SOVIET BLOC AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE CSCE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) (CDE-XI & CDE-XII) 10 JUNE - 18 JULY 1986 19 AUGUST - 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 VOL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 287
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Directorate of
Intelligence
Seerct
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/ Nonaligned
Country-Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)
10 June - 18 July 1986
19 August - 19 September 1986
Volume I
IR 86-10002
November 1986
Copy 3 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Soviet Bloc and Neutral /Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)
10 June - 18 July 1986
19 August - 19 September 1986
Volume I
Secret
'R 86-10002
Vovember 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE XII)
10 June-18 July 1986
19 August-19 September 1986
FOREWORD
This reference aid contains a chronological history
and index of to
ic
di
p
s
scussed during the Eleventh and
Twelfth Rounds of the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (CDE) which commenced in Stockholm on 10 June
and recessed on 19 September 1986. It is indexed
according to subjects and countries. In the case of
the Soviet Union the individual delegate speaking, if
identified, is also specified. Furthermore, the forum
in
hi
h
w
c
the statement(s) occurred is noted.
The conference record has been retained in straight
chronological order. The index, located at the
beginning, is designed to guide the user to pages for
specific topics, countries, and in the case of the
Soviet Union, personalities. By using the type of
entry key located at the front of the index, users can
determine whether the references are from cables
reporting on plenary, post-plenary, or working group
meetings and limit their searches by tnese types of
references when desired. Users interested in
statements by a particular country are directed to the
country index where each country has its own subject
index. In the case of the Soviet Union, an additional
letter code will identify the individual delegate who
made the statement, if noted in the text. Each Soviet
delegate who spoke is also included in the main subject
index. F
Statements by the following countries are indexed:
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland,
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), and Yugoslavia. Please note
that there is also a separate entry for the "East" and
one for the NNA. In these sections are found
statements which were attributed to the East or NNA in
general but to no country in particular. In addition,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL
when a delegate from one country speaks on benalf of
one or more countries, his statements are cited in each
of the various countries' indexes.
All statements made by participating countries
during plenary and working group A3 meetings are
summarized in the "Statement Summaries" section of this
reference aid.
Two items of note which might otherwise be
overlooked are brought to the user's attention:
"weekly wrap-up" cables summarizing developments in all
CDE forums are included chronologically and can be
located by referring to the subject index; a group of
miscellaneous cables are referenced in the subject
index as "miscellaneous cables" and cover such topics
as delegation personnel changes, analyses of delegation
and group positions or motives at CDE, and procedural
issues and similar subjects.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the-
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CUE)
(CDE-XI A CDE-XII)
10 June - 18 July 1986
19 August - 19 September 1986
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
DELEGATION LISTS
STATEMENT SUMi4ARIES
Summaries of Plenary Statements ............)-ges
Summaries of Working Group AB Statements.......4-6
SUBJECT INDEX
Main Subject Index ...........................1-6
COUNTRY INDEXES
Austria ..................... ...........1-2
Cyprus ..................... ........3
East .........................................4-5
GDR. .........................................6
Hungary... ...... 07
..........................Ireland ............... .......................8
Malta...... ...... ............................9
NNA. . ? .. ... ? . . . ,. ... . ... . . ...... 0.000 ..... 00.
l u
Poland .......................................11
Romania.......... ............................12
Switzerland ..................................13
USSR, ............. .......... ............. ..14-17
Session Cables
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
STOCKHOLM 1984
22 August 1986 */
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(as communicated by Delegations)
The previous edition was printed
on 13 June 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
A U S T R I A
Dr Wolfgang LOIBL Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Werner DRUML First Secretary, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Dr Thomas NADER . Delegate
Mr Karl LIKO
Mr Josef BERNECKER
Ms Evelyne GRIESLER
Dr Ingo MUSSI
Mr Wolfgang JUNG
General, Military Adviser
Brigadier, Military Adviser
Administrative Officer
Ambassador
Lieutenant Colonel,
Defence Attache
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Felix STANDAERT Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Ms Lucie de MYTTENAERE Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Colonel Franz LEBLANC Military Expert
Ms E. JANSSENS Attache to the Delegation
Ms L. CAFMEYER Attache to the Delegation
Mr Louis ENGELEN First Secretary at the Embassy
Mr Demetrio ORTIGUEIRA
Mr Rogerio MARQUES
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
B U L G A R I A
Mr Stephan TODOROV Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Zahari RADOUKOV Member of Delegation
Lieutenant Colonel Member of Delegation
Stoyan STOYANOV
Mr Ivan KOEDJIKOV
Mr Georgy GOTEV
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Mr Todor STOYANOV
Mr Dobrin ANASTASOV
Mr Lalo LALOV
Ambassador of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria in
Stockholm
First Secretary at the
Embassy
Second Secretary at the
Embassy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr W.T. DELWORTH Ambassador, Permanent Head of
Delegation
Mr C.J. ANSTIS Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Colonel C. NAMIESNIOWSKI Military Adviser
Mr R. VANIER Adviser
.Administrative and Technical Staff
Mrs Sharon MALOTT Administrative Assistant
Miss T. NEWTON Secretary
Miss B. SCHULTZ Communicator
Mr Roy F. SOUTHERN Security Guard
Mr Joakim.SUNESON Driver
Mr William J. ROBERTS
Mr D"Arty THORPE
Mr Marc LEPAGE
Mr Alan KESSEL
Counsellor
Counsellor
First Secretary
Third Secretary
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr J. BERANGER
Mr Sven CLAUG
Mr G. CLERMONT
Miss Joan BURKE
Mr T. LINDELL
Mr Benny KARLSTROM
Office Manager
Administrative Assistant
Communicator
Secretary
Driver
Driver
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C Y P R U S
Dr Andrestinos N. PAPADOPOULOS Minister-Counsellor,
Head of Delegation
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A
Mr Alois AEZNIK
Mr An KUBA
Lieutenant Colonel
Vladimir MOHYLA
Mr Zden*k SKOBA
Mr Josef KRUIELA
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation
.Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Ambassador of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic to the Kingdom
of Sweden
Administrative and Technical Staff
Ms Mirosiava JELINKOVA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
D E N MAR K
Mr Skjold G. MELLBIN Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Bent ROSENTHAL
Mr Lars FAABORG-ANDERSEN
Commander Patrick HOWARD
Ms Charlotte PEKKARINEN
Ms Grethe HEERING
Mr Niklas BECKER
Mr Niels AADAL RASMUSSEN
Mr Flemming Andre LARSEN
Ms Kirsten LARSEN
Minister-Counsellor, Deputy
Head of Delegation
Secretary of Embassy
Military Adviser
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Chauffeur
Counsellor, Danish Embassy
Press Counsellor, Danish Embassy
Administrative Officer,
Danish Embassy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Johann Georg DREHER
Mr Werner SCHMIDBAUER
Mr Jurgen Hans UTTINGER
Mr Gunter KOLBECK
Mr Klaus METSCHER
Mr Detlef WEIGEL
Mr Horst GRZEGORZ
Mr Oliver NOWAK
Mr Gunter KANDLER
Mrs Ines OETLING
Ms Gisela SCHRbDER
Ms Corinna PAUL
Mrs Brunhild LARSSON
Mr Herbert KEMPER
Mr Hans JAGER
Mr Dirk FATH
Dr Gerhard RITZEL
Dr Claus von KAMEKE
Mr Rolf-Eckart ROLFS
Mr Kay SCHUHR
Mr Friedrich Wilhelm CATOIR
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Brigadier General,
MOD Representative
Colonel
Captain (Navy)
Counsellor
First Secretary
Attache
Attache (Communication Officer)
Senior Master Sergeant
Language Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Administrative Staff
Technical and
.Administrative Staff
Technical and
Administrative Staff
Technical and
Administrative Staff
Ambassador
Counsellor
Commander S.G.
Political Adviser
Counsellor (Press Affairs)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Manfred KOSTNER Second Secretary
(Administrative Affairs)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Matti KAHILUOTO
Dr Markku REIMAA
Mr Jussi LAHTEINEN
Mr Tuomas PEKKARINEN
Mr Yrjo KUKKO
Ambassador, Head of Delegation,
Special Mission of Finland
Minister-Counsellor, Delegate,
Special Mission of Finland
Commander, Delegate, Special
Mission of Finland
First Secretary, Delegate,
Special Mission of Finland
Major, Expert,
Special Mission of Finland
Mr Seppo PIETINEN Director for Political Affairs,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr Bjorn-Olof-ALHOLM Ambassador of Finland to Sweden
Mr Jukka VALTASAARI
Deputy Director for Political
Affairs, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs
Mr Pertti TORSTILA
Mr Ilkka HEISKANEN
Dr Pauli JARVENPAA
Assistant Director, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
First Secretary, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
l
Expert, Ministry of Defence
Miss Pirjo LEINO Special Mission of Finland
Miss Riitta GUSTAFSSON Special Mission of Finland
Miss Sinikka FLINK Special Mission of Finland
Mr Pertti AIRIKAINEN Special Mission of Finland
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Paul GASCHIGNARD
Mr Jean FELIX-PAGANON
Colonel Christian MERIC
Mr Gerard FAUVEAU
Lieutenant Colonel
Pierre MACE
Miss Monique GUILLAOUET
Miss Lyliane CHAPELLET
Mr Benoit d"ABOVILLE
Mr Serge SMESSOW
Mr Henri ZIPPER
Mr Robert MAZEYRAC
Mr Claude LOSGUARDI
Lieutenant Colonel
Andre LAURENT
Adjudant chef Herve LAUDREN
Mr Francis HURTUT
Mr Gabriel SAUVEZON
Ambassador, Chief of Delegation
Deputy Chief of Delegation
Military Counsellor
First Secretary
Military Counsellor
Secretary
Secretary
Deputy Director, Arms Control
and Strategic Affairs Division.
Ministry for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Arms Control and Strategic
Affairs Division, Ministry
for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Arms Control and Strategic
Affairs'Division, Ministry
for External Affairs,
.Special Adviser
Ambassador of France to Sweden
Counsellor at the Embassy
Military Adviser
Deputy Military Adviser
First Secretary of Embassy
Consul
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Christophe DESSOUDE
Mr Jean-Christophe SPORTIELLO
Mrs Bodil PERSSON
Mr Julien QUARTINO
Mr Claude QUARTINO
Mr Claude MEDARD
Mrs FREMERY
Mr Rene DESVAGERS
Mr Emile SOULIER
Communicator
Communicator
Press Attache of Embassy
Administrative Assistant
Administrative Assistant
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
G E R M A N D E M O C R A T I C R E P U B L I C
Dr Gunter BUHRING
Mr Manfred GRACZYNSKI
Mr Gunter FUNK
Mr Thomas`GEORGI
Dr Erika BUHRING
Mr Herwig KAISER
Mr Bodo BAUMGARTEN
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Captain of the Navy, Member of
Delegation
,Lieutenant Colonel,
Member of Delegation
First Secretary,
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Technical Staff Member
Technical Staff Member
Mr Manfred SCHMIDT
Mr Eberhard GLbCKNER
Mr Bernd HUBNER
Ambassador of the German
Democratic Republic to Sweden
First Secretary at the Embassy
Third Secretary at the Embassy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Dimitri PAPADAKIS
Lieutenant Colonel
Emmanuel KYRKAS
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Military Adviser
Ms Marina Nicoletta IOANNOU Administrative Officer
Mr Emmanuel PONIRIDIS
Mr Efthymios PARASHOS
Mr Ilias KOUVELAS
Miss Simerouda GIANNOULI
Mr Anastasios TSIAPALIS
Mr Kyriakos GAVRILIDIS
Ambassador
First Secretary
Attache
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
H 0 L Y S E E
Archbishop Henri LEMAITRE Apostolic Pro-Nuncio to the
Kingdom of Sweden, Head of
Delegation
Monsignor Francois BACQUE Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Reverend Jan SMITH
Attache
Reverend Raymond CROCHET Attache
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Karoly SZIGETI Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Istvan KORMENDY Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Lieutenant Colonel Military Expert
Lajos IMRE
Ms Maria KANYORSZKY Administrative Officer
Mr Istvan KOMOROCZKI Attache of the Embassy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
I C E L A N D
Mr Benedikt GRONDAL
Mrs Sigridur Berglind
ASGEIRSDOTTIR
Ms Aslaug SKOLADOTTIR
Ms Elin OSKARSDOTTIR
Mr Bert HARNELL
Ambassador, Permanent Head
of Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Administrative Secretary
Administrative Secretary
Administrative Assistant
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Gearoid 0 BROIN
Ambassador of Ireland to
Sweden and Poland,
Head of Delegation
Mr Philip Mc DONAGH First Secretary, Deputy Head
? of Delegation
Mr Keith MCBEAN Second Secretary
Colonel Donal O'CARROLL Military Adviser
Ms Yvonne ANDERSSON Secretary
Ms Lena DAHLBERG-TUNANDER Secretary
Mr Johan MOLIN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Antonio CIARRAPICO Ambassador, Permanent Head of
Delegation
Mr Sandro DE BERNARDIN Counsellor, Deputy Head of
,Delegation
Mr Mauro CARFAGNINI Counsellor
Brigadier General
Giorgio BLAIS Military Adviser
Navy Captain Ettore
DI GIOVANNI
Military Adviser
Administrative and Technical Personnel
Mrs Albertina BARBIERI
Mrs Margherita BENSAIA
Mrs. Diana MARIANO
Mr Venanzio DI NINO
Mr Alessandro PUZIO
Mr Ruggero VOZZI
Mr Manlio GIUFFRIDA
First Counsellor at the Italian
Embassy
Counsellor at the Italian
Embassy
Administrative and Technical Personnel at the Italian Embassy
Mr Giovanni PAPA
Mrs Carla DI PAOLO
Miss Maria Pia PAGLINO
Mr Francesco D"ORTA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
L I E C H T E N S T E I N
Count Mario LEDEBUR Head of Delegation
Mr Daniel OSPELT Member of Delegation
Mrs Claudia FRITSCHE Member of Delegation
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
L U X E M B O U R G
Mr Robert BLOES Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Robert KAYSER Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Alphonse BERNS Counsellor of the Embassy
Mr Raymond PETIT Secretary of the Embassy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Victor J. GAUCI Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Vincent L. CAMILLERI First Secretary
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Hans Bertil WESTERBERG Consul General of Monaco
in Stockholm
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
N E T H E R L A N D S
Mr Petrus BUWALDA Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Brigadier General Delegate
Henny J. van der GRAAF
Mr Laurens V.M. van GORP Delegate
Technical and Administrative Personnel
Mr J.H. OOMS
Miss Gwendolyn MACLEOD MANUEL
Miss Willy E.R. TOMLOW
Mr A.J.M. van MEER
Watze J.J.D. Baron thoe Counsellor, Embassy of the
SCHWARTZENBERG Netherlands
Mr Siewert H. STEENWIJK Accounting Officer, Embassy
of the Netherlands
Miss Madelon MOSK Secretary, Embassy of the
-Netherlands
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
N 0 R W A Y
Mr Leif MEVIK Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr'Hans Jacob BIORN LIAN Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Morten AASLAND Second Secretary
Colonel Carl O.S. LANGLIE HQ Defence Command
Ms Anne Elise NORDVIK
Secretary-Archivist, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Mr Knut Arne HOLTHE Communications Officer,
HQ Defence Command
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Wlodzimierz KONARSKI Ambassador, Head of the Permanent
Delegation
Colonel Edmund STANIEWSKI Delegate
Mr Krzysztof OPALSKI Delegate
Mr Piotr SWITALSKI Secretary
Dr Maria REGENT-LECHOWICZ Ambassador of the Polish
People's Republic in the
Kingdom of Sweden
Mr Slawomir PETELICKI Counsellor at the Embassy
of the Polish People's
Republic in Stockholm
Ms Grazyna BIERUT Technical Secretary
Mr Wladyslaw STASZEWSKI Administrative Assistant
Mr Jerzy MOZDZENSKI Administrative Assistant
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
P O R T U G A L
Mr Jose CUTILEIRO Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Jose Maria BRANCO ALEIXO Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr Joao de MATOS SEQUEIRA Second Secretary
Lieutenant Colonel Military Adviser
Antonio PINTO GUEDES
Mrs Gloria MORALES DE Administrative Officer
LOS RIOS
Mrs Luisa Cristina HAMMARBERG Administrative Officer
Ms Maria Madalena PEREIRA Administrative Officer
RAIMUNDO
Mr Carlos Manuel ZACARIAS Administrative Officer
FRANCO
Mr Jose de Noronha GAMITO Ambassador of Portugal
-to Sweden
Mr Antonio BOTELHO DE SOUSA Secretary of Embassy
Ms Arminda Albarran BARATA Administrative Officer
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Ioan CETERCHI Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Nicolae IORDACHE Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Mr Ovidiu IONESCU
Mr Nicolae CORDUNEANU
Mr Vasile ILIE$.
,Counsellor, Member of Delegation
Colonel, Member of Delegation
Major, Member of Delegation
Mr Petre MOGOSEANU
Mr Petru-Dumitru BORDEA
Mr Mihai ALBU
Counsellor, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
Counsellor, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
Second Secretary, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
Mrs Floarea STOENICA Secretary of the Delegation
Mrs Ana-Mariana MOGOSEANU Secretary of the Delegation
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S A N M A R I N O
Mr Gabriele GATTI Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mrs Maria Antonietta BONELLI Director, Office for Political
and Diplomatic Affairs
Mr Oscar PASQUINI .Minister
Mr Fredrik W. LETTSTROM Consul General of San Marino,
Stockholm
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Jose Manuel
ALLENDESALAZAR
Mr Joaquin PEREZ-VILLANUEVA
Captain Jose Luis RIPOLL
Mr Emilio LORENZO
Mr Carlos MIRANDA y ELIO
Mr Juan DURAN-LORIGA
Ambassador of Spain in
Stockholm, Head of Delegation
Deputy Head of Delegation
.Defence International Affairs
Division, Ministry of Defence,
Adviser
Delegate
Delegate
Director General for Inter-
national Security and Dis-
armament in the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs in Madrid,
Adviser
Adviser
Administrative and Technical Staff
Miss Maria Isabel SANZ REGATERO
Mr Jose Manuel GONZALEZ ROSSI
Mr Jose TOLEDANO
Mr Francisco REVUELTA
Mr Mats ERIKSSON
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Sten ANDERSSON
Mr Pierre SCHORI
Mr Curt LIDGARD
Mr Bjorn ELMER
Mr Gustav EKHOLM
Dr Lars-Erik LUNDIN
Mr Arne KALLIN
Mrs Maj Britt THEORIN
Mrs Gunnel JONANG
Mr Stu re ERICSON
Mr Rune ANGSTROM
Mr Stig ALEMYR
Mrs Anita BRAKENHIELM
Mr Jan ELIASSON
Mr Carl-Magnus. HYLTENIUS
General Nils SKOLD
Mr Jan PRAWITZ
S WED E N
Minister for Foreign Affairs
- Head of Delegation -
ex officio when in attendance
Permanent Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister Plenipotentiary,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegate
Head of Section, Delegate
First Secretary, Delegate
Chairman of the Swedish
Disarmament Commission,
Ambassador, MP, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member.of Parliament, Delegate
Ambassador, Under-Secretary
for Political Affairs,
Ministry.for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Assistant Under-Secretary,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Ministry of Defence, Expert
Special Adviser on Disarmament,
Ministry of Defence, Expert
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Ministry of Defence, Expert
Captain (Navy) Jan AKERHIELM Defence Staff, Expert
Lieutenant Colonel
Crister STERNING
Ministry of Defence,
Expert
Mr Johan TUNBERGER
Mr Lars-Erik WINGREN
Mr Ove.BRING
Mr Lars L6NNBACK
Ms Christina BERGSTR6M
Senior Security Policy Analyst,
National Defence Research
Institute, Expert
Deputy Assistant Under-
Secretary, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs
Doctor of Laws, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs
Ambassador, Assistant Under-
Secretary, Head of Press and
Information Department, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Press Officer, Head of Section,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S W I T Z E R L A N D
Mr Blaise SCHENK Ambassador, Read of Delegation
Mr Benoit JUNOD Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Mr Josef SCHARLI ' Major EMG, Military Adviser
Mr Urs STEMMLER First Secretary
Miss Susanna JUTZI Secretary of the Delegation
Mr Jean-Claude JOSEPH Counsellor
(non-permanent)
Mr Gerard STOUDMANN Second Secretary
(non-permanent)
Ms Marianne ENGLER Second Secretary
(non-permanent)
Mr Fritz BOHNERT
Ambassador of Switzerland to
Sweden
Mr Daniel WOKER Counsellor
Colonel Hans STdSSEL Defence Attache
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr timer ERSUN Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Deniz BOLUKBASI Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Administrative Staff
Mr Duran AYDOGMUS
Mrs GUner ERCETIN
Mr Mustafa TURKKAN
Mr Mehmet KUTLU
Mr Yasin GUZEL
Mr Faruk DARENDELIOGLU
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
U N I O N O F S O V I E T
S O C I A L I S T REP U B L I C S
Mr P.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr V.M. TATARNIKOV
Mr I.S. ROZANOV
Mr Y.N. RAHMANINOV
Mr V.I. EROFEEV
-Mr Y.D. NOVIKOV
Mr I.S. BOGDANOV
Mr B.B. KAZANTSEV
Mr V.A. VOLOSSATOV
Mr V.V. LEJEN
Mr E.S. VOLK
Mr E.V. RAZORENOV
Mr A.S. ANDROSSOV
Mr A.N. GROCHEV
Mr A.V. PIROGOV
Mr B.D. PANKIN
Mr N.S. CHAMORTSEV
Mr N.S. SELIVERSTOV
Mr Y.V. KISSILEV
Mr P.N. KOUGOUENKO
Mr A.J. AXENOV
Mr A.V. ZOLOTAREV
Mr G.S. BAKHTINE
Mr V.I. BAIKOV
Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
`Ambassador to Sweden
Minister-Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Military Attache
Deputy Military Attache
Second Secretary
Third Secretary
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr V.I. TATARINTSEV Attache
Mr D.V. BONDAR Attache
Mr V.G. GROMOVIK Secretary to the Ambassador
Administrative and Technical Personnel
Mrs T.A. PLOKHOVA
Miss N.J. CHOULIAK
Mr V.A. GOGATCHEV
Mr I.V. MININE
Mr B.S. SEROV
Mr A.F. TOUPCHI
Mr M.V. CHALNEV
Miss N.J. ANTOCHKINA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
Mr J.M. EDES, CMG
Mr I.W. MACKLEY
Colonel R.W. BACK
Dr J.P.G. FREEMAN
Mr S.R.H. PEASE
Mr J . N.. POWELL
Miss S.A. CHURCHLEY
Miss L. MOXHAM
Miss K.E. GILLMORE
Sir Richard PARSONS,
KCMG
Mr R.M. JACKSON, CVO
Mr B.S. ROBERTS
Mr J. WHITE
Mrs M. BRADFIELD, MBE
Mr S. CATLIN
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Counsellor
Military Adviser
First Secretary
First Secretary
First Secretary
Personal Assistant
Personal Assistant
Administrative and Technical
Assistant
MM Ambassador
Counsellor
Counsellor
First Secretary
First Secretary
Attache
.Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr C. GLASS
Mr J. BENTLEY
Miss N. TETLOW
Miss H. DONALDSON
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Personal Assistant
Personal Assistant
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Mr Robert L. BARRY Ambassador, Head of
Delegation
Dr Lynn HANSEN Ambassador, Deputy Head
.of Delegation
Mr Gregory J. NEWELL Ambassador of the United
States to Sweden, Delegate
Major General Jonas BLANK Delegate
-Ms Katharine C. CRITTENBERGER Delegate
Mr Jeremy F. CURTIN Delegate
Ms Priscilla GALASSI Delegate
Mr Jon GUNDERSEN Delegate
Mr Kenneth HUCK Delegate
Colonel William W. LOFGREN Jr Delegate
Major Evan C. MACGIBBON Delegate
Mr Rolf MOWATT-LARSSEN Delegate
Mr Edwin NOLAN Delegate
Ms Suzanne PARRY Delegate
Lieutenant Colonel Delegate
Joseph TYO
Administrative and Technical Personnel
Ms Mary CARDOSO
Ms Marie FRYE
Ms Janette HILL
Ms Cameron MCCALL
Ms Donna PETRICH
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
? Ms Nancy WALKER
Ms Sonja WALSH
Ms Marlou WOODWARD
Mr John D. DANIELS
Counsellor for Administrative
Affairs, American Embassy,
Stockholm
Colonel Leo J. WEEKS Army Attache
Mr Allen F. SCHEEL Attache (Security)
Mr Jan FRIBERG
Mr Karl-Erik STENBXCK
Mr Guy ROSENQVIST
Ms Marie JXGLUND
Mr.David L. BLEYLE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Y U G O S L A V I A
Mr Aleksandar BOZOVIC Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Colonel Branislav MIHAILOVIC Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr Ljubivoje ACIMOVIC Special Adviser
Colonel Milutin CIVIC Member of Delegation
Dr Vladimir BILANDZIC Member of Delegation
Mr Jure GA?PARIC Member of Delegation
Mr Marjan OSOLNIK Ambassador to Sweden
Mr Dobrosav VEIZOVIC Counsellor of the Embassy,
Stockholm
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr Milorad DIMITRIJEVIC Administrative Secretary to
the.Delegation
Mrs Ratomirka DJORDJEVIC Secretary
Mr Vojislav DJORDJEVIC
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SUMMARY OF
PLENARY STATEMENTS
20 June 1986
- Calls for a "flexible and elastic" approach to air based on specific
parameters.
- Claims that the USSR's 700-sortie parameter would capture 20 NATO air
exercises a year as well as such Soviet exercises in 1985 as "Ravkaz,"
"Zapad," "Granit," and air defense exercises, but not routine daily
training exercises.
- Suggests that verification of air exercises is simpler than that of
ground force exercises.
- Proposes that the conference return to the Wk-sponsored formula.
18 July 1986
United Kingdom
- Stresses the Importance of a CDE agreement within the context of the
future CSCE process.
- Warns that there out be substantive agreement.
- Asserts that there be a guarantee of inspections taking place.
- Declares verification be proportionate to preclude the possibility
of abuse.
- Urges that "Third Party" participation in the inspection regime is
worth exploring.
- Requests that restricted areas be limited in size and number.
- Emphasizes access to territory be limited as "absolutely necessary."
- Maintains that success in Stockholm could be the key to future fora.
Suggests an air parameter of 200 sorties.
- Proposes a formulation for ground forces.
- Urges agreement on notification of transfers.
- Advocates exchange of annual calendars between 15-20 November of the
proceeding year.
- Requests using the NNA proposal on constraints as a basis for
negotiations.
- Endorses finalizing NUF, using the NNA document and elements of
NUF text.
- Emphasizes ensuring adequate verification.
- Reaffirms inspection be implemented in connection with CSBM's.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
United States
- Suggests momentum is right for a possible agreement.
- Welcomes Grinevskiy's reply on 30 June NATO statement.
- Stresses air activities as an important issue.
- Accepts Grinevskiy's introduction to a 200 air sortie threshold.
- Denies that the West is thinking of ten to twelve thousand troops
as a starting point for negotiating the numerical aspect of the
Ground-Force notification formula.
- Asserts that tranfers should be included in notifications
of ground activities.
- Emphasizes that inspection must be part of any agreement adopted.
19 August 1986
USA
- Stresses the importance of reaching an agreement by the September 19
deadline.
- Welcomes the Soviet statement of July 18.
- Argues that a notification threshold must contain structural,
numerical and equipment elements.
- Claimes that agreement on the exchange of annual forecasts of military
activities will be one of the most important measures decided upon.
- Stresses the importance of verification in any argreement and the need
for a "complete and effective inspection regime."
19 August 1986
- Asserts that verification is the most serious obstacle to agreement.
- Praises the proposal of the NNA states on observation of notifiable
military activities.
- Accepts possible compromise on inspections using a quota system.
- Rejects the "out-of-garrison" concept.
- Reiterates importance of the Stockholm conference in creating favorable
prerequisites for the CSCE meeting in Vienna.
29 August 1986
- Highlights the military build-up in Europe and the need for CSBMS.
- Stresses the importance of the Helsinki Final Act in laying the
foundation for a reduction of tension.
- Assesses positively the agreement on transfer of forces.
- Emphasizes that mobilization activities should not be included in
conference discussions.
- Rejects the "out-of-garrison" concept.
- Proposes that a quota system be used for limiting inspections, and
- that closed areas be exempted from inspections.
- Agrees to a system of air ground inspection with the inspected state
supplying air and ground transportation.
- 2 -
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
22 September 1986
Welcomes the adoption of the Final Document.
Calls for improved sharing of military information in the future.
Reaffirms the West's committment to aerial inspection using neutral
aircraft.
Calls the Stockholm conference a positive step toward arms control and
better East-West relations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
Working Group AB
- Rejects applying the zone of application of Warsaw Pact proposals to
nuclear weapons.
- Suggests a step-by-step CSCE approach to conventional disarmament
outside the context of blocs.
- Stresses that CSBM'S must respect the Madrid Mandate, apply to the
entire zone, and be verifiable.
Hungary
- Declares the Budapest documents an integral part of the CSCE process.
- Elaborates Warsaw Treaty member-states proposals on reductions in
land and tactical forces.
- Agrees to convening a special forum on reducing military confrontation
in Europe, which includes all European states, the United States, and
Canada.
- Advocates widening the framework of the Vienna negotiations.
July 14
- Appeals to conference participants to work between round XI and XII.
- Emphasizes resolving the key questions which deadlock the conference.
- Urges an intensification of work during the last week of round XI.
- Informs conference participants of Soviet wishes to hold informal
contacts and negotiations during the break.
United States
- Suggests that an understanding exists between all participating
states on accepting inspections in a CSBM regime.
- Emphasizes defining an inspection regime.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
FRG (Along with Italy and Portugal)
- Questions the extension of work.
Italy
Asks the USSR for comment on concessions or a response to the 30 June
NATO Statement.
- Opposses a work extension on procedural, precedential, and legal
grounds.
Cyprus
- Questions French appeal.
Spain
- Stressed that CSBM'S would be incomplete without OSV.
Asserts that OSV should only be used in serious situations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Working Group AB
September 1, 1986
Ireland
Welcomes FRG's proposal for a prohibition on exercises involving more than
75,000 troops unless announced two years in advance.
Applauds Marshall Akhromeyev's acceptance of aerial inspection.
Expresses the hope that the conference can overcome the differences
regarding the nationality of aircraft used in inspection and that the conference
will achieve concrete results.
September 15, 1986
Proposes on behalf of Sweden, Austria, Finland and Switzerland, that a system
of neutral air transport be established for conducting inspections
Suggests several practical measures to facilitate such a system.
6
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MAIN SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
- plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussion
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 224b, 432-433c
AKHROMEYEV, S.F. 265-272p, 290-293d
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 82x, 148p, 188x
CDE-XI:
General references to: 126-127c, 172x
Duration of round: 151p
Expressions of dissatisfaction: 48d
Personnel issues:
Resumption date:
Scheduling matters:
CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: 223a, 224b, 432c
COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS
COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5: 200p
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: la, 147p, 214-216p, 222a, 343a,
417c
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 155p, 292d
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: see also MEASURE 6
EQUAL SECURITY: 147p
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 147p, 200, 222a, 418c
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 118-119x, 149p, 173x
EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2
General references to: 360, 426c
Military calendars: 84x, 155p, 223a, 344a, 360
Exercise schedules: 360, 426c
Annual forecasts of military activities: 147p, 149p, 215p, 263a, 267p,
360, 426-427c, 433c
EXERCISE SCHEDULES: 360, 426c
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FINAL DOCUMENT: 200, 214p, 438-447c
GRINEVSKIY, O.A. 3d, 16, 27, 29, 38d, 40d, 69e, 71x, 118-120x, 126-127c,
147-151p, 154-155p, 172-174x, 185p, 188x, 213-216p, 349x-351x, 362d, 394c
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 3d, 122a, 200, 224b, 418c, 433c
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IMMUNITIES FOR INSPECTORS AND OBSERVERS: see subheadings under
INSPECTIONS; OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 268p
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 71x, 89-90x, 150p, 155p, 186p, 214p, 241c, 290d,
343a, 428c
Aerial inspection: 43-44, 271p, 275d, 291d, 320-321, 333x, 391c-394c,
430-431c
Areas of inspection: 120x, 185a, 271p, 291d
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Communications provisions for inspectors: 431c
Composition of inspection teams: 430c
Coordination of inspections: 155p, 244-246c, 343a
Exceptions: 241c, 271p, 429c
Logistic support for inspectors: 290d, 320, 343a, 392c, 430-431c
Methods: 271p, 290d, 349x
Protection and immunities for inspectors: 343a, 429c, 430c
Quotas: 119-120x, 214p, 241-246c, 271p, 428c
Timing of inspections: 290d, 430c
MADRID MANDATE: 90x, 200, 214p, 222a, 224b, 246c, 417c, 428c, 432c
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 150p, 292d
Of ground forces: 148p, 292d
Of naval forces: 148p, 292d
Of air forces: 148p, 292d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 30-31b, 48d, 71x, 83x, 84x, 118-119x,
148-149p, 173x, 188x
MBFR: see MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS
MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS
MEASURE 4: see also OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION
MEASURE 6: see also DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS
MISCELLANEOUS CABLES:
CDE and the Warsaw Pact "Appeal": p. 3-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Soviet MFA reorganization: p. 16
The Budapest Appeal from the CDE perspective: pp.20-25
Polads paper on Vienna meeting: p. 26
CDE and the Mitterand visit to Moscow: p. 29
French consultations in Moscow: pp. 53-54
Consultations with French on CDE: pp. 55-56
CDE: What's in a name? p. 80-81
CDE: Ambassador Barry's end-of-round press briefing: pp. 138-142
Jockeying on the Soviet delegation: pp. 177-184
Bonn meeting: pp. 190-196
CDE Round XII: U.S. delegation goals: pp. 197-199
Nato brainstorming meeting: pp. 204-207
Translation problems with a CDE concluding document: pp. 252-254
Consultations with the Swiss military: pp. 273-274
CDE: Aerial inspection: pp. 365-366
CDE: Leaks: p. 397
Options for future handling of conventional arms control: p. 406
CDE fact sheet: pp. 413-415
Ambassador Barry's speech to Chatham House: pp. 459-466
MOBILIZATION: 267p
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also INTERFERENCE WITH NTM; VERIFICATION
428c
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 266p-267p
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 48d, 90-91x, 147p, 213-214p, 216p, 417c
Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 222a, 342-343a
4
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 222a, 342-343a, 417-418c
Reaffirmation of NUF: 222a, 342-343a
NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRENOTIFICATION;
PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 9b, 38d, 50x, 83x, 147p, 173x, 188x, 213-216p,
223b, 344-346b, 359, 369x, 419c, 423c
Designation of the activity: 9b, 225b, 345b, 370b, 420-422c
Duration of the activity: 225b, 345b, 421-422c
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 346b, 421c
Names of participating states: 9b, 225b, 345-346b, 421c
Purpose of the activity: 9b, 423c
Type of forces involved: 173x, 345-346b, 359, 420c
Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 225b, 359, 420-422c
Number of regiments or brigades: 225b, 359, 420-422c
Number of troops participating: 48d, 50x, 84x, 148-149p, 188x, 225b,
345b, 359, 420-423c
Number of naval vesssels involved: 148p, 225b
Number of military aircraft involved: 27, 39p, 48d, 50x, 71x, 148p, 155p,
188x, 345b, 420c, 423c
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 30b, 119x, 149p,
155p, 173x, 188x, 213p, 255b, 345b, 370b, 420c, 422c
Information to be included: 9b, 30b, 225b, 359
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFC: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES: see also MEASURE 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
General references to: 90x, 264b, 370b, 424c, 426c
Coordination of observation with other states:
Duration of observers' stay: 424c
Host country responsibilities: 226b, 228b, 264b, 346-347b, 370b, 424-426c
Invitations of observers: 147p, 213p, 226b, 228b, 267p, 346-347b, 424-426c
Logistical arrangements for observers: 77b, 226b, 227b, 346-347b, 424-426c
Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 226b, 227b, 346-347b,
424-425c
Scope of observation:
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of
differences): 120x, 214p, 269-270p
PRENOTIFICATION:
PRIOR NOTIFICATION:
RAKHMAANINOV, Yu.N. 89x-91x
ROZANOV, I.S. 29, 185a
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 118-119x, 149p, 155p, 173-174x
TATARNIKOV, V.M. 32b, 38d, 39p, 50x, 82x, 118x
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: la, 71x, 89-90x, 147p, 150p, 213p, 222a, 241-242c
267p, 270p, 428c
Verification by cadres:
WEEKLY WRAP-UP CABLES: 11-15, 33-37, 60-63, 92-96, 111-115, 161-165, 229-232,
277-281, 328-332, 374-377
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE
ZONE OF PEACE: see MALTESE MEDITERRANEAN ZONE OF PEACE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
z - bilateral discussion
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 241c
Aerial inspection: 320
Coordination of inspections: 244-246c
Exceptions: 241c
Quotas: 241-246c
MADRID MANDATE: 246c
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 8b
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
Number of troops participating: 8b
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
Logistical arrangements for observers: 77b
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
General references to: 241-242c
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE Zone
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CYPRUS SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussions
General references to: 127c
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussion
CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 23
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 4d, 21
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 122a
INSPECTIONS:
Aerial inspections: 275d, 320
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 30-31b, 84x
MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS: 4d
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 48d
NOTIFICATIONS:
Number of troops participating: 84x
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels, or aircraft: 30b
Information to be included: 30b
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 23
4
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 84x
VERIFICATION:
General references to: la, 4d, 84x
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
X - bilateral discussions
INSPECTIONS:
Aerial inspections: 362d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 30-31b
NOTIFICATIONS:
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels, or aircraft: 30b
Information to be included: 30b
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussion
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 4d
INSPECTIONS: 320
MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS: 4d
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 4d
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussions
INSPECTIONS:
Aerial inspections: 308-309c
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 307c
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussions
General references to: 127o
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussions
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 106a
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):
Military calendars: 106a
INSPECTIONS:
Aerial inspections: 275d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 8b
NOTIFICATIONS:
Number of troops participating: 8b
10
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussions
CDE-XI:
Expressions of dissatisfaction: 48d
INSPECTIONS:
Aerial inspections: 362d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 48d
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION
Number of troops participating: 48d
Number of military aircraft involved: 48d
11
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussions
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 159d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS:
159d
NOTIFICATIONS:
Number of troops participating:
159d
THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussions
informal conversations
Aerial inspections: 275d, 320
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other
informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
x - bilateral discussion
Speaker Key
A - Grinevskiy
B - Rakhmaninov
C - Rozanov
D - Solomenko
E - Tatarnikov
F - Mikhaylov
G - Akhromeyev
AKHROMEYEV, S.F. 265-272p, 290-293d
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 82x, 148p/A, 188x/A
CDE-XI:
General references to: 172x/A,
Duration of round: 151p/A
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: la, 147p/A, 214-216p/A, 265p/G
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 155p/A, 292d/G
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
EQUAL SECURITY: 147p/A
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 147p/A
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2;
Military calendars: 84x, 155p/A
Annual forecasts of military activities: 147p/A, 149p/A, 215p/A, 267p/G
14
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
FINAL DOCUMENT: 214p/A
GRINEVSKIY, O.A.: 3d, 29, 38d, 40d, 69c, 71x, 118-120x, 147-151p, 154-155p,
172-174x, 185p, 188x, 213-216p, 349-351x, 362d, 394c
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 3d, 265p/G
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 268p/G
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 71z/A, 89-90z/B, 150p/A, 155p/A, 186p/A, 214p/A
271p/G, 290d/G
Aerial inspection: 271p/G, 291d/G, 349-351x/A, 362d/A, 394c/A
Areas of inspection: 120x/A, 185a/A, 271p/G, 291d/G, 350x
Coordination of inspections: 155p/A
Exceptions: 271p/G
Logistic support for inspectors: 290d/G, 349x/A
Methods: 271p/G, 290d/G, 349x/A
Quotas: 119x/A, 214p/A, 271p/G
Timing of inspections: 290d/G
MADRID MANDATE: 90x/B, 214p/A
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 150p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G
Of ground forces: 148p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G
Of naval forces: 148p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G
Of air forces: 148p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 71x/A, 83x/E, 118-119x/A, 148-149p/A
173x/A, 188x/A, 350-351x/A
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS
MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS
MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION
MOBILIZATION: 267p/G
NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 266-267p/G
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 90-91x/B, 147p/A, 213-214p/A, 216p/A
NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 38d/A, 50x/E, 83x/E, 173x/A, 188x/A, 213-216p/A,
267p/G, 269p/G
Purpose of the activity: 271p/G
Type of forces involved: 173x/A
Number of troops participating: 84x/E, 148-149p/A, 188x/A,
Number of naval vesssels involved: 148p/A
Number of military aircraft involved: 8a, 39p/E, 50x/E, 71x/A, 148p/A,
155p/A, 188x/A
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 83x/E, 119x/E,
149p/A, 155p/A, 173x/A, 188x/A, 213p/A, 267p/G
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 90x/B
Invitations of observers: 147p/A, 213p/A, 267p/G
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES
16
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES: 120X/A, 173X/A, 214P/A, 269-270p/G
RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N.: 89-91x
ROZANOV, I.S.: 29, 185a
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 32b/E
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 118-119X/A, 149p/A, 155p/A, 173-174x/A, 350-351x/A
TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 8a, 32b, 38d, 39p, 50x, 82-84x, 118x
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS, MANPOWER THRESHOLDS, STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLDS.
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 71x/A, 89-90z/E, 147p/A, 150p/A, 213p/A,
267p/G, 270p/G
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see CDE ZONE
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 04670
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE "NOTED" IN WORKING GROUP
ON VERIFICATION
1. CDE IX - 003.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AT THE FIRST MEETING THIS ROUND OF WORKING GROUP A
ON "INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION,"
JUNE 11, 1986, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO PROVISIONALLY
NOTE THE FOLLOWING VERIFICATION SENTENCE IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK:
BEGIN TEXT.
"THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING
STATE (S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED
CSBMS IS IN DOUBT. (FULL STOP) . . ."
END TEXT.
4. COMMENT. AGREEMENT TO PROVISIONALLY NOTE THIS
SENTENCE FOLLOWS FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS OF ARDUOUS
DISCUSSIONS; THIS SENTENCE, INTRODUCED BY THE
COORDINATOR, REFLECTED HIS BEST JUDGEMENT AS TO WHAT
MIGHT ACHIEVE AGREEMENT. ITS IMPORTANCE FROM OUR
PERSPECTIVE IS THREEFOLD: (1) PROCEDURALLY, WE
HAVE BEGUN TO DRAFT ON VERIFICATION "MODALITIES";
(2) IT CONTAINS THE IMPORTANT NOTION OF TERRITORY;
AND (3) IN THAT CONTEXT IT RECOGNIZES EACH STATE'S
SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS RESPONSIBILITIES.
5. DURING DISCUSSION THE USSR AND ITS COHORTS HAVE
VOICED TWO CONCERNS ABOUT THIS SENTENCE: (1) THEY
BELIEVE THE NOTION OF "TERRITORY" IS UNCLEAR, PARTI-
CULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING OF
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. THEY ARE CLEARLY
CONCERNED THAT IT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS APPLYING
SIMPLY TO GROUND ACTIVITIES, AND EXCLUDE APPLICATION
IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. SEVERAL
ATTEMPTS BY THE EAST TO QUALIFY "TERRITORY," SUCH
AS TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
UNDERSTANDING OF "TERRITORY" APPLIED IN THIS CASE,
WERE REJECTED BY THE WEST, PARTIALLY ON THE GROUND
THAT THE NOTION OF "TERRITORY" HAS BEEN USED
IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS WITHOUT QUALIFICATION.
IN ACCEPTING THE ABOVE MENTIONED LANGUAGE FOR NOTATION,
THE EAST AGAIN EXPRESSED THIS CONCERN, AND
SUGGESTED, BUT DID NOT PRESS, THAT THE CONFERENCE
DEVELOP AN "AUTHORITATIVE" DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"TERRITORY" TO BE APPLIED EACH TIME THE WORD IS USED. THEY
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEIR CONCERNS WERE BROADER THAN
JUST VERIFICATION BUT DID NOT MAKE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS
LANGUAGE FOR NOTATION CONDITIONAL UPON ACCEPTANCE
OF THE USSR IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT CONSIDERED.
' (2) THE SECOND USSR CONCERN RELATES TO WHICH
COUNTRY A REQUEST IS ADDRESSED. AS CURRENTLY
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SFr.RF!T
PHRASED, THE REQUEST GOES TO THAT COUNTRY
WHICH HAS SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR
SOMETHING TAKING PLACE ON ITS TERRITORY. THE
USSR WANTED TO EXPAND THIS NOTION SO THAT REQUEST
COULD BE ADDRESSED TO STATES PARTICIPATING IN
AN ACTIVITY NOT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY (I.E., TO
THE USSR IF ON GDR TERRITORY). WEST AGAIN REJECTED
SOVIET PROPOSALS TO INCLUDE SUCH A NOTION FOR TWO
REASONS: IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE SOVEREIGN RESPONSI-
BILITY OF STATES FOR ACTIVITIES ON THEIR OWN
TERRITORIES, AND, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF A
NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITY, THE NATIONALITY OF THE
STATE CONDUCTING A SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY COULD BE
DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04692
SUBJ: CDE AND THE WARSAW PACT "APPEAL"
1. CDE XI -04
2. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: IN CONTRAST TO THEIR NEAR-SILENCE ABOUT
THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS IN CDE
HAVE HEADLINED THE WARSAW PACT JUNE 11 "APPEAL" WITH A
FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE HERE (06/12/86). IMMEDIATE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPEAL FOR STOCKHOLM ARE UNCLEAR,
BUT SOVIET COMMENTS REINFORCE OTHER INDICATORS TO
SUGGEST STRONGLY THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO DEVELOP
THEIR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVE THROUGH A
CDE STAGE II. THE MESSAGE FROM THE WEST,
CONSIDERATION OF CDE STAGE II MAKES NO SENSE IF
STAGE I FAILS IN STOCKHOLM. END SUMMARY.
4. IN CONTRAST TO THE LOW PROFILE GIVEN HERE TO THE
APRIL 18 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL, THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION
THURSDAY HELD A FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE TO HIGHLIGHT
THE WARSAW PACT'S BUDAPEST "APPEAL" ON CONVENTIONAL
ARMS REDUCTIONS. NEAR THE END OF AN OTHERWISE ROUTINE
PRESS CONFERENCE, IN WHICH HE REVIEWED THE BUDAPEST
APPEAL AND BLAMED THE WEST FOR STALLING CDE, SOVIET
CDE AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINVESKY MADE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE APPEAL ON CDE.
-- BUDAPEST PROVIDES A PERSPECTIVE FOR CDE, IN BOTH
THE SHORT TERM AND THE LONG TERM;
-- BUDAPEST CREATES DEFINITE (THOUGH UNSPECIFIED)
OBJECTIVES FOR CDE;
CDE IS PART OF THE WHOLE HELSINKI PROCESS;
-PRESENT-DAY "EUROPEAN POLICIES MAKE IT PARAMOUNT" TO
END THE FIRST STAGE OF CDE POSITIVELY;
SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN CDE IS A "TOUCHSTONE" OF THE
(WEST'S) DESIRE FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS IN
EUROPE; CDE IS IMPORTANT IN ITSELF AND AS IT HELPS THE
VIENNA CSCE MEETING TO MOVE TO A SECOND STAGE,
DISARMAMENT.
-- BUDAPEST SHOULD GIVE A NEW IMPULSE TO THE HELSINKI
PROCESS IN ALL ITS DIMENSIONS.
5. COMMENT: THE HIGH PROFILE GRINEVSKY HAS GIVEN TO
THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IN CONNECTION WITH A CDE STAGE II
REINFORCES OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS INDEED
SEE THE APRIL 18 INITIATIVE AND THE BUDAPEST APPEAL
BEING PLAYED OUT IN THE CDE CONTEXT. LAST WEEK,
AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH OF THE SOVIET MFA TOLD SWEDISH
CDE AMBASSADOR LIDGARD THAT THE SOVIET PREFERENCE WAS
TO NEGOTIATE CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS IN A CDE
STAGE II. INDEED, THIS SEEMS THE ONLY LIVE OPTION FOR
MOSCOW; THE FRENCH WILL NEVER JOIN AN EXPANDED MBFR,
AND THE WEST WOULD NEVER AGREE TO A "NEW FORUM" WHICH
WOULD DEAL SOLELY WITH SECURITY QUESTION AND, THEREBY,
TAKE THE EUROPEAN FOCUS AWAY FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
CSCE PROCESS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. END COMMENT
6. HUNGARIAN CDE DEPUTY KORMENDY, SPEAKING
"PERSONALLY," SPECULATED TO USDEL MEMBER THAT THE EAST
WOULD PREFER BEGINNING WITH TWO FORUMS CONCURRENTLY,
ONE IN VIENNA WHERE ALL MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW
PACT WOULD NEGOTIATE THE INITIAL ARMS CUTS AND ONE IN
STOCKHOLM WHERE ALL THIRTY-FIVE CSCE STATES COULD
NEGOTIATE SECOND GENERATION CSBM'S. FOLLOWING THE
INITIAL CUTS OF 100,000 - 150,000, THE TWO
NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE MERGED.
7. COMMENT: EVEN WHILE ADVANCING CDE STAGE II AS THE
PREFERRED FORUM FOR NEGOTIATING CONVENTIONAL ARMS
REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO
DISTANCE STAGE II FROM ANY SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT FOR
SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, STAGE I. THE BUDAPEST APPEAL
LUMPS STOCKHOLM WITH MBFR IN THE BRIEFEST MENTION. IN
HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, GRINEVSKY WITHHELD COMMENT ON
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL AND STOCKHOLM
UNTIL ASKED DIRECTLY; THEN HE SPOKE VAGUELY ABOUT ITS
BEING A "TOUCHSTONE" OF WESTERN INTENTIONS, CLEARLY
AVOIDING MAKING SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM A PREREQUISITE
FOR CDE STAGE II. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY TO TELL ALL THE
IMPLICATIONS, INITIAL SIGNS SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS
ARE TRYING TO LAY THE GROUND FOR A MAJOR PUSH IN THE
VIENNA FOLLOW-UP TO ESTABLISH CDE STAGE II REGARDLESS
OF THE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. SUCH A TACTIC WOULD
REDUCE WESTERN LEVERAGE FOR SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS HERE
AND THUS REDUCE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE
MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON VERIFICATION.
EVEN BEFORE JUNE 11, WE HAD BEGUN TO HEAR WHISPERS
FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE NNA, THAT
ENDING STOCKHOLM WITHOUT A FINAL DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT
PREJUDICE VIENNA'S CONSIDERATION OF STAGE II. END
COMMENT.
8. THE MESSAGE WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE SENDING IS THAT
PROPOSING A CDE STAGE II IN VIENNA MAKES NO SENSE AT
ALL UNLESS SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED IN
STOCKHOLM; EVEN THEN, A MOVEMENT TO STAGE II IS FAR
FROM BEING A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. WHATEVER SOVIET
OBJECTIVES FOR THE BUDAPEST APPEAL RELATIVE TO
STOCKHOLM, SOME EASTERN DELEGATIONS, AT LEAST,
RECOGNIZE THE NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUCCESS
IN STOCKHOLM AND CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER CDE
MEETINGS: IN CONVERSATION WITH POLISH AMBASSADOR
KONARSKI, U.S. AMBASSADOR BARRY SAID THAT THE MESSAGE
OF THE BUDAPEST APPEAL SEEMED TO BE THAT THE WARSAW
PACT HOPED TO "ESCAPE FORWARD" FROM BOTH CDE STAGE I
AND MBFR WITHOUT RESULTS IN EITHER. KONARSKI
RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS NOT THE CASE, THAT THE EAST
UNDERSTOOD THE WESTERN POSITION THAT STOCKHOLM MUST
SUCCEED IN PRODUCING A MEANINGFUL RESULT IF REALISTIC
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONSIDERATION OF CDE STAGE II WAS TO BE POSSIBLE IN
VIENNA. BARRY SAID HE WAS GLAD THE EAST WAS GETTING
THAT MESSAGE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I DENT I AL STOCKHOLM 04713
SUBJECT: UK VIEWS ON AIR ACTIVITIES
1. CDE IX - 005.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. UK AMBASSADOR EDES, READING FROM INSTRUCTIONS,
INFORMED US DELEGATION AND OTHERS THAT LONDON FEELS
THERE IS WESTERN ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO DEAL SERIOUSLY
WITH SOVIET CONCERNS ON AIR ACTIVITIES, IRRESPECTIVE
OF SOVIET MOTIVES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT LONDON
BELIEVES ANY POSSIBLE ACCOMMODATION SHOULD BE
FIRMLY EMBEDDED IN THE WESTERN APPROACH. LONDON
HAS INSTRUCTED THAT THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE,
AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE AIR IMPASSE,
BE CONSIDERED FOR INSERTION AS A THIRD ELEMENT
IN THE WESTERN THRESHOLD. THE LANGUAGE:
BEGIN TEXT
-- "AN AIR COMPONENT OF AT LEAST ... SORTIES
BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT." END TEXT.
THE ALLIED APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS WOULD THEN BE
GROUND FORCE STRUCTURE (AT LEAST TWO MOBILE COMBAT UNITS)
AT REGIMENT/BRIGADE LEVEL WITH . . . TROOPS,
INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS OR . . . BATTLE TANKS
OR AN AIR COMPONENT OF AT LEAST . . . SORTIES
BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT.
4. EDES NOTED THAT LONDON WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS
APPROACH AS TRIGGERING THE NOTIFICATION OF A COMBINED
ARMS ACTIVITY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, E.G. 700
SORTIES BUT ONLY 9,000 TROOPS. DISCUSSION INDICATED
THAT THERE IS A RISK OF THIS APPROACH ACTUALLY
TRIGGERING NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVITY, WHICH WOULD
NOT OTHERWISE BE NOTIFIABLE. THIS RISK MIGHT BE
MINIMIZED AS LONG AS THE STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENT FOR TWO
COMBAT UNITS (VICE COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS) WAS
MAINTAINED AND THE NUMERICAL VALUES FOR TROOPS
AND TANKS WERE LOW WITH A RELATIVELY HIGH NUMERICAL
VALUE FOR AIR SORTIES. THE DIFFICULTIES IN VERIFYING
A SEPARATE AIR TRIGGER WERE ALSO RAISED.
5. AFTER MEETING, FRENCH REP ADVISED DEPUTY
THAT FRENCH GENERALLY SUPPORT THIS SOLUTION,
ALTHOUGH THE ADDITION OF AN AIR SORTIES ELEMENT
TO THE THRESHOLD COULD RESULT IN FRENCH NOTIFYING
OTHERWISE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. THIS IS
BECAUSE TWO REGIMENTS COULD BE OUT OF GARRISON
PERFORMING DUTIES RELATED TO THE AIR EXERCISE RATHER
THAN CONDUCTING A GROUND FORCE EXERCISE. PARIS
IS STILL CONSIDERING THIS APPROACH.
6. DELEGATION WILL DISCOURAGE USE OF THIS APPROACH TO
THE AIR ISSUE PENDING REVIEW BY WASHINGTON. THE
IMPLICATION THAT AN AIR ACTIVITY COULD TRIGGER
NOTIFICATION OF A JOINT (COMBINED ARMS) ACTIVITY
WITHOUT THE PERSONNEL OR TANK THRESHOLDS BEING REACHED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
-- AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE FRENCH CASE -- NEEDS
CAREFUL STUDY.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
7
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 04714
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION TEXTS
1. CDE XI - 006.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: AUSTRIA, ACTING FOR ALL THE NNA, SUBMITTED
A PROPOSAL FOR A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FOR GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES. MODEST INITIAL TEXT ON THE INFORMATION TO
BE PROVIDED IN A NOTIFICATION WAS NOTED IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. THREE ADDITIONAL WESTERN
PROPOSAL TEXTS ARE ON THE TABLE. ALL THREE TEXTS ARE
PROVIDED BELOW. END SUMMARY.
4. ON 13 JULY, AUSTRIA (GEN LIKO), SPEAKING ON BEHALF
OF ALL THE NNA STATES PRESENT IN STOCKHOLM, INTRODUCED A
NEW THRESHOLD FORMULA WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A
TIGHTENING AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SC-7 THRESHOLD FOR
NOTIFYING GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HE ALSO NOTED THAT
THIS NEW NNA FORMULA TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE
DISCUSSIONS HELD TO DATE ON THIS TOPIC AND ATTEMPTED TO
BUILD UPON POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS; HE ALSO
STRESSED THAT IT REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS ON
THE PART OF SOME NNA. THE FORMULA IS:
BEGIN TEXT.
"THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO ... WHENEVER
IT INVOLVES AT LEAST ONE DIVISION, OR AN EQUIVALENT
FORCE, DEFINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT AS
2 - 5 MOBILE COMBAT UNITS (THAT IS9 TANK, MECHANISED
INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE, AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) ON
BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL OR A FORMATION OF EQUIVALENT
CAPABILITY
WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST
... TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
... BATTLE TANKS"
END TEXT.
5. THE SOVIET UNION (GEN TATARNIKOV) INDICATED A
WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON THIS FORMULA BUT QUICKLY CHANGED
THE SUBJECT TO AIR ACTIVITIES -- EVEN THOUGH AN
AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED TO REMAND THIS ISSUE TO THE
HEADS OF DELEGATION. TATARNIKOV WANTED TO TAKE UP THE
FORMULA HE REJECTED BEFORE THE LAST BREAK SUB-CEILING
ON AIR ACTIVITIES) NOTING THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH HAD
BEEN VIRTUALLY ADOPTED AND THAT WE WERE CLOSE TO
AGREEMENT ON THE SECOND.
6. TATARNIKOV ALSO GAVE A SOVIET ACCOUNTING OF NATO'S
1985 AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH, ACCORDING TO HIM WOULD HAVE
SURPASSED THE LEVEL OF 700 SORTIES. ALTHOUGH HE ARGUED
THERE WERE 18 SUCH ACTIVITIES, HE LISTED ONLY SIX (WITH
THE SIXTH, THE FRENCH EXERCISE DATEX QUESTIONABLE, EVEN
IN THE SOVIETS MIND). THE OTHER FIVE WERE COLD FIRE
(PHASE I), CENTRAL ENTERPRISE, COLD FIRE (PHASE II),
DISPLAY DETERMINATION, AND A UK EXERCISE PRIORY.
NEITHER THE WEST NOR THE NNA ENJOINED ON THE AIR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
QUESTIONS AND THE MEETING WAS ADJOURNED.
7. A BRIEF MEETING OF THE NATO NOTIFICATION CLUSTER,
AFTER THE WORKING GROUP MEETING, SHOWED GENERAL SUPPORT
FOR THE NNA FORMULATION, ALTHOUGH THE DUTCH AND ITALIANS
VOICED SOME RESERVATION.
8. IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE
CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION, I.E., THE INFORMATION TO BE
PROVIDED, WAS ALSO NOTED.
BEGIN TEXT.
" .. WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED
FORM OF CONTENT:
- THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
... OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
END TEXT.
THIS TEXT REPRESENTS ONLY THE INTRODUCTORY OR GENERAL
SECTION OF THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WE WERE
RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO THE WORD "ORGANIZING" IN THE
FOURTH TICK BUT WERE ASSURED BY THE VISITING IMS REP
THAT THIS DID NOT REPRESENT A MAJOR DIFFICULTY. THE
FIRST ELLIPSES SHOULD CONTAIN THE WORD "NOTIFICATION",
THE SECOND PROVIDES SPACE FOR A SECTION HEADING, E.G.,
GENERAL, THE THIRD TO INSERT THE NOTION OF THE
HEADQUARTERS CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITY, AND THE LAST TO
INDICATE MORE FOLLOWS.
9. WHEN LIKO INTRODUCED THE NNA THRESHOLD FORMULATION,
HE NOTED THAT THEY WOULD BE INTRODUCING AT A LATER DATE
A SEPARATE SECTION ON AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE
ACTIVITIES. (COMMENT: PRIVATELY, HE CONFIRMED THAT THE
MENTION OF AIRBORNE WAS TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE
NNA POSITION IN ORDER TO GET ALL NNA ON BOARD WITH THE
GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS. END COMMENT). THE WEST NOW
HAS ON THE TABLE FOR TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS
THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:
BEGIN TEXT.
"ASSAULT TYPE LANDINGS FROM THE SEA IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, WHICH ARE NOT PART OF A LARGER
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY, BY GROUND FORCES, NAVAL
INFANTRY, OR MARINES.
NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN WHENEVER THE LANDING
INVOLVES AT LEAST ... BATTALIONS OR ... TROOPS.
RECALL OF RESERVISTS WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS FOR A PERIOD EXCEEDING ... HOURS.
NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN WHENEVER THE ACTIVITY
INVOLVES EITHER RESERVISTS ALONE OR IN COMBINATION WITH
REGULARS, THE MOBILISATION OF ... OR MORE DIVISIONS (OR
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS) WITH THE RECALL OF AT LEAST ...
TROOPS.
PERIODIC ROTATION OF TROOPS WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN WHENEVER THE ACTIVITY
INVOLVES AT LEAST ... DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS
OR ... TROOPS WITHIN A PERIOD OF ... ."
END TEXT.
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, THESE ARE
IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR REASONS OF SUBSTANCE BUT ALSO A
TACTICAL COUNTER TO OTHER PROPOSALS FROM THE EAST AND
THE NNA.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKH0LM04716
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, JUNE 9-13, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 4670
1. CDE XI - 0O7
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED ITS
11TH -- AND MOST CRUCIAL -- SESSION IN A MOOD OF NERVOUS
EXPECTANCY. CLEARLY, NO ONE WANTS TO BE THE SKUNK AT THE
STOCKHOLM GARDEN PARTY AND, THUS, THE WORKING GROUPS
BEGAN IN AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY AMIABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE
FASHION. UNCONTENTIOUS LANGUAGE WAS NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE,
ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AND ON VERIFICATION
MODALITIES. IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP, THE WEST
INTRODUCED ITS THIRD AND FINAL "COHERENT BLOCK" WHICH
CONTAINED LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM AND
COMPLIANCE. DISAPPOINTED AT THE RESULTS IN BERN, MOST OF
THE NATO ALLIES ARE MORE ANXIOUS THAN EVER FOR A SUCCESS
IN STOCKHOLM. THE SOVIETS, TOO, WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN
AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM, IF ONLY TO JUSTIFY MOVING ON TO
A PHASE II, WHICH WOULD DEVELOP THE GORBACHEV
CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT WANT
TO APPEAR TOO EAGER FOR FEAR OF DRIVING UP THE PRICE OF
THE AGREEMENT, I.E., A MORE SUBSTANTIAL SET OF CSBM'S,
INCLUDING INSPECTION. PROGRESS WAS MADE IN MOST WORKING
GROUPS, INCLUDING, BARELY, ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF
NOTIFICATION. END SUMMARY.
4. THE MOOD AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE IN
A LISTENING MODE; THEY CLEARLY WANT PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM
-- BUT NOT AT ANY PRICE. THEREFORE, MOSCOW DOES NOT WANT
TO APPEAR TOO EAGER -- OR SHOW ITS SUBSTANTIVE CARDS TOO
EARLY -- FOR FEAR OF DRIVING UP THE NEGOTIATING STAKES.
IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS WANT TO PAY THE MINIMUM PRICE
NECESSARY IN TERMS OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S IN
ORDER TO JUSTIFY MOVING TO A CDE PHASE II TO DEVELOP THE
GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE, AND EVEN HOLD
OPEN THE POSSSIBILITY OF CDE PHASE II REGARDLESS OF
RESULTS HERE (CF. SEPTEL ON CDE AND THE BUDAPEST APPEAL).
THE ALLIES ENTER THIS SESSION LOOKING NERVOUSLY OVER
THEIR SHOULDERS AT THE PERCEIVED LESSONS OF BERN. FROM
A U.S. PERSPECTIVE, THE BAD NEWS EMERGING FROM THE HUMAN
CONTACTS MEETING IS THAT OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES FEAR
THAT THE U.S. MIGHT GO IT ALONE IN STOCKHOLM, TOO. THE
GOOD NEWS IS THE SAME. WHILE THERE IS ALWAYS THE
POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR SPLIT IN THE WESTERN RANKS WHICH
THE SOVIETS COULD -- AND WOULD -- EAGERLY EXPLOIT, IT IS
HIGHLY UNLIKELY, GIVEN CLOSE ALLIED COMMUNICATION AND
COOPERATION IN STOCKHOLM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE
DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS OF THE U.S. TO ACCEPT NOTHING
LESS THAN MEANINGFUL RESULTS IN CSCE FORA WILL MAKE IT
11
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
LESS LIKELY THAT THE ALLIES WILL PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF
A MINI-PACKAGE IN STOCKHOLM. INDEED, AT THE FIRST CAUCUS
OF THE SESSION FRG, DENMARK, NORWAY AND OTHERS EXPRESSED
THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. INSISTENCE ON
MEANINGFUL VERIFICATION AND REJECTION OF A MINI-PACKAGE.
FOR OUR PART, THE U.S. IS MAKING IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT
WE CAN ONLY AGREE TO A CONCRETE AND MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT RESULT IN STOCKHOLM. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
SUCH AN AGREEMENT WE ARE STRESSING OUR BOTTOM LINE
POSITIONS ON VERIFICATION/INSPECTION, STRUCTURAL
PARAMETERS AND INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE,
IF THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY INTERESTED IN THE NEGOTIATION
OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION IN EUROPE, INCLUDING
THEIR STATED WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION
IN SUCH A REGIME, THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IN STOCKHOLM
PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS
BEHIND SOVIET STATEMENTS.
THE FIRST WEEK OF THE PENULTIMATE CDE SESSION PROVIDED A
GLIMMER OF HOPE THAT SERIOUS DRAFTING HAD BEGUN AS THE
CONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY MADE SOME PROGRESS ON A NUMBER OF
TOPICS, INCLUDING, IF BARELY, ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF
NOTIFICATION.
5. NOTIFICATION: DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THIS ROUND,
THE CONFERENCE SEARCHED FOR WAYS TO SOLVE THE SEEMINGLY
INTRACTABLE PROBLEM CAUSED BY CONTINUED SOVIET INSISTENCE
ON NOTIFICATION OF ALL AIR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING
INDEPENDENT AIR. IN AN ATTEMPT TO UNBLOCK DRAFTING ON
GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, THE AIR ISSUE WAS RAISED TO THE
HEADS OF DELEGATION (HOD) LEVEL WITH A COFFEE GROUP
ESTABLISHED TO EXPLORE SOLUTIONS FOR THE AIR PROBLEM,
I.E., NOT TO DRAFT LANGUAGE BUT RATHER TO DRAW THE
POISON OUT OF THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE. THERE WERE NO
SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THIS GROUP.
THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP WAS ABLE TO NOTE
SOME LANGUAGE ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION (TEXT SENT
SEPARATELY), A DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE DRAFTING
TEMPO DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF PREVIOUS ROUNDS. THE NNA
FOCUSSED ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES WITH AUSTRIA
INTRODUCING, ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, A NEW PROPOSAL ON
GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS (FULL TEXT REPORTED SEPARATELY)
WHICH, WHILE BASED ON SC.7 (THE NNA PROPOSAL), MOVES
TOWARD OUR CONCEPT: A STRUCTURAL TRIGGER COMBINED WITH
A NUMERICAL (NUMBER OF TROOPS) OR EQUIPMENT (NUMBER OF
TANKS) PARAMETER. THE USSR INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO
WORK ON THE NNA PROPOSAL BUT REMINDED THE CONFERENCE
THAT THERE WERE OTHER ISSUES TO SETTLE, SUCH AS
DEFINITIONS OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. THE
SOVIET UNION ALSO DEFENDED ITS PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE
SEPARATE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES BY DESCRIBING
SOME OF THE EXERCISES (18) WHICH IN THE SOVIET VIEW
12
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WOULD BE CAPTURED UNDER THE SOVIET 700-SORTIE AIR
PARAMETER. THE SOVIET UNION HINTED AT ITS PREFERENCE
FOR RESURRECTING A FORMULATION WHICH HAD ENJOYED
CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT IN THE CONFERENCE BUT WHICH IT (THE
USSR) HAD REJECTED AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND. THIS
APPROACH HAD INCLUDED A SUBTHRESHOLD FOR AIR ACTIVITIES
WHICH WAS IMBEDDED IN THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER. IT
WOULD NOT HAVE TRIGGERED ANY NOTIFICATION BUT WOULD HAVE
TRIGGERED THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON AIR
PARTICIPATION ABOVE A CERTAIN SORTIE LEVEL. IT THUS
WOULD ENABLE THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO TELL MOSCOW THAT
IT HAD OBTAINED AN AIR PARAMETER (WITHOUT THAT PARAMETER
ACTUALLY TRIGGERING NOTIFICATIONS). THERE IS INTEREST
IN NATO IN RETURNING TO THE EARLIER FORMULA, WHICH IS
PERCEIVED BY MANY AS THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE AIR
PROBLEM THAT NATO WILL BE ABLE TO EXACT FROM THE EAST.
6. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE "COFFEE GROUP" MOVED CLOSE TO
AGREEMENT ON THE ACTUAL NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE, THE
HEART OF THE NUF SECTION. THE FORMULA IS SHORT AND
SWEET: IT RECALLS THE UN OBLIGATION AND REAFFIRMS THE
FINAL ACT COMMITMENT; IT DOES NOT INCLUDE REFERENCE TO
"MILITARY" FORCE OR ANY NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUF
PRINCIPLE, AS INITIALLY DEMANDED BY THE EAST. THE TEXT
SHOULD BE REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON
TUESDAY, JUNE 17. THE "COFFEE GROUP" ALSO DISCUSSED A
SELF-DEFENSE TEXT. EAST AND WEST ARE STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
ON THIS ISSUE, BOTH ARGUING THAT THE TEXT MUST MENTION
THE UN CHARTER. THE NNA, LED BY NON-UN MEMBER STATE
SWITZERLAND, INSISTED THAT SELF-DEFENSE BE PLACED IN THE
CONTEXT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, NOT ANY
PARTICULAR DOCUMENT.
IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE WEST INTRODUCED ITS THIRD AND
LAST "COHERENT BLOCK" CONTAINING HFA PRINCIPLES AND
COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING PASSAGES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, TERRORISM AND COMPLIANCE. THE ALLIANCE IS NOW
IN A GOOD POSITION TO FASHION THE NUF DRAFTING AGENDA.
THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS BLOCK WAS WELCOMED BY ALL
SIDES, INCLUDING THE EAST. THE SOVIETS DID LAY DOWN A
MARKER THAT, CONTRARY TO THE WESTERN DOCUMENT, THE USE
OF "MILITARY" OR "ARMED" FORCE MUST BE REFLECTED
SOMEPLACE IN THE NUF SECTION OF A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.
7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THE EAST
SIGNALED ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO DRAFT ON A
FRAMEWORK FOR VERIFICATION AND TO BEGIN TO DRAFT ON
VERIFICATION MODALITIES BY AGREEING TO NOTE
PROVISIONALLY A SENTENCE STATING THAT A REQUEST (FOR
VERIFICATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE STATE(S) ON WHOSE
TERRITORY COMPLIANCE IS IN DOUBT. AGREEMENT TO THIS
SENTENCE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE EAST
ACCEPTED THE WORD "TERRITORY" WITHOUT QUALIFICATION (THE
13
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
EAST HAD BEEN ARGUING EITHER FOR USING THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL DEFINITION OF "TERRITORY," WHICH WOULD HAVE
INCLUDED TERRITORIAL WATERS, OR FOR DEVELOPING A
CONFERENCE-WIDE DEFINITION, AN IDEA WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY
TO RESURFACE). (SEE REFTEL FOR FULL TEXT AND ANALYSIS.)
IN DISCUSSION OF A MAY 21 HUNGARIAN PROPOSAL FOR A
TEMPORARY CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, THE ALLIANCE FIRMLY
OPPOSED CONSULTATIONS AS A FORM OF VERIFICATION. IN
FACT, THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK - SWITZERLAND) HAS
SUGGESTED LANGUAGE AS THE NEXT CANDIDATE FOR DRAFTING,
I.E., "THE STATE REQUESTING THE . . . WILL DEFINE THE
AREA IN WHICH THE . . . WILL TAKE PLACE . . . ," THAT
COULD HELP US RESIST CONSULTATIONS SINCE IT IS CLEARLY
ILLOGICAL TO REPLACE THE ELLIPSES WITH ANYTHING OTHER
THAN SOME FORM OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION. THE EAST
CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT THERE MUST BE MORE THAN ONE FORM
OF VERIFICATION, AND THE SOVIET STATEMENT THAT EACH STATE
HAS A RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE FORM OF VERIFICATION
APPROPRIATE FOR THE SITUATION LEFT IN DOUBT WHO MAKES
THAT CHOICE -- THE REQUESTING STATE OR THE STATE
RECEIVING THE REQUEST. (A SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE
(ROZANOV) TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THE CHOICE WOULD BE
LEFT TO THE REQUESTING STATE.) OF COURSE, IN THE PRESENT
EASTERN THINKING ANY VERIFICATION LIST WOULD NOT INCLUDE
INSPECTION, BUT COULD INCLUDE A VERSION OF SC.7'S
OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST.
ALTHOUGH A-2 WAS DOMINATED BY VERIFICATION THIS WEEK,
ITALY DID MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE IMPORTANT PURPOSES
SERVED BY AN EXCHANGE OF STRUCTURAL INFORMATION IN ORDER
TO EXPRESS THE WEST'S CONTINUED INTEREST IN MEASURE 1
TYPE INFORMATION.
8. OBSERVATION: IN THE ROUND'S FIRST MEETING, ALL
PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE COORDINATOR'S
(KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) NON-PAPER PROVIDING AN OBSERVATION
FRAMEWORK AS THE BASIS FOR FUTURE DRAFTING. ALL SIDES,
HOWEVER, ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE SUGGESTING
CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS TO THIS FRAMEWORK
WHICH, OF NECESSITY, AVOIDS TACKLING SOME FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUES. THE EAST POINTED TO THE NEED TO INCLUDE
OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS, WHILE THE
WEST AND IRELAND HIGHLIGHTED THE NECESSITY OF FURTHER
DEFINING WHAT OBSERVERS WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE AND
DO DURING AN OBSERVATION PROGRAM. EVEN WITH ITS GAPS,
HOWEVER, THIS FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE A USEFUL TOOL FOR
B-2'S WORK WHICH IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL FOCUS ON
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS.
9. CONSTRAINTS: THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR (BOZOVIC)
RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM THIS ROUND INSISTING THAT
CONSTRAINTS MUST FIGURE IN A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. HE
14
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WENT SO FAR AS TO WARN HIS NNA COLLEAGUES THAT HE WOULD
SABOTAGE THE CONFERENCE IF HIS CONCERNS WERE NOT TAKEN
INTO CONSIDERATION. APPARENTLY DISSATISFIED BY OTHER
NNA'S PASSIVITY ON THIS ISSUE, BOZOVIC FOR THE MOMENT IS
DIRECTING HIS IRE AT THE NNA OBSERVATION-ON-REQUEST
PROPOSAL, LINKING ITS FATE WITH THAT OF CONSTRAINTS; IT
IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL SHED NO TEARS IF NATO'S
INSPECTION MEASURE ALSO FALLS VICTIM TO THIS LINKAGE.
THE SWISS COORDINATOR (JUNOD), UNDER INCREASING EASTERN
AND YUGOSLAV PRESSURE, WILL INFORMALLY CIRCULATE
LANGUAGE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS; THIS COULD BE
USED AS AN INTRODUCTION TO BOTH THE CALENDAR AND
CONSTRAINING MEASURES (IT WILL PROBABLY EVEN AVOID USE
OF THE WORD "CONSTRAINTS"). HOWEVER, THE EXISTENCE OF
LANGUAGE ON CONSTRAINTS WILL MAKE NATO'S JOB MORE
DIFFICULT. THE WORKING GROUP-THIS WEEK, MOREOVER,
FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON CONSTRAINTS. THE SOVIETS
HAMMERED AT WESTERN OPPOSITION TO CEILINGS WHILE THE
NNA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE NNA'S ODD COUPLE,
YUGOSLAVIA AND MALTA, WATCHED FROM THE SIDELINES.
10. ANNUAL FORECASTS: ALTHOUGH ANNUAL FORECASTS WERE
NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL IN THE WORKING GROUP THIS
WEEK, THE BULGARIANS MADE MILDLY POSITIVE NOISES ABOUT
THE CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF THIS MEASURE. WHILE NATO
HAS AGREED ON ITEMS TO INCLUDE IN THE CONTENT OF THE
FORECAST, THE DELICATE ISSUE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH STATIC
INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FORECAST AND ITS
OVERLAP WITH THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION HAS NOT YET
BEEN RESOLVED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENT I A L STOCKHOLM 04781
SUBJECT: SOVIET MFA REORGANIZATION
REF: MOSCOW 10167
1. CDE XI - 008.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. IN DISCUSSIONS OF CHANGES IN THE MFA, SOVIET CDE
AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY HAS PROVIDED US THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS AND SUPPLEMENTS THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY REFTEL:
- -- VLADIMIR F. PETROVSKIY HAS BEEN ELEVATED TO
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. ACCORDING TO A MID-LEVEL
MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, BORIS KAZANTSEV (PLEASE
PROTECT), PETROVSKIY'S PORTFOLIO INCLUDES INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, OUTER SPACE ISSUES, AND PEACEFUL USES OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY.
- -- VIKTOR KARPOV, HEAD OF THE NEW ARMS CONTROL
GROUP WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, REPORTS DIRECTLY TO
THE NEW FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER VORONTSOV, NOT TO
BESSMERTNYKH.
- -- LEV I. MENDELEVICH IS NOW IN CHARGE OF CSCE/CDE
MATTERS. MENDELEVICH REPORTS TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
KOVALEV.
- -- IT APPEARS THAT A NEW SECTION DEALING WITH
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING
ORGANIZED. KAZANTSEV (PROTECT) INDICATED THAT SOVIET
HEAD OF DELEGATION TO THE CSCE HUMAN CONTACTS EXPERTS
MEETING IN BERN, KASHLEV, WAS A LIKELY CANDIDATE TO HEAD
THIS SECTION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
16
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04761
SUBJECT: FRENCH REACTION TO THE BUDAPEST APPEAL
1. CDE XI - 009.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE JUNE 16 WORKING GROUP AB
MEETING, FRENCH CDE AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD DELIVERED A
STATEMENT PROVIDING AN OFFICIAL FRENCH REACTION TO THE
WARSAW PACT'S BUDAPEST APPEAL (UNOFFICIAL USDEL
TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT FOLLOWS IN PARA 4). THE FRENCH
AMBASSADOR MADE THREE POINTS: 1) GIVEN THAT THE ZONE
OF APPLICATION OF THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS CLEARLY IS
EUROPE, THEY CANNOT APPLY TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE
NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD NOT BE LIMITED TO
EUROPE; 2) RECALLING ITS LONGSTANDING RESERVATIONS
REGARDING THE BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH OF MBFR, FRANCE
IMPLICITLY REJECTED AN ENLARGED MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,
PREFERRING INSTEAD A STEP-BY-STEP CSCE APPROACH TO
CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF BLOCS,
I.E., PARTICIPATION OF ALL 35 CSCE STATES ON EQUAL
FOOTING; AND 3) FRANCE WILL NOT ACCEPT AGREEMENT FOR
THE SAKE OF AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM; CSBM'S MUST RESPECT
THE MADRID MANDATE, APPLY TO THE WHOLE ZONE AND BE
VERIFIABLE. IN CONCLUSION, GASCHIGNARD MADE THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THE FIRST TEST OF BUDAPEST APPEAL'S
CREDIBILITY.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
WE ARE STUDYING WITH INTEREST THE PROPOSALS FORMULATED
ON THE 11 OF JUNE IN BUDAPEST REGARDING CONVENTIONAL
DISARMAMENT 3N EUROPE. FRANCE IS SATISFIED TO SEE THE
IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING ("LA MAITRISE") OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS RECOGNIZED IN THIS WAY BY THE
MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT . THE ISSUE HERE FOR
MY COUNTRY IS AN OLD PREOCCUPATION SINCE, IN TAKING THE
INITIATIVE OF THE CDE, IT (FRANCE) ALREADY WAS AIMING AT
PROGRESSING IN THIS COURSE ("VOIE") BY STAGES.
THE DECLARATION PUBLISHED IN HALIFAX ON THE 29TH OF MAY
MADE IT POSSIBLE TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED,
AND I QUOTE, "TO STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY
THROUGHOUT EUROPE, BY MEANS OF A GREATER TRANSPARENCY,
AND (BY MEANS OF) THE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
WHICH WOULD BE AT LOWER LEVELS AND WOULD BE VERIFIABLE"
END OF QUOTE. (BEGIN FYI: THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION
OF THE HALIFAX STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
READS AS FOLLOWS: "OUR OBJECTIVE IS THE STRENGTHENING
OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, THROUGH
INCREASED OPENNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFIABLE,
COMPREHENSIVE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
AT LOWER LEVELS." END FYI). THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGH
LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON THESE ISSUES HAS BEEN DECIDED. IT
17
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WAS FORESEEN THAT IT (THE WORKING GROUP) WOULD EXAMINE
THE PROPOSALS OF MR. GORBACHEV AT POTSDAM (APRIL 18). IT
FOLLOWS THAT IT ALSO WILL FOCUS ON ("SE PENCHER SUR")
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE BUDAPEST COMMUNIQUE.
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS IDEA DOES NOT PREVENT ME FROM
PRESENTING FROM NOW ON AND IN A COMPLETELY PRELIMINARY
WAY, THREE IDEAS WHICH THE BUDAPEST COMMUNIQUE PROMPTS:
FIRST, THIS COMMUNIQUE ADVOCATES, IN PARALLEL
WITH CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, THE REDUCTION OF TACTICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH A RANGE OF LESS THAN 1,000
KILOMETERS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE WARSAW PACT
PROPOSALS ARE REGISTERED (S'INCRIVENT) IN THE FRAMEWORK
OF EUROPE, THEY MUST EXCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHATEVER
THEY ARE, SINCE IN OUR VIEW ONE COULDN'T HAVE NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT LIMITED TO EUROPE.
SECOND, WE HAVE NOTED THAT THREE PROCEDURES HAD
BEEN ENVISAGED FOR ARRIVING AT THE DESIRED ENDS. TWO OF
THEM TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE THE CSCE PROCESS AT 35 TO WHICH
OUR CONFERENCE BELONGS; THERE IS MENTION MADE OF
"ENLARGED MBFR" (NEGOTIATIONS) OR OF A NEW FORUM. I
WOULD LIKE TO RECALL OUR POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT.
FRANCE, FROM THE BEGINNING, IN THE COURSE OF
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MR. BREZHNEV AND MR. POMPIDOU, AT
MINSK IN JANUARY 1973, HAS EXPRESSED ITS RESERVATIONS
REGARDING THE BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH OF MBFR. IT
(FRANCE) DOES NOT SEE A PRIORI ANY REASON TO CHANGE ITS
ATTITUDE, EVEN REGARDING "ENLARGED MBFR", WHILE ALL THE
EUROPEAN STATES AGREED IN MADRID IN 1983 ON A
PROGRESSIVE STAGED APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT,
OUTSIDE BLOCS, THAT IS TO SAY, WITH THE PARTICIPATION ON
EQUAL FOOTING OF THE 35 SIGNATORY STATES OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT.
THIRD, FINALLY, FRANCE NOTED WITH INTEREST THE
WILL REAFFIRMED BY THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT
TO ARRIVE AT A FAVORABLE ("HEUREUSE") CONCLUSION OF THE
WORK OF OUR CONFERENCE. I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY
AGAIN IN THE MAY 23 PLENARY MEETING THAT THIS IS THE
GOAL OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION AND IN STRICT RESPECT FOR
THE DEADLINES WHICH WE HAVE SET FOR OURSELVES. BUT THE
ISSUE IS NOT THAT OF HAVING AN AGREEMENT TO HAVE AN
AGREEMENT. THE CSBM'S WHICH WE MUST ADOPT WILL HAVE TO
RESPECT OUR MANDATE AGREED IN MADRID AND, IN PARTICULAR,
APPLY TO THE WHOLE ZONE -- FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE
URALS -- AND BE VERIFIABLE. IF IT WERE NOT TO PROVE
POSSIBLE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM ON SUCH
CSBM'S, HOW COULD WE IMAGINE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO ENVISAGE NEGOTIATING REALISTICALLY ON OTHER FAR MORE
CONSTRAINING LIMITATIONS ON FORCES? CONSEQUENTLY, THE
RESULT OF OUR CONFERENCE IS THE FIRST TEST OF THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE NEW PROPOSALS ADVANCED IN BUDAPEST.
11
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
END TEXT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
19
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04816
SUBJECT: THE BUDAPEST APPEAL FROM THE CDE PERSPECTIVE
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3163, B) STOCKHOLM 3398,
C) STOCKHOLM 3684, D) STOCKHOLM 4692
- E) MBFR VIENNA 532, F) USNATO 3388
1. CDE XI - 010
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE JUNE 11 BUDAPEST APPEAL
ELABORATING GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT
INITIATIVE CLEARLY FOCUSES ON THE CSCE AS THE MOST LIKELY
FORUM FOR ITS FUTURE CONSIDERATION. USDEL VIEWS THE
APPEAL, LIKE GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 PROPOSAL, PRIMARILY AS
A PROPAGANDA EFFORT AIMED AT WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLICS; IT
SEEMS TO BE A NICELY PACKAGED GRAB BAG OF EXISTING SOVIET
PROPOSALS FROM A VARIETY OF FORA WRAPPED AROUND THE CORE
REDUCTION OFFER FROM "THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS." THE
APPEAL IS CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO CAPTURE ALL EXISTING
SOVIET POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH IN SOME CASES IT SEEMS TO
PROVIDE BOTH EAST AND WEST A "JUNKYARD" FOR DUMPING NON-
NEGOTIABLE PROPOSALS THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO OUTRIGHT
ABANDON. THE APPEAL'S RENDERING OF THE MADRID MANDATE'S
"THE WHOLE OF EUROPE" AS "THE TERRITORY OF THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE" FOR THE REDUCTIONS AREA COULD SIGNAL RENEWED
SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ALTER THE CDE'S ZONE OF APPLICATION IN
PHASE II AND DESTROY THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE CLEAR
SIGNAL THAT INSPECTION WILL ONLY BE ACCEPTED FOR THE
VERIFICATION OF REDUCTIONS AND NOT FOR MEASURES
CONCERNING RESIDUAL FORCES COULD DENOTE A HARDENING OF
THE EASTERN POSITION AGAINST INSPECTION FOR VERIFICATION
OF CSBM'S AGREED IN STOCKHOLM (ALTHOUGH WE WILL ARGUE
THE OPPOSITE, I.E., CDE IS THE TEST OF STATED SOVIET
WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON-SITE INSPECTr'ON). THE EAST
WILL CERTAINLY PURSUE THE CAMPAIGN FOR CDE II AT THE
VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME IN
STOCKHOLM IN ORDER TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ITS HUMAN
RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND DRIVE WEDGES IN THE ALLIANCE.
THE APPEAL'S FOCUS ON CDE PHASE II MAY PROVIDE US WITH
ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE IN STOCKHOLM, BUT USDEL
BELIEVES THAT WESTERN LEVERAGE CAN ONLY BE MAXIMIZED IF
OUR WESTERN ALLIES JOIN US IN SENDING A CLEAR SIGNAL TO
THE EAST THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANCE FOR PHASE II IN
THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME HERE. END SUMMARY.
4. USDEL HAS READ VARIOUS COMMENTS ON THE JUNE 11
BUDAPEST "APPEAL" ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
AS AN ELABORATION ON THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV BERLIN
INITIATIVE INCLUDING, ESPECIALLY, MBFR'S (REF E). AS
CONCERNS THE SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROL REDUCTIONS, WE AGREE WITH USDEL MBFR'S COMMENTS.
WHAT WE HAVE TO OFFER CONCERNS THE QUESTION OF THE FORUM,
?0
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ITS UTILITY, THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MBFR AND CDE,
AND THE APPEAL'S POTENTIAL EFFECT ON STOCKHOLM.
5. THE JUNE 11 APPEAL, ALTHOUGH SUBSTANTIVELY MORE
RELEVANT TO MBFR THAN TO THE CURRENT PHASE OF CDE, IS
CLEARLY TARGETED AT THE CSCE. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING A "SPECIAL FORUM" OF ALL
EUROPEAN STATES PLUS THE U.S., AND CANADA OR, ALTERNA-
TIVELY, TO WIDENING THE FRAMEWORK OF MBFR TO INCLUDE
"OTHER" EUROPEAN STATES, BUT IN OUR VIEW THESE
POSSIBILITIES ARE WINDOW DRESSING DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE
EASTERN FORTHCOMINGNESS TO WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLICS.
THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE WEST WILL NOT AGREE
TO AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN FORUM WHICH WOULD DETACH
SECURITY ISSUES FROM THE OTHER BASKETS OF CSCE, AND THEY
ARE EQUALLY AWARE OF FRENCH REJECTION OF BLOC-TO-BLOC
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MBFR FORUM OR CDE. IN FACT THE
FRENCH, PERHAPS AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIETS,
HAVE MADE THEIR DESIRE TO TORPEDO MBFR EXPLICIT HERE
(SEE SEPTEL). ADDITIONALLY THE RUMOR IS THAT THE CHIEF
"TORPEDO" IN THIS EXERCISE, BENOIT D'ABOVILLE, WILL
SUCCEED ISABELLE RENOUARD AND THUS BECOME THE FRENCH
REPRESENTATIVE ON THE NATO HIGH-LEVEL GROUP.
6. INDICATIONS IN STOCKHOLM, PARTICULARLY IN A RECENT
PRESS CONFERENCE BY SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (REF
D), ARE THAT THE EAST SEES THE BUDAPEST APPEAL AS
"PROVIDING OBJECTIVES" FOR CDE PHASE II. ONE EASTERN
DELEGATE HAS TOLD US THAT THIS COULD INVOLVE A DOUBLE-
BARRELED PHASE II, WITH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT
NEGOTIATING INITIAL REDUCTIONS ON A BLOC-TO-BLOC BASIS,
WHILE ALL 35 CSCE STATES CONTINUE TO DISCUSS CSBM'S AT A
SEPARATE VENUE. EVENTUALLY THE TWO TALKS WOULD BE MERGED
TO NEGOTIATE ALL-EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT. THIS TYPE OF
EVOLUTION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE PARTICULAR APPEAL FOR MOST
NNA, WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS LEGITIMATE PARTICIPANTS IN THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS, BUT THE FRENCH WOULD BALK AT
THE BLOC-TO-BLOC ASPECT.
7. WE CONTINUE TO VIEW THE BUDAPEST APPEAL PROPOSAL
PRIMARILY AS A HIGHLY SKILLFUL PUBLIC RELATIONS GAMBIT
DESIGNED TO DRIVE WEDGES IN THE ALLIANCE AND TO PERMIT
THE SOVIETS TO "ESCAPE FORWARD" OUT OF BOTH MBFR AND CDE
PHASE I. IN VIENNA THE SOVIETS HAVE CLEARLY BEEN BOXED
IN BY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 5, WHILE IN
STOCKHOLM THEY HAVE SEEN THE SHAPE OF A POTENTIAL CDE
AGREEMENT TAKE ON AN INCREASINGLY WESTERN FORM AS EASTERN
NON-STARTERS HAVE FALLEN BY THE WAYSIDE.
8. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING
FEATURES OF BOTH THE APPEAL AND THE WARSAW PACT
COMMUNIQUE IS THAT THEY CONTAIN A VIRTUAL "GRAB BAG" OF
SOVIET NON-STARTERS FROM STOCKHOLM AND OTHER NEGOTIATING
FORA (E.G., SO-CALLED FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, LIMITATIONS
21
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES, REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY BUDGETS,
NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONES, A NATO-WARSAW
PACT NON-USE OF FORCE TREATY, ETC.). IN FACT, WHILE
UNDENIABLY WELL PRESENTED FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS
VIEWPOINT, THESE PROPOSALS SEEM SOMEWHAT ANALAGOUS TO
PACKAGING THE SAME DETERGENT IN A MORE ATTRACTIVE BOX
MARKED "NEW AND IMPROVED " IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE
SOVIETS MAY EVEN BE USING THIS BROAD PROGRAM AS A MEANS
OF WITHDRAWING CERTAIN OF THEIR PROPOSALS FROM OTHER
FORA WITHOUT LOSING FACE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE NOTE THAT
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH APPARENT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DROP
THEIR INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING FBS AIRCRAFT IN AN NST
AGREEMENT, THE IDEA OF CAPTURING SO-CALLED "TACTICAL
STRIKE AIRCRAFT" SURFACES IN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL. AS IN
OUR VIEW THE SOVIETS HARBOR NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THIS
PROPOSAL'S CHANCES FOR SUCCESS, THIS COULD MERELY BE A
WAY OF CASTING OFF AN UNTENABLE POSITION WITHOUT
EXPLICITLY ABANDONING IT.
9. FROM THE CDE CONTEXT, THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IS BROADLY
CONSISTENT WITH EASTERN PROPOSALS AND STATEMENTS IN
STOCKHOLM. ITS PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON REDUCTIONS IS MORE
IMMEDIATELY PERTINENT TO THE MBFR TALKS THAN TO THE
CURRENT STAGE OF THE CDE, BUT WE CAN OFFER THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN TO US:
A) ZONE OF REDUCTIONS: WHILE THE APPEAL SEEMS TO ADOPT
THE CDE ZONE FOR REDUCTIONS, IT STATES A SLIGHTLY
DIFFERENT FORMULATION FROM THAT IN THE MADRID MANDATE.
WHEREAS THE MANDATE REFERS TO "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE," THE
APPEAL SPEAKS OF THE "TERRITORY OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE
FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS." THE USE OF THE WORD
TERRITORY" COULD BE SIGNIFICANT. THE SOVIETS HAVE
RECENTLY PRESSED IN STOCKHOLM FOR USE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL DEFINITION OF "TERRITORY" WHICH WOULD
INCLUDE TERRITORIAL WATERS AS WELL AS THE AIRSPACE ABOVE
THE EUROPEAN LAND-MASS. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THE SOVIETS
INTEND TO USE THIS TERM "TERRITORY" AS A BENIGN MEANS OF
DELIMITING THE ZONE OR TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR PRESSING
US TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES TAKING
PLACE IN THE "TERRITORY" OF EUROPE (I.E., IN THE AIRSPACE
ABOVE EUROPE OR IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS) IN CDE II. WE
WILL HAVE TO WATCH CAREFULLY FOR SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO USE
THE APPEAL TO BREAK OUT OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
NEGOTIATED AT MADRID, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. AND, AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, BY EXTENDING THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FROM THE MBFR GUIDELINES AREA --
WHERE THEY MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL ARMS
ADVANTAGE -- TO THE CDE ZONE -- WHERE THE DISPARITY IS
NEGLIGIBLE, THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO PUT FORWARD THEIR
REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL AS BEING ON A STRICTLY ONE-FOR-ONE
BASIS AND PRESERVE, THROUGHOUT THE REDUCTION PROCESS,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THEIR ADVANTAGE IN THE CENTRAL AREA.
B) MEASURES AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK: IN SECTION II THE
BUDAPEST APPEAL PROPOSES A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH THE
EAST HAS PREVIOUSLY TABLED IN STOCKHOLM; THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT COVER LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY
EXERCISES AND AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FORCES
BEING "REGROUPED" TO EUROPE FOR SUCH EXERCISES. THE
LATTER CLEARLY BUILDS ON THE EAST'S PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE
IN CSBM'S TO BE AGREED THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
OF FORCES BEING TRANSFERRED INTO THE CDE ZONE, AND IS
AIMED AT CAPTURING U.S. REINFORCEMENT EXERCISES (E.G.,
REFORGER). A NEW ELEMENT IN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IS THAT
THE EAST IS NOW PROPOSING AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON
EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS MANPOWER FOR SUCH TRANSFERS. THE
EAST'S SUGGESTION FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE
ZONES HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN TABLED AND LARGELY IGNORED IN
STOCKHOLM, WHILE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR LOWERING THE LEVEL
OF CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS ALONG THE CENTRAL FRONT HAS
BEEN BORROWED FROM EARLIER SUGGESTIONS BY SOME NNA
COUNTRIES. BUT HERE, AS IN OTHER AREAS, THE SOVIETS MAY
BE USING THIS APPEAL TO CONSIGN A VARIETY OF PROPOSALS
WHICH ARE EITHER HEADED NOWHERE OR WHICH THE SOVIETS
THEMSELVES DON'T REALLY LIKE (E.G., NWFZ, REDUCTION OF
MILITARY BUDGETS, ETC.) TO THE SCRAP HEAP WITHOUT
EXPLICITLY HAVING TO SWALLOW THEM.
C) VERIFICATION: THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IS CONSISTENT WITH
OTHER RECENT SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OFFERS IN OFFERING
INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR THE REDUCTION
PROCESS. IN THIS INSTANCE, INSPECTION COULD BE USED "IF
NECESSARY" ALONG WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM'S)
AND OTHER "INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES." INSPECTIONS COULD
BE PERFORMED BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
TO INCLUDE PARTICIPATION OF NATO, WARSAW PACT AND NNA
REPRESENTATIVES. THIS POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
SOVIET POSITION IN STOCKHOLM THAT INSPECTION IS APPRO-
PRIATE FOR DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS BUT NOT FOR VERIFYING
COMPLIANCE WITH CSBM'S. THE REMAINDER OF THE SOVIET
OFFER OF VERIFICATION SEEMS TO FLOW LOGICALLY FROM THIS:
-- WHILE MEASURES UP TO ON-SITE INSPECTION COULD BE
USED "IF NECESSARY" TO VERIFY REDUCTIONS, IT WOULD NOT
EXTEND TO THE VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL FORCES.
FOR THAT PURPOSE THEY OFFER ONLY "THE OBSERVATION OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF TROOPS REMAINING AFTER THE
REDUCTIONS" AND VAGUE "APPROPRIATE" FORMS OF VERIFICATION
FOR AGREED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.
AS IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIET APPROACH IS TO HAVE A
VERIFICATION LADDER, WITH THE EMPHASIS ON NTM'S FOLLOWED
BY CONSULTATIONS. THE APPEAL CLEARLY IMPLIES THAT THE
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WOULD DO JUST THAT -- CONSULT --
23
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
cFrAVr
IF VERIFICATION QUESTIONS AROSE, AND ONLY LATER, "IF
NECESSARY," CARRY OUT AN INSPECTION, AS A LAST RESORT
(I.E., THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE A DELAYING RATHER THAN A
PROBLEM-SOLVING MECHANISM).
-- THE EAST PROVIDES NO DETAIL OF WHO CAN REQUEST
INSPECTION (INDIVIDUAL STATES PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT OR
THE CONSULATIVE COMMITTEE?) AND IF SUCH A REQUEST CAN BE
REFUSED. JUDGING FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN STOCKHOLM, WE
CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THE EAST WILL REQUIRE "GROUNDS" FOR
AN INSPECTION REQUEST (THE VALIDITY OF WHICH THEY CAN
DETERMINE) AND WILL RETAIN SOME FORM OF THE RIGHT OF
REFUSAL (PROBABLY WHEN THEY REGARD THE "GROUNDS" FOR A
REQUEST AS INSUFFICIENT).
-- THIS BUDAPEST APPEAL COULD, IN FACT, REPRESENT A
HARDENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION AGAINST ANY INSPECTION
MEASURE FOR CSBM'S. AS MUCH AS WE SEE IMPORTANT
IMPLICATIONS (IN TERMS OF A PRECEDENT FOR OTHER ARMS
CONTROL FORA) FOR AGREEMENT TO INSPECTION IN STOCKHOLM,
THE SOVIETS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY WORRIED ABOUT ESTABLISHING
THAT PRECEDENT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THEIR APPARENT
PROPOSAL FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR GROUND FORCES
AND TACTICAL STRIKE AIR FORCES OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF
REDUCTIONS. IF THEY WERE TO PERMIT INSPECTION FOR CSBM'S
OR FOR RESIDUAL FORCES WITHIN THE ZONE, THEY COULD COME
UNDER PRESSURE TO EXTEND THE SAME PROCEDURES TO THE NO
INCREASE COMMITMENT COVERING THE NON-EUROPEAN PORTIONS OF
THE SOVIET UNION.
D) INFORMATION: THE BUDAPEST APPEAL PROPOSES AN
INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORCES TO BE
REDUCED. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE EAST IS OFFERING
ANYTHING BEYOND THEIR CURRENT POSITION IN VIENNA, WE
DEFER TO MBFR DEL FOR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. WE ARE
INTERESTED IN THE OFFER TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE
TOTAL TROOP STRENGTH OF LAND AND TACTICAL STRIKE AIR
FORCES WHICH ARE TO REMAIN IN THE ZONE, AS SUCH AN
EXCHANGE OF STATIC INFORMATION IS A MAJOR PORTION OF THE
NATO PACKAGE IN STOCKHOLM. THE REFERENCE TO SUCH AN
EXCHANGE, HOWEVER, IS SO VAGUE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO
ASSESS ITS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THEY WOULD ONLY
PROVIDE THE KIND OF DETAILED INFORMATION WE ARE SEEKING
ON THOSE FORCES TO BE REDUCED OR DISBANDED.
10. WHAT DOES THE BUDAPEST APPEAL MEAN FOR STOCKHOLM?
WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT, IF PROPERLY PLAYED BY THE
ALLIANCE, THESE PROPOSALS MAY OFFER US SOME NEGOTIATING
LEVERAGE HERE. THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT THE CHANCES FOR
MOVING TO A PHASE II CDE NEGOTIATION WILL BE ENHANCED BY
A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, AND USDEL IS MAKING
IT CLEAR TO THEM THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS WHAT THE PRICE
OF FAILURE WILL BE -- NO CONSIDERATION OF MOVING BEYOND
CDE PHASE I. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, EXAGGERATE THE
POTENTIAL LEVERAGE OFFERED TO THE WEST. BOTH THE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
EASTERN APPEAL AND THE COMMUNIQUE MAKE ONLY PASSING
REFERENCE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IN STOCKHOLM AS
CREATING MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR PHASE II.
NEITHER MAKES SUCCESS HERE A PREREQUISITE FOR THE
PURSUIT OF A DISARMAMENT PHASE IN VIENNA. AND WHILE ONE
EASTERN HEAD OF DELEGATION HAS TOLD US THAT THE EAST
UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE WILL BE NO PHASE II WITHOUT A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HERE, WE BELIEVE THE EAST WILL
ADVANCE A PHASE II PROPOSAL AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP
MEETING IN ANY EVENT FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1) THE
PROPOSAL IS PRIMARILY A PROPAGANDA PLOY AND AS SUCH THE
SOVIETS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT ITS SUCCESS
OR FAILURE AS LONG AS IT SERVES TO HIGHLIGHT THEIR
"PEACE-LOVING" POLICIES WITH EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION; 2)
THE PROPOSAL AND A CAMPAIGN FOR CDE PHASE II WILL SERVE
TO DEFLECT ATTENTION IN VIENNA FROM THE POOR EASTERN
RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS; 3) SUCH AN CAMPAIGN WOULD, AT
THE MINIMUM, FORCE THE WEST TO REJECT "A COMPREHENSIVE"
PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT WITH THE RESULTANT PROPAGANDA
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST; AND 4) IT COULD ONCE AGAIN
SERVE TO DRIVE WEDGES IN THE ALLIANCE, AS WE COULD
ANTICIPATE THAT A NUMBER OF NATO ALLIES WILL FEEL
CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO MOVE TO PHASE II
REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. IN LIGHT OF
THIS, USDEL BELIEVES WE CAN BEST EXPLOIT OUR LEVERAGE BY
ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES TO IMPRESS UPON THE EAST THAT
THERE WILL BE NO CONSIDERATION OF PHASE II CDE WITHOUT A
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME HERE. THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE OF
OUR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION BUT AS IT IS A EUROPEAN
AUDIENCE THAT IS THE TARGET OF THE BUDAPEST APPEAL, OUR
VIEWS WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A
UNIFIED ALLIANCE RESPONSE.
11. CONCLUSION:
1) AS TO FORUM, THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO
KILL OFF AN "EXPANDED MBFR; THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT THE
"NEW FORUM" IDEA IS A NON-STARTER BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAVE
BASKET III TO WITHER ON THE UNTENDED VINE; THUS, LEAVING
ONLY CDE PHASE II.
2) WHAT THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE OFFERING (IF
ANYTHING) IS A FACE-SAVING DUMPING GROUND FOR BOTH
SIDES' PROPOSALS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENT I A L STOCKHOLM 04916
SUBJECT: POLADS PAPER ON VIENNA MEETING
REF: USNATO 3342
1. CDE XI - 014.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. USDEL CDE IS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHY, IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW PORTION OF THE VIENNA CSCE
MEETING, THE WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY PART OF
BASKET I SHOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE
CDE. IN OUR VIEW, THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE SHOULD
REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMITMENTS CONTAINED
IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THUS, AT VIENNA, WE SHOULD
CAREFULLY REVIEW EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI
CBMS, INCLUDING THE FREQUENCY, NUMBER, AND TREATMENT
OF OBSERVERS AT NOTIFIED MILITARY EXERCISES AS WELL AS
THE EAST'S MINIMALIST APPROACH TO THE PROVISION OF
INFORMATION IN PAST NOTIFICATIONS, AND OF COURSE, IN THE
CASE OF ZAPAD-81, SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL
ACT.
4. THE MADRID MANDATE DOES NOT SPEAK OF IMPLEMENTATION
REVIEW VIS A VIS THE CDE, BUT OF REVIEWING THE RESULTS
ACHIEVED BY THE FIRST STAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF A FUTURE
(NOT NECESSARILY VIENNA) FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH WOULD
CONSIDER THE WAYS AND APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR THE
PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS
SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF
SUPPLEMENTING THE PRESENT MANDATE. THIS PLACES THE
REVIEW OF RESULTS AT STOCKHOLM CLEARLY IN THE CONTEXT
OF NEW PROPOSALS; COMPLIANCE WITH PAST OR CURRENT
COMMITMENTS IS A SEPARATE ITEM.
5. USDEL URGES WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION OF THESE FACTS
AS PREPARATION FOR VIENNA BEGIN.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04899
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET
- POSITION ON AIR ACTIVITIES
1. CDE XI - 015
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS JUNE 18 DISCUSSED
ALLIANCE REACTION TO U.S. AND FRENCH REPORTS THAT THE
SOVIET POSITION CALLING FOR AN INDEPENDENT NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD FOR AIR ACTIVITIES AND REJECTING THE COMBINED
ARMS APPROACH HAS APPARENTLY HARDENED. WHILE ALL CAUCUS
MEMBERS VOICED CONCERN, MOST AGREED THAT THE ISSUE WAS
SERIOUS BUT NOT CRITICAL AT THIS TIME. THERE WAS GENERAL
SUPPORT FOR THE SUGGESTION THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS USE
ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH SENIOR
SOVIET OFFICIALS TO VOICE OUR CONCERNS ON THIS AND OTHER
CDE ISSUES. IN THIS REGARD, FRANCE INDICATED THAT CDE
MAY BE RAISED DURING PRESIDENT MITTERAND'S JULY VISIT TO
MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADORS GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) AND BARRY (U.S.)
REPORTED TO THE CAUCUS ON RECENT CONTACTS WITH SOVIET
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR
ACTIVITIES. GASCHIGNARD REPORTED THAT GRINEVSKY
CONTINUES TO REJECT THE CONCEPT OF COMBINED ARMS
ACTIVITIES AND INSISTS ON AN INDEPENDENT THRESHOLD FOR
THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES. BARRY AGREED WITH
GASCHIGNARD'S ASSESSMENT BASED ON HIS ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT
WITH GRINEVSKY A POSSIBLE STARTING TEXT FOR DRAFTING A
SOLUTION TO THE AIR ISSUE. BARRY REPORTED THAT THE
SOVIETS REFUSE TO WORK FROM ANY FORMULATION WHICH
MAINTAINS THE SUBORDINATE POSITION OF AN AIR THRESHOLD
TO GROUND ACTIVITIES AND WILL ONLY CONSIDER LANGUAGE
WHICH WOULD, DE FACTO, CREATE AN INDEPENDENT AIR TRIGGER
FOR NOTIFICATION. THE SOVIET POSITION, BARRY NOTED,
SEEMS TO HAVE HARDENED SINCE THE END OF ROUND X, ALTHOUGH
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS IS FOR TACTICAL OR
SUBSTANTIVE REASONS. HE THEORIZED THAT THE SOVIETS,
PARTICULARLY THE GENERAL STAFF, MAY NOT WANT TO SETTLE
THE AIR ISSUE, BUT RATHER USE IT AS A MEANS OF SETTING
UP A MINI-PACKAGE. UNDER THIS THEORY, THE SOVIETS,
WISHING TO AVOID A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT, MAY WANT TO
USE WESTERN REFUSAL TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR TO SET UP
AN ULTIMATE TRADE-OFF OF AIR FOR INSPECTION, LEAVING
COSMETIC IMPROVEMENTS OVER THE FINAL ACT'S CBM'S AS THE
ONLY ATTAINABLE RESULT.
4. CAUCUS MEMBERS EXPRESSED GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THIS
SOVIET POSITION AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME
OF THE CONFERENCE. THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS EMERGED IN
THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION:
-- IN GENERAL, THE CAUCUS VIEWED THE AIR ISSUE AS
27
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
SERIOUS BUT NOT NECESSARILY CRITICAL AT THIS TIME,
ALTHOUGH SOME (NOTABLY ITALY) BELIEVED THAT IT COULD RISK
THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE. MOST FELT THE SOVIET
POSITION WAS MORE TACTICAL THAN SUBSTANTIVE AND THAT WE
COULD EXPECT TO HEAR MORE FROM THE EAST ON THIS ISSUE.
-- THERE WAS FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD SIGNAL
OUR CONCERN TO THE EAST, INDICATING THAT WE ARE EAGER TO
SOLVE THE AIR PROBLEM, BUT NOT IN ANY WAY WHICH WOULD
CREATE A DE FACTO INDEPENDENT AIR NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD.
-- FRANCE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT MITTERAND WOULD BE IN
MOSCOW IN JULY AND THAT CDE ISSUES COULD BE RAISED WITH
THE SOVIETS AT THAT TIME. IN LIGHT OF THIS, THERE WAS
GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL
CONTACTS WITH SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS SHOULD BE USED TO
UNDERLINE OUR POSITION ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES AND
VOICE OUR CONCERNS.
-- MEVIK (NORWAY), AFTER SUGGESTING THAT IN STOCKHOLM
THE WEST SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND LET THE EAST MAKE OVERTURES
TO US, RAISED THE IDEA OF A COORDINATED ALLIANCE DEMARCHE
IN MOSCOW ON THE AIR ISSUE, BUT THERE WAS NO WIDESPREAD
SUPPORT FOR SUCH A DEMARCHE AT THIS TIME. THERE WAS SOME
SENTIMENT FOR REVISITING THE QUESTION OF DEMARCHES ON
THIS BUT ALSO OTHER ISSUES IN LIGHT OF THE NEGOTIATING
SITUATION AT THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND.
-- THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON THE AIR ISSUE.
-- OF SOME CONCERN TO US WAS BUWALDA'S (NETHERLANDS)
CAUTION THAT NATO MUST NOT BE SEEN AS RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE OVER THIS ISSUE. CLAIMING
TO BE PLAYING THE ROLE OF "DEVIL'S ADVOCATE," HE ARGUED
THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PAINT THE EAST AS AT FAULT
FOR THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE OVER AIR BECAUSE NATO
HAD NOT CONSISTENTLY VIEWED INDEPENDENT AIR AS OUTSIDE
THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE AND BECAUSE THE EAST CAN MAKE A
STRONG CASE WITH OUR PUBLICS THAT AIR ACTIVITIES "AFFECT
SECURITY IN EUROPE." WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT BUWALDA'S
SO-CALLED "DEVIL'S ADVOCATE" ROLE MAY BE INDICATIVE OF
GENUINE WEAKNESS IN THE NETHERLANDS' POSITION ON THE
EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
2?
u
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 04893
SUBJECT: CDE AND THE MITTERAND VISIT TO MOSCOW
1. CDE XI - 016
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ACCORDING TO SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBER AND KGB
REPRESENTATIVE ROZANOV, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
FLEW TO MOSCOW TODAY (JUNE 20) TO "PREPARE FOR THE
MITTERAND VISIT." SINCE BENOIT D'ABOVILLE OF THE QUAI
WILL BE IN MOSCOW ON TUESDAY, JUNE 24, IN PREPARATION
FOR THE VISIT, WE SUSPECT THAT CDE ISSUES WILL BE
DISCUSSED BILATERALLY. WE ALSO SUSPECT THAT GRINEVSKY
WILL REPORT TO SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS ON THE RATHER
BLEAK SITUATION HERE IN STOCKHOLM AT PRESENT AND THAT
SOME NEW DECISIONS MIGHT BE MADE.
4. WE THINK THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO GET A FRESH
IDEA OF QUAI THINKING ON THE CDE ASAP.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I DENT I AL STOCKHOLM 04911
SUBJECT: CDE: EASTERN NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS
REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 1519 (B) STOCKHOLM 3962
- (C) STOCKHOLM 4133 (D) STOCKHOLM 4714
1. CDE XI -17.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON
JUNE 18, THE EAST (GDR) TABLED A NEW TEXT CONTAINING
ACTIVITIES AND RELATED THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION. WHILE
BUILDING ON PREVIOUS EASTERN PROPOSALS, THERE ARE SOME NEW
ELEMENTS. IT IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. END SUMMARY.
4. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF EASTERN NOTIFICATION TEXT
TABLED BY GDR CAPT. GRACZYNSKI IN B-1 WORKING GROUP ON
NOTIFICATION, JUNE 18. WE REPORT IT BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS
WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE COMPLETE EASTERN POSITION ON THE
ISSUES. COMMENT FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN OF:
MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES
CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY
OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, AMPHIBIOUS OR
AIRBORNE COMPONENTS, IF THEY INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS OR
MORE. AT THE SAME TIME THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS WILL BE
REPORTED.
- MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES,
IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE MANOEUVRES 700
SORTIES AND MORE WILL BE FLOWN.
- MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF LAND OR AIR FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES, EFFECTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS AS WELL AS INTO THE ZONE OR OUT OF IT, IF THEY
INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS OR 100 AIRCRAFTS (SIC) AND MORE.
- MANOEUVRES OF AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS CONDUCTED
INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH LAND FORCES, IF THE
NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS AND/OR AIRBORNE TROOPS WILL TOTAL
5,000 MEN AND MORE.
END TEXT.
5. ASSESSMENT. THIS JUNE 18 GDR TEXT REPRESENTS A MINOR
EVOLUTION IN THE EASTERN POSITION ON THRESHOLDS FOR
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. EARLIER 1986 PROPOSALS
INCLUDED A FEBRUARY 25 GDR PROPOSAL (REF A), A MAY 13 GDR
PROPOSAL (REF B), AND A MAY 23 USSR PLENARY PROPOSAL (REF
C). THE SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENT IN THE JUNE 18 TEXT IS A
PROVISION FOR NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS AND,AIRBORNE
TROOPS, WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR IN COMBINATION WITM LAND
FORCES, AT A NUMERICAL TROOP THRESHOLD OF 5,000 OR MORE.
OTHER ITEMS OF NOTE IN THE NEW PROPOSAL INCLUDE:
-- ON LAND FORCE MANEUVERS THE PHRASE "UNDER A COMMON
PLAN" HAS BEEN SUBSTITUTED WITH "UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND." THE THRESHOLD REMAINS PURELY A
MANPOWER THRESHOLD AND INCORPORATES THE 18,000 TROOP
FIGURE PROPOSED BY THE USSR MAY 23 (AND IF MEMORY SERVES
30
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
US CORRECTLY THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THIS THRESHOLD IN
BELGRADE AS WELL). IT ALSO INCLUDES THE MAY 23 USSR
REFERENCE TO STRUCTURE -- THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS WILL BE
REPORTED, I.E., INCLUDED IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION;
STRUCTURE IS NOT, HOWEVER, AN ELEMENT IN THE NOTIFICATION
TRIGGER. (IN OUR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THE SOVIETS HAVE
INDICATED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO COMBINE STRUCTURE AND
NUMBER INTO A TRIGGER - I.E. "18,000 TROOPS AND THE
CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF DIVISION/UNITS/SUBUNITS." BUT IN
PUBLIC WE HAVE SEEN NO SUCH INDICATIONS.) IN ALL OTHER
VARIANTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, MANEUVERS OF LAND
FORCES WERE TO BE NOTIFIED IF INDEPENDENT, OR IF IN
COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE "AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS, OR
AIRBORNE COMPONENTS." THE NEW TEXT DROPS ANY REFERENCE TO
"NAVAL."
-- THE PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE MANEUVERS
INCORPORATES THE USSR MAY 23 THRESHOLD OF 700 SORTIES. IT
DROPS, HOWEVER, THE OTHER ELEMENT INCLUDED IN THE USSR MAY
23 AIR FORCE MANEUVER NOTIFICATION PROPOSAL -- "OR MORE
THAN 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN THE MANEUVER." UNLIKE
EARLIER PROPOSALS, BOTH THE MAY 23 AND JUNE 18 PROPOSALS
EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO AN AIR FORCE MANEUVER BEING
CONDUCTED UNDER A "COMMON PLAN" OR EVEN A "SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND." BOTH THE MAY 23 PROPOSAL AND THIS
PROPOSAL SEEM TO CHANGE THE INDEPENDENT AIR DISGUISE AS
NEITHER MENTIONS NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE MANEUVERS
WHETHER "COMBINED WITH LAND FORCES OR INDEPENDENTLY;" BUT
RATHER SIMPLY REFER TO AIR FORCE MANEUVERS.
-- ON MOVEMENT (TRANSFERS) OF LAND OR AIR FORCES, SPECIFIC
NUMERICAL PARAMETERS HAVE NOW BEEN PROVIDED: "18,000
TROOPS OR 100 AIRCRAFT AND MORE." IN ADDITION, IN EARLIER
PROPOSALS REFERENCE TO AIR WAS MADE SIMPLY IN THE CONTEXT
OF "TRANSFERS;" NOW REFERENCE TO AIR IS MADE IN THE
CONTEXT OF "MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS)." BOTH THIS PROPOSAL
AND THE MAY 13 GDR PROPOSAL HAVE DROPPED THE 250-300 KM
STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE QUALIFICATION FOR NOTIFICATION OF
MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) INCLUDED IN THE GDR FEBRUARY 25
PROPOSAL.
6. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE FACT OF A SEPARATE AMPHIBIOUS
THRESHOLD IS WELCOME, THE THRESHOLD IS SO HIGH THAT FEW,
IF ANY, NOTIFICATIONS WILL EVER BE REQUIRED BY THE EAST,
WHEREAS IT WOULD CAPTURE A NUMBER OF NATO'S AMPHIBIOUS
ACTIVITIES (NORWAY, DENMARK). OTHER CHANGES DO NOT MAKE
THIS PROPOSAL ANY MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN EARLIER VARIANTS.
THE USSR CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR NOTIFICATION OF WESTERN
INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MINIMIZE
ITS OWN NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. IN ADDITION, THEY SEEK
TO AVOID PROVISION OF ANY INFORMATION ON NAVAL SUPPORT OF
NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, EXCEPT AMPHIBIOUS. IN
INTRODUCING THE PROPOSAL, THE EAST SIDESTEPPED ANY COMMENT
ON THE NNA PARAMETERS PROPOSAL OF JULY 13 (REF D), CAUSING
31
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ONE NNA DELEGATE TO OBSERVE THAT THE EAST WAS EMPLOYING A
WELL-KNOWN TACTIC -- INTRODUCING A NEW PROPOSAL TO AVOID
COMMENTING ON ANOTHER PROPOSAL. (PRIVATELY THE SOVIETS
HAVE BEEN QUITE NEGATIVE ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, DESCRIBING IT
AS "OVERLY COMPLICATED" AND, WITH REMARKABLE CHUTZPAH,
"DIFFICULT TO VERIFY.") THE USSR, IN ADDITION, REFERRED
TO THE SC.1 PARAMETERS AS A "JOKE," AND CALLED FOR
REALISTIC, NEW" PARAMETERS FROM THE WEST AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. "FOR THE TIME BEING WE CONSIDER THIS A GAME,"
USSR MILREP TATARNIKOV SAID, "AND NOTHING MORE THAN
THAT." END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 04931
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 4714, B) STOCKHOLM 4911
1. CDE XI - 018
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE FRG
DEFENSE STATE SECRETARY OPENED THE JUNE 20 PLENARY BY
DECLARING THAT HE WAS "DEEPLY WORRIED" ABOUT THE COURSE
OF THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS GLOOMY ASSESSMENT IS
WIDELY SHARED IN STOCKHOLM. AS WAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED
ALMOST ON A DAILY BASIS THIS WEEK, THE SOVIETS ARE IN NO
HURRY TO RESOLVE A SERIES OF ISSUES, MOST PARTICULARLY
THE QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE AIR ACTIVITIES. U.S.-
SOVIET CONTACTS SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW (OR AT LEAST
THE GENERAL STAFF) HAS MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO
EXPLOIT THE AIR NOTIFICATION ISSUE AS AN EXCUSE TO STALL
PROGRESS ON OTHER ISSUES. THIS MAY CHANGE WITH GRINEVSKY
NOW IN MOSCOW "TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT."
PRESENT SOVIET OBDURACY MAY WELL BE INSPIRED BY TACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS. THE SOVIETS EVENTUALLY MAY AGREE TO A
FORMULA ON AIR FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO A NOTIFIABLE GROUND
ACTIVITY BUT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A MINI-PACKAGE WHICH
AVOIDS EVERYTHING WE CONSIDER NECESSARY FOR A MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT. AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIANCE IS
HOLDING TOGETHER -- AT LEAST PUBLICLY -- ON A RANGE OF
ISSUES FROM INDEPENDENT AIR TO ON-SITE INSPECTION TO
CONSTRAINTS. IN FACT, SOME ALLIANCE MEMBERS SEEM TO WANT
A BREATHING SPACE TO CONSIDER WESTERN OPTIONS (WE ARE,
FOR EXAMPLE, SLOWING DOWN DRAFTING ON NUF CONSISTENT WITH
OUR APPROACH OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM"). HOWEVER, AS THE
SEPTEMBER DEADLINE APPROACHES WITH NO SIGNIFICANT
AGREEMENT IN SIGHT, THE EASY BREATHING OF SUMMER MAY TURN
TO HEAVY PANTING FOR ANY AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A MINI-
PACKAGE, THIS AUTUMN. IF THIS ASSESSMENT IS ACCURATE,
THE FRG STATE SECRETARY HAS GROUNDS FOR CONCERN. END
SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSM ENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: U.S.-SOVIET PRIVATE EFFORTS TO
ELIMINATE THE IMPASSE ON THE AIR ISSUE HAVE GROUND TO A
HALT. AT THE SAME TIME EASTERN ACTIONS IN THE WORKING
GROUPS -- THROWING IN LANGUAGE ON AIR TO SET UP A
ROADBLOCK TO THE NOTATION OF MORE LANGUAGE -- HAVE
REFLECTED A GENERAL UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE AHEAD UNTIL
THE AIR ISSUE IS RESOLVED TO THEIR SATISFACTION.
MOREOVER, AS IT BECAME CLEAR THAT ANY BILATERAL SOLUTION
TO AIR WAS NOT GOING TO FLY, THE EAST INTENSIFIED THEIR
PUBLIC SELLING CAMPAIGN FOR A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER:
THE GDR ON JUNE 18 INTRODUCED AN EASTERN PARAMETERS
PROPOSAL WHICH PROVIDES SEPARATE PARAMETERS FOR LAND
FORCES, AIR FORCES, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE FORCES, AND
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS (SEE REF B). IN THE JUNE 20
PLENARY (THE DAY AFTER THE FINAL U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL
ON AIR), WITH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY ON HIS WAY
TO MOSCOW "TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT", SOVIET
GENERAL TATARNIKOV MADE THE SOVIET CASE PUBLICLY FOR A
SEPARATE 700-SORTIE AIR PARAMETER. REVEALING TO THE
CONFERENCE ARGUMENTS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD USED WITH US
PRIVATELY, TATARNIKOV CALLED FOR A "FLEXIBLE AND ELASTIC"
APPROACH TO AIR BASED ON A SPECIFIC PARAMETER. HE
CLAIMED THAT THE 700-SORTIE PARAMETER WOULD HAVE CAPTURED
20 1985 NATO AIR EXERCISES AS WELL AS SUCH SOVIET
EXERCISES IN 1985 AS "KAVKAZ", "ZAPAD", "GRANIT" AND AIR
DEFENSE EXERCISES. HE TRIED TO MAKE THE CASE THAT
VERIFICATION OF AIR EXERCISES IS SIMPLER THAT THAT OF
GROUND FORCE EXERCISES -- THROUGH THE USE OF NTM'S,
E.G., RADAR, RADIO INTERCEPTS AND SATELLITE TRACKING
SYSTEMS.
IN THE WORKING GROUP THE WEST SIGNALED ITS WILLINGNESS
TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA PARAMETER PROPOSAL
(REF A). THE EAST PUBLICLY WAS SILENT, FOCUSING INSTEAD
ON ITS OWN PROPOSAL. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, HOWEVER,
GRINEVSKY HAS CRITICIZED THE NNA PROPOSAL AS
UNVERIFIABLE AND UNEQUAL IN ITS TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT
STATES (REF B). FOR THEIR PART THE NNA HAVE BEEN
STRANGELY RELUCTANT TO DEFEND OR EXPLAIN THEIR PROPOSAL.
5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: IN WORKING GROUP
DISCUSSION THIS WEEK THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE GAVE THE
MOST EXPLICIT SIGNAL TO DATE OF WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO
MOVE AWAY FROM MEASURE 1 IF IT IS AGREED TO PROVIDE
STATIC/STRUCTURAL INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER -
MEASURES (I.E., FORECASTS, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION).
THE SOVIETS REITERATED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER PROVIDING
SOME STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION,
BUT NOT MEASURE 1 TYPE INFORMATION SUCH AS NORMAL
PEACETIME LOCATIONS OF FORCES. THE SOVIETS NOTED THAT
INCLUSION OF SUCH INFORMATION IN CSBM'S WAS "PREMATURE"
ALTHOUGH IT COULD, PERHAPS, BE CONSIDERED IN A
DISARMAMENT PHASE OF CDE.
ON VERIFICATION, THE EAST BID TO SLOW OR STOP DRAFTING
BY SHIFTING THE DISCUSSION AWAY FROM VERIFICATION
MODALITIES, WHERE SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, ONTO THE
MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BEFORE THE GROUP -- FORMS OF
VERIFICATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE CLEARLY DECIDED TO BLOCK
FURTHER DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION MODALITIES, APPARENTLY
PERCEIVING THAT THE DEVELOPING VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
WAS BIASED TOWARD SOME FORM OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION
(I.E., INSPECTION OR OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST), LEAVING
BEHIND THEIR PREFERENCE FOR CONSULTATIONS. THE EAST
SUGGESTED THAT THE COORDINATOR'S LATEST "FOOD FOR
THOUGHT" ON DEFINING THE AREA (WHERE THE INSPECTIONS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WOULD TAKE PLACE) BE PUT ASIDE AND TABLED A TEXT
PROVIDING THE REQUESTING STATE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE FROM
"AGREED FORMS" OF VERIFICATION FOR A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY
(I.E. LAND, AIR, OR MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF TROOPS AND
AVIATION). TO ILLUSTRATE THESE CHOICES, THE SOVIETS
CITED DIFFERENT METHODS OF VERIFYING AIR ACTIVITIES
(E.G., RADAR AND RADIO INTERCEPTS). SOME OF THE NNA
(SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA) FOUND PARTICULAR APPEAL IN
ESTABLISHING A STATE'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE FROM A "MENU" OF
AGREED VERIFICATION METHODS, BUT NATO FOCUSED ON WHETHER
THE REQUESTING STATE'S RIGHT TO "CHOOSE" ALSO MEANT THE
RIGHT TO "USE" THE METHOD SELECTED. THE CLEAR ANSWER
THE SOVIET DELEGATE AT THE TABLE (COL. BOGDANOV) PROVIDED
WAS THAT THE STATE RECEIVING THE REQUEST RETAINED THE
RIGHT OF REFUSAL (HOWEVER, EARLIER THE MORE SENIOR SOVIET
REP ON THIS GROUP, ROZANOV, HAD TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT
THE RIGHT TO "USE" YOUR CHOICE WAS INHERENT IN THIS
IDEA). SINCE THERE ARE ONLY TWO FORMS OF ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION -- NTM'S AND INSPECTION -- AND SINCE NO
AGREEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR A STATE TO USE ITS NTM'S, THE
"CHOICE" OFFERS NO CHOICE AT ALL. FOR THE WEST, THE
CHALLENGE NOW IS TO GET BACK TO DRAFTING ON MODALITIES.
6. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS BLOCKED AS THE
EAST TORPEDOED A TEXT IDENTIFYING WHICH STATE WILL BE
THE "HOST STATE" FOR AN OBSERVATION, OVER THE DEFINITION
OF THE WORD "TERRITORY." THIS ISSUE, WHICH GOES WELL
BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE OF OBSERVATION, HAD BEEN
RAISED BEFORE BY THE SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH LANGUAGE
ON VERIFICATION. IT HAS NOW RESURFACED WITH A VENGEANCE
IN B-2, AS THE SOVIET MILREP SOUGHT A CONFERENCE-WIDE
UNDERSTANDING THAT "TERRITORY" IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN
ITS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SENSE (I.E., THE LAND, AIR
SPACE, AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A STATE) AND MADE SUCH
AN UNDERSTANDING A PRECONDITION FOR THE NOTATION OF THE
TEXT BEING CONSIDERED. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THIS WOULD
"SETTLE" THE QUESTION OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBM'S. THE EAST'S OBJECTIVE HERE SEEMS TO BE TO DRAW
TERRITORIAL WATERS (AND AIR SPACE) INTO THE MADRID
MANDATE'S CONCEPT OF "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE," PERHAPS IN
ORDER EVENTUALLY TO CAPTURE AIR AND SOME NAVAL ACTIVITIES
UNDER CSBM'S WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR A FUNCTIONAL
LINK TO GROUND ACTIVITIES. NATO (JOINED BY SWITZERLAND)
REFUSED TO NOTE ANY TEXT BASED ON THE LEGAL DEFINITION
OF TERRITORY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR SEVERAL
REASONS: 1) "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE" IN THE MADRID MANDATE
REFERS ONLY TO THE LAND MASS OF EUROPE, NOT TERRITORIAL
WATERS; 2) ANY DISCUSSION OF "TERRITORY" BASED ON THE
LEGAL DEFINITION RISKS UNDERMINING THE ZONE AS AGREED AT
MADRID; AND 3) WE ARE NEGOTIATING A POLITICALLY BINDING,
NOT LEGALLY BINDING DOCUMENT AT CDE. ON OTHER ISSUES,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THE COORDINATOR IS CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON FOUR TEXTS
DEALING WITH THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO OBSERVERS
AND THERE IS SOME CHANCE THAT THESE CAN BE NOTED IN THE
NEAR FUTURE.
7. ANNUAL FORECAST: WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE TOLD US
BILATERALLY THAT THEY WOULD NOT LET THE CONTINUED IMPASSE
ON THE AIR ISSUE INTERFERE WITH WORK ON OTHER ISSUES,
THEY STALLED AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST THREE TIRETS OF THE
CONTENT OF THE FORECAST: 1) DESIGNATION OF THE ACTIVITY;
2) CHARACTERISTICS AND GENERAL PURPOSE; 3) NAMES OF THE
STATES INVOLVED. THE U.S., NOT CONTENT WITH NOTED
LANGUAGE IN B-1 (NOTIFICATION) ON INFORMATION TO BE
PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION ON THE LEVEL OF COMMAND
"ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING" THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, TRIED
WITHOUT SUCCESS TO WIN ACCEPTANCE FOR A LOWER LEVEL BY
INTRODUCING THE WORDS "NAME OR NAMES OF HEADQUARTERS AND
LEVEL OR LEVELS OF COMMAND CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITY."
8. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST, AFTER BLOCKING PROGRESS ON
FORECASTS, CONTINUED TO WOO THE NNA AND ISOLATE THE WEST
BY INTRODUCING A NEW CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL, DESIGNED TO
COUNTER TO WESTERN ARGUMENTS THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO
BE ABLE TO CONDUCT CYCLICAL LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES. THE
EASTERN PROPOSAL, WHICH WOULD PERMIT STATES TO CONDUCT
LARGER EXERCISES ONCE EVERY THREE YEARS, WAS GREETED
WARMLY BY SOME NNA.
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: AFTER DISMISSING LAST-MINUTE
EASTERN AND CYPRIOT AMENDMENTS, THE WORKING GROUP
REGISTERED ON JUNE 17 A TEXT ON THE ACTUAL REAFFIRMATION
OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, THE HEART OF THE NUF SECTION:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR
OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL AS WELL AS THEIR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. (TENSE TO BE DECIDED
LATER) THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE
THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT." THE SECTION
QUOTES VIRTUALLY VERBATIM FROM ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN
CHARTER AND HENCE, THE ORIGINAL U.S. LANGUAGE ON THE
SUBJECT. THEREFORE, IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE
SOVIETS AND SOME OF THE NNA TO INSIST THAT THE PRINCIPLE
SHOULD BE DEVELOPED, E.G., BY DEFINING MANIFESTATIONS OF
FORCE SUCH AS "ARMED" OR "MILITARY" FORCE. THE NEXT
LOGICAL CANDIDATE FOR "NOTATION" IS THE SELF-DEFENSE
EXCEPTION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE. WHILE EVERYONE AGREED
TO STICKING WITH LANGUAGE BORROWED FROM ARTICLE 51 OF
THE UN CHARTER, THE SWISS9 SUPPORTED BY THE NNA, OBJECTED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
TO ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE CHARTER. THE U.S. AND
USSR, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS ON THIS ISSUE, HAVE A COMMON
INTEREST IN PUTTING SELF-DEFENSE IN THE UN CONTEXT,
PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN ANY
CASE, GIVEN THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS,
WE ARE IN NO RUSH TO NOTE THIS TEXT. WE HAVE NOW TAKEN
UP PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE "ERGA OMNES" (ANTI-
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE) PRINCIPLE AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES IN THE COFFEE GROUP. THE SOVIETS WILL BE
HARD-PRESSED TO REFUSE TO NOTE LANGUAGE ON THIS SUBJECT,
GIVEN THE INCLUSION OF THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE IN THE
NUF REAFFIRMATION AND NNA INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT (NOT
TO MENTION THE UNDERSTANDABLE LACK OF HEARTFELT SUPPORT
FOR MOSCOW'S POSITION AMONG ITS ALLIES).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04909
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON STATUS OF US-SOVIET BILATERALS ON
THE AIR ISSUE
1. CDE - 019.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE U.S. AND SOVIET HEADS OF DELEGATION
HAVE MET SEVERAL TIMES THIS ROUND FOR INTENSE
DISCUSSIONS OF THE AIR ISSUE. SO FAR, THEY HAVE BEEN
UNABLE TO RESOLVE IT. THE U.S. HAS STUCK WITH THE SUB-
THRESHOLD CONCEPT WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE PRESSING A
SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER WITH EXTENSIVE EXCEPTIONS.
APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT THE BILATERAL VENUE COULD MOVE
NO FURTHER, ON JUNE 19 THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED
THAT THE COORDINATOR BE INFORMED OF THE IMPASSE SO THAT
HE COULD DEVISE ANOTHER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE. THE
NEXT DAY, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR LEFT FOR MOSCOW "TO
PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT." END SUMMARY.
4. DURING THIS SESSION, USDEL (AMBASSADORS BARRY AND
HANSEN) HAS ENGAGED SOVIET COUNTERPARTS (AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV) IN SIX HOURS OF INTENSIVE
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THREE SEPARATE DAYS ABOUT THE
AIR PROBLEM.
5. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY PREFER A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER
WITH EXCEPTIONS PERMITTING THE EXCLUSION OF STRATEGIC AIR
FORCES, AIR DEFENSE FORCES, FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AND/OR
INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. WE HAVE SHOWN NO INTEREST
IN SUCH A FORMULA, STRESSING THAT A SEPARATE AIR NOTIFI-
CATION, IN ADDITION TO VIOLATING THE MANDATE'S FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH TO AIR, WOULD POSE SERIOUS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS
FOR US.
6. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, GRINEVSKY'S VIEW IS THAT THE
ONLY POSSIBLE AVENUE FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE LIES IN
"CONSTRUCTIVELY AMBIGUOUS" LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD ENABLE
BOTH SIDES TO PRESERVE THEIR POSITIONS, I.E., FOR THE
SOVIETS, NOTIFICATION OF ALL AIR EXERCISES AND, FOR THE
U.S., PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON AIR COMPONENTS OF
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. CONSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE BASED
OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON AN NNA PAPER TABLED LATE
LAST SESSION WHICH, BY PERMITTING SUCH "CONSTRUCTIVE
AMBIGUITY", WAS DESIGNED TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR
RESOLVING THE U.S.-SOVIET PRINCIPLED DIFFERENCE ON AIR.
THE SOVIETS REJECTED IT LATE LAST ROUND; THEY SUGGESTED
RETURNING TO IT THIS ROUND BUT THEN INSISTED ON CRITICAL
DRAFTING CHANGES WHICH "TILT" IT IN THE DIRECTION OF
"INDEPENDEN'" AIR. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY AT THE INSISTENCE
OF TATARNIKOV, WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN AMBIGUOUS
SOLUTIONS.
7. AT THE END OF A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY ON JUNE 19, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT IT
APPEARED THAT THE BILATERALS COULD MOVE NO FURTHER ON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THE ISSUE AND THAT IT WAS TIME TO INFORM THE SWEDISH
COORDINATOR (LIDGARD) OF THE CONTINUING IMPASSE. HE
WILL RESUME PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE IN "EXTRA
MEETINGS" OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP. FOR THE
MOMENT THE SOVIETS WANT TO SET ASIDE THE AIR ISSUE IN
THIS FASHION, POSSIBLY USING INABILITY TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEM AS AN EXCUSE FOR GIVING AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE
ELSEWHERE. THEY MAY STILL COME BACK TO THE SUBTHRESHOLD
IDEA, BUT PROBABLY ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A MINI-PACKAGE
WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.
8. IN THE JUNE 20 PLENARY TATARNIKOV MADE THE SOVIET
CASE PUBLICLY FOR A SEPARATE 700-SORTIE AIR PARAMETER,
CALLING FOR A "FLEXIBLE AND ELASTIC" APPROACH TO AIR
BASED ON A SPECIFIC PARAMETER. HE CLAIMED THAT THE
USSR'S 700-SORTIE PARAMETER WOULD CAPTURE 20 NATO AIR
EXERCISES A YEAR AS WELL AS SUCH SOVIET EXERCISES IN
1985 AS "KAVKAZ", "ZAPAD", "GRANIT" AND AIR DEFENSE
EXERCISES BUT THAT ROUTINE DAILY TRAINING EXERCISES
WOULD NOT BE CAPTURED. THE SOVIET GENERAL ALSO TRIED TO
MAKE THE CASE THAT VERIFICATION OF AIR EXERCISES IS
SIMPLER THAN THAT OF GROUND FORCE EXERCISES -- THROUGH
THE USE OF NTM'S, E.G., RADIO INTERCEPTS AND SATELLITE
TRACKING SYSTEMS. IN CONCLUSION, TATARNIKOV PROPOSED
THAT THE CONFERENCE RETURN TO THE NNA-SPONSORED FORMULA
AND FILL IN THE ELLIPSES -- PRECISELY WHAT THE THE U.S.
AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD FAILED TO DO PRIVATELY THE DAY
BEFORE.BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04910
SUBJECT: NEW GRINEVSKY FORMULA FOR DEFERRAL OF NAVAL
ACTIVITIES
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3838, B) STATE 146054,
- C) STOCKHOLM 3458
1. CDE XI - 020.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON JUNE 19, 1986 SOVIET CDE
AMBASSADOR PRESENTED US WITH A NEW SOVIET FORMULATION OF
A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT DEFERRING NAVAL ACTIVITIES (SEE
PARA 4 FOR TEXT). U.S. CDE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT HE
WOULD SEND THE LANGUAGE TO WASHINGTON (ACTION REQUEST IN
PARA 6). END SUMMARY.
4. IN A PRIVATE BILATERAL MEETING ON JUNE 19, SOVIET
CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF
LANGUAGE FOR A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT DEFERRING NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW DURING
THE RECESS HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT SUCH A CHAIRMAN'S
STATEMENT WAS AN ACCEPTABLE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE NAVAL
ISSUE. HE MADE NO MENTION OF TWO OTHER PROPOSALS
FLOATED IN THE PAST AS WAYS TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL PROBLEM
(REF A): 1) A "FRENCH SOLUTION" LISTING UNRESOLVED
ISSUES; AND 2) A "SWISS SOLUTION" INVOLVING A
PRENEGOTIATED UNILATERAL STATEMENT. INSTEAD HE PROPOSED
THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD BE PART OF A
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT:
BEGIN TEXT:
. POSTPONEMENT TO THE NEXT STAGE OF THE ISSUE OF
NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING MANDATE
END TEXT.
5. BARRY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THIS NEW
SOVIET FORMULATION, BUT THAT HE WOULD REPORT IT BACK TO
WASHINGTON. GRINEVSKY DID NOT CONVEY ANY SENSE OF
URGENCY FOR AGREEING ON A FORMULATION. NONETHELESS, WE
THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR WASHINGTON TO GIVE SOME
THOUGHT TO WHAT ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE MIGHT LOOK LIKE
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY ON
THIS ISSUE (SEE REFS). IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD BE USEFUL
TO HAVE SUCH AGREED LANGUAGE IN OUR POCKET TO BE USED IF
NECESSARY AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME DURING THE END GAME
NEGOTIATIONS.
6. ACTION REQUEST: DELEGATION REQUESTS WASHINGTON
GUIDANCE ON THIS LATEST GRINEVSKY FORMULA AND, IF
APPROPRIATE, CHANGES OR AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA. ONE
POSSIBLE APPROACH MIGHT BE TO COMBINE THE EARLIER SOVIET
AND U.S. FORMULAS IN THIS FASHION: "PARTICIPATING
STATES CAN RAISE IN ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA
CONTINUATION OR NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE SUBJECTS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED MANDATE, INCLUDING THE
SUBJECT OF NAVAL ACIVITIES." CLEARLY ANY U.S.-AGREED
FORMULA WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED BY THE ALLIES AS WELL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 04988
SUBJECT: CDE: DISCUSSIONS OF INSPECTION
1. SUMMARY: IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH CLOSE ALLIES,
SELECTED NEUTRALS AND THE USSR WE HAVE BEEN PROMOTING THE
IDEA OF EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AS THE ONLY REAL MEANS OF
VERIFICATION. WE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS, BUT THE NEUTRALS
HAVE BEEN UNWILLING SO FAR TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE AIR
INSPECTION ISSUE. END SUMMARY.
2. BASED ON WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE BEEN
PRESSING THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON INSPECTION IN OUR
PRIVATE CONTACTS HERE:
-- INSPECTION IS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
VERIFICATION AVAILABLE TO ALL CDE PARTICIPANTS AND
MUST BE PROVIDED FOR IN ANY CONCLUDING DOCUMENT THE
US WILL AGREE TO IN STOCKHOLM.
THERE CAN BE NO ESCAPE CLAUSE ENABLING A PARTICI-
PANT TO TURN ASIDE AN INSPECTION REQUEST, BUT WE MIGHT
BE ABLE TO ACCEPT A FORMULA WHICH SAYS THAT IF A COUNTRY
DENIES AN INSPECTION REQUEST IN EXERCISE OF ITS SOVER-
EIGNTY, ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
LAPSE UNTIL THERE IS CONSENSUS ON RESUMING THEM.
-- INSPECTION MODALITIES MUST BE EFFECTIVE; ONLY AIR
INSPECTION GIVES A REAL CHANCE TO SEE WHAT IS HAPPENING
ON THE GROUND. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT
NEUTRALS WILL PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND/OR THE PILOT,
BUT THE INSPECTORS WOULD BE FROM THE CHALLENGING STATE
ONLY.
3. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH THE BRITISH,
FRENCH AND FRG HERE ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS. ALL ACCEPT
THE CONCEPT OF SUSPENDING THE AGREEMENT IF A REQUEST
FOR INSPECTION WAS DENIED, BUT THE UK AND FRG STRESSED
THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING A NEUTRAL TO PROPOSE THE IDEA.
ON AIR INSPECTION THE COMMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:
-- FRG: BONN'S REACTION IS POSITIVE, ESPECIALLY IF
THE NEUTRALS WILL PLAY A ROLE. THEY DOUBT THAT THE
PROPOSAL WILL BE NEGOTIABLE BUT BELIEVE IT SHOULD
SURFACE ASAP "FOR THE RECORD". SPECIFICALLY, BONN'S
FAVORABLE REACTION IS TAKEN BY THIS DELEGATION HERE TO
MEAN WAIVING THEIR INSISTENCE ON A 4000' MINIMUM
ALTITUDE FOR AIR INSPECTION. BONN WANTS TO CALL FOR
A PASSIVE QUOTA ON INSPECTIONS AND SUGGESTS THE FOLLOW-
ING TEXT:
BEGIN TEXT
A PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY
WITH MORE THAN ... REQUESTS FOR ... FROM OTHER PARTICI-
PATING STATES BELONGING TO A MILITARY GROUP OF WHICH
IT IS NOT A MEMBER, AND, IN ADDITION, WITH NO MORE
THAN ... FROM OTHER STATES.
END TEXT.
42
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
(COMMENT: FRENCH REP SUGGESTED THAT FORMULA AVOID
REFERENCE TO MILITARY ALLIANCES OR GROUPS; IT COULD
BE SOMETHING LIKE "STATES WHICH PARTICIPATE IN MULTI-
LATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES" THOUGH ROMANIA COULD ESCAPE
THROUGH THE LOOPHOLE.)
UK: ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS THE UK DOES NOT
SHARE OUR VIEW ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR INSPEC-
TION; WITHOUT SENSORS AND PRE-POSITIONED VEHICLES
ON THE GROUND FOR USE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AIR
INSPECTION THEY DOUBT THAT MUCH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.
THEY WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE AIR INSPECTION RANKED
HIGHER THAN GROUND.
-- FRANCE: THE QUAI DOES NOT OBJECT TO OUR IDEA
IF THERE ARE NO MAJOR TECHNICAL PROBLEMS; THE MOD
HAS NOT YET BEEN HEARD FROM. (COMMENT: BUT THEY
MAY WELL NOT BE READY TO OFFER RECIPROCITY.
END COMMENT)
4. ON JUNE 19 BARRY DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH FRG MOD
STATE SECRETARY RUEHL WHO SPENT THREE DAYS IN STOCKHOLM.
HE WAS GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO OUR EMPHASIS ON VERIFICA-
TION BUT URGED THAT WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF AN AIR MODALITY. AS SOMEONE WHO SPENT
A LOT OF TIME "INSPECTING" MILITARY EXERCISES FROM THE
AIR, OFTEN IN THE COMPANY OF TOP US AND FRG COMMANDERS,
HE COULD TELL US THAT:
ANY GERMAN COMMANDER COULD HIDE A DIVISION
MANY TIMES OVER IN THE 24-36 HOURS BEFORE INSPECTORS
COULD ARRIVE ON THE SCENE UNDER THE NATO PROPOSAL;
EVEN WITH COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE FLIGHT OF
FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT OR HELICOPTERS, HE HAD FREQUENTLY
BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A DIVISION OR CORPS HE KNEW WAS
OPERATING IN THE FIELD;
THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD
BE TO PERMIT SIMULTANEOUS COORDINATED INSPECTION BY
F-4 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS AND ALL-
TERRAIN VEHICLES. THE FRG WOULD NOT PERMIT THIS ON
ITS OWN TERRITORY. RUEHL AGREED WITH OUR STRESS ON
THE NEED TO PREVENT AN ESCAPE CLAUSE BECAUSE OF THE
EFFECT ON MBFR, AND HE SAID THE FRG MOD WOULD ACCEPT
OUR POSITION ON AIR MODALITIES. BARRY STRESSED THE
DETERRENT VALUE OF AIR INSPECTION AND SAID WE WERE
NOT THINKING OF USING IT TO PIN DOWN MINOR VIOLATIONS.
5. IN A COUPLE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH GRINEVSKY, BARRY
HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE AIR MODALITY IN SC.1. GRINEVSKY
HAS NOT REJECTED THE IDEA OUTRIGHT, BUT CLAIMS THAT
THIS IS SOMETHING NEW IN THE US POSITION. HIS FIRST
REACTION WAS THAT THE USSR WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ALLOW-
ING OVERFLIGHT ON SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS OR AREAS.
WHEN WE STRESSED THAT INSPECTING AIRCRAFT WOULD KEEP
TO APPROVED CIVIL AIRWAYS ENROUTE TO AND FROM THE
43
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
INSPECTED AREAS, HE RETORTED THAT "THERE ARE NO CIVIL
AIRWAYS IN THE DISTRICTS NEAR THE URALS" - I.E. THE
SOVIETS WOULD NEVER LET FOREIGN AIRCRAFT THERE. HE
SEEMED LESS ADAMANT ABOUT AIR INSPECTION IN THE NSWP
PART OF THE ZONE.
6. THE NEUTRALS WE HAVE CONTACTED SO FAR HAVE REACTED
NEGATIVELY TO THE AIR MODALITY. A COUPLE OF KEY INDI-
VIDUALS WHO WE THOUGHT MIGHT BE HELPFUL ON THE ISSUE
CLAIM IT IS NON-NEGOTIABLE. EVEN RAISING THE ISSUE
WOULD TOLL THE DEATH KNELL OF THE CONFERENCE, ONE NNA
HEAD OF DELEGATION SAID. THIS IS TYPICAL OF THE NNA
AT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE; THEY ARE SO
AFRAID THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL FAIL THAT THEY ARE
UNWILLING EVEN TO STAND UP FOR IDEAS OF THEIR OWN.
7. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE BOTH THE NO-ESCAPE
CLAUSE AND AIR MODALITY ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 05010
SUBJECT: UK PROPOSAL ON AIR ACTIVITIES
REF: STOCKHOLM 4713
1. CDE XI - 022
2. C-ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS, FRANCE, THE FRG,
AND THE US COMMENTED ON THE UK IDEA FOR A SOLUTION TO
THE AIR IMPASSE (REFTEL). THE RESPONSE WAS MIXED WITH
THE FRENCH ENDORSING THE CONCEPT AND THE US AND FRG
VOICING SEVERAL CONCERNS. THE DISCUSSION REAFFIRMED
THAT THIS APPROACH COULD CAUSE SERIOUS VERIFICATION
PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.
4. SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, THE FRENCH CDE DEPUTY
(PAGANON) INFORMED US THAT FRANCE COULD ACCEPT THE UK
CONCEPT. PARIS BELIEVES THAT THE SUBTHRESHOLD
APPROACH IS PREFERABLE AND SHOULD BE KEPT ON THE TABLE
FOR TACTICAL REASONS, SO THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE
TO PAY A PRICE FOR AN APPROACH THEY WOULD PREFER.
THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE UK APPROACH COULD MAKE AIR
THE TRIGGER ELEMENT FOR NOTIFICATION IN SOME CASES
(I.E., THE FRENCH AIREX EXERCISE WHICH HAS OVER 700
SORTIES AND TWO REGIMENTS INVOLVED, BUT WHICH WOULD
NOT REQUIRE NOTIFICATION UNDER OUR CURRENT THRESHOLD,
OR A COMBINED STRUCTURE-TROOPS OR STRUCTURE-TANKS
THRESHOLD). PAGANON INDICATED THAT FRENCH POSITION
IN MOSCOW WILL BE THAT THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE AIR
ISSUE IS A SUBTHRESHOLD, BUT THAT FRENCH WILL FIELD
THE BRITISH IDEA IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE
SOLUTION WHICH INCLUDES-A LOWER STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD
AND NO REFERENCE TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
5. FRANCE ALSO SEES TWO PROBLEMS IN NEGOTIATING SUCH
AN APPROACH: IT COULD RESULT IN THE WEAKENING OF THE
STRUCTURAL PART OF THE THRESHOLD WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY
INCREASING THE CURRENCY OF THE NUMERICAL; AND, IT
COULD UNDERMINE OUR DEFINITION OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT
(A DIVISION CAN BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AND
TANKS BUT NOT IN TERMS OF AIR SORTIES).
6. THE FRENCH SAW LESS PROBLEM WITH AN "OPTICAL"
TRIGGER IF IT DID NOT IN FACT CAUSE NOTIFICATION OF AN
ACTIVITY BASED ON THE AIR COMPONENT. THE US (BARRY)
INDICATED THAT EVEN AN OPTICAL TRIGGER IS IN CONFLICT
WITH THE US VIEW OF THE MANDATE AND COULD ACT TO
UNDERMINE OUR POSITION ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. HE
ALSO SAID THAT ANY AIR TRIGGER RAISED THE PROBLEM OF
VERIFICATION; THERE WAS NO WAY TO "INSPECT" A NUMBER
OF SORTIES. THE SUBTHRESHOLD APPROACH TRIGGERED
INFORMATION, NOT NOTIFICATION, AND THUS DID NOT RAISE
THE SAME PROBLEM. THE UK, FRANCE AND THE FRG DISAGREE
WITH THE MORE NARROW US INTERPRETATION OF THE
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, BUT AGREE THAT THE VERIFICATION
PROBLEM RAISED BY THE US WAS A THORNY ISSUE. THE US
FURTHER ARGUED AGAINST AIR AS AN INDEPENDENT TRIGGER
FOR NOTIFICATION BY POINTING TO THE MUTUAL INTEREST IN
US REINFORCEMENT FLEXIBILITY.
7. THE FRG (CITRON) ALSO TELLS US THEY ARE AGAINST AN
INDEPENDENT TRIGGER AND URGED THAT ALLIES STAY CLOSE
TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE. COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN
INFORMED PRIVATELY THAT MOD BONN WILL SUPPORT THE US
POSITION ON AIR STAUNCHLY, ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS
THEMSELVES ARE NOT OPPOSED TO A MORE FLEXIBLE
SOLUTION. THE FRG CDE DELEGATION IS UNDER
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT US IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID THE
ISOLATION OF THE US AND DIVISION OF THE ALLIANCE ON
THIS, OR ANY OTHER, ISSUE. END COMMENT.
8. THE UK IS NOW ARGUING RATHER STRONGLY FOR ITS
PROPOSAL, WHICH WE HAVE SAID REMAINS UNDER REVIEW IN
WASHINGTON. WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY OF THE CLOSE ALLIES
TO BEGIN ARGUING FOR THE PROPOSAL IN THE CORRIDORS,
BUT WE GATHER IT HAS BEEN THOUGHT OF INDEPENDENTLY BY
AMB LIDGARD (SWEDEN, B-1 COORDINATOR) AND THUS MAY
EMERGE IN ANY CASE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05049
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF GROWING EASTERN DISSATISFACTION WITH
- SOVIET TACTICS AT THE CDE
1. CDE XI - 023
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT SOME OF
THE USSR'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES (MOST NOTABLY POLAND) ARE
BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE PACE OF WORK
IN STOCKHOLM AND DO NOT EXEMPT THEIR BIG BROTHER FROM
BLAME. INFORMAL CONTACTS HAVE REVEALED THAT SOME
EASTERNERS, WHO ARE CLEARLY MORE INTERESTED THAN MOSCOW
IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, FEEL THEY ARE BEING
IGNORED ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AND SLIGHTED IN OTHER
AREAS. WHILE WE CANNOT EXPECT TO REAP ANY MAJOR GAINS
FROM EAST EUROPEAN DISSATISFACTION, IT MAY PRESENT US
WITH SOME TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES TO ISOLATE THE EAST ON
SPECIFIC ISSUES. END SUMMARY.
4. RECENTLY USDEL HAS NOTED INCREASING SIGNS OF
FRUSTRATION WITH THE PACE OF THE CDE AMONG THE NON-
SOVIET WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS. WHILE IN PUBLIC THEY
CONTINUE TO PARROT THE SOVIET LINE THAT THE WEST IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR FOOTDRAGGING IN STOCKHOLM, IN PRIVATE
THEY ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY PERTf1R ED OVER SOVIET
TACTICS AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE:
WE HAVE HEARD COMPLAINTS FROM SEVERAL EASTERNERS
OVER THE RECENT ACTION OF THE SOVIET MILREP (TATARNIKOV)
WHO TORPEDOED NOTATION OF AN INNOCUOUS TEXT ON OBSERVA-
TION BY INSISTING THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS ACCEPT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE WORD "TERRITORY"
AS A PRECONDITION FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE TEXT.
THAT DEFINITION, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE LAND, AIRSPACE
AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A STATE, IS UNACCEPTABLE TO
THE WEST AS IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
AS AGREED IN THE MADRID MANDATE. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT
THE OTHER EASTERNERS HAD RECOMMENDED AGAINST THIS COURSE
OF ACTION IN THE WARSAW PACT CAUCUS AND WERE NOT AT ALL
PLEASED THAT THE SOVIETS BLOCKED DRAFTING OVER AN ISSUE
THEY VIEWED AS A NON-STARTER. POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI
TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY
RECOMMENDED AGAINST RAISING THIS ISSUE BUT WAS IGNORED
BY THE SOVIET MILREP.
EASTERN AMBASSADORS WERE SLIGHTED BY THE SOVIETS
WHEN AMBASSADOR GRINVESKY (USSR) DEPARTED SUDDENLY FOR
MOSCOW TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT
IN JULY. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR
(TODOROV) THAT NOT ONLY HAD THE SOVIETS NOT INFORMED
THEIR ALLIES OF GRINVESKY'S DEPARTURE, BUT THAT HE,
TODOROV, HAD LEARNED ABOUT IT FROM THE FRG AMBASSADOR.
TODOROV WAS CLEARLY PIQUED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD KEPT THE
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
FRG BETTER INFORMED THAN THEIR WARSAW PACT PARTNERS.
-- IN PRELIMINARY COFFEE GROUP DISCUSSION OF THE WEST'S
(AND NNA'S) ERGA OMNES LANGUAGE FOR USE IN A NON-USE OF
FORCE (NUF) TEXT, THE EASTERNERS HAVE PROVIDED THE
SOVIETS LITTLE OR NO SUPPORT IN REJECTING SUCH A TEXT.
(NOTE: THE ERGA OMNES LANGUAGE IS, IN EFFECT, ANTI-
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE, COMMITTING STATES NOT TO
THREATEN OR USE FORCE AGAINST THEIR ALLIANCE PARTNERS AS
WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.) THE LACK OF
EASTERN SUPPORT, COMBINED WITH THE FACT THAT THE EAST
HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE IN THE
NOTED NUF REAFFIRMATION PARAGRAPH, IS MAKING IT MORE
DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO OPPOSE THE NOTATION OF AN
ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE SENTENCE.
-- GDR AMBASSADOR BURRING TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY THAT
THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR ACCIDENT HAD SENSITIZED HIM TO THE
IMPORTANCE OF INCREASED OPENNESS, THAT IS, IN CDE
CONTEXT, TO THE NEED FOR INCREASED EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION.
5. ON JUNE 24, KONARSKI (POLAND) PROVIDED THE MOST
EXPLICIT STATEMENT TO DATE OF EASTERN DISSATISFACTION
WHEN HE INFORMALLY TOLD BARRY THAT WARSAW WAS VERY
CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THE CDE AND HAD
INSTRUCTED HIM TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO SAVE THE
CONFERENCE. KONARSKI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- HE DIDN'T DISPUTE THAT THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF WAS
DRAGGING ITS FEET.
-- HE IMPLIED THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS HAD BEEN PREPARED
TO ACCEPT THE NNA'S RECENT GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD
PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NOTIFICATION
GROUP BUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD VETOED IT.
-- HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE THAT GRINEVSKY (USSR) WOULD
COME BACK FROM MOSCOW WITH ANYTHING NEW TO OFFER.
-- HE (KONARSKI) IS TRYING TO PROMOTE ANOTHER NNA
INITIATIVE ON NOTIFICATION TO BREAK THE LOGJAM OVER
AIR/COMBINED ARMS PARAMETERS. INTERESTINGLY,
HE CLAIMS NOT TO KNOW HOW GRINEVSKY WILL REACT.
6. IT SEEMS THAT, WITH THE END OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE NOW IN SIGHT, THE SOVIETS ARE GATHERING IN ALL
THE REINS FOR THE STRETCH RUN AND THAT EASTERN VIEWS AND
SENSIBILITIES WILL BE INCREASINGLY IGNORED IN THE RUSH
TO THE FINISH. AS THE EASTERN EUROPEANS ARE CLEARLY MORE
INTERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT THAN THEIR SOVIET MASTERS,
THEIR FRUSTRATION IS ONLY LIKELY TO INCREASE. AND WHILE
WE CANNOT ANTICIPATE ANY SIGNIFICANT GAINS FROM EASTERN
DISSATISFACTION, IT MAY PRESENT US WITH SOME ADDITIONAL
TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES TO ISOLATE THE EAST ON SPECIFIC
ISSUES.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
4.0
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05028
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE NOTED IN NOTIFICATION WORKING
GROUP
1. CDE XI - 024.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, FOR INCLUSION IN THE
"CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION" WAS PROVISIONALLY NOTED
IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK AT THE JUNE 24
MEETING OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP:
BEGIN TEXT.
"
- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN
THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY
- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES." END TEXT. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05068
CORRECTED COPY TEXT
ORIGINALLY PROCESSED AS 1333108.
SUBJECT: CDE: SOVIET "IDEA" ON AIR
1. THE FRG HAS BRIEFED US ON AN "IDEA" FLOATED BY SOVIET
MILREP GENERAL TATARNIKOV AT LUNCH WITH CDE REP CITRON
ON JUNE 24.
2. TATARNIKOV SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT
IMPASSE OVER AIR ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE PARALLEL SIMULTAN-
EOUS NOTIFICATION OF THE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY AND A RELA-
TED AIR ACTIVITY. HE DID NOT PROVIDE MUCH DETAIL ON THE
IDEA BUT SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT RELATED ACTIVITIES (E.G.,
COLD FIRE-DEFIANT SAXON) COULD BE SEPARATELY FORECAST AND
NOTIFIED AND THAT OBSERVERS COULD BE INVITED SEPARATELY
TO BOTH GROUND AND AIR ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITY.
3. FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON TOLD US THAT HIS REACTION WAS
NONCOMMITTAL AND FOCUSED ON THE PROBLEM OF INVITING TWO
TEAMS OF OBSERVERS TO TWO PHASES OF THE SAME ACTIVITY.
CITRON REPEATED THAT THE FRG WOULD FOLLOW THE US LEAD
ON THE AIR ISSUE AT CDE.
4. BARRY COMMENTED THAT A SEPARATE AIR NOTIFICATION
RAISED THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION, AND THUS THE SUB-
THRESHOLD APPROACH WAS PREFERABLE.
5. EVIDENTLY THE SOVIETS ARE STILL SHOPPING AROUND.
IN A MEETING WITH THE FRENCH THE NEXT DAY THEY
EXPLAINED A VARIATION ON THE SUB-THRESHOLD THEME WHICH
INCORPORATED A REFERENCE TO NOTIFYING AIR ACTIVITIES
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. THE FRENCH
EMPHATICALLY REJECTED THAT APPROACH BECAUSE OF THE CLEAR
SOVIET INTENTION THAT THIS WOULD CAPTURE INDEPENDENT AIR.
WE WILL NOT KNOW WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDER-
ING UNTIL GRINEVSKY RETURNS FROM MOSCOW, NOW PROJECTED
FOR JUNE 28.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05069
SUBJECT: AGREED COORDINATOR'S TEXT ON OBSERVATION
1. CDE XI - 025
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2
(OBSERVATION) WHICH WAS AGREED FOR NOTATION IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON JUNE 26.
BEGIN TEXT:
TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE
A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:
-- THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
-- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM;
LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR
TRANSLATION;
ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODING AND TRANSPORTATION OF
THE OBSERVERS;
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN
Si
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I DENT I A L STOCKHOLM 05076
SUBJECT: CDE: AIR INSPECTION MODALITY
1. THE FRG HAS OFFERED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF A POSSIBLE
NEUTRAL ROLE IN A CDE AIR MODALITY AT A HIGH LEVEL WITH
THE AUSTRIANS IN VIENNA, AND WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM TO
DO SO.
2. MEANWHILE THEY HAVE INQUIRED AS TO US VIEWS ON
BURDEN-SHARING THE COST OF MAINTAINING NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT
FOR CDE INSPECTION PURPOSES. ANY GUIDANCE WHICH WASH-
INGTON COULD OFFER WOULD BE APPRECIATED (E.G. WOULD THE
US BE WILLING TO SHARE THE COST ON THE SAME BASIS AS
THE FORMULA FOR COST-SHARING IN CSCE ACTIVITIES?)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05077
SUBJECT: FRENCH CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW
1. CDE XI -26.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: FRENCH CDE DEPUTY PROVIDED USDEL WITH OUTLINE
OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BETWEEN QUAI'S D'ABOVILLE AND SOVIET
OFFICIAL MENDELEVICH DURING FORMER'S RECENT VISIT TO
MOSCOW FOR FRENCH-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS TO PREPARE FOR THE
JULY MITTERAND-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. FRENCH WILL PROPOSE THAT
WORK IN STOCKHOLM CONTINUE PAST THE AGREED END OF THIS
SESSION, JULY 18, AND INTEND THAT A SUMMIT DECLARATION
WILL INDICATE INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET AND FRENCH
DELEGATIONS TO INTENSIFY THEIR WORK (POSSIBLY BY
CONTINUING INTO THE FORESEEN SUMMER BREAK PERIOD). THE
FRENCH WANT NATO TO GIVE "PUBLIC SIGNALS" OF FLEXIBILITY
IN AN AGREED STATEMENT NEXT WEEK. END SUMMARY
4. FRENCH CDE DEPUTY FELIX-PAGANON INFORMED U.S. AMB
HANSEN THAT D'ABOVILLE HAD BEEN TOLD IN MOSCOW THAT
VLADIMIR LOMEYKO HAD STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN NAMED TO HEAD
THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION. HIS REPLACEMENT AS MFA
SPOKESMAN IS GERASIMOV OF APN. (COMMENT: GRINEVSKY
DEPARTED STOCKHOLM FOR MOSCOW ON 20 JUNE WITH NO PRIOR
NOTIFICATION. MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION STATED
THAT HIS DEPARTURE WAS CONNECTED WITH PREPARATIONS FOR THE
FRENCH-SOVIET SUMMIT; THEY HAVE BEEN ADAMANT, HOWEVER, IN
DENYING THAT HE IS TO BE REPLACED; HE IS SUPPOSED TO
RETURN 28 JUNE. END COMMENT.)
5. IN CONNECTION WITH CDE, D'ABOVILLE WAS REPORTED TO
HAVE SEEN MENDELEVICH AND AN UNNAMED DEPUTY. MENDELEVICH
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERPRETED THIS A POSSIBLE U.S. TACTIC
TO REPEAT THE BERN EXPERIENCE, DENYING AN ABREEMENT AT
STOCKHOLM. THE FRENCH LAID THE BLAME ON THE SOVIET
DELEGATION, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO
LEAVE EVERYTHING TO THE ENDGAME IN STOCKHOLM. MENDELEVICH
REPORTEDLY AGREED WITH FRENCH THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN
ANYONE'S INTEREST AND THEREFORE THE DRAFTING PROCESS MUST
BE INTENSIFIED IN STOCKHOLM WITH THE AIM OF RESOLVING
MAJOR ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FRENCH SUGGESTED THAT
WORK MIGHT CONTINUE AFTER THE END OF THE CURRENT SESSION,
JULY 18. MENDELEVICH REPORTEDLY SHOWED INTEREST IN THIS
IDEA. (COMMENT: FRENCH IDEAS REGARDING THE SUMMIT ARE TO
FOCUS ON PROCEDURAL RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WITH
RESPECT TO CDE. THUS, THEY HOPE THAT THE SUMMIT
DECLARATION WILL INCLUDE A JOINT EXHORTATION TO INTENSIFY
THE WORK IN STOCKHOLM, I.E., TO WORK DURING THE SCHEDULED
SUMMER BREAK. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH HAVE ENCOUNTERED STRONG
RESISTANCE TO THIS IDEA IN STOCKHOLM AND MAY BACK OFF.)
END COMMENT)
6. D'ABOVILLE EMPHASIZED TO MENDELEVICH THE NECESSITY OF
AN OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM WHICH INCLUDED THE RIGHT TO
53
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
ON-SITE VERIFICATION. THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT
THIS WOULD BE LIKE PULLING TEETH.TO THIS, THE FRENCH
REPLIED THAT IT WAS TIME TO PULL TEETH BUT THAT THE
ANESTHESIA MIGHT BE FOUND IN REASONABLE MODALITIES FOR
ON-SITE VERIFICATION. FRENCH MADE CLEAR THAT THE RIGHT TO
VERIFY MUST BE AVAILABLE TO EACH CDE PARTICIPANT, BUT THAT
A PASSIVE QUOTA (I.E., A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF
INSPECTIONS ANY STATE WILL BE REQUIRED TO ACCEPT) MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE. D'ABOVILLE ALSO ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A
PENALTY IN THE EVENT THAT A REQUEST FOR ON-SITE
VERIFICATION WERE DENIED, IMPLYING A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION
OF OBLIGATION, PENDING AD HOC CONSULTATIONS AFTER A
REQUEST HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN. FRENCH ALSO CHALLENGED
SOVIETS TO THINK ABOUT WHAT KIND OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION
WOULD BE MOST ACCEPTABLE, FROM THE AIR OR FROM THE GROUND.
7. THE QUAI, I.E., D'ABOVILLE, BELIEVES IT IS TIME TO
GIVE SOME PUBLIC SIGNALS REGARDING WESTERN FLEXIBILITY IN
STOCKHOLM. SUCH SIGNALS, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, SHOULD BE
CONVEYED IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT NEXT WEEK AND COULD
INCLUDE: ACCEPTANCE OF THE NNA THRESHOLD FORMULA AS A
BASIS FOR DRAFTING; MOVE FROM THE 6000 THRESHOLD WITHOUT
NAMING ANY NEW NUMERICAL FIGURE; ABANDONMENT OF THE
PROPOSAL TO NOTIFY MOBILIZATIONS; AGREEMENT TO LIMIT THE
DURATION OF OBSERVATION (I.E., EITHER TO THE MAIN EXERCISE
PHASE OF THE ACTIVITY OR DURING THE PERIOD THAT THE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS EXCEEDED.); AND A REDUCTION IN
THE ACTIVE QUOTA FOR INSPECTIONS FROM TWO TO ONE PER STATE
AS WELL AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF A PASSIVE QUOTA. (COMMENT:
USDEL IS OF THE VIEW THAT WE HAVE REACHED THE TIME IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS WHEN A PUBLIC SIGNAL OF THIS NATURE COULD BE
POLITICALLY USEFUL, BUT WE SENSE THAT THE LIST MIGHT BE
PARED DOWN DURING CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE SAID THAT WE
BELIEVE THE PASSIVE QUOTA OF INSPECTIONS, IN PARTICULAR,
SHOULD BE WITHHELD FOR LATER BARGAINING. END COMMENT)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
54
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STATE 209382
SUBJECT: CONSULTING WITH THE FRENCH ON CDE
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 5077, B. PARIS 29815
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: AS PART OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH
ON EAST-WEST AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN ADVANCE OF
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S JULY 7-10 VISIT TO MOSCOW, EMBASSY
IS REQUESTED TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS AGAIN ON CDE. SOVIET
CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY'S RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW,
REPORTEDLY TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERRAND VISIT, INDICATE
THAT THE CDE IS LIKELY TO FIGURE IN THE MOSCOW TALKS.
DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED
TO UPDATE GOF ON US VIEWS AND SEEK A READING OF FRENCH
OBJECTIVES FOR THE MITTERRAND VISIT. END SUMMARY.
3. TALKING POINTS
------------------
- THREE WEEKS INTO THE CURRENT CDE ROUND, WE BELIEVE THE
PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ARE NOT GOOD.
-- WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT DECLARED SOVIET INTEREST
IN A CDE PHASE II ON DISARMAMENT HAS BEEN TRANSLATED INTO
MORE CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS IN STOCKHOLM. IN FACT, THE
SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE IN NO HURRY TO RESOLVE THE MAIN ISSUES
BLOCKING PROGRESS.
-- THIS MAY REPRESENT A TACTICAL DECISION TO WITHHOLD KEY
CONCESSIONS UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
PUBLIC PRESSURES WILL GROW ON THE WEST TO ACCEPT A MINIMAL
AGREEMENT. THOSE TACTICS WILL PUT A PREMIUM ON ALLIED
UNITY.
-- IN VIEW OF SOVIET FOOTDRAGGING IN STOCKHOLM --
ESPECIALLY BY THE SOVIET MILITARY -- PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S
VISIT MAY BE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSCORE AT THE
HIGHEST LEVEL THAT THE CDE WILL BE A TEST OF SOVIET
SERIOUSNESS ON ARMS CONTROL.
-- THE SOVIETS MAY HOPE THAT FRANCE'S WELL-KNOWN VIEWS ON
MBFR WILL MAKE YOU EAGER TO CONCLUDE PHASE I OF CDE IN
ORDER TO MOVE ON TO A REDUCTIONS PHASE. WE KNOW HOW
STRONGLY YOU FEEL THAT A SOLID, MILITARILY-SIGNIFICANT
PHASE I ON CSBMS IS AN ABSOLUTE PRECONDITION FOR ANY
CONSIDERATION OF EXPANDING THE PRESENT MANDATE. PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL DELIVERY OF THIS MESSAGE COULD BE
VERY IMPORTANT IN DISPELLING SOVIET HOPES THAT SOME ALLIES
MIGHT SETTLE IN THE END FOR A MINI-PACKAGE.
-- WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE
AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM THAT IS VERIFIABLE AND MARKS A
SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE OVER THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
-- WE ARE PREPARED TO INTENSIFY THE DRAFTING PROCESS, AS
YOU HAVE SUGGESTED (REF A, PARA 5), IN ORDER TO RESOLVE
MAJOR ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
-- BUT WE MUST ALSO MAKE CLEAR TO THE EAST AND THE NNA THAT
WE ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME WHICH DOES NOT MEET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
OUR REQUIREMENTS. WE MUST BE PREPARED, IF NECESSARY, TO GO
TO VIENNA WITHOUT A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
-- OUR DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM ARE STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH
AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED.
-- WISH TO UNDERSCORE SOME OF THE POINTS WE HAVE BEEN
MAKING IN STOCKHOLM:
0 IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT ALLIES
VIEW PROGRESS AT THE CDE AS A TEST OF THEIR SERIOUSNESS IN
PURSUING BROADER CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. FAILURE TO
ACHIEVE A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY
BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM WILL PRECLUDE MOVING ON TO
MORE AMBITIOUS PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTIONS.
0 THE KEY TO FURTHER PROGRESS IS DECIDING ON THE
GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS. A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD ALONE IS
NOT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT IS UNVERIFIABLE. WE URGE
CONSIDERATION OF A COMBINATION OF STRUCTURE, MANPOWER AND
EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD RESULT IN EQUITABLE TREATMENT FOR ALL
PARTICIPANTS.
0 IN RESOLVING THE AIR ISSUE, WE STILL BELIEVE THE
BEST APPROACH IS TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO NOTIFY ALL
FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES. BUT WE ARE
CONSIDERING A SUB-THRESHOLD BELOW WHICH
FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT NEED TO BE
REPORTED. WE CANNOT ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT TRIGGER FOR
NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES.
0 WE SHOULD SET ASIDE ISSUES, SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS
AND INSTITUTIONALIZED CONSULTATIONS, WHICH CANNOT BE AGREED
UPON IN THIS PHASE OF CDE .
0 WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ABOUT THE NEED FOR
VERIFICATION. INSPECTION IS THE ONLY FORM OF VERIFICATION
AVAILABLE TO ALL CDE PARTICIPANTS AND MUST BE PROVIDED FOR
IN ANY CONCLUDING DOCUMENT THE U.S. WILL AGREE TO IN
STOCKHOLM.
-- WOULD WELCOME YOUR READING OF SOVIET APPROACH TO CDE
ENDGAME AND LIKELY TACK GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL
TAKE WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND DURING HIS MOSCOW
DISCUSSIONS.
-- HOW DO YOU INTEND TO APPROACH CDE IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS?
SHULTZ
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
56
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05088
SUBJECT: EASTERN COMMENTS ON LENGTH OF VIENNA CSCE
1. CDE XI - 027
2. FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO STOCKHOLM OF US CSCE
DELEGATION HEAD WARREN ZIMMERMAN, SEVERAL EASTERN CDE
REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TOLD US THAT THE U.S. POSITION
THAT THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING SHOULD END AFTER
NINE MONTHS OR A YEAR SEEMS TO BE DESIGNED TO RESTRICT
DISCUSSION IN VIENNA OF THE BUDAPEST APPEAL ON
CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION. WE HAVE REFUTED THIS
CHARGE, NOTING THAT OUR POSITION ON THE LENGTH OF THE
REVIEW MEETING WAS ESTABLISHED LONG BEFORE THE BUDAPEST
APPEAL WAS ISSUED ON JUNE 11.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
57
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05104
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR CDE
1. IN THE THIRD WEEK OF THE PENULTIMATE CDE ROUND, EVERY-
ONE HERE IS WAITING FOR GRINEVSKY TO RETURN FROM MOSCOW
WITH A SIGNAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS FOLLOWING POLITBURO
CONSIDERATION OF CDE ISSUES JUNE 27. IN MY VIEW THE REAL
QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A LIMITED
BUT EFFECTIVE INSPECTION REGIME; THIS WAS PROBABLY THE
CENTRAL QUESTION FOR TOP LEVEL DECISION IN MOSCOW. IF
THE SOVIETS CANNOT ACCEPT INSPECTION, THEIR DELEGATION
HERE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO STALL, USING AIR, TRANSFERS/
TRANSITS, CONSTRAINTS, ETC. AS BLOCKING DEVICES.
IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO FACE THE VERIFICATION
MUSIC, THEY WILL PROBABLY EASE THE LOG JAM. THE REASON
THEY HAVE BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET SO FAR IS BECAUSE
THEY DON'T WANT TO SEE THE CONFERENCE FAIL ON THE
VERIFICATION ISSUE, THUS DEMONSTRATING THAT GORBACHEV'S
PROMISES OF A "NEW LOOK" IN ARMS CONTROL ARE EMPTY.
THEIR POSITIONS ON AIR, CONSTRAINTS, ETC. ARE EASIER TO
DEFEND PUBLICLY THAN A REFUSAL TO AGREE TO INSPECTION.
2. I THINK THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THE FOLLOWING KEY
ELEMENTS IN THE CURRENT WESTERN POSITION:
-- THERE WILL BE NO BERN IN STOCKHOLM; THE ALLIES
WILL NOT ALLOW THE US TO BE ISOLATED ON SECURITY
ISSUES;
-- THERE CAN BE NO "ESCAPE FORWARD" INTO A CDE PHASE
II WITH AN ARMS REDUCTION MANDATE UNLESS THERE IS A
PHASE I AGREEMENT;
-- THE WEST WON'T ACCEPT A PACKAGE OF CSBMS WITHOUT
INSPECTION.
3. THE MAIN QUESTION IS WHETHER THE SOVIET MILITARY CAN
BE BROUGHT TO SWALLOW THIS BITTER PILL. IN THAT SENSE
STOCKHOLM REALLY IS A TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS ON ARMS
CONTROL.
- ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIETS MAY ABANDON
THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND TAKE THE TEST, HERE IS WHAT
I THINK MAY BE ATTAINABLE IN THE END:
- A PRETTY SOLID FORECASTING MEASURE, WHICH MAY
INCLUDE SOME CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS, E.G., A COMMITMENT
TO FORECAST LARGE ACTIVITIES TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE.
- NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BASED ON
A COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL PARAMETER. I DOUBT
THAT WE CAN GET THE NUME RICAL PARAMETER DOWN TO THE
10,000-12,000 RANGE WE NEED, BUT AS AN ALTERNATIVE WE
COULD PROBABLY GET AGREEMENT TO A MINIMUM QUOTA OF
NOTIFICATIONS BY THE WTO WITH SOME IN THE NEW CDE ZONE.
OBSERVATION OF AT LEAST 50 PERCENT OF NOTIFIED
GROUND ACTIVITIES (AT LEAST ONE IN THE NEW ZONE) WITH
AGREED PROVISIONS ON WHAT OBSERVERS ARE TO SEE AND DO;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE OBSERVATION REGIME.
RESOLUTION OF THE AIR PROBLEM IN AN OUTWARDLY
AMBIGUOUS FASHION WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DE FACTO
NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES.
- AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION RELE-
VANT TO A NOTIFICATION BUT NO SIGNIFICANT STATIC INFOR-
MATION.
- PROTECTION OF THE US POSITION ON TRANSITS, BUT A
WRITTEN FORMULATION COMMITTING US TO NOTIFY REFORGER
ON THE BASIS OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT CONTAINED
IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL.
- A VAGUE PARAGRAPH POSTPONING THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE
AND POSSIBLY OTHERS UNTIL THE FUTURE.
- A VERIFICATION REGIME WITH THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
A) RIGHT TO INSPECTION WITH NO ESCAPE CLAUSE;
REFUSAL OF AN INSPECTION WOULD INCUR SUBSTANTIAL POLITI-
CAL PENALTY, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE SUSPENSION OF SOME
PROVISIONS TO THE AGREEMENT;
B) A PASSIVE QUOTA: A REQUIREMENT THAT EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE ACCEPT A LIMITED NUMBER OF INSPEC-
TIONS FROM THOSE NOT MEMBERS OF THE SAME ALLIANCE;
C) LESS THAN IDEAL INSPECTION MODALITIES INCLUDING
RESTRICTED AREAS BROAD ENOUGH TO MAKE INSPECTION PROBLEM-
ATICAL;
D) SPECIFICATION OF MEANS TO ENHANCE COMPLIANCE IN
ADDITION TO INSPECTION WITH THE QUALIFICATION THAT THE
CHOICE OF MEANS IS UP TO THE INSPECTING STATE; PERHAPS
INCLUDING A PROVISION FOR EX POST FACTO CONSULTATION.
E) A NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION LARGELY REFLECTING
A WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY, INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON
COMPLIANCE, TERRORISM AND THE ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE
PRINCIPLE; HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE CAN BE OBTAINED IF WE
ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE ON MILITARY FORCE.
5. I WANTED TO FLAG THIS OUTLINE OF AN AGREEMENT IN
CASE THE POLICY LEVEL IN WASHINGTON THINKS ELEMENTS ARE
CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. WE ARE NOT INVITING ADVICE TO
TRY HARDER ON THIS OR THAT ISSUE, THAT IS WHAT WE ARE
DOING ALREADY. NOR AM I CLAIMING THAT MY CRYSTAL BALL
IS UNCLOUDED; THERE MAY BE ELEMENTS IN THE ABOVE OUTLINE
WHERE WE CAN DO BETTER OR MAY DO WORSE. FINALLY, IT MAY
TURN OUT WHEN GRINEVSKY RETURNS NEXT WEEK THAT "OLD
THINKING" AND BUREAUCRATIC CONFUSION IN MOSCOW STILL
PREDOMINATES AND WE ARE DOOMED (OR SPARED).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
59
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
C O N F I DENT I A L STOCKHOLM 05112
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, JUNE 23-27, 1986
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 5028, B) STOCKHOLM 5069
1. CDE XI - 028
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: WHILE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY WAS IN MOSCOW, ALLEGEDLY "TO
PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT" (PROBABLY TO PREPARE
FOR A JUNE 26 POLITBURO MEETING-WHICH ADDRESSED THE CDE),
THE CONFERENCE MADE LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE HEADWAY. THE
THORNY -- AND CRUCIAL -- ISSUES OF HOW TO HANDLE AIR
ACTIVITIES AND VERIFICATION REMAINED UNRESOLVED.
HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY SENSITIVE TO THE CHARGE
THAT, IN CONTRAST TO THE NEW SOVIET IMAGE A LA GORBACHEV,
THE SOVIET TEAM IN STOCKHOLM FITS INTO THE STOLID "NYET"
STEREOTYPE OF THE 1950S. THUS, IN PRIVATE CONTACTS AND
ON SOME MARGINAL ISSUES, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE LOOKING
FOR SOLUTIONS TO SOME PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, DRAFTING
PROGRESS WAS NOTED IN THE OBSERVATION AND NOTIFICATION
WORKING GROUPS AND THE EAST MOVED TOWARDS SOME WESTERN
POSITIONS ON NON-USE OF FORCE. THE EAST, MOREOVER,
QUICKLY RETREATED FROM GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING'S FRANK
PREDICTION TO THE PRESS THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD FAIL
TO PRODUCE A FINAL DOCUMENT BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER DEADLINE
AFTER THE NNA AND WEST MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE COULD NOT
EVEN BE CONSIDERATION OF A PHASE II WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME OF PHASE I. NEVERTHELESS, WITH ONLY EIGHT
WORKING WEEKS REMAINING IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, IF
GRINEVSKY RETURNS FROM MOSCOW EMPTY-HANDED, BUHRING'S
PROPHECY WILL BE SELF-FULFILLING. END SUMMARY AND
ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT IN THE
CONFERENCE ON THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF PARAMETERS. IN
PUBLIC SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV HELD FIRM ON SOVIET
POSITIONS, NOTABLY IN FAVOR OF A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER
WHICH WOULD TRIGGER NOTIFICATION. IN THE CORRIDORS
MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FLOATED SEVERAL
ALTERNATIVES:
1) TWO SIMULTANEOUS, PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS, ONE FOR
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, THE OTHER FOR THE AIR COMPONENT
OF COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES;
- 2) THE ADDITION OF A THIRD (AIR) PARAMETER -- WHICH
WOULD BE A NOTIFICATION TRIGGER -- TO THE NNA PARAMETER
PROPOSAL WHICH ALREADY INCLUDES PARAMETERS FOR THE
NUMBERS OF TROOPS AND TANKS (THIS CONCEPT SEEMS TO
CLOSELY RESEMBLE THE UK IDEA RECENTLY FLOATED WITH CLOSE
ALLIES);
- 3) TWO PARAMETERS: A GROUND FORCE PARAMETER WHICH
ALONE WOULD TRIGGER NOTIFICATION AND A SEPARATE
60
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
COMBINATION GROUND AND AIR FORCE PARAMETERS WITH THE
GROUND FORCE PARAMETER SET AT A LOWER LEVEL SO THAT SOME
LARGE-SCALE AIR EXERCISES WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL GROUND
FORCE COMPONENT COULD BE COVERED.
- 4) AN AIR PARAMETER ACCOMPANIED BY A LIST OF
EXCLUSIONS (E.G., STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE, ETC.)
THIS WEEK THE NNA DEFENDED THEIR GROUND FORCE PARAMETER
PROPOSAL IN THE WORKING GROUP. (BEHIND THE SCENES THE
NNA HAVE BEEN WRANGLING OVER AN AMPHIBIOUS PARAMETER TO
BE PROPOSED IN THE NEAR FUTURE). THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH
IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THEIR EARLIER SC.7 FORMULATION,
IS STILL A CREDIBLE CONTENDER TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR
DRAFTING. THE EAST WAS ISOLATED TO THE POINT WHERE
EASTERN DELEGATES FOR THE FIRST TIME ADDRESSED THE NNA
PROPOSAL -- ALBEIT WITH THE AIM OF DISCREDITING IT -- IN
ORDER NOT TO BE CUT OUT OF THE ACTION ENTIRELY. LANGUAGE
WAS NOTED FOR INCLUSION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION
(SEE REF A).
5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: ALTHOUGH NO DRAFTING
PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK, THERE WAS MOVEMENT ON THE
PROCEDURAL FRONT AS IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD SEPARATE COFFEE
GROUP MEETINGS DEALING RESPECTIVELY WITH THE VARIOUS SUB-
ITEMS UNDER A-2'S MANDATE, I.E., EXCHANGE OF MILITARY
INFORMATION, COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION AND MEANS OF
COMMUNICATIONS (WHICH ALSO INCLUDES RAPID EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS AND CONSULTATIONS). WE SEE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGE IN
THIS NEW ARRANGEMENT: 1) IT ISOLATES CONSULTATIONS FROM
VERIFICATION, THUS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST
TO ARGUE THAT IT IS A FORM OF VERIFICATION; 2) IT WILL
ALLOW DISCUSSION OF THE COORDINATOR'S PROPOSED DRAFTING
LANGUAGE ON MODALITIES TO RESUME IN THE COFFEE GROUP
(WHILE ISSUES THE SOVIETS HAVE THROWN UP TO BLOCK
PROGRESS SUCH AS FORMS OF VERIFICATION ARE EXPLORED IN
THE WORKING GROUP); AND 3) IT WILL PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE
WITH A DEDICATED FORUM IN WHICH TO EXPLORE THE BEST WAY
TO OBTAIN MEASURE 1 TYPE INFORMATION (OF LATE THE EAST
HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN AVOIDING OR LIMITING DISCUSSION
OF INFORMATION IN THE WORKING GROUP).
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ONCE AGAIN FOCUSED ON THE EASTERN
TEXT PROVIDING THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO CHOOSE FROM AGREED
FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THE WEST PRESSED THE EAST TO
IDENTIFY WHAT SUCH "AGREED FORMS" WOULD BE, BUT THE EAST
REMAINED EVASIVE, CLAIMING THAT DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC
FORMS OF VERIFICATION MUST AWAIT FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE
CSBM'S TO BE VERIFIED. PERHAPS MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, NATO
WAS ABLE TO SMOKE OUT THE SOVIETS ON THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE A FORM OF VERIFICATION WOULD
ALSO IMPLY THE RIGHT TO USE IT. ACCORDING TO THE
SOVIETS, A REQUESTING STATE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO CHOOSE
ANY AGREED FORM OF VERIFICATION WITHOUT ANY LIMITATION,
61
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
BUT THE RIGHT TO IMPLEMENT ITS CHOICE WOULD DEPEND ON A
VARIETY OF FACTORS INCLUDING: THE CSBM'S AGREED; THE
FORMS OF VERIFICATION AGREED; AND THE LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS TO BE AGREED FOR EACH FORM. THE SOVIETS
FURTHER QUALIFIED THEIR POSITION BY ARGUING THAT THE
VERIFICATION METHOD CHOSEN MUST BE "RELEVANT," AND
IMPLYING THAT INSPECTION MAY NOT BE "RELEVANT" FOR
CSBM'S.
IN THE FIRST COFFEE GROUP MEETING ON INFORMATION THE
WEST PRESSED THE EAST TO EXPLAIN JUST WHAT KIND OF
STATIC INFORMATION IT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE. IN
RESPONSE THE EAST MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHAT LITTLE STATIC
INFORMATION, IF ANY, THEY MIGHT BE INCLINED TO PROVIDE
WOULD BE IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.
6. OBSERVATION: AFTER A SIX-WEEK HIATUS, THE
OBSERVATION GROUP GOT BACK ON THE DRAFTING TRACK BY
AGREEING TO NOTE A TEXT ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO
OBSERVERS ALONG WITH THE INVITATION (REF B). ELLIPSES
APPEAR IN THE TEXT IN PLACE OF THREE ITEMS STILL UNDER
DISCUSSION INCLUDING INFORMATION ON OPTICAL EQUIPMENT
(I.E., BINOCULARS) OR OTHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT OBSERVERS
WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO BRING WITH THEM (THE EAST CONTINUES
TO REJECT THE USE OF PERSONAL BINOCULARS). THE B-2
COFFEE GROUP HAS ALSO TENTATIVELY AGREED ON A FOLLOW-ON
TEXT FOR NOTATION NEXT WEEK DEALING WITH INFORMATION TO
BE PROVIDED AT THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM.
SIGNIFICANTLY, IN THIS TEXT THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED THE
PRINCIPLE THAT OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH A MAP OF
THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE QUESTION OF THE
SCALE OF SUCH MAPS, HOWEVER, REMAINS TO BE RESOLVED AS
THE SOVIETS HAVE TIED FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER
TO A DETERMINATION OF THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES WHICH WILL
BE NOTIFIED.
7. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE WORKING GROUP
AGREED TO ESTABLISH TWO SEPARATE COFFEE GROUPS FOR
CONSTRAINING MEASURES AND FORECASTS WITH A REFERENCE TO
THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR
THERE IS AN OBLIGATION TO DISCUSS BUT NOT TO DRAFT ON
CONSTRAINING MEASURES. THE ALLIANCE MADE IT CLEAR THAT
THE MOVE TO COFFEE GROUPS REFLECTS NO CHANGE IN OUR
POSITION VIS-A-VIS CONSTRAINTS. NATO PLANS TO USE THE
LESS FORMAL COFFEE GROUP TO REEXPLAIN OUR PRINCIPAL
MILITARY OBJECTIONS TO CONSTRAINING MEASURES. ALTHOUGH
IT APPEARS THAT THE COORDINATOR (SWITZERLAND - JUNOD)
WILL TRY TO FOCUS DISCUSSION IN THE CONSTRAINING MEASURES
COFFEE GROUP ON THE SOLE AREA WITH ANY POTENTIAL FOR
CONSENSUS, THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE CALENDAR,
OTHERS, BOTH EASTERNERS AND SOME AMONG THE NNA'S
(YUGOSLAVIA), PROBABLY WILL PUSH HARD TO DRAFT LANGUAGE
62
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ON A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS. THESE
DIVERGENT APPROACHES SUGGEST A ROUGH RIDE FOR THE
ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE COFFEE GROUP ON
CONSTRAINING MEASURES.
8. NON-USE OF FORCE: NO DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS
REGISTERED THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, THE COFFEE GROUP AGREED
ON A PROVISIONAL TEXT ON THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE, WHICH
IS CLEARLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE:"
THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE,
REGARDLESS OF THIS STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR
CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY
MAINTAIN WITH THIS STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE." WITH
APPROPRIATE PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS, THIS TEXT
WILL BE REGISTERED NEXT WEEK. ON SELF-DEFENSE, TWO OF
OUR CLOSEST NON-NATO FRIENDS WERE AT LOGGERHEADS: THE
SWISS INSISTED ON NO REFERENCE TO THE UN CHARTER WHILE
THE IRISH CALLED FOR A FULL QUOTATION OF ARTICLE 51 OF
THE CHARTER. MEANWHILE, THE EAST, PERHAPS HAVING LOST
ITS APPETITE NOW THAT THE WEST AND NNA ARE LARGELY THE
CHEFS OF THE NUF MENU, IS CONSPICUOUS BY ITS SILENCE.
THE SOVIETS ARE PUTTING OUT THE WORD THAT THE ONLY
LANGUAGE THEY WILL INSIST ON IS SOME REFERENCE TO
"MILITARY FORCE" AND THAT THEY WILL HOLD HUMAN RIGHTS
AND TERRORISM DRAFTING HOSTAGE TO AGREEMENT ON
"MILITARY" FORCE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05146
SUBJECT: NATO INITIATIVE IN CDE
1. CDE XI - 30
2. SUMMARY: THE 16 NATO COUNTRIES TODAY 30/06/86)
ANNOUNCED A MAJOR INITIATIVE IN THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) IN AN EFFORT
TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN THE CONFERENCE AND TRY
TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL RESULT BEFORE ITS SEPTEMBER 19
DEADLINE. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY
CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR W. T. DELWORTH, WHO
SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE 16. END SUMMARY.
3. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN: THIS NEGOTIATION IS
STILL SPINNING ITS WHEELS ON THE SANDS OF POLITICAL
INDECISION, AND TIME IS PASSING QUICKLY. WE ARE
HALFWAY THROUGH THIS SESSION WHICH WE HAVE ALL CALLED
CRITICAL IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTIONS BASED ON THE COMMON GROUND IDENTIFIED SO FAR.
WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO REPEAT OLD ARGUMENTS, VALID
THOUGH SOME OF THEM MAY BE. WE NEED TO REASSESS OUR
RESPECTIVE POSITIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS
AND PERCEPTIONS EXPRESSED BY OTHERS HERE.
INITIATIVES NOW SEEM CALLED FOR, TO UNBLOCK THE ROAD
AHEAD TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE MANDATE, WILL BEGIN A PROCESS MEANINGFUL FOR
BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS FOR THE
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.
IN SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE SPONSORS OF SC.1, THE
SIXTEEN DELEGATIONS WHICH TOGETHER MADE THE FIRST
INITIATIVE AT THIS CONFERENCE, I CAN SAY THAT WE HAVE
THEREFORE DECIDED THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE
MOVES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF THE NEGOTIATION:
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES HAS OFTEN BEEN
DESCRIBED AS THE CORE OF THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE TO
ADOPT; THE DEFINITION OF THE THRESHOLDS FOR GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES IS A KEY ELEMENT OF THIS MEASURE.
THREE APPROACHES TO THIS PROBLEM HAVE BEEN PRESENTED:
ONE PUTS THE EMPHASIS ON STRUCTURES; ANOTHER ON
MANPOWER; A THIRD ONE ON "MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER",
WHICH IN PRACTICAL TERMS MEANS EQUIPMENT. AN ATTEMPT
TO COMBINE THESE THREE APPROACHES WAS RECENTLY MADE BY
THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. WE THINK THAT THIS
IS THE RIGHT WAY TO PROCEED, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO
DECLARE OUR READINESS TO DRAFT ON THE BASIS OF THE
PROPOSAL TABLED BY THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION ON JUNE L3.
WE HOPE OTHERS WILL TAKE A SIMILARLY POSITIVE VIEW.
WE MUST, HOWEVER, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS FORMULA AS IT
STANDS IS FAR FROM IDEAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. THE
ATTEMPT TO EQUAL OUT EXISTING DISPARITIES IN FORCE
STRUCTURES BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES -- THAT IS, TO
ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING FOR CDE PURPOSES OF WHAT A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
DIVISION IS -- IS USEFUL. OUR CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS TO
FIND A SOLUTION THAT WOULD INCLUDE ALL FORMATIONS OF
GROUND FORCES THAT HAVE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
CAPABILITY, REGARDLESS OF WHAT PARTICIPATING UNITS MAY
BE CALLED. WE BELIEVE AMENDMENTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO
THIS END.
THE LEVEL OF THE THRESHOLD IS AN ESSENTIAL ISSUE. OUR
APPROACH IS TO EMPHASIZE STRUCTURES, AND THE NUMBER OF
TROOPS IS ONLY ONE ELEMENT IN THIS APPROACH. IT HAS
BEEN CONTENDED THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IN AN
EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS PER YEAR. WE DO NOT
THINK THAT THE FIGURES WHICH WERE MENTIONED IN SUPPORT
OF THIS OBJECTION ARE ACCURATE. BUT WE ARE READY TO
CONSIDER RAISING THE NUMERICAL ELEMENT OF THE THRESHOLD
BEYOND THE FIGURE OF 6,000 TROOPS. WE SEEK INCREASED
CONFIDENCE THROUGH MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND
VERIFIABLE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. WE ENVISAGE A
REASONABLE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS WHICH WOULD
CONSTITUTE A STEP BEYOND THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. WHAT WE FORESEE IS
NOT 300 NOTIFICATIONS PER ANNUM, NOT EVEN 100. WE
BELIEVE IT IS A COMMON OBJECTIVE THAT THE NUMBER OF
NOTIFICATIONS NOT BE UNNECESSARILY BURDENSOME. WE HAVE
TO BUILD CONSTRUCTIVELY UPON THIS COMMON GROUND AND
AGREE TO A COMPREHENSIVE THRESHOLD WHICH WOULD
CORRESPOND TO THIS SHARED GOAL WITHOUT ENTERING INTO A
NUMBERS GAME.
MOREOVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE ANOTHER MOVE.
UNDERSTANDING OF MOBILIZATION PRACTICES THROUGH
NOTIFICATION WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO GREATER
STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. HOWEVER, WE HAVE
HEARD CONCERN EXPRESSED ON OUR PROPOSAL RELATING TO
NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES. SOME
COUNTRIES WHOSE DEFENCE CAPABILITIES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY
RELY ON THE RECALL OF RESERVISTS HAVE ARGUED THAT SUCH
A MEASURE WOULD AFFECT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS.
WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE COULD MEET THIS
PREOCCUPATION, BUT WE WOULD EXPECT SIMILAR
CONSIDERATION OF OUR CONCERN IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS
CONSTRAINTS WHERE PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN ADVOCATED WHICH,
IN TURN, WOULD UNACCEPTABLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY
INTERESTS.
I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT ALL THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A
SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE POSITION ESTABLISHED IN
SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE MOVES WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE ARE
PRESENTED IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE OUR NEGOTIATING
PARTNERS TO MATCH THEM, INTER ALIA, BY CONTRIBUTING TO
SOLVING THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES ON THE BASIS OF
EXISTING COMMON GROUND.
ON OBSERVATION, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT
65
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
TO OBSERVE ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FROM
THEIR BEGINNING TO THEIR END WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL
IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL
ACT. BUT, THIS AMBITIOUS AIM HAS RAISED MANY
LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL OBJECTIONS. IT IS OUR VIEW
THAT OBSERVATION SHOULD ASSIST PARTICIPATING STATES IN
MEETING THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFIDENCE-
BUILDING PROCESS: IT MUST ENABLE THE OBSERVERS TO
ASSESS THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY, WHICH
OF COURSE DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE FIRST MAN TO LEAVE
AND THE LAST TO RETURN TO NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS
SHOULD BE OBSERVED.
HERE AGAIN WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY AT
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED OBJECTIONS AND CONSIDER A
LIMITATION ON THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION BOTH AS FAR
AS ITS STARTING AND ITS ENDING ARE CONCERNED. WE
EXPECT THIS MOVE TO ENABLE EVERYBODY BOTH TO AGREE TO A
LOW THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE
AGREEMENT ON DETAILED AND SPECIFIC MODALITIES FOR THE
OBSERVATION REGIME.
ON VERIFICATION, OUR INSPECTION PROPOSAL MEETS THE
MANDATE CRITERIA AND ENSURES EACH STATE EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. OBJECTIONS
HAVE BEEN RAISED, HOWEVER, EMPHASIZING THE BURDEN
REPRESENTED BY OUR PROPOSAL. WHILE WE WOULD HAVE
PREFERRED TO LEAVE OPEN THE OPTION FOR EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE TO CONDUCT TWO INSPECTIONS A YEAR,
WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EACH PARTICIPATING
STATE SHOULD HAVE THE OPTION TO CONDUCT AT LEAST ONE
INSPECTION A YEAR. CENTRAL TO OUR APPROACH TO
VERIFICATION IS THE POSITION THAT INSPECTIONS MUST BE
AN ESSENTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE RESULT OF THE
CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE THE
NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS EACH STATE IS ENTITLED TO CARRY
OUT EVERY YEAR FROM TWO TO ONE AS EVIDENCE OF OUR
WILLINGNESS TO ENSURE AGAINST THE ABUSE OF THE RIGHT TO
INSPECT MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES. INSPECTIONS WILL BE USED ONLY ON THOSE
OCCASIONS WHEN DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE ARISE.
INSPECTIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO BE ONEROUS OR UNDULY
INTRUSIVE.
BUT IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE INSPECTION PROVISIONS
CANNOT BE IMPAIRED BY ANY ESCAPE CLAUSE, DEFECTIVE
MODALITIES OR OTHER FLAWS THAT WOULD RENDER THEM
INEFFECTIVE.
CONCLUSION: THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE REQUIRES US
TO ENACT "NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS" TO
INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THEREBY
REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION. TO FULFILL
THIS OBLIGATION, WE MUST AGREE ON VERIFIABLE MEASURES
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
OF TRUE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED WILL NOT ACCEPT MERELY INSIGNIFICANT
IMPROVEMENTS OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE
FINAL ACT. NONE OF US CAN AFFORD TO COMPROMISE ON THIS
TA 7.ww
THE TIME HAS NOW COME FOR NEW EFFORTS TO FURTHER THE
DRAFTING PROCESS. THE POINTS I HAVE JUST MADE ARE
INTENDED TO SERVE THAT PURPOSE. THIS IS NOT, OF
COURSE, THE FIRST EXAMPLE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO REACH
AN AGREEMENT. MAY I RECALL THAT ON THE ISSUE OF THE
NON-USE OF FORCE WE HAVE ALSO MADE SIGNIFICANT STEPS,
FIRST IN AGREEING TO INCLUDE THIS ISSUE ON THE AGENDA
OF THE CONFERENCE, THEN IN TABLING THE MOST
COMPREHENSIVE CONTRIBUTION TO DATE, AND MORE RECENTLY
IN DRAFTING ACTIVELY ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE DONE
THIS EVEN THOUGH WORK IN THE FIELD OF CONCRETE MEASURES
WAS STAGNATING.
THE INITIATIVE WE ARE TAKING REPRESENTS CAREFUL STUDY
AND SOMETIMES DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON OUR PART. IN
MAKING THESE OFFERS; THAT IS, IN SHOWING YET AGAIN THAT
WE ARE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE, WE MUST OF COURSE MAKE
IT CLEAR THAT WE DO SO IN THE EXPECTATION THAT OUR
OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTNERS WILL SHOW MATCHING MOVEMENTS
NOT ONLY ON THE ISSUES I HAVE MENTIONED BUT ALSO ON
OTHERS, SUCH AS INFORMATION, WHICH I HAVE NOT RAISED
TODAY. NOR WOULD WE EXPECT NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO
INTRODUCE OBSTACLES TO REAL PROGRESS.
THE ONLY WAY TO REACH A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IS TO
FOLLOW A GIVE-AND-TAKE PROCESS. WE HOPE THAT THE
INITIATIVE WE HAVE TAKEN TODAY WILL CREATE A DYNAMISM
LEADING TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN THE EIGHT WEEKS LEFT TO
US BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNS ON THE 19TH OF
SEPTEMBER.
WE SHALL BE PREPARED TO DO OUR PART.
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
67
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05200
SUBJECT: NATO STATEMENT ON CDE
REF: STOCKHOLM 5146
1. CDE XI - 031
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE JUNE 30 WORKING GROUP AB
MEETING CANADA OUTLINED, ON BEHALF OF NATO, AREAS OF
FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIELD OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION
AND VERIFICATION. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE NATO REPRE-
SENTATIVES CHARACTERIZED THE STATEMENT AS A MAJOR NEW
POLITICAL SIGNAL TO FURTHER THE DRAFTING PROCESS IN
STOCKHOLM. ITALY, THE FRG, AND FRANCE OFFERED
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS. THE FRENCH ALSO PROPOSED TO WORK
"INFORMALLY" THROUGH THE SUMMER RECESS. THE USSR GAVE A
QUALIFIED, THOUGH VAGUE, WELCOME TO NATO'S INITIATIVE;
GRINEVSKY ALSO CITED HIS POLITBURO INSTRUCTIONS TO
ACHIEVE "A TANGIBLE CONCLUSION" TO CDE "ON THE BASIS OF
RECIPROCITY." MALTA AND YUGOSLAVIA COMMENTED ON THE
NATO INITIATIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR SPECIFIC
SECURITY CONCERNS. END SUMMARY.
4. ACTING ON A FRENCH PROPOSAL, THE NATO CAUCUS AGREED
TO DRAFT A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD SEND A "SERIES OF
SIGNALS" OF FLEXIBILITY IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE MOMENTUM
TO THE DRAFTING PROCESS AND DEFEND AGAINST CHARGES OF
IMMOBILITY. AFTER TWO DAYS OF DRAFTING WHICH THE UK
JOINED IN RELUCTANTLY, NATO CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON A
TEXT FOR A PAPER WHICH OUTLINED AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY IN
NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION (FULL TEXT
SENT REFTEL).
5. IN MAKING THESE OFFERS, CANADA MADE IT CLEAR THAT
THE ALLIANCE EXPECTED "THE OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTNERS,"
I.E., THE SOVIETS, TO SHOW SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY. THE
FRENCH PREPARED THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE STATEMENT,
LARGELY DRAWING ON U.S. IDEAS. HOWEVER, MANY
DELEGATIONS MADE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS DURING THE
DRAFTING PROCESS. THE UK HAD THE MOST DIFFICULTY TAKING
THIS INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME, ARGUING THAT IT WAS
PREMATURE AND THAT IT DID NOT DEMAND ANY DIRECT QUID PRO
QUOS, ALTHOUGH IT CLEARLY LINKED NATO FLEXIBILITY ON
MOBILIZATION TO RECIPROCAL NNA AND EASTERN FLEXIBILITY
ON CONSTRAINTS. NATO REPRESENTATIVES WORKED OVER THE
JUNE 28-29 WEEKEND TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES. ON JUNE 30,
AFTER LAYING DOWN THEIR MARKERS, THE BRITISH WENT ALONG
WITH THE STATEMENT.
6. AT THE JUNE 30 MEETING OF WORKING GROUP AB, AFTER
CANADA'S STATEMENT, THE FRG OFFERED BRIEF SUPPORTING
COMMENTS; ITALY AND FRANCE ADDED THEIR OWN NATIONAL
TWISTS. ITALY EMPHASIZED THAT THIS STATEMENT SHOULD
BEGIN A DRAFTING PROCESS "NOT ONLY ON THE POINTS
63
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MENTIONED." FRANCE (GASCHIGNARD) STRESSED THE NEED TO
RESOLVE THE NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK WITHIN THE "NEXT FEW
DAYS" ON THE ISSUES OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND VERIFICATION.
REGARDING NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, HE SUGGESTED A
SOLUTION BE FOUND ON BASIS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
AND IN CONTEXT OF NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS TO BE
REQUIRED. UNDERSCORING THIS POINT, HE SAID THAT "IT IS
CLEAR THAT THE SOLUTION FOR AIR ACTIVITIES CAN ONLY BE
FOUND IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT ON
NOTIFICATION." ALTHOUGH HE WAS FLEXIBLE ON NUMBERS AND
MODALITIES FOR INSPECTION, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS
FIRM ON THE PRINCIPLE: " . . ADEQUATE VERIFICATION
INVOLVES A CERTAIN DEGREE OF INTRUSIVENESS, IE.,
INSPECTION." AS ANTICIPATED, THE FRENCH ALSO DELCARED
THEIR WILLINGNESS TO "INTENSIFY" THE WORK OF THE
CONFERENCE IN THE SUMMER BY CONVENING EARLY NEXT SESSION
ON AN INFORMAL BASIS.
7. THE SOVIETS (GRINEVSKY) QUALIFIED THEIR WELCOME OF
THE PAPER BY PROMISING TO STUDY IT TO SEE IF IT IS
"REALLY DIRECTED TOWARDS PROGRESS." GRINEVSKY
ENUMERATED WARSAW PACT "INITIATIVES," QUESTIONING
WHETHER NATO'S PAPER IS AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO EASTERN
"FLEXIBILITY." THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALSO SAID HE WAS
GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS BY THE POLITBURO "TO ACHIEVE A
TANGIBLE CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON THE
BASIS OF RECIPROCITY." ROMANIA WELCOMED THE WESTERN
INITIATIVE; THERE WERE NO OTHER EASTERN REACTIONS IN THE
WORKING GROUP. (BEGIN COMMENT: ALTHOUGH PRIVATE
EASTERN REACTION HAS BEEN GENERALLY UPBEAT, THE SOVIET
REACTION REMAINS VAGUE. EASTERN DELEGATES TELL US THE
SOVIETS HAVE YET TO GIVE THEM A READOUT OF THE THURSDAY
POLITBURO MEETING. END COMMENT.)
8. MALTA AND YUGOSLAVIA COMMENTED ON NATO'S PAPER TO
LAY DOWN MARKERS ON THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS. MALTA
IMPLIED THAT FLEXIBILITY MUST ALSO APPLY TO THE
MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. PICKING
UP ON ITALY'S SECONDING OF THE NATO INITIATIVE,
YUGOSLAVIA WELCOMED NATO'S PAPER AS THE "BEGINNING OF
GIVE AND TAKE," IMPLYING THAT SUCH FLEXIBILITY SHOULD
EXTEND TO AREAS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PAPER (I.E.,
CONSTRAINTS).
9. AFTER THE WORKING GROUP, THE U.S., FRENCH, AND
CANADIAN AMBASSADORS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE STRESSING
THAT THE WESTERN INITIATIVE WAS A MAJOR STEP AND A
SIGNAL TO OTHERS TO SHOW RECIPROCAL FLEXIBILITY. THE
INITIATIVE WOULD HELP BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN
STOCKHOLM. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE STRESSING THE NECESSITY
OF MAINTAINING THE RIGHT OF INSPECTION WITHOUT ANY RIGHT
OF REFUSAL OR INEFFECTIVE MODALITIES, WE UNDERLINED THE
IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FROM TWO TO ONE INSPECTION PER
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
STATE. WE EMPHASIZED THAT A KEY ELEMENT OF THE
INITIATIVE WAS WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF ITS NNA FORMULA AS
A BASIS FOR DRAFTING ON NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, THE CENTERPIECE OF THE CONFERENCE. EARLIER
PREDICTIONS BY THE GDR AMBASSADOR THAT THE CONFERENCE
WAS DOOMED TO FAILURE WERE DISMISSED BY THE NATO
SPOKESMEN AS PREMATURE. BUT THE ACTUAL MESSAGE WAS THAT
THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN AT AN EASTERN-IMPOSED IMPASSE
FOR THE FIRST HALF OF THE ROUND AND THAT THE ONLY
EFFECTIVE EASTERN RESPONSE WOULD BE TO ACCELERATE THE
DRAFTING PROCESS. THE NATO STATEMENT AND PRESS
CONFERENCE GOT POSITIVE TREATMENT IN THE MEDIA AND, IN
GENERAL, AMONG THE NNA.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05259
SUBJECT: FIRST US-SOVIET BILATERAL SINCE POLITBURO
MEETING WHICH CONSIDERED CDE
1. BEGIN SUMMARY: DISAPPOINTED WITH THEIR FAILURE
TO DIVIDE THE FRENCH FROM THE US THE SOVIETS ARE NOW
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR BILATERALS WITH THE
US. THEY WON'T ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION,
BUT OUR GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO IN
THE END. ON AIR, THEY WANT TO MOUNT A NEW EFFORT AT
FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA. THEY ARE CONSIDERING
ADOPTING THE NNA FORMULA ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS.
END SUMMARY
2. UPON HIS RETURN FROM HIS CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW
AND HIS PUBLICIZED REPORT TO THE POLITBURO ON CDE MATTERS,
THE FIRST THING WHICH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
DID WAS TO SUMMON FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD ON JUNE
30. THE FRENCH FOUND HIS MESSAGE ENTIRELY NEGATIVE.
GRINEVSKY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE FRENCH
APPROACH TO AIR, I.E., FRENCH REJECTION OF THE SOVIET
EXCLUSIONARY APPROACH (WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE CERTAIN TYPES
OF ACTIVITIES OR AIRCRAFT FROM AN INDEPENDENT AIR NOTI-
FICATION REGIME);
HE DID NOT CARE FOR THE FRENCH IDEA OF ADDING AN
AIR PARAMETER TO THE LIKO FORMULA (I.E. THE "UK"
APPROACH WHICH THE FRENCH FLOATED IN MOSCOW);
HE THOUGHT THAT THE "UK APPROACH" AND THE SUB-
THRESHOLD APPROACH BOTH WERE ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVES
FOR COVERING AIR IN COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES, BUT NOT
FOR THE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH THE SOVIETS
WERE TRYING TO CAPTURE;
WHEN THE FRENCH RAISED THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION
GRINEVSKY GAVE THE SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTION:
INSPECTION IS RELEVANT TO ARMS REDUCTIONS NOT TO CSBMS;
WHEN PRESSED, HE ALLUDED TO ITS POSSIBLE RELEVANCE FOR
CSBM'S BUT ONLY IN PHASE TWO OF THE CDE.
3. IN OUR INITIAL CONTACT WITH GRINEVSKY (JULY 2), OUR
MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO PIN HIM DOWN ON WHETHER THE SOVIET
APPROACH TO INSPECTION WAS AS NEGATIVE AS HIS MESSAGE
TO THE FRENCH. BARRY STRESSED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
OF INSPECTION TO THE US AND WARNED THAT IF HE WERE TO
REPORT TO WASHINGTON SOVIET REJECTION OF INSPECTION IN
THIS PHASE OF THE CDE, IT WAS LIKELY THAT FURTHER WORK
ON RESOLVING OTHER ISSUES WOULD BE FROZEN AND THIS WOULD
HAVE A SIMILAR NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WORK AT THE CONFERENCE.
BARRY WARNED GRINEVSKY AGAINST APPEALING TO THE NNA TO
SAVE US, NOTING THAT THE CDE IS DIFFERENT THAN OTHER
CSCE MEETINGS AND THAT SUCH A RESUCE MISSION PROBABLY
WOULD FAIL: THE NNA ARE SLOWMOVING AND DIVIDED THEM-
SELVES ON THE ISSUES. AN NNA COMPROMISE PACKAGE WOULD
INCLUDE ELEMENTS UNACCEPTABLE TO EAST AND WEST. SUCH
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
A MOVE PROBABLY WOULD NOT SURFACE UNTIL NEXT ROUND WHEN
IT WOULD BE TOO LATE FOR THE US BUREAUCRACY TO REACT.
JUDGING FROM WHAT WE HAVE HEARD, GRINEVSKY IS NOT REPEAT
NOT NOW PLANNING SUCH A DISTRESS CALL TO THE NNA.
4. GRINEVSKY SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY REPLIED THAT HIS
GOVERNMENT FELT "THAT THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
CSBM'S -- AS OPPOSED TO DISARMAMENT -- DO NOT REQUIRE
ON THEIR OWN A MEASURE LIKE INSPECTION ... IT'S ANOTHER
MATTER IF WE TAKE DISARMAMENT. HERE THERE CAN BE A
REGIME OF VERIFICATION. FOR THE ARMAMENTS REMAINING
AFTER REDUCTIONS, WE CAN HAVE ON-SITE INSPECTION...
WE COULD THINK OF AGREEING SOMEHOW THAT IN THE PROCESS
OF DISARMAMENT OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMA-
MENTS ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S
WOULD BE CONDUCTED AS WELL. IF THAT COULD HELP YOU, YOU
NEED TO THINK IT OVER. HOWEVER, HE SOFTENED THE MESSAGE
BY ASKING "HYPOTHETICALLY" IF OUR POSITION INCLUDED A
PASSIVE QUOTA ON INSPECTIONS. (WE COUNTERED BY ASKING
IF THEY WOULD ACCEPT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO ESCAPE
CLAUSE IN AN INSPECTION FORMULA.) IN RESPONSE TO A
QUESTION, HE SAID HE DID NOW NOT PLAN TO STATE THE SOVIET
POSITION ON INSPECTION PUBLICLY, BUT EVERYTHING DEPENDED
ON BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE US - "AND NOW ONLY THE US."
5. ON AIR, BARRY STRESSED THAT THE INDEPENDENT TRIGGER
QUALIFIED BY EXCLUSIONS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US. HE
SAID THAT ONE OF THE IDEAS CIRCULATED IN THE CORRIDORS
WAS THE IDEA OF ADDING AN AIR PARAMETER TO THE NNA GROUND
FORCE NOTIFICATION FORMULA; HE UNDERSTOOD THIS DID NOT
APPEAL TO THE USSR; IT ALSO DID NOT APPEAL TO THE US. DID
THE USSR ACCEPT THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH? IF NOT, DID
IT HAVE ANY OTHER IDEAS WHICH WOULD PROTECT THE US POSI-
TION? THE CLEAR SOVIET PREFERENCE WAS FOR EXPLORING THE
FORMULA DISCUSSED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND; HANSEN
AND TATARNIKOV WILL DO SO ON JULY 3.
6. ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS, GRINEVSKY SEEMED TO BE
QUESTIONING US TO CONVINCE TATARNIKOV THAT THE NNA PARA-
METER MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW SAYING
THAT GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY OF
THE CONFERENCE. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL
RESIST THE EQUIPMENT (TANK) ELEMENT OF THE TRIGGER BUT
MAY COME AROUND ON THE STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL ASPECTS.
7. IN SUM, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
IMPRESSED BY THE UNITY OF THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR
FRENCH UNWILLINGNESS TO DEPART FROM ALLIANCE POSITION
ON KEY ISSUES SUCH AS AIR AND VERIFICATION. THEY ARE
KEEPING THEIR HANDS CLOSE TO THEIR CHESTS (AS ALWAYS)
BUT THEY SEEM TO HAVE A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY. ONLY
THE DRAFTING SESSIONS WILL DEMONSTRATE HOW MUCH REAL
FLEXIBILITY THERE IS, HOWEVER, AND WE WILL PROBABLY
NOT SEE THEIR HOLE CARD ON INSPECTION UNTIL SEPTEMBER.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
8. WE HAVE SHARED THESE IMPRESSIONS WITH NATO HEADS OF
DELEGATION.
9. GRINEVSKY SAYS HE HIMSELF REPORTED TO THE POLITBURO;
A UNIQUE EVENT. HE IMPLIED THAT THE MFA, NOT THE
SECRETARIAT, PREPARED THE DOCUMENTATION FOR THE MEETING.
HE DESCRIBED THE POLITBURO ATMOSPHERE AS "MORE BUSINESS-
LIKE" THAN IN THE PAST.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
73
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05325
SUBJECT: AMB. ZIMMERMANN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH SWEDISH
OFFICIALS
REF: STATE 167999
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. AMB. WARREN ZIMMERMANN, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT FROWICK,
SAM WISE, DAVID JOHNSON AND EMB POLCOUNS INTS SILINS, HELD
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE UPCOMING VIENNA CSCE
CONFERENCE WITH SWEDISH OFFICIALS ON JUNE 26. THE TALKS
WERE HELD IN TWO BRIEF SESSIONS OF ABOUT 20 MINUTES EACH.
MEETING WITH SCHORI
-------------------
3. IN A MEETING WITH UNDERSECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PIERRE SCHORI, ALSO ATTENDED BY SWEDEN'S CDE AMBASSADOR
CURT LIDGARD AND EUROPE/AMERICAS DIRECTOR MATS BERGQUIST,
ZIMMERMANN OUTLINED THE PROSPECTS FOR THE VIENNA CONFERENCE
SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEED FOR BALANCE IN THE CSCE
PROCESS AND THE EXPECTED SOVIET INTEREST IN A SECOND --
DISARMAMENT -- PHASE OF THE STOCKHOLM CDE. SCHORI SAID
THE SWEDES ARE RELATIVELY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CSCE
PROCESS JUST NOW, REALIZING THAT THERE MUST BE A SIGNIFI-
CANT RESULT AT STOCKHOLM, NOT JUST A MINI-PACKAGE, IN
ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING AT VIENNA. TO ZIMMERMANN'S
OBSERVATION THAT VERIFICATION IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT, AMB. LIDGARD INTERJECTED THAT
SWEDEN IS "JUST AS FIRM ON VERIFICATION AS YOU ARE,"
SINCE SMALL COUNTRIES LIKE SWEDEN LACK SOME OF THE
NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AVAILABLE TO THE U.S.
4. SCHORI REMARKED THAT "ONE COULD WONDER AT THE U.S.
POSITION (ON CSCE) AFTER BERN," WHERE THE AGREEMENT
WITHIN REACH "COULD HAVE HELPED SOME HUMAN BEINGS."
ZIMMERMANN EXPLAINED THAT THE KEY ISSUE AT BERN WAS "THE
PROBLEM OF DOCUMENTS": THE STRONG FEELING IN THE U.S.
THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS NOT MORE DOCUMENTS BUT TO OBSERVE
THE ONES WE ALREADY HAVE. THE OUTCOME AT BERN SHOULD NOT
BE TAKEN TO SET THE PATTERN FOR VIENNA, ZIMMERMANN NOTED.
MEETING WITH LIDGARD
--------------------
5. LIDGARD DESCRIBED HIS CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW WITH
LEV ISAAKEVICH MENDELEVICH, WHO LIDGARD EXPECTS WILL
HEAD THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO VIENNA. MENDELEVICH
"EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A SECOND PHASE OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE," LIDGARD SAID, AND INDICATED THAT
WHILE ITS POSSIBILITY WOULD DEPEND ON A "POSITIVE
OUTCOME" IN PHASE I, A SECOND PHASE MIGHT NOT BE
IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT SUCH AN OUTCOME. IT WAS LATER
POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAD JUST SAID THAT THE CONFERENCE
MIGHT FAIL BUT A SECOND PHASE COULD STILL BE POSSIBLE.
LIDGARD ADDED THAT FOR ITS PART, SWEDEN FAVORS A
DISARMAMENT PHASE OF CDE.
74
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
6. MENDELEVICH PROFESSED TO HAVE AN OPEN MIND ON BASKET
ONE AND SUGGESTED THAT ONE MIGHT TAKE A FRESH LOOK, FOR
EXAMPLE, AT THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION, LIDGARD
SAID. ON BASKET TWO, MENDELEVICH REMARKED THAT SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY HAVE DEVELOPED GREATLY SINCE 1975 AND THE
COOPERATION ENVISAGED THEN WOULD NOT SUFFICE FOR TODAY.
IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION ON THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER,
LIDGARD SAID THAT SWEDEN AND FINLAND WOULD HAVE SOME NEW
IDEAS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.
7. ON BASKET THREE, LIDGARD MENTIONED SWEDISH INTEREST
IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON FAMILY
REUNIFICATION, AND HE REITERATED CONTINUING SWEDISH
INTEREST IN THE PROPOSALS MADE AT OTTAWA AND BERN.
THERE IS ALSO TALK, HE SAID, OF A SECOND CULTURAL FORUM
AND OF A FORUM ON WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS.
SWEDEN WOULD LIKE TO SEE SUCH EXPERTS' MEETINGS STREAM-
LINED, PERHAPS THEIR PREPARATORY MEETINGS ELIMINATED.
8. LIDGARD CONFIRMED, UNOFFICIALLY, THAT HE WILL HEAD
THE SWEDISH DELEGATION TO VIENNA.
9. THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY AMB. ZIMMERMANN. NEWELL
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
7S
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05283
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE NOTED IN WORKING GROUP ON
VERIFICATION
1. CDE XI - 034.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING VERIFICATION LANGUAGE WAS
PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK IN
THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUP ON JULY 2:
BEGIN TEXT.
"THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL
SPECIFY THE AREA WHERE . . ."
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05 331
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE XI - 035
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE IN
THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK THE FOLLOWING THREE TEXTS.
A. BEGIN TEXT 1:
AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM GIVE A
BRIEFING ON THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES
OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH
THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A MAP OF
THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY . . . AND AN OBSERVA-
TION PROGRAM WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH
INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION.
END TEXT 1.
B. BEGIN TEXT 2:
IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM GIVE THE
OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE
VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR
POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY . . . .
END TEXT 2.
C. BEGIN TEXT 3:
THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
END TEXT 3.
4. FOLLOWING AGREEMENT TO NOTE THE TEXT ON PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES THE AUSTRIAN REP MADE A UNILATERAL
STATEMENT INDICATING THAT OBSERVERS INVITED TO AUSTRIA
WHO ARE NOT ATTACHED TO A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN AUSTRIA
OR ARE TEMPORARILY ATTACHED FOR THE OBSERVATION PERIOD
WILL BE GRANTED PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER THE
SPECIAL MISSION AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 16, 1969, RATHER
THAN THE VIENNA CONVENTION. THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION HAS
INDICATED THAT THIS IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT TEMPORARY
OBSERVERS FROM PURCHASING PROPERTY IN AUSTRIA UNDER THE
TERMS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05363
SUBJECT: CDE: PROPOSED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS
1. SUMMARY: THE BRITISH AND GERMANS HAVE PROPOSED AN
END-OF-ROUND DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE
A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES. WE
HAVE EXPRESSED GENERAL WILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG, DEPENDING
ON THE SUBSTANCE AND ON CONCRETE SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXI-
BILITY OVER THE NEXT WEEK. IN OUR VIEW THIS IS AS MUCH
AN EXERCISE IN KEEPING KEY ALLIES ON BOARD AS IT IS A
NEGOTIATING MOVE.
END SUMMARY
2. FRG CDE AMBASSADOR CITRON HAS SUGGESTED TO US AN IDEA
WHICH CAME OUT OF GERMAN-BRITISH ARMS CONTROL CONSULTA-
TIONS IN BONN LAST WEEK. IT IS CLEARLY RELATED TO THE
SHEVARDNADZE VISIT TO LONDON JULY 14-15 AND THE GENSCHER
VISIT TO MOSCOW JULY 21-23. CDE WILL BE A TOPIC IN BOTH
DISCUSSIONS AND THE BRITISH-GERMAN IDEA IS A WAY OF
SOUNDING POSITIVE ON CDE WHILE KEEPING CONTROL OF THE
SUBSTANCE HERE IN STOCKHOLM.
3. THE IDEA IS THAT SOME OR ALL NATO DELEGATIONS HERE
WOULD AGREE ON A FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF OUT-
STANDING PROBLEMS, INCLUDING A DESCRIPTION OF BOTH THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THEWESTERN POSITION AND SOME
AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY. GRINEVSKY WOULD BE BRIEFED ON
THIS FRAMEWORK AT THE END OF THIS ROUND, IN AN EFFORT
TO INDUCE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THE EASTERN POSITION AND
TO DISCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEUTRAL "RESCUE
PACKAGE" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LAST ROUND. THE CONTENT
OF THE PAPER AS DESCRIBED BY THE FRG WOULD BE A UNIFIED
PACKAGE WITH NO IMPLICIT TRADES OR BARGAINS (I.E., THE
SOVIETS COULD NOT CHOOSE THE ITEMS THEY FOUND APPEALING
AND LEAVE THE REST). IT WOULD INCLUDE:
-- LIST OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH THERE WAS NO WESTERN
FLEXIBILITY, E.G. CONSTRAINTS, NUMERICAL PARAMETERS,
TRANSITS, INDEPENDENT AIR, ETC.;
-- CLARIFICATION OF QUESTIONS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN
ASKING; E.G. WE WOULD CITE THAT OUR NUMERICAL PARA-
METER IN OUR THRESHOLD FORMULA WOULD BE 10,000;
-- ANOTHER LIST OF AREAS WHERE THERE WAS SOME NATO
FLEXIBILITY, E.G. PASSIVE QUOTA ON INSPECTIONS AND
NEUTRAL INVOLVEMENT IN AIR INSPECTION MODALITIES AS
DISCUSSED AMONG SOME ALLIES HERE.
4. THE FRENCH HAVE EXPRESSED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE
IDEA DEPENDING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PAPER ITSELF.
WE HAVE EXPRESSED SOME RESERVATIONS BUT HAVE SAID WE
ARE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE PROJECT IN GENERAL AND HAVE
ENCOURAGED THE GERMANS TO PROVIDE A TEXT FOR DISCUSSION
LATER THIS WEEK.
5. WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT MUCH OF THE SUBSTANCE WILL
EMERGE FROM THIS EFFORT. THE BRITISH ARE ALREADY SAYING
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THEY DON'T WANT TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON STATIC INFOR-
MATION AS A SEPARATE INFORMATION MEASURE OR SPECIFY THE
10,000 GROUND FORCE PARAMETER. WE HAVE EXPRESSED
RELUCTANCE TO SHOW ANY OF OUR CARDS ON INSPECTIONS
UNLESS THE UK IS READY TO MOVE ON INFORMATION; WE AND
MOST OTHER ALLIED DELEGATIONS THINK THE UK STRATEGY ON
THIS IS WRONG-HEADED; STICKING WITH MEASURE 1 PREVENTS
US FROM ASKING FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WE REALLY WANT
AND MAY BE ABLE TO GET - LOCATIONS ON DIVISIONAL HEAD-
QUARTERS IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.
6. NEVERTHELESS WE REGARD THIS AS AN EXERCISE IN
ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT. THE BRITISH AND GERMANS WANT TO
BE ABLE TO HAVE THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS REFER TO THIS
DEMARCHE DURING THEIR MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE SO
THAT THEY CAN BE SEEN AS BEING AS ACTIVE AS THE FRENCH,
WHO STIRRED UP THE LAST PUBLIC DEMARCHE. WE SEE MERIT
IN PROCEEDING BECAUSE IT WILL HELP TO KEEP THEM WITH
US ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUES AND BECAUSE THIS WILL KEEP
CONTROL OF THE SUBSTANCE HERE IN STOCKHOLM RATHER THAN
LEAVING THE ISSUE TO THE IMAGINATION OF MINISTERS AND
THEIR AIDES.
7. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE MAY WISH TO AVOID THE PRESEN-
TATION OF A NATO "BOTTQK-LINE" LONG BEFORE THE
NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS OVER. A LOT COULD HAPPEN IN THE
LAST FIVE-WEEK ROUND, AND WE WOULD WANT TO ENSURE
MAINTENANCE OF OUR OWN NEGOTIATING AND TACTICAL FLEXI-
BILITY AND LEVERAGE BY NOT PLACING ALL OUR CARDS ON THE
TABLE TOO SOON. WE WILL REVIEW THE TEXT WITH THESE
CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE PAPER
WILL IN FACT REPRESENT A REAL "BOTTOM LINE", ESPECIALLY
WITH THE QUALIFICATIONS DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE.
IN FACT, NATO'S "BOTTOM" LINE AT THE PRESENT EQUALS THE
SUM OF THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF ALL OF THE 16.
8. THE FRG WILL BE PROVIDING A TEXT LATER THIS WEEK
WHICH WE HAVE PROMISED TO EXAMINE AND COMMENT ON. IF
THE EXERCISE SEEMS TO BE GOING ANYWHERE WE WILL, INFORM
WASHINGTON OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS PAPER AS IT EMERGES
FROM DISCUSSIONS HERE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
79
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I DENT I A L STOCKHOLM 05393
SUBJ: CDE: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 5325; B. LONDON 14033
1. CDE XI - 37
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: COMMON PARLANCE SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTING "CDE
STAGE II" AS THE TAG FOR ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA
CONTINUATION OF CDE. ALTHOUGH THE MADRID MANDATE DOES
NOT EXPLICITLY EQUATE CONTINUATION WITH A STAGE II, THE
EQUATION, IN PART BECAUSE OF EASTERN CONVENTIONAL ARMS
REDUCTION PROPOSALS, IS GAINING SOME CURRENCY. WE NEED
TO TAKE CARE NOT TO PREJUDICE THE US POSITION REGARDING
CONTINUATION OF CDE AND, IN PARTICULAR, AVOID REFERRING
TO CONTINUATION AS "CDE STAGE II." END SUMMARY.
4. WITH THE STOCKHOLM CDE APPROACHING ITS DEADLINE
(SEPTEMBER 19) AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE VIENNA CSCE
REVIEW UNDERWAY, TERMINOLOGY ABOUT ANY POSSIBLE
POST-VIENNA CDE CONTINUATION BECOMES INCREASINGLY
IMPORTANT. IN PARTICULAR, WE NOTE A TENDENCY AMONG
NATO ALLIES AS WELL AS THE NNA (REFS) TO REFER
AUTOMATICALLY TO A CONTINUATION AS "CDE STAGE II." US
SPOKESMEN NEED TO MAINTAIN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CDE
STAGE I, WHICH IS NOW GOING ON IN STOCKHOLM AND MAY (OR
MAY NOT) (INUE AFTER VIENNA, AND ANY SUBSTANTIVELY
DIFFERENT CDE STAGE II, THE POSSIBILITY OF WHICH IS
IMPLIED IN THE MADRID MANDATE.
5. JUDGING FROM THE JUNE 11 BUDAPEST APPEAL, THE
SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES APPARENTLY WANT A CDE STAGE
II, DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT, TO COME OUT OF THE VIENNA
CSCE. SUCH A MOVE WOULD REQUIRE CONSENSUS OF THE
THIRTY-FIVE IN VIENNA TO REVISE THE MADRID MANDATE.
WHETHER CONSENSUS IS REQUIRED TO CONTINUE CDE UNDER ITS
CURRENT MANDATE FOCUSED ON CSBM'S IS MORE OPEN TO
INTERPRETATION: THE RELEVANT DECISION OF THE 1983
HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING, WHICH SET "THE AGENDA,
TIME-TABLE AND OTHER MODALITIES FOR THE FIRST STAGE" OF
CDE READS, "THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL
CONTINUE PENDING CONSIDERATION BY THE VIENNA OR A
FUTURE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF WAYS AND APPROPRIATE
MEANS FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR
EFFORTS FOR SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SUPPLEMENTING THE MADRID
MANDATE FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE . . . "
6. COMMENT: CONTINUATION WITH THE SAME MANDATE MIGHT
MEET THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS OF MANY, INCLUDING
ALLIES, WITHOUT THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES OF MOVING
TO A DISARMAMENT STAGE. END COMMENT
8. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, WE
NEED TO GUARD AGAINST PREJUDICING THE US POSITION
REGARDING ANY POST-VIENNA CDE. EVEN TERMS LIKE "CDE
STAGE I(B)II OR SIMPLY "CONTINUATION OF CDE," WHICH
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MIGHT HELP COUNTER HAVING STAGE II TERMINOLOGY ASSUME A
POLITICAL OR PUBLIC AFFAIRS CURRENCY ACTING AGAINST OUR
INTERESTS, COULD IMPLY US ACCEPTANCE OF CONTINUATION
AND SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH CARE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05343
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION FORMULAE, BILATERAL WITH SOVIETS
REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 3962 (B) STOCKHOLM 4L27
1. XI - 38.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: U.S. - SOVIET CONSULTATIONS HAVE RESULTED
IN TWO VARIANTS OF THE SAME FORMULA FOR RESOLVING THE
IMPASSE ABOUT HOW AIR ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN A
CDE CSBMS REGIME (INCLUDED PARA 10 BELOW). BOTH TEXTS
INDICATE THAT AIR ACTIVITIES WOULD BE PART OF A
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BUT ALSO
INCLUDE A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER BASED ON NUMBER OF
SORTIES OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. SOVIETS APPEARED
RECEPTIVE TO U.S. PROPOSED CHANGES TO LANGUAGE DEFINING
GROUND FORCES AND GAVE EXPLANATIONS REGARDING NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD OF 18,000 TROOPS. FORMULATION FOR THE
NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDINGS IS ALSO
INCLUDED. DELEGATION BELIEVES THE APPROACH TO
RESOLVING THE AIR ISSUE SHOULD BE PURSUED TO SEE WHERE
IT LEADS; UNLESS WASHINGTON OBJECTS WE WILL DO SO.
SPECIFIC GUIDANCE REQUESTED IN PARA. 13. END SUMMARY.
4. IN A FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH FLOWED FROM THE LAST
U.S. - SOVIET BILATERAL, AMB HANSEN AND USDEL MEMBER
GALASSI MET WITH GENERAL TATARNIKOV AND INTERPRETER
VOLOSSATOV FOR DISCUSSIONS DEALING WITH THE
NOTIFICATION SECTION OF A POSSIBLE FINAL DOCUMENT.
SOVIETS HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THEY BELIEVED THE
APPROACH WHICH OFFERED THE MOST PROMISE FOR RESOLVING
THE IMPASSE ON AIR ACTIVITIES WAS THAT DISCUSSED IN THE
WORKING GROUP AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION, 20 AND 21
MAY (REFS). TATARNIKOV SOUGHT AFFIRMATION THAT U.S.
DEL WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THAT
FORMULA AND THEN ASKED WHAT CHANGES THE U.S. WANTED IN
IT. HANSEN RESPONDED THAT WE NEEDED TO PLACE
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE FORCES WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF GROUND FORCES IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WHICH
DEALT WITH THE ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES IN A MILITARY
ACTIVITY. THIS COULD BE DONE WITH AN ASTERISK AFTER
LAND FORCES FOLLOWED BY A FOOTNOTE WHICH STATED: "IN
THIS CONTEXT, LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE
AND AIRMOBILE FORCES." TATARNIKOV AMENDED HIS TEXT
ACCORDINGLY WITHOUT COMMENT. THE NEXT CHANGE HANSEN
PROPOSED WAS IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH, THAT DEALING WITH
AIR FORCES. THERE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INDICATE
THAT ANY SORTIE NUMBER WAS APPLICABLE ONLY TO FIXED
WING AIRCRAFT. BEING UNABLE TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE
RUSSIAN EXPRESSION FOR FIXED WING, BOTH PARTIES AGREED
THE IDEA COULD BE EXPRESSED: ". . . SORTIES OF
AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, PLANNED TO BE FLOWN."
5. TATARNIKOV THEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION ON
AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. HANSEN RESPONDED
32
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THAT WE HAD PROPOSED AND SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF
NOTIFYING AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES; WE HAD NOT PROPOSED
NOTIFICATION OF AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES APART FROM
INCLUDING THEM IN THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES. THUS THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TIME TO STUDY
THIS ISSUE AND TO CONSULT WITH CAPITALS. IN PRINCIPLE,
HOWEVER, THE U.S. DELEGATION DID NOT OPPOSE THE IDEA OF
NOTIFYING AIRBORNE LANDINGS IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO
AMPHIBIOUS (I.E., ASSAULT) LANDINGS. NEVERTHELESS,
NEITHER WE NOR OUR ALLIES HAD INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD
ALLOW US TO AGREE TO TEXT DEALING WITH AIRBORNE
LANDINGS AND IT COULD TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE ALL
DELEGATIONS WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS ISSUE.
BOTH TATARNIKOV AND HANSEN INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS
TO CONSIDER WHETHER AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE LANDINGS
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SAME OR SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS.
TATARNIKOV SEEMED EAGER TO ENSURE THAT THE THRESHOLD
FOR BOTH KINDS OF ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE THE SAME.
6. CURRENTLY NO LANGUAGE EXISTS ON MOVEMENTS OR
TRANSFERS WHICH CAN BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING.
TATARNIKOV INSISTED THAT ELLIPSES BE PLACED AT THE END
TO INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE LANGUAGE ON
MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS AND ROTATIONS. SUCH ELLIPSES, IN
OUR VIEW, SIMPLY INDICATE THAT SOME TEXT MAY FOLLOW.
THEY DO NOT PREJUDGE THE SUBSTANCE OF ANY POSSIBLE
TEXT, I.E., THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE WILL BE TEXT
ON MOVEMENTS. AMB HANSEN INFORMED TATARNIKOV IN THE
PLAINEST LANGUAGE THAT THERE CAN BE NO LANGUAGE OF ANY
KIND DEALING WITH TRANSITS IN AN AGREED DOCUMENT.
TATARNIKOV REPLIED HE UNDERSTOOD U.S. DIFFICULTIES BUT
INSISTED HE MUST FOLLOW HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS ISSUE.
7. HAVING FOUND REASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. POSITION
PERMITS THE NOTIFICATION OF SOMETHING MORE THAN JUST
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, I.E. AMPHIBIOUS AND POSSIBLY
AIRBORNE LANDINGS, TATARNIKOV TURNED TO THE 20/21 MAY
FORMULATION ON DEFINING THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE
NOTIFIED. HE WANTED TO KNOW THE U.S. VIEW OF THE ORDER
IN WHICH VARIOUS PARAGRAPHS IN THE NOTIFICATION SECTION
WOULD BE ARRANGED. HANSEN RESPONDED THAT AS CURRENTLY
CONSTITUTED THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WOULD DEAL WITH THE
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCES ACTIVITIES, THE SECOND
WOULD ADDRESS AIR ACTIVITIES, THE THIRD PARAMETERS AS
SET FORTH IN THE NNA (LIKO) 13 JUNE TEXT ON THRESHOLDS
AND THE FOURTH WOULD DEAL WITH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, IF
WE AGREED ON OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES THEY WOULD
FOLLOW IN SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS. TATARNIKOV NODDED HIS
UNDERSTANDING AND THEN ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
PLACE THE THRESHOLD TEXT IN SECOND POSITION, AFTER THE
PARAGRAPH ON GROUND FORCES. HANSEN NOTED THIS WAS
ANOTHER APPROACH BUT THAT IN THAT APPROACH, THE PHRASE
AT THE END OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH "WHICH WILL BE
a3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION" WOULD HAVE TO FIND ITS
PLACE IN THE AIR PARAGRAPH WHICH WOULD NOW BE IN THIRD
POSITION. TATARNIKOV INDICATED HIS WILLINGGSS TO MAKE
THIS CHANGE IN ORDER TO HAVE TWO APPROACHES WHICH EACH
SIDE COULD CONSIDER FURTHER. HE NOTED HE WOULD BE
PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE AGAIN IN THE SAME FORMAT
AS SOON AS THE U.S. DELEGATION HAD A POSITION.
8. AMB HANSEN NOTED THAT THE AIR ACTIVITIES QUESTION
WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE SAME
GENERAL FASHION IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. TO THIS,
TATARNIKOV STATED THAT HE FORESAW ONLY THE MOST GENERAL
INFORMATION ON AIR ACTIVITIES IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR.
HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION DOES NOT FAVOR
PROVIDING THE NAME OF AIR ACTIVITIES SUCH AS "COLD
FIRE" SINCE THEY OFTEN DID NOT GIVE NAMES TO SUCH
ACTIVITIES AND DID NOT THINK THE PROVISION OF NAMES WAS
IN ANY CASE NECESSARY. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE
EASTERN POSITION WAS TO MAKE PROVISION FOR BOTH THE
OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES. HANSEN
REPLIED THAT OUR OWN POSITION ALLOWED THE OBSERVATION
OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND THAT TOPIC COULD BE DEALT WITH IN
THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP. HOWEVER, WE HAVE A
FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING THE VERIFICATION OF
AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH WE HAVE EXPLAINED IN GREAT
DETAIL. TATARNIKOV REPLIED THAT AIR ACTIVITIES ARE
VERIFIABLE FULL STOP. AND, HE SAID, THE SOVIET SIDE IS
NOT THINKING ABOUT OBSERVERS ON AIRFIELDS OR INSPECTORS
IN CONTROL CENTERS. OBSERVERS AT RADAR SITES DID NOT
RATE HIGH ON HIS LIST OF OBJECTIVES EITHER, ALTHOUGH
THIS HAS BEEN ONE EASTERN IDEA OFTEN EXPRESSED IN THE
CONTEXT OF OBSERVATION. (COMMENT: THE SOVIET DELEGATION
HAS TAKEN PAINS TO ENSURE THAT NTMS GAIN RECOGNITION AS
ONE OF THE FORMS OF VERIFICATION TO BE AGREED UPON IN
THIS CONFERENCE. THIS APPROACH IN THE CONTEXT OF
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES HAS FAILED MISERABLY WITH THE
NNA, AND THE SOVIETS PROBABLY SEE AIR ACTIVITIES AS THE
VEHICLE BY WHICH THEY MIGHT GAIN THIS RECOGNITION. END
COMMENT)
9. IN A DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS,
TATARNIKOV INSISTED THAT A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF
18,000 TROOPS WOULD CARRY AN OBLIGATION TO MAKE AT
LEAST 20 NOTIFICATIONS EACH YEAR FOR THE WTO STATES.
HE AGREED THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS DO NOT ROUTINELY
EXERCISE WITH ALL THEIR REGIMENTS PARTICIPATING. THE
PRACTICE VARIES ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF DIVISION.
NEVERTHELESS, AN EXERCISE INVOLVING A "FRONT-LINE"
DIVISION WOULD BREAK THE 18,000 THRESHOLD AND SUCH
EXERCISES OCCUR, IF NOT EVERY YEAR THEN EVERY OTHER
YEAR. CORPS LEVEL EXERCISES WOULD OCCUR AT SIMILAR
INTERVALS AS WOULD ARMY LEVEL EXERCISES. (COMMENT:
TATARNIKOV HAS FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED KAVKAZ-85 AS A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
DIVISIONAL EXERCISE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOTIFIED UNDER
THE HELSINKI REQUIREMENT OF 25,000 TROOPS. HE DID NOT
FURTHER DEFINE WHAT HE MEANT BY CORPS LEVEL EXERCISES,
BUT WE SUSPECT HE MAY HAVE BEEN SPEAKING OF EXERCISES
AT THE TWO DIVISION LEVEL. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT MENTION
THEM ON THIS OCCASION, HE HAS PREVIOUSLY ADDED WTO
EXERCISES TO THE CATEGORY OF THOSE WHICH WOULD EXCEED
THE 18,000 FIGURE. END COMMENT) THE MAJOR CONCERN FOR
THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, WAS THE DANGER THAT THE WEST,
WHICH KNOWS OF SOVIET DIVISIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS,
WOULD RAISE COMPLIANCE ISSUES RELATED TO SMALL
EXERCISES CONDUCTED IN THE INTERIOR MILITARY DISTRICTS
BY DIVISIONS AT A LOW LEVEL OF MANNING. HE TOOK PAINS
TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THE FIGURE OF 20
NOTIFICATIONS PER YEAR AT THE LEVEL OF 18,000 WOULD
INCLUDE SOME EXERCISES IN THE NEW ZONE.
10. FORWARDED FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION ARE BOTH
VARIANTS OF THE ENTIRE NOTIFICATION TEXT AS SUCH TEXTS,
STILL UNNOTED, CURRENTLY EXIST. THEY MUST STILL BE
HANDLED WITHIN NATO AS WELL AS IN THE NOTIFICATION
WORKING GROUP. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS AMPHIBIOUS (AIRBORNE?) LANDINGS
ARE "SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION" WHEREAS AIR ACTIVITIES
"WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION." TATARNIKOV'S
WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXTS TO DEAL
WITH THE AIR ACTIVITIES ISSUE DOES NOT IMPLY SOVIET
WILLINGESS TO ACCEPT THE NNA (LIKO) FORMULA OF 13 JUNE;
IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME MODIFICATIONS WILL BE SOUGHT
DURING NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS FORMULA. (WORDS AND
PHRASES WITHIN BRACKETS REFLECT ELLIPSES IN THE TEXT
AND OUR PROPOSALS FOR TEXT TO FILL THEM.) BEGIN TEXT.
FIRST VARIANT
THE (ENGAGEM ENT) OF (FORMATIONS) OF LAND FORCES
(ASTERISK) OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES (IN A
MILITARY ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME
LOCATIONS) UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND
INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE
AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS, WHOSE PARTICIPATION WILL
BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION.
THE (ENGAGEMENT) OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING
STATES (IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACTIVITY) IF IT IS
FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY 700
SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE
FLOWN.
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
(NOTIFICATION) WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT LEAST ONE
DIVISION, OR AN EQUIVALENT FORCE, DEFINED FOR THE
PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT AS
2 - 5 MOBILE COMBAT UNITS (THAT IS, TANK,
MECHANISED INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE,
AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
LEVEL OR A FORMATION OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY
WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST
. TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
. BATTLE TANKS
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS
(OR AIRBORNE) ASSAULT IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS.
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
(NOTIFICATION/PRIOR NOTIFICATION) WHENEVER THE
LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST (THREE) BATTALIONS OR
(3000) TROOPS.
(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE FORCES.
SECOND VARIANT
THE (ENGAGEMENT) OF (FORMATIONS) OF LAND FORCES
(ASTERISK) OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES (IN A
MILITARY ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME
LOCATIONS) UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND
INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE
AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
(NOTIFICATION/PRIOR NOTIFICATION) WHENEVER IT
INVOLVES AT LEAST ONE DIVISION, OR AN EQUIVALENT
FORCE, DEFINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT AS
- 2 - 5 MOBILE COMBAT UNITS (THAT IS, TANK,
- MECHANISED INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE,
- AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT
- LEVEL OR A FORMATION OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY
WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST
. TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
. BATTLE TANKS
THE ENGAGEMENT OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING
STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS
FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY 700
SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE
FLOWN.
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS
(OR AIRBORNE) ASSAULT IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS.
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE LANDING INVOLVES AT
LEAST (THREE) BATTALIONS OR (3000) TROOPS.
(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES. END TEXT
11. AT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE IS
NO TITLE FOR THE NOTIFICATION SECTION UNDER DISCUSSION.
THE FIRST FORMULATION IS UNDERSTOOD BY TATARNIKOV TO BE
THE U.S. PREFERRED VARIANT. THE SECOND IS CLEARLY
TATARNIKOV'S. IN REALITY, USDEL BELIEVES THE SECOND
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
VARIANT IS THE BEST APPROACH TO DATE OF THOSE WHICH
HAVE EITHER BEEN UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION OR WHICH
HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE CORRIDORS AS POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS TO THE AIR ACTIVITIES IMPASSE. IT CONTAINS
FAR LESS AMBIGUITY REGARDING THE FUNCTIONAL
RELATIONSHIP OF AIR TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY THAN ANY
OTHER NEGOTIABLE FORMULATION TO DATE. USDEL VIEWS IT
AS MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN THE U.K. IDEA OR THAT OF
CONCURRENT NOTIFICATIONS BOTH OF WHICH HAVE SURFACED IN
THE CORRIDORS HERE.
12. THE LANGUAGE ON AMPHIBIOUS AND/OR AIRBORNE
ASSAULTS IS CRITICAL TO THE OVERALL APPROACH AND TO
PROTECTING OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. THE ENGAGEMENT
OF "MILITARY FORCES" IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AS IT APPLIES TO NAVAL FORCES
PRECISELY BECAUSE IT DOES GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF
INCLUDING THEM. IF THIS WORDING IS REDUCED TO FORCES
WHICH OPERATE ON LAND, WE WILL IN THE FUTURE HAVE NO
BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO NAVAL
ACTIVITIES HAS BEEN PRESERVED IN STOCKHOLM. THE ACTUAL
THRESHOLD MAKES IT CLEAR THAT ONE IS ONLY SPEAKING OF
THE LANDING. THE INCLUSION OF NAVAL FORCES IS LIMITED
TO THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION SECTION WHERE ALL THAT
CAN BE AGREED IS TO STATE NUMBERS OF SORTIES FLOWN
(WITH NO REFERENCE TO BRANCH OF SERVICE) AND SHIP TO
SHORE GUNNERY. THIS IS AN AGREED POSITION WITHIN THE
NATO GROUP HERE. IN SUM, THIS FORMULATION DOES THREE
THINGS FOR US 1) FOCUSES ON THE ASSAULT LANDING, 2)
PROTECTS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND 3) IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN FOR RESOLVING THE AIR
ISSUE. (NOTE: JCS REPS HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE
USE OF THE TERM "MILITARY FORCES" IN AN AMPHIBIOUS OR
AIRBORNE ASSAULT. THEIR CONCERN CENTERS AROUND THE
POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH AN AMBIGIOUS TERM COULD BE
INTERPRETED AS INCLUDING NAVAL OR AIR FORCES NOT
DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN THE LANDING BUT EMPLOYED IN SUPPORT
OF THE ENTIRE AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE ACTIVITY. JCS
REPS PREFER THE TERM "GROUND FORCES". AN ALTERNATE
WHICH COULD ALSO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS RAISED BY JCS
WOULD BE THE ADDITION OF THE WORD "LANDING" TO
"ASSAULT". END NOTE) (COMMENT: REGARDLESS OF THE
MERITS OR DEMERITS OF THE "GROUND FORCES" APPROACH IT
IS CLEARLY UNATTAINABLE. THE NNA, PARTICULARLY THE
YUGOSLAVS AND MALTESE, WOULD NEVER AGREE TO IT. END
COMMENT)
13. REQUEST WASHINGTON GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE
FORMULATIONS FOR THE NOTIFICATION ISSUE AS REPORTED
ABOVE. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, WE WILL PURSUE
APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE FOR RESOLVING THE AIR
ACTIVITIES ISSUE. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING A
SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR AIRBORNE ASSAULT LANDINGS AS
u7
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
WELL AS WASHINGTON REACTION TO THE TWO FORMULAE IN
PARA. 10 ARE REQUESTED BY FRIDAY, 11 JULY, IN ORDER
THAT THE ISSUE CAN BE WORKED HERE BEFORE THE CLOSING OF
THIS SESSION ON 18 JULY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05349
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN'S BILATERAL WITH SOVIET
ACTING CDE CHIEF, JUNE 26, 1986
1. CDE XI - 039
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN, ACCOMPANIED
BY U.S. CDE HEAD AMBASSADOR BARRY, MET WITH ACTING HEAD
OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV, FOR
OVER AN HOUR ON JUNE 26 TO DISCUSS CDE ISSUES -- IN
PARTICULAR, NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, VERIFICATION,
MANDATORY OBSERVATION AND NON-USE OF FORCE -- AS WELL AS
U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING.
END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN, ACCOMPANIED BY U.S. CDE HEAD
AMBASSADOR BARRY, MET WITH ACTING HEAD OF THE SOVIET
DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR RAKH14ANINOV, FOR OVER AN HOUR ON
JUNE 26 TO DISCUSS CDE ISSUES AS WELL AS U.S. AND SOVIET
APPROACHES TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. RAKHMANINOV
OPENED THE MEETING BY OUTLINING FOUR "DIFFICULT ISSUES"
WHICH, IN THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, REMAIN
OUTSTANDING: 1) NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE AND AIR
ACTIVITIES; 2) VERIFICATION, IN PARTICULAR, INSPECTION;
3) MANDATORY INVITA fl N OF OBSERVERS; AND 4) NON-USE OF
FORCE.
5. NOTIFICATION: RAKHMANINOV'S CHARACTERIZATION OF
WHAT SORT OF AIR ACTIVITY WOULD BE NOTIFIED DIFFERED
SOMEWHAT FROM THAT OF USSR CDE CHIEF GRINEVSKY IN RECENT
U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS AND MAY REFLECT THE APPROACH THE
SOVIETS HAVE BEEN TAKING WITH OUR ALLIES SINCE THE U.S.-
SOVIET BILATERALS ON AIR BROKE DOWN LAST WEEK. WHILE
GRINEVSKY INSISTED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL AIR,
INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR, MUST BE CAPTURED BY A SEPARATE
AIR TRIGGER (WITH CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED "EXCEPTIONS"),
RAKHKANINOV DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF A "CONSTRUC-
TIVELY AMBIGUOUS" FORMULATION WHICH, "IN FACT," WOULD
APPLY ONLY TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND TO THOSE AIR
ACTIVITIES LINKED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HE
OFFERED ONE POSSIBLE FORM SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING COULD
TAKE: TWO BLOCKS -- ONE FOR GROUND FORCES, ONE FOR AIR
FORCES -- WITH A "FLEXIBLE LINK" BETWEEN THE TWO.
REFERRING TO PAST ASSERTIONS THAT FUNCTIONALLY LINKED
AIR AMOUNTS TO 90 PER CENT OF ALL AIR ACTIVITY IN EUROPE,
HE SAID THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK WOULD BE TO SINGLE
OUT THE TEN PER CENT OF NON-NOTIFIABLE (AIR) ACTIVITY.
HOWEVER, HE CHARACTERIZED THIS TASK AS A TECHNICAL
PROBLEM WHICH MILITARY EXPERTS COULD WORK OUT.
6. VERIFICATION/INSPECTION: RAKHMANINOV ARGUED THAT
INSPECTION IS BUT ONE FORM OF VERIFICATION AND THAT IT
IS MORE APPROPRIATE FOR DISARMAMENT MEASURES; THEREFORE,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THE USSR WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER INSPECTION DURING THE
SECOND (DISARMAMENT) PHASE OF THE CDE. HE TOOK ISSUE
WITH "WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES" WHO ACCUSE THE SOVIET
DELEGATION OF NOT IMPLEMENTING GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE
WITH REGARD TO INSPECTION, INSISTING THAT GORBACHEV
LINKED INSPECTION WITH DISARMAMENT. RAKHMANINOV STRESSED
THAT INSPECTION WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE ON HIS LIST.
7. ZIMMERMANN POINTED OUT THAT AT THE GENEVA NST
NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH THE U.S. AND THE USSR HAVE STATED THAT
AGREEMENTS ARE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.
HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS SHARED THE VIEW
EXPRESSED RECENTLY BY GDR CDE AMBASSADOR THAT STOCKHOLM
IS NOT THE CORRECT FORUM AT WHICH TO BREAK NEW GROUND ON
VERIFICATION. RAKHMANINOV RESPONDED NONCOMMITTALLY THAT
VERIFICATION IS A SERIOUS ISSUE AND SHOULD BE RESOLVED
ON THE BASIS OF THE MADRID MANDATE.
8. BARRY STRESSED THAT THE USDEL WAS IN NO POSITION TO
ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH IT COULD NOT DEFEND AS
VERIFIABLE. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS NOT JUST A U.S.
POSITION BUT ALSO A NATO POSITION. CALLING
RAKHMANINOV'S CONVERSATION "SOBERING," BARRY SAID THAT
HE HAD NOT HEARD THE SOVIETS SAY SO CLEARLY IN PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS THAT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO INSPECTION IN
THE CONTEXT OF T IS CONFERENCE. IF THAT WAS THE CASE,
BARRY CONCLUDED, THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT AND THUS NO
POINT IN DISCUSSING OTHER ISSUES. ZIMMERMANN, SAYING
THAT HE WAS REFLECTING WASHINGTON'S VIEW, SUPPORTED
BARRY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION IN
STOCKHOLM AND IN ALL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
9. OBSERVATION: RAKHMANINOV PROPOSED LIMITING OBSERVA-
TION TO "THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE THREATENING TO
SECURITY IN EUROPE". HE SUGGESTED THAT THE FRG AND THE
USSR, AS THE TWO COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY THIS MEASURE,
SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO FIND THE RIGHT THRESHOLD.
10. NON-USE OF FORCE: RAKHMANINOV SAW A PARADOX IN THE
U.S. APPROACH TO NUF: ON THE ONE HAND INSISTING ON
ESTABLISHING A LINK BETWEEN NUF AND "MILITARY" CSBM'S
AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, INTRODUCING ISSUES, E.G., HUMAN
RIGHTS, WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH CSBM'S.
11. VIENNA REVIEW MEETING: ZIMMERMANN PREDICTED THAT
THE U.S. IN VIENNA WOULD PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS ON BALANCE
BETWEEN THE SECURITY ELEMENT OF THE FINAL ACT AND OTHERS,
INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN CONTACTS. HE EXPRESSED
HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THERE IS A "NATURAL RELATIONSHIP"
BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GOVERNMENT WHICH
CAN THREATEN ITS OWN CITIZENS ALSO COULD THREATEN ITS
NEIGHBORS AND OTHER COUNTRIES. HE URGED ALL 35 PARTICI-
PATING STATES TO TRY TO REDUCE BOTH KINDS OF THREATS.
12. RAKHHANINOV'S RESPONSE WAS TO QUOTE EXTENSIVELY
FROM GORBACHEV STATEMENTS (TO FRENCH PARLIAMENTARIANS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
LAST OCTOBER AND TO THE CPSU CONGRESS) WHICH EXPRESS THE
"SAME IDEAS ABOUT THE CSCE PROCESS." REPEATING SEVERAL
TIMES THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS OF PRINCIPLE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, RAKHMANINOV SAID
THAT, AS PART OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW WAY OF THINKING" ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USSR WOULD PLACE THE MOST SERIOUS
IMPORTANCE ON PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS. IN THIS CONTEXT
RAKHMANINOV EXPLICITLY ADVOCATED DEALING WITH BINATIONAL
MARRIAGES IN A "POSITIVE AND HUMANE SPIRIT." HE ASKED
WHETHER THE U.S. PLANNED TO RATIFY THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
CONVENTION. ZIMMERMANN RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS
OPPOSITION IN THE U.S. TO THE CONVENTION AS PEOPLE WERE
CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON STATES' RIGHTS.
13. RAKHMANINOV COMPLAINED THAT THE WESTERN PRESS HAD
NOT REPORTED ON CHERNOBYL THE WAY THE SOVIETS EXPECTED.
ZIMMERMANN NOTED THAT WESTERN SOCIETIES EXPECT TRANS-
PARENCY ESPECIALLY WHEN IT COMES TO A NUCLEAR DISASTER
WHICH AFFECTS OTHER COUNTRIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF
THE U.S. HAD FAILED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT A SIMILAR
EVENT, WESTERN PRESS CRITICISM WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN
STRONGER. RAIHMANINOV THEN ARGUED THAT OPPENNESS MUST
BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CUT-OFF
OF BILATERAL EXCHANGES AND CIVILIAN FLIGHTS. ZIMMERMANN
RESPONDED THAI-GENEVA SUMMIT HAD SERVED TO SPUR THE
RECREATION OF SUCH CONTACTS.
14. BEGIN COMMENT: RAKHMANINOV'S TONE THROUGHOUT THE
MEETING WAS POSITIVE -- HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT
HE WAS AN OPTIMIST ABOUT CDE -- AND NONPOLEMICAL. WE
ALSO WERE STRUCK RECENTLY BY SOVIET CDE HEAD GRINEVSKY'S
FORTHCOMING APPROACH WHEN HE MET WITH CSCE COMMISSION
CO-CHAIRMAN CONGRESSMAN HOYER'S PARTY FOR A DISCUSSION
BEFORE THE BERN EXPERTS MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS.
ALTHOUGH GRINEVSKY WAS CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT HUMAN
CONTACTS WERE NOT HIS RESPONSIBILITY, HE DISCUSSED THE
ISSUE IN GENERAL TERMS, ACCEPTED A REPRESENTATION LIST
AND HINTED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATE IN BERN WOULD
SERIOUSLY CONSIDER U.S. PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, WE NOTE
THAT IT DOESN'T COST THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATES ANYTHING
TO BE POSITIVE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN STOCKHOLM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
) 91
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05368
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -
JUNE 30-JULY 1, 1986
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 5200, B) STOCKHOLM 5343
1. CDE XI - 040
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THE STOCKHOLM LOGJAM
MAY BE BREAKING. AT THE JUNE 30 WORKING GROUP AB
MEETING CANADA OUTLINED, ON BEHALF OF NATO, AREAS OF
WESTERN FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIELDS OF NOTIFICATION,
OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION (REF A). THE INITIATIVE
WAS GENERALLY GREETED WARMLY BY THE NNA AND GIVEN A
QUALIFIED, THOUGH VAGUE, WELCOME BY THE SOVIETS. TOWARD
THE END OF THE WEEK SOME OF THE PROGRESS MENTIONED AT
THE JUNE 27 POLITBURO MEETING WHICH DISCUSSED CDE BEGAN
TO APPEAR. FOR EXAMPLE, BASED ON OUR PRELIMINARY
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, THE SOVIETS SEEM PREPARED TO
RESOLVE THE VEXING ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES (SEE REF B).
THIS COULD BE A SIGNAL BECAUSE, IF MOSCOW HAD DECIDED
THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT INSPECTIONS, OUR "SINE QUA NON,"
IN ANY FORM, IT COULD HAVE CONTINUED TO STALL ON THE
"AIR" ISSUE, WHICH IS EASIER TO DEFEND PUBLICLY THAN A
REFUSAL TO AGREE TO INSPECTION. WE FORESECONTINUED
DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT A REASONABLE
PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED
ACTIVITIES. WE ARE NOW TAKING THE LINE THAT WE ARE
GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE COURSE OF THE STOCKHOLM
NEGOTIATIONS; FIRST, BECAUSE THAT OPTIMISM WILL BE JUSTI-
FIED ONLY IF INITIAL SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ACTUALLY
MATERIALIZE AND SECOND, BECAUSE WE WANT TO HEAD OFF ANY
PREMATURE NNA INITIATIVES TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN EAST
AND WEST. IN THE WORKING GROUPS, LANGUAGE WAS REGISTERED
ON OBSERVATION, VERIFICATION, AND ANNUAL CALENDARS AND
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN RESOLVING KEY NOTIFICA-
TION ISSUES, E.G., THE DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: WORK PICKED UP IN BOTH THE WORKING
GROUPS AND IN A NEW, MORE INTENSIVE ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET
BILATERALS. UPON HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW FOLLOWING A
POLITBURO MEETING AT WHICH CDE ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED,
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IMMEDIATELY MET WITH THE
FRENCH WHERE HE TRIED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO PUNISH THEM
FOR SEEKING TO GUARD ALLIANCE POSITIONS BY EXPRESSING
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE MEAGER RESULTS OF THE "SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP." THE SOVIETS THEN RESUMED PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS WITH US, AND HAVE GENERALLY SEEMED EAGER TO
SETTLE SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE
INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SETTLE AIR ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE
TO US, THEY HAVE HINTED THAT TRANSFERS (TRANSITS) MIGHT
92
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
BECOME THE NEXT EXCUSE FOR STALLING. ON THE WHOLE,
HOWEVER, IT IS OUR TENTATIVE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
READY TO DO BUSINESS -- AT LAST.
IN THREE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THIS WEEK, DISCUSSION
FOCUSED ON NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES,
MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS AND ALERT ACTIVITIES. THERE WAS NOT
MUCH PROGRESS ON ANY SUBJECTS, AS DIFFERENCES -- WITHIN
GROUPS AS WELL AS AMONG THEM -- EMERGED FOR ALL TO SEE.
THE NNA NOT ONLY WERE UNABLE TO INTRODUCE THEIR MUCH
HERALDED AMPHIBIOUS PROPOSAL; THEY DISAGREED PUBLICLY ON
WHETHER A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY SHOULD INCLUDE
JUST THE LANDING (SWEDEN) OR THE WHOLE ACTIVITY (MALTA
AND TO SOME EXTENT YUGOSLAVIA). THE EAST AND SWEDEN
WANTED TO NOTIFY BOTH AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES
WHILE THE WEST HAD TO RESERVE ITS POSITION ON THE
INCLUSION OF AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. ON MOVEMENTS/TRANS-
FERS, THE WEST STRESSED THE SC.1 APPROACH ACCORDING TO
WHICH MOVEMENTS WOULD BE PART OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY AND
ARGUED THAT SOVIET TROOP ROTATIONS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED
WHILE THE USSR TRIED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MOVEMENTS,
WHICH IT CHARACTERIZED AS THREATENING, AND ITS
SEMI-ANNUAL TROOP ROTATIONS, WHICH IT INSISTED WERE
NOT. THE EAST (GDR) FOR THE FIRST TIME ASKED THE WEST
POINT BLANK WHETHER U.S. TRANSITS WOULD BE NOTIFIED.
THE U.S. RESPONSE: TRANSITS ARE EXCLUDED; THERE IS NOT,
AND NEVER WILL BE, ANY POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING THE
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSITS IN A FINAL DOCUMENT IN
STOCKHOLM. THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR (LIDGARD) MADE A
CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE A NEW CONCEPT FOR ALERT
ACTIVITIES BASED ON A NATIONAL (SWEDISH) POSITION, WHICH
ALSO WOULD HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR A NEW SWEDISH PROPOSAL
FOR CONSTRAINTS IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. HIS INITIATIVE
NEVER GOT OFF THE GROUND AS THE WEST DISSECTED AND
DISCREDITED IT. WHEN PRESSED, EVEN THE NNA REAFFIRMED
THEIR ORIGINAL SC.7 POSITION ON SHORT-NOTICE
NOTIFICATIONS.
5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: DRAFTING
ON A VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK RESUMED THIS WEEK WITH A
TEXT BEING NOTED STATING THAT "THE PARTICIPATING STATE
WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL SPECIFY THE AREA WHERE .
THIS TEXT REPRESENTS TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTS IN THE MINDS
OF EAST AND WEST: THE WEST HAS FOCUSED ON "THE AREA WHERE
THE INSPECTION WOULD TAKE PLACE," WHILE THE EAST HAS
FOCUSED ON "THE AREA WHERE THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
OCCURRED."
THE SOVIETS TABLED A PROPOSAL FLESHING OUT THEIR
VERIFICATION "MENU" CONCEPT WITH A LIST OF VERIFICATION
FORMS A STATE COULD "USE:" IN A FIRST PARA, THEY
IDENTIFY NTM'S TO DETECT A POSSIBLE VIOLATION AND THEN,
AS FORMS TO USE, CLARIFICATIONS, BILATERAL OR
93
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, OR A TEMPORARY CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE AS VERIFICATION METHODS -- IN OTHER WORDS,
CONSULTATIONS, CONSULTATIONS AND MORE CONSULTATIONS.
ELLIPSES AT THE END OF THE TEXT LEAVE OPEN THE
POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL FORMS COULD BE ADDED.
SEVERAL OF THE NNA WELCOMED THE EAST'S PROPOSAL AS A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE DRAFTING PROCESS.
NATO REJECTED THE SOVIET APPROACH BECAUSE IT FAILED, IN
OUR VIEW, TO INCLUDE ANY LEGITIMATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION
THAT CONSULTATION IS NOT VERIFICATION WAS SEVERELY
UNDERMINED BY A FRENCH INTERVENTION WHICH SEEMED TO
CONCEDE TO THE EAST THAT FOR LESS SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
CLARIFICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS COULD BE USED, ALTHOUGH
"ON-SITE VERIFICATION" REMAINED NECESSARY FOR "SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS." WE SUSPECT THIS LATEST FRENCH DEPARTURE
FROM THE NATO LINE REFLECTS BOTH A DIFFERENT TACTICAL
APPROACH TO THE THE PROBLEM AS WELL AS POSSIBLY PARIS'S
DESIRE, IN PREPARATION FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT TO MOSCOW,
TO DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY ON VERIFICATION WHILE
CONTINUING TO INSIST ON A ROLE FOR INSPECTION IN THE
OVERALL PROCESS. IN STOCKHOLM, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH
INTERVENTION HAS MERELY SERVED TO GIVE THE EAST FRESH
HOPE THAT THEY CAN EXPLOIT ALLIED DIFFERENCES OVER THE
VERIFICATION ISSUE. WHAT MAKES THIS ACTION ALL THE MORE
UNFORTUNATE IS THAT NATO SEEMED TO BE HAVING SOME SUCCESS
IN SELLING OUR VIEWS OUTSIDE OF THE ALLIANCE. AT A
COFFEE GROUP EARLIER IN THE WEEK MANY OF THE NNA'S, AS
WELL AS YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA, OBSERVED THAT
CONSULTATIONS ARE NOT IN AND OF THEMSELVES A FORM OF
VERIFICATION, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IMPORTANT TO THE
COMPLIANCE PROCESS AS A WHOLE.
6. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING REGAINED ITS MOMENTUM IN B-2
AS THREE TEXTS WERE AGREED FOR NOTATION: 1) INFORMATION
TO BE PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
OBSERVATION PROGRAM; 2) UPDATED BRIEFINGS TO BE PROVIDED
DURING THE PROGRAM; AND 3) PRIVELEGES AND IMMUNITIES FOR
OBSERVERS (I.E., VIENNA CONVENTION). IN THESE TEXTS THE
EAST HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE TYPE OF BRIEFINGS AND
UPDATES THE WEST HAS BEEN SEEKING AND HAS CONCEDED THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROVIDING MAPS TO OBSERVERS, ALTHOUGH THE
SCALE AND ACCURACY OF SUCH MAPS REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED.
THE EAST IS STILL UNPREPARED TO DRAFT SERIOUSLY ON THE
CENTRAL QUESTION OF WHAT OBSERVERS WILL BE ENTITLED TO
SEE AND DO, APPARENTLY FINDING THE PROPOSALS OF THE WEST,
IRELAND AND THE NNA TOO INTRUSIVE FOR ITS TASTE, AND
CONTINUES TO USE THE ISSUE OF OBSERVATION OF AIR
ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS AS A STALLING TACTIC. NEVERTHE-
LESS, THE COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) IS CONTINUING
TO MAKE STEADY IF UNSPECTACULAR PROGRESS AND CLEARLY HAS
94
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THE MOST DEVELOPED MEASURE IN THE CONFERENCE TO DATE.
7. ANNUAL FORECASTS: DESPITE EASTERN WARINESS ABOUT
NOTING ANYTHING IN THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR WHICH
MIGHT PREJUDICE ITS POSITION ON NOTIFICATION, THREE
TIRETS WERE NOTED THIS WEEK: 1) TYPE OF MILITARY
ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION; 2) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY; AND 3) NAMES OF
THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. DURING
DISCUSSION OF A FOURTH TIRET -- THE AREA OF A MILITARY
ACTIVITY -- THE EAST APPEARED NOT TO RULE OUT PROVISION
OF GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES AND SWEDEN SUGGESTED A
POSSIBLE FORMULATION: "GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES
SUPPLEMENTED BY GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES."
WITHIN NATO, THE UK CONTINUES TO INSIST ON NOT
COMPROMISING THE USE OF MEASURE 1 AS AN END GAME
BARGAINING CHIP IF THE EAST SHOWS NO WILLINGNESS TO
INCLUDE STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF THE
CALENDAR OR NOTIFICATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THE UK HAS
RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO GIVE NATO NEGOTIATORS THE
FLEXIBILITY TO ASK LEADING QUESTIONS ABOUT STATIC
INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CALENDAR (AND
NOTIFICATION) TO THE EXTENT THEY CAN DO THIS WITHOUT
SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING MEASURE 1 PROVISIONS, SUCH AS
THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE NORMAI PEACETIME LOCATIONS.
8. CONSTRAINTS: THE USSR SOUGHT TO DISCREDIT NATO'S
RECENT INITIATIVE, WHICH IMPLICITLY LINKS WESTERN
WILLINGNESS TO DROP NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATIONS TO
OTHERS' (EAST AND NNA) WILLINGNESS TO STOP PUSHING
CONSTRAINTS. INSTEAD THE SOVIETS INTRODUCED A DIFFERENT
LINKAGE: CONSTRAINTS AND INSPECTION AS TWO SUBJECTS
WHICH BELONG TO A DIFFERENT CDE STAGE. THE WEST REFUSED
TO CONSIDER THIS EFFORT TO DEFER INSPECTION. THE EAST
CONTINUED TO PUSH ITS JUNE 18 CONSTRAINTS MEASURE.
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: AT THE TIME OF THE NUF MEETING
(TUESDAY, JULY 1) IT WAS STILL UNCLEAR WHETHER GRINEVSKY
HAD RETURNED WITH NEW MARCHING ORDERS FROM MOSCOW AND
WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON KEY ISSUES.
THE WEST, THEREFORE AVOIDED REGISTERING NEW LANGUAGE IN
THE NUF WORKING GROUP FOR THE SECOND STRAIGHT WEEK.
HOWEVER, BASED ON APPROPRIATE PROGRESS IN THE CSBM'S
WORKING GROUPS, THE WEST IS NOW PREPARED TO NOTE LANGUAGE
ON THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE, "NO CONSIDERATION" LANGUAGE
TAKEN VERBATIM FROM THE WESTERN TEXT AND SELF-DEFENSE
LANGUAGE APPROVED BY WASHINGTON, I.E., "AS RECOGNIZED IN
THE UN CHARTER." (ONLY IRELAND IS HOLDING UP CONSENSUS.)
AT THE SAME TIME SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS REFLECTING THE
WESTERN APPROACH WAS MADE REFINING TEXTS ON THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, THE COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT,
AND THE EQUALITY OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES. THE WEST PRESSED
FOR DRAFTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
95
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL
ACT MUCH TO THE DISMAY OF THE EAST AND, UNFORTUNATELY,
EVEN SOME OF THE NNA. AS THE CONTOURS OF THE NUF SECTION
BECOME MORE EVIDENT, THE EAST IS BECOMING MORE DIFFIDENT.
THE SOVIET NUF REPRESENTATIVE ADMITTED TO US (AFTER A FEW
DRINKS) THAT MOSCOW HAD LOST ITS ENTHUSIASM FOR THE EXER-
CISE AND WOULD BE HAPPY WITH A "CUT-AND-PASTE" JOB USING
FINAL ACT LANGUAGE PLUS SOME MENTION OF "MILITARY FORCE."
DURING THE WORKING GROUP, THE EAST INTRODUCED ITS
LANGUAGE ON "MILITARY FORCE:" "THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM
ANY USE OF MILITARY FORCE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE
FINAL ACT, IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PREVENT ANY KIND OF
WAR, CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR." THIS LANGUAGE, IN EFFECT,
IS WHAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THEY CAN SALVAGE FROM SC.6
-- THEIR NUF TREATY. IT IS STILL UNACCEPTABLE TO US.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05391
SUBJECT: EMERGING SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTION
REF: MBFR VIENNA 558
1. CDE XI - 041
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOVIET POSITION ON VERIFICATION
WHICH SEEMS TO BE EMERGING IN STOCKHOLM MIGHT INCLUDE A
PROVISION FOR AN EXTREMELY LIMITED FORM OF INSPECTION.
IN ADDITION TO PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO DENY A REQUEST
FOR AN INSPECTION, THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEK TO LIMIT ITS
USE TO DEMONSTRABLY GROSS INSTANCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE.
END SUMMARY.
4. THE SOVIETS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR VARIOUS WTO
FRONTMEN, HAVE BEGUN TO HINT, PRIMARILY BEHIND THE
SCENES, AT THE KIND OF INSPECTION MEASURE THEY MIGHT
FIND ACCEPTABLE FOR A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH THEY
CONTINUE TO ASSERT THAT INSPECTION IS APPROPRIATE ONLY
FOR DISARMAMENT OR FOR A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF SECURITY
NEGOTIATIONS THEY UNDOUBTEDLY UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN
POSITION THAT STOCKHOLM WILL FAIL IF THERE IS NO
PROVISION FOR INSPECTION IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
ACCORDINGLY, THE SOVIETS AND THEIR EAST EUROPEAN PARTNERS
AVOID RULING OUT INSPECTION PER SE AND HAVE BEGUN
PROPOSING A SPECTRUM OF SO-CALLED FORMS OF VERIFICATION.
THE FORMS THUS FAR ADVANCED IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS
INCLUDE THE RIGHTS TO 1) USE NTM'S; 2) REQUEST CLARIFICA-
TIONS; 3) CONSULT BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY; AND
4) SET UP TEMPORARY OR AD HOC CONSULTATIVE COMMISSIONS.
ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE YET TO PROPOSE IT EXPLICITLY, THE
EAST HAS MADE CLEAR THAT ITS LIST IS INCOMPLETE AND THAT
SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR
OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST (WHICH THE EAST WOULD TRY TO
SELL AS INSPECTION) WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE ADDITION.
5. BY AVOIDING OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE WESTERN
POSITION ON INSPECTION AT THE MOMENT, THE SOVIETS ARE
PROBABLY SETTING THEMSELVES UP TO EMPLOY ONE OF TWO
POSSIBLE TACTICS. FIRST, THEY PROBABLY INTEND TO EXHIBIT
SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN VERIFICATION TO STRING NATO ALONG
UNTIL LATE IN THE GAME WHEN THEY HOPE INTERNAL ALLIANCE
PRESSURES FOR A CDE OUTCOME WILL PROVE MORE PERSUASIVE
TO NATO THAN THE -- BY THAT TIME -- RELATIVELY ISOLATED
U.S. POSITION ON INSPECTION. SECOND, THEY SEE PROBABLE
ADVANTAGE IN CONTINUING TO PLAY FOR TIME BY ARGUING
AGAINST THE NEED FOR INSPECTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT
WOULD ONLY BE APPROPRIATE TO DISARMAMENT AND BY
ESTABLISHING VARIOUS ROADBLOCKS TO PROGRESS (E.G., FIRST
AIR, NOW TRANSITS). THESE ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES COULD
THEN SERVE AS MAJOR "CONCESSIONS" LATE IN THE END GAME
WHEN THE WEST COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY EXPECT MORE THAN A
WATERED-DOWN VERSION OF INSPECTION IN RETURN.
97
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
6. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET APPROACH, INSPECTION WOULD BE
THE LAST RECOURSE IN A GRADUATED PROCESS IN WHICH THE
OTHER LESS INTRUSIVE FORMS OF VERIFICATION SHOULD FIRST
BE EMPLOYED. MOREOVER, INSPECTION WOULD BE RESERVED ONLY
FOR SERIOUS TRANSGRESSIONS. MARGINAL OR NONTHREATENING
INSTANCES OF SUSPECTED NONCOMPLIANCE WOULD NOT WARRANT
INSPECTION; THESE COULD BE DEALT WITH MORE APPROPRIATELY
THROUGH CLARIFICATIONS TENDERED UPON REQUEST OR
CONSULTATIONS.
7. QUESTION OF RIGHT OF REFUSAL: OBSERVATION UPON
REQUEST MAY PROVIDE THE SOVIETS A WAY OUT OF THEIR
DILEMMA. OF OBVIOUS APPEAL, BUT WITH SOME MODIFICATION,
IS THE EXPLICIT PROVISION IN THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR THE
RIGHT TO DENY A REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION; DOUBTLESSLY
PREFERABLE WOULD BE A RANGE OF LESSER GROUNDS FOR DENYING
A REQUEST THAN THE NNA PROPOSAL STIPULATES, I.E., SUPREME
NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE NNA PROPOSAL ALSO ENTAILS TWO
REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD NOT ONLY FACILITATE EVADING A
REQUEST BUT ALSO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF INSPECTION IN
THE NEW CDE ZONE. THE NNA PROPOSAL, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD
REQUIRE THAT A REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION BE OCCASIONED BY
A PERCEIVED THREAT TO ONE'S NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.
THIS PROVISO WOULD REST ON SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT WHICH
READILY COULD BE DISPUTED; DISPUTES, IN TURN, COULD LEAD
TO REQUESTS FOR PROOF, A REQUIREMENT THE SOVIETS DESIRE
BUT HAVE YET TO ENUNCIATE AS THEY HAVE IN THE MBFR TALKS
(SEE REFTEL). THE NEUTRAL APPROACH ALSO STIPULATES THAT
REQUESTS FOR OBSERVATION BE LIMITED TO INSTANCES WHEN
THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREED CSBM REGIME IS
IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. MARGINAL OR NONTHREATENING ACTS OF
NONCOMPLIANCE, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, WOULD MEET NEITHER
THE PERCEIVED THREAT NOR THE JEOPARDY CRITERION.
MOREOVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER OF THESE CRITERIA
WOULD EVER APPLY TO SOVIET MILITARY TRAINING ACTIVITIES
IN THE INTERIOR OF THE USSR, ESPECIALLY THE URAL AND
VOLGA MILITARY DISTRICTS, WHERE SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE OF
RELATIVELY SMALL SCALE.
8. THE SOVIETS' ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL
AND LIMIT THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR INSPECTION IS TO A
CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ABETTED BY NATO'S OWN POSITION ON
THE QUESTION OF RESTRICTED AREAS. THE ALLIANCE'S LACK
OF AN AGREED POSITION ON RESTRICTED AREAS HAS HAMPERED
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE TACTIC FOR CONFRONTING THE
SOVIETS ON THE ISSUE OF RIGHT OF REFUSAL. THE SOVIETS
HAVE THUS BEEN ABLE TO RESPOND EVASIVELY TO REQUESTS TO
ELABORATE THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THEY WOULD TURN DOWN A
REQUEST FOR INSPECTION. TO BUILD A CASE FOR THE RIGHT OF
REFUSAL THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO EMPLOYED OTHER TACTICS.
THESE INCLUDE:
-- ELABORATION OF FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THE SOVIETS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
HAVE ENCOURAGED DEVELOPMENT IN WORKING GROUPS OF A LIST
OF AGREED FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THEIR AIM IS TO
FORMALIZE SPECIFIC APPROACHES WHICH WOULD BE TAILORED TO
THE CSBM IN QUESTION OR THE GRAVITY OF SUSPECTED
INSTANCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE; INSPECTION OF COURSE WOULD
BE RESERVED FOR ONLY THE GRAVEST.
-- WAFFLING ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE. THE SOVIETS
HAVE FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO CHOOSE
THE FORM OF VERIFICATION IT WISHES TO EMPLOY. IT HAS
BECOME APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY DRAW A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE AND THE OBLIGATION OF THE
STATE WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE IN QUESTION TO GRANT THE
CHOICE.
-- REFERENCES TO VIOLATIONS, OR ALLEGATIONS OF
VIOLATIONS. ATTEMPTS TO HAVE SUCH REFERENCES
INCORPORATED INTO DRAFTING TEXT ARE INTENDED TO ESTABLISH
THE RATIONALE FOR A REQUIREMENT FOR PROOF. THE ADEQUACY
OF THE PROOF, OF COURSE, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO QUESTION.
9. USDEL, WITH GENERAL SUPPORT FROM NATO, HAS MADE THE
FOLLOWING RESPONSES IN REPLY:
-- NO INSPECTION, NO AGREEMENT.
-- WE CAN ACCEPT NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND NO FLAWED
MODALITIES; OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST IS UNACCEPTABLE.
-- FOR US THERE IS ONLY ONE "CHOICE" OF VERIFICATION:
INSPECTION.
-- BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF
INSPECTIONS SO THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ABUSED.
10. LOCALLY, THE ALLIES ARE SOLIDLY ON BOARD BUT SOME
UNHELPFUL IDEAS ARE BEGINNING TO SURFACE.
-- FRG IS BEGINNING TO BACK OFF THE IDEA OF SUSPENSION
AS THE PENALTY FOR REFUSAL; THEY ARE SUGGESTING INSTEAD
THAT OBLIGATIONS WOULD ONLY BE SUSPENDED FOR THE REFUSING
STATE. THEY ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO SURFACE THE IDEA THAT
INSPECTION OUGHT ONLY APPLY TO NONFORECAST EVENTS.
-- UK IS ACTUALLY EXPRESSING A PREFERENCE FOR GROUND
INSPECTION AS OPPOSED TO AIR.
-- ITALY IS OPENLY TALKING ABOUT A QUOTA OF INSPECTION
REFUSALS (ONE EVERY TWO YEARS, FOR EXAMPLE).
-- NETHERLANDS IS PUSHING FOR CONSULTATIONS/CLARIFICA-
TIONS AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION.
11. WE ARE CAUTIONING THAT THESE IDEAS ARE NOT
ACCEPTABLE TO US AND WARNING AGAINST CREATING
MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE ALLIANCE POSITION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8 25X1
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 05471
SUBJECT: CDE: UK PROPOSAL ON "COMPLIANCE VISITS"
1. CDE XI-044. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON JULY 10, UK AMBASSADOR EDES SHARED WITH US A PRO-
POSAL ON "COMPLIANCE VISITS" WHICH HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN
LONDON. THE IDEA IS TO MAKE INSPECTION MORE PALATABLE
BY CHANGING ITS NAME AND ESTABLISHING A "CDE COMMISSION"
MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL 35 PARTICIPATING STATES
WHICH WOULD BE CHARGED WITH MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
"COMPLIANCE VISITS" AND ACTING AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR
INFORMATION ON COMPLIANCE. WE SUSPECT THE FRENCH WILL
TORPEDO THE IDEA IN ANY CASE BECAUSE OF THEIR FEARS OF
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONSULTATION. SINCE THE SOVIETS
HAVE NOW ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF INSPECTION, THE USE OF
THE TERM "COMPLIANCE VISIT" WILL DIE A NATURAL DEATH.
WE WILL DISCOURAGE PUTTING THE IDEA TO THE 16, WHERE IT
WOULD PROBABLY EVOLVE INTO A NEUTRAL INSPECTION TEAM.
AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD LIKE TO DEMONSTRATE TO LONDON
THAT WE HAVE TAKEN IDEA SERIOUSLY; TO THAT END WOULD
APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE WASHINGTON MIGHT WISH TO PROVIDE.
3. TEXT FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT
COMPLIANCE
1. COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
BE MONITORED BOTH BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFI-
CATION AND THROUGH COMPLIANCE VISITS ORGANISED BY A CDE
COMMISSION.
"2. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE
WILL USE AVAILABLE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICA-
TION IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNISED
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
"3. NO PARTICIPATING STATE MAY INTERFERE WITH THE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 2
ABOVE.
"4. COMPLIANCE VISITS. A CDE COMMISSION SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED. ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE, MEMBERSHIP AND
OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE SET OUT BELOW. IT WILL BE
RESPONSIBLE, INTER ALIA, FOR ORGANISING, AT THE REQUEST
OF A PARTICIPATING STATE, VISITS TO THE TERRITORIES OF
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING
COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.
"5. LIMITATIONS. THE RECEIVING STATE WILL NOT BE
REQUIRED TO PERMIT COMPLIANCE VISITS IN THE FOLLOWING:
A) DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS (AS IN SC1 (AMPLIFIED)) B)
RESTRICTED AREAS, WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR. THESE AREAS SHALL NOT BE EITHER SO NUMEROUS
OR SO EXTENSIVE AS TO FRUSTRATE THE PURPOSES OF THIS
AGREEMENT. ANY CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF GEOGRAPHICAL
CO-ORDINATES OF THESE RESTRICTED AREAS SHACL BE NOTIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
AT LEAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE.
"6. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPLIANCE VISITS. ANY PARTI-
CIPATING STATE WHICH WISHES A COMPLIANCE VISIT TO BE
ORGANISED UPON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER SHALL INFORM
SIMULTANEOUSLY THE CDE COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE CONCERNED. THE PARTICIPA-
TING STATE WHICH REQUESTS SUCH A VISIT SHALL INDICATE
REASONS WHY IT WISHES THE VISIT IN QUESTION TO BE CARRIED
OUT. THE CDE COMMISSION SHALL, IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT
OF THE REQUEST, CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE UPON
WHOSE TERRITORY THE VISIT IS TO BE CARRIED OUT. ARRANGE-
MENTS SHALL BE MADE BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE STATE WHOSE TERRITORY IS INVOLVED SO AS TO
ENABLE THE VISIT TO COMMENCE WITHIN 36 HOURS OF THE
INITIAL ISSUANCE OF THE REQUEST.
"7. THE DESIGNATED AREA. IN SUBMITTING ITS REQUEST FOR
THE ORGANISATION OF A COMPLIANCE VISIT, THE REQUESTING
STATE SHALL SPECIFY THE GEOGRAPHICAL CO-ORDINATES OF THE
AREA WHICH THE VISIT SHOULD COVER.
118. IF ANY PART OF THE DESIGNATED AREA COINCIDES WITH A
RESTRICTED AREA (SEE PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE) THE CDE COMMISSION
SHALL EXCLUDE THAT PART OF THE AREA FROM THE ORGANISATION
OF THE VISIT.
"9. ACCESS AND ENTRY TO THE DESIGNATED AREA AND THE
UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY OF IT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE COM-
PLIANCE VISIT SHALL BE ENSURED BY THE STATE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE VISIT TAKES PLACE.
"10. PARTICIPATION. THE COMPLIANCE VISIT SHALL BE UNDER-
TAKEN BY TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REQUESTING STATE
ACCOMPANIED BY THREE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CDE COMMIS-
SION. IN THE CASE OF THE THREE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION,
NO TWO MEMBERS SHALL BE FROM STATES BELONGING TO THE SAME
MILITARY ALLIANCE.
"11. TIMING. A COMPLIANCE VISIT WILL PROCEED IN THE
FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:
A. WITHIN 12 HOURS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A REQUEST, THE
RECEIVING STATE WILL REPLY TO THE REQUESTING STATE THROUGH
THE CDE COMMISSION, MAKING NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
VISIT, AND TRANSMITTING CO- ORDINATING INFORMATION,
INCLUDING THE POINT OF ENTRY TO ITS TERRITORY. THE
RECEIVING STATE WILL ENSURE THAT THE VISITING TEAM IS ABLE
TO REACH THE DESIGNATED AREA WITHOUT DELAY FROM THE POINT
OF ENTRY:
B. WITHIN 36 HOURS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF A REQUEST,
UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED, THE TEAM WILL BE
PERMITTED TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE:
C. THE TEAM WILL INFORM THE RECEIVING STATE OF ANY DELAY
IN ITS ARRIVAL BEYOND 36 HOURS AT THE POINT OF ENTRY TO
THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE AND INDICATE THE
EXTRA TIME NEEDED TO ARRIVE AT THE POINT OF ENTRY:
1 r)
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
D. WITHIN 36 HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM AT THE
DESIGNATED AREA, UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED, THE
VISITORS WILL BE REQUIRED TO LEAVE THE DESIGNATED AREA.
"12. CONDUCT OF COMPLIANCE VISITS. THE TEAM SHALL BE
PERMITTED TO CONDUCT THE VISIT ON LAND AND FROM THE AIR.
THE STATE REQUESTING THE VISIT SHALL PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT
(WITH THE CREW) AND THE LAND VEHICLES (WITH TWO DRIVERS)
UNLESS, UPON REQUEST, THE RECEIVING STATE DOES SO. THE
TEAM SHALL BE PERMITTED THE USE OF THAT ONE AIRCRAFT AND
THE TWO LAND VEHICLES THROUGHOUT.
"13. LOGISTIC SUPPORT. UPON REQUEST THE RECEIVING STATE
WILL FURNISH ADEQUATE FOOD AND LODGING FOR THE VISITORS.
THE VISITORS MAY PROVIDE THEIR OWN TENTS AND RATIONS AND
MAY MAKE USE OF CIVILIAN FACILITIES.
"14. OPTICAL EQUIPMENT. THE VISITORS WILL HAVE THE
UNRESTRICTED USE OF MAPS, BINOCULARS, CAMERAS AND TAPE
RECORDERS. BINOCULARS, CAMERAS AND TAPE RECORDERS WILL
BE DRAWN FROM THE STOCK HELD BY THE CDE COMMISSION.
"15. COMMUNICATIONS. THE VISITING TEAM WILL HAVE ACCESS
TO, AND MAY USE, STANDARDISED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP-
MENT, THE TYPE OF WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL
FORECAST OF THE PRECEEDING YEAR. NO ENCRYPTION OF
MESSAGES WILL BE ALLOWED.
"16. REPORT. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REQUESTING STATE
SHALL PROVIDE A REPORT ON THE VISIT. THIS REPORT,
TOGETHER WITH ANY COMMENTS ON IT WHICH THE REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF THE COMMISSION MAY WISH TO MAKE, SHALL BE
CIRCULATED BY THE COMMISSION TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.
THE REPORT AND THE ACCOMPANYING COMMENTS WILL FORM THE
BASIS OF ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS.
"17. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. WHEN IN THE TERRITORY
WITHIN THE ZONE OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATE, THE VISITORS
WILL BE GRANTED THESE DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNI-
TIES ACCORDED TO ACCREDITED DIPLOMATS UNDER THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
THE CDE COMMISSION
1118. THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIS-
TRIBUTION OF ALL INFORMATION REGARDING ALL MEASURES AGREED
AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE). PAR-
TICIPATING STATES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THAT
INFORMATION IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE FORMAT AND
TIMESCALES LAID DOWN BY THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
"19. THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING
REPRESENTATIVES FOR COMPLIANCE VISITS CONDUCTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS VERIFICATION MEASURE. PERSONAL
OPTICAL AND AUDIO EQUIPMENT (BINOCULARS, CAMERAS, TAPE
RECORDERS) WILL BE PROVIDED FROM A STOCK MAINTAINED BY
THE COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION WILL ALSO BE THE FORUM
FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMENTS BY NATIONS ON THE COM-
PLIANCE VISIT REPORT CIRCULATED BY THE CHALLENGING STATE.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
"20. THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE LOCATED IN (VIENNA).
IT WILL BE COMPOSED OF A SINGLE PERMANENT REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM EACH OF ALL THIRTY FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES,
WHO WILL AT THE DISCRETION OF THE SENDING STATE, BE
SECONDED FROM THEIR COUNTRY'S BILATERAL MISSIONS TO
(AUSTRIA). THOSE STATES WITHOUT PERMANENT REPRESENTATION
IN (AUSTRIA) MAY DESIGNATE ANOTHER TO REPRESENT THEIR
INTERESTS. IN ADDITION, UP TO TWO FURTHER DELEGATES
FROM CAPITALS MAY BE SECONDED TEMPORARILY. ADMINISTRA-
TIVE SUPPORT FOR THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE PROVIDED BY
THE HOST NATION, WHICH WILL BE REIMBURSED BY PARTICIPATING
STATES ACCORDING TO THE USUAL CSCE FORMULA."
END TEXT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
103
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8 25X1
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05469
SUBJECT: CDE: FRANCO-SOVIET "BREAKTHROUGH"
1. CDE XI-046. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY USED THE OCCASION OF THE
MITTERAND VISIT TO ANNOUNCE SOME IMPORTANT NEW POSITIONS
ON CDE. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SLIPPAGE WHEN GRINEVSKY
RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM AND ANNOUNCES WHAT HAS BEEN DECIDED,
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE USSR IS NOW READY:
- TO LOWER THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD FROM 18,000
TO 15-14,000 AND ACCEPT SOME KIND OF A STRUCTURAL PARA-
METER;
- TO ACCEPT THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH TO AIR
ACTIVITIES, WHICH INVOLVES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON
AIR ACTIVITIES INVOLVING OVER 700 SORTIES IN A NOTIFICA-
TION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES;
- TO PUT ASIDE THE QUESTION OF TRANSITS BUT PRESS FOR
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS INTO THE ZONE SO THAT "STOCK-
PILING OF MEN AND THEIR EQUIPMENT" AT ARRIVAL BASES IN
THE ZONE WOULD BE CAPTURED;
- TO ACCEPT BOTH THE PRINCIPLES OF INSPECTION AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PRINCIPLE ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS
IN THIS PHASE OF THE CDE, I.E. WE COULD HAVE SOME INSPEC-
TION BUT NOT MUCH.
3. WE UNDERSTAND GRINEVSKY WILL LAY OUT THE NEW SOVIET
POSITIONS TO THE CONFERENCE WHEN HE RETURNS FROM MOSCOW
ON JULY 14. HE WILL PROBABLY ALSO SAY THAT THE USSR IS
READY TO DRAFT MORE INTENSIVELY IN ORDER TO MEET THE
APPROACHING DEADLINE. HE WILL SUGGEST STAYING ON FOR
AN EXTRA WEEK IN JULY (JULY 18-25) TO TRY TO REACH AGREE-
MENT ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF NOTIFICATION ISSUES AND
VERIFICATION IF POSSIBLE AND THEN COMING BACK 10 DAYS
EARLY (AUGUST 9). (COMMENT: THE FRENCH BELIEVE THIS
SCHEDULE WOULD ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO RESOLVE THE REMAIN-
ING ISSUES BY SEPTEMBER 1, LEAVING THE REST OF SEPTEMBER
FOR EDITORIAL WORK. END COMMENT.)
4. THESE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES SHOULD MAKE SERIOUS DRAFT-
ING POSSIBLE. IF THE SOVIETS SHOW REAL FLEXIBILITY ON
KEY ISSUES, WE DOUBT THAT DELEGATIONS WILL INSIST ON
THEIR SUMMER VACATIONS, THOUGH MANY WILL RESENT THE
FRANCO-SOVIET MOVE INTENSELY. WE ARE ALREADY LETTING
IT BE KNOWN THAT WE ARE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH ANY
INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK PROGRAM WHICH DOESN'T GO
BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19.
5. AS FOR THE ACTUAL DRAFTING, WE SEE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
PINNING DOWN AGREEMENT ON THE AREAS LISTED ABOVE.
- ON THRESHOLDS, THE SOVIETS WILL CERTAINLY HOLD OUT
FOR HIGHER LEVELS THAN NATO IS NOW READY TO ACCEPT; A
NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES INSIST THAT 10,000 IS AS HIGH AS
THEY CAN GO; THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO RESIST INCLUSION OF
ANY MEANINGFUL EQUIPMENT ELEMENT;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
- ON AIR, THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE TROUBLESOME DEMANDS
REGARDING OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION;
- ON TRANSFERS, THE SOVIETS WILL CERTAINLY TRY TO
INCLUDE TRANSITS DE FACTO;
- ON INSPECTIONS, WE WILL HAVE GREAT PROBLEMS NEOGTIA-
TING MODALITIES REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE REGIME.
6. ALL THAT BEING SAID, THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT
ARE NOW REASONABLY BRIGHT.
BARRY##
?7. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS: JCS WASHDC AND SECDEF WASHDC
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENT I A L STOCKHOLM 05502
SUBJECT: CDE - NNA CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL PRESENTED
1. CDE XI - 047.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE NNA (ELMER-SWEDEN) PRESENTED A NEW
CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL DURING THE 10 JULY WORKING GROUP
MEETING OF A-3 (ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINING
MEASURES). THIS CONCEPT, WHICH RESEMBLES THE IRISH
PROPOSAL OF 1 MAY, IS PART OF AN APPARENT TREND IN
THE NNA POSITION AWAY FROM CEILINGS AND TOWARDS
CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE CALENDAR.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ABIDE BY THE
FOLLOWING PROVISIONS CONSTRAINING NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS APPLY TO
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY MANOEUVRES, WHICH HAVE NOT
BEEN LISTED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, PROVIDED THEIR
DURATION EXCEEDS 24 HOURS:
NO SUCH MILITARY MANOEUVRE WILL COMPRISE MORE THAN
... DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORCES ...
THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN
TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE IN MORE THAN
A TOTAL OF ... SUCH MILITARY MANOEUVRES PER CALENDAR
YEAR.
MOREOVER, THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR
OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE IN A
TOTAL OF MORE THAN ... SUCH MILITARY MANOEUVRE(S) AT
THE SAME TIME.
TO BE DEFINED
AS DEFINED IN SC 7
... PARAMETERS WILL RELATE TO THE COMBINATION OF
STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL ELEMENTS TO BE AGREED IN
THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION"
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05510
SUBJECT: CDC: PROPOSED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS
RCF: STOCKHOLM 5363
1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. REFTEL DESCRIBED UK/FRG IDEA FOR AN END-OF-ROUND
INFORMAL DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS REGARDING ALLIANCE
VIEWS ON THE CHARACTER OF A CDE AGREEMENT. FRG DRAFT
TALKING PAPER, AT PARA 2 BELOW, HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO
CLOSE ALLIES. THE CONCEPT WILL BE DISCUSSED BY THE
FULL CAUCUS ON JULY 14. IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT ANY
DECISION TO PROCEED DEPENDS ON CONCRETE SIGNS OF
SOVIET FLEXIBILITY UPON GRINEVSKY'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
INFORMAL WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A CDE PACKAGE
"IT IS IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO DEFINE IN TIME
THE OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM AND
TO OBLIGE THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND TO IT AT THE LATEST
EARLY IN THE 12TH ROUND. MANY ELEMENTS OF THIS
PACKAGE ARE NOT NEW BUT REPRESENT KNOWN WESTERN
POSITIONS.. THEY ARE REITERATED HERE IN ORDER TO
PREVENT ANY MISUNDERSTANDING.
- THIS PACKAGE WOULD CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
- 1. --NOTIFICATION--:
WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST THE STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL
THRESHOLDS SO THAT ONLY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING ELEMENTS
OF MORE THAN ONE DIVISION WOULD HAVE TO BE NOTIFIED.
WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A
NUME RICAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OF LAND
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE RANGE FROM 6.000 TO 10.000 MEN.
INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF SORTIES
OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT ABOVE A CERTAIN LEVEL IN THE
NOTIFICATION OF COMBINED ACTIVITIES.
WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE CONCERN ON NOTIFICATION
OF MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES AS INDICATED ON JUNE 30TH.
CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION TO INCLUDE STATIC
INFORMATION (SEE PARA 3 AND 4).
NO NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES
INCLUDING TRANSFERS.
- NO NOTIFICATION OF TRANSITS.
2. --OBSERVATION--:
- MANDATORY INVITATION OF ALL CSCE-STATES TO OBSERVE
ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES AS LONG AS THE CRITERIA FOR
A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY ARE MET.
3. --CALENDAR--: (TO INCLUDE STATIC INFORMATION
ELEMENTS).
4. --INFORMATION--:
WILLINGNESS NOT TO INSIST IN THIS PHASE ON AN
INDEPENDENT INFORMATION MEASURE PROVIDED THAT ADEQUATE
INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE
107
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
AND IN THE CALENDAR (SEE PARAS 1 AND 3), INCLUDING
PEACE-TIME LOCATION, DESIGNATION OF ALL UNITS AT
DIVISION LEVEL AND ABOVE PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES.
5. --VERIFICATION--:
- ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH WOULD
BE EFFECTIVE BUT NOT UNDULY INTRUSIVE. THE WEST HAS
ALREADY SHOWN FLEXIBILITY AT STOCKHOLM EXPRESSING ITS
WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO ONLY ONE ACTIVE INSPECTION PER
YEAR PER PARTICIPATING STATE. IT IS SUGGESTED TO
FACILITATE AGREEMENT THROUGH SPECIFIC MODALITIES
ASSOCIATED WITH AN INSPECTION REGIME:
(A) --LIMITATION OF INSPECTIONS--:
- IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INSPECTION REGIME WITH NO
ESCAPE CLAUSE WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER A LIMITATION
OF THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS A STATE HAS TO ACCEPT ON
ITS TERRITORY.
- (FOR EXAMPLE: A PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL NOT BE
REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH MORE THAN (...) REQUESTS FOR
INSPECTIONS FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES WITH WHICH
IT HAS NOT CARRIED OUT COMMON MILITARY ACTIVITIES
DURING THE LAST 5 YEARS.)
(B) --LAND OR AIR INSPECTIONS--:
WILLINGNESS TO PROPOSE BOTH LAND AND AIR,
INDICATING THAT AIR INSPECTIONS COULD BE MADE MORE
ACCEPTABLE BY SUGGESTING THAT THEY MIGHT BE CARRIED
OUT WITH NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW, WHICH WOULD TAKE
INSPECTORS OF THE INSPECTING STATE AND THEIR ESCORT
FROM THE INSPECTED STATE TO THE INSPECTION AREA.
6. --COMMUNICATION MEASURE--:
7. --CONSTRAINTS--:
- UNDERSTANDING THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE NOT TO BE
INCLUDED IN A RESULT OF THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE."
END TEXT."
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05555
SUBJECT: WHAT TO DO WITH A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT?
REF: STOCKHOLM 1444
1. CDE XI - 048
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE OUTLINES A NUMBER OF
UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ADOPTION, INITIALING
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IF CONSENSUS
CAN BE ATTAINED ON SUCH A DOCUMENT HERE IN STOCKHOLM.
SEE PARA 8 FOR ACTION REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.
4. AS WE ENTER END GAME NEGOTIATIONS HERE IN STOCKHOLM
WE MUST ADDRESS A NUMBER OF PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, SOME
WITH SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. WITHOUT PREDICTING THAT
THERE WILL BE A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, IT IS NEVERTHELESS
ESSENTIAL FOR WASHINGTON TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHAT
TO DO WITH SUCH A DOCUMENT WHEN AND IF CONSENSUS IS
REACHED. WOULD SUCH A DOCUMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE
INI'IALED OR SIGNED? WOULD IT BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS
IN STOCKHOLM OR IN VIENNA? WHEN WOULD THE IMPLEMENTATION
PHASE BEGIN? CONCURRENTLY WITH THE DOCUMENT'S ADOPTION
BY CONSENSUS IN STOCKHOLM OR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE?
5. BACKGROUND: AS EARLY AS THE VISIT OF NST CHIEF
NEGOTIATOR AND FORMER CSCE AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN ON
FEBRUARY 21, USDEL OUTLINED SOME OF OUR CONCERNS AS TO
HOW AND WHEN A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MIGHT BE
ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED (REFTEL). IF WE ARE ABLE TO
REACH A GOOD MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT RESULT IT WOULD BE
LOGICAL TO IMPLEMENT SUC AN AGREEMENT AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE
CDE CHILD DOES NOT TAKE ON A LIFE OF ITS OWN AND THAT IT
MAINTAINS ITS SUBORDINATION TO ITS CSCE PARENT
ORGANIZATION -- THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHICH
BEGINS ON NOVEMBER 4, 1986. OUR ALLIES SHARE THESE
CONCERNS. HOWEVER, THEIR OVERRIDING PREOCCUPATION SEEMS
TO BE THAT ANY DOCUMENT JUDGED TO BE IN NATO'S SECURITY
INTERESTS (AND, IMPLICITLY, IN THEIR DOMESTIC POLITICAL
INTERESTS) SHOULD BE ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT
DELAY. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION FOR THE USG IS WHETHER A
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AGREED TO IN STOCKHOLM, EVEN THOUGH
IT WILL BE POLITICALLY AND NOT LEGALLY BINDING, WOULD
HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE CASE ACT GOVERNING
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.
6. ONE APPROACH, SUGGESTED BY THE UK AMBASSADOR (EDES),
IS TO HAVE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ADOPT A CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT BY CONSENSUS AT THE END OF ITS LAST SESSION
(SEPTEMBER 19) AND TO HAVE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE
"BLESS" THE DOCUMENT DURING ITS OPENING WEEK IN NOVEMBER,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THUS SIGNALING THE BEGINNING OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THIS
APPROACH WOULD BE LOGICAL IF MINISTERS WERE TO BE PRESENT
AT THE VIENNA OPENING; THEY WOULD WANT TO SHARE IN THE
CREDIT FOR A SUCCESS. LIKEWISE IT WOULD GIVE GOVERNMENTS
A CHANCE TO REVIEW A LAST-MINUTE AGREEMENT, AND WOULD
COINCIDE WITH THE NEED TO BEGIN FORECASTING FOR 1987 IN
NOVEMBER 1986 AND TO BEGIN NOTIFICATION FOR 1987 EFFEC-
TIVE FOR EXERCISES THAT BEGIN JANUARY 1, 1987. IN VIENNA
FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD THEN CALL FOR THE EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
WHICH WOULD FORMALLY INITIATE THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
OF THE ACCORD. FINALLY, A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MUST BE
TRANSLATED INTO ALL SIX OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES; BASED
ON THE DIFFICULTY OF TRANSLATION OF PREVIOUS CSCE
DOCUMENTS, PARTICULARLY INTO RUSSIAN, THIS MAY BE A
TIME-CONSUMING AND CONTENTIOUS TASK WHICH MIGHT NOT BE
COMPLETED BY THE SEPTEMBER 19 CLOSE OF THE CONFERENCE.
7. WHILE THIS APPROACH HAS CERTAIN ATTRACTIONS TO USDEL,
IT IS NOT WITHOUT PITFALLS. AS NOTED ABOVE, MANY, IF NOT
MOST OF OUR ALLIES -- NOT TO MENTION THE EAST AND NNA --
PREFER TO HAVE ANY DOCUMENT ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, PROBABLY IN STOCKHOLM. FURTHERMORE,
THE SWEDISH HOSTS WILL PRESS TO HIGHLIGHT ANY DOCUMENT
EMERGING FROM STOCKHOLM.
8. ACTION REQUESTED: IN OUR VIEW, A STOCKHOLM
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MUST BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS BEFORE
THE SEPTEMBER 19 CLOSING DATE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE
DOCUMENT CANNOT BE SIGNED IN STOCKHOLM, ACCORDING TO THE
CONFERENCE'S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. THUS IT IS NECESSARY
TO DEVELOP AN APPROACH TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS POSED BY
THIS CONUNDRUM BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND IN
AUGUST. IN PARTICULAR, WHAT ROLE WILL THE CDE AMBAS-
SADORS PLAY? SHOULD THEY INITIAL ANY DOCUMENT? WHAT
ROLE SHOULD THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE PLAY, IF ANY?
WHEN SHOULD THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE BEGIN? COULD THE
DOCUMENT FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE CASE ACT? BASED
ON OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE, USDEL IS FURTHER DEVELOPING ITS
VIEWS AND LOOKS FORWARD TO CONSULTATION ON THESE AND
RELATED SUBJECTS WHEN WE RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN LATE
JULY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05529
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS - JULY 7-11, 1986
1. CDE XI - 049
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THIS WEEK THE REAL
"BREAKTHROUGH" IN STOCKHOLM OCCURRED AT THE MITTERAND
AND GORBACHEV SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. SOVIET AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY FLEW TO MOSCOW AGAIN AT MID-WEEK, PRESUMABLY
TO GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS. WHILE WE ARE EXPECTING
GRINEVSKY TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON JULY 14, WE
ALREADY HAVE A GOOD IDEA FROM THE FRENCH OF WHAT THE
USSR IS NOW READY TO ACCEPT: 1) LOWERING THE GROUND
FORCE THRESHOLD FROM 18,000 TO 15-14,000; 2) ACCEPTING
SOME KIND OF A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER; 3) ACCEPTING THE
SUB-THRESHOLD APROACH TO AIR ACTIVITIES; 4) PUTTING ASIDE
THE QUESTION OF TRANSITS BUT PRESSING FOR NOTIFICATION
OF TRANSFERS INTO THE ZONE; AND 5) ACCEPTING BOTH THE
PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION ON AN
EXPERIMENTAL BASIS IN THIS PHASE OF THE CDE. WHILE WE
SEE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN PINNING DOWN AGREEMENT ON THESE
AREAS, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ARE CLEARLY
NARROWING. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: THE REAL ACTION ON NOTIFICATION THIS
WEEK TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
FLEW HOME AGAIN AT MID-WEEK, PRESUMABLY TO GET NEW
INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING THE FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMIT. WHILE
WE ARE EXPECTING HIM TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON
JULY 14, WE ALREADY HAVE A GOOD IDEA FROM THE FRENCH OF
CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON NOTIFICATION:
1) REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD FROM 18,000
TO 15-14,000; 2) ACCEPTANCE OF SOME KIND OF A STRUCTURAL
PARAMETER; 3) ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUB-THRESHOLD APROACH TO
AIR ACTIVITIES, WHICH INVOLVES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON
AIR ACTIVITIES INVOLVING OVER 700 SORTIES IN A
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES; AND 4) PUTTING
ASIDE THE QUESTION OF TRANSITS BUT PRESSING FOR
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS INTO THE ZONE. WHEN IT COMES
TO ACTUAL DRAFTING, WE PREDICT THAT 1) ON THRESHOLDS,
THE SOVIETS WILL BOTH HOLD OUT FOR HIGHER LEVELS THAN
NATO IS NOW READY TO ACCEPT AND RESIST INCLUSION OF ANY
MEANINGFUL EQUIPMENT ELEMENT; 2) ON AIR, THE SOVIETS
WILL MAKE TROUBLESOME DEMANDS REGARDING OBSERVATION AND
VERIFICATION; 3) ON TRANSFERS, THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO
INCLUDE TRANSITS DE FACTO.
MOST OF THE ACTION IN STOCKHOLM ALSO OCCURRED BEHIND THE
SCENES THIS WEEK IN U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS. IN A REAL
REVERSAL OF ROLES WHICH DOUBTLESS REFLECTED THE SEA
CHANGE IN MOSCOW, SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV, WHO HAS BEEN
ANYTHING BUT FLEXIBLE IN THE PAST, PROPOSED TO US
111
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
PRIVATELY THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOW THE
CONFERENCE THAT THE LOGJAM OVER AIR ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN
BROKEN BY NOTING ALL TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES TOGETHER AS A SERIES OF BLOCKS BEFORE THE END
OF THE SESSION. MOREOVER, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE SAID
PRIVATELY THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A MODIFIED
VERSION OF THE NNA (LIKO) FORMULA ON GROUND FORCE
PARAMETERS. HE INSISTED, HOWEVER, ON INCLUSION OF A
BLOCK FOR MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, SAYING THAT THIS WAS
A SOVIET "PRINCIPLED POSITION".
IN THE WORKING GROUP, DISCUSSION PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON
THE NNA THRESHOLD PROPOSAL WITH THE SOVIETS ARGUING
AGAINST DEFINING A DIVISION EQUIVALENT IN TERMS OF
BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS. WHILE THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT
BEHIND THE SCENES, BOTH SIDES STALLED IN THE COFFEE
GROUPS THIS WEEK: FIRST, EARLY IN THE WEEK THE SOVIETS
ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE LIKO FORMULA, APPARENTLY
WAITING TO SEE THE RESULTS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH
US ON A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEE ABOVE); THEN THE WEST, IN ORDER
TO PROTECT NATO'S POSITION THAT THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING,
NOT THE WHOLE AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY, IS NOTIFIABLE,
STALLED ON LANGUAGE ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES -- AN ITEM
BOTH THE EAST AND THE NNA WERE EAGER TO DRAFT ON. BY
THE END OF THE COFFEE GROUP MEETING, HOWEVER, SOME
COMMON GROUND APPEARED TO EMERGE.
5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: THE SIGNIFICANT
DEVELOPMENT ON VERIFICATION THIS WEEK ALSO TOOK PLACE IN
MOSCOW, WHERE THE SOVIETS INDICATED TO THE FRENCH A
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PRINCIPLE ON AN
EXPERIMENTAL BASIS IN THIS PHASE OF CDE. WHILE WE
WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR GRINEVSKY'S RETURN TO CONFIRM
THIS, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS NOW ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT
SOME KIND OF INSPECTION -- WHAT WILL BE DIFFICULT IS
PINNING DOWN INSPECTION MODALITIES WHICH MEET OUR
REQUIREMENTS. IN STOCKHOLM THE SOVIETS PROVIDED A PALE
REFLECTION OF THEIR MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS BY INDICATING
THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF "ON-SITE
INSPECTION" FOR CSBM'S IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT; HOWEVER,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR LATER
IN "THE PROCESS OF MONITORING REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES
AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS." STOCKHOLM COULD NOT PUT
INSPECTION INTO PRACTICE, THE SOVIETS ARGUED, DUE TO THE
ABSENCE OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE, BUT THEY NOTED THAT SUCH
EXPERIENCE MIGHT BE GAINED ON THE BASIS OF EXPERIMENTS
AND TRIAL RUNS, PERHAPS TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE VIENNA
CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. INSPECTION POSSIBLY COULD GO
INTO EFFECT, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, AFTER THE VIENNA MEETING
IF THAT MEETING MANDATES A CDE PHASE II DISARMAMENT STAGE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
(BASED ON THE BUDAPEST APPEAL). BOTH NATO AND THE NNA
GAVE A COOL RECEPTION TO THIS NEW EASTERN IDEA. NATO
INDICATED THAT THE EAST'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
INSPECTION WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, BUT THAT IT WAS
NOT ENOUGH. IN BILATERAL CONTACTS IN STOCKHOLM, THE
SOVIET MILREP ALSO HAS SHOWN SUDDEN INTEREST IN
INSPECTION MODALITIES FOR GROUND AND AIR INSPECTION OF
ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT HAS INSISTED THAT
SENSITIVE POINTS BE OFF LIMITS.
THE WEST TRIED TO CONTINUE THE DRAFTING PROCESS ON
VERIFICATION MODALITIES THIS WEEK BY PROPOSING TWO
SENTENCES DEALING WITH THE NEED FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO
VERIFICATION REQUESTS AND THE FACT THAT NOTHING SHOULD
DELAY CARRYING OUT VERIFICATION. WHILE THESE SENTENCES
WERE WELL RECEIVED BY THE NNA, THEY WERE SIMPLY IGNORED
BY THE EAST. WE WILL TAKE THEM UP AGAIN NEXT WEEK.
ON INFORMATION THIS WEEK, BOTH IN THE COFFEE GROUP AND
THE WORKING GROUP, A HOST OF ALLIANCE SPEAKERS BEAT THE
DRUM FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MEASURE I-TYPE INFORMATION, BUT
MADE NO DISCERNIBLE HEADWAY. THE EAST REITERATED ITS
STANDARD ARGUMENTS THAT MEASURE I WAS NOT COMPREHENSIVE
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INCLUDE NAVAL INFORMATION, AND THAT
INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH
NOTIFICATION (IN THE B-1 GROUP). THIS PRESENTS A REAL
TACTICAL PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIANCE IN THAT, WHILE THE
EAST INSISTS THAT THEY WILL DISCUSS STATIC INFORMATION
ONLY IN B-1, THE UK STUBBORNLY REFUSES TO LET THE
ALLIANCE TAKE THE EAST UP ON THE OFFER FOR FEAR OF
"GIVING AWAY" MEASU E 1. THE UK, HOWEVER, DOES NOT
OPPOSE OUR PROBING IN A-2 EASTERN READINESS TO PROVIDE
STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.
6. OBSERVATION: THERE WAS NO DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE
WORKING GROUP THIS WEEK. FOR THE FINAL MEETING OF THE
ROUND IT IS HOPED THAT TWO TEXTS WILL BE NOTED (I.E.,
BOARD AND LODGING FOR OBSERVERS AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR
OBSERVERS). THESE TEXTS WILL VIRTUALLY COMPLETE THE
DRAFTING ON ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. ONCE AGAIN THIS
WEEK IN THE B-2 COFFEE GROUP, THE EAST TRIED TO PREEMPT
WORKING GROUP B-1'S DISCUSSION OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO
BE NOTIFIED (AND SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVED) BY TABLING AN
ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL ON THE OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES
AND MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS). INTERNALLY, THE NATO TEAM
AND CLUSTER CONTINUE TO CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR FLESHING
OUT THE ALLIANCE'S JUNE 30 OFFER OF FLEXIBILITY ON
DURATION OF OBSERVATION. FOUR OPTIONS ARE UNDER
CONSIDERATION: OBSERVATION 1) WHEN THE ACTIVITY IS AT
OR ABOVE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD; 2) OF THE ACTIVE
PHASE OF THE EXERCISE; 3) FROM THE TIME THE TROOPS ENTER
THE EXERCISE AREA UNTIL THEY RETURN TO BARRACKS; 4) A
COMBINATION OF OPTIONS 1 AND 3 (PROPOSED BY U.S.). AT
113
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
WEEK'S END OPTION 4 HAD ATTRACTED THE MOST INTEREST, BUT
DISCUSSION CONTINUES.
7. CONSTRAINTS: THE NNA INTRODUCED A NEW PROPOSAL FOR
"CONSTRAINING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES" (SEE
SEPTEL), WHICH IT DEFENDED AS INCREASING PREDICTABILITY
AND REINFORCING THE ANNUAL CALENDAR -- TWO OBJECTIVES
WHICH NATO SUPPORTS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PRESENTED ON A
SINGLE SHEET OF PAPER, THE PROPOSAL CONSISTS OF TWO
DISTINCT PARTS. THE NEW PROPOSAL POSES A NUMBER OF
PROBLEMS FOR NATO: 1) THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WOULD REGISTER
PARTICIPATING STATES' ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONSTRAINING MILITARY ACTIVITIES -- A PRINCIPLE WHICH THE
WEST HAS DOGGEDLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT; 2) THE SECOND PART
LIMITS THE SIZE, FREQUENCY AND SIMULTANEOUS CONDUCT OF
UNFORECAST NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH LAST MORE
THAN 24 HOURS. IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT HOW THIS
NEW NNA CONSTRAINT WILL APPLY TO NATO; HOWEVER,
DISCUSSION IN THE COFFEE GROUP CONFIRMED OUR INITIAL
IMPRESSION REGARDING ITS POTENTIALLY DETRIMENTAL IMPACT
ON ALERTS. IT IS, HOWEVER, TARGETED ONLY AT ALERTS FOR
TRAINING PURPOSES, NOT THOSE WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN
IN RESPONSE TO A CRISIS SITUATION (I.E, U.S.
REINFORCEMENTS, FRG MOVES TO GDP'S). BASED ON WHAT WE
HAVE HEARD IN THE CORRIDORS, IT APPEARS THAT THIS
PROPOSAL WAS A SWEDISH INITIATIVE WITHIN THE NNA AND
THAT IT DOES NOT ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF ALL OF THE OTHER
NNA'S. NATO GAVE THE NEW NNA PROPOSAL A COOL RECEPTION
IN THE WORKING GROUP, BUT ENGAGED THE NNA IN A DETAILED
EXCHANGE REGARDING ALERTS IN THE COFFEE GROUP. THE EAST
BARELY MENTIONED IT IN THE WORKING GROUP WHERE THEY
FOCUSED ON THEIR OWN CONSTRAINTS PROPOSALS. IN THE
COFFEE GROUP, HOWEVER, THE EAST DID ACCEPT OUTRIGHT THE
FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF THE PROPOSAL (SEE SEPTEL).
8. ANNUAL CALENDAR: THE ANNUAL CALENDAR TOOK A BACK
SEAT TO THE NEW NNA CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL THIS WEEK. TWO
POSSIBLE TICKS OF THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR WERE
DISCUSSED: THE AREA AND TIMEFRAME OF A NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY. ON THE FIRST ISSUE, THE EAST INSISTED
ON THE OPTION TO DESIGNATE THE AREA WITH EITHER
"COORDINATES" OR "FEATURES." THE WEST CONTINUED TO PUSH
FOR GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES AS BEING THE ONLY
REASONABLE STANDARD. ON TIME FRAME, BOTH THE NNA AND
THE WEST WANTED A PRECISE FORMULATION -- DURATION AND
STARTING AND ENDING DATES -- WHILE THE EAST THIS WEEK
BECAME THE CHAMPION OF THE SC.1 APPROACH -- THE 30-DAY
PERIOD DURING WHICH THE ACTIVITY IS PLANNED TO BEGIN --
ALTHOUGH FOR MONTHS THEY HAVE CRITICIZED IT AS TOO
COMPLICATED. WE DO NOT EXPECT RAPID MOVEMENT ON EITHER
OF THESE ITEMS, IN PART BECAUSE THE EAST REMAINS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CAUTIOUS ABOUT PREJUDICING ITS POSITION ON THE CONTENT
OF NOTIFICATION.
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE TEXT ON THE ERGA OMNES (ANTI-
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE) CONCEPT WAS NOTED. THE WORKING GROUP
WAS PREPARED TO NOTE TWO SENTENCES ON SELF-DEFENSE, BUT
THE IRISH STILL CONTEND THAT THE FORMULATION "AS
RECOGNIZED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS" DOES NOT
SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT THE PRIMACY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
IN DETERMINING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. THE COMMITMENT
TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT, MANIFESTATION OF FORCE AND TERRORISM FORMED THE
FOCUS OF DRAFTING IN THE COFFEE GROUP. UNDER THE RUBRIC
OF COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT, THE EAST INTRODUCED AN
AMENDMENT ENUMERATING ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE ACT,
PRESUMABLY TO SUBSUME A SEPARATE PASSAGE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS. THE NNA JOINED THE WEST IN REJECTING THIS
APPROACH. THE EAST ALSO INTRODUCED A TEXT ON TERRORISM
WHICH ADDS THE CONCEPT OF "STATE TERRORISM" TO THE
DISCUSSION. AGAIN THE NNA JOINED THE WEST IN OPPOSING A
REFERENCE TO THIS CONTENTIOUS CONCEPT. UNTIL THE RECENT
DECLARATIONS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY EMERGING OUT OF THE
GORBACHEV-MITTERAND SUMMIT ARE TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE
DRAFTING PROGRESS ON CSBM'S, THE NATO NUF CLUSTER HAS
DECIDED TO SLOW DOWN THE ACTUAL REGISTRATION OF TEXTS IN
THE NUF WORKING GROUP.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05526
SUBJECT: CDE: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD -- SINGLE
- OPERATIONAL COMMAND
1. CDE XI - 050.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: USDEL UNDERSTANDS THAT WASHINGTON IS
CONCERNED THAT INCLUSION OF THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND" MIGHT PUT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS AT RISK WERE THE U.S. REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A COMPLIANCE CHALLENGE. USDEL
RAISED THESE CONCERNS WITH CLOSE ALLIES ON JULY 11.
BASED ON THAT DISCUSSION, USDEL STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT
WE NOT PURSUE REMOVAL OF THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND" FROM THE NOTIFICATION TEXT
CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION. TO DO SO WOULD ENDANGER
THE ENTIRE STRUCTURAL APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NECESSITY OF EVIDENCE. WHILE ALLIES SUPPORT
FULL PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS,
THEY ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL THAT A COMPLIANCE CHALLENGE
WOULD REQUIRE THE U.S. TO PRESENT SUCH EVIDENCE OR THAT
"SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" PROVIDES THE SOVIETS A KEY
LOOPHOLE FOR REFUTING AN ALLEGATION. THE SOVIETS NEED
NOT GO SO FAR AS TO USE "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" AS
A LOOPHOLE: IF THEY ARE INTENT ON REFUTING AN
ALLEGATION THEY COULD CLAIM, DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF AN
ACTIVITY, THAT IT HAD NOT MET THE STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD. THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIETS REJECTING WESTERN
NONCOMPLIANCE ALLEGATIONS WILL EXIST REGARDLESS OF THE
AVAILABILITY OF EVIDENCE. NO VERIFICATION REGIME WE
DEVELOP HERE WILL BE AIRTIGHT ENOUGH TO OVERCOME THE
PROBLEM OF SOVIET DENIAL, BUT IN ANY CASE, OUR APPROACH
TO VERIFICATION GUARDS AGAINST ANY REQUIREMENT TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF NONCOMPLIANCE IN ADVANCE OF A
REQUEST FOR INSPECTION.
5. NEGOTIATING CONCERNS. THE UK, FRG, AND FRANCE
STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT IF NATO DEMANDS A CHANGE IN THE
APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION THE DOOR WILL BE OPENED TO A
VARIETY OF SUCH DEMANDS. USDEL SUPPORTS ALLIED CONCERNS
THAT SUCH A MOVE ON OUR PART WOULD SERIOUSLY RISK
UNDERMINING GRUDGING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE BASIC
APPROACH TO THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES
-- AN APPROACH WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO WESTERN INTERESTS.
ALLIES ARGUE THAT SUCH A MOVE COULD DESTROY THE
PRECARIOUS CONSENSUS TO DRAFT ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA
(LIKO) FORMULA FOR DEFINING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
6. STRUCTURAL APPROACH. IT IS THE VIEW OF BOTH ALLIES
AND USDEL THAT THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL
COMMAND" IS REQUIRED TO PRESERVE OUR STRUCTURAL APPROACH
TO NOTIFICATION. WITHOUT SUCH A REFERENCE THE THRESHOLD
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WOULD LOSE ITS CURRENT REQUIREMENT FOR A RELATIONSHIP
AMONG THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITY. NATO ARGUMENTATION IN SUPPORT OF A STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLD WOULD BE DAMAGED BY THE ELIMINATION OF THIS
INTERRELATIONSHIP -- AS EXPRESSED BY THIS PHRASE.
MOREOVER, AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, CERTAIN ALLIES (E.G.,
FRG) STRONGLY PREFER THE NUMERICAL TO THE STRUCTURAL
ASPECT OF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AND WOULD USE U.S.
INSISTENCE ON REMOVAL OF THIS PHRASE AS ANOTHER REASON
TO PRESS FOR A "NUMBERS ONLY" SOLUTION.
7. "COMMON ACTIVITY" VS "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND."
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE STRUCTURAL
APPROACH, AS EXPRESSED ABOVE, USDEL IS CONVINCED THAT
ONE OF THESE PHRASES IS NECESSARY. IN ARGUING THE
RELATIVE MERITS OF "IN A COMMON ACTIVITY" OR "UNDER A
SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND," ALLIED DELS POINT OUT THAT
THE PROOF PROBLEM REGARDING SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE EXISTS
IN EITHER CASE. FURTHERMORE, UK DEL ARGUES THAT THE
PHRASE "COMMON ACTIVITY" COULD REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF
CPX'S LIKE WINTEX, WHEREAS "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL
COMMAND" WOULD NOT. ALLIES STRONGLY BELIEVE WINTEX
SHOULD NOT BE CAPTURED BY A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AND
WE AGREE. LASTLY, THE FRENCH HAVE RELUCTANTLY SUPPORTED
THE FOCUS ON BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS IN THE CURRENT NATO
APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION. IT IS THEIR VIEW THAT USE OF
THE PHRASE "COMMON ACTIVITY" STRENGTHENS THAT EQUATION;
THEREFORE, THEY STRONGLY PREFER TO USE THE PHRASE "UNDER
A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND." IN FACT, AS WILL BE
RECALLED, THEY WERE THE ONES TO INSIST THAT THE PRESENCE
OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD BE INSERTED INTO
OUR FORMULA IN DISCUSSIONS IN THE LAST ROUND; "UNDER A
SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" WAS A FALLBACK FOR THEM.
THEY HAVE REMINDED US OF THAT -- FORCEFULLY -- IN THE
CURRENT DISCUSSION.
8. USDEL WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REVIEW OF THE
CONCERNS EXPRESSED ABOVE AND STRONGLY SUGGESTS
MAINTAINING THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL
COMMAND" IN THE CURRENT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FORMULA.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
11/
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05549
SUBJECT: FRANCO-SOVIET BILATERAL
REF: STOCKHOLM 5343
1. XI - 051.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF THE SOVIET
CDE DELEGATION, UPON HIS RETURN FROM CONSULTATIONS IN
MOSCOW, MET WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO OUTLINE NEW
SOVIET POSITIONS ON CDE OUTCOME. GRINEVSKY TOLD THE
FRENCH HE WANTS RAPID PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF
NOTIFICATION BEFORE THE SUMMER BREAK, WHICH HE SAID
SHOULD BE POSTPONED AT LEAST ONE WEEK. HE SAID,
FURTHER, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO ACCEPT OUTLINES
OF FINAL AGREEMENT AS REPORTED REFTEL BUT HAVE
DIFFERENT FORMULATION FOR GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS.
GRINEVSKY ALSO PROVIDED FRENCH WITH FORMULA FOR
POSTPONEMENT OF ISSUES TO FURTHER STAGE OF CDE. END
SUMMARY.
4. UPON HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW, SOVIET AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH HEAD AND DEPUTY HEAD
OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO OUTLINE SOVIET POSITIONS ON
FINAL DOCUMENT AT STOCKHOLM. AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET
DEL MEMBER GENERAL TATARNIKOV WAS MEETING WITH SENIOR
FRG MOD DEL MEMBER, GENERAL SCHMIDBAUER. SOVIET AND
FRENCH DELEGATIONS HAVE AGREED THAT THEY ARE NOT ONLY
WILLING TO WORK BEYOND JULY 18, BUT THAT SUCH AN
INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK IS REQUIRED. GRINEVSKY
STATED HE NOT ONLY WANTS TO MAKE QUICK PROGRESS ON THE
OUTLINE OF A FINAL NOTIFICATION SECTION DURING THIS
PERIOD BUT ALSO WANTS TO AGREE ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR
GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS. (NOTE: IN THE WORKING GROUP
AB THIS AFTERNOON, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR MERELY
SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF EXTENDING THE CONFERENCE WORKING
SCHEDULE, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF AREAS OF
SUBSTANTIVE FLEXIBILITY, LET ALONE CHANGES IN THE
SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET POSITIONS. END NOTE)
AIR: SOVIETS WILL AGREE TO REPLACING THE FIRST SET
OF ELLIPSES IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH LAND
FORCES SO IT WOULD READ "THE ENGAGEMENT OF . . . OF
LAND FORCES" AND THE AIR PARAGRAPH WOULD BE AGREED TO
READ "THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES IN AN
EXERCISE/MANEUVER WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
NOTIFICATION" THUS CLEARLY MAKING AIR ACTIVITIES A
SUB-SET OF NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE ACTIVITIES. FRENCH
INFORMED GRINEVSKY THAT NO REFERENCE COULD BE MADE TO
EITHER EXERCISE OR MANEUVER IN THIS PARAGRAPH. SOVIETS
ALSO INDICATED THAT THEIR AIR SORTIE THRESHOLD COULD BE
700 SORTIES, OR JUST AS EASILY, 200 SORTIES.
GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS: GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT
THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT WE ARE SPEAKING OF
MULTI-DIVISIONAL EXERCISES IN THE CDE; TO THIS THE
113
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
FRENCH REPLIED THAT IT COULD NOT BE MULTI-DIVISIONAL
FOR THE WEST SINCE MANY WESTERN STATES, INCLUDING
FRANCE, DID EXERCISE WITH AN ENTIRE SINGLE DIVISION
ALONE. GRINEVSKY OFFERED TWO NEW FORMULAE FOR GROUND
FORCE PARAMETERS. EACH STARTS WITH THE APPROACH IN THE
NNA 13 JUNE FORMULA "THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE
SUBJECT TO . . . WHENEVER IT INVOLVES:" AND THEN
CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS:
A) -- TWO MOBILE COMBAT FORMATIONS OR UNITS
(THAT IS, TANK, MECHANISED INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE,
AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) AT THE
DIVISIONAL/BRIGADE/REGIMENTAL LEVEL WITH A TOTAL OF
. . . TROOPS
OR
B) -- . . . TROOPS AND MORE CORRESPONDING TO
TWO DIVISIONS WHOSE TYPE WOULD BE INCLUDED. FOR STATES
WITH STRUCTURES NOT INCLUDING DIVISIONS, THESE WOULD BE
THE CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS;
(COMMENT: GRINEVSKY ALSO NOTED THE POSSIBILITY OF
INCLUDING IN BOTH FORMULAE A PROVISION FOR MAIN BATTLE
TANKS, DEPENDING UPON THE ACTUAL FIGURES FOR BOTH
TROOPS AND TANKS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE
ABOVE LANGUAGE IS VERY PROVISIONAL, BEING TRANSLATED
FIRST FROM RUSSIAN TO FRENCH AND THEN TO ENGLISH. END
COMMENT)
MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS: GRINEVSKY CALLED THIS A VERY
IMPORTANT ISSUE AND SAID, IN RESPONSE TO FIRM FRENCH
STATEMENT, THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN ARMAMENTS,
ONLY IN THE TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL.
5. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CHAIRMAN'S
STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT
THAT EACH CDE DELEGATION HAS THE RIGHT TO RAISE (AT
SOME SUBSEQUENT CSCE MEETING) ANY AND ALL QUESTIONS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING MANDATE. AFTER A
CHAIRMAN'S STATEM ENT, DELEGATIONS WOULD PRESENT THEIR
OWN LIST OF ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.
(COMMENT: THE SOVIET LIST WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
CONTAIN BOTH INDEPENDENT AIR AND INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THE U.S. WOULD
REPLY BY SAYING THAT WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED AND
THAT STOCKHOLM COULD NOT PRESUME THAT FURTHER CDE/CSCE
MEETINGS WOULD, IN FACT, TAKE PLACE. END COMMENT)
6. SOVIETS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF A PASSIVE
QUOTA FOR INSPECTIONS WITH GRINEVSKY NOTING THAT THEY
COULD ACCEPT ONE OR TWO "INSPECTIONS" PER YEAR. HE
TOOK CARE TO STATE THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO
ENGAGE IN PRACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS MATTER, BUT
THAT IT WAS NONETHELESS NECESSARY TO BEGIN TO DRAFT
PRACTICAL ARRANGMENTS. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, THREE
PRECONDITIONS TO SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTIONS:
119
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
1) THE WEST MUST GIVE UP THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT;
2) INSPECTIONS CANNOT BE ROUTINE IN NATURE, THEY MUST
REFLECT EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND 3) THEY CANNOT
APPLY IN CLOSED AREAS. GRINEVSKY THEN NOTED EXAMPLES
OF "CLOSED AREAS", E.G., MILITARY BASES, INSTALLATIONS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05600
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE IN NON-USE OF FORCE
- WORKING GROUP
1. CDE XI - 052
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE U.S., WITH THE SUPPORT OF ITS
ALLIES, HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS TO
THE FOREFRONT OF DISCUSSION AND DRAFTING IN THE NON-USE
OF FORCE COFFEE GROUP. WE ARE INTRODUCING OUR HUMAN
RIGHTS TEXT AS A LOGICAL, INDEPENDENT, AND NONCONTROVER-
SIAL COMPONENT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THE EAST, HOWEVER,
WANTS TO POSTPONE THE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH
IT APPARENTLY PERCEIVES AS A SUBJECT FOR AN END GAME
TRADE OFF BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE."
THE NNA, WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT IS NOT DISSIMILAR TO
OUR OWN, HAS MAINTAINED A SPECTATOR'S ROLE THUS FAR, BUT
WE EXPECT THEM TO BE MORE SUPPORTIVE AS THE DISCUSSION
PROGRESSES. END SUMMARY.
4. THE SITUATION: DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS THE WEST
HAS INITIATED DISCUSSION AND ATTEMPTED TO DRAFT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE NUF COFFEE GROUP. THE WEST HAS RELATED THE
DISCUSSION, WHICH IS BASED ON OUR HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT, TO
THE COMMITMENT TO THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT.
THE WEST HAS ARGUED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A VITAL COMPO-
NEN' OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE.
THE EAST, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS OPPOSED THE WESTERN
LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE PRIVATELY SAYING IT MIGHT
ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN EXCHANGE FOR A
PASSAGE ON "MILITARY FORCE." AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR LOIBL,
THE COORDINATOR OF THE GROUP, HAS TENDED TO EQUATE THESE
TWO SUBJECTS. WE HAVE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THIS
LINKAGE AND HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN
IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL NUF COMPONENT SEPARATE FROM
"MILITARY FORCE."
5. EASTERN TACTICS: WHILE THE EAST HAS YET TO RAISE
SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO OUR HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT, IT WANTS
TO DELAY DRAFTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS UNTIL THE COFFEE GROUP
HAS RUN THROUGH ALL THE OTHER NUF TEXTS. THE EAST
PRESUMABLY WANTS TO DELAY HUMAN RIGHTS DRAFTING IN ORDER
TO SET IT UP AGAINST "MILITARY FORCE" IN AN END GAME
TRADE OFF. LAST WEEK THE EAST TABLED A PROPOSAL TO
SIMPLY LIST ALL OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES. IN OUR VIEW,
THIS ENUMERATION, WHICH OF COURSE WOULD INCLUDE THE
HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE, WAS INTENDED, INTER ALIA, TO
SUBSUME A FUTURE AND INDEPENDENT PASSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
6. THE EAST HAS ALSO INTRODUCED A TEXT WHICH IT LABELS
AS ITS HUMAN RIGHTS CONTRIBUTION:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THAT ACTS OF
AGGRESSION ESPECIALLY INVOLVING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT CONSTITUTE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
PARTICULAR THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY."
BEGIN COMMENT: WE VIEW THIS AS A TACTICAL MOVE TO LINK
HUMAN RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE." IT HAS NO CHANCE OF
BEING ACCEPTED. END COMMENT.
7. WESTERN APPROACH: THE U.S., SUPPORTED BY ALLIES, HAS
TAKEN THE LEAD IN THE DISCUSSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ARE
PRESENTING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AS A LOGICAL AND NONCON-
TROVERSIAL INGREDIENT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. IN OUR VIEW,
IF A COUNTRY RESPECTS AND OBSERVES HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, IT WILL BE LESS INCLINED TO USE OR
THREATEN TO USE FORCE. SEVERAL OF THE NNA MEMBERS HAVE
SUPPORTED THIS PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH. IN ADDITION, WE
HAVE ARGUED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS HIGH-
LIGHTED IN THE FINAL ACT AND IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF BOTH
THE WESTERN AND NNA APPROACH. OUR HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE,
MOREOVER, HAS MERIT ON ITS OWN AND SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO
OTHER ISSUES, PARTICULARLY "MILITARY FORCE." THE WEST
HAS FIRMLY REJECTED THE EAST'S ATTEMPTS TO EQUATE HUMAN
RIGHTS WITH "MILITARY FORCE;" WE REFUSE TO DISCUSS HUMAN
RIGHTS IN TERMS OF AN "ULTIMATE" TRADE OFF WITH "MILITARY
FORCE."
8. NNA APPROACH: A LOW PROFILE HAS CHARACTERIZED THE
NNA'S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS THUS FAR. IN OUR VIEW,
THE NNA COUNTRIES HAVE REMAINED QUIET IN ORDER TO AVOID
ENTANGLEMENT IN A POTENTIAL EAST-WEST CONTROVERSY. WE
REMAIN CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE NNA, PARTICULARLY
THE SWISS, WILL PROVIDE THE WEST WITH SUPPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, GIVEN THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A KEY ASPECT TO THEIR
APPROACH. FURTHERMORE, THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT PUT FORWARD
BY THE WEST IS NOT DISSIMILAR TO THE NNA'S OWN HUMAN
RIGHTS TEXT.
9. GIVEN THAT THE EAST INTENDS TO HOLD HUMAN RIGHTS
LANGUAGE HOSTAGE TO OUR ACCEPTANCE OF MILITARY FORCE, WE
HAVE SEVERAL OPTIONS TO CONSIDER. IN ITS QUEST TO LINK
HUMAN RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE," THE EAST SEEMS TO
PREFER A POSITIVE-POSITIVE TRADE OFF. THAT IS, IT FAVORS
A TRADE OFF WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE INCLUSION OF BOTH
"MILITARY FORCE" AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A FINAL NUF
DOCUMENT. THE WEST, HOWEVER, IS AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY
OF A NEGATIVE-NEGATIVE TRADE OFF IN WHICH BOTH HUMAN
RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE" WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM A
FINAL DOCUMENT. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO FIGHT
OVER LINKAGE, BUT WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER THE
FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
-- IN THE END GAME, ARE WE WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME
REFERENCE TO "MILITARY FORCE" IN RETURN FOR A HUMAN
RIGHTS SECTION? (IF SO, WHAT SORT OF REFERENCE TO
"MILITARY FORCE?")
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
-- IN OTHER WORDS, CAN WE ACCEPT EITHER A NEGATIVE-
NEGATIVE OR POSITIVE-POSITIVE TRADE OFF BETWEEN HUMAN
RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE?"
-- DO OTHER OPTIONS EXIST, SUCH AS SOME ALLUSION TO
"MILITARY FORCE," E.G. THE REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCES"
IN THE FINAL ACT, IN EXCHANGE FOR EASTERN CONCESSIONS ON
ISSUES IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS?
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
123
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05704
SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
1. CDE XI - 053
2. FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FOR
OPENING OF ROUND XII.
3. BEGIN STATEMENT: AFTER TWO AND A HALF YEARS, THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) BEGINS ITS
TWELFTH AND FINAL SESSION ON AUGUST 19. IT MUST
COMPLETE ITS WORK BY SEPTEMBER 19.
ALTHOUGH VERY INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON KEY ISSUES ARE
STILL REQUIRED, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE
CONFERENCE CAN REACH ITS OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING
PRACTICAL, CONCRETE MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF
MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. TO MEET THIS
OBJECTIVE, THE CDE MUST ADOPT MEASURES TO CREATE A
COMPREHENSIVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME FOR THE
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION AND THE FORECASTING,
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
AS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AREAS, THE
MEASURES MUST PROVIDE THE MEANS TO ASSURE ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES THAT THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ARE
LIVING UP TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARRANGEMENT; THAT
IS, THEY MUST BE VERIFIABLE. IN THE CDE CONTEXT,
ADEQUATE VERIFICATION CAN ONLY COME FROM INSPECTION OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH CAST DOUBT ON COMPLIANCE.
THE UNITED STATES PLACES THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON
REACHING A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT RESULT IN STOCKHOLM,
BECAUSE THE IMPLICATIONS TRANSCEND THE FATE OF A SINGLE
CONFERENCE. IN THE MILITARY FIELD, SUCCESS IN CDE
WOULD CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO A MORE PREDICTABLE AND
STABLE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE AND, THUS, HELP TO
INCREASE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD.
FURTHERMORE, CDE COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FUTURE,
PERHAPS MORE AMBITIOUS, STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTIONS AS
WELL AS IN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING EFFORTS. MORE BROADLY,
SUCCESS IN CDE SHOULD GIVE AN IMPORTANT IMPULSE TO THE
HELSINKI PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
THE CSCE, OF WHICH CDE IS AN INTEGRAL PART, AND THUS
CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP
OVERALL.
AS HE RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM FOR THE FINAL DAYS OF
NEGOTIATIONS, AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE
U.S. DELEGATION TO CDE, HAS THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT IN SEEKING A FINAL DOCUMENT WHICH MEETS THE
STRINGENT OBJECTIVES WE HAVE PURSUED DURING THE PAST
YEARS, AND WHICH WE WERE CHARGED WITH ACHIEVING IN THE
CONFERENCE'S MANDATE. END STATEMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05599
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE NOTED IN NOTIFICATION WORKING
GROUP
1. CDE XI - 054.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WAS PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN
THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP (B-1) ON JULY 15:
BEGIN TEXT.
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS
(1) LANDING . . . (2) IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO . . . (3)
WHENEVER THIS LANDING . . (2) INVOLVES AT LEAST
...(4)
END TEXT.
4. FOOTNOTES. INTERNAL ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDING IS THAT
LANGUAGE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WILL FILL IN THE
ELLIPSES:
-- (1) ASSAULT
-- (2) AN APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO AN AIRBORNE DROP,
SHOULD THE ALLIANCE AGREE TO ACCEPT ANY AIRBORNE
REFERENCE.
-- (3) NOTIFICATION
-- (4) PARAMETERS, I.E., 3 BATTALIONS OR 3,000 TROOPS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
125
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 05591
SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, JULY 14, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 5469
1. CDE XI - 055
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE WORKING GROUP AB MEETING,
FRANCE AND THE USSR MENTIONED THE "POSITIVE" RESULTS OF
MITTERAND'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, BUT NEITHER DELEGATION
OFFERED SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON THE TRIP. THE SOVIET
LACK OF SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON NOTIFICATION AND VERIFI-
CATION WAS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTING, GIVEN THEIR
PRIVATE COMMENTS TO THE FRENCH (REFTEL). NONETHELESS,
FRANCE "APPEALED" TO PARTICIPANTS TO VOLUNTARILY HOLD
"INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS" DURING THE BREAK WITHOUT CHANGING
THE CDE WORK CALENDAR. THE SOVIETS, POLES, AND SWEDES
ENDORSED THE FRENCH "APPEAL." WHILE THE U.S. WELCOMED
MITTERAND'S TRIP, U.S. AMBASSADOR BARRY VOICED DISAP-
POINTMENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT ELABORATED SOLUTIONS
TO THE NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK; HE SUGGESTED INTENSIFICATION
OF WORK TO DEFINE AND DRAFT INSPECTION AND ITS MODALITIES
DURING THIS WEEK; IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS THERE IS LITTLE
REASON TO EXTEND THIS SESSION. PORTUGAL, ITALY, FRG AND
THE NETHERLANDS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER LACK OF
SUBSTANTIVE SUGGESTIONS FROM THE SOVIETS. MALTA AND
CYPRUS OPPOSED EXTENDING WORK AS THE FRENCH SUGGESTED.
IN PREPARED COMMENTS, SPAIN REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF
INSPECTION BUT ALSO DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY IN ITS USE AND
MODALITIES, WHICH WAS WELCOMED BY SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA AND
THE SOVIETS. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) NOTED THE PARTICULAR
INTEREST PAID TO CDE AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING
MITTERAND'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, WHICH HAS GIVEN "CAUSE FOR
OPTIMISM." STRESSING THAT WE MUST NOW REALISTICALLY
ASSESS THE SCOPE OF OUR TASK, HE "APPEALED" TO PARTICI-
PANTS TO WORK THROUGH THE BREAK, I.E., "INFORMAL CONSUL-
TATIONS" WITHOUT A CHANGE TO THE CDE CALENDAR. HE ARGUED
THAT SUCH VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF WORK WOULD NOT SERVE AS
A PRECEDENT VIS-A-VIS THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF FOR THE
CONFERENCE, SINCE ANY DECISIONS UNDERTAKEN DURING THE
BREAK WOULD HAVE TO BE REGISTERED DURING THE SESSION
WHICH BEGINS ON AUGUST 19.
5. LIKE THE FRENCH, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (USSR) REFERRED
TO THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF MITTERAND'S TRIP WITHOUT
OFFERING SPECIFICS. HE CALLED FOR "RESPONSIBLE FLEXIBI-
LITY" ON A "RECIPROCAL BASIS" TO RESOLVE THE "FOUR OR
FIVE KEY QUESTIONS" WHICH DEADLOCK THE CONFERENCE. IN
THIS CONTEXT, HE URGED AN INTENSIFICATION OF WORK DURING
THE LAST WEEK OF THE CURRENT SESSION. HE ALSO ANNOUNCED
THAT HIS "DELEGATION WILL REMAIN IN STOCKHOLM TO WORK
126
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT CAN AND WISH TO HOLD INFORMAL
CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS" DURING THE BREAK. GRINEVSKY
OFFERED NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON NOTIFICATION AND
VERIFICATION AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED TO THE FRENCH.
6. AMBASSADOR BARRY WELCOMED THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF
MITTERAND'S TRIP. ALTHOUGH HE INDICATED READINESS TO
INTENSIFY WORK, HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING --
IN SUBSTANTIVE TERMS -- WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SUCH
WORK. ALLUDING TO THE FACT THAT GRINEVSKY OFFERED NO
NEW PROPOSALS, HE AGAIN ASKED THE SOVIETS: "WHERE'S THE
BEEF?" CITING RECENT STATEMENTS BY MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN
GERASIMOV ON INSPECTION IN CONTEXT OF CSBM'S, BARRY
SUGGESTED THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES HAD NOW ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF INCLUDING
INSPECTIONS IN A CSBM REGIME HERE IN STOCKHOLM. IT WAS
TIME TO DEFINE AND DRAFT AN INSPECTION REGIME TO MAKE IT
"A TRULY EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF VERIFICATION." THIS
SHOULD INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE: 1) NUMBER, DURATION, AND
TIMING OF INSPECTION; 2) SIZE OF INSPECTION TEAMS;
3) AREAS FOR INSPECTION AND "OFF LIMITS AREAS," AND
4) IMPORTANT MODALITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR, LOGISTICAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE.
7. NATO ALLIES (ITALY, FRG, PORTUGAL) ALSO EXPRESSED
THEIR DISAPPONTMENT OVER THE LACK OF SUBSTANCE IN THE
SOVIET STATEMENT. THEY QUESTIONED WHETHER EXTENSION OF
WORK WOULD BE USEFUL WITHOUT AN INDICATION THE TIME WOULD
BE SPENT PRODUCTIVELY. AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO (ITALY)
ASKED POINT BLANK WHETHER GRINEVSKY WOULD "TELL US WIICH
CONCESSIONS WOULD BE MADE," OR PROVIDE "A RESPONSE TO
NATO'S JUNE 30 STATEMENT." GRINEVSKY REPLIED THAT THE
USSR IS PREPARED TO MAKE "MUTUAL CONCESSIONS." THE
NETHERLANDS RAISED PROCEDURAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE FRENCH
IDEA.
8. BOTH MALTA AND CYPRUS OPPOSED THE WORK EXTENSION ON
PROCEDURAL, PRECEDENTIAL, AND LEGAL GROUNDS. AMBASSADOR
GAUCI (MALTA) ARGUED SOMEWHAT BITTERLY THAT CDE MUST
"STICK TO DECISIONS AND PROJECTIONS MADE." AMBASSADOR
PAPADOPOULOS (CYPRUS) QUESTIONED THE FRENCH "APPEAL" WITH
SEVERAL QUESTIONS: 1) WHO PAYS THE COSTS? 2) SHOULD
THERE NOT BE A PROCEDURAL DECISION TO MAKE SUCH A CHANGE
TO THE WORK CALENDAR? 3) WHAT IS THE STATUS AND LEGALITY
OF SUCH AN EXTENSION? 4) WOULD IT SERVE AS A PRECEDENT,
PAR'ICULARLY IN TERMS OF THE SEPTEMBER 19 ENDING OF THE
CONFERENCE?
9. AMBASSADOR ALLENDESALAZAR EXPOUNDED SPANISH IDEAS ON
THE ROLE OF "ON-SITE VERIFICATION" (OSV) IN A CDE
AGREEMENT. WELCOMING SOVIET STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO
ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION IN CDE, HE STRESSED
THAT CSBM'S WOULD BE INCOMPLETE WITHOUT OSV. HOWEVER,
HE DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF INSPECTION,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
JGVAG 1
MAKING THREE MAIN POINTS IN THIS REGARD: 1) USE OF OSV
SHOULD NOT BE FREQUENT. EXPERIENCE MUST BE GAINED IN ITS
USE TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE BUILDING. THUS ESTABLISHMENT
OF A "NUMERICAL LIMITATION" (PASSIVE QUOTA) ON OSV SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED. 2) TOO-FREQUENT USE OF OSV WOULD "MAKE IT
UNACCEPTABLE." THUS OSV SHOULD ONLY BE USED IN "SERIOUS
SITUATIONS" SO AS NOT TO RENDER THE MEASURE "TRIVIAL."
WE MUST DEFINE A SERIES OF ELEMENTS WHICH GIVE RISE TO
SUSPICION OF A GRAVE FAILURE TO FULFILL CSBM'S. 3) OSV
SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD "MULTILATERALLY," THUS HINTING AT A
NEUTRAL ROLE IN OSV. (BEGIN COMMENT: THE SPANISH
STATEMENT, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS NOT CLEARED IN THE
CAUCUS, REFLECTS THE READINESS OF CERTAIN ALLIES TO MOVE
OFF ESTABLISHED POSITIONS AND THE SPANISH TENDENCY TO
ACT AS A LAST-MINUTE MEDIATOR A LA MADRID 1983. END
COMMENT.) SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE USSR WELCOMED THE
SPANISH STATEMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 05710
SUBJECT: CDE: RESTRICTED AREAS
1. CDE XI - 056.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. U.S. DEL HAS CONSULTED WITH KEY ALLIES
WITH THE VIEW TO RESOLVING THE RESTRICTED AREAS ISSUE
IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INSPECTION MEASURE. U.S. DEL
SEEKS WASHINGTON APPROVAL (SEE PARA 5) TO USE PROPOSED
SOLUTION (SEE PARAS 7 AND 8) IN EXPANDED CONSULTATIONS
WITH OTHER ALLIES. END SUMMARY.
4. AS NOTED REFTEL, ONE OF THE KEYS TO GAINING SOVIET
ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION LIES IN RESOLVING THE QUESTION
OF AREAS TO BE EXCLUDED FROM SUCH INSPECTIONS, I.E.
EXCLUSIONS, EXCEPTIONS, RESTRICTED AREAS. U.S. DEL HAS
CONSULTED WITH KEY ALLIES IN STOCKHOLM, INCLUDING
TURKEY, WITH A VIEW TO FINDING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD
SERVE TWO PURPOSES: (1) MEET ALLIANCE SECURITY
CONCERNS AND, (2) AT THE SAME TIME, NOT PROVIDE THE
EAST WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXEMPT VAST PORTIONS OF
ITS TERRITORY THUS RENDERING INSPECTION ESSENTIALLY
USELESS. A RELATED OBJECTIVE IS OUR DESIRE TO ENSURE
THAT WHATEVER FORMULATION WE ARRIVE AT IS NOT PRESENTED
IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PROVIDE "GROUNDS" FOR REFUSAL OF AN
INSPgTION REQUEST. IN PRACTICE, OF COURSE, IT WILL BE
HARD TO GET AROUND THE FACT THAT IF AN AREA IS EXCLUDED
FROM AN INSPECTION, INSPECTION OF THAT AREA CAN BE
REFUSED. WE TOOK AS A GIVEN IN OUR CONSULTATIONS THAT
EXCEPTIONS AS AGREED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED/ MEASURE 5 WOULD
APPLY IN ANY EVENT, AND FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE OF
ADDITIONAL RESTRICTED AREAS. IN OUR CONSULTATIONS, THE
FOLLOWING KEY POSITIONS WERE IDENTIFIED:
-- FRG. FOR THE PURPOSES OF CSBMS, THE FRG HAS MOVED
BACK TO A "PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREA" CONCEPT. THESE
AREAS, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED IN NORMAL
PEACETIME SITUATIONS. RESTRICTIONS WOULD ONLY BE
INVOKED AND APPLIED DURING A CRISIS. THE FRG WANTS TO
EXCHANGE A LIST WITH OTHER CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES OF
SUCH AREAS, WITH THE INDICATION THAT UNDER NORMAL
CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AREAS WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED.
AREAS TO BE TREATED IN THIS WAY ARE NOT NECESSARILY
BORDER AREAS, BUT COULD INCLUDE SUCH POINTS AS TOWNS OR
TRAINING AREAS, WHICH WOULD NOT FALL INTO THE CATEGORY
OF MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS. FRG DELEGATION DOES NOT YET
HAVE AN INDICATION FROM BONN CONCERNING THE PERCENTAGE
OF FRG TERRITORY THAT WOULD FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY,
BUT BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN TEN
PERCENT.
FRANCE. FRANCE DOES NOT WANT PERMANENT RESTRICTED
AREAS, AND PARIS REJECTS THE IDEA OF EXCHANGING ANY
LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS. FRANCE DOES, HOWEVER,
DEMAND THAT A "SENSITIVE POINTS" CONCEPT--- SMALL
129
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
AREAS, WHICH COULD BE INVOKED AS
OFF-LIMITS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, BE ADDED TO THE
AGREED MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS.
-- TURKEY. TURKEY HAS, IN PRACTICE, BOTH PERMANENTLY
RESTRICTED AREAS AND A REQUIREMENT FOR TEMPORARILY
RESTRICTED AREAS. PERMANENT AREAS INCLUDE THE BORDER
REGIONS, APPROXIMATELY 5-10 KMS WIDE, AS WELL AS SOME
AREAS THAT WOULD FALL UNDER THE MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS,
SUCH AS DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS (APPROXIMATELY 10 PERCENT
OF TOTAL TURKISH TERRITORY). THEY ARTICULATE A
REQUIREMENT FOR UP TO 5 PERCENT TEMPORARY RESTRICTED
AREAS, WHICH COULD BE INVOKED UNDER VARIABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES AND COULD INCLUDE POINTS SUCH AS TOWNS,
AS WELL AS AREAS INCLUDED UNDER THE MEASURE 5
EXCEPTIONS.
-- NORWAY. NORWAY HAS TWO LARGE RESTRICTED AREAS,
WHICH SURROUND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND THEREFORE
WHICH MIGHT WELL FALL UNDER THE MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS.
NORWEGIAN COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, HAVE THE RIGHT TO INVOKE
A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA AT ANY TIME THEY DEEM
ADVISABLE AND, ACCORDING TO OUR NORWEGIAN CONTACT, SUCH
AREAS COULD INCLUDE TRAINING AREAS AND PUBLIC TERRAIN.
WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL PRESENT AN OBSTACLE
TQ_3OLVING THE PROBLEM, IF WE CAN FIND A WAY TO MEET
FRG, TURKISH, AND FRENCH CONCERNS.
--UK. THE UK POSITION IS VERY MUCH LIKE OUR OWN. THEY
DO NOT LIKE THE RESTRICTED AREA CONCEPT, NOR DO THEY
FAVOR AN EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF SUCH AREAS.
5. BASED ON THESE CONSULTATIONS WE, IN CONCERT WITH
KEY ALLIES (NOT NORWAY, HOWEVER), HAVE DEVELOPED THE
FOLLOWING FORMULA AS ONE THAT MIGHT MEET RESPECTIVE
CONCERNS, AND HAVE AGREED TO CONSULT WITH AUTHORITIES
ABOUT IT. WHILE NO COMMITMENTS TO THIS POSSIBLE
SOLUTION HAVE BEEN MADE, U.S. DEL BELIEVES IT SERVES
OUR PURPOSES AND WILL USE IT, ALONG WITH THE ATTACHED
COMMENTS, AS A BASIS FOR EXPANDED CONSULTATIONS WITH
OTHER ALLIES.
6. PLEASE NOTE: TURKISH DEPREP HAS MADE NO COMMITMENT
TO AND, INDEED NO COMMENTS ON, THE FORMULA ONE WAY OR
ANOTHER. HE INTENDS TO PURSUE CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS
AUTHORITIES IN PERSON IN ANKARA OVER THE BREAK BETWEEN
ROUNDS; WE WOULD THUS PREFER TO HANDLE THIS WITH
TURKISH DEPREP HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND WOULD THEREFORE
REQUEST THAT THIS ISSUE NOT BE RAISED AT THIS POINT BY
US WITH TURKISH AUTHORITIES IN ANKARA, NATO, OR
ELSEWHERE.
7. PROPOSED TEXT AND EXPLANATORY COMMENTS FOLLOW.
THIS TEXT IS DESIGNED AS A REPLACEMENT FOR EXISTING
PARAS 6 AND 7 IN MEASURE 5 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND IS, TO
THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, BASED ON TEXTS ALREADY
PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE WORKING GROUP.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
BEGIN TEXT.
AREA FOR INSPECTION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING
COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CSBMS, AN INSPECTING STATE IS
PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION
IS TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A
PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A
"DESIGNATED AREA." THE DESIGNATED AREA WILL INCLUDE,
INTER ALIA, TRAINING AREAS AND PUBLIC TERRAIN WHERE
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN BE CONDUCTED.
EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS IN THE DESIGNATED AREA, TO
WHICH ACCESS BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS NORMALLY
RESTRICTED OR DENIED, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE
PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY.
END TEXT.
8. COMMENTS :
U.S. DEL BASED ITS THINKING IN FORMULATING THE ABOVE
TEXT ON CERTAIN BASIC ASSUMPTIONS, WHICH FOLLOW:
-- A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY CANNOT TAKE PLACE IN
NAVAL VESSELS, MILITARY VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT, ETC.; IT IS
NOT CONCEIVABLE TO THINK THAT SUCH AN EXERCISE COULD
TAKE PLACE WITHIN DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS EXCEPT
TRAINING AREAS), NAVAL BASES, DOCKYARDS, GARRISONS,
.-_-MILITARY AIRFIELDS, FIRING RANGES, ETC.; AND EVEN MORE
ABSURD TO THINK THAT AN ACTIVITY (OF AT LEAST 10,000
MEN) COULD OCCUR IN DEFENSE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT OR
PRODUCTION ESTABLISHMENTS.
-- ALL OF THE ABOVE CAN BE COVERED BY THE CONCEPT OF
SENSITIVE POINTS.
-- IMPLICIT IS THE IDEA THAT THE HOST STATE WILL
IDENTIFY ANY SENSITIVE POINTS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED
AREA AT THE TIME IT ACCEDES TO THE REQUEST OR DURING
ACTUAL INSPECTION.
-- THIS FORMULA ASSUMES THAT A DIVISION LEVEL EXERCISE
WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED IN A RESTRICTED AREA AT OR NEAR
THE BORDER, I.E., WITHIN 5-10 KILOMETERS. ALTHOUGH WE
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS, NOT
PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY PER SE, COULD BE
CONCENTRATED ON A BORDER AREA FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL
OR MILITARY INTIMIDATION.
-- IN PERIODS OF CRISIS (WHICH IS A CONTINGENCY ONE
HOPES WILL NEVER HAPPEN AND WHICH COULD, IN ANY CASE
SPELL THE END OF CSBMS), TWO OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN:
(1) REFUSE INSPECTION AND INCUR A POLITICAL PENALTY,
E.G. THE SUSPENSION OF CSBMS OBLIGATIONS AND THE
POSSIBLE CONVENING OF AN AD HOC CSCE BODY TO DETERMINE
STATUS OF CDE OBLIGATIONS;
(2) TO EXTEND THE CONCEPT OF "SENSITIVE POINTS" TO
THAT OF "SENSITIVE AREAS." SENSITIVE AREAS IS A MUCH
BROADER CONCEPT AND COULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE THE
PERMANENT/TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREA CONCEPT, I.E.,
131
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THE NAMING OF PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH WOULD
BECOME EFFECTIVE ONLY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
-- THE CONCEPT OF PROVIDING LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS
OR OF ALLOWING A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF A NATIONAL
TERRITORY TO BE CLASSIFIED AS RESTRICTED WOULD ALLOW
THE EAST TO ESTABLISH RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH WOULD
NULLIFY ANY INSPECTION.
-- IF RESTRICTED AREAS ARE REQUIRED IN A FINAL
AGREEMENT, THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE THE ONES WHO DEMAND
THEM, LEST WE WEAKEN OUR OWN TACTICAL POSITION ON THE
NEED FOR THE RIGHT TO INSPECT.
9. SOVIET POSITION: IN INFORMAL AND INDIRECT CONTACT
WITH THE SOVIETS, WE GATHER THEIR POSITION ON
RESTRICTED AREAS MIGHT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ABOVE;
-- THEY DO NOT WANT TO DESIGNATE RESTRICTED AREAS OR
AGREE TO A PERCENTAGE LIMITATION
-- NOR DO THEY WANT TO LIST "SENSITIVE POINTS"
-- THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, DENY A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION
OF A "SENSITIVE POINT"
-- SC-1'S APPROACH TO THE "EXCEPTION" PROBLEM IS "NOT
TOO BAD"
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05632
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE ON NOTIFYING LAND FORCE
ACTIVITIES NOTED IN NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, JULY
16, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 5599
1. CDE XI - 057.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. LATE NIGHT MEETING ON JULY 15 LED TO AGREEMENT ON A
TEXT DEFINING LAND FORCE ACTIVITIES AS A TYPE OF
MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE NOTIFIED. REFERENCE TO
PARTICIPATING" AIR FORCES MAKES IT UNAMBIGUOUSLY CLEAR
THAT INFORMATION ON AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THE LAND FORCE NOTIFICATION, BUT THAT AIR
FORCE ACTIVITY WILL NOT TRIGGER A NOTIFICATION, NOR
REQUIRE SEPARATE NOTIFICATION. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF
THIS TEXT ("THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHENEVER . . .") SERVES AS THE LEAD IN TO
RELATED PARAMETERS TRIGGERING A LAND FORCE
NOTIFICATION, WHICH HAVE YET TO BE RESOLVED. THIS TEXT
WOULD PRECEDE THAT ALREADY NOTED ON AMPHIBIOUS LANDING
(REFTEL) IN A FINAL DOCUMENT. THIS TEXT, NOTED IN A
JULY 16 MEETING OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP
(B-1), READS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT.
THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES (ASTERISK)
OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES . . . CONDUCTED UNDER A
SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN
COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WHENEVER .
THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING
STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS
FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY . . . OR
MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL
BE FLOWN.
(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES
INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
133
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05629
SUBJ: FRG DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 5363; B. STOCKHOLM 55L0
1. CDE XII - 58
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: IN NATO CAUCUS TODAY, US WILL SUPPORT FRG
PROPOSAL FOR A DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS LATER THIS WEEK ON
OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN CDE. OUR MAIN CONCERN IS TO
HEAD OFF ANY FRG INCLINATION TO USE GENSCHER'S VISIT
TO MOSCOW FOR MORE RADICAL INITIATIVES. SUBSTANTIVE
POSITIONS CONTAINED IN DEMARCHE MEET US REQUIREMENTS;
IT IS TO OUR TACTICAL ADVANTAGE TO PIN DOWN UK
READINESS TO GIVE UP ON INDEPENDENT INFORMATION IN
RETURN FOR INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. END
SUMMARY.
4. IN THE NATO CAUCUS TODAY (7/16) US WILL JOIN
CONSENSUS ON THE FRG PROPOSAL FOR A DEMARCHE TO THE
SOVIETS THIS WEEK ON SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE
CONFERENCE (REFS). USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE UPCOMING
GENSCHER VISIT TO MOSCOW (7/20 - 7/22) FAVORS OUR
SUPPORTING FRG NOW ON THIS SPECIFIC INITIATIVE, WHICH
WE KNOW ABOUT AND CAN INFLUENCE. WITHOUT A
COORDINATED INITIATIVE IN STOCKHOLM, THE FRG WOULD BE
INCLINED TO ATTEMPT A UNILATERAL AND PROBABLY LESS
ACCEPTABLE PLAY IN MOSCOW.
5. IN ADDITION, USDEL BELIEVES THAT ANOTHER WESTERN
INIITIATIVE GIVES NATO ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE. IT WILL
PUT GREATER PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO RESPOND TO OUR
DEMANDS FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR
POSITIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FRG
DEMARCHE CONTAINS LITTLE NEWS: EVEN THE IDEAS OF
..PASSIVE QUOTAS AND NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT VIS-A-VIS
INSPECTION HAVE BEEN STIRRING IN THE CDE RUMOR MILL.
6. SUBSTANTIVELY, THE POSITIONS IN THE DEMARCHE ARE
IN KEEPING WITH USG POSITIONS.
7. THE FRG WILL MAKE THE POINTS CONTAINED IN REF A
ORALLY TO THE SOVIET, PROBABLY TOMORROW (7/17).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05676
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ON THE JUNE 30 NATO
CDE INITIATIVE
REF: SOFIA 2968
1. CDE XI - 059
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY SOFIA'S SUGGESTION (REFTEL)
FOR A SEPARATE DEMARCHE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS ON
NATO'S JUNE 30 CDE INITIATIVE IN ADDITION TO BROADER
CSCE BRIEFINGS IN PREPARATION FOR VIENNA. IN PREPARING
SUCH AN APPROACH, YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:
ON JUNE 30, NATO INTRODUCED A MAJOR INITIATIVE AT
THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) DESIGNED TO
HELP UNBLOCK THE CONFERENCE AND CONTRIBUTE TO AN
AGREEMENT WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONFERENCE'S
MANDATE, CAN HELP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND
REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.
THE INITIATIVE IDENTIFIED AREAS OF NEW FLEXIBILITY
IN NATO'S POSITION ON THE MAJOR UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
BEFORE THE CONFERENCE: NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND
VERIFICATION.
IN THE AREA OF NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES, WHICH HAS OFTEN BEEN DESCRIBED AS THE CORE
OF A CDE AGREEMENT, 'HE ALLIANCE MADE A SIGNIFICANT
DEPARTURE FROM THE POSITION ESTABLISHED IN
SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
-- ON THE KEY QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF GROUND
FORCE THRESHOLDS, NATO HAS ACCEPTED AS THE BASIS FOR
DRAFTING THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES' (NNA)
PROPOSAL OF JUNE 13, WHICH COMBINES OUR PREFERRED
EMPHASIS ON A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, WITH THE WARSAW
PACT'S EMPHASIS ON MANPOWER AND THE NNA'S APPROACH
FOCUSING ON MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER.
IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD
RESULT IN AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS PER YEAR,
THE ALLIANCE ALSO INDICATED THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO
RAISE ITS PROPOSAL FOR THE NUMERICAL ELEMENT IN THIS
THRESHOLD BEYOND OUR CURRENT FIGURE OF 6,000 TROOPS.
FURTHER, WE ALSO EXPRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO DROP
OUR PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES
IF OTHERS, IN TURN, WILL DEMONSTRATE SIMILAR CONSIDERA-
TION FOR OUR CONCERNS IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS.
ON THE VITAL ISSUE OF VERIFICATION, IT REMAINS OUR
VIEW THAT INSPECTION MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY CDE
AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE, HOWEVER, TO CONCERNS WHICH HAVE
BEEN EXPRESSED BY SOME PARTICIPANTS, EMPHASIZING THE
BURDEN REPRESENTED BY OUR PROPOSAL TO ALLOW EACH PARTICI-
135
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
PATING STATE TO CONDUCT TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR, WE HAVE
INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INSPEC-
TIONS EACH STATE IS ENTITLED TO CARRY OUT FROM TWO TO
ONE. BUT IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE INSPECTION PROVISIONS
CANNOT BY IMPAIRED BY ANY ESCAPE CLAUSE OR BY FAULTY
MODALITIES WHICH WOULD RENDER INSPECTION MEANINGLESS.
-- IN THE AREA OF OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES,
NATO HAS INDICATED NEW FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF
DURATION OF OBSERVATION. ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO
BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE ALL NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES FROM THEIR BEGINNING TO END WOULD
CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE HELSINK FINAL ACT, WE HAVE RECOGNIZED
THE LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF MANY REGARDING
THIS APPROACH. THEREFORE, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A
LIMITATION ON THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION BOTH AS FAR AS
ITS STARTING AND ENDING DATES ARE CONCERNED. WE EXPECT
SUCH A LIMITATION TO ENABLE ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO
AGREE TO A LOW THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION.
-- NATO HAS TAKEN THESE SIGNIFICANT STEPS IN ANTICI-
PATION THAT OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS, INCLUDING YOUR
GOVERNMENT, WILL SHOW MATCHING MOVEMENT. IN THIS REGARD,
WE WELCOME THE EASTERN DECISION TO JOIN US IN RESOLVING
THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING
COMMON GROUND.
-- MORE IS NEEDED. ONLY AN ACCELERATED AND SUBSTANTIVE
GIVE-AND-TAKE PROCESS CAN LEAD TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME
IN STOCKHOLM BY SEPTEMBER 19. WE HOPE THAT YOUR
GOVERNMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SUCH A PROCESS
DURING THE FINAL SESSION OF THE CDE.
IN THIS REGARD, WE MUST BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO DEVELOP
EFFECTIVE MODALITIES FOR INSPECTION WITHOUT A RIGHT OF
REFUSAL. WHILE WE WELCOME THE RECENT SOVIET STATEMENT
IN STOCKHOLM ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AS
APPROPRIATE FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH CSBM'S -- THE
PRINCIPLE IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST AGREE TO IMPLEMENT
INSPECTION AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PACKAGE OF
MEASURES TO BE AGREED IN STOCKHOLM.
-- RECENTLY THE STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION
APPEALED TO THE NATO STATES TO BEGIN A PROGRAM FOR THE
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT
IN EUROPE AND SUGGESTED THAT A SUCH A PROGRAM COULD BE
CONSIDERED IN A SECOND PHASE OF THE CDE UNDER A NEW
MANDATE FROM THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO
REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE. AS YOU ARE
AWARE, IN JUNE, NATO MINISTERS MEETING IN HALIFAX CREATED
A HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TO
STUDY HOW BEST TO WORK TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVE OF INCREASED
OPENNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPRE-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
HENSIVE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT
LOWER LEVELS.
NO PROGRESS TOWARD OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES IS POSSIBLE,
HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF GENUINE
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IN THIS REGARD A
SUBSTANTIVE, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE
AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
IN STOCKHOLM WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD CREATING SUCH
AN ATMOSPHERE AND OPENING THE POSSIBILITY TO CONSIDER
MORE AMBITIOUS STEPS WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS. IT WOULD
BE IMPOSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT,
HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER ANY DECISION AT THE VIENNA MEETING
TO BROADEN THE CDE MANDATE WHILE THE FOUNDATION NECESSARY
TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY LIES UNFINISHED.
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE MUST BE BUILT BRICK BY BRICK
ON THE STRONG FOUNDATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL OUTCOME IN
STOCKHOLM. WE HOPE YOU WILL WORK WITH US TO ACHIEVE
SUCH A RESULT IN THE WEEKS REMAINING.
4. USDEL SUGGESTS THAT THIS APPROACH BE MADE IN ALL
WARSAW PACT CAPITALS ASAP.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
137
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SF.f'RF:T
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05677
SUBJ: CDE AMB. BARRY END-OF-ROUND PRESS BRIEFING
1. CDE XI - 60
2. TO END THE NEXT TO LAST ROUND OF CDE, AMBASSDOR
ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION TO CDE,
BRIEFED THE PRESS ON THE RECORD TODAY (07/17/86),
SUMMING UP PROGRESS DURING THE ROUND AND GIVING HIS
VIEW OF PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE AS IT APPROACHES
ITS DEADLINE. FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF AMB.
BARRY'S OPENING STATEMENT, WITH EXCERPTS OF THE Q&A.
3. BEGIN STATEMENT: IN CONTRAST TO WHAT I SAID AT THE
END OF THE LAST ROUND, AT THIS POINT I REGARD OUR
PROSPECTS WITH GUARDED OPTIMISM. AT THE END OF THE
LAST ROUND, I SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BE
ABLE TO SEE THE CONTOURS OF AN AGREEMENT BY THE END OF
THE NEXT ROUND, THAT IS, THIS ONE, BECAUSE OTHERWISE IT
WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER THE FINAL
ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT. WELL, I THINK THAT NOW THE
CONTOURS OF AN AGREEMENT ARE VISIBLE, THOUGH SOME OF
THEM ARE STILL FAIRLY WELL SHROUDED WITH THE CLOUDS. I
HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION,
WHICH I STILL FIND SOMEWHAT CLOUDY. BUT I DO BELIEVE
THAT SUCCESS IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT HERE IS WITHIN
OUR GRASP.
THE TIME REMAINING TO US IS INDEED SHORT: WE HAVE FIVE
WEEKS OF OFFICIAL SESSIONS STILL BEFORE US9 AND A LOT
OF DRAFTING REMAINS TO BE DONE; A LOT OF BLANKS REMAIN
TO BE FILLED IN. BUT I ALSO THINK THERE IS A STRONG
DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE WEST, AND I WOULD SAY ALSO OF
THE EAST AND THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED HERE, TO SEE
THIS CONFERENCE REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION: THAT IS,
BY THE 19TH OF SEPTEMBER, WE WOULD HAVE A CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT THAT COULD BE ACCEPTED BY CONSENSUS BY ALL OF
US HERE.
AS YOU KNOW, THE MEMBERS OF NATO MADE A PUBLIC
INITIATIVE ON THE 30TH OF JUNE, WHICH IS AN EXAMPLE OF
THE COMMITMENT THAT WE HAVE TO SUCCESS HERE. WE ARE
EVEN NOW WORKING ON SOME OF THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF
NOTIFICATION, AND I HOPE WE WILL HAVE STILL MORE
PROGRESS THERE BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION TOMORROW.
ON INSPECTION, WHAT MAKES ME MORE OPTIMISTIC IS MY
IMPRESSION THAT ALL OF THE STATES REPRESENTED HERE
ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT INSPECTION WILL BE ADOPTED AND
IMPLEMENTED HERE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT, AND THAT MAKES ME MUCH MORE POSITIVE ABOUT
THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.
LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF AN OUTCOME
HERE, BECAUSE, QUITE ASIDE FROM THE VIRTUES THAT AN
AGREEMENT HERE WOULD HAVE IN TERMS OF ITS ABILITY TO
BUILD CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR
INSTABILITY AND SURPRISE IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THE COUNTRIES HERE, A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WOULD ALSO
HAVE A VERY POSITIVE IMPACT IN GENERAL EAST-WEST
TERMS. BECAUSE THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE OVERALL
HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS, WE THINK THAT SUCCESS HERE WOULD
HAVE A VERY HELPFUL EFFECT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE
EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. AS YOU KNOW, IT HAS BEEN OUR
POSITION THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE ENCOMPASSES THE
BROADER CONCEPT OF SECURITY WHICH INCLUDES HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HUMAN CONTACTS AND ALL OF THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE
HELSINKI PROCESS. WE THINK THAT THE MILITARY SECURITY
ASPECT FITS IN VERY WELL WITH THE REST, AND WE HOPE,
THEREFORE, THAT WE WILL SEE SOMETHING COME OUT OF THIS
CONFERENCE WHICH WILL GIVE A BOOST TO THE GENERAL
EAST-WEST CONTEXT.
I DON'T WANT TO OVERSTRESS MY OPTIMISM, BECAUSE A GREAT
DEAL OF WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE AND NOT VERY MUCH TIME
REMAINS TO DO IT. BUT WE'RE CERTAINLY GOING TO TRY
VERY HARD FOR OUR PART -- AND I KNOW I SPEAK IN THIS
SENSE ON BEHALF OF ALL THE SIXTEEN MEMBERS OF NATO --
TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE TIME
REMAINING.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS:
Q: AMBASSADOR BARRY, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN
A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE?
A: I WOULD SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS
IN THIS ROUND AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE LAST FEW DAYS.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF AIR
ACTIVITIES IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. IT INVOLVED
THE PROCESS OF GIVE AND TAKE ON BOTH THE SIDES, EAST
AND WEST. WE BELIEVE THIS OPENS THE WAY TO RESOLUTION
OF THE OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES. I THINK THAT THERE IS
NO SINGLE BREAKTHROUGH THAT IS GOING TO MAKE THIS
CONFERENCE. IT IS THE RESOLUTION OF A SERIES OF
ISSUES, LIKE THE AIR ISSUE; BUT THE ISSUES OF
NOTIFICATION AND THE ISSUES OF VERIFICATION ALSO PLAY A
VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE TOTAL AGREEMENT THAT IS
GOING TO BE PRODUCED HERE.
Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, WHO GAVE MOST AND WHO TOOK MOST IN
THIS PROCESS, THE EAST OR THE WEST?
A: WELL, THIS ISN'T REALLY A BAZAAR. I MEAN, YOU
CAN'T PUT A PRICE ON THINGS. WHAT'S IMPORTANT IS THAT
BOTH SIDES WERE READY TO FOLLOW THE PROCESS OF GIVE AND
TAKE, AND WE PRODUCED AN AGREEMENT (ON AIR) WHICH WAS
SATISFACTORY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. AND I THINK
THAT IS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE REMAINING ISSUES WILL BE
RESOLVED ALSO. IT'S RATHER POINTLESS TO SAY WHO GAVE
MORE. THE QUESTION IS: ARE BOTH SIDES WILLING TO GIVE?
AND I THINK THE ANSWER TO THAT IS "YES."
Q: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED YESTERDAY?
A: WELL, THERE WAS TEXT AGREED UPON YESTERDAY (7/16)
WHICH RESOLVES THE QUESTION OF WHAT AIR ACTIVITIES ARE
139
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME HERE. THE
TEXT BASICALLY TREATS AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF
NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.
Q: HAS IT BEEN RESOLVED OR SIMPLY POSTPONED?
A: IT HAS BEEN RESOLVED FOR PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT.
Q: AMBASSADOR, COULD YOU GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHERE
THE CONFERENCE IS ON THE NEGOTIATION OF THE THRESHHOLDS
FOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TODAY?
A: WELL, IT'S HARD TO KEEP UP WITH IT
MINUTE-BY-MINUTE, BUT WE HOPE THAT MOST OF THE
QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE WHOLE NOTIFICATION ISSUE
CAN BE RESOLVED IN BROAD TERMS BEFORE WE LEAVE (AT THE
END OF THIS ROUND). SOME OF THEM NO DOUBT WILL BE LEFT
FOR US TO DEAL WITH IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS DURING
THE PERIOD BEFORE THE START-UP OF THE NEXT SESSION;
SOME OF THEM MAY BE LEFT FOR US TO DEAL WITH WHEN WE
COME BACK NEXT ROUND. BUT I THINK THAT REAL PROGRESS
HAS BEEN MADE ACROSS THE BOARD. THE TEXT THAT WAS
ADOPTED YESTERDAY, IN FACT, COVERED GROUND ACTIVITIES
AS WELL AS AIR ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE STILL
GROUND ACTIVITY PARAMETERS THAT NEED TO BE WORKED OUT.
Q: COULD YOU SPECULATE, OR MAYBE MORE THAN SPECULATE,
ON WHAT HAPPENED IN THE EAST-WEST POLITICAL CONTEXT TO
PERMIT THIS PROGRESS RIGHT NOW. DO YOU THINK THAT THE
PROGRESS THAT IS TAKING PLACE IN THIS CURRENT SESSION
REFLECTS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE EAST-WEST
ATMOSPHERE?
A: WELL, ACTUALLY I THINK IT REFLECTS SOMETHING ELSE,
AND I THINK MAYBE IT IS SOMETHING THAT OUGHT TO BE TRUE
OF MORE NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS KIND. THE PROGRESS AT
THIS POINT, IN MY VIEW, COMES IN LARGE PART FROM THE
FACT THAT THE NEGOTIATION IS COMING TO AN END.
SOMETIMES DEADLINES HAVE A VERY USEFUL PLACE IN HELPING
TO CONCENTRATE THE MIND. MAYBE THAT'S WHY PEOPLE HAVE
SUDDENLY FACED UP TO SOME OF THE HARD DECISIONS THAT
HAVE TO BE MADE. IT'S MY IMPRESSION THAT IF YOU HAVE A
NEGOTIATION THAT RUNS ON AND ON WITHOUT ANY DEADLINE
THERE IS NO CATALYST FOR HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL
DECISIONS. SO MY EXPLANATION IS THAT WE ONLY HAVE FIVE
WEEKS TO GO IN TERMS OF OFFICIAL WORKING TIME, AND THAT
DOES SERVE TO CONCENTRATE THE MIND AND MAKE THE EFFORTS
BE A LITTLE MORE INTENSIVE. IT MAY HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT
SOME OF THE DECISIONS WHICH I THINK HAVE TAKEN PLACE
THAT HAVE HELPED PRODUCE PROGRESS OVER THE BROAD FRONT.
Q: DON'T YOU FEEL THAT THE AGREEMENT, THE CONCRETE
PROPOSALS THAT COME OUT AT THE END OF THIS CONFERENCE,
ARE GOING TO BE SO DILUTED BECAUSE YOU ARE GOING FOR
POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY, IN JUST GETTING ANY KIND OF
AGREEMENT?
A: OH, ABSOLUTELY NOT. I WOULD SAY QUITE THE
CONTRARY. I THINK THAT THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CAN SEE COMING OUT OF THIS CONFERENCE IS GOING TO BE A
VERY SUBSTANTIVE ONE. IT'S GOING TO HAVE IN IT, FOR
EXAMPLE, A MEASURE ON FORECASTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES A
YEAR IN ADVANCE, WHICH IS SOMETHING COMPLETELY NEW. IT
IS GOING TO HAVE A SECTION ON NOTIFICATION WHICH IS
GOING TO MEAN BY AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE MORE KINDS OF
ACTIVITIES ARE BEING NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED THAN
CURRENTLY UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IT'S GOT A
WHOLE NEW AREA IN WHICH THESE MEASURES APPLY; THAT IS,
THE WHOLE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS,
WHICH WILL BE AN IMPORTANT NEW STEP IN ARMS CONTROL
TERMS. I EXPECT THERE TO BE AN INSPECTION MEASURE
WHICH WILL BE AN INNOVATION IN ARMS CONTROL, WHICH WILL
PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION OF SITUATIONS WHERE THERE IS
DOUBT ABOUT COMPLIANCE. AND THERE WILL ALSO, I THINK,
BE OTHER SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. WE HAVE SAID FROM THE
VERY OUTSET THAT WE DO NOT WANT AN AGREEMENT FOR
AGREEMENT'S SAKE, THAT A BAD AGREEMENT IS WORSE THAN NO
AGREEMENT AT ALL. THAT REMAINS OUR ATTITUDE. SO IT'S
NOT POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY. IT'S THE FACT THAT A
SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE A MAJOR
IMPROVEMENT ON THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IS IN REACH THAT MAKES IT
ACCEPTABLE TO US.
Q: COULD YOU PUT THIS INSPECTION MEASURE IN TERMS OF
THE LARGER CONTEXT OF ARMS CONTROL MATTERS: WHY WOULD
IT BE SIGNIFICANT, AND WOULD IT REPRESENT A
BREAKTHROUGH SOMEWHAT? WHAT SORT OF EAST-WEST
PRECEDENTS WOULD IT SET?
A: WELL, OBVIOUSLY, INSPECTION IS ONE OF THE BIG
ISSUES IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION, AND
THIS HAS BEEN A BIG STUMBLING BLOCK FOR DISCUSSIONS IN
THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS. BUT, LIKEWISE, IT IS A MAJOR
OBSTACLE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND
NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC IMMEDIATE-RANGE WEAPONS; SO
THERE ARE IMPLICATIONS ACROSS THE BOARD. NOW, MIND YOU
AGAIN, WE HAVEN'T GOT INSPECTION HERE YET. THE
DRAFTING IS GOING RELATIVELY SLOWLY ON THE ISSUE, BUT I
AM HOPEFUL THAT THIS PROCESS WILL ACCELERATE AND THAT
WE WILL END UP WITH A SOLID, WELL-DRAFTED SET OF
MODALITIES TO MAKE INSPECTION EFFECTIVE.
Q: WOULD YOU GIVE ODDS NOW ON WHETHER YOU WILL GET
INSPECTION?
A: WELL, YOU'RE ASKING ME WHAT SORT OF ODDS I WOULD
GIVE FOR SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE. BECAUSE WE HAVE
ALWAYS SAID THAT INSPECTION IS A REQUIREMENT FOR A
SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT -- THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST BE
VERIFIABLE. IN FACT, THE MADRID MANDATE SAYS THAT.
Q: COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MOVEMENT ON THE EASTERN SIDE
DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE OF
INSPECTION?
141
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
A: WELL, I THINK THAT THE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN -- AND I'M
HAVING TO SAY HERE THAT I AM INFERRING FROM STATEMENTS
THAT HAVE MADE HERE AT THE CONFERENCE AND STATEMENTS
MADE BY, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SPOKESMAN OF THE SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTRY IN MOSCOW AT THE TIME OF THE MITTERAND
VISIT -- WHAT I INFERRED FROM THIS IS THAT SUCCESS IN
THE AREA OF INSPECTION IS POSSIBLE. I CANNOT TELL YOU
THAT BASED UPON THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE GONE ON SO
FAR. THAT IS STILL TO COME, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DONE SOME
DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION, AND DISCUSSION IN THE GROUP
ON VERIFICATION HAS CERTAINLY FOCUSED ON THE IDEA OF
INSPECTION AND THE MODALITIES OF INSPECTION.
Q: THERE HAS BEEN SOME AGREEMENT THAT WAY?
A: THERE HAS BEEN DRAFTING, BUT WHAT HAPPENS HERE IS
THAT YOU DON'T AGREE ABOUT THINGS IN THE ABSTRACT; WHAT
YOU DO IS YOU WRITE DOWN SENTENCES THAT ARE GOING TO BE
PART OF THE AGREEMENT. AND WE HAVE WRITTEN DOWN QUITE A
FEW SENTENCES ON VERIFICATION, THOUGH NONE OF THEM YET
PINS DOWN THE IDEA THAT INSPECTION IS THE MEANS OF
VERIFICATION OF CERTAIN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.
BUT I BELIEVE THAT IS OBTAINABLE.
Q: WILL SUCCESS HERE MAKE EUROPE A SAFER PLACE TO LIVE
IN?
A: I BELIEVE THAT IF WE GET A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT HERE
IT CERTAINLY WILL MAKE EUROPE A SAFER PLACE TO LIVE
IN. IT WILL OPEN UP AN ENTIRE NEW PERSPECTIVE OF
PREDICTABILITY IN THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE
CONTINENT AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR STATES PARTICIPATING
IN THIS AGREEMENT TO APPRECIATE BETTER WHAT IS GOING ON
ON THE OTHER SIDE IN MILITARY TERMS. AND THAT, I
THINK, SHOULD MAKE EUROPE SAFER.
Q: AND THIS IS ABOUT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, IS IT? WHAT
ARE YOUR FEELINGS? ARE YOU GOING TO GET THERE OR NOT?
A: WELL, I BELIEVE WE ARE GOING TO GET THERE,
ALTHOUGH A GREAT DEAL OF WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE. BUT
I BELIEVE ALL PARTICIPANTS NOW WANT TO MAKE THE
CONFERENCE A SUCCESS, AND I BELIEVE WE JUST BARELY HAVE
ENOUGH TIME TO DO THAT.
Q: THE EAST BLOC ARE SAYING THEY MADE ONE CONCESSION
BY NOT DEMANDING THAT THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THIS CONFERENCE.
WHAT CONCESSIONS HAVE YOU MADE?
A: WELL, I DON'T THINK IT IS A USEFUL EXERCISE IN
COMPARING ONE'S CONCESSIONS WITH SOMEONE ELSE'S
CONCESSION. THE AIM IS TO TAKE PART IN THE PROCESS OF
GIVE AND TAKE, AND THAT'S WHAT THE EAST IS DOING AND
THAT'S WHAT THE WEST IS DOING. WE MADE A MAJOR
STATEMENT ON THE 30TH OF JUNE, LISTING ALL THE AREAS IN
WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY. WE'RE GLAD
THAT THE EAST DID, FINALLY, SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY ON
THIS AIR QUESTION.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Q: WHY ARE THINGS MOVING SO FAST NOW? BECAUSE IT IS
NEARLY THE END OF THE CONFERENCE OR BECAUSE THERE HAS
BEEN A THAW IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS?
A: I THINK THAT THE APPROACHING END HAS FOCUSED THE
MIND OF NEGOTIATORS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS.
Q: YOU WANT TO GET HOME WITH SOMETHING IN YOUR
PORTFOLIO.
A: WELL, WE WANT TO GET HOME WITH SOMETHING GOOD IN
OUR PORTFOLIO.
END Q&A. END TRANSCRIPT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05702
SUBJ: US AMB. BARRY CDE PLENARY STATEMENT, 07/18/86
1. CDE XI - 61
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF REMARKS BY AMB. ROBERT L.
BARRY, HEAD OF US DELEGATION TO CDE, IN THE CLOSING
PLENARY OF ROUND XI 07/18/86. AMB. BARRY SPOKE AFTER
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVKSY AND REFERS TO COMMENTS IN
GRINVEVSKY'S TEXT, WHICH WAS SENT SEPTEL.
BEGIN US TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN: AS MANY HAVE SAID, THE
TIME FOR SPEECHES IS PAST AS THE ADJOURNMENT DATE OF
OUR CONFERENCE APPROACHES WITH UNREMITTING SPEED. BUT
AT THE END OF THIS CRUCIAL PENULTIMATE ROUND OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, I FELT IT NECESSARY TO SAY A FEW
BRIEF WORDS ABOUT THE VIEW MY DELEGATION TAKES OF OUR
PROSPECTS HERE.
THE LAST TIME I SPOKE BEFORE A PLENARY SESSION, ON MAY
16, I SAID THAT THE PROSPECT OF FAILURE LOOMED LARGE
ABOVE THE CONFERENCE. IT WOULD BE INCAUTIOUS TO SAY
THAT WE ARE NOW FACING THE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS, BUT I
AM GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC THAT A SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT OF
THE KIND MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED IS WITHIN
OUR GRASP. THE CONTOURS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT ARE
VISIBLE, AS WE HAVE SAID THEY SHOULD BE BY THE END OF
THIS SESSION; BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN A VERY
SHORT TIME IF WE ARE TO PRODUCE A DOCUMENT TO WHICH ALL
CAN AGREE BY SEPTEMBER 19.
THE MAIN FACTOR THAT ENCOURAGES ME TO THINK THAT
AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE IS THAT FINALLY WE SEEM TO HAVE
DEVELOPED SOME MOMENTUM. THE GLACIER IS MOVING, AT
LEAST ON SOME CENTRAL ISSUES. WE, THE SIXTEEN
CO-SPONSORS OF SC.1, HAVE DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY BOTH IN
THE DRAFTING ITSELF AND IN PUBLICLY FORMULATING OUR
POSITIONS, AS (CANADIAN) AMBASSADOR DELWORTH DID ON
JUNE 30. I BELIEVE (SOVIET) AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS
MADE A RECIPROCAL, SUBSTANTIAL AND IMPORTANT REPLY TO
THAT IN HIS STATEMENT TODAY, WHICH I CERTAINLY WELCOME,
AS I WELCOME THE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO RESOLVE
KEY ISSUES, SUCH AS THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH I
REGARD AS IMPORTANT.
JUST IN COMMENTING BRIEFLY AND INFORMALLY, AS IT WERE,
ON SOME OF THE COMMENTS THAT AMBASSADOR GRINEVKSY MADE
TODAY: MY DELEGATION, AT LEAST, WELCOMES HIS
INTRODUCTION OF THE FIGURE 200 AS A FIGURE FOR THE
NUMBER OF SORTIES IN THE AIR THRESHOLD. AND WE, AT
LEAST, WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK TOGETHER TO REACH A
STILL LOWER NUMBER. WE HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT AIR
ACTIVITIES ARE IMPORTANT, AND WE HAVE STARTED FROM A
POSITION OF SAYING THAT WE WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON
ALL AIR ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH NOTIFIABLE GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES.
I ALSO WELCOME WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ON INCLUDING THE
144
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURE, NUMBERS AND MOBILITY/FIREPOWER
IN A CONCEPTUAL FORMULA FOR GROUND-FORCE NOTIFICATION;
THAT IS A VIEW WHICH WE SHARE. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO
CORRECT ONE MISAPPREHENSION: IT IS NOT REALLY ACCURATE
TO SAY THAT WE IN THE WEST ARE SERIOUSLY THNKING OF TEN
TO TWELVE THOUSAND (TROOPS) AS A STARTING POINT FOR
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NUMERICAL ASPECT OF THAT FORMULA.
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SAY THAT WE ARE QUITE PREPARED TO
CONTINUE TO WORK ON FINDNG AN APPROPRIATE FORMULA TO
RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF TRANSFERS. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN
OUR POSITION THAT TRANSFERS OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED IN
NOTIFICATIONS OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, AND WE
CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT QUESTION CAN BE RESOLVED.
I COULD ALSO SAY THE SAME IN TALKING ABOUT FORECASTS.
THERE IS ANOTHER AREA WHERE I THINK MY DELEGATION CAN
EASILY MOVE AHEAD TO ADD SUBSTANCE TO THE FORECASTING
PROPOSAL. I WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED, I MUST SAY, BY
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S COMMENTS ON VERIFICATION AND
INSPECTION. THE VARIOUS COMMENTS MADE ON THIS SUBJECT
IN RECENT DAYS ENCOURAGE ME TO BELIEVE THAT INSPECTION
IS WITHIN OUR REACH HERE IN STOCKHOLM. AS THE
DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR OF SPAIN POINTED OUT ON JULY
14, UP UNTIL NOW MANY HERE HAVE PREFERRED THE OSTRICH
APPROACH TO THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE. NOW THAT ALL
DELEGATIONS SEEMINGLY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF
INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, IT IS TIME FOR US ALL TO
LIFT OUR HEADS FROM THE SAND. THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF
INSPECTION MIGHT SEEM AT FIRST GLANCE SOMEWHAT
FRIGHTENING, BUT I THINK IT IS IMPROTANT THAT WE ALL
OVERCOME THIS FEAR SO THAT WE CAN DO NECESSARY DRAFTING
ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE VERIFICATION SECTION OF AN
AGREEMENT, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE MODALITIES AND THE
UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO USE INSPECTION FOR VERIFICATION.
EARLIER, WE HAD HEARD IT SUGGESTED THAT THIS WORK COULD
BE DONE BY EXPERTS IN VIENNA. LET ME BE CLEAR IN
SAYING THAT, IN MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, THIS IS NOT AN
OPTION. THE AGREEMENT WE ADOPT HERE MUST BE COMPLETE
AND, IN OUR VIEW, INSPECTION MUST BE PART OF IT IF IT
IS TO BE COMPLETE.
IT IS TRUE THAT WE WILL BE BREAKING NEW GROUND IN
DRAFTING INSPECTION PROVISIONS HERE IN STOCKHOLM,
ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT OF INSPECTION HAS BEEN UNDER
DISCUSSION FOR DECADES. IN DOING THIS DRAFTING, WE
HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS; AS AMBASSADOR DELWORTH SAID, WE
ARE WILLING TO ENSURE AGAINST THE ABUSE OF THE RIGHT
AND SEE TO IT THAT INSPECTIONS ARE NOT ONEROUS OR
UNDULY INTRUSIVE. BUT WE MUST ALSO BE CAREFUL NOT TO
SET THE WRONG PRECEDENT BY ESTABLISHING PROVISIONS
WHICH CANNOT EFFECTIVELY VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REGIME OF WHICH IT IS A PART. THIS WOULD SET BACK THE
145
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SFCRFT
CAUSE OF ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, NOT
ADVANCE IT.
TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE REGIME, WE MUST BE READY TO
DRAFT INTENSIVELY ON ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES, INCLUDING
INSPECTION, WHEN THE CONFERENCE RESUMES ON AUGUST 19.
THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY PROCESS, BUT FAILURE TO TACKLE
IT HEAD-ON WILL LEAD TO AN INCOMPLETE AGREEMENT AND AN
UNSATISFACTORY CONCLUSION TO THE CONFERENCE.
LIKE MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS HERE, MY OWN WILL RESPOND
TO THE CALL FOR INTENSIFIED WORK. WE STAND READY FOR
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE INSPECTION ISSUE AND
OTHER ISSUES IN HOPES OF SMOOTHING THE WAY FOR DRAFTING
WHEN THE CONFERENCE RESUMES OFFICIALLY. THERE ARE A
NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH NEED URGENT ATTENTION, BUT
OBVIOUSLY THEY REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF THIS CONFERENCE. AND MY DELEGATION IS
CLEARLY SENSITIVE TO THAT ISSUE. THANK YOU MR:
CHARIMAN. END TEXT. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05703
SUBJ: TEXT OF SOVIET CDE STATEMENT, 07/18/86
1. CDE XI - 62
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT (AS DISTRIBUTED) OF THE
SPEECH SOVIET AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY GAVE IN CDE
PLENARY TODAY, 07/18/86:
BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, IN RECENT DAYS THE
CONFERENCE HAS BEEN GIVEN NEW AND FRESH IMPULSES WHICH
STEER IT DIRECTLY TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POSITIVE
RESULTS IN CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING IN
EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ALONG THIS DIRECTION
THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A TURN IN EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL. TODAY SUCCESS IN
STOCKHOLM IS THE KEY LINK GRASPING WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE
TO SET IN MOTION THE ENTIRE CHAIN OF NEGOTIATIONS AND
SOLUTIONS TO PRESSING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. IF WE ARE
ABLE TO WORK OUT IN STOCKHOLM SUFFICIENTLY MEANINGFUL
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, THIS WOULD CREATE
FAVOURABLE PREREQUISITES FOR THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING TO
BE HELD THIS FALL AND HENCE FOR THE SECOND STAGE OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WHICH COULD ADDRESS PRODUCTIVELY
DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS.
WHAT IS REQUIRED TO ASSURE SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM? AS
GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED, THE TIME
HAS COME FOR ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE TO
DEMONSTRATE RESPONSIBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY. ONLY
SERIOUS MUTUAL CONCESSIONS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND
EQUAL SECURITY CAN PRODUCE A POSITIVE RESULT.
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE MADE
QUITE A FEW STEPS TO OUTLINE SOLUTIONS ON SUCH KEY
ISSUES AS NOTIFICATION, EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS,
LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES, NON-USE
OF FORCE, VERIFICATION, ETC.
DURING THE PAST YEAR THERE HAS NOT BEEN, IT WOULD SEEM,
A SINGLE SESSION WHERE ONE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
-- BULGARIA, HUNGARY, THE GDR, POLAND, ROMANIA,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA -- DID. NOT INITIATE A PROPOSAL MOVING
THE CONFERENCE FORWARD.
WE HIGHLY APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN AND ARE
BEING MADE BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO
ACHIEVE PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE.
WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO VIEW AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL OF
THEIR READINESS TO MOVE AHEAD THE PROPOSALS PRESENTED
BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THE STATEMENT BY THE
DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA, AMBASSADOR
DELWORTH, OF JUNE 30. THOSE PROPOSALS TOUCH UPON THE
MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT FACE THE CONFERENCE,
ALTHOUGH, FRANKLY SPEAKING, THEY GIVE LITTLE FOR THEIR
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS.
AS TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACT
147
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ALSO IN THE FUTURE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE KEY, TO SEEK
BALANCED SOLUTIONS TO THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS BY WAY
OF A COMPROMISE AND A REALISTIC VIEW ON WHAT GENERALLY
ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS COULD CONCLUDE THE WORK IN
STOCKHOLM.
I WOULD NOTE, FIRST OF ALL, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:
FIRST, AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH HAS BEEN MADE AT THE
CONFERENCE IN RECENT DAYS. WE HAVE MANAGED TO UNDO ONE
OF THE TIGHTEST KNOTS WHICH FOR A LONG TIME IMPEDED OUR
MOVEMENT FORWARD, I.E. NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE
MANOEUVRES.
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS CONSISTENTLY
ADVOCATED NOTIFICATION OF ALL MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF AIR
FORCES WHICH ARE THE STRIKE TYPE OF THE ARMED FORCES.
UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, THE NATO COUNTRIES REFUSED
ALTOGETHER TO NOTIFY AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES. IT IS
BETWEEN THESE POLAR POSITIONS THAT THE SIDES HAVE
CLASHED FOR A LONG TIME AT THE CONFERENCE.
A COMPROMISE BECAME POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF
ESTABLISHING AN AIR SUB-LEVEL WITHIN NOTIFICATION OF
MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES STARTING FROM WHICH CERTAIN
IMPORTANT INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED ON AIR FORCE
MANOEUVRES. WE SHOULD BE STRAIGHTFORWARD IN SAYING
THAT ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO THIS COMPROMISE BY DEMONSTRATING THE
POLITICAL WILL FOR AN AGREEMENT. AS THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF POLAND STATED, GIVEN THIS SOLUTION THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO POSTPONE NOTIFICATION OF
SEPARATE AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES TO THE NEXT STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE, AS IS THE CASE WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
AT PRESENT, IT IS NECESSARY TO AGREE UPON THIS AIR
SUB-LEVEL. MANY COUNTRIES, BOTH NEUTRAL AND NATO
ALIKE, HAVE SPOKEN ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS IN FAVOUR
OF A LOWER CEILING WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR MORE
INFORMATION ON AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES. WE HAVE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT THEIR VIEWS AND PROPOSE NOW AN AIR
PARAMETER OF 200 SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE MANOEUVRES.
WE TRUST THAT OUR COUNTERPARTS WILL DULY CONSIDER THIS
PROPOSAL.
SECOND, AS REGARDS MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES,
SUBSTANTIAL COMMON GROUND IS ALSO VISIBLE. IN RECENT
DAYS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED THAT NOTIFICATIONS
WOULD COVER MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES CONDUCTED IN
COMBINATION WITH AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE
TROOPS.
WE ARE YET TO AGREE ON PARAMETERS OF SUCH
NOTIFICATION. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE KNOWN TO
HAVE MADE A STEP TO MEET THE DESIRES OF MANY COUNTRIES,
BOTH NATO AND NEUTRAL, REGARDING A LOWER NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD BY PROPOSING THAT THEY WOULD COVER MANOEUVRES
TOTALLING 18 THOUSAND TROOPS. THE NATO COUNTRIES
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO RAISE THE NUMERICAL LEVEL
OF NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ALMOST
A MONTH HAS PASSED SINCE, THEY DID NOT NAME ANY
SPECIFIC FIGURES (THOUGH SOMETIMES HINT AT THE FIGURE
OF 10-12 THOUSAND). LET US BE STRAIGHT; SUCH VALUES
CANNOT BE A STARTING POINT IN THE SEARCH FOR A
COMPROMISE. NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO STEER THE
NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON
THIS QUESTION, T00, WE WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT 18
THOUSAND IS NOT THE LAST WORD. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
ACCEPT A LOWER LEVEL BUT, OBVIOUSLY, ON THE BASIS OF
RECIPROCITY.
CERTAINLY, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PARAMETER OF
NOTIFICATION OF LAND FORCE MANOEUVRES BE ACCEPTABLE TO
ALL AND DAMAGE NO-ONE'S SECURITY. PROVIDED A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION IS FOUND, IT
WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LOOK FOR SUCH A NOTIFICATION
PARAMETER CONCERNING LAND FORCES WHICH WOULD COVER ALL
ITS ASPECTS. IT HAS BEEN ALREADY STATED HERE THAT
THREE APPROACHES TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM ARE
SUGGESTED AT THE CONFERENCE: IN ACCORDANCE WITH ONE OF
THEM, FOCUS IS MADE ON STRUCTURE; IN ANOTHER CASE, ON
NUMBERS; IN THE THIRD CASE, ON "MOBILITY AND
FIREPOWER." WELL, WE ARE READY, TOGETHER WITH THE
OTHER DELEGATIONS, TO WORK ON THE BEST COMBINATION OF
THESE APPROACHES.
THIRD. THE WAY TO CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IS ALSO
CONNECTED WITH SUCH AN IMPORTANT MEASURE AS
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF TROOPS TO THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S. SUCH AGREEMENT COULD IMPART AN
IMPULSE TO MOVEMENT IN OTHER QUESTIONS AS WELL. IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF
COVERT ACCUMULATION OF FORCES AND PROVIDE AT THE SAME
TIME FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF TROOPS
TO EUROPE TO CONDUCT AN ACTIVITY WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED.
FOURTH. AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF EXCHANGES OF
ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD BECOME A KIND
OF SAFETY VALVE AGAINST COVERT PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE DONE A LOT TO MOVE AHEAD
IN THE ELABORATION OF THIS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURE. AND THINGS ARE SLOWLY MOVING FORSARD. TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES MADE BY THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND BY THE WESTERN STATES, WE
PROPOSE TODAY THAT SUCH PLANS FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT YEAR
WOULD BE GIVEN BY ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO ONE
ANOTHER NOT LATER THAN NOVEMBER 15-20 OF THE PRECEDING
YEAR.
FIFTH. IN ORDER TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS
ON CONSTRAINS (SIC) CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH
WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL THE
PARTICIPATING STATES, WE ARE READY TO TAKE, AS A BASIS,
149
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
THE PROPOSALS OF NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.
THEY PROVIDE FOR MANY OPTIONS: E.G. ON THE ONE HAND,
NOT TO CONDUCT DURING ONE YEAR IN ADDITION TO PLANS
MORE THAN FIVE MILITARY MANOEUVRES THE SIZE OF WHICH
WOULD EXCEED THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL LESS THAN TWO TIMES
AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, NOT TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SUCH
MANOEUVRES IF THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL PLANS OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
AGREEMENT WITH THIS MULTIPLICITY OF APPROACHES?
SIXTH. VERIFICATION IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE FOR THE
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. WE WANT TO BE CONFIDENT THAT
AGREEMENTS WE CONCLUDE ARE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH BY
ALL. THEREFORE, WE FAVOUR THAT AGREEMENTS ON
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BE PROVIDED WITH EFFECTIVE
AND ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, AND ARE READY TO GO AS FAR
IN THIS QUESTION AS THE INTERESTS OF OUR BUSINESS
REQUIRE.
IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE PROPOSALS OF THE WARSAW
TREATY COUNTRIES SET FORTH IN BUDAPEST CONTAIN THE IDEA
OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES AS WELL AS OF ON-SITE INSPECTION.
ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF
INSPECTION AND BELIEVE THAT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO MOVE
FORWARD IN THIS AREA. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES ARE READY TO RECORD AGREEMENT THAT THE
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL CONDUCT ON-SITE INSPECTION OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE PROCESS OF
VERIFICATION OF REDUCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. I WOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE
ALSO READY TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE CAN
MEET THE CONCERN VOICED BY SOME COUNTRIES ON THE
ISSUE. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT THE SAME TREATMENT OF OUR
PROBLEM IN OTHER AREAS WHERE PROPOSALS ARE MADE WHICH
AFFECT ADVERSELY OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.
SEVENTH. IN ORDER TO FINALIZE THE ELABORATION OF
AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE, WE ARE MAKING A STEP
FORWARD IN THIS AREA, TOO -- WE TAKE THE DOCUMENT OF
THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AS A BASIS. WE
ARE ALSO READY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POSITIVE ELEMENTS
IN NATO PROPOSALS.
SOME SAY THAT A HUMAN-RIGHTS PROVISION SHOULD BE A
NECESSARY COMPONENT OF THE AGREEMENT. WHAT IS THE
MATTER, THOUGH? WE DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS HERE. WE
ARE READY TO NOTE A PROVISION THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR OF PEACE. THIS FOLLOWS
FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES TO HUMAN RIGHTS AS ONE OF THE COMPONENTS OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE ONLY WAY OF HAVING A MEANINGFUL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
AGREEMENT LIES THROUGH MUTUAL CONCESSIONS. WE HOPE
THAT OUR INITIATIVES WILL PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE
DYNAMISM LEADING TO ACHIEVING PRECISELY THIS AGREEMENT
IN THE WEEKS LEFT BEFORE THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDES ITS
WORK ON SEPTEMBER 19. OBVIOUSLY, THIS REQUIRES
GOODWILL ON THE PART OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05703
SUBJ: TEXT OF SOVIET CDE STATEMENT, 07/18/86
CONFERENCE. IT IS THIS WILL THAT SOME, UNFORTUNATELY,
ARE NOT YET TOO HASTY TO DEMONSTRATE.
TIME FACTOR, TOO, STARTS TO PLAY AN EVER-INCREASING
ROLE. IT IS LIKE DAMOCLES'S SWORD OVER THE
CONFERENCE. IF WE DO NOT INTENSIFY OUR WORK, TIME MAY
RUN OUT, EVEN GIVEN THE WILL. WE ARE NOT IN FAVOUR OF
PROTRACTED DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING WHEN AGREEMENTS ARE
REACHED AT THE LAST NIGHT. THEREFORE, THE SOVIET
DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO REMAIN IN STOCKHOLM DURING
THE BREAK AS WELL AS TO HOLD INFORMAL MEETINGS AND
CONSULTATIONS.
END TEXT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
151
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENT I A L STOCKHOLM 05712
SUBJ: NAC/POLADS DISCUSSION OF STOCKHOLM CDE
REFS: A. USNATO 03987; B. STOCKHOLM 5350;
C. STOCKHOLM 5676; D. STOCKHOLM 5702
1. CDE XI - 63
2. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE POLADS/NAC DISCUSSION OF
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS ON CDE IS PARTICULARLY
TIMELY AS THE CONFERENCE APPROACHES ITS FINAL ROUND.
THIS MESSAGE SUGGESTS TALKING POINTS ON CDE PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY AND ALSO SUPPLEMENTS EARLIER SUGGESTIONS FOR
TALKING POINTS ON CDE MORE GENERALLY. END SUMMARY.
4. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT AGREE WITH FRG POLAD'S
ASSESSMENT THAT EASTERN PROPAGANDA HAS THE ADVANTAGE
OVER WESTERN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON THE CDE ISSUE, WE
STRONGLY SUPPORT POLAD/NAC DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO
EXPLOIT A POSSIBLE CDE AGREEMENT TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ADVANTAGE. FOR JULY 22 POLADS MEETING AND JULY 24
NAC, IF THERE IS ONE, WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:
-- NOW AS CDE ENDS, NATO MEMBER STATES SHOULD INCREASE
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT ANY SUCCESS IN
CDE: CDE HAS FOLLOWED THE WESTERN APPROACH AND MET
WESTERN OBJECTIVES; ANY CDE FINAL DOCUMENT WILL
ADVANCE IMPQTANT WESTERN CONCEPTS OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING BASED ON INCREASED OPENNESS AND,
IN VERY SPECIFIC WAYS, OF VERIFICATION BY INSPECTION;
WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO EXPLOIT THAT POSITION
WITH THE PUBLIC;
-- THE WEST WILL NEED TO COUNTER EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO
CLAIM CREDIT FOR ANY SUCCESS IN CDE; THE EAST OFTEN
SEEMS TO HAVE THE EDGE IN ORCHESTRATING ANNOUNCEMENTS
OF "DRAMATIC" CONCESSIONS AND OTHER "NEWSWORTHY"
EVENTS TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
CONFERENCE;
-- BECAUSE THE NON-BLOC-TO-BLOC NATURE OF CDE IS AN
IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC OF THE CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY
AMONG THE NNA, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SHOULD DEPEND ON
EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES RATHER THAN NATO
AS A WHOLE;
-- OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL
TO THIS POINT: CDE IS VIEWED BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN
PUBLIC IN WESTERN TERMS; SOVIET/WTO EFFORTS TO TURN
CDE INTO A POLITICAL/PROPAGANDA FORUM HAVE FAILED TO
CATCH FIRE;
-- PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS HAVE REINFORCED THE
CREDIBILITY OF KEY WESTERN POSITIONS, E.G., ON
INSPECTION, INSIDE THE CONFERENCE;
-- AS FAR AS THE JUNE 30 INITITIATIVE IS CONCERNED,
ALLIES HERE DISAGREE WITH THE FRG POLAD'S ASSESSMENT;
FRG, FRENCH AND OTHER CDE DELEGATES HAVE EXPRESSED
SATISFACTION WITH THE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE THE
152
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
INITIATIVE RECEIVED IN THEIR NATIONAL MEDIA;
-- USDEL HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN AN ACTIVE PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY EFFORT; WITH THE END OF THE CONFERENCE IN
SIGHT, MAINTAINING A HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE IS
INCREASINGLY OUR INTEREST; WE ARE INCREASING OUR OWN
EFFORTS TO THIS END;
-- HIGH LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACTS, LIKE THE
FRENCH-SOVIET, SOVIET-UK AND UPCOMING FRG-SOVIET
VISITS, WHICH DRAW ATTENTION TO THE CONFERENCE, SHOULD
BE USED TO HIGHLIGHT WESTERN POSITIONS IN CDE.
5. REFS B AND C SUGGEST TALKING POINTS ON CDE MORE
GENERALLY WHICH CAN BE ADAPTED FOR POLADS/NAC
DISCUSSION. US STATEMENT AT END OF ROUND XII SUMS UP
CURRENT VIEW (REF D): WE ARE GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT; RESOLUTION OF THE
AIR ISSUE WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD; IMPORTANT ISSUES,
ESPECIALLY INSPECTION AND DETAILS OF THE GROUND FORCE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, REMAIN TO BE SETTLED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
153
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05708
SUBJECT: PLENARY, JULY 18
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. CDE XII - 064
3. THE FINAL PLENARY OF THE ELEVENTH ROUND WAS
CHARACTERIZED BY A MOOD OF GUARDED OPTIMISM. SPEAKING
ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12, UK MINISTER RENTON STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL RESULT IN STOCKHOLM WHICH
WOULD GO WELL BEYOND THE LIMITED MEASURES CONTAINED IN
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; HE EMPHASIZED BRITISH VIEWS ON
INSPECTION. IN AN UPBEAT STATEMENT, GRINEVSKY (USSR)
SHOWED SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN
THE CONFERENCE FULL TEXT SENT SEPTEL). BARRY (US)
ASSESSED THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT AND WELCOMED
POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT. REZNIK
(CSSR) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) MADE OPTIMISTIC
ASSESSMENTS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT; REZNIK
LISTED PROBLEM AREAS. ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, SCHENK
(SWITZERLAND) NOTED WILLINGNESS TO DO INTENSIVE WORK BY
RETURNING TO STOCKHOLM ON AUGUST 12. THE US AND USSR
AGREED TO INTENSIFY WORK BY HOLDING INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS WITH INTERESTED DELEGATIONS DURING THE
BREAK. END SUMMARY.
4. BRITISH MINISTER-OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS TIM RENTON, SPEAKING FOR THE
EC-12, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A CDE AGREEMENT IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE OF THE CSCE PROCESS,
SPECIFICALLY THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS AT THE VIENNA
FOLLOW-UP MEETING. HE WARNED THAT THERE CAN BE "NO
COMPROMISE FOR COMPROMISE SAKE", I.E., THERE MUST BE A
SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. FAILURE IN STOCKHOLM, HE ADDED,
WOULD ALSO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO BEGIN WORK ON
"FAR-REACHING DISARMAMENT STEPS" SUCH AS THOSE PROPOSED
BY THE BUDAPEST APPEAL. IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY,
RENTON OUTLINED BRITISH VIEWS ON INSPECTION:
-- THERE MUST BE A GUARANTEE THAT INSPECTIONS WILL TAKE
PLACE.
-- ARRANGEMENTS MUST NOT BE "UNDULY BURDENSOME".
VERIFICATION SHOULD BE "PROPORTIONATE" TO PRECLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE.
__ "THIRD PARTY" PARTICIPATION IN THE INSPECTION REGIME
IS "PERHAPS WORTH EXPLORATION." SUCH PARTICIPATION
"CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR INSPECTORS," HOWEVER.
-- CONCERN FOR THE PROBLEM OF RESTRICTED AREAS IS
LEGITIMATE. NONETHELESS, SUCH AREAS SHOULD BE LIMITED
IN SIZE AND NUMBER. ACCESS TO TERRITORY SHOULD BE
LIMITED AS "ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY" TO MAKE INSPECTION
J CTIVE.
-- THE BRITISH DO NOT HAVE "RIGID VIEWS ON MODALITIES."
5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (USSR) MAINTAINED THAT SUCCESS
IN STOCKHOLM COULD BE A "KEY LINK TO SET IN MOTION"
154
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
OTHER FORA, E.G., THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING AND A
POSSIBLE SECOND STAGE OF CDE. HE CALLED FOR MUTUAL
CONCESSIONS, REFERRING TO THE EAST'S "INITIATIVES," NNA
CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE "POLITICAL SIGNAL" REPRESENTED
BY THE WEST'S JUNE 30 INITIATIVE. IN THIS SPIRIT, HE
SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING:
-- AN AIR PARAMETER OF 200 SORTIES;
-- A FORMULATION FOR GROUND FORCES WHICH TAKES INTO
ACCOUNT THE THREE DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF A STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLD, NUMERICAL THESHOLD AND MOBILITY-AND-
FIREPOWER;
-- AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS;
-- EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 15-20
OF THE PRECEDING YEAR;
-- USING THE NNA PROPOSAL ON CONSTRAINTS AS A BASIS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS;
-- FINALIZING NUF, USING THE NNA DOCUMENT AND
"ELEMENTS" OF NATO'S NUF TEXT. FOR THE FIRST TIME
PUBLICLY, THE SOVIETS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO
INCLUDE SOME LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS;
-- GOING AS "FAR AS NECESSARY" TO ENSURE ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION; ON INSPECTION, GRINEVSKY REPEATED THE
SOVIET POSITION THAT INSPECTION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN
CONNECTION
WITH CSBM'S AS PART OF AN ARMS REDUCTION
AGREEMENT.
6. AMBASSADOR BARRY CHARACTERIZED THE US VIEW OF
PROSPECTS AT THE END OF ROUND XI A ONE OF GUARDED
OPTIMISM (FULL TEXT SEPTET,); HE WELCOMED RESOLUTION OF
THE AIR ISSUE AS AN IMPORTANT STEP AND NOTED THE ROLE
OF THE JUNE 30 NATO INITIATIVE IN STIMULATING PROGRESS
IN THE CONFERENCE.
7. AMBASSADORS REZNIK (CSSR) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE)
ALSO ASSESSED THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT FAVORABLY,
GASCHIGNARD NOTING THAT HE VIEWED THESE PROSPECTS WITH
"SATISFACTION, REALISM AND HOPE". REZNIK LISTED
REMAINING DIFFICULT AREAS FROM AN EASTERN PERSPECTIVE.
8. INTENSIFICATION OF WORK: GRINEVSKY AND BARRY AGREED
TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE BY HOLDING
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS DURING THE BREAK. AMBASSADOR
SCHENK (SWITZERLAND) NOTED NNA WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO
STOCKHOLM ON AUGUST 12 TO INTENSIFY THE WORK ON AN
INFORMAL BASIS. NO PROCEDURAL DECISION WAS MADE
REGARDING THE CDE WORK CALENDAR.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
155
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I AL STOCKHOLM 05721
SUBJECT: CDE: FRG PRESSURE FOR ABANDONING STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLD
1. NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF A
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION, THE
GERMANS ARE PRESSING US TO ABANDON IT. WE WOULD
APPRECIATE IT IF EMBASSY BONN WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A
DEMARCHE AT A HIGH LEVEL.
2. THE FRG MOD HAS ALWAYS DISLIKED THE CONCEPT OF A
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD AND PREFERRED SETTING THE "TRIGGER"
FOR NO'IFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BY A
NUMERICAL PARAMETER ALONE. WE HAVE OBJECTED TO THE
APPROACH ON 'HE GROUNDS THAT A NUMERICAL PARAMETER CANNOT
BE VERIFIED. SO FAR, THE GERMANS HAVE GONE ALONG
RELUCTANTLY WITH THE ALLIANCE POSITION, BUT AT THE MOMENT
THE MOD IS PRESSING HARD TO CHANGE THE GERMAN POSITION
BASED ON A NEW - AND IN OUR VIEW FAULTY - ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECT OF VARIOUS PARAMETERS ON NOTIFICATION.
3. WE UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH ARE PLANNING A HIGH LEVEL
DEMARCHE IN BONN TO FORESTALL THIS; WE RECOMMEND THAT WE
DO LIKEWISE, AT THE LEVEL OF FRED RUTH OR MEYER-LANDRUT.
'HE FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINT FOR DEPARTMENT'S
CONSIDERATION:
-- WE KNOW YOU SHARE OUR INTEREST IX -A SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME TO CDE WHICH NOW SEEMS WITHIN OUR GRASP.
-- WE SUPPORT YOUR GOAL OF OPERATIONALIZING THE MADRID
ZONE BY GETTING SOME NOTIFICATIONS/OBSERVATIONS OF
EXERCISES THERE, AND WE AGREE THAT THE BURDEN OF
OBSERVATIONS SHOULD BE SPREAD AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.
-- BUT WE DON'T AGREE WITH YOUR MOD WHICH SEEMS TO
WANT TO DROP THE STRUCTURAL AND EQUIPMENT ASPECTS OF THE
GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION PARAMETER NOW THAT THE SOVIETS
HAVE AGREED TO THEM.
-- FOR US, A STRUCTURAL AND EQUIPMENT ELEMENT IN THE
GROUND FORCE PARAMETER IS ESSENTIAL TO VERIFICATION.
NUMBERS ALONE CANNOT BE VERIFIED; NEITHER INSPECTION NOR
NTMS CAN DISTINGUISH BETWEEN EXERCISES AT 10,000, 12,000
OR 15,000.
-- ALSO, WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE APPARENT METHODOLOGY
WHICH THE MOD HAS USED IN THE ANALYSIS WHICH HAS LED TO
'HEIR RENEWED ENTHUSIASM FOR THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER. IT
SEEMS TO US THAT MOD HAS USED A THEORETICAL MODEL RATHER
THAN EMPERICAL DATA. WE BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ALL
EXERCISES AT THE LEVEL OF 10-12,000 INVOLUE UNITS OF TWO
OR MORE DIVISIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE "NEW
ZONE";
-- OUR BEST ANALYST ON THIS TOPIC (KEN HUCK, CIA) WILL
BE TRAVELING TO BONN JULY 24 TO MEET WITH MOD ANALYSTS;
-- WE HOPE THAT THIS EXCHANGE ON THE EXPERT LEVEL WILL
HELP. BUT IN ANY CASE, WE URGE THAT YOU STICK WITH THE
156
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ALLIANCE POSITION, WHICH HAS BEEN PRODUCED THROUGH CLOSE
CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS AND STOCKHOLM.
-- WE SUPPORT YOUR DESIRE TO SEE THE NUMERICAL ASPECT
OF THE PARAMETER KEPT TO 10,000 - BUT FRANKLY WE DO NOT
THINK THE SOVIETS WILL AGREE. THEY MAY NOT BE WILLING TO
GO BELOW 14-15000, SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY DON'T WANT
OBSERVATION IN THE NEW ZONE.
-- SOME DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM HAVE RAISED THE IDEA
OF SEPARATE THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION -
SAY STRUCTURE WITH 10,000 PERSONNEL OR 250 TANKS FOR
NOTIFICATION AND 15,000 FOR OBSERVATION. THEY CLAIM THIS
IS A NEGOTIABLE WAY OF ENSURING NOTIFICATION BUT NOT
OBSERVATION IN THE NEW ZONE. WE DON'T EXCLUDE SUCH A
SOLUTION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
157
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05722
SUBJECT: CDE: NOTED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP,
18 JULY 1986
1. CDE XI -
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING TEXT, AGREED UPON IN THE LATE
NIGHT HOURS OF 17 JULY, WAS NOTED JULY 18 IN
THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP. IT DEALS
WITH "AIRBORNE DROP" ACTIVITIES, AND STANDS
AS A SEPARATE ACTIVITIY TO BE NOTIFIED.
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WILL LATER
BE MERGED WITH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDINGS
LANGUAGE, AS INITIALLY SUGGESTED BY THE
EAST AND SOME NNA DELS, MAY BE RETURNED
TO LATER.
BEGIN TEXT.
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE
ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST . . .
END TEXT. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05724
SUBJECT: CDE: ROMANIAN OAR IN CDE WATERS; UNIDIR DIRECTOR
LIVIU BOTA
L. CDE XI -
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: IN STOCKHOLM TO ASSESS THE POSSIBILITIES
OF A CDE AGREEMENT, AMBASSADOR KONSTANTIN ENE, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SECTION IN
THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, DISCUSSED ROMANIAN
PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET POSITIONS IN CDE WITH USDEL DEPUTY
AMBASSADOR HANSEN. HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN MOSCOW TO
CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM CEAUSESCU TO GORBACHEV ABOUT THE
IMPORTANCE OF A POSITIVE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, ROMANIANS
RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE: THE
POLITICAL DECISIONS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A CDE
AGREEMENT. ENE REPORTED SOVIETS INDICATED A NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATIONS OF GROUND FORCES BETWEEN L2
AND L8 THOUSAND AS WELL AS ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION
WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF CDE AGREEMENT. CEAUSESCU IS
PREOCCUPIED WITH CSCE PROCESS AND PROGRESS TOWARD
REALIZATION OF A CDE PHASE II IN ANSWER TO THE BUDAPEST
APPEAL. LIVIA BOTA IS ALIVE AND WELL. END SUMMARY.
4. ACCORDING TO ENE, PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU DEVOTES A PART
0F'EVERY WEEK TO ASSESSING THE POSSIBILITIES OF Of
AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. THIS PREOCCUPATION HAD RESULTED
IN A VISIT BY ENE TO MOSCOW TO CONVEY TO THE SOVIETS THE
IMPORTANCE OF A POSTIVE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. THE. ONLY
SOVIET OFFICIAL IDENTIFIED BY NAME WITH WHOM THE
ROMANIANS SPOKE WAS AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH, BUT ENE WAS
IMPRESSED THAT THE POLITICAL DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE
IN MOSCOW WHICH WOULD FACILITATE AN AGREEMENT IN
STOCKHOLM. WITHOUT PROVIDING DETAILS, ENE MENTIONED THAT
INSPECTION IS NO LONGER A PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH DRAFTING
CONCRETE TEXT WILL BE DIFFICULT. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD
SUGGESTED A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 8000 TROOPS FOR THE
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES WHICH HAD RAISED
SOVIET HACKLES AND RESULTED IN THE RETORT THAT THE FINAL
FIGURE WOULD BE BETWEEN L2 AND L8 THOUSAND. THE
SOVIETS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO SHOW
MORE FLEXIBILITY ON STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. ENE TOOK PAINS TO EXPLAIN THAT
THE POLITICAL DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE BUT THAT THERE WAS
STILL RESISTANCE IN SOME QUARTERS TO MOVING VERY FAR.
5. ENE CLAIMED CREDIT FOR HAVING DRAFTED THE BUDA?EST
APPEAL AND CLAIMED THAT CEAUSESCU WAS RESPONSIBLE ]?OR
THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE NECESSITY FOR CONVENTIONAL
DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS TO COMPLEMENT THE IDEAS
EXPRESSED BY GORBACHEV IN HIS L5 JANUARY SPEECH
ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. WTO DISCUSSIONS HAVE
SUGGESTED A GENERAL REDUCTION IN CONVENTIONAL
FORCES OF ABOUT 50 BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO
159
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MATCH THE DREAM OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.
(COMMENT: ENE REFERRED TO THIS AS A DREAM,
PROBABLY A ROMANIAN ONE. END COMMENT) WTO
PREFERENCES FOR A FORUM REMAIN A CDE PHASE II AND
THEY UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF A POSITIVE
OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, ACCORDING TO ENE. HEOPINED
THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY
SENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
WOULD INVOLVE ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF U.S.
FORCES AND NOTHING ON U.S. TERRITORY. HE
PREDICTED THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD LOOM LARGE IN A
CDE DISARMAMENT PHASE.
6. ACCORDING TO ENE, LIVIA BOTA (FORMER DIRECTOR
OF UNIDIR IN GENEVA) RETURNED TO BUCHAREST TO
PARTICIPATE IN A TWO WEEK SEMINAR DEALING WITH
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS. DURING THAT
PERIOD, THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED BOTA'S
L4 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL IN BUCHAREST AND
THEY OFFERED HIM AN OFFICE DIRECTOR'S JOB IN THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY. BOTA ACCEPTED THE OFFER AND
HIS UNIDIR RESIGNATION WAS DRAFTED IN ENE'S
OFFICE. FOR REASONS WHICH ENE DID NOT ELABORATE,
BOTA'S RESIGNATION WAS MISINTERPRETED AND MADE AN
ISSUE BY THE MEDIA. IN TURN, THE ROMANIAN
GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD BOTA CHANGED AND
HARDENED. ENE INSISTED THAT WHEN THE WHOLE ISSUE
COOLS DOWN, THINGS WILL BE WORKED OUT. IN THE
MEANTIME, BOTA IS ALLEGEDLY WORKING FOR THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY IN BUCHAREST. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05725
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS: 11TH ROUND
1. CDE XI -
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: AT THE CONCLUSION OF
THE PENULTIMATE ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE A
SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE WITHIN REACH.
DESPITE ALLIED SQUABBLES AND SOVIET FOOTDRAGGING,
DRAFTING HAS PROGRESSED, PARTICULARLY IN THE KEY AREA OF
NOTIFICATION. THUS, THE CONTOURS OF A POSSIBLE C:)E
ACCORD ARE CLEAR: A SOLID FORECASTING MEASURE,
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BASED ON A
COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL, PARAMETER, A SUBTHRESHOLD
FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES, A SUBSTANTIAL
OBSERVATION REGIME, LIMITED INSPECTION AND INFORMATION
AND A NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION REFLECTING A WESTERN
APPROACH TO SECURITY. A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
WILL NOT INCLUDE: NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR OR
NAVAL ACTIVITIES OR OF TRANSITS THROUGH THE ZONE, OR A
SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS MEASURE.
WHILE THE OUTLINES OF THE AGREEMENT ARE VISIBLE, THE
RESULTS ARE NOT GUARANTEED. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED TO A CDE AGREEMENT BECAUSE' THEY
KNOW THEY CAN'T GET AN ARMS REDUCTION CDE II WITHCUT IT,
THE MILITARY IN PARTICULAR IS DRAGGING ITS FEET IN THE
DRAFTING PROCESS. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY TRUE ON
INSPECTION: OVER THE PAST WEEKS, MOSCOW HAS ACCEPTED
BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AND ITS POSSIBLE
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CDE CONTEXT ON AN "EXPERIMENTAL
BASIS." TRANSLATING THESE SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS INTO
THE CONCRETE MODALITIES NEEDED FOR AN EFFECTIVE
VERIFICATION REGIME WILL BE LIKE PULLING TEETH. OT ER
UNRESOLVED ISSUES REMAIN, SUCH AS ESTABLISHING A REGIME
WHICH INCLUDES NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN THE NEW ZONE, I.E., MOST OF THE EUROPEAN
PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE RESOLVING THESE AND
O'HER ISSUES WILL ENTAIL HARD BARGAINING, NOT LEAS"' OF
WHICH WITH OUR ALLIES, WE BELIEVE A SATISFACTORY
SOLUTION MAY BE ATTAINABLE. STAY TUNED. END SUMMELRY
AND ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: IN THE FINAL WEEK OF THE CONFERENCE,
FOLLOWING MITTERAND'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS
FINALLY BEGAN TO MOVE ON THE KEY ISSUES OF TYPES OF
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND, TO A LESSER DECREE,
ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS
AGREED TO NOTE LANGUAGE ACCEPTING THE SUBTHRESHOLD
APPROACH FOR AIR ACTIVITIES, I.E., INCLUDING INFORMATION
ON THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES IN A
NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE ACTIVITY AS PART OF THE
NOTIFICATION OF THE NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE ACTIVITY. IN
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH US, SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV
161
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SKETCHED OUT THE PRELIMINARY OUTLINES OF THE
NOTIFICATION MEASURE: SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS FOR GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES, GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, AIR
ACTIVITIES, AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES,
AND TRANSFERS. (AT THE FINAL PLENARY MEETING THE
SOVIETS SUGGESTED 200 SORTIES AS THE "AIR" SUBTHRESHOLD
AND WE COUNTERED BY OFFERING TO GO LOWER STILL.) IN
KEEPING WITH THIS STRUCTURE, SEPARATE TEXTS ON
AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AND AIRBORNE ASSAULTS (PARACHUTE
DROPS) ALSO WERE NOTED DURING THE FINAL WEEK OF THE
ROUND. THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED TRANSITS AND TRANSFERS
BUT ARE INSISTING ON SEPARATE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND
FORCE TRANSFER; IN FACT THEY ARE LINKING A SOLUTION TO
THIS PROBLEM TO A SOLUTION OF INSPECTION.
ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, THE SOVIETS FINALLY AGREED
TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE LIKO (NNA) FORMULA, WITH ITS
STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT (TANK) ELEMENTS;
HOWEVER, THEY RESIST ANY ELEMENT IN THE STRUCTURAL
POR'ION OF THE FORMULA WHICH WOULD IMPLY THAT A SINGLE
DIVISION EXERCISE MIGHT BE INCLUDED, THEY ALSO ARE
MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT COME DOWN AS LOW AS
12,000 IN THE NUMERICAL SECTION. MEANWHILE THE FRG
MAKES ALMOST DAILY PLEAS TO US TO DROP THE STRUCTURAL
APPROACH ENTIRELY AND SO FAR A STRICTLY NUMERICAL
PARAMETER.
5. INFORMATION: ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO
SWALLOW THE BITTER PILL OF INSPECTION IN STOCKHOLM, THEY
WILL GIVE US LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ON INFORMATION. IN
PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ONLY WLEMENT OF
STATIC INFORMATION WE THOUGHT FEASIBLE - LOCATION OF
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS PROVIDED IN NOTIFICATION - IS "AS
DIFFICULT A QUESTION FOR THEM AS AIR TRANSFERS ARE
FORCES." AND THEY HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT THEY WILL NEVER
AGREE TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT - PRESUMABLY
BECAUSE IT IMPLIES THAT "NORMAL LOCATION" OF EVENTS WILL
HAVE TO BE MOVED. MEASURE I - THE INDEPENDENT
INFORMATION MEASURE - WAS BURIED THIS WEEK WHEN IN THE
AGREED FRG-UK DEMARCHE TO GRINEVSKY WE SAID NATO WOULD
NOT INSIST ON IT IF WE GOT NORMAL LOCATIONS OF
PARTICIPATING UNITS AT DIVISION LEVEL AND ABOVE.
GRINEVSKY OFFERED LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT THAT WE WOULD.
6. VERIFICA'ION: IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SKETCH THE
OUTLINES OF THE VERIFICATION MEASURE FROM THE SCANT FEW
SENTENCES WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED TO DATE. WHILE SOME
DRAFTING WAS ACCOMPLISHED THIS ROUND ON A FRAMEWORK FOR
VERIFICATION, THE EAST WORKED TO HINDER DRAFTING BY
INSISTING ON A DELETERIOUS DISCUSSION OF FORMS OF
VERIFICATION. RECENT SOVIET SIGNALS, HOWEVER, FROM BOTH
WITHIN THE CONFERENCE AND MORE IMPORTANTLY IN
SOVIET-FRENCH BILATERALS CONTACTS, HAVE BEEN
ENCOURAGING. PARTICULARLY DURING THE
162
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
GORBACHEV-MITTERAND MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS
INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT BCTH THE
PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR CSBM'S AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS DURING THIS
PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. IN HIS JULY 18 PLENARY
STATEMENT, GRINEVSKY ESSENTIALLY OFFERED TO DRAFT AN
INSPECTION MEASURE "IF OTHERS WOULD DROP INSISTENCE ON
MEASURES WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR SECURITY
INTERESTS." WHAT HE HAS IN MIND ARE ISSUES LIKE
OUT-OF-GARRISON, STATIC INFORMATION, AND TRANSFERS.
WE CAN FORESEE THE BROAD OUTLINES OF A VERIFICATION
MEASURE AS HAVING: TWO "FORMS" OF VERIFICATION
INSPECTION WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND NTM'S; ONE
INSPECTION REQUEST PER YEAR PER STATE; AND SOME FORM OF
PASSIVE QUOTA ON HOW MANY INSPECTIONS A STATE MUST
ACCEPT PER YEAR; IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL COMPLIANCE
WITH ALL MEASURES, WE CAN FORESEE SOME FORM OF
ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT CLARIFICATIONS CUM CONSULTATIONS
(WHICH CANNOT BE USED TO BLOCK OR DELAY A REQUEST FOR
INSPECTION) CAN PLAY A ROLE. PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT
TASK BEFORE US WILL BE PINNING DOWN THE DETAILED
MODALITIES REQUIRED TO MAKE INSPECTION EFFECTIVE 1:E.G.,
AIR AND/OR GROUND INSPECTION, UNRESTRICTED ACCESS.,
AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT, ETC.). THIS EFFORT WILL REQUIRE
CONTINUED ALLIANCE UNITY IF THE EAST IS TO BE CONVINCED
THAT NATO WILL NOT ACCEPT A PURELY COSMETIC INSPECTION
REGIME. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE SINGING FROM THE
SAME SHEET OF MUSIC, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT' TO
RESOLVE SOME LINGERING INTRA-ALLIANCE DIFFERENCES, CHIEF
AMONG THESE IS THE HANDLING OF RESTRICTED AREAS.
MEANWHILE THE NNA ARE BECOMING MORE INTERESTED IN
PLAYING A ROLE IN THE INSPECTION PROCESS AS "GUARANTORS
OF NON-ABUSE "(I.E., OBSERVERS) OR FACILITATORS (I.E.,
PROVIDERS OF THE AIRCRAFT)
7. OBSERVATION: THE OBSERVATION MEASURE IS THE MOST
DEVELOPED IN THE CONFERENCE TO DATE. THE EAST HAS
ACCEPTED THAT OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED FROM ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES AND HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE TYPE
OF DETAILED BRIEFINGS AND UPDATES TO OBSERVERS NATO HAS
SOUGHT. ADDITIONALLY, MOST OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DETAILS OF THE OBSERVATION REGIME HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT.
PROBLEMS REMAIN, HOWEVER, IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT AREAS.
WHILE THE EAST HAS DROPPED ITS EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A
QUOTA ON OBSERVATIONS, IT HAS YET TO ACCEPT THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED TO
ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. THE EAST IS HOLDING OUT
UNTIL THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION IS DECIDED,
CLAIMING IT FEARS TOO GREAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE BURDIEN IF
THE THRESHOLD IS LOW (AS DO SEVERAL NATO DELEGATIONS)
BUT, MORE LIKELY, BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WANT TO AVOII)
PERMITTING OBSERVATION IN THE NEW PART OF THE CDE ZONE.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WE SUSPECT THAT IF THE NUMERICAL ELEMENT OF THE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WERE RELATIVELY HIGH THE EAST
WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT UNIVERSAL OBSERVATION BECAUSE THE
GREATER PART OF THE NEW ZONE PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE
CAPTURED, BUT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT IT AT OUR
FIGURE OF 10,000. AS OBTAINING OBSERVATION IN THE
INTERIOR MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE USSR IS A REQUIREMENT
FOR THE FRG IN PARTICULAR, THIS COULD PROVE TO BE A
SIGNIFICANT HURDLE IN THE FINAL ROUND. IN REGARD TO
REDUCING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF A LOW NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD, THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH SEEMS TO BE A
LIMITATION ON THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION (TIED TO WHEN
THE ACTIVITY EXCEEDS THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, ITS ACTIVE
PHASE, OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH), WHICH COULD REDUCE THE
BURDEN WITHOUT REQUIRING A HIGHER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD
OR A SEPARATE OBSERVATION TRIGGER. IN ADDITION, THE
WEST WILL HAVE TO PRESS THE EAST HARD ON SCOPE OF
OBSERVATION, I.E., WHAT THE OBSERVERS WILL ACTUALLY SEE
OR DO, IF THE OBSERVATION REGIME IS TO BE MEANINGFUL.
THE PROBLEM OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE OBSERVED HAS
BEEN ALLEVIATED SOMEWHAT BY THE AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE
INFORMATION ON AIR IN THE GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION,
WHICH SHOULD ELIMINATE EASTERN DEMANDS FOR A SEPARATE
OBSERVATION PROGRAM FOR AIR ACTIVITIES. FINALLY,__.
PROGRESS WILL ALSO BE HAMPERED UNTIL THE THE BROADER
CONFERENCE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH RESTRICTED AREAS,
SENSITIVE POINTS, ETC. IS RESOLVED.
8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: PROGRESS ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR
WAS LIMITED THIS ROUND ALTHOUGH SOME AREAS OF
CONVERGENCE WERE DEFINED. LANGUAGE WHICH PROVIDED FOR
THE TYPE AND DESIGNATION, THE CHARACTER AND GENERAL
PURPOSE AND THE NAME OF THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE
ACTIVITY WAS NOTED. EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON BOTH THE
AREA OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DURATION SAW NO
FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE EAST WHO REMAIN OPPOSED
TO PROVIDING GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES TO DEFINE THE
LOCATION OF A MILITARY ACTITIVIY OR TO PROVIDING PLANNED
STARTING AND ENDING DATES. WE EXPECT A TOUGH UPHILL
BATTLE TO GET ANY REASONABLY DETAILED INFORMATION
PROVIDED IN THE CALENDAR. THE EAST WILL BE HARD PRESSED
TO AGREE TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN GENERAL OR AMBIGIOUS
LANGUAGE IN THE CONTENT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST.
FURTHERMORE, WE EXPECT PARTICULARLY TOUGH OPPOSITION IN
THE FIGHT FOR INFORMATION ON HEADQUARTERS' LOCATIONS AND
THE DESIGNATION OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES/REGIMENTS.
OUR CAUSE WILL BE AIDED LITTLE BY THE NNA. ALTHOUGH
THEY HAVE ENDORSED A REASONABLY DETAILED CALENDAR, THEY
HAVE DEMONSTRATED LITTLE RESOLVE IN DEFENDING THEIR
PROPOSAL.
9. CONSTRAINTS: THE ROUND WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE
JULY 10 NNA PROPOSAL: CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF
164
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
NON-FORECAST MILITARY ACTIVITIES (AIMED AT TRAINING
ALERTS.) THE EAST, OVER THE PAST WEEK AND IN THE
CLOSING PLENARY, HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO DRAFT ON
THE BASIS OF THIS PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH EASTERN DELEGATES
HAVE PAID LIP-SERVICE TO MORE TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS,
WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR ATTENTION TO THE NNA PROPOSAL
INDICATES A SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION IN THEIR POSITION.
THEY ARE NOW FOCUSING ON THE CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF
THE CALENDAR. NATO HAS ENGAGED IN A LIMITED EXCHANGE ON
THE DETAILS OF THE NNA PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, THERE ELKS NOT
BEEN EVEN AS MUCH AS A SUBTLE INDICATION THAT THE
WESTERN POSITION ON MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT HAS SOFTENED.
10. NON-USE OF FORCE: A NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION IS
EMERGING WHICH REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO
SECURITY, INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON COMPLIANCE, TERROR::SM
AND THE ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE PRINCIPLE. CONSEQUENTLY,
THE EAST SEEMS TO BE LOSING ITS APPETITE FOR THE NUF
MAIN COURSE SINCE THE MENU HAS BEEN REWRITTEN BY THE NNA
AND THE WEST. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE, IN FACT, IS
CONSPICUOUS BY HIS FREQUENT ABSENCES DURING NUF
DRAFTING. THE SOVIETS INSIST PRIVATELY THAT THEIR ONLY
SINE QUA NON IS SOME REFERENCE TO THE DANGER OF
"MILITARY FORCE." WE HAVE REJECTED THIS DEVELOPME?IT OF
THE NUF PRINCIPLE. LANGUAGE WAS NOTED THIS RQUND TYING
THE NUF REAFFIRMATION TO THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF CONCRETE CSBM'S, TO THE UN CHARTER AND TO THE EA.GA
OMNES PRINCIPLE. BASED ON NATO'S APPROACH OF FLEXIBLE
PARALLELISM NUF LANGUAGE HAS AND ONLY WILL BE NOTED WHEN
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE CSBM'S
WORKING GROUP. FINALLY, THE U.S., WITH ALLIED SUPPORT,
HAS BEGUN TO PUSH FOR A STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION. AT
THE LAST PLENARY THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY STATED WHAT THEY
HAVE BEEN PRIVATELY HINTING FOR THE LAST FEW WEEKS:
THEY COULD ACCEPT A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE; HOWEVER, IT IS
YE'UNCLEAR WHAT SORT OF SECTION THEY CAN ACCEPT AND AT
WHAT PRICE, E.G., IN EXCHANGE FOR A REFERENCE TO
"MILITARY FORCE."
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
165
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05776
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS
THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL THE LANGUAGE THAT HAS
BEEN REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK FOR ALL
WORKING GROUPS AT CDE.
BEGIN TEXT:
A-1 (NON-USE OF FORCE):
...THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE,
TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE
ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO
AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO 'HE DUTY OF STATES
TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN GENERAL. ... (3/11/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZ.. THAT THE ADOPTED SET
OF MU'UALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS, WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE MADRID MANDATE, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND
BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. (5/20/86)
...THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION
TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN
THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN
IN THE FINAL ACT. (6/17/86)
THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF
ALLIANCE. (7/8/86)
A-2 (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION):
THE CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE
AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT...
(2/26/86)
ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS
WILL BE ALLOWED TO... (4/30/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS... WILL STATE THE
REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST. (4/30/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A
166
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
REQUEST WILL. . .WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. ...
(5/7/86)
THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING
STATE(S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS IS IN IOUBT.
... (6/11/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS... WILL SPECIFY
THE AREA WHERE... (7/2/86)
A-3 (ANNUAL CALENDAR AND CONSTRAINTS):
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT
CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN
WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER
THAN...FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR. ...
TO BE DEFINED (3/6/86)
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05776
STATE FOR EUR/RPM DAVID JOHNSON AND PM/TMP STAN WE;-.KS
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL
PROVIDE INFORMATION ON-MACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE FOLLOWING MODEL: ... (5/22/86)
- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION
- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
... (7/3/86)
B-1 (NOTIFICATION):
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WILL GIVE...IN WRITING THROUGH
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES...DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF
THE START OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES...
...WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHO!E
TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE
PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED
IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE..., IF
THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY
REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
-------------
TO BE DEFINED (3/4/86)
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS IS AS FOLLOWS:
ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE AND
RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF
ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
167
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THESE CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE.
THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY
BINDING AND WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS
CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES
TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT
SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS
REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY.
NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.
NOTHING IN THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE
WILL DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE
FINAL ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO
BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE
PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
SECURITY AND DISARMAJNT.
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF ADJOINING SEA AREA IS
UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN AREAS ADJOINING EUROPE.
HEREINAFTER THE ABOVE MENTIONED WILL BE REFERRED TO AS
"THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS". (3/11/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE...IN WRITING THROUGH
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES...DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF
THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE
OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
...WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE
PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED
IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05776
STATE FOR EUR/RPM DAVID JOHNSON AND PM/TMP STAN WEEKS
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS
NO'IFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE..., IF
THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY
REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
TO BE DEFINED (3/11/86)
MILITARY ACTIVITIES... CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED
BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED. (5/13/86)
...WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED
163
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
- THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- ...OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
... (6/13/86)
- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED
IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY
- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES. (6/24/86)
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS) ...
LANDING ... IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS?
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO ... WHENEVER
THIS LANDING ... INVOLVES AT LEAST ... (7/15/86)
THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES... CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH
ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WHENEVER...
THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING
STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS
FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY... OR MORE
SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL EE
FLOWN.
----------------
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES. (7/16/86)
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT
BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST ...
(7/18/86)
B-2 (OBSERVATION):
A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM A;:,L
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO...
THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
S'ATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT
LA'ER THAN...DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION. IF
THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE
ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT. (2/27/86)
OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.
169
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
(3/6/86)
THE INVITING STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05776
STATE FOR EUR/RPM DAVID JOHNSON AND PM/TMP STAN WEEKS
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS
RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE
ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
INVITING STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE INVITING STATE WILL
SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS
INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY. (3/13/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL
PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR
REPLY TO THE INVITATION. (3/13/86)
THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS
PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. (4/17/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH
TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND
BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER
THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED
IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT OBSERVERS ARE IN A POSITION
BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. (4/24/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
MEANS OF TRANSPQRTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)
THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS
OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION
SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND
BACK. (5/1/86)
TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE
A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:
THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR
TRANSLATION;
- ARRANGEMEN'S FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF
THE OBSERVERS;
(6/26/86)
THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
(7/3/86)
A' THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE A
BRIEFING OF THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES
OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A DAILY
SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC
SITUATION. (7/3/86)
IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE TIE
OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE
VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR
POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY ...
... (7/3/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARR'CING
OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY,
MEDICAL CARE. (7/17/86). END TEXT. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05862
SUBJECT: US/USSR CDE CONSULTATIONS: RIDGWAY-GRINEVSKY
MEETING
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY AND US
CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY MET WITH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR ON
JULY 23 TO DISCUSS THE PROSPECTS OF A STOCKHOLM
AGREEMENT. BOTH BARRY AND GRINEVSKY WERE GUARDIDLY
OPTIMISTIC. THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE ROLE OF THE CDE
IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND KEY ISSUES IN THE DRAFTING
OF THE CDE DOCUMENT, PARTICULARLY
VERIFICATION/INSPECTION. END SUMMARY.
3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS RIDGWAY MET
WITH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY IN US CDE
AMBASSADOR BARRY'S OFFICE ON JULY 23 TO DISCUSS THE
PROSPECTS OF A CDE AGREEMENT. GRINEVSKY WAS ACCOMPANIED
BY HIS INTERPRETER ANDREI GROSHEV; JIM WHITLOCK, ACTING
DIRECTOR EUR/NE, AND USDEL MEMBER JON GUNDERSEN WERE
ALSO PRESENT.
4. AFTER INITIAL PLEASANTRIES, BARRY SUGGESTED THAT HE
AND GRINEVSKY SHOULD GIVE RIDGGWAY A "FRESH OBJECTIVE
AND UNPREJUDICED" JOINT BRIEFING ON WHERE WE ARE IN
STOCKHOLM. GRINEVSKY BEGAN BY PLACING THE CDE IN THE
LARGER-INTERNATIONAL PROSPECTIVE. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE
EFFECT NOT ONLY IN EUROPE, BUT IN THE LARGER EAST/WEST
FRAMEWORK AS WELL AS IN US SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS.
HE ARGUED THAT STOCKHOLM WAS A LOGICAL LINK TO LARGER
US/USSR DISARMAMENT CONCERNS. MORE SPECIFICALLY,
GRINEVSKY STATED THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM
WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF
THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE WHICH COULD LEAD TO A
DISARMAMENT PHASE WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS, I.E., CDE
PHASE II. FINALLY, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT HE SAW A REAL
POSSIBILITY FOR SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM BECAUSE: 1) THE
ISSUES HERE ARE NOT AS SENSI'IVE AS THE ISSUES IN US
SOVIET BILATERAL DISARMAMENT TALKS IN GENEVA. 2) THE
CDE HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED COMMON GROUND ON MOST OF THE
RELEVANT ISSUES AND 3) THE MAJORITY OF PARTICIPATING
STATES HERE INCLUDING THE US HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE
POLITICAL WILL FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
5. RIDGWAY RESPONDED BY THANKING GRINEVSKY FOR HIS
POSITIVE OVERVIEW ON THE PROSPECTS IN STOCKHOLM. SHE
MAINTAINED THAT THE FOCUS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS MUST BE
ON THE KEY QUESTIONS THAT APPEAR IN THE BROAD RANGE OF
EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS VERIFICATION/INSPECTION.
SINCE THERE WILL BE A US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGENDA FOR
THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, SHE ARGUED, WE MUST RESOLVE
THESE KEY ISSUES IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER IN STOCKHOLM.
6. BARRY NOTED THAT THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL DECISIONS
NECESSARY TO ATTAIN AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM HAVE
172
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ALREADY BEEN 'AKEN BY THE US AND USSR. THE MAIN PROBLEM
NOW IS THE LACK OF TIME REMAINING AND THE FACT THAT ALL
'HE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES JEALOUSLY GUARD THEIR
RIGHTS AT THE CONFERENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, BARRY POTVTED TO
THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING THE OTHER STATES TO EVEq AGREE
ON AN EXTENSION OF WORK DURING THIS INTERSESSIONA]:
BREAK. BARRY ALSO SAID THAT DRAFTING ON SUCH ISSUES AS
NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, TRANSFERS, AND PARTICULARLY
INSPECTIONS, WOULD REQUIRE A CONCERTED EFFORT ON TIE
PART OF ALL DELEGATIONS.
7. IN RESPONSE TO RIDGWAY'S QUESTION ON HOW BEST TO
ATTAIN THE DESIRED RESULTS, BARRY SUGGESTED THAT
NOTIFICATION ISSUES SHOULD BE RESOLVED ASAP. HE ADDED
THAT HE BELIEVED THAT SOVIET CONCERNS REGARDING THE
'RANSFER QUESTION COULD BE RESOLVED. ADDRESSING
RIDGWAY'S QUERY, GRINEVSKY SUGGESTED THAT STOCKHOLM
SHOULD NOW BE THE FOCUS OF DECISIONMAKING ON THE
REMAINING KEY ISSUES. THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES WAS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO
GRINEVSKY. IF THIS IS RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY, ALL
OTHER RELATED QUESTIONS COULD BE RESOLVED. HE LII?ENED
THE QUESTION OF PARAMETERS, E.G., STRUCTURAL, NUME:RICAL
OR EQUIPMEN', TO A RUBIKS CUBE; IT IS A QUESTION OF
FINDfNG THE RIGHT COMBINATION. REGARDING OTHER KEY
NOTIFICATION ISSUES, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE ISSUE: OF
TRANSFERS WAS A SENSITIVE ONE FOR BOTH THE US AND THE
USSR NATIONS. GRINEVSKY STATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
RAISE THIS QUESTION OPENLY, THEREBY CONCENTRATING PUBLIC
ATTENTION ON THE ISSUE. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION
COULD BE RESOLVED QUIETLY BEHIND THE SCENES. GRINEVSKY
ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US PROBLEM REGARDING
TRANSITS AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE
DROPPED IF TRANSFERS WERE RESOLVED. FINALLY, HE STATED
THAT THE KEY UNRESOLVED QUESTION IN CONNECTION WITH
INSPECTION IS WHAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE
NOTIFIED. GRINEVSKY OFFERED TWO REASONS FOR THIS
ASSERTION: 1) THERE MUST BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF
WHAT THESE ACTIVITIES ARE SO NO FUTURE BODY COULD START
BLAMING EACH OTHER FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. (THE
OUTOF-GARRISON CONCEPT, GRINEVSKY NOTED, DOES NOT MAKE
IT CLEAR WHAT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED.) 2) IT IS
NECESSARY TO HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF THESE MILITARY
AC'IVITIES IN ORDER TO KNOW WHA' TO INSPECT.
8. BARRY ARGUED THAT DISCUSSION OF INSPECTION AND
NOTIFICATION SHOULD PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY. BARRY ADDED
THAT WE WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE AIR QUESTION
INDEPENDENT OF RESOLVING ALL QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND ACTIVITIES, AND SUGGESTED NAT
THE SAME SIMULTANEOUS APPROACH COULD APPLY REGARDING THE
ABOVE ISSUES.
9. THE DISCUSSION BECAME SOMEWHAT MORE ANIMATED WHEN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
GRINEVSKY STATED THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A US POLITICAL
DECISION ON QUESTIONS OF WHAT TO NOTIFY IN ORDER '0
DETERMINE WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE INSPECTED. HE SAID
I' WAS "ABNORMAL" THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD NOT EVEN
DISCUSS OPENLY HOW MANY PEOPLE, WHAT SORT OF STRUCTURE,
HOW MANY TANKS, ETC., OR EVEN USE THE WORD
"NOTIFICATION" IN DRAFTING. GRINEVSKY WENT ON TO ARGUE
THAT THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, IN EFFECT, DEPENDED ON THE
RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. FOR
EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT IF WE AGREED ON AN 18,000
NUMERICAL PARAMETER THIS WOULD IMPLY A CERTAIN
STRUCTURE; A 9,000 PARAMETER IMPLIES ANOTHER STRUCTURE.
THEREFORE, PLACING STRUCTURE FIRST WAS, IN GRINEVSKY'S
VIEW, "NONSENSE."
10. RIDGWAY THEN ASKED WHAT WAS ON THE MALTESE
AGENDA. BARRY SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT MALTA TO REPEAT
ITS HELSINKI PERFORMANCE, BUT VALETTA'S ACTIONS WERE
ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. GRINEVSKY ALSO THOUGHT
THAT MALTA'S APPROACH HAD CHANGED. HE ADDED THAT MALTA
WAS INTERESTED IN THE FORMULA FOR POSTPONING NAVAL
ACTIVITIES AND THAT VALETTA COULD NOT DROP THIS QUESTION
COMPLETELY. BARRY SAID HE PRESUMED THAT THE ANSWER TO
THIS "DEFERRAL" PROBLEM WOULD BE FOUND IN A CHAIRMAN'S
STATEMENT WHICH DID NOT SINGLE OUT ANY ISSUE; THEN EACH
COUNTRY WOULD MAKE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT ON ITS OWN PET
ISSUE AND OTHERS WOULD CHIME IN WITH THEIR COMMENTS
11. THIS CABLE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY RIDGWAY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05863
SUBJECT: CDE: LATEST SOVIET POSITIONS
1. - SECRET- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: BASED ON A JULY 23 BARRY-GRINEVSKY
CONVERSATION, DEBRIEFS OF ALLIED CONTACTS WITH GRINEVSKY
AND USDEL CONTACTS WITH SOV DEL, WE OFFER A SNAPSHOT OF
THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF CDE. WE
CAUTION THAT THE PICTURE CHANGES AS NEGOTIATIONS
PROGRESS. PARTICULARLY ON INSPECTION, SOVIET THINKING
IS IN A STATE OF FLUX.
3. VERIFICATION:
--SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN THIS PHASE OF CDE
IS LINKED TO THE WESTERN POSITION ON OUT-OF-GARRISON AND
TRANSFERS.
--THE REASON FOR THE LINKAGE TO OOG IS THAT THE S)VIETS
FEAR THAT WE WOULD USE OOG TO JUSTIFY INSPECTIONS OF
ANOMALOUS EVENTS LIKE THE CHERNOBYL CLEANUP.
--THERE MUST BE A CLEAR DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES BEFORE INSPECTION LANGUAGE CAN BE DRAFTED;
THE SOVIET LIST WOULD INCLUDE GROUND AND COMBINED ARMS
EXERCISES, AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, AIRBORNE DROPS,
TRANSFERS AND MOVEMENTS. ALL OF THESE COULD BE
INSPECTED, EVEN THE AIR COMPONENT OF A COMBINED ARMS
EXERCISE.
--THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PASSIVE QUOTA; THE SOV:[ET
POSITION IS 1-2 INSPECTIONS A YEAR.
-- THE USSR HAS NO INTEREST IN A RIGHT OF REFUSAL? BUT
THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A CLOSED AREA/SENSITIVE PO]:NT
REGIME. THE SC-1 APPROACH TO THIS "DOES NOT LOOK BAD";
THE USSR WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING LISTS OF
SENSITIVE POINTS.
--REASONS FOR AN INSPECTION REQUEST WOULD HAVE TO BE
CITED; THIS WOULD BE PART OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.
--BUT INSPECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE PROMPT; THE KIDFD OF
TIME FRAMES CONTAINED IN SC-1 SEEM GENERALLY IN LINE.
--BOTH AIR AND GROUND MODALITIES ARE ACCEPTABLE A1D IT
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE INSPECTING STATE TO CHOOSE; IT
ALSO MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE INSPECTING STATE TO
DETERMINE WHERE IN THE DESIGNATED INSPECTION AREA
INSPECTORS VISIT (SENSITIVE POINTS EXCLUDED.)
INSPECTION MODALITIES SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM'
OBSERVATION MODALITIES.
--BUT THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD HAVE TO SUPPLY THE
AIRCRAFT: "THERE WOULDN'T BE TIME" FOR NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT
TO GET TO THE SCENE.
--LIKEWISE THERE IS LITTLE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE IDEA
OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS OF THE INSPECTION PROCESS;
SELECTING AND GATHERING THEM WOULD BE TOO MUCH OF A
PROBLEM.
--IT SHOULD BE UP TO EACH INSPECTING STATE TO DECIDE HOW
TO TREAT AN INSPECTION REPORT - "RAISE A SCANDAL OR
175
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
THROW IT AWAY." THERE IS NO PARTICULAR SOVIET INTEREST
IN EX POST FACTO CONSULTATIONS.
--INSPECTION SHOULD BE CALLED INSPECTION, NOT SOME
EUPHEMISM.
--THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS "THINKING" ABOUT THE TRADEOFF
IMPLICIT IN SPECIFYING VARIOUS MEANS OF VERIFICATION IN
RETURN FOR SPECIFYING THE INSPECTED STATE'S RIGHT TO
CHOOSE AND USE WHATEVER MEANS IT SELECTS.
--SOVIET THINKING IS DETERMINED MORE BY THE WESTERN
PROPOSAL ON INSPECTION SC-1 THAN BY THE SOVIET MODEL IN
MBFR.
--DRAFTING ON INSPECTION CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A
SMALL GROUP, NOT IN A 35 NATION WORKING GROUP.
3. NOTIFICATION:
--SOVIET INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO RESOLVE THE STRUCTURAL AND
NUMERICAL ELEMENTS OF THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER
TOGETHER; THEY CANNOT DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON 2 OR MORE
DIVISIONS UNLESS THEY ARE SURE THAT THE NUMBER IS HIGH
ENOUGH TO PROTECT SINGLE DIVISION EXERCISES.
--MUCH OF SOVIET FEAR OF THE NNA NOTIFICATION FORMULAS
WHICH IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY IDENTIFY REGIMENTS AS THE
UNIT OF ACCOUNT STEMS FROM FEAR THAT THE WEST WILL
INSIST ON DESIGNATION AND NORMAL LOCATIONS OF
PARTICIPATING REGIMENTS. ASSURANCES THAT THIS IS NOT
THE CASE "HAVE HELPED" THEM TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF
UNITS."
it. INFORMATION:
--ALTHOUGH READY TO ACCEPT INSPECTION, THEY WILL NOT
ACCEPT THE IDEA OF "STATIC INFORMATION" - I.E.
DESIGNATION AND HEADQUARTERS LOCATION OF DIVISIONS.
5. TRANSFERS:
--IN RETURN FOR DROPPING TRANSITS, THE SOVIETS INSIST ON
INCLUDING TRANSFERS IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME. THEY
MIGHT BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE INFORMATION ON TRANSFERS IN
THE NOTIFICATION OF LARGER EXERCISES RATHER THAN ASKING
FOR SEPARATE NOTIFICATION.
--BUT THEY ALSO WANT NOTIFICATION OF THE PERMANENT
STATIONING OF NEW UNITS ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL IN
THE ZONE ("TO TAKE CARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE WILL
SEND TWO SIBERIAN ARMIES TO POLAND.")
6. MOVEMENTS:
--BECAUSE THEY ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT OR ITS NNA VERSION "NORMAL
PEACETIME LOCATION," THE SOVEITS STILL INSIST ON A
SEPARATE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE ZONE ABOVE
THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
--THEY SAY THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
ABOUT SUCH MOVEMENTS OF THEIR OWN AND PERMIT OBSERVATION
AND INSPECTION OF SUCH MOVEMENTS (PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE
ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.)
BARRY
176
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 05875
SUBJECT: JOCKEYING ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE MAJOR SOVIET ACTORS ON ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES -- THE PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY -- HAVE
OFTEN BEEN COMPARED TO THE LEGS OF A STOOL: WHENEVER ONE
LEG THREATENS TO UNBALANCE THE STOOL BY TRYING TO
PREDOMINATE, THE OTHER TWO COMBINE FORCES TO BRING IT
DOWN. THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS, A MILITARY-SECURITY FORUM
WHERE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO ARE IMPORTANT, IS A
USEFUL MICROCOSM IN WHICH TO STUDY THE PRESENT JOCKEYING
FOR POWER IN MOSCOW BY THE PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY
IN THE CONTENTS OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW WAY OF THINKING" ON
ARMS CONTROL. BASED ON WHAT WE HAVE OBSERVED HERE, IT
APPEARS TO US THAT THE POLITICAL (PARTY) LEADERSHIP,
REPRESENTED HERE BY THE MFA, HAS JOINED FORCES WITH THE
KGB AND THAT THE MILITARY IS FIGHTING AN AGGRESSIVELY
DEFENSIVE BATTLE INTERNALLY WITHIN THE SOVIET DELEGATION
AS WELL AS EXTERNALLY IN THE CONFERENCE. AT DIFFERENT
TIMES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS,, DELEGATION HEAD GRINEVSKY
AND GENERAL STAFF REP TATARNIKOV HAVE APPEARED TC HOLD THE
UPPER HAND. THIS HAS BEEN REFLECTED PARTICULARLY CLEARLY
DURING THE DRAFTING PHASE IN INCREASING SIGNS OF
DIFFERENCES OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND
MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HOWEVER, IN
THE END GAME NEGOTIATIONS, GIVEN PAST SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND
RECENT EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW WANTS AN AGREEMENT AT
STOCKHOLM, WE EXPECT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO PREVAIL.
IN OUR VIEW, THE GENERAL STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST
MAKING COMPROMISES ON SUBSTANCE, BUT IN THE END WILL
KNUCKLE UNDER WITHOUT SURRENDERING. RATHER, IT WILL TRY
TO SET THE STAGE FOR RE-FIGHTING THE BATTLES IT LOSES HERE
BY PROPOSING (AS THE PRICE THE CONFERENCE HAS TO :PAY FOR
THESE COMPROMISES) THAT "UNRESOLVED" ISSUES BE DEFERRED
UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE . END SUMMARY.
3. THE MAJOR SOVIET ACTORS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES -- THE
PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY -- HAVE OFTEN BEEN
COMPARED TO THE LEGS OF A STOOL: WHENEVER ONE LEG
THREATENS TO UNBALANCE THE STOOL BY TRYING TO PREDOMINATE,
THE OTHER TWO COMBINE FORCES TO BRING IT DOWN. THE CDE
NEGOTIATIONS, A MILITARY-SECURITY FORUM WHERE POL::TICAL
CONSIDERATIONS ALSO ARE IMPORTANT, IS A USEFUL MICROCOSM
IN WHICH TO STUDY THE PRESENT JOCKEYING FOR POWER IN
MOSCOW BY THE PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY FOR CONTROL
OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW WAY OF THINKING" ON ARMS CONTROL.
THESE ISSUES RECENTLY CAME TO A HEAD WHEN THE POL]:TBURO
DISCUSSED CDE ISSUES ON JULY 10; THE "NEW THINKER" SEEM
TO HAVE CARRIED THE DAY. WE HAVE HAD TWO AND A HALF YEARS
OF NEGOTIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM, BOTH BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL. HERE ARE SOME OF THE DELEGATION'S THOUGHTS:
4. THE MAJOR PLAYERS ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION: THE MAJOR
177
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
ACTORS ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION ARE: ON THE POLITICAL
SIDE: AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF DELEGATION AND
KGB REPRESENTATIVE IVAN ROZANOV. MFA REPRESENTATIVES
YURIY RAKHMANINOV, WHO LIMITS HIMSELF TO THE NON-USE OF
FORCE, BUT ACTS AS THE ACTING HEAD OF DELEGATION WHEN
GRINEVSKY IS AWAY, AND VLADIMIR YEROFEYEV, WHO ACTS AS
GRINEVSKY'S TROUBLE-SHOOTER WHEN PERIPHERAL ISSUES
THREATEN TO DEADLOCK THE CONFERENCE, PLAY LESSER, IF ANY,
ROLES IN DETERMINING POLICY. ON THE MILITARY SIDE: MAJOR
GENERAL VIKTOR TATARNIKOV.
5. BACKGROUND: THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THESE THREE INSTITUTIONS HAS WAXED AND WANED OVER TIME,
WITH THE MAIN COMPETITION OCCURRING BETWEEN GRINEVSKY AND
TATARNIKOV. THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE
PHASES: 1) THE FIRST YEAR (1984) OF PLENARY MEETINGS
SETTING FORTH PARTY LINE POSITIONS WHEN GRINEVSKY WAS THE
MAIN DEFENDER OF THE SOVIET POSITION; 2) THE SECOND YEAR
(1985) OF WORKING GROUP DEBATES WHEN TATARNIKOV WAS THE
MOST VISIBLE SOVIET DELEGATE; AND 3) THE FINAL YEAR (1986)
WHEN ACTUAL DRAFTING OCCURRED.
6. IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, DIFFERENCES
OF APPROACH BETWEEN GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV WERE NOT
APPARENT SINCE GRINEVSKY'S PLENARY STATEMENTS BASICALLY
REFLECTED THE PARTY LINE WHICH, IN TURN, REFLECTED THE
CONCERNS OF THE GENERAL STAFF. GRINEVSKY'S CONTRIBUTION
WAS TO PACKAGE THE AGREED PARTY LINE IN TERMS
COMPREHENSIBLE TO WESTERN DELEGATIONS AND PUBLICS. THESE
CONCERNS INCLUDED: 1) THE LONG-TERM SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF
HAVING A DRDIT DE REGARD OVER NATO DEFENSE DECISIONS
THROUGH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WHICH SEEKS TO DIVORCE U.S. AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS BY STRESSING "OUR COMMON
(EUROPEAN) HOME"; 2) THE MEDIUM TERM OBJECTIVE OF
EXTENDING THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION WESTWARD INTO THE
ATLANTIC TO CAPTURE U.S. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AND
REINFORCEMENTS AND TO REDRESS BREZHNEV'S UNILATERAL
EXTENSION AT MADRID OF THE ZONE EASTWARD TO THE URALS; AND
3) THE SHORTER TERM OBJECTIVE OF MINIMIZING THE EFFECTS OF
ANY CDE CSBM'S ON SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND GENERAL
PURPOSE FORCES. IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THEIR LONG-TERM
OBJECTIVE, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED STOCKHOLM AS A PUBLIC
FORUM WHERE THEY CAN EXPLOIT EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT "THE
ARMS RACE" AND DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS
PERSHING-2'S, IN EUROPE. THEY HAVE TRIED TO ACHIEVE THE
SECOND OBJECTIVE BY DESTROYING THE MADRID MANDATE'S
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND THE THIRD BY STALLING ON
THE DRAFTING OF SPECIFIC MODALITIES AND OTHER DETAILS ON
INDIVIDUAL MEASURES. DURING THIS EARLY STAGE, GRINEVSKY
WAS THE MOST VISIBLE MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WITH
TATARNIKOV AND ROZANOV (AND HIS STOLID PREDECESSOR IVANOV)
NATURALLY IN THE BACKGROUND.
7. HOWEVER, THE CONFERENCE'S TRANSITION IN LATE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
1985-EARLY 1986 FROM FORMAL PLENARY MEETINGS, WHEF'E HEADS
OF DELEGATION PRESENTED INITIAL NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE
NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND PROPOSALS, TO INFORMAL WORKING
GROUPS, WHERE DELEGATIONS WERE REPRESENTED AT A WCRKING
LEVEL, GAVE THE GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE A FORUM FOR
ARGUING THE MERITS OF SOVIET GENERAL STAFF POSITIONS.
8. THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) GROUP HAS BEEN A SPECIAL
CASE, WHERE ONLY THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE DELEGATION HAS
BEEN VISIBLE. EARLY IN THE CONFERENCE RAKHMANINOV WAS
VERY VISIBLE IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP WHERE HE PUSHED A
NUF TREATY AND NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
INSISTED THAT THERE MUST BE EQUAL TREATMENT FOR
"POLITICAL-MILITARY" CSBM'S (NUF) AND FOR
"MILITARY-TECHNICAL" CSBM'S (EVERYTHING ELSE); IN RECENT
MONTHS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE DRAFTING PHASE, HE HAS
PRACTICALLY DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT. THIS CAN BE EXPLAINED
IN PART BY HIS INADEQUATE COMMAND OF ENGLISH AND PARTLY BY
HIS ADMISSION THAT NOW IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE A
NUF SECTION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, HE WOULD BE
SATISFIED WITH CUTTING AND PASTING LANGUAGE FROM TE
HELSINKI ACT. HE MAY EVEN BE SOMEWHAT DISQUIETED :3Y THE
WAY THE WEST HAS TAKEN CONTROL OF THE CONTENT OF 7NUF
SECTION, SUPPORTED BY THE NNA AND, ON CERTAIN ISSUES, EVEN
TACITLY BY A NUMBER OF EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS. THE
ONLY ISSUE HE RAISES NOW IS INCLUSION OF THE TERM
"MILITARY" OR "ARMED" FORCE IN THE DOCUMENT. OTHERWISE,
HE SITS BACK IN THE DRAFTING SESSIONS WITH A BEATIFIC
SMILE ON HIS FACE, CLEARLY NOT UNDERSTANDING THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE DISCUSSION AND LETS THE CAPABLE HUNGARIAN DEPUTY
(KORMENDY) NEGOTIATE FOR THE EAST.
9. TATARNIKOV, A PRACTICED PUBLIC SPEAKER, INITIALLY
REPRESENTED THE SOVIET UNION AT ALL FOUR WORKING GROUPS
DEALING WITH MILITARY ISSUES. TATARNIKOV EVEN DOM]:NATED
THE SINGLE WORKING GROUP (A-2 ON INFORMATION,
VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATIONS) WHERE ROZANOV REPRESENTED
THE USSR. THEN, WHEN THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DISCUSS
INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN B-1,
TATARNIKOV STOPPED ATTENDING THE A-2 GROUP, BUT MADE SURE
THAT THE GENERAL STAFF'S INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED BY
HAVING HIS SUBORDINATE, COLONEL IGOR BOGDANOV, SHARE THE
SOVIET SEAT WITH ROZANOV. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE ON SOVIET
DELEGATIONS TO U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TALKS,
TATARNIKOV'S ACCESS TO MILITARY INFORMATION WHICH
APPARENTLY WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS
DELEGATION FURTHER STRENGTHENED HIS NEGOTIATING PO:,ITION
BOTH EXTERNALLY IN THE CONFERENCE AND INTERNALLY VIS-A-VIS
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND THE WTO. A
FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY, HE WAS SOON SEEN AS THE EASTERN
FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH -- AT TIMES OVERSHADOWING EVEN
GRINEVSKY AS ISSUES BECOME INCREASINGLY MILITARY AND
HIGHLY TECHNICAL.
179
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
10. THE KGB'S INTEREST, AND THEREFORE ROLE, IN THE CDE
NEGOTIATIONS ARE LESS CLEAR-CUT THAN THOSE OF THE GENERAL
STAFF. WE ASSUME THAT THEY SEEK TO LIMIT CSBM'S WHICH
INCREASE WESTERN INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND CONTACTS BY SOVIET CITIZENS, AND
ESPECIALLY BY SOVIET SOLDIERS, WITH WESTERN OBSERVERS OR
INSPECTORS.
11. EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE KGB WAS REPRESENTED
BY A HIGHLY BOMBASTIC, POLEMICAL MAN, BORIS IVANOV, WHO
ENDED UP BORING WESTERN REPS WITH HIS FIVE-MINUTE
DIATRIBES ON U.S. INF DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND HIS
ZEALOUS SUPPORT FOR SOVIET PROPOSALS WHICH OTHER
DELEGATIONS INCREASINGLY SAW AS NON-STARTERS (NON-FIRST
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES AND A EUROPEAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS
BAN). PERHAPS EVEN THE SOVIETS SAW THAT THEY HAD REACHED
THE POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS IN USING IVANOV TO
INFLUENCE OTHER DELEGATIONS: IN EARLY 1985 HE WAS
REPLACED BY IVAN ROZANOV WHOSE MESSAGE AND NEGOTIATING
STYLE WAS MORE SOPHISTICATED AND MORE PALATABLE TO WESTERN
DELEGATES.
12. ROZANOV, IN CONTRAST TO HIS PREDECESSOR, WAS WILLING
TO SET ASIDE POLEMICS AND TO DISCUSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF
POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH
NORMALLY ELICIT A NEURALGIC REACTION FROM SOVIETS, E.G.,
ON-SITE INSPECTION, INFORMATION. RELATIVELY EARLY ON HE
HINTED AT AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION AND,
ON INSPECTION, SAID SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THAT IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON SOME FORM OF ON-SITE
INSPECTION. ONLY RECENTLY HAVE THE SOVIETS INDICATED
PUBLICLY THAT THIS MAY BE POSSIBLE.
13. AS SOVIET BLOCKAGE OF SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING BECAME
CLEAR FOR ALL TO SEE, ROZANOV EXPRESSED IRRITATION THAT
TATARNIKOV, "THE MOST PEDANTIC PERSON ON OUR DELEGATION",
WAS THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION AT THE CONFERENCE AND
CRITICIZED THE MILITARY IN GENERAL AS "INEPT
NEGOTIATORS." IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING HE SOFTENED HIS
CRITICISM BY SAYING THAT WHILE HE ADMIRED TATARNIKOV AS A
COMPETENT MILITARY PROFESSIONAL, THE SOVIET GENERAL HAD
VERY NARROW INSTRUCTIONS AND NO LICENSE TO DEVIATE FROM
THEM. INTRUSION BY GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVES INTO HIS
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CLEARLY RANKLES ROZANOV WHO LEFT
THE ROOM ONE DAY WHEN BOGDANOV SUBMITTED A PARTICULARLY
UNCOMPROMISING TEXT. ROZANOV, MOREOVER, HAS DISTANCED
HIMSELF FROM THE GENERAL STAFF'S CONSERVATIVE APPROACH,
ARGUING IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THERE WILL BE NO
AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM UNLESS THE POLITICAL
REPRESENTATIVES ("POLITIKI") STEP IN AND PREVAIL OVER THE
MILITARY REPS WHOSE TASK, IN HIS VIEW, IS TO DEFEND THEIR
MILITARY DOCTRINES, NOT TO MAKE THE COMPROMISES NECESSARY
TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. ROZANOV HAS PLACED
130
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
HIMSELF SQUARELY ON THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE EQUATION AND
HAS INITIATED A SERIES OF PERIODIC MEETINGS WITH A USDEL
MEMBER TO DISCUSS THE FULL RANGE OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL
ISSUES AT THE CONFERENCE.
14. SOVIET BACKPEDALING: WE HAVE OBSERVED ON A NUMBER OF
OCCASIONS HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DECISIONS APPEARING TO BE
UNDERCUT IN THEIR EXECUTION BY MEMBERS OF THE SOY IT
DELEGATION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS COMMON SOVIET
NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR TO AGREE TO SOMETHING IN PRINCIPLE IN
A GRAND PUBLIC GESTURE AND THEN IN PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS TO
COME UP WITH FINE PRINT WHICH EITHER TAKES THE TEETH OUT
OF THE PRINCIPLED AGREEMENT OR INSERTS UNACCEPTABLE.
CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THERE IS MORE TO IT
THAN THAT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION SEVERAL TIMES HAS
RESISTED CARRYING OUT THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF GORBACHEV'S
PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ON CDE ISSUES. MOREOVER, WITHIN THE
SOVIET DELEGATION ITSELF GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV HAVE
CONVEYED DIFFERENT MESSAGES IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH
WESTERN DELEGATIONS -- AT TIMES EVEN CONTRADICTING EACH
OTHER. AND, FINALLY, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, TATARN]KOV HAS
TAKEN INITIATIVES WHICH HAVE BLOCKED PROGRESS IN T}E
CONFERENCE WITHOUT BOTHERING TO INFORM GRINEVSKY OF HIS
ACTIONS. GRINEVSKY HAS BEEN VISIBLY ANGRY WHEN WE:TERN
DELEGATES HAVE INFORMED HIM OF POSITIONS TAKEN BY
TATARNIKOV WITHOUT CONSULTING HIM. SOME EXAMPLES CF
SOVIET BACKPEDALLING FOLLOW:
-- GORBACHEV HAS MADE A POINT OF USING FRANCO-SOVIET
SUMMITS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE MUCH-PUBLICIZED
CONCESSIONS ON CDE ISSUES. DURING HIS TRIP TO PARIS IN
OCTOBER, 1985, GORBACHEV MADE A SPLASH WHEN HE ANNOUNCED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE INCLUDING
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR.
WESTERN AND NNA DELEGATIONS VIEWED THIS AS A MAJOR SIGNAL
THAT THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF CSBM'S. HOWEVER, WHEN THE SOVIET DELEGATION
IN STOCKHOLM REVEALED THE DETAILS OF THE SOVIET PRO1?OSAL,
ITS INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, IN
ADDITION TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, RENDERED THE Sc)VIET
PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE.
DURING THE RECESS IN JANUARY 1986 GORBACHEV MADE A
STATEMENT IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE
WILLING TO POSTPONE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CDE. UNTIL THAT
TIME THE SOVIETS HAD USED INSISTENCE ON INCLUSION OF
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES -- WHICH THE WEST AND EVEN
MOST OF THE NNA AGREED WERE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE,
MADRID MANDATE AND, THEREFORE, UNACCEPTABLE -- TO BLOCK
PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE. WE RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM LATE
IN JANUARY EXPECTING THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO IMPLEMENT
GORBACHEV'S GESTURE. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. INSTEAD, THE
SOVIET DELEGATION TRIED TO GET LANGUAGE REGISTERED
131
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
=;1 r
FORMALLY BY THE CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL NAVAL
ACTIVITIES WOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE OF THE
CONFERENCE, IN WHAT WE INTERPRET AS THE GENERAL STAFF'S
ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE WHATEVER FUTURE MANDATE THE VIENNA
REVIEW MEETING MAY AGREE TO.
-- AT ABOUT THE TIME THE SOVIETS PROPOSED DEFERRING NAVAL
ACTIVITIES THEY STARTED PUSHING THEIR NEXT, AND MUCH MORE
THORNY, OBSTACLE BY PROPOSING THAT THAT ALL AIR ACTIVITIES
-- INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES -- BE NOTIFIED.
THE HIGH PARAMETER -- 700 SORTIES -- WHICH THE SOVIETS
PROPOSED WAS INTENDED TO CAPTURE THE PRINCIPLE OF
INDEPENDENT AIR WHILE NOT ACTUALLY CAPTURING SOVIET AIR
ACTIVITIES. SINCE MANY INTERPRET THE "WHOLE OF EUROPE" IN
THE MANDATE AS INCLUDING THE AIR SPACE ABOVE EUROPE, IT
WAS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO REJECT THIS SOVIET
PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND. INSTEAD WE HAD TO ARGUE THAT SUCH
ACTIVITIES ARE UNVERIFIABLE. THIS SOVIET-CREATED OBSTACLE
BLOCKED PROGRESS ON THE KEY ISSUES OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES
TO BE NOTIFIED AND PARAMETERS UNTIL THE FINAL WEEK OF THIS
(PENULTIMATE) ROUND. ONCE AGAIN THE SOVIETS USED A
FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMIT -- THIS TIME MITTERAND'S JULY VISIT
TO MOSCOW -- TO UNVEIL IMPORTANT SOVIET CONCESSIONS. THEY
AGREED TO DEAL WITH AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND ACCEPTED
ON-SITE INSPECTION IN PRINCIPLE, THE WEST'S SINE QUA NON
FOR AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM.
-- HOWEVER, AS THEY MOVED FORWARD ON AIR, TYPES OF
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND GROUND FORCE
PARAMETERS, INDICATING THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT SOME SORT
OF COMBINED (STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL, EQUIPMENT) PARAMETER
WHICH WOULD TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, THEY ONCE AGAIN BEGAN
PUSHING ANOTHER DIFFICULT ISSUE: TRANSFERS. MOREOVER, IN
PUBLIC FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY RAISED THE ISSUE OF
TRANSITS -- APPARENTLY AS BARGAINING FAT SINCE, IN
PRIVATE, THEY INDICATED THAT IF WE WOULD AGREE TO NOTIFY
TRANSFERS SEPARATELY, THEY WOULD DROP TRANSITS.
15. POLITICAL-MILITARY COMPETITION: AS THESE EXAMPLES
INDICATE, THE GENERAL STAFF HAS HAD THE PREDOMINANT VOICE
IN DETERMINING THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSALS AT
STOCKHOLM AND THE PARTY, REPRESENTED HERE BY GRINEVSKY,
HAS PACKAGED AND PROPAGATED THEM. HOWEVER, WHEN PUSH HAS
COME TO SHOVE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, SO FAR POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS HAVE PREVAILED OVER GENERAL STAFF
POSITIONS: HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL SIDE APPARENTLY WAS NOT
STRONG ENOUGH TO RUN ROUGHSHOD OVER THE GENERAL STAFF
WHICH HAS BEEN ABLE TO DELAY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS BY IMPOSING UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS.
16. RIVALRY BETWEEN GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV:
GRINEVSKY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TATARNIKOV, TO THE EXTENT
THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE IT, HAS CHANGED AS THE
NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE CHANGED: EARLY IN THE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
NEGOTIATIONS, GRINEVSKY FELT FREE TO MEET WITH HIS U.S.
COUNTERPART ALONE TO PRESENT THE GENERAL SOVIET POSITION
ON BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES. AS ONE WESTERN
MILREP OBSERVED RECENTLY, GRINEVSKY'S ROLE DURING THE
EARLY MONTHS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO PRESENT THE
GENERAL STAFF'S VIEW IN DIPLOMATICALLY ACCEPTABLE
LANGUAGE. TATARNIKOV SIMILARLY MET WITH THE U.S. :DEPUTY
AND JCS AND OSD REPS TO DISCUSS "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" ISSUE
"SOLDIER TO SOLDIER". HOWEVER, AFTER THE CONFERENCE
RESUMED IN LATE JANUARY 1986 AND ACTUAL DRAFTING OF
COMPROMISE LANGUAGE APPEARED TO BE IMMINENT, GRINEVSKY
INSISTED ON HAVING HIS GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE WITH
HIM AT PRIVATE BILATERAL MEETINGS. IN THESE MEETINGS
TATARNIKOV, NOT GRINEVSKY, USUALLY HAS SPOKE FOR THE
SOVIET SIDE ON MILITARY ISSUES.
IT. MORE RECENTLY, SINCE HIS TWO TRIPS TO MOSCOW HIS
ROUND, GRINEVSKY SEEMS TO FEEL THAT HE HAS THE UPPER HAND
AGAIN. HE AGAIN HAS SUGGESTED PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH HIS
U.S. COUNTERPART AND WHEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS
HAVE MET WITH HANSEN AND TATARNIKOV, GRINEVSKY HAS NOT
BEEN CAREFUL TO SEE THAT EVERYTHING IS INTERPRETED FOR
TATARNIKOV. ON OCCASIONS WHEN HE APPEARS TO THINK THAT
U.S. COMMENTS MAY INFLUENCE HIS INFLEXIBLE MIL REP, E.G.,
WHEN WE EXPLAINED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIKO FOFIMULA ON
GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS AS A MOVE TOWARD THE SOVIET
POSITION, HE DID INSIST ON CAREFUL INTERPRETATION.
18. CONVERSELY, TATARNIKOV HAS SEEMED TO SENSE A CHANGE
IN THE WIND FROM MOSCOW AND, APPARENTLY FEARING THAT
GRINEVSKY MAY OUTFLANK HIM IF HE HOLDS OUT TOO LONG, HAS
NEGOTIATED SERIOUSLY FOR THE FIRST TIME THIS ROUND WITH
U.S. ON AIR, GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, TRANSFERS, ETC. HE
HAS BEEN EAGER TO NAIL DOWN AGREEMENT ON THE TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED BEFORE THE OFFICIAL END OF THE
SESSION, AGAIN APPARENTLY WORRIED BY WHAT GRINEVSKY MIGHT
AGREE TO DURING THE WEEK OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS (JULY
21-25) WHICH THE FRENCH AND THE SOVIETS PROPOSED AFTER
THEIR RECENT SUMMIT. GRINEVSKY HAS GIVEN TATARNIKOV A
FIRST CRACK GO AT DRAFTING COMPROMISE LANGUAGE ON THESE
ISSUES, BUT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WILL REMAIN FOR THE
WEEK OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. SINCE TATARNIKOV'S
COUNTERPART ON THE U.S. DELEGATION (HANSEN) MADE IT CLEAR
THAT HE HAD TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIO:;IS, THE
PRESSURE WAS ON TATARNIKOV DURING THE FINAL WEEK OF THE
ROUND TO PROTECT THE GENERAL STAFF POSITION. (IT WAS NOT
COINCIDENTAL THAT DURING THE FINAL WEEK, THE CONFERENCE
NOTED TEXTS ON GROUND, AIR, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE
ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV WAS NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT THE
CONDITIONS WE PLACED ON AGREEMENT TO NOTE LANGUAGE ON
TRANSFERS.)
19. CONCLUSION: THUS, BASED ON WHAT WE HAVE OBSERVED
HERE, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE POLITICAL (PARTY)
133
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTED HERE BY THE MFA, HAS JOINED FORCES
WITH THE KGB AND THAT THE MILITARY IS FIGHTING AN
AGGRESSIVELY DEFENSIVE BATTLE INTERNALLY WITHIN THE SOVIET
DELEGATION AS WELL AS EXTERNALLY IN THE CONFERENCE. AT
DIFFERENT TIMES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, GRINEVSKY AND
TATARNIKOV HAVE APPEARED TO HOLD THE UPPER HAND. THIS HAS
BEEN REFLECTED PARTICULARLY CLEARLY DURING THE DRAFTING
PHASE IN INCREASING SIGNS OF DIFFERENCES OF STRATEGY AND
TACTICS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE
SOVIET DELEGATION. HOWEVER, IN THE END GAME NEGOTIATIONS,
GIVEN PAST SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND RECENT EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW
WANTS AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM, WE EXPECT POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS TO PREVAIL. IN OUR VIEW, THE GENERAL STAFF
WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST MAKING COMPROMISES ON SUBSTANCE,
BUT IN THE END WILL KNUCKLE UNDER WITHOUT SURRENDERING.
RATHER, THE GENERAL STAFF WILL TRY TO SET THE STAGE FOR
RE-FIGHTING THE BATTLES IT LOSES HERE BY PROPOSING (AS THE
PRICE THE CONFERENCE HAS TO PAY FOR THESE COMPROMISES)
THAT "UNRESOLVED" ISSUES BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05876
SUBJECT: CDE: SOVIETS ON INSPECTIONS
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 5425; B. STOCKHOLM 5703
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. ALL SIGNS ARE THAT THE USSR HAS BITTEN
THE BULLET AND MADE THE DIFFICULT DECISION TO ACCEPT A
LIMITED NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS, IN PRACTICE AS WELL AS
PRINCIPLE AND WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL, IN THE CON'TXT
OF THE CSBMS AGREED HERE IN STOCKHOLM. ALTHOUGH THE
SOVIET CURRENT PUBLIC POSITION ON INSPECTIONS REMA::NS
UNACCEPTABLE TO US, FROM A VARIETY OF INDICATORS WE
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PIECE TOGETHER THEIR PROBABLE FINAL
POSITION, ONE WHICH WE WOULD FIND ACCETABLE. THE
CRITICAL. JOB WILL BE DRAFTING MODALITIES TO MAKE AM
INSPECTION REGIME EFFECTIVE. END SUMMARY.
3. IN A WORKING GROUP MEETING JULY 9, SOVIET DELEGATE
ROZANOV OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE,
PUBLIC SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTION/VERIFICATION FOR
CSBMS (REF A): (COMMENT: SINCE THIS WORKING GROUP
MEETING PRECEDED THE JULY 1 POLITBURO MEETING AT WEIICH
CDE WAS DISCUSSED AND THE INSPECTION ISSUE PRESUMABLY
DECIDED, WE DO NOT THINK MUCH IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE
PLACED ON THIS STATEMENT. END COMMENT)
-- ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTICN IN
A CSBMS CONTEXT, BROADLY DEFINED;
-- AGREEMENT TO RECORD THIS PRINCIPLE IN A STOCKHOLM
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IF DIRECTLY LINKED TO IMPLICIT
AGREEMENT THAT THERE WILL BE A FUTURE
DISARMAMENT/REDUCTION STAGE FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND
WEAPONS, AS FORESEEN IN THE WTO BUDAPEST APPEAL;
--DEFERRAL OF THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE TO THIS FUTURE DISARMAMENT/REDUCTION STAGE.
PARTICIPATING STATES LACK THE NECESSARY PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCE TO IMPLEMENT INSPECTION AT THE STOCKHOLM
CSBM STAGE.
-- WHILE DEFERRING PRACTICAL APPLICATION, THE USSR HAS
LEFT ROOM FOR EXPERIMENTATION AND TEST RUNS OF
INSPECTION EVEN BEFORE THE NEGOTIATION ON, AND ADOPTION
OF, DISARMAMENT/REDUCTION MEASURES, I.E. "DURING
VIENNA" CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING;
-- ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF SUCH TEST RUNS WOULD BE TO
ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION MODALITIES DEVELOPED WOULD
NOT BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE TASK OR TOO "STRINGENT."
-- A REFERENCE TO OBSERVATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
INSPECTION, I.E. INSPECTION "AS ONE OF THE ELEMENT$ OF
THE MACHINERY FOR COMPLIANCE AND OBSERVANCE OF CSBMa,"
AND "INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION OF. . .";
4. IN THE CLOSING PLENARY OF ROUND XI (07/18/86), JJSSR
AMB. GRINEVSKY STATED THAT, IF OTHERS WOULD TAKE SOVIET
SECURITY CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, THE USSR WAS PREPARED
TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN AND NNA COMMENTS THAT 'l'HE
135
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION ALONE WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH (REF
B). FROM THIS SPEECH AND SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS WITH
SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERNERS, THE FOLLOWING PICTURE OF
THE USSR POSITION IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE:
-- THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN FACT, ACCEPTED BOTH PRINCIPLE
AND PRACTICE OF INSPECTION IN THE STOCKHOLM CDE CONTEXT.
-- INSPECTION SHOULD BE APPLIED ON A LIMITED AND
EXCEPTIONAL BASIS AND BE TIED CLOSELY TO "REAL"
VIOLATIONS, AS OPPOSED TO LESS CONCRETE "DOUBTS." IN
THIS CONTEXT, THE ROLE OF CLARIFICATIONS AND/OR
CONSULTATIONS WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THEM, AND THEY MAY
SEEK SUCH AN EXCHANGE AS A PRE-CONDITION TO AN
INSPECTION.
-- THEY SEEM TO BE HEADING FOR A PASSIVE QUOTA OF ONE
OR TWO INSPECTIONS TO BE CONDUCTED ON A PARTICIPATING
STATE'S TERRITORY PER YEAR.
-- THEY CAN ACCEPT A "NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL" REGIME UNDER
THE APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES AND, IN THIS CONTEXT,
BOTH THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS ALLOWED AND THE CRITERIA
FOR WHAT AREAS WILL BE RESTRICTED OR EXCLUDED FROM
INSPECTION WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THEM. IN
SOME INFORMAL CONTACTS, THEY HAVE INDICATED A NEED FOR
LARGE RESTRICTED AREAS, ON THE ORDER OF 20-25 OF A
STATE'S TERRITORY. OF THIS TERRITORY, SOME WOULD BE
PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED, WHICH WOULD BE ANNOUNCED, AND
SOME OF IT DECLARED AS NEEDED AND NOT ANNOUNCED IN
DETAIL. IN OTHER CONTACTS, THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT
THE SC.1 APPROACH OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE INSPECTION
REGIME WOULD BE ADEQUATE. IN THE COURSE OF AN ACTUAL
INSPECTION, THEY SEEM TO ENVISAGE THAT, AS WITH
OBSERVERS, INSPECTORS WOULD BE GUIDED BY HOST COUNTRY
AND THUS STEERED AWAY FROM SENSITIVE POINTS NOT KNOWN
OR PREVIOUSLY DECLARED.
-- THEY ENVISAGE DEVELOPING CONCRETE MODALITIES FOR
APPLICATION AS PART OF THE CSBM REGIME ADOPTED HERE IN
STOCKHOLM, ALTHOUGH THEY WANT TO ALLOW ROOM TO REFINE
THE MODALITIES AS NECESSARY. MODALITIES ALONG THE
LINES LAID OUT IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED MEASURE 5 MAY HEAD IN
THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN A CHANGE,OF POSITION, HOWEVER,
THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW COMPLETELY DISAVOWED TME CONCEPT
OF "EXPERIMENTAL" INSPECTION. ROZANV, WHO INTRODUCED
THE CONCEPT, TOLD THE FRG ON JULY 23 THAT IF INSPECTION
IS AGREED HERE IT WILL NOT BE EXPERIEMENTAL.
-- THEY ACCEPT AERIAL INSPECTIONS, THOUGH THEY
APPARENTLY WANT TO SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT. SO FAR, THEY
HAVE SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF NEUTRAL
AIRCRAFT/NEUTRAL OBSERVERS.
5. COMMENT:
-- MOST IMMEDIATELY, SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION AS
PART OF A CDE CSBM REGIME OPENS UP THE POSSIBILITY THAT
STOCKHOLM WILL, IN FACT, REACH A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME;
136
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
-- A KEY IN UNLOCKING THE FINAL DOOR FOR INSPECTION MAY
LIE IN HOW RESTRICTED/EXCEPTED AREAS ARE RESOLVED, AND
HOW THE SOVIETS WANT TO FIT
CLARIFICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS INTO THE OVERALL
COMPLIANCE REGIME. THE EAST WILL HAVE SUPPORT FROII THE
NNA REGARDING A ROLE OF SOME KIND FOR CLARIFICATIONS
AND CONSULTATIONS IN AN OVERALL COMPLIANCE REGIME,
THOUGH THE MAJORITY OF THE NNA SHARE OUR VIEW THAT
NEITHER CLARIFICATIONS NOR CONSULTATIONS CAN SERVE TO
DELAY, OR AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, INSPECTION. AT THIS
POINT, MANY NNA ARE LOOKING AT CONSULTATIONS AS A
POST-INSPECTION MECHANISM TO SERVE DETERRENT PURPOSES
AND TO HOLD PARTICIPATING STATES POLITICALLY
ACCOUNTABLE. SOME NNA CLEARLY ENVISAGE SOME KIND OF
FOLLOW-UP REPORTS, PARTICULARLY IF REPORTS INDICATE
THAT THE RESULTS OF INSPECTION ARE EITHER AMBIGUOUS OR
INDICATIVE OF CLEAR VIOLATIONS. WE HAVE MORE SYMPATHY
FOR THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO
PRESCRIBED FOLLOW-UP TO AN INSPECTION; EACH INSPECTING
STATE WOULD DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHAT TO DO WITH ITS
INSPECTION REPORT.
-- THE REFERENCES TO THE WTO BUDAPEST PROPOSAL AND TO
THE APPLICABILITY OF INSPECTION FOR CSBMS "IN THE
PROCESS OF MONITORING REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AID
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS" INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS
PURSUING A CDE STAGE II OUTCOME FROM VIENNA BASED UPON
ITS BUDAPEST PROPOSAL. THUS CDE SEEMS TO BE THEIR
PREFERRED OPTION FOR PURSUIT OF THE BUDAPEST PROPOSAL,
AND INSPECTION, A WESTERN CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVE, SERVES
AS A LINK FROM STOCKHOLM TO THE NEW FORUM FOCUSING ON
REDUCTIONS/DISARMAMENT.
6. SUBSTANCE/STRATEGY/TACTICS. WE HAVE POCKETED THE
SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO INSPECTION AND INTEND
TO POCKET THEIR IMPLICIT AGREEMENT TO OPERATIONALIZE
INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CSBM'S. AS THE SOVIETS
TRY TO LINK INSPECTION, AND OTHER CDE ISSUES, WITH THE
FUTURE OF CDE, WE HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS UP
TO THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING(S) TO DECIDE THE FUTURE
COURSE OF EVENTS; I.E. WE CANNOT DECIDE IN STOCKHOLM TO
MOVE TO A CDE STAGE II WHERE INSPECTIONS WOULD BE
FURTHER DEVELOPED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
107
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
CRET
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05905
SUBJECT: CDE: MORE ON SOVIET POSITIONS
REF: STOCKHOLM 5863
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BASED ON A LENGTHY MEETING BETWEEN SOVIET CDE
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AND UK AND FRG AMBASSADORS JULY 24
AND A BRIEF BARRY - GRINEVSKY ENCOUNTER JULY 25, WE
HAVE THE FOLLOWING TO ADD TO REFTEL ACCOUNT OF SOVIET
POSITIONS:
A. VERIFICATION:
-- EVEN IF A NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT COULD BE PERMANENTLY
STATIONED IN A NEARBY NEUTRAL CAPITAL AND KEPT
CONSTANTLY AVAILABLE, USSR OBJECTIONS TO AIR INSPECTION
BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE MET;
-- NOR WOULD IT HELP TO HAVE A SOVIET NAVIGATOR ON
BOARD THE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT TO CONTROL ITS ROUTING AND
ALTITUDE UNTIL IT REACHED THE DESIGNATED INSPECTION
AREA;
-- ON THE OTHER HAND, INSPECTORS COULD BRING THEIR OWN
EQUIPMENT (OF A KIND TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED, INCLUDING
PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT) TO USE ABOARD A SOVIET AIRCRAFT;
-- THE USE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS IN AN AIR INSPECTION
IS NOT EXCLUDED.
B. AIR SUB-THRESHOLD:
-- GRINEVSKY REACTED TO BARRY'S PROPOSAL OF AN AIR
THRESHOLD OF 100 BY SAYING THAT 200 WAS AS LOW AS HE
COULD GO AND THAT "THE FRENCH AND GERMANS HAVE ALREADY
ACCEPTED IT."
C. AMPHIBIOUS THRESHOLD:
-- IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURE TO ACCEPT THE NATO THRESHOLD
OF 3 BATTALIONS/3,000 TROOPS FOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS,
GRINEVSKY STUCK WITH 5,000 TROOPS, WHICH, HE CLAIMED,
WOULD PROVIDE "A NUMBER" OF NOTIFICATIONS.
D. GROUND FORCE/COMBINED THRESHOLD:
-- GRINEVSKY PROPOSED TO THE BRITISH AND GERMANS A
SPLIT-LEVEL NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION THRESHOLD WITH THE
NUMERICAL PART OF THE OBSERVATION THRESHOLD AT 20,000.
THEY REJECTED THIS AS WORSE THAN THE CURRENT SOVIET
OFFER OF AN 18,000 TROOP COMMON THRESHOLD FOR
NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION.
-- RESPONDING TO BARRY'S COMMENT THAT SOME EAST
EUROPEANS HAD SAID THAT MOSCOW COULD ACCEPT A
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER OF 10,000 IN THE CONTEXT OF A
SPLIT PARAMETER, GRINEVSKY ANGRILY DENIED THAT 10,000
COULD EVER BE A FIGURE;
-- BARRY IN TURN SAID THAT THE US HAD NO INTEREST IN
THE SPLIT-LEVEL IDEA AND BELIEVED THAT ALL NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED.
E. MOVEMENTS:
-- GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH TO MOVEMENTS
WAS BROADER THAN THAT IN SC.7, WHICH ONLY CALLS FOR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
NOTIFYING MOVEMENTS TO AND FROM THE EXERCISE AREA. THE
SOVIET APPROACH WOULD CAPTURE ALL MOVEMENTS OF UNITS
OVER THE THRESHOLD IF THE MOVEMENTS WENT FURTHER THAN A
CERTAIN DISTANCE.
F. COMMUNICATIONS:
-- THE SOVIETS WILL CALL FOR COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH
NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND SPECIFICALLY RULE OUT
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNELS "FOR THE PRESENT."
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
139
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06370
SUBJECT: CDE--BONN MEETING
1. CDE XII - 002
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: AT THE FRG'S INVITATION, CLOSC ALLIES
MET ON 11 AUGUST FOR A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF
CDE ISSUES IN PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL ROUND. THE
DISCUSSION FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLDS AND INSPECTION. IT SHOULD PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR NEXT WEEKEND'S NATO CDE MEETING IN THE
HAGUE AND WAS USEFUL AS A NUMBER OF ISSUES/POSITIONS
WERE CLARIFIED: ALLIED SUPPORT FOR A COMBINED
STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WAS
SOLIDIFIED; GENERAL CONSENSUS FOR A "TIME
CONSTRAINT" WAS ESTABLISHED; AND DIVERGENT ALLIED
POSITIONS ON RESTRICTED AREAS AND INSPECTIONS WERE
IDENTIFIED. THE DAY-LONG SESSION WAS CHAIRED BY DR.
RUDIGER HARTMANN, FRG. OTHER PARTICIPANTS
INCLUDED: FRG - AMB KLAUS CITRON, DR. BUERSTEDDE,
COL KAHMANN, DR. DUERR; UK - MR. PAUL LEVER, MR.
MACKLEY, COL SPEIGHT; FRANCE - AMB PAUL-HENRI
GASCHIGNARD, COL MERIC, MR. CARRE; US - AMB ROBERT
BARRY, MS WALKER, MS PARRY, MAJ TYO. END SUMMARY.
4. NOTIFICATION: IN INTRODUCING THE SUBJECT OF
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS, HARTMANN IDENTIFIED SEVERAL
FRG OBJECTIVES: 1) TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF
NOTIFICATIONS FOR BOTH NATO AND THE WTO OVER THAT
PROVIDED UNDER THE FINAL ACT; 2) TO ESTABLISH THE
APPLICATION OF A NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME IN
SOVIET TERRITORY EAST OF THE FINAL ACT'S 250 KM
DEMARCATION; 3) TO ENSURE THAT THE FRG DOES NOT
PROVIDE THE VAST MAJORITY OF NATO NOTIFICATIONS; 4)
TO ESTABLISH A ROUGH BALANCE BETWEEN EASTERN AND
WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS; AND 5) TO ENSURE THAT THE NNA
ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE MORE NOTIFICATIONS THAN
UNDER THE FINAL ACT. HE THEN ARTICULATED FRG
CONCERNS REGARDING THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION ON
NOTIFICATION: THAT THE FORMULA FOCUSSES ON
MULTIDIVISIONAL ACTIVITIES ONLY; THAT ALL SOVIET
SINGLE DIVISION EXERCISES WOULD BE EXEMPTED; THAT
THE WTO AND NATO WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE ONLY
5-6 NOTIFICATIONS EACH; AND, THAT ALL NATO
NOTIFICATIONS WOULD BE MADE BY THE FRG.
5. THE US ARGUED THAT, IN ITS VIEW, THESE CONCERNS
WOULD NOT BE OPERATIVE UNDER THE "AT LEAST TWO
MOBILE COMBAT UNITS" FORMULA ENDORSED BY THE
ALLIANCE. BOTH THE US AND FRANCE ARGUED THAT
STRUCTURE WAS ESSENTIAL FOR VERIFICATION AND
ULTIMATELY FOR AN AGREEMENT. FURTHER ELABORATION OF
THE FRG INTERPRETATION REVEALED A KEY
190
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
MISUNDERSTANDING: THE FRG HAD TAKEN THE US FOCUS ON
MULTIDIVISIONAL EXERCISES TO MEAN THAT IN THE
CURRENT FORMULA "UNITS" REFERRED TO DIVISIONS,
RATHER THAN BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS. ALL ALLIES
AGREED THAT "UNITS" CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS
DIVISIONS. BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE
STRUCTURE REQUIRED BY ANY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA WOULD
BE BELOW DIVISIONAL LEVEL, THE FRG DROPPED ALL HIATS
THAT NATO SHOULD CONSIDER DROPPING STRUCTURE FROM
THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD.
6. THE FRG THEN PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING FORMULA,
WHICH WOULD CEMENT THIS UNDERSTANDING VIS-A-VIS
STRUCTURE BY USING THE WORDS "BELOW DIVISIONAL
LEVEL." BEGIN TEXT:
"THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHEN IT INVOLVES AT LEAST TWO COMBAT
UNITS WITH MOTORIZED LAND OR AIR OR SEA
TRANSPORTATION MEANS BELOW DIVISIONAL LEVEL WHICH
MAY BE SUBORDINATED TO MORE THAN ONE DIVISION WITH A
TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST 10,000 TROOPS INCLUDING
SUPPORT TROOPS OR 250 MAIN BATTLE TANKS." END TENT.
THERE ARE SEVERAL OBVIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THIS TEXT
(E.G., "MOTORIZED LAND OR AIR OR SEA TRANSPORTATION
MEANS" COULD REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL
ACTIVITIES; TWO UNITS CANNOT BE SUBORDINATE "TO MORE
THAN ONE DIVISION"), BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE
DISCUSSION THAT THE GERMAN MOTIVATION IN PRODUCING
THIS TEXT WAS TO ESTABLISH AN UNAMBIGUOUS
UNDERSTANDING THAT UNITS BELOW THE DIVISION LEVEL,
I.E., REGIMENTS AND BRIGADES, ARE THE FOCUS OF OUE
FORMULA.
7. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPT OF A
DIFFERENTIATED THRESHOLD (LOWER FOR NOTFICATION TEAN
OBSERVATION) REVEALED GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT A
SINGLE THRESHOLD IS PREFERABLE. A SINGLE THRESHOLD
AS HIGH AS 14-15,000, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE
DESIRABLE. IF NATO PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL IN
NEGOTIATING A SINGLE THRESHOLD BELOW THIS LEVEL,
ALLIES THOUGHT WE MIGHT THEN WANT TO CONSIDER A
SPLIT THRESHOLD WITH THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD LOW
ENOUGH TO REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES EAST OF
THE 250 KM DEMARCATION IN THE USSR AND THEREBY OPEN
THE POSSIBILITY OF INSPECTION IN THAT AREA.
8. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF ESTABLISHING A MINIMUM
NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS, FRANCE ENDORSED THE CONCEPT
OF AGREEING TO A MINIMUM NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS AND
THE FRG SUGGESTED THAT NATO MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER
THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: BEGIN TEXT:
"TO ACHIEVE A FAIR AND EQUITABLE OUTCOME, TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFERENT NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF
191
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
ALLIANCES IN EAST AND WEST, AND THE DIFFERENT
MAGNITUDE OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF STATES INVOLVED,
THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT IS ENVISAGED:
IT IS THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE THRESHOLD
FOR NOTIFICATION AS CONTAINED IN .... WILL LEAD TO
AT LEAST 20 NOTIFICATIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE RESPECTIVE
GROUPS OF COUNTRIES WHICH USED TO HAVE EXERCISE WITH
MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUPS DURING THE LAST 5 YEARS."
END TEXT.
THE US AND UK TRIED TO DISSUADE THE FRG AND FRANCE
FROM THIS APPROACH, ARGUING THAT WE SHOULD GET
AGREEMENT TO THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WHICH WILL
PROVIDE THE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS NATO WANTS, NOT
THE REVERSE.
9. IN AN INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE INFORMATION
ELEMENTS OF NOTIFICATION AND THE OUT-OF-GARRISON
CONCEPT, THE US AND UK STRONGLY SUPPORTED GETTING
AGREEMENT TO INFORMATION ON DESIGNATIONS AND
LOCATIONS OF DIVISIONS. THE US SUGGESTED THAT ITS
POSITION ON TRANSFERS (OUR WILLINGNESS TO IDENTIFY
ARRIVAL BASES WHEN TROOPS BEING TRANSFERRED ARE TO
PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY) COULD
BE USED TO PRESS THE EAST FOR DIVISION LOCATIONS, AS
COULD OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE EASTERN
POSITION ON MOVEMENTS. WHILE ALLIES AGREED THAT THE
SOVIETS ARE THE DEMANDEURS ON LANGUAGE HANDLING
MOVEMENTS, THE FRG IN PARTICULAR SUGGESTED THIS WAS
AN ISSUE ONLY THE US COULD SOLVE. ALTHOUGH ALLIES
HAD NO SUGGESTIONS FOR LANGUAGE BETTER IN TERMS OF
ALLIANCE INTERESTS THAN OUT-OF-GARRISON, IT WAS
RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BLOCK PROGRESS IN
OTHER AREAS (I.E., INSPECTION) IF NATO REMAINS RIGID
IN ITS ENDORSEMENT OF OOG. ALLIES AGREED THAT ANY
MODIFICATION IN THE OOG CONCEPT WOULD HAVE TO
PROTECT THE US POSITION ON TRANSITS AS WELL AS AVOID
COMPLICATING VERIFICATION.
10. IN A BRIEF FORAY INTO THE SUBJECT OF
EXCEPTIONS, THERE WAS GENERAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE US
IDEA THAT ALERTS SHOULD NOT BE COVERED BY ANY
PASSIVE INSPECTION QUOTA. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE
DISCUSSION ON NOTIFICATION, THE US AGAIN RAISED
WASHINGTON CONCERNS WITH THE PHRASE "SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND" AND ASKED ALLIES TO CONSIDER
SUBSTITUTING THE WORDS "COMMON ACTIVITY." ALTHOUGH
INITIAL ALLIED REACTION WAS TO RAISE CONCERN THAT
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF WINTEX WOULD BE
REQUIRED, ALLIES SEEMED TO RECOGNIZE THE STRENGTH
WITH WHICH THE US POSITION IS HELD AND ALL AGREED TO
RE-EXAMINE THE ISSUE AND PROVIDE FORMAL REACTIONS IN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
11. THE LUNCHTIME DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON TWO
PROCEDURAL ISSUES. FIRST, HARTMANN SUGGESTED THAT A
SIMILAR MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE FRINGES OF
THE 27-28 AUGUST HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE MEETING IN
BRUSSELS. DESPITE GENTLE US DISCOURAGEMENT (BASE])
ON THE FACT THAT NO STOCKHOLM REPRESENTATIVES COULD
BE PRESENT AT THAT TIME) THE FRG MAY MAKE A FORMAL
REQUEST. SECOND, DURING A TOUR DE TABLE REGARDING
THE FINAL HANDLING OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THE US
PROPOSED THAT ANY DOCUMENT BE ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM
AND IMPLEMENTED DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW
CONFERENCE. GENERAL SUPPORT WAS EXPRESSED FOR THIS
APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THE PRECISE DATE FOR
IMPLEMENTATION WILL NO DOUBT BE A FAVORITE SUBJECT
FOR UPCOMING NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS.
12. INSPECTION. UNLIKE THE AMICABLE MORNING
SESSION ON NOTIFICATION, THE AFTERNOON DISCUSSION OF
INSPECTION REVEALED SIGNIFICANT DIVERGENCIES IN
ALLIED VIEWS. HARTMANN'S PRESENTATION OF FRG
OBJECTIVES INDICATED THAT THE FRG IS INTERESTED IIi1 A
BROAD SYSTEM OF RESTRICTED AREAS CHARACTERIZED BY:
1) RESTRICTED AREAS NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE (EXCHANGED);
2) THE ABILITY TO CHANGE RESTRICTED AREAS WITH
ADVANCE NOTICE; 3) INSPECTION WITHIN RESTRICTED
AREAS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE PRECLUDED--THE
INSPECTED STATE WOULD DECIDE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS
WHETHER OR NOT TO "ACTIVATE" ITS RESTRICTED AREAS;
AND 4) VERY LIMITED TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH
WOULD BE HANDLED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF SENSITIVE
POINTS. THE FRG ACCOMPANIED THEIR ORAL PRESENTATION
WITH THE FOLLOWING FORMULA: BEGIN TEXT.
"FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH A
MILITARY ACTIVITY WHICH IS NOTIFIABLE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH (M 3), AN INSPECTING STATE IS PERMITTED TO
DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION IS TO BE
CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICIPATING
STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.
SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A 'DESIGNATED
AREA'. THE DESIGNATED AREA WILL INCLUDE, INTER
ALIA, TRAINING AREAS AND PUBLIC TERRAIN BUT WILL BE
LIMITED TO PLACES WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN A DESIGNATED AREA,
THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSPECTED STATE, BUT THE
INSPECTORS WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND
UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS OR
ACTIVATED RESTRICTED AREAS, NOT INCLUDING TRAINING
AREAS. SENSITIVE POINTS WILL BE DECLARED AT LATEST
193
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S SECRET
AT THE TIME OF THE INSPECTION. THE INDIVIDUAL
SENSITIVE POINT SHOULD NOT EXCEED X SQUARE MILES.
RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE AS FEW IN NUMBER AND AS
LIMITED IN EXTENT AS POSSIBLE NOT EXCEEDING X PCT OF
THE EUROPEAN TERRITORY OF THE PARTICIPATING STATE
AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATED
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S. RESTRICTIVE
AREAS ARE TO BE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
ANY CHANGE IN THE NUMBERS OF GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES OF RESTRICTED AREAS IS TO BE NOTIFIED AT
LEAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE. ACCESS TO RESTRICTED
AREAS SHOULD BE PERMITTED UNLESS THE RESTRICTION IS
ACTIVATED. THE NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVATION HAS TO
OCCUR AT LATEST WHEN A REPLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL
INSPECTION REQUEST IS GIVEN." END TEXT.
13. A DISCUSSION OF THE FRG FORMULA INDICATED THAT
THE GERMANS ARE UNWILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A
NUMBER FOR THE PERCENTAGE OF PRAS. APPARENTLY, THEY
ARE WILLING TO GO AS LOW, OR AS HIGH, AS THE SOVIET
UNION. COMMENT: THE FRG SEEMS QUITE WILLING TO
HIDE BEHIND THE SOVIET POSITION ON RAS. THE SOVIETS
HAVE THUS FAR ONLY TALKED IN TERMS OF FIGURES AS
HIGH AS 20-25 PCT. ALTHOUGH THE TURKS HAVE NOT YET
CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION WITH US, THEY TOO MAY BE
CONTENT TO LAY BACK AND LET THE SOVIETS DRIVE THE
PERCENTAGE OF RAS UP TO AN "ACCEPTABLY" HIGH LEVEL.
ONE INTERESTING THRUST IN THE FRG FORMULA IS THEIR
USE OF THE PHRASE "ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS." THE
GERMANS ARE TRYING TO INSTITUTE A REQUIREMENT THAT
THE PERCENTAGE OF RAS WOULD HAVE TO BE EVENLY SPREAD
OVER THE SOVIET REPUBLICS IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE
ENTIRE WESTERN MDS FALLING UNDER A RA. END
COMMENT.
14. BY WAY OF COMMENT ON THE FRG PROPOSAL, THE US
PRESENTED AN OPPOSITE APPROACH: DEFINING WHERE
INSPECTION CAN TAKE PLACE, RATHER THAN WHERE IT
CANNOT. BY ESTABLISHING A NARROWLY DEFINED
UNDERSTANDING OF SENSITVE POINTS AND AVOIDING THE
ISSUE OF PRAS ALTOGETHER, WE COULD AT LEAST RAISE
THE POLITICAL COST TO THE SOVIETS OF INVOKING
"SENSITIVE POINTS" IN ORDER TO AVOID INSPECTION.
COMMENT: OPERATIONALLY, THE TWO OPTIONS OF EITHER
COMBINING SENSITIVE POINTS WITH PRAS DECLARED IN
ADVANCE OR ALLOWING A NARROW "SENSITIVE POINTS"
LOOPHOLE MIGHT BE THE SAME: THE SOVIETS COULD AVOID
INSPECTION. THE SECOND OPTION, HOWEVER, WOULD AT
LEAST RAISE THE POLITICAL COST TO THE SOVIETS OF
USING THE LOOPHOLE. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT IF WE
MUST HAVE PRAS (THE DIRECTION THE FRG AND TURKEY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
WILL DRIVE US), IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THEY WERE
DECLARED IN ADVANCE. OUR CONCERN WITH THIS APPROACH
IS THAT WE NOT LEGITIMIZE PRAS SO LARGE AS TO RENDER
THE INSPECTION REGIME USELESS. AND THAT WE NOT
COMPEL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RESTRICTED AREA REG:ME
WHERE IT HAS NOT HERETOFORE EXISTED. HOPEFULLY, HE
"SENSITIVE POINTS" CONCEPT, WHICH COULD BE INVOKED
AT THE TIME OF INSPECTION, WILL SUFFICE FOR MANY
PARTICIPATING STATES. END COMMENT.
15. THE UK PREFERENCE REMAINS FOR NO PRAS; HOWEVER,
IF WE MUST HAVE THEM THE UK WOULD PREFER AN EXCHANGE
SUCH AS THE FRG PROPOSED. THE DISCUSSION REVEALED
SOME FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE US APPROACH--THEY TOO
DISLIKE THE CONCEPT OF RAS IN GENERAL--UNFORTUNATELY
FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. THEY INSIST THAT INSPECTOFS
WILL BE "GUIDED" OR "ACCOMPANIED" AND THEREFORE,
WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO WHEREVER THEY WANT.
FRANCE FURTHER ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD RESERVE A TOUGH
POSITION ON INSPECTION FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIOr1S,
NOT THE CDE. THE US STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH THE
FRENCH APPROACH, ARGUING THAT INSPECTORS ARE NOT
OBSERVERS AND MUST HAVE THE "KEYS TO THE CAR."
FURTHERMORE, THE PRECEDENTIAL NATURE OF ANY CDE
AGREEMENT ON INSPECTION INCREASES THE IMPORTANCE
THAT CDE AGREE ONLY TO AN INSPECTION REGIME WHICH
WILL WORK. IN RESPONSE TO THE FRG APPROACH, THE U'S
INDICATED IT WAS SKEPTICAL THAT AN EXCHANGE OF PRAS
WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE CONFERENCE. WE INDICATED
THAT THE US COULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON THE FRG
"EXCHANGE" APPROACH ONLY IF THE PERCENTAGE OF PRAS
WAS VERY SMALL. THE US WILL NOT SUPPORT THE
LEGITIMIZATION OF LARGE PRAS.
16. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, TWO OTHER
TOPICS WERE COVERED BRIEFLY. ON PASSIVE QUOTAS, THE
US PROPOSED, AND ALLIES SUPPORTED, THAT THE NNA BE
EXCLUDED FROM ANY QUOTA. THAT IS, IF WE NEGOTIATE A
PASSIVE INSPECTION QUOTA, NATO WOULD ONLY BE
REQUIRED TO ACCEPT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS
FROM MEMBERS OF THE WTO, AND VICE VERSA, BUT WITHIN
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ACTIVE INSPECTION QUOTA,
INSPECTIONS FROM THE NNA WOULD NOT BE COUNTED
AGAINST THE PASSIVE QUOTA. ON CONSTRAINTS, THE US
PROPOSED THAT NATO ENDORSE A "TIME" CONSTRAINT
REQUIRING THAT ACTIVITIES ABOVE 40,000 BE FORECAST
TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE. WE ARGUED THAT THIS WILL HELP
THE ALLIES DEFUSE THE ISSUE OF CONSTRAINTS, AVOIDING
BOTH SUBSTANCE AND A STATEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE.
ALL ALLIES SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF TIME CONSTRAINTS
ALTHOUGH FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE APPROPRIATE
PARAMETERS WILL BE NECESSARY. THE UK AND FRG HAD
195
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
THE FIGURE 75,000 IN MIND AND HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING
A PROVISION REQUIRING THAT ACTIVITIES UP TO 75,000
COULD BE ADDED TO THE CALENDAR BUT ACTIVITIES ABOVE
75,000 COULD NOT BE ADDED AND WOULD HAVE TO BE
NOTIFIED AS ALERTS IN THE CONTEXT OF A TIME
CONSTRAINT, AND BUILDING ON THE EARLIER US
SUGGESTION THAT ALERTS BE EXEMPTED FROM ANY PASSIVE
INSPECTION QUOTA, THE FRG SUGGESTED THAT NATO
CONSIDER ADDITIONAL OR "PENALTY" INSPECTIONS FOR
ALERTS. COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST FRG CONSIDERATION
OF ANY CONSTRAINT ON NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES. THEIR
ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS
IS ALSO NOTEWORTHY. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 06369
SUBJECT: CDE ROUND XII: U.S. DELEGATION GOALS
REF: (A) STATE 018606 (B) STOCKHOLM 5710 (C) STOCKHOLM 3458
1. CDE XII-003. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BASED ON WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, AUGUST 7 IG
MEETING, DISCUSSION WITH JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AUGUST 8
AND MEETING WITH UK9 FRENCH AND FRG AUGUST 11 IN BONN,
U.S. DEL BELIEVES THAT ITS GOALS IN THE FINAL RO1.PID OF
CDE SHOULD BE:
A. GENERAL:
WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE AN AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS THE
GOALS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL A.
B. NOTIFICATION REGIME:
-- ONLY A THRESHOLD BASED ON STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL AND
EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS IS ACCEPTABLE. THE COMBINED
THRESHOLD SHOULD FOCUS ON MULTI-DIVISIONAL ACTIVITIES
BUT NOT EXCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF DIVISION-LEVEL EXERCISES.
TO THAT END, STRUCTURE MUST BE BASED ON 2 OR MORE
REGIMENTS/BRIGADES, NOT 2 OR MORE DIVISIONS. NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD SHOULD BE LOW ENOUGH TO ENSURE OBSERVAT:ON
ON SOVIET TERRITORY; AT LEAST FORECASTING AND NOT::FICA-
TION PROVISIONS MUST COVER ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION
EAST OF THE FINAL ACT 250 KM DEMARCATION TO PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR INSPECTION IN THE NEW ZONE. TANK THRESHOLD
SHOULD BE IN RANGE 150-200.
-- SINGLE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION IS
GREATLY PREFERABLE TO A SPLIT-LEVEL THRESHOLD; WE WILL
EXPLORE LATTER ONLY IF NECESSARY TO ENSURE SOME
NOTIFICATION/INSPECTION IN NEW ZONE.
-- THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AS CURRENTLY FORMCLATED
REMAINS OUR STRONG PREFERENCE; IF NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
PERMIT DRAFTING ON INSPECTION MODALITIES, WE WILL
EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE SC.1 FORMULATION ON CUT-OF-
GARRISON. TO BE ACCEPTABLE, ANY FORMULATION MUST
PROTECT TRANSITS AND MUST BE ALL-ENCOMPASSING ENOUGH
TO AVOID CIRCUMVENTION. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE WILL ALSO
EXPLORE FORMULATIONS ON TRANSFERS AND RESTATIONING TO SEE
IF ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE CAN BE DEVELOPED.
-- WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUBSTITUTE CONCEPT OF
"COMMON ACTIVITY" FOR "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" IN
NOTIFICATION FORMULA.
-- WE WILL ACCEPT AN AIR SUB-THRESHOLD OF 200 SORTIES.
-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE INFOR-
MATION IN BOTH FORECASTING AND NOTIFICATION MEASURES.
C. INSPECTION:
AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME MUST BE AN INTEGRAL
PART OF ANY STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT. ELEMENTS OF SUCH A
REGIME MUST INCLUDE AN EFFECTIVE STRUCTURAL NOTIFICATION/
FORECAST THRESHOLD AND EFFECTIVE MODALITIES - I.E. PROMPT
ADMISSION OF INSPECTORS TO DESIGNATED AREA, NO BUI;:.T-IN
197
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
DELAY MECHANISMS, SUFFICIENT ACCESS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED
AREA, NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL OR, UPON REFUSAL, AUTOMATIC
SUSPENSION OF ALL PARTIES' OBLIGATIONS. WE WILL PURSUE
BOTH GROUND AND AERIAL INSPECTION.
-- WE WILL SEEK A PASSIVE QUOTA UNDER WHICH NO STATE HAS
TO ACCEPT MORE THAN FIVE INSPECTIONS A YEAR FROM MEMBERS
OF AN ALLIANCE TO WHICH IT DOES NOT BELONG; WE WILL
CONTINUE TO SUPPORT AN ACTIVE QUOTA OF ONE INSPECTION PER
STATE PER YEAR.
-- ON RESTRICTED AREAS, OUR FIRST PREFERENCE IS FOR A
FORMULA WHICH DEFINES WHAT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED RATHER
THAN WHAT CAN BE (REFTEL B). IF THIS IS NOT NEGOTIABLE,
OUR FALLBACK WOULD BE FOR A SENSITIVE POINT/RESTRICTED
AREA REGIME WITH MINIMAL PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS
(E.G. 10 PERCENT OR LESS), NO TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS
AND WITH EXCHANGES OF LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS (BUT NOT
SENSITIVE POINTS, WHICH WOULD BE INDICATED AT THE TIME
OF AN INSPECTION).
-- WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH
MAKES INSPECTION NEGOTIABLE THROUGH A PROCESS OF CONSUL-
TATION OR THROUGH PROVISIONS THAT SUGGEST THAT INSPECTED
STATE CAN SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF VERIFICATION TO
INSPECTIONS. HOWEVER, IF IT IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT
CHALLENGING STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO USE WHATEVER FORM OF
VERIFICATION IT CHOOSES, NTMS MAY BE DESCRIBED AS A MEANS
OF VERIFICATION.
-- THE PREFERRED WAY OF DEALING WITH CLARIFICATIONS IS
AS PART OF THE COMMUNICATIONS MEASURE OR AS PART OF EACH
INDIVIDUAL MEASURE.
-- REFUSAL OF AN INSPECTION TO WHICH A CHALLENGING STATE
IS ENTITLED UNDER AGREEMENT SHOULD CONSTITUTE NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT AND RESULT IN AUTOMATIC
SUSPENSION OF ALL PARTIES' OBLIGATIONS. CONSENSUS WOULD
BE REQUIRED TO REINSTATE OBLIGATIONS. CONSENSUS COULD
BE ACHIEVED BY A SITTING CSCE BODY OR AN AD-HOC MEETING
OF CSCE AMBASSADORS.
D. FORECASTING:
-- IF THE ALLIES CONCUR, WE WILL SUPPORT A MEASURE TO
STRENGTHEN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BY PROVIDING THAT EXER-
CISES ABOVE LEVEL OF 40,000 MUST BE NOTIFIED 2 YEARS
IN ADVANCE. WE WILL ALSO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF
ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR EXCEPTIONS (I.E. FOR NON-
FORECAST ACTIVITIES).
E. OBSERVATION:
-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT OBSERVA-
TION OF AMPHIBIOUS/AIR PARADROP ACTIVITIES CAN ONLY
TAKE PLACE ON LAND AT THE POINT OF INTERSECTION.
F. IMPLEMENTATION:
-- OUR POSITION IS THAT MEASURES AGREED TO BY THE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS BEFORE
THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNS. A FIXED DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION
SHOULD BE ALSO AGREED BY CONSENSUS IN STOCKHOLM - E.G.
NOV. 15, 1986 TO ALLOW FOR THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL
CALENDARS FOR 1987 AND FOR NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES
WHICH BEGIN IN JANUARY, 1987. IMPLEMENTATION IN VIENNA
WILL ESTABLISH THE SUBORDINATION OF THE CDE TO CSCE.
G. DEFERRAL OF ISSUES:
-- FORMULA CONTAINED IN REF C IS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE WAY
OF DEALING WITH ISSUES NOT RESOLVED IN STOCKHOLM ?? I.E.
NO ISSUES CAN BE SINGLED OUT FOR ATTENTION AT POST-VIENNA
CDE. IF, AS EXPECTED, OTHERS MAKE UNILATERAL STATEMENTS
PLUGGING THEIR OWN ISSUES, U.S. REP WILL MAKE HIS OWN
UNILATERAL STATEMENT IN REBUTTAL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
199
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SECRET
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06449
SUBJECT: NUF UPDATE
REF: STOCKHOLM 5776
1. CDE XII - 004
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS TEXTS ON
SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, COMPLIANCE AND THE PRIMACY OF THE UN
CHARTER WHICH ARE RIPE FOR NOTATION AND TEXTS ON
TERRORISM AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY CURRENTLY UNDER
DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY.
4. WASHINGTON WILL HAVE SEEN TEXTS ALREADY NOTED ON A
PROVISIONAL BASIS IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK (SEE
REFTEL). IN ADDITION TO THOSE TEXTS THE FOLLOWING THREE
TEXTS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP
AND MAY BE NOTED AS EARLY AS TUESDAY, AUGUST 19.
SOVEREIGN EQUALITY:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT
TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF
STATES AND STRESS.. THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS
AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW."
(LANGUAGE BASED ON WESTERN TEXT AND DERIVED FROM
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PRINCIPLE 1, P.78)
COMPLIANCE:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO
STRESS.. THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR
BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY."
(LANGUAGE BASED ON WESTERN AND NNA TEXTS AND DERIVED
FROM HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PRINCIPLE 10, P.82)
(BEGIN COMMENT: WASHINGTON WILL RECALL THAT THE
CONCEPTS OF "COMPLIANCE" AND "EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES"
WERE ACCEPTED (RELUCTANTLY) IN THE WESTERN TEXT AT U.S.
INSISTENCE (THE EARLIER EC-12 TEXT DID NOT CONTAIN THESE
ELEMENTS). SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARGUED AT THE TIME THAT
THESE CONCEPTS WERE NOT "MARKETABLE" WITH THE EAST OR
EVEN THE NNA. THE WORKING GROUP IS NOW CLOSE TO NOTING
THESE TEXTS. IN OUR VIEW, THIS EPISODE ONCE AGAIN
DEMONSTRATES THE FOLLY OF TRYING TO INCORPORATE AN
ANTICIPATED EASTERN RESPONSE IN OUR INITIAL NEGOTIATING
POSITION, I.E., PRENEGOTIATIONS. END COMMENT.)
PRIMACY OF THE UN CHARTER:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM.. THAT IN THE EVENT OF
A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER
WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS."
200
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
(LANGUAGE TAKEN VERBATIM FROM HELSINKI FINAL ACT, P.82)
5. THE FOLLOWING NEW LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM HAS BEEN
DISCUSSED IN THE COFFEE GROUP:
WESTERN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL (TABLED BY FRG):
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN.. TERRORISM, INCLUDING
TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. REAFFIRMING THEIR
COMMITMENTS UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THEY EXPRESS.. THEIR DETERMINATION
TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND
SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL
LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. THEY WILL
TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPEC-
TIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION,
ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES,
INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS."
(LANGUAGE DERIVED FROM MADRID DOCUMENT, P.34-35)
YUGOSLAVIAN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN TERRORISM IN ANY FORM
AND EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO
COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION
AND SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST, SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER
ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW CIF THE
REGIME OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. THIS ALSO
INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION
OF ACTS OF TERRORISM."
(LANGUAGE DERIVED FROM MADRID DOCUMENT, P.34-35)
MALTESE PROPOSAL (INTENDED AS INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE TO
THE TERRORISM TEXT):
"THEY EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO CONTRIBUTE THROUGH
DIALOGUE TO THE PROGRESSIVE ELIMINATION OF THE CAUSES
UNDERLYING SUCH ACTS."
(LANGUAGE DERIVED FROM VALETTA DECLARATION)
THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE SELECTED SOME OF THE MOST QUESTIONABLE
LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM FROM BOTH THE MADRID DOCUMENT AND
THE NNA TEXT. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THE
REFERENCE TO THE PREVENTION OF "SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER
ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF
ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE" FOCUSES ON JUST ONE ASPECT
OF TERRORISM (AND AN ISOLATED ONE AT THAT). (BEGIN
COMMENT: THIS PASSAGE REFLECTS A YUGOSLAV PREOCCUPATION
BASED ON "BOTTOM LINE" INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH IS TACITLY,
IF TEPIDLY, SUPPORTED BY THE OTHER NNA. END COMMENT.)
THE WEST, FURTHERMORE, REJECTS THE MALTESE PROPOSAL. IN
THE COFFEE GROUP WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THE TERRORISM TEXT
MUST BE DYNAMIC AND ACTION ORIENTED NOT A STUDY OF THE
201
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
SEL T
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF TERRORISM. AND BESIDES DO WE WANT
A "DIALOGUE" WITH TERRORISTS?
7. THE NUF COFFEE GROUP IS ALSO CURRENTLY DISCUSSING
WESTERN AND NNA TEXTS ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE
EAST, PARTICULARLY POLAND, HAS STRONGLY OBJECTED TO THE
WESTERN TEXT, TELLING US IN PRIVATE THAT THEY CONSIDER
THE LANGUAGE AIMED AT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. THE EAST
SAYS IT CAN LIVE WITH THE NNA TEXT. BASED ON OUR
INFORMAL SOUNDINGS, THE FOLLOWING TEXT MIGHT WIN
CONSENSUS:
"NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL."
(DERIVED FROM HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PRINCIPLE 4, P.79)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06465
SUBJECT: CDE: ADJOURNMENT DATE
REFS: (A) STATE 249735
- (B) EMBBERLIN 02711
1. CDE XII - 005.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. U.S. CDE DEL APPRECIATES BOTH THE SPEED AND THE
COMPREHENSIVE WAY IN WHICH OUR EAST EUROPEAN EMBASSIES
HAVE FORWARDED THE "DEMARCHE TO EASTERN EUROPEAN
CAPITALS ON EVE OF CDE'S CONCLUDING ROUND," WHICH WE
BELIEVE WILL SERVE TO REINFORCE BOTH OUR COMMITMENT TO
SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, AND THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE
APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS DURING THIS FINAL FOUND.
4. WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID
DEMARCHE, THE GDR HAS RAISED QUESTIONS CONCERNING U.S.
FLEXIBILITY ON WORKING BEYOND THE SEPTEMBER 19 CDE
ADJOURNMENT DATE (REF B). WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT FOR
US, SEPTEMBER 19 IS AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE AND THAT A
FINAL DOCUMENT MUST BE COMPLETE BY THAT DATE. WE WOULD
LIKE TO REINFORCE THIS POINT; TO SIGNAL ANY FLEXIBILITY
ON THIS QUESTION, PARTICULARLY AT THE OUTSET OF OUR
FINAL ROUND COULD, IN OUR VIEW, DETRIMENTALLY IMPACT ON
THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REFERENCE TO A LATE DEPARTURE WAS
NOT FOR THIS FINAL ROUND BUT RATHER TO THE LAST ROUND,
ROUND 11, WHICH CONCLUDED FORMALLY ON JULY 18. IN TURN,
THE EARLY RETURN REFERRED TO ROUND 12, THE FINAL ROUND,
WHICH COMMENCES FORMALLY ON AUGUST 19. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
203
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100070001-8