nuclear disarmament are required urgently. Such
disarmament would reduce if not remove the need for anyone to rely on nuclear
deterrence.
We know that the only way in which nuclear disarmament can be achieved is
through the negotiation of balanced and verifiable agreements. We see that
process under way today between the two major nuclear-weapon States, and we
welcome it. Indeed, we wish them success in their negotiations, and as soon
as possible.
We do believe that this Conference can and should play a role in what we
see, now, as a global trend leading towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
The objective of preventing an arms race in outer space appears to be
shared universally, although there is some disagreement about how this can
best be achieved and who should bear the primary responsibility for achieving
My delegation acknowledges the significant responsibility of the two
super-Powers in this field. As the distinguished Ambassador of Japan has
pointed out, progress in their bilateral negotiations has a critical impact on
our discussions in this Conference. But we are also firmly convinced that the
international community, through the multilateral disarmament machinery, must
play a role in assisting in the fulfillment of this urgent task, not least
because outer space is not and will not be used exclusively by the two
super-Powers.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 426
It is also true that existing and future uses of outer space have and
will have a profound impact on the security of all States.
The crucial issue that needs to be addressed by the international
community if it wishes to prevent an arms race in outer space is the need to
monitor the military uses of space, and in particular the issues of whether
the space Powers can agree not to use space for purposes that others consider
would require a response, defensive or otherwise# and whether compliance with
a non-arms-race regime can be verified effectively.
Regarding the first question, this is a matter currently under
negotiation between the two major space Powers, and is of course inextricably
linked with efforts to halt and reverse the arms race on Earth. However, it
is. also relevant to the activities of other space-using States. In seeking to
determine whether the international community needs to devise additional legal
instruments in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, a thorough
understanding of what the existing legal r?gime covers is a fundamental
prerequisite.
It is our view -- and we believe that it is also the view of the majority
of delegations here -- that the existing legal regime is not a foolproof
guarantee to prevent an arms race in space. The application to space of
general international legal norms, including the provisions of the
United Nations Charter, as for example reference to the right of self-defence,
does not necessarily reduce or significantly diminish the prospects of an arms
race in outer space.
Preventing an arms race in space involves, in our view, preventing the
development and deployment of arms against space assets, not just the
prevention of the use of force in space. For example, the existing legal
r?gime offers very little in the way of specific protection for satellites.
The variety of views which there is on the meaning of such terms as "peaceful
uses", "militarization" and "stabilizing" introduces a wide area of
uncertainty and ambiguity into attempts to establish what are permitted or
prohibited uses of space, and into attempts to define which satellites should
be protected.
The question of whether compliance with a non-arms regime can be verified
effectively is, of course, of fundamental relevance to our work. It is true
that with ever-increasing technological sophistication, verification of what
functions space objects are capable of performing becomes increasingly
difficult. But we must not forget that sophisticated technologies are also
helpful in devising increasingly sophisticated techniques of verification.
This Conference can and should make a contribution in the area of
verification, not least because the technology is not limited to the major
space Powers alone. This was admirably demonstrated by the workshop and the
presentation given to us in the Conference on Disarmament on the PAXSAT
concept by the Canadian Department of External Affairs. .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.426
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
In this respect, I would like to address briefly verification proposals
regarding the possibility that surveillance and monitoring functions of
satellites should be entrusted to an international agency.
Australia supports the concept of international means of verification as
an extension of the principles that the issue of global stability are the
legitimate business of every nation, and that together with the riqht to be
heard on these issues comes the obligation to play a full role in making
possible a more stable and secure world with a minimum level of armaments.
We also believe that national technical means will need to be
supplemented by new measures, and that they will need to be protected for the
indefinite future.
We therefore see an international satellite monitoring agency as a
positive contribution to existing arms control efforts in terms of its
verification, confidence-building and transparency objectives.
Such an agency might also help to provide for a system which could verify
that the threshold between permissible and non-permissible military uses of
space, once identified and agreed upon, is not crossed.
But considerably more work needs to be done in defining the scope and
application of the proposal -- technological feasibility and cost being two
major factors.
The concept of an international satellite monitoring agency is yet
another area where this Conference clearly has the resources to make its own
contribution towards seeking the most effective ways and means of meeting the
objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.
The effectiveness and viability of the existing and future legal regime
pertaining to outer space ultimately depends on two factors -- participation
in and compliance with such a regime, and the ability of States parties to
verify that the agreements are being complied with. This involves both a
political decision as well as adequate technological means to support that
decision. That decision will be based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether
an agreement is cost- and.security-effective, and whether it will deter
non-compliance.
Accordingly, this Conference must continue to seek to demonstrate in a
scientific and rigorous way on what basis we might need additional
multilateral agreements to regulate activities in outer space, and how this
might practically and realistically be achieved.
Several statements have been made in the plenary recently about the
current state of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Concern
has been expressed that the negotiations are marking time, that there has been
a change in atmosphere.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
13 --
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
If there has been a perceptible slowing of the pace of the negotiations,
we should not be discouraged. The rapid progress which was recorded during
the latter part of last year and in the first half of this year naturally gave
rise to expectations that the momentum would be sustained. But the convention
we are negotiating is a complex one. And progress cannot always be even.
Indeed, we have reached'a stage now where we have narrowed the remaining
issues, but those issues necessarily require careful consideration and
discussion in order to arrive at solutions. This is the process we are now
engaged in.
It is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the initiative of the Chairman
of the CW Committee in holding informal open-ended consultations yesterday on
the key subject of challenge inspection.
We all recognize the importance of reaching agreement on a challenge
inspection regime for inclusion in the convention. Thus a number of proposals
and ideas have been put forward by delegations. I believe we are building a
solution through a process of careful consideration and discussion of the
various component parts which have been suggested. We encourage
Ambassador Ek?us to continue the initiative which he has taken on this suject.
Important work has also been undertaken during the current session on,
inter alia, the important questions of commercial super-toxic lethal
chemicals, and the composition, powers and functions and decision-making of
the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council.
In addition, a very productive two-day meeting of chemical industry
representatives was held which made a significant contribution to our
consideration of aspects of the convention relating to the civil chemical
industry.
So a lot has been going on, and we have hardly been marking time.
Clearly, the need to conclude a convention as early as possible continues
to be of vital importance.
Australia; like other members of this Conference, deeply deplores the
fact that chemical weapons continue to be used. The conclusions of the
United Nations team of experts that chemical weapons have once again been used
recently in the Gulf war is a matter of the deepest concern to us.
Simply, the use of chemical weapons must cease.
We also share the view that has been expressed by other delegations that
all members of this Conference should indicate whether or not they possess
chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. Several
countries, including Australia, have indicated that they do not possess such
weapons or, facilities, but many member States have remained silent. They
should break that silence. It would contribute to the strength of the
convention to which we are all committed if each member of this Conference
were to frankly state its position. Otherwise, confidence in the convention
will be seriously undermined.
627
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
The CW Committee's report for this session will record the substantial
progress made so far this year in the negotiations. But it is imperative that
the process of negotiation continue after the formal conclusion of the
Conference session. As in previous years, we strongly support the carrying
out of inter-sessional work, at the very least in the same pattern as existed
last year. We cannot afford to let these negotiations falter. Useful work is
being done, it must be. sustained so that we can achieve the objective of a
comprehensive convention as soon as possible.
The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is a project the Conference
has had in hand for a number of years. It should be completed this year.
The work on the programme has been intensified, and my delegation
believes that the interests of the Conference would be best served by it being
able to send forward to the General Assembly a programme if not completely
then certainly substantially free of disputed sections. Such a result will be
able to be obtained if delegations show the necessary flexibility and avoid as
far as possible reopening differences which have been resolved or set aside in
the past.
Our action on the comprehensive programme of disarmament is not only
intrinsically significant but will, like the nuclear-test ban issue, have a
direct bearing on the review of the work of this Conference which will take
place at the third special session of the General Assembly.
Later today the plenary will consider in an informal session two papers
which have been prepared by the Grout) of Seven. One of these papers relates
to the preparation of our annual. report. In the view of my delegation, the
suggestions made in that paper should be applied to the preparation of this
year's report.
Those suggestions are based on established practice and some new
approaches. If applied, they would ensure the production of a report which
would be factual, clear and freed from some of the sterile and repetitious
recording of disputes which has been characteristic of past reports. I think
we would do credit to the Conference by acting, now, on these proposals.
The other paper relates to the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the
Conference. In the view of my delegation, it provides a sensible solution to
the problems we have experienced in the past with respect to mandates for such
bodies.
This issue is perhaps more complex than that of the preparation of our
report, and may be one on which further reflection by the Conference is
required. My delegation will take part in such reflection and discussion. It
is sufficient for me to re ord, at this stage, that we believe the generic
mandate provided to the Conference in paragraph 120 of the final document is
sufficient for the effective functioning of the Conference, and does not need
supplementation or modification.
628
9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
15
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Related to this is the possibility -- and I mention this merely for
consideration -- the possibility that the terms of rule 23 of the rules of
procedure may, in fact, derogate from what is stated in paragraph 120.
What we Australians want to see is an end to the argument about mandates
in a situation where the Conference in fact has a generic mandate. Instead we
believe that it would be valid for there to be a thorough discussion of -- and
indeed, as appropriate, negotiation on -- a suitable programme of work for
each subsidiary body, because such a discussion or negotiation would relate to
substance, whereas the discussion we have had in many cases in the past with
regard to mandates has related merely to form.
In conclusion, I recognize that some of what I have said this morning in
this statement has been critical of Conference procedures and results. I want
it to be clear that it has been my purpose to be constructively critical,
because any other approach would be contrary to the policy of my Government
towards this Conference. That policy is one of full support to this
Conference, and to the process of the multilateral negotiation of disarmament
agreements.
Simply, we want to see this Conference work.
The PRESIDENT, I thank the representative of Australia for his
statement. I now give the floor to my next speaker, the representative of
Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.
Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia), Mr. President, in my statement today I am
going to express the position of a group of socialist countries towards the
work of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
Before doing so, however, I would like to express the regret of my delegation
over the fact that Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt will soon be leaving us. I
will miss him both as my neighbour in the CD and as a partner with whom I had
excellent relations. Let me also bid farewell to Ambassador Cromartie of the
United Kingdom. We wish him a speedy recovery. Within the same perpetual
process of our colleagues coming and going, we welcome the new representative
of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, and the representative of Brazil,
Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. I am certain that the excellent
relations my delegation had with their predecessors will continue.
As we all know, the task of elaborating a CPD was advanced at SSOD-I, and
the complete draft was to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly
at its second special session on disarmament, which took place in 1982. The
Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was one of the
first committees established by this body back in 1980. Since 1981 this
Committee has worked under the chairmanship of Ambassador Robles of Mexico,
and his tireless efforts, supported by many delegations around this table,
gradually led to the drafting of texts on practically all basic problems of
disarmament. Even today, five years after SSOD-II, I still see around this
table some of us who participated personally in the effort to finalize the
draft CPD so that it could be sent to the United Nations General Assembly in
629
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
16
(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
time and completely free of brackets. And it has to be emphasized that we
almost succeeded., We offered SSOD-II a draft CPD with the overwhelming
majority of its provisions jointly agreed. Just a very limited number of
problems remained in brackets.. Unfortunately, these bracketed parts contained
some high-priority items, like the nuclear-test ban or the prevention of
nuclear war.
During SSOD-II and afterwards, a long and arduous debate took place on
whether a CPD without these priority measures of nuclear disarmament could be
agreed. The position of the socialist countries was and continues to be that
a comprehensive programme which did not in its first stage encompass the
achievement of a nuclear test ban, effective measures aimed at the prevention
of nuclear war and initial, specific measures of nuclear disarmament would by
no means be comprehensive and would not ensure the commencement of a process
of nuclear disarmament, let alone general and complete disarmament. At the
same time, the members of the socialist group proceeded from the fact that.the
CPD should build on the Final Document of SSOD-I and should in no way be a
step backwards from that document. Let me point out that this basic position
was shared by an overwhelming majority of delegations participating in the
work on a CPD.
For a number of years after SSOD-II the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD
focused on the bracketed parts of the draft programme, hoping that the
countries which insisted on these brackets would reconsider their approach and
would finally stop blocking the consensus on the international strategy
towards. general and complete disarmament. In the meantime, the members of the
socialist group advanced, at the highest level, comprehensive proposals
suggesting a framework for a gradual, stage-by-stage approach to the
elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In this regard
let me mention especially the proposal made by the Soviet Union on
15 January 1986, suggesting a three-stage programme which would, by the end of
this century, ensure that nuclear weapons as well as chemical and other
weapons of mass destruction disappeared from the face of the Earth. No one
can deny that this initiative has much in common with the concept of the CPD
discussed so far, and that its individual provisions would fit well into the
standing draft CPD.
As time went by some disarmament problems gained new importance, in view
of recent developments in arms technology and the threat emanating therefrom.
This applies, in the first instance, to the problem of prevention of an arms
race in outer space. Almost five years ago it was preliminarily agreed to
place a couple of paragraphs on outer space within the section on "Related
measures". But a reservation on the part of many delegations, including the
socialist countries, on the placement of these paragraphs in the CPD, was
attached to it. It is becoming increasingly clear that the prevention of an
arms race in outer space is one of the central problems affecting efforts to
stop the nuclear-arms race and to proceed to nuclear disarmament. It is not
by chance that space arms have become a subject of the bilateral negotiations
between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was thus only appropriate
to suggest that a new, more prominent place be found in the CPD for the
section on outer space, preferably within the main section on disarmament
measures.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.426
(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
In view of the fact that our Conference had been requested to submit a
finalized draft CPD to the forty-first United Nations General Assembly
session before it formally concluded its work, and also bearing in mind the
approaching SSOD-III, the delegations of the socialist countries presumed that
all participants in the CD would now focus on an effort to increase the agreed
parts of the draft CPD and to reduce the area of discord and find generally
acceptable formulations for still bracketed texts. It was sincerely hoped
that the spirit of give and take which characterized the Ad hoc Committee on
the CPD in the past would regain ground. Unfortunately, the opposite seems to
have taken place recently. The United States delegation, with certain support
from some of its allies, has apparently reassessed its approach towards the
CPD and launched a process of bracketing a large number of provisions which
had already been agreed previously. That applies to a number of important
aspects of nuclear disarmament, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones,
zones of peace, verification, the principles, priorities and objectives of the
CPD and some of its other parts. It is most disquieting that even some key
formulations of the Final Document of SSOD-I are now being disavowed.
The socialist countries have always approached work on the CPD in a
constructive and flexible way, trying to understand and take into account the
positions and preoccupations of other delegations. But if it is now
suggested that we should engage in a process of revising the Final Document of
SSOD-I and bringing the draft CPD back to an even more contentious stage than
what we started from in 1981, the only answer to an invitation to such a
course of action will be resolutely negative. We cannot agree that the CPD
should be brought into line with the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which
envisages a first use of nuclear weapons and reliance on it for the indefinite
future.
We continue to maintain that the only way to achieve a meaningful
comprehensive programme is to include in it specific measures which would lead
towards cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and which
would ensure that no weapons are placed in outer space. We are also in favour
of dividing the CPD into stages, it seems that three stages will be the most
practical approach, with the inclusion of time frames, even if they are only
indicative in nature. The socialist countries have already clearly stated
that they are prepared to agree to a ceremony of signature of the CPD that
would emphasize its high political significance.
In conclusion, Mr. President, let me express to you personally good
wishes in the performance of your further diplomatic duties. It was nice to
have you here again, and the manner in which you conducted our deliberations
proved that you still belong to the Geneva multilateral disarmament mafia,
even if you now work on the other side of diplomatic duties, namely bilateral
relations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/YV.4LO _
18
The PRESIDENT, I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his
statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the
representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.
Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America)? Mr. President, in his
plenary statement on 28 July, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic
of Iran described recent attacks with chemical weapons against his country by
the military forces of Iraq. He reminded us at that time that such attacks
violate the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Foreign Minister also expressed bitter
disappointment that the international community has done little to stop such
attacks.
It is extremely unfortunate that'these important points were accompanied
by charges that the United States "is condoning deployment of chemical weapons
in the war and justifies its control only in peacetime". This, of course, is
an unfounded statement.
Quite the contrary -- the United States Government has deplored and
strongly condemned the illegal use of chemical weapons whenever and wherever
it has occurred, specifically the repeated violations of the
1925 Geneva Protocol by Iraq. The United States has also established export
controls to help curb the flow of chemicals that could be used for weapons.
The reaction of the international community to the use of chemical
warfare in the Iran-Iraq war has been meagre. This has very serious
implications for the effectiveness of any future convention banning chemical
weapons. If vigorous action is not taken by the international community when
there is clear-cut evidence that people are being killed by chemical weapons,
can we expect vigorous action against less dramatic violations, for example,
of a prohibition on possession of such weapons? The United States calls upon
other nations, especially other members of the Conference on Disarmament, to
join in condemning the use of chemical weapons to prevent erosion of the
1925 Geneva Protocol, and to make clear that compliance with existing
agreements is essential to progress in arms control.
The United States will continue to remind others that treaties that can
be violated with impunity, offer nothing but a false sense of security. That
is why delegations in the Conference on Disarmament must concentrate on
negotiating a chemical weapons convention that is truly verifiable, in order
that nations can be confident that violations will be detected. The
international community must not look the other way when violations are
discovered.
The United States has condemned the use of chemical weapons in the
Gulf war, and has called on the warring parties to put an end to the bloodshed
by agreeing to end the war itself. It is in this spirit that the
United States supported the recent United Nations Security Council resolution,
adopted by unanimous vote, I believe, which, in addition to deploring the use
of chemical weapons, includes a call on Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate
cease-fire as a first step towards a negotiated settlement.
632
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 426
19
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
In this connection, I.refer to comments made by officials of the
United States just this week. On 28 July, Assistant Secretary of State Redman
referred to the recent Security Council resolution, noting that the
United States wants the war to end and both parties to facilitate the
Secretary-General's efforts to make the resolution work. He added that the
United States welcomes steps by both Iran and Iraq to decrease the tension and
the level of violence on land, sea and air. The same day, Assistant Secretary
of State Murphy told the United States Congress that while the United Nations
Secretary-General works to implement the initial resolution urging a
cease-fire, the United States will press for a second resolution containing'
enforcement measures should either party refuse to comply under the first
resolution.
The United States opposes the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq
war, as well as opposing the war itself. Our position is clearly on the side
of peace.
The PRESIDENT, I thank the representative of the United States for his
statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other
member wish to take the floor at this time? I see none.
I wish now to put before the Conference the timetable for meetinqs to be
held during next week. It has been prepared in consultation with the incoming
President of the Conference, as well as with the chairmen of the ad hoc
committees. It is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If I
see no objection, I shall consider the Conference adopts the timetable.
The PRESIDENT, This being my last plenary session, I would like to make
a few concluding remarks.
We had, as you know, both formal and informal meetings of the
Conference. In particular, informal meetings of co-ordinators were held
during the month of July to consider matters dealing with certain agenda item's.
Draft mandates for an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban were under
discussion before my presidency. The draft mandate emanating from the
Group of 21 was considered by two other groups in the CD to be a good basis
for negotiation. However, further progress was not possible on the basis of
this initiative. As I stated at the time of my assumption of the presidency,
one cannot over-emphasize the fact that a nuclear-test ban deserves the
highest priority in the multilateral negotiating forum. Initiatives directed
towards this goal should therefore receive positive responses in the future
lest the international community judge the CD for failing to exercise the
responsibility entrusted to it.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 426
20
(The President)
With respect to item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear
disarmament", it will be recalled that three informal meetings were held in
which discussions were guided by the list of topics provided by the President
of the Conference for the month of June, and within the terms of reference
described by him in his statement at the 415th plenary meeting of the
Conference.
We have not found an acceptable organizational framework to consider
agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".
Consensus could not be achieved on the draft mandate presented by the-
Group of 21 for an ad hoc committee on this item, despite the fact that the
position was supported by two other groups..
The Group of Seven on the improved and effective functioning of the
Conference under the chairmanship of Ambassador Fan of China will introduce
its report to the informal meeting of the Conference.
Existing organizational arrangements still cannot satisfy all the
requirements of the ad hoc committees, especially in the case of those which
are reaching a critical stage in their work. Following a meeting with the
chairmen of the ad hoc committees, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament has been provided with additional meetings since its
report needs to be submitted to the resumed forty-first session of the
United Nations General Assembly. The secretariat has also arranged for
additional meetings for the seismic group now in session.
On several occasions I have raised with the co-ordinators the question of
expansion of the membership of the Conference, and particularly how to deal
with the section of the annual report dealing with this question. There is no
new movement in this regard, and therefore it would seem that the secretariat
will have to rely on decisions already taken by CD and on past experience in
drawing up draft reports on the item.
So much for organizational and logistic matters. But what about progress
in the substantive work of the CD? The Conference is about to conclude.
its 1987 session. During the month of August, much of the remaining time will
be devoted to the preparation of the report to the forty-second session of the
General Assembly. It seems appropriate, therefore, to recall some of the
unresolved issues and the rationale behind them.
The Conference has been unable to reach agreement on the establishment of
subsidiary bodies on a nuclear-test ban and on the prevention of nuclear war
and related matters. This was not feasible despite the position of the two
maior nuclear Powers declaring that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought". Unable to arrive at a negotiating mandate for the ad hoc
committees on these agenda items, the CD continues to face serious obstacles
in achieving the objective of halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race in
all its aspects. Both formal and informal statements, endorsed and documented
by previous studies, have reminded us again that nuclear weapons pose the
greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, and that those
member States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special
responsibility for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war.
634
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 426
21
The grim scenario following global nuclear catastrophe includes the fact
that any survivors of a first strike will have to live in a "nuclear winter"
condemned to a state below the prehistoric level. This has been vividly
described in the statements and studies. Is this where the world is
consciously or unconsciously proceeding to? It seems that no country or
groups of countries can afford to ignore this question. Nor should anyone
fail to recognize the risks and the consequences of a nuclear war.
The question should not be how effectively nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction can be used. It is rather how effectively and
reliably they can be prohibited. For as long as such weapons exist there will
be the possibility that they will be used, and such a first use would open the
way for further use of nuclear weapons, thus escalating the process which may
end in disaster. It is also a fact that over the last decade and half an
increasing consensus had emerged among States on the prohibition of nuclear
weapons. The expected breakthrough in the elimination of shorter- and
intermediate-range nuclear forces will no doubt reduce anxiety and mistrust
which causes and constantly feeds the arms race.
Resolutions related to disarmament adopted at the forty-first session of
the General Assembly have been referred to by many speakers as guidelines for
the work of the CD. I shall refer to the message embodied in a few of them,
for it is likely that they will reappear in the CD's future work.
In recent years in many parts of the world, mass peace and disarmament
movements have been demanding the cessation of weapon tests and the arms race
in outer space and its termination on Earth.
?
The political declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference of Heads of
State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from
7 to 12 March 1983, believed that the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms
race, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, heightened the
risk of the outbreak of nuclear war.
The Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, called upon the CD to
reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weanor.s.
Ensuring security on an equal basis for all States and in all spheres of
international relations, as called for by the General Assembly in
resolution 41/92, would strengthen the collective security system embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations.
In making this statement I wish to underline the fact that the most
crucial task of the Conference remains that of conducting negotiations to bar
weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, before it is too late.
Before concluding, I wish.to express the hope that the ad hoc committees
will reflect some. progress in their reports to the Conference in their
respective mandates.
635
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 426
(The President)
I am particularly grateful to-the Secretary-General of the Conference,
Ambassador Komatina, and to his deputy Ambassador Berasategui, as well as to
fore their
the members of the secretariat, for their assistance to me and to
highly competent and efficient work. My gratitude interpreters for their highly professional work.
I wish Ambassador Morel of France, the next President of the Conference
for the month of August and the remaining part of the 1987 session, success in
his work.
This concludes my remarks.. As announced at the opening of this plenary
hold an
meeting, the Conference will immediately after this meeting
a ansinfoio lon
meeting on its improved and effective functioning, followed the substance of agenda item 2. I have another announcement. At the request
of the Chairman of Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological
Weapons, I wish to inform delegates that an open-ended informal consultation
will be held this afternoon at 3 p.m. in room C-108.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Tuesday, 4 August at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.427
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT - 4 August 1987
FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 August 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)
637
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the
427th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to start
by making a statement.
First, I would like to thank my predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe, for the
very effective way he presided over our meetings during July, and to express
to him the gratitude of all the members of the Conference. I would also like
to convey to him on behalf of all of us our very best wishes for the success
of his mission in Bonn. .I should also like to welcome the representative of
Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo, and the representative of Brazil,
Ambassador de Azambuja, on behalf of France, and assure them of my
delegation's full co-operation. I would also like to express personally my
regret at the departure of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, head of the delegation of
the United Kingdom. His work as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical
Weapons made it possible, in particular, to take a decisive step forward in
the negotiation of the draft convention. I would ask the delegation of the
United Kingdom to be kind enough to convey to him in London my wishes for his
speedy recovery.
Serving as President in the month of August is not an easy task. That is
a point on which I think the Conference can easily reach a consensus, to judge
from the encouragement I have been given by my colleagues. I think that one
may even speak -- for once -- of a rare unanimity. In other words, I feel
that this presidency is an honour to my country, but it is also a heavy burden
for me and for my delegation. Believe me when I say that I will do everything
I can to ensure that our work runs smoothly, and you can- be sure that I will
also call on your experience and your good will, individually and
collectively. I would like to thank you for that in advance.
Preparing the report is the main task in August, even though we must not
neglect the continuation of political work on each of the items on the agenda,
when that is possible. The moment has therefore come to step back and take an
overall look at the work accomplished during this session. A number of
delegations have already started to do this, and now we must all prepare
together the balance sheet of our activities. And it is in this spirit that I
would like to take a brief overview and propose a few reflections on methods.
First of all, on nuclear matters, the situation for the first three items
on the agenda is well known. For item 1, the nuclear test ban, will it be
possible to break out of the present impasse at the last moment? For item 2,
Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", a final informal
session of the Conference is scheduled for next Thursday. As last year, these
meetings have proved to be a useful complement to our discussions in plenary,
by allowing more direct and more lively exchanges. On item 3, "Prevention of
nuclear war, including all related matters", the absence of a consensus might
offer an opportunity for some reflections concerning what is to follow. For
my part, I wish only to stress as President that I remain available to
delegations for any new contribution on agenda items where there is no
agreement on the procedure to follow, that is items 1 and 3, which I have just
mentioned, and also item 7, weapons of mass destruction. More generally, I
would like to note that on nuclear matters, where my country's position is
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.427
3
(The President)
/
well known, we are engaged here in various forms in a very lively debate on
the question of nuclear deterrence. This exchange is important because it
goes back to what is basically at stake in security in the world of today.
It is natural that on this point we should have different views, even
very different views. Nuclear matters are and will long remain a source of
controversy. It is enough to call up the explosion of Hiroshima 42 years
later, give or take a couple of days, to see that it retains its dual nature.
It is a terrible event that goes beyond its time and place to make us think of
the very destiny of mankind, but it is also a decisive turning-point in the
history of international relations. Today I would simply like to express the
wish that the necessary continuation of this discussion, both during this
month and in future sessions, will avoid becominga sort of ideological
confrontation, leading instead to joint thinking on conditions of security, in
which no one can say he has had the last word. On this topic, more than any
other, we must continue the dialogue along the road of reason.
Second, on the subject of chemical weapons, I think that all delegations
are aware of the importance of the month of August, when we have to adopt the
report of the Committee, an important part of the final report, while still as
far as possible pursuing work on substance, including the most sensitive
items. The Ad hoc Committee, under the very active chairmanship of
Ambassador Ekdus of Sweden, helped by the three group co-ordinators,
Messrs. Nieuwenhuys, Macedo and Krutzsch, has already made considerable
progress during this session. Although it may seem that their pace has slowed
in recent weeks, this is because we have been able to isolate the main
problems which will require very thorough discussions so as to produce
solutions that are acceptable to everyone.
We can already weigh up the constructive work that has been done in the
negotiation of the various parts of the draft convention. On the essential
matter of the procedure for challenge inspection, the Chairman of.the Ad hoc
Committee is seeking the necessary clarification. I would add that the recent
meeting of industrial experts made a useful contribution to consideration of
the aspects of the Convention relating to the civilian chemical industry. As
President, I must also remind you that delegations must rapidly take a
decision on the possible continuation of work during the period between the
sessions, as happened in previous years. This decision is now becoming
urgently necessary, if only for practical reasons concerning the scheduling of
the resources required.
Third, regarding the other items on the agenda, I will simply note that
the preparation of the reports of the committees seems to be proceeding
smoothly, and express the wish that they will be adopted rapidly and in the
best possible conditions.
However, I would like to refer to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, which has entered a very active phase. We
are coming up to the deadline set by the General Assembly for transmission to
it of the draft programme requested at the first special session of the
. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.427
4
(The President)
United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We must all hope that
the Ad hoc Committee will be able to produce a text which will, to the
greatest possible degree, reflect a consensus on the various elements of a
document which should constitute a disarmament guide for the international
community. In view of the special effort that this deadline implies, special
arrangements have been made for next week, thanks to the kindness of the other
ad hoc committee chairmen. We must hope that the result will be commensurate
with the effort made.
I would also like to report on the first results of the work of the
Group of Seven chaired by Ambassador Fan of China on improving the procedures
of the Conference, which have just been presented to the Conference. This is
a set of issues that deserves close and attentive examination. Everyone can
see that the effectiveness and therefore the influence of the Conference are
at stake. In particular, we must try not to take too procedural an approach
to the questions of procedure. Initially, we must improve the Conference's
report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations and prepare the way for a better procedure for the subsidiary
bodies. Let us try, during this first exercise, to work in the same spirit as
that which governed the work of the Group of Seven.
I must also bring up a topic that is not on the agenda of the Conference
on Disarmament but one which we cannot ignore during this month of August:
the relationship between disarmament and development, bearing in mind the
Conference which is to be held in New York starting on 24 August. There is an
inevitable overlapping of activities here which I feel particularly acutely
because I participated personally in the launching of this initiative at:the
beginning by the President of France. I understand all the better the
inconvenience this deadline might cause for various delegations during the
third week of August, and I would like to express the hope that in order to
deal with this constraint we will work even more effectively and harmoniously
so that each delegation will be able to perform a useful function-both here in
Geneva and in New York.
Finally, I would remind you that the Conference must continue its efforts
to put into effect the expansion in membership decided upon in 1983.
These, my dear colleagues, are the few thoughts that I wanted to outline
to you at the beginning of this month, the last month of the 1987 session.
They reflect my concern to make as much as possible of the potential offered
by the Conference in large matters and in smaller ones. I think that we have
a sort of appointment with ourselves, as happens each year in August, but also
because of the upcoming deadline of the third special session of the
General Assembly on disarmament. Once again, we are led to acknowledge the
limits and shortcomings of the Conference. But should we therefore throw in
the towel or shut ourselves away with our bad consciences? The answer I
suggest is: No, quite the contrary. Following the example of the wise men of
antiquity, we must recognize what does not depend on us so as to adapt to
it -- knowing the world around us moves, and moves fast. And we must
recognize what does depend on us, so that we may tackle-it actively, together
and without delay. That is the invitation that I address to you today, an
invitation to join forces at an important moment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.427
- 5
(The President)
Turning to today's work, the Conference is starting its consideration of
item 8 of its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".
However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any
representative who wishes to raise any matter relevant to the work of the
Conference may do so.
On my speakers' list I have the representatives of the German Democratic
Republic, Romania and Mongolia. I now give the floor to the representative of
the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, allow me to begin
my brief statement by cordially congratulating you on behalf of the delegation
of the German Democratic Republic on your assumption of office. Since you
joined the Conference, you have demonstrated your great diplomatic skills. In
this last phase of the session, I am certain we can all benefit from your
excellent abilities. Please count on my delegation's support and good will.
I take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of
Ethiopia who guided the work with judiciousness and dedication, and I express
a very warm welcome to Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja of Brazil, to
whom I wish good luck in his work, and I look forward to fruitful co-operation.
The prevention of an arms race in outer space is an international task of
the highest priority. There is far-reaching agreement on that. In an effort
to speed up the conclusion of a treaty and, at the same time, pave the way for
a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the USSR has just recently submitted
a draft treaty in its bilateral negotiations with the United States. The
German Democratic Republic welcomes this initiative. I think the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament, too, will have to make its contribution to ensuring
that no type of weapon is stationed in outer space and that space is used
exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Many delegations believe that the Conference should devote more attention
to practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It was in this
context that I presented some ideas in my speech of 28 July on what a treaty
banning ASAT weapons could look like and how the immunity of space objects
could be guaranteed in very practical terms.
Today I would like to introduce, on behalf of the delegation of the
Mongolian People's Republic and my own, a working paper in which we suggest
the main provisions of a future treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite
weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects. The paper has
come out as CD/777. It focuses on the scope of such a treaty, compliance with
its provisions and the safeguarding of the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space for the good of all peoples. Various verification methods and
techniques are proposed,, among them on-site challenge inspections under the
auspices of an international inspectorate. Information obtained through
national means, as well as data on launch parameters and the general function
of space objects, should be made available to all parties to the treaty.
641
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.427
6
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
We offer this document as a basis for discussion and trust it will be
useful in the ongoing search for understanding at the Conference, especially
in the Committee on agenda item 5. In conclusion, I wish to thank the
secretariat for having distributed our workina paper so promptly.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French)s I thank the distinguished
representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for his
kind words to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania,
His Excellency Ambassador Dolqu.
Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French)+ Mr. President, first of
all I should like to congratulate you most heartily on your accession to the
presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. Our
satisfaction is particularly great in that you represent France, a country
with which Romania has had traditional relations of friendship and
co-operation in all fields. We are convinced that you will guide our efforts
with skill and wisdom as this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament
enters its final phase.
I should also like to express our very sincere appreciation
and our warmest gratitude to the representative of Ethiopia,
Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe, who steered the work of the Conference with such
devotion and effectiveness during the month of July. I should also like to
underscore here how much we have appreciated the activity and co-operation of
the distinguished representatives of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, the
United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie, and Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe, who have
recently completed their assignments to the Conference. We should like to
express to all our 6 colleagues who have left us or are going to leave us our
best wishes for good health and success in their future endeavours.
Allow me lastly to extend a very cordial welcome to the distinguished
representatives of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, the United States,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, and Brazil,
Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, and to express the hope that we will
enjoy the same close co-operation with them as with their predecessors.
One might say that, more than ever before, international life is
characterized by the search for ways and means to move to concrete disarmament
measures. In that context, Romania has consistently come out in favour of the
implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, focused on the
elimination of nuclear armaments, which should also include measures to reduce
conventional armaments, armed forces and military budgets. We have called and
continue to call for the adoption of urgent measures to eliminate all nuclear
weapons in stages, between now and the year 2000, and for the independent
solution of the various problems and aspects of general nuclear disarmament
without tying one to another.
In Bucharest last week, the President of Romania, Nikolae Ceausescu, and
the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, adopted an important
declaration and appeal. The two leaders urgently called on the President of
the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, and the General Secretary of the
642
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 427
7
(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Mikhail Gorbachev, to pursue and intensify efforts to arrive as soon as
possible at an initial agreement to eliminate all intermediate range missiles
in order to open the path to the conclusion of further agreements required to
achieve complete nuclear disarmament.
They also called for efforts to be made to arrive speedily at a complete
halt to nuclear tests and the renunciation of any action to militarize space.
The declaration and appeal underscore the responsibility of European
States, and first and foremost the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, to work
actively for disarmament, security and peace. These countries are called upon
to intensify their efforts to ensure that an agreement is reached on nuclear
weapons, to support the conclusion of such an agreement, the elimination of
all problems that may remain. Romania and Greece reaffirmed their
long-standing position on transformation of the Balkans into a zone of
good-neighbourliness, understanding, co-operation and peace, free of nuclear
and chemical weapons, and supported proposals for the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free-zones in the Nordic part of Europe and a
nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe.
Romania is in favour of a new approach to problems of security, national
and international, which would exclude the nuclear element and would require
that a military balance be established at the lowest possible level of
armaments. That is why my country co-sponsored the document adopted recently
by the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties
to the Warsaw Treaty, on the military doctrine of those States. This doctrine
is founded on the defence needs of the States parties and is strictly
defensive in character, categorically excluding any offensive action aimed at
other States that would impinge in any way upon the independence, frontiers or
territorial integrity of other States. This military doctrine is based on the
theoretical and practical conclusion that recourse to war is inadmissible
given the existence of nuclear armaments, and that war must be eliminated from
the life of society. The corollary of this conclusion, as well as of the
principle of equal security for all States, is that the two military groupings
should proceed to the identification and gradual elimination of any imbalances
that may exist in the various categories of weapons, with the objective being
to achieve a situation in which none of the parties, while maintaining a
defence capability, would possess the means to carry out a surprise attack
against another party or, in general, to mount offensive operations.
On the basis of Romania's constant position on the need for a halt to
nuclear tests, our delegation has come out in favour of substative
consideration, in an appropriate framework, of agenda item 1, "Nuclear test
ban". Document CD/743 of 4 March 1987, which was co-sponsored by Romania,
proposes the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference to examine
item 1 of the agenda with two working groups, one of which would study the
substance and purpose of a future nuclear-test-ban treaty, and'the other
compliance and verification of the implementation of such a treaty. This
proposal basically draws on the recommendations included in resolution 41/54
adopted by consensus at the last session of the United Nations
General Assembly.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
tow/ rv. %& I
(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)
The provisions of the resolution also underlie the draft mandate for an
ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 of the Conference proposed by Indonesia,
Kenyap Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia in
document CD/772 presented to the plenary of the Conference on 15 July 1987.
The Romanian delegation supports the adoption by the Conference of a decision
along these lines.
The Romanian delegation also co-sponsored document CD/756 dated
9 June 1987, presented by a number of socialist countries which are members of
the Conference. on Disarmament, entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". As has already
been emphasized in this forum by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR,
Vladimir'Petrovsky, in a plenary meeting on 9 June, this document takes into
account developments and new elements that have emerged recently in this
field, particularly in so far as verification is concerned.
Our delegation welcomed the consensus achieved on the holding of special
informal plenary sessions to consider substantive issues which arise in the
context of agenda item 2 of the Conference, "Cessation of the nuclear arms
race and nuclear disarmament". We consider the list of issues drawn up by the
President of the Conference for June, Ambassador Saad Alfarargi, when the
decision was taken on holding informal plenary sessions for item 2, offers
important guidance to ensure that this work is placed within a certain
framework and is structured, even if only to a modest extent. The debates
thus far have gone a good way towards demonstrating the usefulness of this
approach.
In the same context of nuclear problems, the Romanian delegation would
like to underscore that agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war", also
deserves all our attention, including the establishment of appropriate
discussion machinery. The delegation of Romania would have been prepared to
support the adoption by the Conference of a decision along these lines, on the
basis of the proposals made by the Group of 21 in document CD/515/Rev.3 of
21 July 1987, and regrets that it was not possible to take such a decision.
My delegation commends the implementation of the decision taken by the
Conference on the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on security guarantees
for non-nuclear-weapon States. We should like to express the hope that the
work of the Ad hoc Committee will highlight the genuine possibilities that
exist for concrete steps in this direction.
The deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space have shown once again that the existing legal regime is
still a long way from being able to ensure a complete and effective ban on the
spread of the arms race to outer space. It would appear that a large number
of members of the Conference share this opinion.
We consider that the work of the Committee, particularly its
consideration of item 3 of its programme of work, namely "Existing proposals
and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", have
registered appreciable progress under the competent chairmanship of
Ambassador Pugliese which could in the future serve as a basis for a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.427
9
(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)
substantive approach to the issues of such complexity which arise in this
area. We support the proposals made by the delegations of Argentina,
Venezuela and Sri Lanka, aimed essentially at drawing up a list of issues and
proposals formulated to date that would offer a basis for a possible reference
"rolling text" for future debates, without such a document necessarily
figuring already in drafts of new legal texts.
The Romanian delegation supports the intensification of efforts to
develop and strengthen the legal regime to be established by the convention on
the prohibition of chemical weapons, in keeping with the principles that have
thus far underlain its elaboration by the Conference. We would like to
express appreciation and thanks for the efforts made by the Chairman of the
Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekeus, and the co-ordinators
of the negotiating groups. At this very advanced stage of the negotiations,
all possible efforts should be made to find constructive and unanimously
acceptable solutions to still unresolved problems, taking care not to
jeopardize the effectiveness of the future convention either in the
transitional stage or afterwards.
Our delegation also welcomes the initiation and continuation of the
activities of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, under the
enlightened chairmanship of Ambassador D. Meiszter. We note and welcome the
positive and concrete stamp of the work, its orientation towards substantive
efforts and in-depth consideration of problems in the two negotiating groups.
Like many others, the Romanian delegation attaches special importance to
fulfilment by the Conference of the mandate to prepare a draft Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament. This is a task which all regard as linked in
particular to the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly
devoted to disarmament. It would be regrettable if the Conference was unable
to present a draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for consideration at
the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to
disarmament.
Our delegation appreciates and fully supports the tireless efforts made
by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament, Ambassador Garcia Robles, to discharge this important mission.
The fundamental problem of our era remains the cessation of the arms
race, and primarily nuclear disarmament, the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons, the radical reduction of conventional weapons, the promotion of new
relations, equality and active co-operation among all nations of the world,
and the guaranteeing of lasting peace on our globe. An important role in
efforts to resolve this problem falls to the Conference on Disarmament as a
multilateral negotiating forum. We should like to express the hope that, in
the short period that remains until the end of this year's session, all
efforts will be made to conclude our work with the best possible results in
the Conference's endeavours to fulfil the mandate that has been entrusted to
it.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV .427
10
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Romania for his statement and the kind words addressed to the President. I
now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, His Excellency
Ambassador Bayart.
Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of
all I would like on behalf of the delegation of the Mongolian People's
Republic to offer my warmest congratulations on your accession to the post of
President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August, a
particularly important and certainly difficult period because our tasks
include the drafting of the report of the Conference to the United Nations
General Assembly. I am sure that thanks to your talents as a diplomat and
your personal qualities, you will guide our work skilfully, effectively and
productively. My delegation undertakes to co-operate with you in the
performance of your task.
I would like to add my voice to those of preceding speakers to express to
your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, our gratitude
for the valuable contribution he made to the work of the Conference.
I would also like to welcome the new representatives of Sri Lanka,
Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, and Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja,
and to assure them that my delegation will continue to co-operate with
theirs. Finally, I would like to express my best wishes to
Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom,
Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt on their
departure and thank them for their contributions to the work of the Conference.
(continued in English)
In his recent interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, the
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, announced the Soviet Union's decision to
eliminate all of its medium- and shorter-range missiles in the Asian part of
the country.
As everywhere in the world, this decision was widely acclaimed in the
Mongolian People's Republic. We consider it a new and extremely constructive
proposal aimed at speedy agreement on the elimination of medium- and
shorter-range missiles on a world-wide scale. We express our hope that the
United States side will demonstrate the same responsible approach to this
vital issue and show in deeds, not in words, its will and readiness to come to
an agreement. We are highly gratified by the fact that the decision of the
Soviet Government fully meets the aspirations of the peoples and States of
Asia and the Pacific basin to turn this vast region into a zone of reliable
security, a zone free of nuclear weapons. For us the problems of disarmament,
peace and security are no less pressing than for the peoples of Europe and
other continents. In addition to that, the other important proposals
contained in the interview also deserve the. highest appreciation -- in
particular, the proposal on reduction of the number of nuclear-capable
aircraft in Asia and the activities of the Soviet and United States naval
fleets in the Pacific, strengthening of security in the Indian Ocean, and the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.427 - _
11
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
limitation and complete prohibition of nuclear tests. In our opinion they are
in full harmony with the wider conception of all-Asian security, and their.
implementation would considerably facilitate the lessening of military tension
in our region, the strengthening of confidence and the development of
constructive interaction among all States in Asia and the Pacific basin, in
the interests of establishing lasting peace and security.
The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is
now about to wind up this year's work. As the Co-ordinator of the group of
socialist countries, my' delegation ventures to sum up in a preliminary way the
results of the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 of the
Conference's agenda for the year 1987.
The delegations of the socialist States, determined to block every
possible means by which weapons could be stationed in space, have actively
participated in and contributed to the work of the Ad hoc Committee during the
1987 session, by introducing proposals which took into account the views of
other States. Here I wish to recall some of them: the Soviet Union
introduced initiatives on the establishment of an international inspectorate
to verify compliance with an international agreement on the prevention of
stationing any weapons in space, studying the possibility of eliminating
existing anti-satellite systems and ensuring immunity for artificial Earth
satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board, and prohibiting weapons
of the "space-to-space", "space-to-Earth", and "Earth-to-space" types. The
German Democratic Republic and Mongolia submitted a draft set of "Main
provisions of a treaty on the prohibitons of anti-satellite weapons and on
ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" which have just been introduced
by Ambassador Rose; the German Democratic Republic proposed a structural
discussion on item 3 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee; and
previous proposals tabled by Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union
were reaffirmed. The Ad hoc Committee has worked actively this year under the
able chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy.
However, we share the opinion of a number of delegations that the work of
the Ad hoc Committee, which to a large extent repeated last year's
discussions, has not made any tangible progress, despite the efforts of many
delegations. This is obviously linked with the lack of new elements in the
mandate and the programme of work. In fact the first two items. in the
programme of work, 'Examination and identification of issues relevant to the
prevention of an arms race in outer space" and "Existing agreements relevant
to the prevention of an arms race in outer space", have been thoroughly
considered during the last two sessions. Giving careful thought to the fact
that there is a. limited number of international agreements constituting the
international legal regime of outer space, the Ad hoc Committee has
practically completed its work on the definition and identification of the
existing bans and limitations. As a result it has been able to outline the
areas which urgently require the elaboration of a new agreement or agreements.
During the discussions the overwhelming majority of delegations noted
both the urgent need for maintaining and strengthening the existing legal
regimes governing the activities of States in outer space -- first and
foremost such an important one as the Soviet-United States ABM Treaty -- and
647
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 427
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
the necessity to start serious substantive negotiations with a view to
preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space. We are convinced
that the Conference on Disarmament is capable of carrying out this task. This
sole multilateral negotiating body has on its table a considerable number of
initiatives and proposals which could serve as a solid ground'for further
concrete negotiations.
Prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the jointly agreed
priority goals of the Conference. Unfortunately, not all States have yet come
to realize this sine qua non. A number of countries, while speaking in favour
of preventing. an arms race, are in fact blocking the immediate start of the
multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament,
and are attempting to replace the negotiations by purely general discussions
around the problem.
Such is the thrust of statements to the effect that it would be
appropriate to keep the Ad hoc Committee's programme of work in its present
form for the next year. In this context, references are being made to the
fact that during the discussion of the programme of work it was not possible
to arrive at generally agreed positions. This is not in the least surprising,
given the positions currently taken by certain States which reject even such
proposals as the idea of distinguished Ambassador Campora of Argentina about
the inclusion in the Conference's report of declarations_by States members of
the Conference on Disarmament that they do not possess weapons in space
deployed on a permanent basis. I would like to state that the socialist
countries have no difficulties with this proposal, and we are ready to include
a relevant formulation in the Conference's report. In our opinion, the idea
expressed at the last meeting of the Ad hoc Committee -- that the annual
report should be divided into three parts corresponding to the items of the
programme of work -- would facilitate a clearer reflection of the positions of
all groups and a better understanding of the essence of these positions.
Now, when we come to the report-writing stage, it is necessary to give
serious consideration to ways and means of making the work of the Ad hoc
Committee more substantive and its activities more practical. The work of the
Ad hoc Committee should be oriented to the future rather than to the past. In
this respect, we believe that the work of this Ad hoc Committee should be
concentrated on the existing proposals and initiatives aimed at the prevention
of an arms race in outer space, which would no doubt make the work more
substantive. In other words, we all should do our utmost so as not to be
compelled tomorrow to talk, ex post facto, about disarmament in space.
My Government continues to consider that in the present situation, which
requires immediate and redoubled efforts for the prevention of an arms race in
outer space and its cessation on Earth, every State, especially those with
major space capabilities, should refrain from actions contrary to this
endeavour. Following this logic, we cannot but express our regret at the fact
that the Government of Japan has taken a decision to allow its companies to
participate in the United States' Strategic Defence initiative, widely known
as the "Star Wars" programme.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.427
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
Mongolia, being an ardent advocate of the complete prohibition and
destruction of chemical weapons and the elimination of the industrial base for
their production, is eager to make its modest contribution towards the speedy
conclusion of an international convention on this subject. We believe that
the elaboration of the convention can be successfully completed in the very
near future if all the parties to the negotiations demonstrate their political
will to reach the accords which are now so essential and not to create
artificial obstacles.
One cannot overlook the fact that, during the second part of the current
session of the Conference, the negotiations on banning chemical weapons have
notably slowed down while there are still many major issues to be tackled. At
the very outset of this year's session, my delegation suggested that the
Ad hoc Committee on item 4 of our agenda should continue its work without
interruption this year with a view to completing the early elaboration of the
convention. This is called for both by the present state of the work of the
Ad hoc Committee and by the existence of various technical questions with
political implications which we will have to solve sooner or later.
The discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on questions related to the order
of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles shows that, solution of this issue
will to a large extent determine success not only with regard.to article 4 of
the convention but also the elaboration of the convention as a whole. The
participants in the negotiations are well aware of my delegation's position on
this score, which has been clearly formulated in working paper CD/CW/WP.162.
In my previous statements I have tried to clarify the essence of our
proposal, according to which the order of elimination of chemical weapon
stockpiles should be determined by comparing chemicals on the basis of their
mass within categories which include chemicals of like effectiveness. Such an
order solves the problem of what quantitites of chemicals are subject to
destruction, including both chemical warfare agents of different categories
and munitions, devices and equipment. This approach also automatically
settles the problem of what should be eliminated first -- chemical warfare
agents or munitions, devices and equipment -- since they are all subject to
parallel and simultaneous destruction. Therefore the suggested order provides
that each State party to the covention possessing chemical weapon stockpiles
should in each destruction period destroy no less than a ninth of each
category of its stockpiles.
It must be underlined, in this connection, that the comparison of all
chemical warfare agents, especially all super-toxic lethal chemicals, on the
basis of their mass, within a category or even between categories which
include a wide range of chemicals, without taking into account their
properties and degrees of filling, is over-simplified. In our opinion, not
all super-toxic lethal chemicals are comparable. Therefore such an approach
could considerably complicate work on elaborating the order of destruction of
chemical weapon stockpiles.
In formulating our proposal, we proceed from the main principle of
undiminished security of all States during the entire destruction period.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.427
14
(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
The convention must immediately put an end to the development and
production of any type of chemical weapon, and in accordance with its
stipulations all the existing stockpiles should be eliminated by the end of a
10-year destruction period. That is why we, as well as a number of other
delegations, consider that the idea of creating so-called security stocks, and
even the possible continuation of chemical weapon production after the
convention enters into force, are incompatible with the spirit and objectives
of the future convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of
chemical weapons.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Mongolia for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.
I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations
wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States,
Ambassador Max Friedersdorf.
Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I appreciate this
opportunity to speak, and I just want to respond very briefly to the
distinguished Ambassador from Mongolia. I wanted to tell him that I certainly
share his support for the progress that is being made here in Geneva between
the United States and the Soviet Union on the INF talks, but I would also want
to remind him that the current proposal which he mentions?that the Soviet
leadership has endorsed, and which he represents as a new and constructive
proposal, was originally presented in 1981 by President Reagan, and I think
that he need not worry about the United States showing a constructive attitude
towards this treaty.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any other speakers who
wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Mongolia,
Ambassador Bayart.
Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I listened with care to
the remarks made by the representative of the United States of America,
Ambassador Friedersdorf. In that connection I should merely like to reiterate
my wish that this time the United States of America will refrain from further
procrastination and reservations regarding efforts to reach agreement on the
elimination of intermediate-range missiles in the talks with the Soviet
Union. That was merely a wish.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind you that
the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure
Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or threat of Use of Nuclear weapons
will meet immediately after the plenary meeting in this room.
I would also like to inform you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency
Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, will be the first speaker at the next plenary
meeting, which will be held next Thursday, 6 August 1987, at 10 a.m. I hope
that we shall be able to open the meeting punctually in order to facilitate
the arrangements relating to the Minister's visit.
The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.428
6 August 1987
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 August 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)
651
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the
428th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, on
behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to extend a warm welcome
to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, who has come to Geneva to
address the Conference. Mr. Shevardnadze's visit is the most important visit
by a senior political representative of the Soviet Union since the
establishment of the Conference. We are all aware of the high-level
responsibilities of the Minister as a member of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His presence here
reflects the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to the Conference. I
am convinced that the members of the Conference will follow his statement wi
the keenest interest, bearing in mind the Soviet Union's decisive role in
disarmament and the present political situation.
Today the Conference continues consideration of agenda item 8, entitled
"Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in keeping with rule 30 of
the rules of procedure, any representative who would like to raise any issue
relevant to the-work of the Conference may do so.
In accordance with the schedule for this week, the Conference will hold
an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting to take urn the
question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on
Disarmament. That meeting will be followed by an exchange of views on
substantive issues concerning agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".
On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argentina and Peru. I now give the floor
to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze.
Mr. SHEVARDNADZE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Mr. President, I am pleased to extend my greetings to you and
express confidence that under your guidance the Conference will be able to
achieve positive results.
There are numerous agencies in the world dealing with the misfortunes of
the human race, ranging from the torment of hunger to threats to the
biosphere. However, these miseries and threats cannot be eliminated unless a
solution is found to the main problem -- that of destroying the material base
for waging war. That is the problem of disarmament, the problem with which
you are dealing as the world's only body established for that purpose.
Documents of vital importance for the future of the world have been drawn
up within these walls -- the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons and on non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean
floor, the conventions on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and or.
the non-use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.
Remarkable in themselves as major landmarks in the development of
international legal thinking, they have also enhanced our common security by
an order of magnitude.
652
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
3
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
They offer proof of the possibility of a nuclear-free and non-violent
world, of an era without wars or weapons, as described by M.S. Gorbachev in
his statement of 15 January 1986. In other words, they were, to some extent,
a prelude to the conclusion reached by the Soviet leadership following a
thorough analysis of the realities of the nuclear and space age.
We may differ as to the interpretation of particular issues, but all your
previous activities and the documents adopted on the basis of consensus
demonstrate that, in the sphere of security, States are capable of exercisinq
voluntary self-restraint for the sake of the common good.
We view your activities as a manifestation of new political thinking
which must be built into the machinery of inter-State relations in the nuclear
age.
This thinking starts with a clear understanding of the realities of this
age. Not only those realities, but the words themselves - the nuclear age --
should make people shudder. However, too many people utter them calmly, as if
they were absolutely indifferent to the possibility that all the preceding
ages -- the Stone or the Bronze age, the Renaissance or the Enlightenment --
which offered mankind new and increasingly more advanced methods of meeting
its spiritual and material needs, will be wiped out by an age which has
brought forth the means of mankind's self-annihilation.
Can we remain calm?
Can this be called progress?
Can this be considered fatally inevitable?
To all these questions the only answer is: No.
Great ideas do not grow old; they are just filled with new content. The
call of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the great citizen of this city, to "the natural
human condition -- equality and freedom" can and must be interpreted in the
context of our time.
Such a condition cannot be attained so long as there are weapons capable
of destroying all life on Earth. It is regrettable that the advocates of
so-called nuclear deterrence pass over this fact in silence.
The concept of deterrence is dangerous also because it dooms all States
to life in constant fear, making them nuclear hostages.
If they complete the logical chain of arguments, the proponents of
nuclear deterrence must admit that it pushes one towards total nuclear
deterrence -- a situation where every State would wish to acquire such weapon
systems.
.1 am absolutely convinced that your Conference, which made the idea of
nuclear non-proliferation a reality, is aware of this danger.
653
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
4
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
Therefore, when we say that a nuclear-free and non-violent world is the
only reasonable alternative to the doctrine of deterrence, we hope for a
sympathetic response.
Although some have described such a world as fantasy, it is already
emerging before our very eyes. Two weeks ago, prior to M.S. Gorbachev's
interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, a nuclear-free world was more
than 200 warheads further away from us. And since Reykjavik that distance has
become shorter by almost 2,000 warheads.
If I am asked why I am referring to this as something that has been
accomplished, I will say that for the Soviet Union this is indeed so. For we
have done all in our power, we have removed everything that could stand in the
way of an agreement based on a "global double zero".
We have dropped the condition concerning the British and French nuclear
forces. We consider intermediate-range missiles separately from the problem
of strategic and space arms, even though we would prefer to discuss them
together. We have called for the total elimination of intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles in Europe. Finally, we have arrived at the concept of
a global double zero", that is the total removal of two classes of nuclear
weapons from the Soviet and United States arsenals. It is no secret that the
Soviet side would have to eliminate a significantly greater number of missiles
than the United States side.
So what is holding things up now, ladies and gentlemen?
Our partners have found the snags. The main one is the Pershing 1A
missiles.
we are being asked why we have raised this issue, and why we did not
raise it earlier.
Let me say this. The question of what the West knew about the Soviet
position, and when it knew it, is utterly irrelevant in this particular case.
After all, determining which arms are to be eliminated is what the
negotiations are all about.
What we are discussing in essence is which specific Soviet and
United States nuclear systems with ranqes between 500 and 1,000 kilometres
should be subject to elimination. The agreement in principle on that score
states that all such systems without exception must be eliminated, which also
means Pershing lAs.
If, however, someone has chosen to start a dispute about who those
missiles belong to -- well then, we are quite prepared to discuss that point
too.
We would Prefer to discuss it only at the negotiating table, but we are
being forced into a public debate in which we'have to engage so that the truth
of the matter and our position are not distorted.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
5
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
To begin with, we are negotiating with the United States, and only about
Soviet and United States nuclear weapons. We fail to see any reason for the
Federal Reoublic of Germany to intrude in the Soviet-United States
neqotiations. Why? By what right? Has it not assumed an obligation under
the non-proliferation Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons?
Let me repeat that it is only with the United States that we are
negotiating an agreement which, if reached, will eliminate all nuclear
warheads on two classes of arms of the two States. But if we speak of all
warheads that certainly includes those on Pershing lA missiles too. How can
it be otherwise?
As to who owns the missile's fuel, the missile's airframe, or,'say, the
wheels of its transporter, this is of no interest to us. We simply proceed
from the principle that zeros must have the same meaning for both sides. If,
however, the United States does not want a "zero option", as is clear from its
present "72 equals zero" formula -- that would be a different matter.
We too have allies, who are concerned at the fact that a neighbouring
country retains shorter-range nuclear missiles which Dose 'a great threat to
their security. They could ask for the stationing of similar systems on their
territories, and the Soviet Union could meet their request.
But what would a Soviet-United States agreement be like as a result of
all this? It would be truncated, emasculated and anaemic.
Literally in the past few days the opponents of the "zero option" have
found another argument to try to bolster their untenable position on the
Pershing lAs. They are now saying that there is an imbalance in conventional
and nuclear tactical arms in Europe, and that therefore these missiles have to
be retained.
But is Bonn itself, or Washington, not aware that the Soviet leadership
has been persistently calling for a start without delay on negotiations to
reduce conventional and nuclear tactical arms and eliminate any disparities or
imbalances where they exist?
Let me say frankly: these tricks leave a'grim impression. And they do
not enhance trust in relations with our negotiating partners.
The Conference on Disarmament is not directly involved in dealing with
the issue of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but it does deal,
and should deal, with the problem of nuclear disarmament; it acts as a moral
depository of the non-proliferation Treaty. Therefore we believe that the
Conference could voice its authoritative opinion on whether the practice of
joint ownership of nuclear arms by a nuclear and a non-nuclear State is
consistent with that legal instrument.
This must be done to prevent the non-proliferation Treaty from being
undermined. There can be no nuclear weapons on Earth that are "no one's"
weapons. It is extremely dangerous to create such a "legal fiction".
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
6
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
If, as some United States Administration officials and their West German
partners contend, these notorious Pershing lAs are third-country systems, then
the question arises again: How and by what right does that third country,
namely the Federal Republic of Germany, possess nuclear weapons? As far as we
know, it has no legal or moral right to have them.
But if it is deliberately trying to arrogate much rights to itself, if
the Federal Republic of Germany has indeed illegally acquired nuclear
weapons -- then this would certainly cause anger and indignation in the world,
and could confront the world with a political crisis.
We believe it is appropriate to ask the representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany at this forum directly: Has his country any
nuclear systems in its arsenal?
Equally legitimate is the question that we are addressing to the
United States delegate: Who actually controls the nuclear warheads for the
Pershing lAs?
A great deal depends on the answers to these two questions: the fate of
an agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles; the future of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons; the reassessment that
the Soviet Union would be forced to make of the overall strategic situation in
terms of the threat to its national interests posed by the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by a State where even today the delirious slogans of
revanchism are being heard, trying to drown out the voices of sober-minded
political and public figures and-mass movements calling for a responsible
approach to European and world affairs.
The Soviet Union hopes that the Federal Republic of Germany will duly
clarify the situation and remove the concern now being felt by many European
States because of the ambiguity of its position with regard to the Pershing 1A
missiles.
We wish to make it perfectly clear that unless this is done, the
Soviet union will find the situation as it exists now unacceptable and will
make known its views on that situation in a clear and unambiguous manner. Th
Soviet people will never acquiesce in West Germany becoming a nuclear Power;
I should like to hope that all this is well understood in the Federal
Republic of Germany, and that in the end healthy forces which stand for
detente and for major progress in nuclear disarmament will prevail there.
I would like to believe that the Federal Republic of Germany will not
become ark obstacle to the achievement of a historic agreement. For the time
being 72 nuclear warheads stand between us and an agreement on
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Under United States-
West German rules of "dual accounting", they are being made to weigh more than
the mountain of 2,000 nuclear warheads that could be deactivated and scrapped.
starting later this year.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
7
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
A Soviet-United States accord on the total elimination of two categories
of nuclear arms is a necessary prologue to solving the main problem -- that of
eliminating strategic offensive arms and preventing the extension of the arms
race to outer space.
Mr. President, it is my privilege to inform you, upon instructions from
the Soviet leadership, of the objectives which the Soviet Union is seeking to
achieve. They include:
The conclusion of treaties with the United States of America and
international agreements on the complete destruction of nuclear weapons
worldwide;
A strict and universal ban on deployment of any arms in outer space;
The establishment of an international regime under which there will be no
chemical weapons or other types of, weapons of mass destruction in the
world;
The reduction of conventional weapons to the lowest possible levels
required for defence;
The establishment, on the basis of co-operation among all States in the
world, of a comprehensive system of international security, under which
the United Nations could, in-accordance with its Charter, effectively
maintain peace and security.
Allow me to outline the sequence of our practical actions to achieve
these objectives.
First, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the Soviet
delegation has been instructed to proceed on the basis of the "global double
zero" formula. Agreement has been reached to hold a meeting with the
United States Secretary of State in mid-September, as a separate event not
linked to the session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Second, at the Geneva negotiations we have submitted a draft treaty on a
50 per cent reduction in strategic arms, and a draft agreement on
strengthening the regime of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems. These are compromise drafts taking into account and seeking
to accommodate the positions of the other side.
Third, the Soviet side has sponsored, together with other 'socialist
countries, and submitted to the Conference on Disarmament for its
consideration, a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". We have put
forward-an initiative concerning the establishment of an international
verification system to-prevent the deployment of any weapons in outer space.
Fourth, a proposal by a group of socialist countries for the
establishment of a comprehensive system of international Peace and security is
being discussed at the United Nations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
8
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
I would like to address specifically the question of verification --
matters of principle and matters of application.
The experience of the past few years has shown that there is verification
spoken of for propaganda purposes, and there is real, permanent verification.
Now, I would say that the Philosophy underlying our approach to the
problem of real verification gives a particularly full and clear idea of the
evolution of our outlook, which has now developed into a system of unorthodox
political views, in other words, a new Political thinking.
Foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous
methods Providing 100 per cent confidence that weapons are being eliminated,
that obligations relating to the remaining weapons and permitted military
activities are being complied with, and that the bans are not being
circumvented -- this, and no less than this, is the verification that we
envision.
The Soviet union is Proposing an exceptionally wide variety of forms and
methods of verification -- both national and international. All of them have
been set forth in detail in the document submitted to your forum on
9 June 1987, concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests -- and, by the
way, some of them have alredy been and are being used in practice. I would
like to remind you that United States scientists equipped with appropriate
monitoring instruments stayed for a long time in the area of our nuclear test
site. The USSR Academy of Sciences has reached a new agreement with
United States colleagues for the installation of monitoring equipment and the
exchange of data.
It is worth recalling that a short time ago our country made an
extraordinary effort to achieve a cessation of nuclear testing. For a long
time we maintained our Unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, and tried
to Persuade the United States by the force of example.
We ask the Conference on Disarmament to assist in achieving a
Soviet-United States agreement banning nuclear tests. I wish to emphasize
that this is not a plea to take sides, but rather an appeal for moral and
Political assistance in attaining a truly universal objective, which is to
make nuclear testing a thing of the Past.
However, for the time being nuclear testing continues, and you know who
is to blame. Nuclear testing is still a fact of life for mankind.
It would be easier to reach agreement at the Soviet-United States talks
if one could be sure that other States, too, support a,ban on nuclear testing
and stand ready to become parties to an international treaty on the subject.
This is why we believe that the search for agreement at the
Soviet-United States negotiations and the preparation of a comprehensive
treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should be
undertaken concurrently.
658
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
9
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
As a practical step to advance the preparation of such a treaty we
propose that a special group of scientific experts should be set up, which
would be assigned the task of submitting to the Conference well-founded and
agreed-upon recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of
verification for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests.
We believe that there is also a need to establish an international system
of global radiation safety monitoring, involving the use of space
communication links. Such a system would be useful for more effectively
verifying compliance with a ban on nuclear testing, once such a ban is
imposed. At the same time it could be used to monitor the extent of pollution
of the atmosphere, the soil, ground water and the sea on a global and regional
scale. It would also provide an additional safeguard in case of any
malfunctions or especially accidents at nuclear power plants.
We establish a strong link between nuclear arms reductions -- at this
stage, reductions in intermediate-range and, shorter-range missiles -- ana an
accord on measures of verification.
These include an exchange of initial data concerning the two sides'
missiles, and verification of such data through on-site inspections.
We insist on continuous monitoring of the process of destroying the
missiles. The elimination of the missile production base and infrastructure
will also be subject to verification.
The system of verification that we propose is designed to create-an
atmosphere of absolute confidence that the agreement will not be circumvented
in any way.
And finally, we believe that there should be mandatory access to Soviet
and United States military facilities in third countries where missiles could
be stationed.
As you can see, we are expanding the area of confidence to the maximum by
opening up the territory of the Soviet Union to inspections. However,
complete confidence naturally presupposes complete reciprocity. An example
and a confirmation of this is Stockholm and the decisions adopted there.
This, I would say, is the material expression of the principle of confidence;
this is new political thinking in action. Naturally, we would like its
geographical scope not to be confined to one continent.
In our opinion, verification will have a particularly important role to
play in preventing an arms race in space.
We would be extremely grateful if you took a close look at the proposal
for the establishment of an international verification system to make sure
that outer space remains peaceful. Is not the idea of inspecting every space
launch a reasonable one? There are as yet not that many space launch centres
in the world, and the presence of international inspectors there would
reliably guarantee that the objects placed in outer space are not weapons and
are not equipped with any weapons. But we go further, and propose not merely
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
10
(Mr Shevardnadze, USSR)
a presence but a permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all space
launch sites. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location
of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object
to be launched and the time of launch would be given in advance to
representatives of the inspectorate.
What doubts can there be about the sincerity of verification proposals
made by a Power which is very actively involved in launching space objects?
All States engaged in space activities would be placed in an absolutely
equal position, and permanent monitoring by inspectors would guarantee the
reliability of verification. After all, a space launch complex is something
that cannot be hidden. In this case the technology itself ensures relatively
simple and effective verification. Furthermore, our proposal provides for the
right to conduct an on-site inspection should suspicion arise that a launch
was carried out from an undeclared launch site.
And, in the event of a total ban on space strike arms, the Soviet Union
would be willing to extend-inspections to storage facilities, industrial
plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc.
If a State has no intention of putting weapons in space, there can be no
reason for it to object to international inspections of its space activities.
Space is a common asset of all mankind. It is much more than a training
ground for military technocrats who cast away traditional humanistic ideals.
It is a sphere for the peaceful application of peaceful efforts. It is this
vision of outer space that the Soviet Union intends to pursue most vigorously.
Reflections about space inevitably lead one to think about the distances
that humanity has to travel in order to reach its cherished goals. Some of
those distances have yet to be covered from beginning to end, others have been
covered half of the way, and there are still others where the end of the road
is already in sight.
I would like to make a few comments about one long-sought goal which is
within reach and which the Conference on Disarmament has almost attained, an
event of great significance for all of mankind -- a complete ban on chemical
weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. Two thirds of a century have
passed since the first gas attack at Ypres, which marked the beginning of the
military use of this barbaric weapon of mass annihilation. Ever since,
Governments of many nations and various international forums have sought to
devise legal constraints on the production and use of lethal substances, but
only now, in our time, is it becoming possible to adopt a historic convention
to that effect.
What could stand in the way of this? Only attempts to outline the draft
of a future treaty with one hand while assembling canisters of binary chemical
weapons with the other.
Need one say how immoral this is, how incompatible with the goal before
us?
660
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
11
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
The Soviet Union will continue to co-operate actively with all the
participants in the Conference on Disarmament so that the long-awaited
convention becomes a reality. We did not dramatize the debates and
differences that emerged in the process. One thing alone was considered
absolutely imperative -- that the convention on the prohibition of chemical
weapons and destruction of their stockpiles should be adopted, and as early as
possible.
I am instructed to inform you that the Soviet delegation at the
negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally
binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of
refusal. This decision is.another vivid manifestation of our commitment to
genuine and effective verification, in accordance with the principles of new
political thinking.
In order to build an atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of an
early conclusion of an international convention, the Soviet side invites the
participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to visit the Soviet military
facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical weapons and observe
the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility.
Later we will invite experts to the special chemical weapon destruction plant
now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk.
In making this announcement I hope that the participants in the
Conference will duly appreciate our desire to untie the most complicated knots
that have appeared in the process of drawing up the convention.
Our external affairs are inseparable from our internal development, and
the policy of restructuring, renewal, democratization and openness prompts us
to act in a positive manner wherever the Soviet Union is represented,
including here at the Conference on Disarmament.
Today, as never before, the most pressing problems of the contemporary
world determine the role and importance of the Conference. In fulfilling its
mission, this representative Conference can assert itself more forcefully by
practical deeds matching the magnitude of the tasks before it.
There may be a need to consider the possibility of adopting a more
intensive schedule of work. We would consider favourably a year-round
schedule for the Conference with two or three recesses.
Why not hold an additional session of the Conference this year to
complete the bulk of,the drafting of the convention banning chemical weapons?
At present it is impossible for the Conference to work with high
efficiency without establishing an optimum balance between bilateral and
multilateral negotiations on security problems. There should be no antagonism
here, but rather the principle of complementarity and mutually enriching
interaction.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)
Promptly informing the participants in the Conference about the status of
Soviet-United States negotiations, particularly on questions relating to items
on the agenda of your forum, could be a first step in this direction. We
intend to discuss this with our United States partners and establish an
appropriate procedure. We hope to be able to find mutual understanding with
them.
Why are we talking about the need to intensify the work of the
Conference? Because the negotiating machinery is running at a rate that is
significantly slower than the pace of the arms race. A dangerous gap is
emerging between political thought and political will, and military
technology. This is evident from the records of the Conference itself:
15 years have passed-since the conclusion of the Bacteriological Weapons
Convention, and the Convention banning the military use of environmental
modification techniques was drawn up in 1977.
The Soviet Union regards improvement in the functioning of the Geneva
forum as one way of redressing this disparity. We believe that in time the
Conference could become a permanent universal body for disarmament
negotiations.
And, of course, the Conference on Disarmament should not become
accustomed to the fact that the issues involved in ending the nuclear arms
race, though they appear on its agenda, are actually not aiscussed here.
Indeed, these issues should be made the focus of its activity. Today there is
no other way. Nuclear disarmament cannot be the province of just a few
Powers. No Government can stand on the sidelines in this matter, for the-
nuclear threat is global in its consequences. Those consequences transcend
national boundaries and ideological differences. They do not recognize
neutrality and they spare no one.
If that is so, it is unjust to keep non-nuclear States from participating
in solving the problems of nuclear disarmement. As M.S. Gorbachev has
repeatedly emphasized, a maximum degree of internationalization is needea in
these efforts. Genuine democratism and humanism in international relations
call for just such an approach.
Proceeding from this premise, the Soviet Union will act constructively to
enhance the prestige of the Conference as the principal nuclear disarmament
forum, not just for exchanging views but for adopting decisions of the
greatest importance.
Time is bringinq us closer to the moment when word will finally become
deed. The time of accomplishments is at hand - the accomplishments of which
we have long been dreaming and towards which we have travelled along difficult
roads.
May these accomplishments include your contribution, too. May it be
tangible, substantive and significant.
662
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
13
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union for his important statement,
and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the
representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Campora.
Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we are
all conscious of the fact that the term of the presidency for the month of
August that you have begun as representative of France coincides auspiciously
with the recognition given today to the Conference on Disarmament as a
multilateral disarmament body through the address of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze. The statement made by
the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union stands out in these times when the
international situation calls for new initiatives and new ways of thinking.
I am therefore very pleased to welcome Mr. Shevardnadze, and at the same time
I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of my close co-operation and warm
friendship, as may be expected of any Argentine diplomat in respect of a
representative of France.
We would ask the delegate of Ethiopia to convey to Ambassador Tadesse
Terrefe our congratulations on his business-like approach to the presidency of
the Conference during the month of July. We also wish to welcome the new
representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, whose experience in the
multilateral world will be of benefit to us in our work.
With the agreement of all my colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament,
I would like to add special emphasis to the words of welcome that I will be
extending as we greet the new'reoresentative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos
Castrioto de Azambuja. The international community is aware of the close
co-operation between Argentina and Brazil in the area of the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, under the guidance of their heads of State, Presidents Raul
Alfonsin and Jose Sarney. This co-operation is the most significant
contribution that the two countries can make to regional stability. It also
provides world public opinion with proof that the nuclear policy of the
two countries is of a transparency that leaves no doubt whatsoever as to its
totally peaceful purposes. Mutual confidence between countries from the same
geographical region, based on the exchange of information and scientists,
visits to each other's nuclear facilities, joint projects, constitute the best
safequard that one can imagine to ensure the Peaceful use of nuclear energy
and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In welcoming the Ambassador of
Brazil, the delegation of Argentina wishes to reiterate the commitment that we
have given his predecessors in the past, to work closely and unswervingly
together to serve the cause of international peace and security at the
world-wide as well as at the regional level. His diplomatic talent and the
high level of the offices that he has held in serving his country fully
justify our hope that Ambassador Azambuja's contribution to the vital work of
the Conference on Disarmament will be of great benefit and importance.
we are convinced that the time has come to make the maximum effort to
intensify negotiations to bring about a convention on the prohibition of
chemical weapons before a new arms race begins in this area.. We believe that
663
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
(Mr. Campora, Argentina)
it is quite possible to arrive in a reasonable time frame at a convention that
would eliminate the danger of these weapons and strengthen the security of all
States and, in addition, would not indirectly create situations of inequality
or discrimination that may arise as a result of different levels of
development.
In this area it is always essential to highlight the importance of the
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, better known as the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, as this was the first instrument to prohibit the use
of a type of weapon of mass destruction. None the less we should recognize
that as a result of the situation created by the right of retaliation, the
Protocol has become essentially a "no first use" agreement, and the fact that
it is being flouted at present should lead us to think seriously about the
convention that is being negotiated in this Conference. Almost half a century
went by before the conclusion of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons,
which marked the first step towards the elimination of a whole category of
weapons. This was the first measure containing a genuine disarmament elenent,
not only because it prohibited the development and production of these
weapons, but also because it provided for the destruction of stockpiles that
then existed. The convention that we are negotiating should complete the
process initiated through the 1925 Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention with a view to prohibiting this type of weapon of mass destruction
fully and without delay.
The chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a
non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal tcotin:
once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing productic:,.
facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a
model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which la-,-E, div.
in law the existence of two categdries cf States: those that posssess nuc_es-
weapons and those that do not. In the future convention there will be a
single category of States with the same rights and obligations, and an
identical verification mechanism applicable for all States, and it will not be
a means of allocating world power, like the non-profileration Treaty, but an
instrument with an egalitarian purpose within the international community.
Thus we have within reach the possibility of drawing up a treaty that would
not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also
important, that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and
technological viewpoint. In this regard the future convention should not be
devised in such a way as to allow for its use to maintain inequalities in the
field of trade or technology or to prevent the development or transfer of
chemicals, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.
During the course of the negotiations, we have noted that time and again
the need has emerged to reconcile three legitimate interests of States:
Firstly, that of completely eliminating the possibility of the threat of
chemical warfare; secondly, that of guaranteeing that a State's security
would not be undermined; and, thirdly, that of ensuring'unimpeded development
of chemical activities for peaceful purposes. Clearly, a strict monitoring
regime would offer greater safeguards, but it could affect the development of
664
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
15
(Mr. Campora, Argentina)
the chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Conversely, a less strict
verification regime would detract from confidence in the convention and would
create a lack of security at the international level. Consequently the aspect
of security and the aspect of the peaceful uses of chemicals should be
properly balanced in the convention. The way in which this question is
resolved will determine whether the objective sought through the convention
will be successfully attained. When these two aspects are raised, it is the
ultimate objective that should guide the negotiations.
This criterion should be reflected, in the first place, in the definition
of chemical weapons. We are all aware that article II of the convention is
crucial to its effectiveness. The present wording was provisionally adopted
in 1984, and should be studied at an appropriate time in the light of progress
in our work and the clearer picture we now have of the convention. Progress
in the negotiations has also highlighted the need for the toxicity criterion
to be determined in a precise and practical manner, and that the concepts used
should be uniform throughout the text of the convention.
The establishment of an order of destruction is another of the major
tasks before the Ad hoc Committee. Just as the existence of chemicals that
pose a greater risk for the convention is recognized, it should also be
recognized that there are chemical weapons that are more dangerous than others
and, consequently, they should be destroyed first, otherwise we would be
jeopardizing the principle of promoting confidence at the start of the
destruction phase.
The principle of not undermining the security of any State during the
chemical weapon destruction phase of is of fundamental importance. The
disparity between chemical-weapon and non-chemical-weapon States will be
maintained during the period of destruction of stockpiles and even
subsequently should there be chemical-weapon States that are not parties to
the convention. Consequently, one cannot rule out the threatened or potential
use of chemical weapons. To make up for that disparity and make the principle
a reality, States parties, particularly those that do not possess chemical
weapons, should be assured of the possibility of some capacity to defend
themselves against chemical warfare. Bearing in mind that what is involved is
defence against a weapon of mass destruction, protection measures should
guarantee the safety not only of the military but also, and particularly, of
the civilian population.
With respect to the non-production of chemical weapons, monitoring should
in no way detract from the inalienable right of all States parties to the
.convention to research, develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use all
chemical substances for peaceful purposes, with the only quantitative
restriction applying to a certain limited quantity of super-toxic lethal
chemicals per year for non-prohibited purposes. Similarly, the provisions of
the treaty should not be interpreted c implemented in a discriminatory
fashion, as this would affect countries' economic, social, scientific and
technological development. Agreement by States parties to the convention to
renounce possession of chemical weapons, particularly states that do not
possess them, should provide a guarantee of access to the exchange of all
chemical substances, equipment and scientific and technological information
and international co-operation for peaceful purposes. Just as the undertaking
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
16
(Mr. Campora, Argentina)
to destroy chemical weapons and existing production facilities, and not to
produce chemical weapons, will be subject to verification, commitments
regarding assistance and co-operation in the field of peaceful uses should
also be assessed. The future convention will set up a variety of bodies which
could perform this function.
It should be emphasized once again that the future chemical weapons
convention will mark an important milestone in international relations in the
area of disarmament, because its significance lies in the mechanisms of
verification and monitoring that will be adopted for on-site as well as
challenge inspections. It is essential to make progress in sensitive areas
such as challenge inspection, counting on the clear-cut determination of the
great Powers to resolve those issues on which there is still no consensus,
drawing on the guidelines that are being drawn up step by step under the wise
guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekeus. The
statement of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that we have heard today will no
doubt facilitate a solution to the issues that remain pending in the area of
challenge inspection.
We are convinced that the threat of chemical weapons will not be totally
eliminated until we have universal accession to the convention. This
objective would be facilitated through joint action by States at two levels
concurrently: At the world-wide level, through effective and judicious
acticn by military Powers possessing chemical weapons, and at the regional
level, through the political handling of procedures for accession to the
con,'er:tion and, the responsibilities deriving therefrom. In this way an
appropriate and adequate regional balance would be achieved in a world-wide
framework of confidence created by chemical disarmament by the countries with
the creates: war-making potential.
The P?ISIDE:N: (transiatec: from French). I thank the representative of
A:centi ft.:: his statement, ano for his kind words addressed to the Chair.
Peru is Lett on the list of speakers. However, I have received a request fro-.
the representative of the Fece:rl Republic of Germany, who wishes to exercise
his rigr._ of reply. With the kind permission of the representative of Peru,
for whic,. I offer him my special thanks, I give the floor to the
representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stilpne;el.
Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): The distinguished
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has
put a direct question to the representative of the Federal Republic
of Germany, to the Conference on Disarmament -- whether his country, has
nuclear systems in its arsenals. The answer, Mr. President, is no. The
Federal Republic of Germany supports the position of the United States
Government, the owners of the warheads of the Pershing LA, that these warheads
should not be included in the current INF_negotiations. This is also the
position of the North Atlantic Alliance. Since the nuclear warheads of the
Pershing lA are not in the arsenals of the Federal Republic of Germany, but in
the arsenals of the United States of America, my country remains in full
compliance with its obligations arising from the non-proliferation Treaty.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
17
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement, and I now call on the
representative of Peru, Mr. Felix Calderon.
Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Peru
welcomes the presence of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Eduard Shevardnadze, at the
Conference on Disarmament, on a day that is particularly meaningful for
mankind, today 6 August. It is on this very day that our spirits, are filled
with unhappy memories of the devastation of Hiroshima. The hecatomb of
Hiroshima is a vivid expression of the previously unthinkable extreme to which
the violence of war can lead, and it is also a stark example of the contempt
for the most basic norms of international humanitarian law that men can reach
if they yield to the Faustian temptation of victory at any price.
Peru considers that the day on which the Hiroshima holocaust is
commemorated should become a day for meditation and reflection throughout the
world on peace and disarmament. We must remain true to our past to prevent
inertia accustominq our minds to coexistence with nuclear weapons. If living
under the threat of nuclear war is an offence to the human race, it is an even
greater affront to the moral conscience of peoples that nothing or almost
nothing has been done in 42 years to change this state of affairs.
Before turning to agenda item 8 on the comprehensive programme of
disarmament, which is the item before us this morning, I wish to make a few
comments on four issues which in our view, notwithstanding the importance of
those not covered today, require additional comment in the light of new
developments since last April. First of all, we will address the question of
a nuclear test ban. It would appear that the efforts of delegations
represented here to come up with an agreed formula to allow for the
establishment of an ad hoc committee on this topic may well suffer a fate
similar to that of Sisyphus in hell, because.of the lack of political will on
the part of certain of those involved. Clearly, the decisions of sovereign
States may not be impugned, but we cannot silence the clamour of the entire
world, over Governments' heads, calling more and more insistently for a final
stop to be put to nuclear tests, not only because the military significance of
nuclear weapons, whether outmoded or modern, is questionable, but because,
bearing in mind the overstuffed nuclear arsenals, they reflect in themselves a
self-destructive wish.
Peru has for several years been working with the indefatigable
Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles in his commendable efforts to find an
honourable solution that would save the face of the Conference on Disarmament
vis-a-vis international public opinion. It is regrettable that conceptual
manoeuvring continues to conspire against this noble objective, and it is even
more regrettable that those who bear primary responsibility for promoting
nuclear disarmament have to a certain extent been encouraging the horizontal
proliferation of nuclear weapons in an attitude of arrogance and defiance
which is at variance with the solidarity that should exist among peoples.
667
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
18
(Mr. Calderon, Peru)
We have noted a feeling of weariness at this interminable procedural
struggle, giving renewed impetus to the prooosal adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in resolutions 40/80 B and 41/46 B, for
activation of the amendment procedure specified in article II of the partial
test-ban treaty so as to extend the ban to underground tests. Peru also
considers it appropriate to point out that, in its view it would be hard to
expect satisfactory results from the forthcoming third special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament or the fourth NPT review conference if
the agreement reached does not include an unquestionable commitment to begin
negotiations that would make it possible to bring about a definitive halt to
nulcear tests within a reasonable period of time.
Quite apart from this overall perception of the problem, the continuation
of nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll is prompting concern in the South Pacific.
Peru is of the view that this situation cannot and must not pass unnoticed, as
what is at stake is the ecological integrity of the South Pacific. It is for
this reason, and not through any animosity, that Peru has sought the support
of Colombia, Chile and Ecuador, which, together with our country, form the
Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, with a view to approaching the
Government of France through the appropriate diplomatic channels to make it
possible to send a new scientific mission to Mururoa atoll and neighbouring
areas to verify that the nuclear explosions on the test site are indeed
harmless and that the levels of radioactivity are below internationally
tolerable limits. These steps could be carried out in accordance with the
precedent established by the Atkinson mission in 1983.
In keeping with this position, a few weeks ago, during the tenth session
of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibitioh of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America (OPANAL), which was held in Montevideo, Peru proposed that
the Council of this regional body should embark on a study of alternative
measures, which could include an additional protocol to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco to prevent radioactive contamination of the marine environment in
the oceanic masses falling within the zone of application referred to in
article 4, paragraph 2 of the main Treaty. This proposal was adopted by
consensus, and its implementation will of course have to take account of the
provisions of article 7 of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Within the same context,
concrete steps have also been taken to promote co-operation between OPANAL and
the South Pacific Forum.
The prohibition of chemical weapons has now become the major issue before
the Conference on Disarmament, given the continuing possibility of arriving at
a comprehensive treaty on the subject in the near future. It is true that
progress has not been spectacular, but the important thing is that there is a
determination to negotiate. Furthermore, we have observed a commendable
effort to find imaqinative solutions to unusual problems, with a particularly
constructive contribution from the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee,
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, who, with dedication, sound judgement and skill, has
set an appropriate pace for our work and maintained a high level of enthusiasm.
However, there are a variety of outstanding issues which undoubtedly
require a great deal of work. We are thinking first and foremost of on-site
challenge inspections, the question of jurisdiction and control, verification
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
19
(Mr. Calderon, Peru)
of destruction and procedures to carry out such destruction, and the use of
chemical facilities and products for peaceful purposes, including the
strengthening of international co-operation. Furthermore, there is a problem
which, even though it is not an urgent one, is none the less relevant to this
forum. We are referring specifically to the procedure that will have to be
followed once the Ad hoc Committee has successfully completed its work. The
disagreeable recollection of the last multilateral instrument negotiated by
the Conference on Disarmament leads us to proceed cautiously in this regard.
As we are aware, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was opened for signature
by States in 1976, despite the fact that there was no consensus in this
negotiating forum regarding the scope of the. obligations stipulated in
article I. The same must not happen in the case of chemical weapons, and we
are duty-bound to prevent this from occurring.
Within that context, it would appear desirable to envisage the
establishment of a new body open to all members of the international
community, whose task would be to give an official stamp to the work of the
40 States which make up the Conference on Disarmament. In a complementary
manner, this would make it possible to define more clearly the process of
transition that will necessarily take place between the adoption of the new
convention, its signing and its entry into force. This would prevent
unforeseen situations from arising in the interim period, and would rule out
arbitrary procedures that could undermine all the efforts of nearly
two decades.
With respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is
clear that first of all a verifiable distinction must be drawn between the
placing of objects in orbit with hostile military intent and the placing of
those with non-hostile military intent. Under article IV of the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the prohibitio-:,
which extends only to objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction, applies once the object is placed in orbit, in other words
once a circuit around the Earth has been completed. On that basis Peru
supports all initiatives aimed at amending the 1967 Treaty as a means of
finding a partial solution to the problem, but it would advocate the simpler
amendment of prohibiting the placing in orbit of any object carrying any type
of weapon whatsoever. We do not think it would be necessary to introduce new
elements such as the concept of "space weapons", as what defines the
prohibition is non-placement in orbit. Nor is it possible to accept new
criteria concerning the length of time the objects remain in orbit, because
the approach followed in the 1967 Treaty is much more appropriate in that it
prohibits even the temporary presence of a delivery system in outer space,
provided it completes a circuit around the Earth.
Now, in so far as an amendment of this type would not involve weapon
systems that can destroy objects in outer space from the air, land or sea
through direct hits or using the principle of directed energy or other
principles of physics, it is clear that their viability will depend on the
concurrent effort being made to multilateralize the basic obligations of the
Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.428
20
(Mr. Calderon, Peru)
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as well as those that are necessary to
prohibit all anti-satellite weapon systems which are not based in outer
space. It is understood that all of this should not undermine any regime for
the full use of space for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
By definition, if one wishes to prevent the transfer of'the arms race to
outer space, the set of prohibitions to be agreed on should be comprehensive
and free of all unambiguity; in other words, there should be no problems of
interpretation such as that posed by article V of the ABM Treaty, because that
would simply undermine mutual confidence and thus weaken the scope of these
obligations. But perhaps what would be really important would be to set up
guidelines or parameters which would allow for the regulation of advanced
technology. While not taking the existing non-proliferation regime as a
model, because it is lopsided and discriminatory, Peru is of the view that it
would be possible to explore formulas that would impose contractual
limitations on the development of certain advanced technologies for hostile
purposes that have a destabilizing effect on the status quo. Of course, the
aim would not be to impede or discourage technological progress, but rather to
regulate it so as to place it at the service of our needs and aspirations, and
not to have it used for destruction and endless military competition.
This reflection leads us directly to another, relating to the important
role that effective prevention of the arms race in outer space could play in
halting and reversing the arms race as a whole. We think that there is a.
direct relationship here, and it is vital to avoid this new spiral in the arms
race. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the real problem does
not lie here but in the causes and epiphenomena which encourage the arms race
urbi et orbi. In other words, it remains an urgent and top priority to fight
against the untiring search for illusory security through the indiscriminate
build-up of weapons, of which the extension to outer space is only the most
sophisticated manifestation.
There has been great interest this year in item 7, on radiological
weapons. A dual approach has been put into practice, which is most welcome.
However, the results of the contact groups' work have been discouraging so
far. It is of very little use to prohibit radiological weapons if these are
going to be reduced to their most basic expression while nuclear arsenals are
kept at their present levels; and as a discussion exercise an effort of this
kind is discouraging. The question of banning military attacks on nuclear
facilities should not continue to be linked to the above, because whereas in
the first case we are speaking of weapons in the strict sense of the term,
nuclear facilities are relevant if they are considered as military objectives
or targets in the event of armed conflict, but can in no way be classified as
weapons. In other words, radiological weapons may be the subject of
disarmament measures, but this is not the case for nuclear facilities,
protection for which falls under international humanitarian law.
In this regard it.is useful to recall that article 35,-paragraphs 1 and?2
of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been supplemented
by the provisions contained in the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its
ID
670
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
21
(Mr. Calderon, Peru)
three protocols. The same could be said with respect to paragraph 3 of the
same article and article 55 of the Additional Protocol, which cover one aspect
of the protection of the natural environment not envisaged in the
ENMOD Convention. Similarly, we are of the view that there is room for
improvement in the provisions of article 56, paragraph 2 (b), which could be
extended to all nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. In this case, it is
politically counter-productive to seek to draw distinctions in this type of
facilities on the basis of specific thresholds of radioactivity whose
definition is questionable. It would be paradoxical to extend protection to
nuclear facilities which have a military purpose.
In this context, one may wonder whether the Conference on Disarmament is
the appropriate forum to establish norms of international humanitarian law.
In any event, one of the precedents that I have mentioned should enable us to
keep open the possibility of resolving the problem of military attacks on
nuclear facilities in the context of an ad hoc diplomatic conference that
could be convened by the United Nations General Assembly.
Item 8, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, has stirred up a
great deal of interest because of the conceptual and programmatic elements
that it involves. The Ad hoc Committee is approaching its 150th meeting, and
the fruit of this work is not clearly apparent. This year we have even noted
a certain step backwards in so?far as we have seen the questioning of certain
principles, priorities and activities enshrined in the Final Document of 1978,
which constitutes the starting-point and frame of reference for the work of
this Committee. We will go into the other aspects of the comprehensive
programme of disarmament at other times; meanwhile, Peru is of the view that
the priorities that should be enshrined in the paper should be the same as
those stipulated in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of 1978 and
supplemented by the provisions of paragraph 46 -- Priorities that are
interpreted in a certain order bearing in mind the urgency and elementary
sense of preservation involved in the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
With respect to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Peru will not
agree to this concept being distorted by identifying the establishment of
these zones as an alternative means of halting the horizontal proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones is much more than
this, and basically implies mutual obligations both for the States within the
zone which renounce nuclear weapons and for States outside the zone,
particularly the nuclear Powers, which are called upon to respect that status
and refrain from using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against the
States in the zone. Thus there are no one-way obligations, nor can or should
the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone be used to remedy the intrinsic
shortcomings of the NPT. It is this singular nature of the concept which
obliges the States parties to safeguard the balance of obligations both within
and outside the area, ensuring that the right to the exclusively peaceful use
of nuclear energy will not in practice lead to a change in the levels of
security prevailing in the zone. Of great importance here is the way in which
the verification system is interpreted and, above all, the efforts made by the
States of the zone directly concerned to prevent any over-broad interpretation
which irreversibly damages the mutual confidence that should prevail among
them.
671
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
22
(Mr. Calderon, Peru)
In more than 11 years the Conference on Disarmament has not been capable
of producing a single agreement that would justify its existence. The
proposals made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union are most welcome
and timely. The fact that no results have been achieved over the past
11 years makes it imperative for us to conclude the convention for a total ban
on chemical weapons and their destruction, failing which we could provide
grounds for a belief that the "attack-defence" equation which underpins the
arms race spiral involves an endless dynamic interaction similar to that
between Eros and Thanatos in the Freudian conception of the life of the psyche.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Peru for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.
I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations
wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States,
Ambassador Friedersdorf.
Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, very
briefly, I know the hour is late, but I would like to respond if I might. Our
delegation has listened with great interest to the statement of the
distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in which he
described proposals for various aspects of the chemical weapons convention.
We will, of course, study this statement in depth during the coming days and
we will no doubt have more detailed comments in the future. I would like to
take the opportunity to welcome this initiative of the Soviet Union, and
express our optimism that this proposal will bring our positions closer
together.
Of course, our delegation recognizes that closing the gap between the
positions of the United States and the Soviet Union is but one step toward a
Cw convention, albeit an important one. There are 38 other equal negotiating
partners, whose views must be taken into account. I remarked last month in
this Chamber that we have seen, during this session, a gradual convergence of
those views. We must acknowledge, however, that significant differences
remain on some of our more complex issues, such as monitoring non-production
in the civil chemical industry; the organizational infrastructure that will
oversee the convention; challenge inspection; and security during the period
between the treaty's effective date and the conclusion of chemical weapon
stockpile destruction. Then there is a difficult problem of what to do with
those chemical plants that do not fall within the present definition of a
chemical weapons production facility, but which nevertheless have the
capability to produce chemical weapons, or their key precursors. Further,
after the Conference reaches consensus on a treaty text, how do we persuade
other chemical-weapon-possessing States outside the Conference to accept it?
This threat posed by non-parties is a problem we should address in future
meetings. The issues I have mentioned are not all the issues remaining
unresolved, nor are they necessarily the most important, but they illustrate
that there are deep-seated differences, based on national interests, and they
illustrate that we still have much work ahead of us. *As we move toward
conclusion of our 1987 Conference on Disarmament session, and begin
preparations for next year, we know that our task is not an easy one, but we,
also know that, with constructive steps, such as the Soviet Union has taken
today, that task will be considerably easier?.
ID
672
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
23
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)
Our delegation also welcomes the opportunity to meet with Soviet
representatives to gain a further understanding of these proposals mentioned
today, before we return to our capitals to begin preparations for our future
negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.
As the Conference delegations are aware, Vice-President Bush, on behalf
of the United States, tabled a draft chemical weapons convention here
three years ago, and our delegation has been engaged in concluding a
convention based on that proposal and the views of all delegations to this
Conference, and will continue to do so.
With respect to the Pershing lA missiles of the Federal Republic
of Germany, the long-standing United States position is clear. The
United States will not negotiate on third-country systems, or on existing
programmes of co-operation with our allies, in these bilateral negotiations.
Therefore, the German Pershing 1A missiles have not been, are not, and will
not be on the table in the United States/Soviet INF missile negotiations.
With respect to the situation beyond these bilateral negotiations, NATO has
taken the position that the German Pershing IA force makes an important
contribution to deterrence -- an honourable policy -- and to the security of
the NATO Alliance, especially in the context of a "double global zero" outcome
for United States and Soviet land-based INF missiles. Future plans for the
German Pershing lA force will therefore be determined by the Federal Reruolic
of Germany in co-operation and consultation with its NATO allies.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
the United States for his statement, and I give the floor.tc the
representative of the Soviet Union.
Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to say a few words in response to
the statements made by the representative of the United States,
Ambassador Friedersdorf, and the representative of the Federal Republic of
Germany, Ambassador von Stilpnagel. First of all, we should like to note
Mr. Friedersdorf's comment concerning the ban on chemical weapons, and to
assure him and all other participants in the negotiations on this important
issue that the Soviet delegation intends in the near future to dwell in
greater detail on the initiatives which were contained in the statement of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Shevardnadze, and naturally,
it will be available for discussions with all delegations, and will be happy
to answer any questions that may arise in this regard, so as to expedite
negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons to the maximum possible
extent.
We have taken note of the fact that, in connection with the question
raised by Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze, the representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany gave us a clarification from which it follows that
the 72 warheads in question do not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany,
and that the Federal Republic of Germany possesses no nuclear weapons at all,
and also that it does comply with the non-proliferation Treaty. The Soviet
side takes note of this important statement, even though we are unclear how it
can be reconciled with. the other part of Ambassador von Stulpnagel's remarks
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
24
(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)
to the effect that his country supports the United States position on the
bilateral INF negotiations. However, the United States representative,
speaking after him, said that the United States would not conduct negotiations
on third-country systems, that the question of Pershing IA warheads, if I
understood him correctly, would not be on the negotiating table, and that the
future of these systems would be determined by the Federal Republic of Germany
in agregment with its North Atlantic Treaty allies. So the question arises:
where does the truth of the matter lie? And all this confirms the seriousness
of the doubts raised and questions asked by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR. For this reason we should like to continue to hope that this
major question of principle will be fully clarified.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
the Soviet Union for his statement. I give the floor to the representative of
Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.
Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my
delegation did not want to let the opportunity go by at this morning's
meeting, despite the fact that the speaker is no longer with us, to express my
delegation's appreciation for the important statement made to this Conference
by Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
The statement was very weighty and cogent on a number of issues related to the
bilateral negotiations being conducted between the Soviet Union and the
United States, but it also touched on fundamental aspects of the work being
done by the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum on
disarmament.
In our view, Mr. Shevardnadze's statement was a?vigorous manifestation of
the Soviet Union's support for the Conference on Disarmament, and it
highlights the importance that the USSR attaches to this forum. We consider
Minister Shevardnadze's initiative in providing the Conference with important
information concerning the state and progress of the bilateral negotiations to
be of particular significance, and we also particularly welcome his statement
that he would discuss with the United States side how an appropriate procedure
could be established for keeping the Conference appropriately informed about
the bilateral negotiations. My delegation, which has referred to this matter
on several occasions, hopes that those consultations will indeed lead to the
establishment of a mechanism through which the flow of information between the
bilateral and the multilateral negotiations could be institutionalized.
Finally, through the delegation of the Soviet Union, we wish to convey to
Minister Shevardnadze our appreciation for his coming to thq'Conference and
for the important statement he made this morning.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Venezuela for his statement. Are there any other speakers? There are not.
Let me now inform you that the Secretariat has distributed this morning at my
request an unofficial document that sets out the meeting schedule for the
Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this
document is merely indicative and may be adjusted later if necessary in the
light of the work of the Conference. If there are no objections, I will take
it that the Conference accepts this timetable.-
It was so decided.
674
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.428
25
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind you that
immediately after this plenary, the Conference will hold an informal meeting
on the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on
Disarmament, following which which we will resume our consideration of
substantive matters relating to agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The next plenary meeting of the
Conference will be held on Tuesday, 11 August at 10 a.m. The meeting is
ajourned.
Thy ? -.ting rose at 12 noon.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.429
11 August 1987
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 August 1987, at 10 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.429
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the
429th plenary meeting of the conference on Disarmament. Today the Conference
begins its consideration of the reports of its subsidiary bodies and its
annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance
with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise
any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.
On the speakers' list for today I have the representatives of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. I now give the floor to the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency
Ambassador Nazarkin.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Following the welcome addressed to you on 6 August by the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, permit me for my part to
express my satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair for August, the concluding
month of our session. We are convinced that under your presidency the
Conference will move forward successfully towards the objectives before it. I
should also like to welcome you as the representative of France, with which we
enjoy both traditional ties of friendship and relations of constructive
political dialogue.
I would like to send greetings to your predecessor as President,
Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, in connection with his successful
accomplishment of his tasks during the month of July. Permit me also to
welcome the newly appointed representatives of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo,
and Brazil, Ambassador de Azambuja, to wish them success in their new tasks
and to express the hope for equally close co-operation with them as with their
predecessors.
The new Soviet initiatives aimed at accelerating the negotiations on
banning chemical weapons, which were put forward by the member of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze at the plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August 1987, are receiving, it
seems, very broad support. I would like to express gratitude to those
delegations which stated their positive attitude to those initiatives at the
6 August meeting.
In his statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR said that
"the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from
the need to make legally binding the principle of-mandatory challenge
inspections without the right of refusal".
It would not be an overstatement to say that this is now the key problem
in the negotiations. Progress on a number of other issues also depends on the
speedy solution of this problem. We support the efforts being made to solve
the problem of challenge inspections by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee
on Chemical Weapons, R. Ekeus, and several other representatives. Our new
initiatives are designed to make a tangible contribution to the early
resolution of this issue.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 429
3
The Soviet side stated some time ago that it supported the United Kingdom
proposal in document CD/715. We continue to believe that this document could
serve as a basis for an integrated solution of the challenge inspection
problem. We note the support expressed by a number of delegations for the
United Kingdom proposal. Unfortunately, the United States delegation is not
among them.
Having considered the existing situation in all its aspects and wishing
to facilitate an early agreement, and also proceeding from the need to
establish the most stringent verification of the chemical weapons convention,
the Soviet Union has decided to go beyond the United Kingdom proposal and
adopt the principle of mandatory challenge inspections. As you know, we had
earlier agreed that a refusal of challenge inspections would not be permitted
in certain instances, e.g. in cases of the suspected use of chemical weapons,
as well as in the case of declared locations and facilities. Now we extend
this principle of mandatory challenge inspections to all possible cases,
making it a universal one.
In our view, the procedure of challenge inspections must reliably ensure
that it is impossible for a State to conceal the fact and the consequences of
a violation of the convention. We think that no more than 48 hours should
elapse between the time of the challenge and the arrival of the inspection
group at the inspection site.
The fact that we have adopted the principle of mandatory challenge
inspections does not, however, mean that we can disregard the possible
disclosure of sensitive data, which can happen during such inspections,
especially in cases of abuse. All the misgivings that we previously expressed
in this regard obviously remain valid.
Nevertheless, in accepting mandatory challenge inspections we proceed
from the understanding that measures should be adopted with a view to
minimizing the danger of disclosure of sensitive data, and that all parties
must be in an equal position as regards both the right to request a challenge
inspection and the obligation to meet such request.
First and foremost we consider that maximum possible use should be made
of the central idea of the United Kingdom proposal on challenge inspections
the possibility for the requested State to suggest alternative measures for
conducting inspections in order to demonstrate compliance with its
obligations. We suggest that the search be continued for opportunities to
elaborate such alternative measures, which may, if necessary and with a view
to ensuring that secrets unrelated to chemical weapons remain undisclosed,
offer a substitute for complete access to the facilities by the inspectors
(for example, visual observation of the facility from the outside,
photographing it, analysis of chemical samples, partial access inside the
facility, etc.).
It would seem that technical means of international verification using
remote control might also serve as a possible alternative measure.
It is our understanding that the possibility of using alternative
measures is generally recognized by the participants in the Conference. We
678
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.429
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
note that in its statement on 23 April this year the United States delegation
also spoke in favour of such a possibility.
It goes without saying that the time-limits for agreeing on the procedure
for conducting challenge inspections must be clearly defined. We would not
object if this time-limit does not exceed 48 hours. Whether the suggested
alternative measures are satisfactory should be decided, in our view, by the
State suspecting non-compliance with the Convention.
Apart from the alternative measures, in our view, attention should also
be paid to the development of the so-called "managed conduct" of inspections
suggested by the United States delegation. To preclude the possibility that
challenge inspections might be used for purposes incompatible with the task of
verifying compliance by States parties with their obligations, or for
disclosing secrets unrelated to chemical weapons, the convention should, in
our opinion, envisage concrete procedures for conducting such inspections. It
would seem feasible to devise measures which would effectively preclude any
possibility of using challenge inspections for obtaining secret data, and in
particular, to ensure that the methodologies and instruments used by
international inspectors in the course of inspections strictly correspond to
their tasks and that the requested State has access to all such instruments
for the purpose of testing them. The instruments used in the course of
international inspections should be standard and uniform for all States
parties. The technical parameters of such instruments must be strictly
limited to the purposes of verifying possible violations-of the convention.
Should the right of challenge be abused, the requested State would suffer
certain material harm related to both the leak of information and the
disruption of the normal operation of the facility or plant. In this
connection we consider that thought might be given to the desirability of
incorporating in the Convention a provision concerning States' liability,
including material liability, for abuse of the right to challenge inspections
and for any damage suffered by the receiving State as a result of an
unjustified inspection. In particular, States parties to the convention might
have the right to raise the question of compensation for the financial loss
caused as a result of a halt to the operations of a facility or the disclosure
of commercial or other secrets because of the conduct of challenge
inspections, if the inspection does not confirm non-compliance with the
convention.
Each request must obviously contain the necessary data: which provision
of the convention has been violated, where and when the suspected violation
has occurred or is occurring, the nature of the suspected violation. It is
equally clear that without such basic data no request could be met.
In suggesting measures which would prevent abuse of the right of
challenge and the use of inspections for purposes incompatible with the tasks
of verifying compliance with the obligations under the convention and the
disclosure of secrets which have nothing to do with chemical weapons, we
consider that such measures should be elaborated within the framework of the
principle of mandatory inspections, and not in opposition to it; they must
not weaken this principle or make any exceptions to it.
679
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 429
5
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
We believe that a request for inspection can be made by any State party
to the convention without exception. Everybody must have equal rights.
Similarly, there should be no discrimination as regards the form of ownership
of those locations and facilities for which an inspection is sought. A
request for inspection, in our opinion, can be submitted in relation to any
facility or location on the territory of a State party, or under its
jurisdiction or control, or belonging to any natural or legal person of a
State party, wherever they may be situated. This, in our view, is a necessary
condition to make challenge inspections a genuinely effective instrument.
We cannot accept the United States concept of a "fact-finding panel" made
up of representatives of a limited number of States, which would play the role
of a "filter". This concept seems to us to be undemocratic and would not
ensure equal rights for all parties to the convention. We understood the
United States delegation's statement on 23 April this year to mean that the
United States side is ready to consider the possibility of abandoning this
concept. We would like to learn the outcome of such consideration.
United States delegation continues to regard article XI as part of its
position, we would like to know in which cases it allows for the application
of this article envisaging the right to refuse challenge inspections.
Furthermore, we are not quite clear about the status of article XI of the
United States draft convention contained in document CD/500. In his statement
on 23 July this year, United States Ambassador Friedersdorf said in response
to our question that in the opinion of the United States side "challenge
inspection should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a State party
without distinction between private property or government ownership". In so
doing he referred to the amendment made by the United States delegation in
April last year to its draft convention (CD/685). That amendment, however,
concerns article X, which deals with special inspections, and has nothing to
do with article XI, which provides for ad hoc inspections. If the
To surr, up the above, our view of the challenge inspections provisions is
as follows:
Firstly, challenge inspections should be mandatory, without the right for
the requested State to refuse such inspections.
Secondly, the period between the time of request and the arrival of the
inspectors at the inspection site should not exceed 48 hours.
Thirdly, all States parties to the convention should have equal rights
and obligations as regards both submitting a request and accommodating it.
Fourthly, the request should contain the necessary basic data (what,
where, when, how).
Fifthly, it is necessry to adopt measures in order to prevent the use of
challenge inspection for purposes incompatible with the task of verifying
compliance with the convention.
Sixthly, the requested State may suggest alternative measures. Whether
they are satisfactory shall be decided by the requesting State.
680
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 429
6
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
Seventhly, the time within which agreement should be reached on the
verification procedure should not exceed 48 hours (during that same period
inspectors arrive at the inspection site).
There is no need to reiterate the importance of confidence-building
measures for speeding up the negotiations. Guided by the necessity to improve
the atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of the early conclusion of the
convention, the Soviet side has issued an invitation to visit the Soviet
military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical munitions
and observe the chemical weapon destruction technology at a mobile facility.
At present the Soviet delegation is working out practical details in
connection with this invitation. We are planning this visit for 7 and
8 October 1987. We intend to invite two persons from every delegation,
including observers, participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons. Delegations will be informed of all the necessary details
regarding this visit before the end of this session.
Later on, after the special chemical weapons destruction facility now
being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk has been constructed, we
will invite experts to visit it as well.
Some time ago the United States side invited us to visit the chemical
weapon destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. On 23 July United States
Ambassador Friedersdorf recalled this invitation. We have already informed
the United States delegation that we accept this invitation, which we view as
a step towards strengthening mutual confidence.
The question of the organs to be established under the convention has
recently been the subject of increasingly active and detailed debate. We
would like to present our views in this regard.
We believe that after signature of the convention, a preparatory
commission should be established, comprising States which have signed the
convention. The commission would, in particular, draw up the necessary
procedures for the entry into force of the convention and the beginning of its
implementation (recruitment of Technical Secretariat personnel, elaboration of
the rules of procedure for organs to be established under the convention,
financial issues, etc.). Then organs should be established which would become
operational after the convention enters into force. In-our view both the
organ composed of all the parties and the executive body should take decisions
on substantive issues by a qualified majority of two thirds of those
participating in the voting, and on other matters -- by a simple majority.
It is also necessary to consider such questions as conditions for the
entry into force of the convention, who will be the depositary, etc. We think
that ratification by 30-40 States is necessary for the convention to enter
into force. The United Kingdom proposal for 60 ratifications seems to us
somewhat excessive. As for the depositary, it seems appropriate that the
United Nations Secretary-General should perform this function.
There is very little time left before the summer session of the
Conference draws to a close. We believe that the early completion of work on
the chemical weapons convention demands that we make the most intensive
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.429
7
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
possible use of the opportunities that we have. In this connection I would
like to draw your attention to the question raised on 6 August by the Soviet
Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the holding of an additional session of
the conference this year to complete the bulk of the drafting of the
convention. Such a session could be held from mid-November (after the First
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has finished its discussion
of disarmament questions) until the end of December, and would focus only on
item 4 of its agenda.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for the kind
words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of
Japan, His Excellency Ambassador Yamada.
Mr. YAMADA (Japan): I wish to congratulate you most sincerely upon your
assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. With
your experience and skills you will no doubt lead us to a successful
conclusion of the summer session of the Conference. For my part, I will spare
no effort in extending co-operation for your important task. To
Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, who is leaving us, I wish every success in his
new assignment. May I also extend my delegation's warm welcome to the new
representative of Brazil to the Conference, Ambassador Castrioto de Azambuja.
I look forward to working closely with him.
Today I would like to make a brief statement on behalf of a group of
Western delegations on agenda item 1. As I stated in the 410th plenary on
30 April, a group of Western countries continue to attach high priority to
agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", and share the hope, expressed by many
delegations. in the spring and summer parts of this session, for commencement
of substantive work by an ad hoc committee on this item without further d l-a?:.
There are many issues and aspects related to a nuclear test ban on which:
the Conference can and must undertake serious work. Western delegations have
tabled a number of working papers to contribute to the substantive
consideration of this subject.
We believe that the draft mandate in document CD/521 tabled by a group of
Western countries on 20 July 1984, as well as the draft programme of work
contained in document CD/621 tabled by the same group of countries together*
with Norway on 24 July 1985, continue to. provide a viable framework in which.
to commence and carry out the substantive examination of many issues relatinC.
to a comprehensive test ban. At the same time, we have stood ready to
.consider positively any initiative to solve the mandate question.
Thus the group of countries on whose behalf I am speaking today has
approached this item throughout the spring and summer parts of this session
with a willingness to start practical work in an ad hoc committee at the
earliest possible opportunity and, for that purpose, to pursue actively the
search for common ground among the various positions thus far expresser.
Indeed, towards the.end of the spring session, there were considerable
grounds for hoping that our efforts to find consensus might be successful-,
thanks to the initiative taken by the President for the month of April,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.429
8
(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, in proposing a draft mandate as recorded
in the proceedings of the 410th plenary.
In the summer part of this session, our group has stood ready to take the
draft mandate proposed by the President for the month of April as a basis for
developing a consensus. There have been a number of delegations, not just in
our group but also in other groups, who felt that consensus might be reached
along this line, and we are curious as to why one group of delegations has not
found it fit to respond to the April President's initiative, as we requested,
and to join in this common endeavour.
We note in this connection that the draft mandate contained in
document CD/772 does not involve a new approach, the ideas contained therein
have been known to us since last year, notably through United Nations
General Assembly resolution 41/46 A, which a majority of countries in my group
did not find it possible to accept.
In concluding, let me reiterate the continued willingness of the group of
Western countries to pursue the search for a mandate which will enable the
Conference to start substantive and practical work on this item. We hope that
the valuable initiative taken by the Czechoslovak Ambassador, which in our
view continues to serve as a basis for reaching consensus, can be brought to
fruition, and strongly urge other delegations to join in that effort.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Japan for his statement, and for-his kind words addressed to the Chair. I
have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to
speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States of
America, His Excellency Ambassador Friedersdorf.
? Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, I have asked
for the floor this morning for only a moment. Our delegation has been
requested to make available the statement issued by the foreign ministers of
the North Atlantic Council at the conclusion of their recent meeting in
Reykjavik, on 12 June. Our delegation is pleased to be able to respond
positively to this request. I have asked that the statement be distributed to
all delegations.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
the United States for his statement. Are there any other requests to speak?
I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, His Excellency
Ambassador Garcia Robles.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I am sure that I
shall have the opportunity on another occasion before this session runs out to
extend to you the congratulations of my delegation. For the moment, I should
like to confine myself to the statement just made by the distinguished
representative of-Japan.
My delegation has always tried to back up its words with deeds. Thus,
for example, when we stated and repeated that we are prepared to seek a
formula that would lead to consensus on the issue of putting an end to all
nuclear weapon tests, we tried to follow up our words with something concrete,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.429
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
a text that would serve this purpose. And that has been the case this year.
My delegation, together with seven other delegations which are members of the
Group of 21, has submitted document CD/772 which contains a draft mandate for
an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda.
My delegation, along with the delegations of the Group of 21, had also
tabled another draft mandate, some two or three years ago, and it has not been
withdrawn, but unfortunately that draft mandate did not meet with consensus.
Consequently, we wished to consider -- not only here but also in New York --
which formula we could submit that would secure progress to achieve
consensus. This formula was recommended by the Assembly at the
fortieth session in a resolution. Despite the fact that, naturally, it
entailed concessions on our part, as compared with the draft we had submitted
previously, it did not meet with the consensus we desired. So, at the
forty-first session, we. made new concessions, substantial concessions, as
anyone who compares the two texts with the previous 1984 text will see.
The text to which I have referred, which appears in document CD/772, is
before the Conference, and those delegations like the distinguished delegation
of Japan, which has just taken the floor, may of course express their support
for the draft if what they wish is to give.concrete evidence -- practical
evidence, to use the word that is customary in such cases -- that they really
are seeking results.
What does the draft say? The draft says that the Conference on
Disarmament wishes to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda
with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on
the cessation of all nuclear test explosions. "With the objective" is a
formulation which is open to a wide variety of interpretations. For my
delegation it is an immediate objective, but for other delegations -- for
example, the delegation of the United States, which has stated this in similar
terms on several occasions -- it is a long-term objective. Fine, it has been
said repeatedly that when this draft resolution is adopted, the delegation of
Mexico can make a declaration indicating its interpretation. If the
delegation of the United States, or any other delegation, can also state its
own interpretation, this resolution can be approved by consensus without any
of the delegations present here having to abandon its position.
What does the draft go on to say? The draft says that the ad hoc
committee will set up two working groups which will deal, respectively, with
the following interrelated questions: Working Group I -- Content and scope of
the treaty, Working Group II -- Compliance and verification. This shows that
we do not wish to overlook any of the aspects of this issue. I hope that if
the words we have heard today reflect the feeling of delegations which had so
far opposed a draft such as the one I have referred to, before this session
ends, although it will be simply a symbolic gesture, that they will be able to
say that they agree with the contents of this draft and that they will agree
to our adopting it now so that we can start work in an ad hoc working group
next year as soon as we begin the next session of the Conference on
Disarmament.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.429 _ .
10
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Mexico for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of the
German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, my delegation will
present its position on the whole question of elaborating mandates of the
ad hoc committees, and especially the ad hoc committee under item 1, in more
detail at a later stage, but I would like to state today that my delegation
supports the mandate contained in document CD/772 presented by members of the
Group of 21.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
the German Democratic Republic for his statement, and I give the floor to the
representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Butler.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, I would prefer, if you would
permit me, follow the example set by Ambassador Garcia Robles and confine
myself at this stage. to remarks consequent upon the brief debate we are .now
holding, and hope that I will have another opportunity later to convey my
respects to you as President of this Conference for the month of August.
I last addressed the plenary of'this Conference on 30 July, and in that
statement made a number of remarks regarding item 1 of our agenda and
regarding the role that mandates as such have come to play in the work of this
Conference. I think I made it clear in that statement that my'delegation is
aware that we are within a hair's breadth of agreement on the issue of forming
an ad hoc committee under item 1 of our agenda, but that the consensus
required for such agreement was being denied to us by what I called in that
statement "a handful of delegations".
It is relevant in the context of the debate we heard this morning to
recall that statement, and to recall the contention of my delegation that we
are being prevented from doing this vital work by only a very small number of
delegations, and I think that this fact is reflected in the statement that has
been made by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan this morning on behalf of a
group of Western States, and I want it to be clear that my delegation was
included in the group of States for which the Ambassador of Japan was
speaking. And in his statement he made it very clear -- and I suggest that
this is asbolutely relevant to the state of affairs of this Conference under
item 1 -- he made it.very clear that a proposal had been put to the Conference
in April by the then President of the Conference, the Ambassador of
Czechoslovakia, that that proposal is widely supported, and from a group of
Western States, the clear indication has been given that we are prepared to
seek consensus on the basis of that proposal. What has been made clear by the
Ambassador of Japan this morning is that we have not even been given an answer
to that position. Not an answer. And that, Mr. President, is very
disappointing. The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has said that his
delegation prefers action rather than words. I accept that: so does mine,
and I would put it to him that an action that would move us towards consensus
on this issue would be for delegations to accept the proposal made by a group
of Western States, that we start to do business, to work with each other
towards a consensus on the basis of the proposal that has been made by the
President for the month of April. In this sense I would draw attention to
685
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 429
11
that part. of the distinguished Ambassador of Japan's statement that points out
that we have made a proposal to which there has been no answer. May we please
have an answer and then work, as Ambassador Garcia Robles has said, towards
consensus so that we can start in a committee on this item at the beginning of
1988.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French), I thank the representative of
Australia for his statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take
the floor? As there are none, I should like to inform the Conference that the
secretariat is now preparing the first draft of the technical part of the
annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. The
document will be available under the symbol CD/WP.288 in all official
languages between Thursday 13 and Friday, 14 August. I intend to ask the
Conference to hold an informal meeting on Tuesday, 18 August, immediately
following the plenary meeting, to begin the first reading of the technical
part of the report to the General Assembly.
At the end of this week the secretariat will also circulate document
CD/WP.287, containing the technical part of the report of the conference to
the forty-first session of the General Assembly on the comprehensive programme
of disarmament. We shall also consider this document in the course of next
week.
The secretariat is now also preparing the substantive paragraphs on the
agenda items on which the Conference has not set up subsidiary bodies, that is
agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7. As far as agenda item 2 is concerned --
"Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" -- the
secretariat will reflect in that draft the exchanges of views we have had
during the informal meetings on this item.
Next I should like to point out that the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee
on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which was to be held today in
room I at 6 p.m. has been cancelled. The Committee will meet on Thursday and
Friday at 3 p.m. in this room, with full interpretation services.
I should like to remind you that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective
International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use
or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this room immediately
following the plenary.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday,
13 August 1987 at 10 a.m. The plenary is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11 a.m.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.430
13 August 1987
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 13 August 1987, at 10 a.m.
President Mr. Pierre Morel (France)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the
430th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will today
continue its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and
of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in
accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to raise
any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.
The secretariat has today circulated document CD/778, which contains the
progress report on the twenty-fourth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific
Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify
Seismic Events. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Group, Mr. Ola Dahlman, of'Sweden,
will introduce this report to the Conference today at the end of the.list of
speakers.
I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mexico and the Chairman of the
Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I now give the floor to the
representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Ekeus.
Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, may I first express my delegation's
delight at seeing you preside over the Conference during this difficult month.
of August. We are convinced that your many personal qualities will indeed
help to steer us through the many difficulties facing the Conference and bring
this year's session to a successful conclusion. My delegation pledges its
full support to your endeavours. I would ask the delegation of Ethiopia to
convey to His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe our gratitude for the calm and
effective manner in which he directed the work of the Conference during the
month of July.
Ambassador Saad Alfarargi is now leaving the Conference. His presidency
during the month of June was characterized by the great diplomatic skills and
political judgement with which he has represented Egypt in the Conference for
more than four years. On a personal note, I must say that close co-operation
with Ambassador Alfararqi during those years has been of great support to me
and my delegation. It is also with great regret that we have noted the
departure of Ambassador Cromartie from the Conference. I had from my arrival
the privilege of workinq closely and for long periods, on a daily basis, with
Ambassador Cromartie, particularly on the chemical weapons convention. His
intellectual capacity, combined with a rare sense of fairness and reason, will
be badly missed. I ask the delegation of the United Kingdom to convey to
Ambassador Cromartie our wishes for a soeedv recovery. I would also take this
opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria and to wish him
every success in his important assignment in Nigeria. May I also take this
opportunity to welcome His Excellency Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil and
His Excellency Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. We are looking forward to
co-operating with the two Ambassadors within the Group of 21 as well as within
the Conference.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.430
3
,(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)
In my intervention today I shall focus on the issue of radiological
weapons, and specifically on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear
facilities. In doing so I should like first of all to express the gratitude
of my delegation to Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary for his skilful
chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and to the two
co-ordinators of contact groups A and B, Mr. Numata of Japan and Mr. Wayarabi
of Indonesia. 0
Having introduced the item concerning the prohibition of attacks on
nuclear facilities as far back as 1980, Sweden is known to give priority to
the early completion of a draft treaty on this subject, which constitutes a
major security concern for Sweden, as it does for many other countries. It is
therefore natural that I should make special mention of the untiring efforts
of Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia, who, as Co-ordinator of Contact Group B, has
been able through patience, dedication and skill to obtain some clarity on the
different views and approaches to the subject entrusted to him.
Despite efforts by many delegations, work on the prohibition of attacks
on nuclear facilities in 1986 and 1987 has been disappointing. As far as the
work is concerned, we are now back in 1983, but at that time at least we
seemed to share a common goal and issues of substance were discussed among
delegations. In the past two years we have seen how the very purpose of a
.prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations has been questioned. This has
not only affected our chances of making progress towards banning attacks on
nuclear facilities, but could also imperil the role of this Conference as the
sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.
The first and foremost question to be addressed is this: What is
the aim of the treaty or treaties that we are trying to elaborate in the
Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons? In this context we might well keep
in mind that the Committee was set up under an agenda item entitled "New types
of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological
weapons".
A definition of weapons of mass destruction was given right back in 1948
in resolution S/C.3/30 of the then Commission for Conventional Armaments under
the United Nations Security Council. "Radioactive material weapons" were then
defined as weapons of mass destruction. Other such weapons were "atomic
explosive weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons
developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive
effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".
The specific question of radiological weapons was raised for the first
time at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969, when the
Assembly in resolution 2602 C (}CXIV), invited the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament, inter alia, to consider effective methods of control against
the use of radiological methods of warfare, independently of efforts in the
field of nuclear disarmament. It is interesting to note that as early as 1969
the General Assembly did not limit the issue to radiological weapons but
addressed the whole concept of radiological warfare.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
4
(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)
This fundamental approach is equally valid today. It is thus our firm
view that the main purpose in dealing with this agenda item should be to
prohibit radiologically-caused mass destruction. This means that the use of
radioactive material for hostile purposes causing destruction, damage or
injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material should
be prohibited irrespective of the method applied. From this point of view it
matters little whether the radioactive material causing mass destruction comes
from the attacker's weapons or from nuclear installations in the country of
the attacked.
One delegation has argued -- its position is reflected in a footnote to
the report of Contact Group B - that a treaty based on the criterion of mass
destruction would "weaken the protection afforded to nuclear facilities under
present international law". My delegation is not aware of any international
law that provides such protection. The only specific international norm in
this respect is contained in the 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva
Conventions on the rules of war. The Swedish delegation considers the
articles in question far too vague and conditional to be satisfactory. They
do not cover all kinds of installations capable of producing mass destruction
if destroyed, but only "nuclear electrical generating stations". Furthermore,
they leave far too much scope for subjective assessments by individual
commanders for the protection to be satisfactory. Let me quote article 56,
paragraph 2 (b) of Protocol I: it states that the protection against attack
shall cease if the nuclear electrical generating station "provides electric
power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if
such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support".
The insufficiency of such a prohibition was recognized by the negotiators
of the Protocol themselves. In article 56, paragraph 6 they state that the
high contracting parties "are urged to conclude further agreements among
themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous
forces". It is thus difficult to understand how such a legal regime can be
weakened by a prohibition based on the mass destruction criterion, which stems
from the very title of the item addressed in the Committee.
Finally, I note with regret that very few countries have even ratified
this Protocol. For instance, none of the members of the CD belonging to the
two military pacts has ratified it.
It has been stated in the same context that a treaty as proposed by
Sweden would amount to "legitimizing attacks on nuclear facilities" that are
not covered by the specifications. Such an argument is unacceptable to my
delegation. If any progress we make in any given field of arms limitation and
disarmament that prohibits a particular kind of warfare or a special kind of
weapon is interpreted as legitimizing other kinds of warfare or other kinds of
weapons, then the whole process of disarmament will be called into question.
For Sweden, the basic rule of the non-use of force is laid down in the Charter
of the United Nations. Any specific agreed prohibition serves to strengthen
the Charter, not to weaken it.
It has also been proposed that the treaty should cover nuclear reactors
and "any other facility for the production, handling, treatment, processing or
storage of nuclear fuel or other nuclear material". Such a definition is
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV,4 30
5
(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)
meaningless unless the term "nuclear material" is well defined. As it stands,
most industrial processes would be covered. Nuclear material is present in
television sets, watches, hospital equipment, construction elements and,
indeed, in the human body itself. However, no definition of the term has been
forthcoming.
What is probably meant by such a proposal is that all installations
connected with the nuclear power industry should be covered, that is to say,
that the aim of a prohibition of?attacks should be to protect nuclear
installations themselves so as to ensure the sovereign right of States to
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The promotion of nuclear energy
is not a task for a disarmament body. The task given to the Conference on
Disarmament is not the protection of industrial installations but the
prohibition of the use for hostile purposes of the radioactive material in
nuclear installations as a means of mass destruction.
This calls for a clear definition that specifies which nuclear facilities
contain amounts of radioactive material such as to cause damage substantial
enough to qualify as mass destruction. Having endeavoured to identify the
facilities that would meet this criterion, Sweden has concluded that a
prohibition of attacks should cover four categories of facilities. They are
nuclear reactors, intermediate spent-fuel storages, reprocessing plants and
waste deposits. Furthermore, these facilities must be of a certain size or
capacity in order to contain enough radioactive material to qualify as being
potentially dangerous from the viewpoint of mass destruction.
The basic norm used by Sweden to calculate mass destruction is a military
one: immediate denial of an area of more than one square kilometre would be
considered mass destruction. This norm is different from the one frequently
used in discussing radioactive protection in peacetime, which is the making of
Permanent residence in a specified area impossible for a certain period.
It has thus been estimated that the amount of radioactive material
required -- uniformly spread over one square kilometre -- to kill people who
stay in the area for a few hours would be of the order of 1018 becguerels.
It has further been estimated that a reactor of more than about 10 megawatts
thermal Dower operating at radioactive saturation level would contain enough
radioactive material to provide 1018 becquerels or more for 10 hours after
an attack on the reactor - the time required for release and settling on the
qround.
The figures given -- 1018 becquerels and 10 megawatts -- are
order-of-magnitude values. They are derived from a reasonable assumption
related to area denial of one square kilometre. Therefore, they could
certainly be subject to discussion. If a value higher than 1018 becquerels
is chosen, fewer facilities will be covered and a lower value will increase
the number of facilities covered. The increase in the number of facilities
which results from lowering the value of 1017 becquerels and 1 megawatt is
not very large, however.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
t,y/rv.+.av
(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)
A significant factor in the release of radioactive material from a
reactor in operation is the driving force provided by the reactor itself.
Smaller reactors would provide a smaller driving force, and thus the effect
would be less radioactivity.
It has been argued that the imposition of such thresholds would be
considered discriminatory against developing countries, since in many cases
their nuclear facilities do not reach the threshold. The fact is that a
number of developing countries have nuclear installations that would be
covered by the mass destruction criterion. Some 16 power reactors are in
operation in developing countries, and almost 20 more are under construction.
This adds to the importance of the problem for developing and industrialized
countries alike. A dozen research reactors with a capacity of 10 megawatts or
more also operate in developing countries. In the range 1-10 megawatts there
are another 20 reactors.
Given an in-depth discussion of the criterion and negotiations on the
relevant thresholds, the concept just outlined seems to have the overwhelming
support of members of the Conference, in all kinds of groups too. The fact
that this approach is based on the very premise of the 1979 joint
United States-USSR proposal, namely a commitment not "to employ radioactive
material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage or injury by means
of the radiation produced by the decay of such material", gives us hope that
both authors of that proposal will seriously consider an attack prohibition
based on the mass destruction criterion.
However, many delegations which support the mass destruction criterion
want to add yet.another, namely that only installations used for peaceful
purposes should be covered by the provisions of a treaty. Some delegations
want the treaty to cover only IAEA-safeguarded installations. The concern is
that military facilities and production for military purposes would herwise
be exempt from attack. While fully understanding such concerns, my ot
submits that the potential for mass destruction is the same whatever the
intended use of a particular facility. In the opinion of Sweden, the
necessity of preventing mass destruction should at any given moment have
priority over military interests.
Furthermore, typical military installations such as nuclear weapon
production plants are not included. Secondly, the provisions cover only
attacks that would cause the release or dissemination of radioactive
material. Thirdly, the Swedish proposal includes on-site verification of
installations proposed for inclusion in the register. these regulations, the
, the
opinion that, if a State party chooses to comply with possible military or non-military nature of a facility would be considered to
be of less concern to the international community than the need to prevent
mass destruction. If our proposal is studied in detail, it should become
quite clear that any concern about the possible sanctioning of military
activities-is not called for.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
7
(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)
It should be emphasized that this approach does not introduce additional
criteria to that of mass destruction. It treats all nuclear facilities in an
equal manner -- be they under IAEA safeguards or not. It treats all States in
an equal manner -- be they parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or not.
When considering whether the prohibition of attack should apply
irrespective of the peaceful or military use of a certain facility, the
crucial question to ask is whether or not an attack -- apart from the mass
destruction effect -- would effectively damage the war effort of the country
attacked. As I have stated, the categories which do pose a mass destruction
risk are limited in number. The relevant facilities are nuclear electricity
generating reactors, reprocessing plants, spent fuel storages, waste storages
and larger research reactors.
It is obvious that the first type of facility, the power reactor, could
make a direct contribution to a country's war effort through that country's
electricity supply. It therefore represents a credible military target.
However, with the high precision of modern weaponry, the electricity supply
could be cut without attacking the reactor itself.
It could also be urged that reprocessing plants, which can produce
plutonioum for weapons purposes, pose a more serious problem. However, there
is a considerable time-lag between plutonium production and subsequent nuclear
weapon production. It is therefore difficult to see that any real military
advantage could be gain during a conflict by attacking a military reprocessing
plant, especially in view of the arsenals of nuclear weapons already existing
in the world.
In the opinion of my delegation a treaty covering these kinds of
installation with a view to preventing mass destruction is not only necessary,
but also realistic and feasible from a military point of view. Finally, the
other categories of nuclear facility such as spent-fuel and nuclear-waste
deposits do not represent credible military targets and could therefore also
realistically be covered by a prohibition of attacks.
To sum up, Sweden's position regarding a prohibition of attacks against
nuclear facilities is, we believe, clear, realistic and feasible. In the
report of Contact Group B, my delegation would have preferred different sets
of elements to be combined in a way that made the choices plain. We were,
however, for some reason not able to reach a consensus on maximum clarity in
the report. Still, a footnote to the "Scope" provision based on the mass
destruction criterion makes clear that there exists only one approach that
constitutes a consistent set of elements for a draft treaty. If we are to use
the Conference on Disarmament to reach a global prohibition of attacks against
nuclear facilities, a basis for such a ban is provided in that alternative.
Permit me in this statment also to make some brief remarks related to
another item on our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.430
(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)
The continued deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee, under the able
leadership of Ambassador Pugliese, have been very useful. The Committee has
benefited from valuable presentations, such as that of the Canadian PAXSAT for
space-to-space and space-to-earth verification. The analysis of legal and
technical matters, as'well as definitions, which has taken place this year has
made a valuable contribution.
Substantive proposals have been made. I can, for instance, refer to the
main provisions of a treaty text submitted by two delegations, the German
Democratic Republic and Mongolia. As nothing indicating the contrary has been
brought forward in the Committee, my delegation also finds quite interesting
the idea voiced by Argentina that the Conference's report could register
statements by member States that they have not permanently deployed weapons in
space.
The centrepiece of the work of the Committee has been and, in the opinion
of my delegation, must continue to be proposals and initiatives aimed at
preventing an arms race in outer space. Only the need to examine possible
measures to that end warrants the efforts of the Conference on the item. That
such an examination takes place does as such not prejudice the conclusions to
be drawn by the Committee. Statements made have illustrated substantial
differences of opinion among States on the adequacy of present legal barriers
to an arms race in outer space, on the urgency of additional measures and on
the scope and contents of such measures. It has also been disputed whether
such measures could be verified at all. The fact that positions are indeed
divergent does not, however, detract from, but add to. the importance of
continued and deepened consideration of the matter.
One aspect of military space activities that might constitute a threat to
the vital national interests of many States is the development of
anti-satellite weapons. There is a strong case for pursuing the matter of a
global prohibition of ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A comprehensive ban
would cover the development, testing, deployment and use of such weapons.
A number of political and technical problems would have to be solved
before such a comprehensive ban could be realized. It has been emphasized
that a workable definition of ASAT weapons must be laid down. Verification
arrangements, possibly of a very far-reaching character, would have to be
devised. The Ad hoc Committee should continue to explore problems of this
nature in order to prepare the ground for substantive negotiations.
A number of partial measures to control or constrain ASAT developments
have been discussed. They range from registration and information on relevant
activities to arrangements to prevent incidents and restrictions on the
testing and deployment of specific, dedicated ASAT systems. Substantive
consideration of those proposals can also hopefully serve to bring about a
common understanding on the role of various types of satellite for
international security, and on desirable approaches to avoid the deployment of
ASAT weapons.
694
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.430
9
(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)
The implementation of even limited measures to check such a development
could be of major significance. Any measure restricting the Possibility of
carrying out an ASAT mission in a reliable way may reduce crisis instability,
and thus benefit international security.
On several occasions my delegation has made it clear that the Conference
on Disarmament would benefit from the contribution of scientific expertise on
space technology. Scientific and technological development in outer space
activiites is dynamic. Our work is suffering from a lack of up-to-date
information on such developments. The deliberations in the Ad hoc Committee
would be greatly facilitated if it became possible to obtain a jointly shared
Perception of basic elements in space technology and development that is of
relevance for the work of the Conference. The Outer Space Workshop in
Montreal, Canada, in May this year was an effective demonstration of the
usefulness of a scientific Presentation of the state of the art relating to
outer space, techniques.
With these considerations and experiences in mind, my delegation would
deem it an important step if the Conference could consider the possibility of
organizing a meeting of scientific or technical experts on space issues during
its 1988 session, preferably' during the first part of the session. During
such a meeting, which should be of ad hoc character and of limited duration
(one to two weeks), definitions and verification techniques relevant to
anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellite warfare could be addressed.
Furthermore, trends and long-term prospects regarding the possible or
Potential weaponization of space could be addressed. Deepened knowledge and
expanded overviews would make the delegations better equipped to advance the
work of the Ad hoc Committee in a serious and constructive way.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Sweden for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I now give the
floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
His Excellency Ambassador Nazarkin.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): In its statement today, the Soviet delegation intends to
concentrate on two issues, a nuclear test ban and the Prevention of an arms
race in outer space.
Like many other delegations Present in this hall, we cannot help being
concerned about the fact that item 1 on the agenda of the Conference continues
to be considered item 1 only formally, without finding expression in concrete
negotiations leading to a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon
tests.
Cessation and prohibition of such tests undoubtedly depends above all on
the Soviet Union and the United States, which, in accordance with the
Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General
Assembly devoted to disarmament, bear special responsibility'for achieving the
goals of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union's position on this problem is
imbued with awareness of that responsibility. Suffice it to recall that we
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
maintained a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for more than
18 months. There is no forum -- bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral -- in
which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to participate in order to work
towards a radical solution of the nuclear test issue.
Unfortunately, the United States has a diametrically opposite position:
both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the Soviet-United States
bilateral meetings of experts in Geneva, the United States is objecting to the
holding of full-scale negotiations on a complete and general prohibition of
nuclear weapon tests. The main "argument" in this respect has been that, in
the current circumstances, the cessation of nuclear tests would undermine the
concept of "nuclear deterrence" and that a stage-by-stage advance towards a
complete cessation of nuclear tests will be possible in the future in
proportion to the progress in the field of nuclear and conventional
disarmament. This approach leaves the international community to console
itself with the thought that, when there are no nuclear weapons, there will be
nothing to test. And when account is taken of another statement by the
United States delegation to the effect that nuclear weapons will, for the
foreseeable future, remain the basis of the United States security, the
present United States position can hardly be considered positive. That
position signifies a notable withdrawal by the United States from what it had
been advocating until a relatively short while ago.
The United States last reaffirmed its agreement in principle to a nuclear
test ban as an independent priority measure in July 1980. I am referring to
the joint report to the Committee on Disarmament by the United. States, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as the participants in the tripartite
negotiations on banning nuclear tests. Paragraph 4 of the report stated that:
"The negotiating.parties are seeking a treaty that for decades has
been given one of the highest priorities in the field of arms limitation,
and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States continue
to attach great importance to it".
That report was transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the
representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union
to the Committee as document CD/130, of 30 July 1980. The report also
emphasized the importance attached by the three sides to the prohibition of
nuclear tests.
Paragraph 6 of the report stated:
"The objectives which the negotiating parties seek to achieve as the
result of this treaty are important to all mankind. Specifically, they
seek to attain a treaty which will make a major contribution to the
shared objectives of constraininq the nuclear arms race, curbing the
spread of nuclear weapons, and strengthening international peace and
security" (CD/130).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.430
11
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
It is well known that these tripartite negotiations, which were close to
a successful conclusion, were never resumed owing to the new position on the
matter adopted by the United States under the Reagan Administration. That the
United States position had changed was stated, in particular, in the speech
made by the then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Mr. Rostow, at the meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on
9 February 1982. It was clear from that speech that the Reagan Administration
had transferred test-ban issues from the category of first-priority goals to
that of long-term goals, and that it had begun to relate a nuclear test ban
"to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent
forces". "We do not believe" said Mr. Rostow, "that, under present
circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of
nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance"
(CD/PV.152, p. 13).
Later, the United States expressed its position in the formula which was,
in particular, repeated by Ambassador Hansen at the meeting of the Conference
on Disarmament on 24 February this year. That formula reads:
"The United States sees a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a
long-term objective which must be viewed in the context of a time when
the United States and its allies do not depend on nuclear deterrence to
ensure international security and stability" (CD/PV.391, p. 11).
I am recalling this since, even in the period prior to the 1980s, when
the United States recognized the priority of a comprehensive nuclear test ban,
it stood by the concept of nuclear deterrence. What has happened now? Why
has the United States abruptly changed its position? I address this question
to the United States delegation and I call upon it to demonstrate a more
constructive attitude to an issue that rightfully occupies the first place on
the agenda of the Conference.
It goes without saying that Soviet-United States agreement in favour of a
test ban would be of great significance. However, because of their bilateral
character the Soviet-United States talks cannot provide a complete and general
solution to this problem. Consequently, we also consider it necessary to
begin concrete negotiations within the framework of the Conference on
Disarmament as well. The concurrent holding of multilateral negotiations --
within the framework of the Conference -- and bilateral negotiations with the
United States would not be contradictory. On the contrary, the concurrent
pursuit of negotiations in this way would merely hasten the achievement of the
ultimate goal.
With a view to stimulating an immediate start on negotiations at the
Conference, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have submitted a
set of "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition
of nuclear weapon tests". It was introduced in the Conference on Disarmament
on 9 July this year by Mr. V.F. Petrovsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR, and has been circulated as document CD/756. We regard this
document as a possible basis for multilateral negotiations aimed at
elaborating the treaty in question. At the same time, we are ready to study
constructively any other proposals or views aimed at ensuring the early
conclusion of such a treaty.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
cu/rv.4su
12 --- -
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
In drafting the "Basic provisions", the sponsors took into account
numerous views and ideas expressed earlier by other participants in the
Conference. To a large degree, this concerns the problem of verification.
The document proposes an extremely varied "assortment" of forms and methods of
verification, both national and international, including some not previously
suggested or discussed.
I would like-to recall that the socialist countries' proposal envisages
the use of national technical means of verification, the creation of an
international seismic verification system with a network of standard seismic
stations that would function with the participation of representatives of an
international inspectorate, verification -- again with the participation of
international inspectors -- of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions at test
sites, and mandatory on-site. inspections without the right of refusal. The
proposal also envisages co-operation in the international exchange of data on
atmospheric radioactivity. I should like to dwell on this matter a little
later.
It is clear that the concrete needs for particular forms of verification,
including seismic verification, can be determined only in the process of
devising the entire system for verifying the non-conduct of nuclear
explosions. In our view, the time has come to start developing such a system.
This is what prompted the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment
of a special group of scientific experts charged with preparing scientifically
based recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system'
for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests. This proposal
was put forward in the statement by E.A. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union, on 6 August. Such a group could consider all the
aspects of verification in their relationship to one another, including
seismic data exchange, on-site inspections, standard characteristics of
seismic stations, means of monitoring atmospheric radioactivity, etc.
Attention should also be oaid..to the possible financial implications of the
establishment of a verification system.
In making this proposal for a group of scientific experts, we also
proceed from the need to put work on a nuclear test ban on a practical footing
as soon as possible. I should like to take this opportunity to express our
support for the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda
that was recently formally submitted by Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia as document CD/772. As is well
known, because of the difficulties concerning a mandate for an ad hoc
committee on agenda item 1, no such work is yet being done.
With regard to the group of scientific experts on verification, we
suggest that, before the end of this year's session, the Conference on
Disarmament should take a decision in principle to establish the proposed
group at the beginning of the Conference's next annual session.
The fact that the Soviet Union has put forward the idea of establishing a
group of scientific experts does not, of course, detract from the role that we
asc:?ibe to the work of the seismic experts, on which their distinguished
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
13
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, is, it seems, to report to the Conference today. That
group is currently working on an.important development designed to lift the
machinery for seismic verification to a qualitatively new stage -- the
exchange of level II seismic data. It also has important tasks to fulfil in
connection with preparations for the international experiment next year, 1988.
Our proposal for the establishment of a group of experts on verification
is, on the whole, aimed at accomulishing the logical next step.
In his statement before the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August,
Minister Shevardnadze mentioned that the USSR Academy of Sciences had reached
a new agreement with United States colleagues on the installation of
monitoring instruments and on the exchange of data from them. This agreement
on the Soviet-United States "Verification of compliance with a
nuclear-test-ban treaty" project provides in particular that, in Soviet
territory, three seismic stations in Kazakhstan will continue work under the
project until at least 15 December this year. In August or September of this
year, a chemical explosion with a yield of up to 10 tonnes will be carried out
at or near a test site in Kazakhstan in order to calibrate the seismic
stations. Use will also be made for calibration purposes of industrial
explosions in the vicinity of the stations.
Beginning in January 1988, the three stations in Kazakhstan will be
relocated at a distance of over 1,000 kilometres from the test site. The
purpose of this transfer is, firstly, to test the possibility of low-threshold
monitoring of explosions of about 1 kiloton and, secondly, to support the
international experiment in the exchange of level II seismic data in 1988.
However, besides seismic devices, there are also many other achievements
of modern science and technology that can be used for verification purposes.
I should like to recall in this context that, in his statement before the
Conference, Minister Shevardnadze proposed the establishment of an
international system of global radiation safety monitoring using space
communication links. The main functions of such a system could be making
monitoring of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition
of nuclear weapon tests more effective; monitoring the status of pollution of
the atmosphere, the soil, and ground and sea water on a global and regional
scale; collecting, collating and analysing data on, and identifying trends in
the radiation situation; prompt acquisition of data on the radiation
situation as a result of accidents at nuclear facilities acid nuclear power
stations or of unauthorized nuclear. explosions; forecasting. of the possible
consequences, etc.
We proceed from the idea that such a system of global radiation safety
monitoring could be established even before the entry into force of the treaty
on the complete and general prohibition of. nuclear weapon tests. The question
of establishing this system could be discussed within the special group of
scientific experts on verification that we are proposing.
Permit me now to move on to item 5 of the Conference's agenda, entitled
"Prevention of an arms race in outer space".
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
-14 .-.
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
The Soviet Union considers the task of preventing the transfer of the
arms race to outer space as one of the most urgent of our time and it intends,
as the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, emphasized in his
statement, to work towards Na strict and universal ban on deployment of any
weapons in outer space".
Our proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment
in outer space of weapons of any kind and of a treaty banning the use of force
in outer space and from outer space against the Earth remain on the table.
We have reaffirmed on more than one occasion our willingness to come to
an agreement even on partial measures, for example, on the immunity of
artificial Earth satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board and on
banning the development of new anti-satellite systems and eliminating the
existing ones.
The Conference also has before it a joint. document from the delegations
of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, entitled "Main provisions of a
treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the
immunity of space objects" (CD/777 of 31 July this year)-, which we support.
The views expressed by a number of other delegations also deserve most
serious consideration. For example, in his statement on 21 July this year,
the head of the Indian delegation, Ambassador Teja, showed the urgent need for
the prohibition as soon as possible of the development, testing and deployment
of new anti-satellite systems and for elimination of such systems as already
exist, and also expressed interesting ideas about ensuring the immunity of
artificial Earth satellites. In his statement on 7 July, the distinguished
representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, also expressed support for the
view that "space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not
be attacked and should be duly protected". We have also noted the readiness
expressed by the delegation of China to proceed, as a first step, to
negotiations on the banning of anti-satellite systems and we are, of course,
in full agreement with Ambassador Fan's view that this measure must be
complemented by other steps aimed at preventing an arms race in space.
Interesting views on agenda item 5 have been expressed today by the
representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus. We shall, of course, study those
views attentively.
The socialist countries' proposals, together with the ideas of other
delegations, constitute for the Conference on Disarmament useful assets that
could serve as a good basis for business-like work on preventing an arms race
in outer space.
It goes without saying that agreement on this issue without reliable
verification is unthinkable. In this connection, I should like to recall
that, on 17 March this year, the Soviet delegation proposed that consideration
should be given to the possibility of establishing an international system, to
include an international inspectorate, for verifying the non-deployment in'
outer space of weapons of any kind. Our proposal met with great interest and
a number of questions were put to us in order better to understand its essence.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430 .
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
Many of those questions were answered in principle in the statement by
the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, on 6 August. Today,
the Soviet delegation would like to make some further clarifications.
The Soviet Union is proposing that a start should be made on establishing
a verification system right away. without waiting for the conclusion of the
corresponding agreement on space, so that the system can be operational as
soon as possible. The principal purpose of such verification would be to
determine that objects launched into space were not weapons and were not
equipped with weapons of any kind. The concrete list of the systems and
devices that the verification bodies should not allow to be launched into
space would have to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations. The
intention is that the verification system could be refined if an international
agreement or agreements are drawn up.
We are convinced that on-site inspection immediately before launch is the
simplest and most effective way of making sure that objects launched into
space are not equipped with weapons of any kind. The distinguished Ambassador
of Argentina, Mr. Cimpora, also talked about this point in his statement on
21 July. Such inspection might begin not long before the object to be
launched into space is installed on the carrier rocket or other launch
vehicle. However, should the future agreement provide for a complete ban on
space strike weapons, the Soviet Union would, as Minister Shevardnadze stated,
be "willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants,
laboratories, testing centres, etc." The verification system we propose would
provide for groups of inspectors to be present permanently at all sites for
the launching of space objects with a view to verifying all such objects
irrespective of their means of launching. In addition, representatives of the
secretariat would be given in good time information on each upcoming launch,
including the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the
object to be launched and the time of the launch. In cases where launches
were infrequent, use could be made of inspections on the basis of prior
notifications of the launches, instead of permanently stationing inspectors at
the launch sites. Should an undeclared launch be suspected, the inspectorate
would have the right to request the relevant information from specially
designated observatories, a list of which would be compiled by the time the
verification system became operational" and also to make, if necessary, a
special on-site inspection if the launch could have been made from an
undeclared launching. site.
What is meant here is, of course, the verification of the non-stationing
in space of weapons of any kind, and not the verification of launches of
ballistic missiles unconnected with the placing of any devices in an orbit for
an artificial Earth satellite or on a flight path towards other celestial
bodies.
Although we view an international inspectorate as the principal element
of a possible verification system, this does not preclude the possibility of
establishing other structures, for example, means of tracking space objects,
within the framework of the inspectorate.
701
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
As experience of negotiations that have reached an advanced stage -- for
example, those on prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons -- shows, it
would be advisable to make provision within the framework of the verification
system for some central. executive body and secretariat. The corps of
inspectors and the number of inspection groups would have to be defined taking
into account the need for the verification to cover all sites or ranges for
the launching of space objects. From the organizational point of view, the
verification system could function either independently or within the
framework of a world space organization once that is set up. It would be
advisable to provide for a certain link between the verification system and
the United Nations bodies to which States already, as is provided for by the
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, send
general-information on the objects they launch into space.
Naturally, specific questions relating to the composition, structure,
organization and financing of the verification system should be the subject of
negotiation. Account might be taken in this respect of the experience in
devising measures and machinery for verifying compliance with disarmament
agreements in other fields.
In conclusion, I should like to express thanks to all the delegations
which have expressed support for the Soviet proposal for a system to verify
the non-stationing of weapons in space.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I have noted the
reminder of his country's proposal of last week for a special group of
scientific experts, which will entail the appropriate consultations.
I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, His Excellency
Ambassador Garcia Robles.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I
would like to begin this brief statement by expressing my delegation's
pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on
Disarmament, and at the fact that this has happened in what could well be
considered the most important month of each year as far as the work of the
Conference is concerned. I take this opportunity to place on record once
again my delegation's appreciation for the exemplary manner in which your
predecessor, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Terrefe,
carried out his functions. I am pleased to welcome among us the new
representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, and the new
representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo. Lastly, I wish to
state how much we regret the fact that Ambassador Saad Alfarargi will soon be
leaving. For almost four years he has headed the delegation of Egypt, and
just two months ago he gave us tangible proof of his skill in conducting the
deliberations of a multilateral body such as this.
702
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV. 430
17
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
At the latest meeting of the Conference on Disarmament two days ago, the
distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, speaking, in his
words, "on behalf of a group of Western delegations" and referring to agenda
item 1, said that they were still prepared "to start practical work in an
ad hoc committee at the earliest possible opportunity" with a view to finding
"common ground among the various positions thus far expressed."
Shortly afterwards, at the same meeting, the distinguished representative
of Australia, Ambassador Butler, said that his delegation "was included in the
group of States for which the Ambassador of Japan was speaking", that they had
"made a proposal to which there has been no answer", and that what could move
us towards consensus on this issue "would be for delegations to accept the
proposal made by a group of Western States ... on the basis of the proposal.
that has been made by the President for the month of April".
In order to Place things in their context, it is important to have clear
ideas which correspond to reality on the following basic points. First of
all, the only -- I emphasize this, the only -- draft mandate submitted to the
Conference on Disarmament in the current year 1987 is.that reproduced in
document CD/772 sponsored by the delegations of Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico,
Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. This mandate faithfully
reflects the request addressed to the Conference on Disarmament by the
General Assembly in paragraph 5 of resolution 41/46A,which was adopted on
3 December 1986 by the overwhelming' majority of 135 votes in favour and
only 3 against.
Secondly, in submitting this draft to the Conference on behalf of the
sponsors at the 422nd meeting on 16 July last, we stated the following:
"We venture to hope that the objective study of this draft and its
comparison to those circulated between 1984 and now will highlig;:- its
constructive spirit and its flexibility, which allows for interpretations
which are not in conflict with any of the points of view which can
legitimately be maintained in connection with this matter, a matter to
which the Assembly has quite rightly been giving the highest priority and
which also takes pride of place on the agenda of our Conference".
Thirdly, at last Tuesday's meeting I had the following to say in an
off-the-cuff statement with respect to CD/772:
"My delegation has always sought to back up its words with deeds.
Thus, for example, when we stated and repeated that we are prepared to
seek a formula that would lead to consensus on the issue of putting an
end to all nuclear tests, we tried to follow up our words with something
concrete, a text that would serve this purpose. That has been the case
again this year. My delegation, together with seven other delegations,
which are members of the Group of 21, has sponsored document CD/772,
which contains a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our
agenda ....
703
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
18
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
"The text to which I have referred, which appears in
document CD/772, is before the Conference, and those delegations like the
distinguished delegation of Japan, which has just taken the floor, may of
course express their support for the draft if what they wish is to give
concrete evidence -- practical evidence, to use the word that is
customary in such cases -- that they really are seeking results.
"What does the draft say? The draft says that the Conference on
Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its
agenda 'with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation
of a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear test explosions'.
"'With the objective' is a formula which is open to a wide variety
of interpretations. For my delegation it is an immediate objective, but
for other delegations -- for example, the delegation of the
United States, which has stated this in similar terms on several
occasions -- it is a long-term objective. For this reason, if the draft
mandate is adopted, the delegation of Mexico might issue a statement
indicating its interpretation thereof. The delegation of the
United States, or any other delegation, would also be able to state its
own interpretation. Thus, this mandate can be approved by consensus
without any of the delegations present here having to abandon its
position.
"What does the draft go on to say? The draft says that the ad hoc
committee will set up two.working groups which will deal, respectively,
with the following interrelated questions; Working Group I - Contents
and scope of the treaty; Working Group II -- Compliance and
verification. This shows that we do not wish to overlook any of the
aspects of this issue."
We would like to know the position of the delegation of Australia with
respect to the mandate we have proposed, which certainly cannot be criticized
as being supported by only "a handful of delegations", since we can state
without fear of contradiction that it enjoys the support of approximately two
thirds of the membership of the Conference.
For our part, we make this offer: if the informal suggestion by the
President for last April were to be formalized in a'Conference document, as in
the case of CD/772, whether under his sponsorship or that of the members
referred to by the distinguished representatives of Japan and Australia, we
would be prepared to express our position on this and explain the reasons for
it in detail.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Mexico for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I now give the
floor to the representative of Australia.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
19
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): In the statement just made by the distinguished
representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, remarks that were made by
me at the last plenary session of the Conference were addressed and, at the
end of the statement, a question was posed to my delegation. With your
permission, Mr. President, I would like to respond briefly and I think it is
appropriate that I do so immediately.
In the first instance, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico sought to
quote from remarks that I made, as he did last week, on an unprepared basis,
and in two cases I regret to say that what was quoted was not in fact. what I
said. But in particular, of those two cases, I would like it to be clear that
I did not under any circumstances say, as is now suggested in page 4 of the
Spanish version of the Ambassador of Mexico's statement, I did not in any way
say that the text of a mandate provided in CD/772 was supported by only a
handful of delegations. I said the reverse. I said that we are being
prevented from working on item 1 of our agenda by only a handful of
delegations, so that, having made that correction, it is easy for me to state
that I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico when he claims that
the text he has tabled together with six other delegations in document CD/772
has the very widespread support -- I think he said support by at least two
thirds - of the Conference. It is perfectly clear to my delegation that that
is a statement of fact.
He posed a particular question to me with regard to my own delegation's
attitude towards the draft mandate in CD/772. I would hope it would be clear
to him and every other member of this Conference that Australian policy on the
issue of a nuclear test ban is such that, on a national basis, we would be
able to accept the mandate provided in document CD/772.
But, Mr. President, that is not the point. I find it interesting -- I am
not sure how useful -- that the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has asked
me to say what our position is. I have merely repeated what is our well-known
policy position. The point is not why my delegation's position is; the point
is how do we find consensus on this issue? And I would like immediately to
express my gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for what he
said in the closing paragraph of the statement he made this morning, namely,
that his delegation would be prepared to participate with others in an
examination of the draft mandate provided by the President for the month of
April, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, with a view to achieving such
consensus, that being our task: not to identify the views of individual
delegations, but to find consensus. What I asked for on Tuesday was precisely
such an expression, an expression of willingness to sit down together and work
towards consensus on the basis of what the distinguished Ambassador of
Czechoslovakia proposed as'President in April, and what I have heard the
distinguished representative of Mexico say this morning is that he, and he
hopes others, are prepared to do just that. That is the answer to the
question which had not previously been given, and I suggest that it has now
been given this morning and I would hope it is not too late for us to start
work on the basis of that proposal made in April and hopefully come to
consensus this year so that we can begin our work immediately next year.
705
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
20
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Australia for his statement and I give the floor to the representative of
Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I thank the
distinguished representative of Australia for some of the ideas in his
statement.
Unfortunately, it would seem that the text on which he based himself does
not correspond to reality, or is it perhaps that the Soanish text (because the
text that we wrote is Spanish) is not really being interpreted correctly by
the members of the Australian delegation? What I said in that text, in the
final paragraph on page 4, I will now try to translate into English as
faithfully as possible, and the members of my delegation inform me that the
simultaneous interpreters interpreted that paragraph very correctly. The
paragraph says the following (It will not be very elegant English, but I am
going to put it into English as I have'it in Spanish):
"In what concerns us, we offer that if the informal suggestion that
the President of last April were to be made a formal proposal in a
document of the Conference, as is the case of the document CD/772, be it
under the sponsorship of that President, or under the sponsorship of the
members which were referred to by the distinguished representatives of
Japan and Australia, we would be ready to express our position concerning
that proposal and to explain in detail the reasons which are the basis
for that position".
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Mexico and I give the floor to the representative of Australia,
Ambassador Butler.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I am grateful to the distinguished Ambassador of
Mexico for his clarification of the last paragraph of this statement. I can
see now from his excellent English translation and from reading the Spanish as
he gave that translation that I was mistaken as to one element of what he said
in his statement.
I cannot purport to speak for the Western Group on this subject, on the
proposal that he has made that the April President's proposal first be made a
formal proposal of the Conference before we can consider it; I am sure that
other deleqations will want to think about that. I would have to say from my
standpoint though, that I am not clear -- and perhaps we can solve this in
informal consultations -- I am not clear why that proposal is made, what
difference it makes. The proposal by the President of April has been there
since April; we have since that time stated our willingness, that is, we, a
number of Western States, have stated our willingness to enter into
consultations on the basis of that proposal. We have not until today even had
the degree of answer that we have now been given, of answer to our proposal
that we discuss this issue on the basis of the April draft. I am not quite
sure what difference it makes to actually table it formally, but I am sure
others of the Conference will want to consider that. I would still remain
706
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
21
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
grateful, however, that for the first time this morning we have been given an
indication that it will be possible, perhaps under formal circumstances, but
that it would be possible, to talk about the substance of what was proposed in
April, which, we have indicated since that time, we are prepared-to discuss.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Australia for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of
Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.
Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): It is rare for us
to have an opportunity in the Conference on Disarmament for such a dynamic
exchange of opinions among delegations.
I should like to say for the present that we fully subscribe to what was
said by Ambassador Garcia Robles in his statement. However, I asked for the
floor to refer to a comment that Ambassador Butler made in his statement last
Tuesday and reiterated in the statement he made a few moments ago, his comment
that a handful of countries has prevented the formation of a consensus
concerning the mandate for the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. That
in effect means that a group of countries, or the handful of countries to
which he referred, is obstructing the work of the Conference. I am not going
to comment on that assertion, but I do believe that it requires some
reflection as to its implications. At the same time, I should like to
emphasize that, according to the statement made by the representative of
Australia, which was also quoted in the statement by the Ambassador of Mexico,
Mr. Garcia Robles, it would seem that the point of view of the countries on
whose behalf the Ambassador of Japan spoke and to which the Ambassador of
Australia subscribes means that-the only possibility of consensus is on the
basis of the proposal made by that group, because it says here that that group
made a proposal to which there has been no response and that what could "move
us towards consensus on this issue would be for delegations to accept the
proposal made by a group of Western States" -- that, to judge from that
statement, the only possibility of consensus would be on the basis of the
proposal by the Western States, which is in a way saying that there would only
be consensus in one direction.
Those are just a few comments that I wanted to make to contribute to this
morning's exchange.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Venezuela and I give the floor to the-representative of Australia,
Ambassador Butler.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): To respond quickly to what has just been said by
my friend and colleague from Venezuela, two points. First of all, when I said
on-30 July, then again yesterday and again today, that it is our perception
that progress on this issue is being impeded by only a handful of States, I
made clear that the reason for mentioning this -- what I believe to be a
fact -- was to lament that we are so close to agreement that the step involved
to find agreement is, and should be, quite small. Secondly, there is a
misunderstanding with regard to the proposal of the West to enter into
,7n7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
22
(Mr. Butler, Australia)
discussion on the basis of the mandate provided in the draft by the President
for April, and I think this misunderstanding is, in fact, repeated on the
first page of the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico
today. I cannot pretend to be in any way fluent in the Spanish language, but
it does seem to me from the second paragraph of that statement, and this has
just been reflected by what our colleague from Venezuela has said, that we
have been understood, Ambassador Yamada has been understood, as saying that we
are prepared to work only on the basis of the proposal advanced by the
President in April, and indeed, the implication is given that we are saying,
"Take this or leave it; this or nothing else".
Now, this is what has just been repeated by the distinguished Ambassador
of Venezuela, and it is not correct. The statement made on behalf of a group
of Western countries said that we preferred the document in CD/521, but that
we were prepared to enter into discussions, negotiations if you will, on the.
basis of the April President's proposal, and it should be very, very clear
that what is not being said is "Take the April President's proposal or nothing
else". In other words, it is not the one-way street that you have just been
suggesting that it might be. What we have said is that we would hope to have
an answer to the proposal, that we look into the matter, we have a discussion,
on the basis of what the President for April proposed -- and, of course, t::st
discussion would be one without prejudice in any way. It would be an open
discussion to see whether or not there is the basis of consensus. It is a
position that is not accurately reflected as being a demand that consensus be
built in only one way, namely, our way.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Australia and I give the floor to the representative of Mexico,
Ambassador Garcia Robles.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Perhaps the most
suitable procedure for making it very clear and very definite what the terms
of a proposal are is to submit it to the. secretariat for it to be circulated
as a .document of the Conference. At least, that is what has always been done
in this connection. That would be the first step, and then the next one is
the one that has just been made by the distinguished representative of
Australia.
Our draft resolution, before being a formal draft resolution, was a
well-known preliminary draft, known to all the members of the Conference on
Disarmament from the "spring session", and we still hope that the delegation:-
to which Ambassador Yamada or Ambassador Butler referred will come and discus
it with us. We then took the next step and made and formalized the proposal
and it has been circulated as document CD/722. And, in my statement today,
said, in the final paragraph on page 4, "We would like to know the position
the delegation of Australia with respect to the mandate we have proposed".
Naturally, instead of Australia, one could also say "the entire group of
delegations for which Ambassador Yamada was the spokesman". We do not see wny
a proposal that does not even exist as a document should be taken as a basis
for talks.
708
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROO0100150001-9
CD/PV.430
23
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of
Mexico for his statement. Are there any further speakers on this matter? The
representative of the United States has requested the floor; I give the floor
? to Ambassador Friedersdorf.
Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I do not want to prolong
the session this morning unduly, but the distinguished Soviet Ambassador in
his remarks this morning on a nuclear test ban and outer space, which
contained much useful and interesting material for our consideration, did
mention the United States in his remarks and again attacked the Western polio:
of deterrence. I would like to just respond very briefly if I might, because
he asked a very direct question at one point. In referring to documents in
the nuclear-test-ban area in July 1980, he referred to those documents, and
then asked a rhetorical question: What has happened? Why has the
United States abruptly changed its position? and he addressed this question
to our delegation. I would just respond that what happened and what chap:.-et
.was that there was a Presidential election in the United States, which occurs
every four years. Several parties compete and issues are discussed, and my
recollection of that campaign was that the President of our country,
Mr. Reagan, campaigned on a platform calling for strengthening of the
United States defence and security posture in the face of an increased Soviet
threat. I recall that campaign very well. As a result of that campaign in
1980, the American people responded overwhelmingly with a landslide election
mandate, which was repeated in 1984 by an even larger majority. Part of this
Reagan policy, enunciated during both these campaigns and overwhelmingly
adopted by the American people, one of its cornerstones and concepts was
nuclear deterrence, so I just want to point out to the distinguished Soviet
Ambassador that these abrupt changes in policy do occur every four years in
the United States through our electoral process.
The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before giving the floor to the
Chairman of the Group of Experts and in view of the exchange of opinions that
has taken place, I be it may be helpful to remind the Conference of what
I said in my opening statement and have said in each of the consultations that
I, as President, have had with the groups, namely that I remain at the
disposal of the members of the Conference should there be any development with
regard to the agenda items on which it has not yet been possible to reach any
procedural agreement, that is, items 1, 3 and 7.
I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific
Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify
Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the Group's report, which
is contained in document CD/778.
Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): Mr. President, I am pleased to present to you the
results of the recent meeting of the Ad hoc Group and to introduce its
progress report contained in document CD/778, which is in front of you.
The meeting took place from 27 July to 7 August 1987 and experts from
25 countries attended the session; I am pleased to inform you that this is
the widest representation we have had for many sessions. The World
Meteorological Organization was also represented. As you may recall, we had a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100150001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100150001-9
CD/PV.430
24
(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)
resources already assigned to the Conference. The secretariat and the Group's
Secretary, Mr. Cassandra, made, in my view, an admirable and successful effort
to arrange an adequate number of meetings even during that first week and also
by providing outstanding services throughout the session. I would also like
to thank those CD Committees that kindly shared some of their scheduled time
with us to make these meeting arrangements possible.
At our two previous sessions, in August 1986 and March 1987, we reached
agreement in principle on the design and testing of a modern international
seismic data exchange system, as documented in CD/721 and CD/745 -- a syster,.
which is based on the expeditious exchange of all available seismic
information from all detected signals and the routine use of all data at
international data centres (IDCs).
A