SOVIET BLOC AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE CSCE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) (CDE-IX & CDE-X) 28 JANUARY - 14 MARCH 1986 15 APRIL - 23 MAY 1986 VOLUME I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 283
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
?Secret---
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-IX & CDE-X)
28 January ? 14 March 1986
15 April 23 May 1986
Volume I
A Reference Aid
&cut
CR 86-11187
June 1986
Copy 34
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-IX & CDE-X)
28 January - 14 March 1986
15 April 23 May 1986
Volume I
A Reference Aid
Secret
CR 86-11187
June 1986
25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-IX & CDE-X)
28 January-14 March 1986
15 April-23 May 1986
FOREWORD
This reference aid contains a chronological history
and index of topics discussed during the Ninth and
Tenth Rounds of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe
(CDE) which commenced in Stockholm on 28 January and
recessed on 23 May 1986. It is indexed according to
subjects and countries. In the case of the Soviet
Union the individual delegate speaking, if identified,
is also specified. Furthermore, the forum in which the
statement(s) occurred is noted.
The conference record has been retained in straight
chronological order. The index, located at the
beginning, is designed to guide the user to pages for
specific topics, countries, and in the case of the
Soviet Union, personalities. By using the type of
entry key located at the front of the index, users can
determine whether the references are from cables
reporting on plenary, post-plenary, or working group
meetings and limit their searches by these types of
references when desired. Users interested in
statements by a particular country are directed to tne
country index where each country has its own subject
index. In the case of the Soviet Union, an additional
letter code will identify the individual delegate who
made the statement, if noted in the text. Each Soviet
delegate who s oke is also included in the main subject
index.
Statements by the following countries are indexed:
Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics '
(USSR), and Yugoslavia. Several countries that were
indexed in previous reference aids were not included in
this edition, since they were not mentioned in the
negotiating record. Please note that there is also a
separate entry for the "East". In this section are
found statements which were attributed to the East in
general but to no one country in particular.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
All statements made by participating countries
during plenary and working group AB meetings are
summarized in t 'Statement Summaries" section of this
reference aid.
Two items of note which might otherwise be
overlooked are brought to the user's attention:
"weekly wrap-up" cables summarizing developments in all
COE forums are included chronologically and can be
located by referring to the subject index; a group of
miscellaneous cables are referenced in the subject
index as 'miscellaneous cables" and cover such topics
as delegation personnel changes, analyses of delegation
and group positions or motives at COE. and procedural
issues and similar subjects.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(COE-IX & CDE-X)
28 January - 14 March 1986
15 April- 23 May 1986
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
DELEGATION LISTS'
STATEMENT SUMMARIES
Pages
Summaries of Plenary Statements
1-5
Summaries of Working Group AS Statements
6-7
SUBJECT INDEX
Main Subject Index
1-6
COUNTRY INDEXES
Bulgaria
1
East
2-3
GDR
4 .
Hungary
5
Malta
6-7
Poland
8
USSR
9-12
Yugoslavia
13
Session Cables
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S1S11 NOLLY0313a
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:NFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
STOCKHOLM 1984
31 January 1986
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(as communicated by Delegations).
*/"The previous edition was printed
on 8 November 1985
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Dr Wolfgang LOIBL
AUSTRIA
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Werner DRUML First Secretary, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Dr Thomas NADER Delegate
Mr Karl LIKO General, Military Adviser
Mr Josef BERNECKER
Ms Evelyne GRIESLER
Dr Ingo MUSSI
Brigadier, Military Adviser
Administrative Officer
Ambassador
Mr Wolfgang JUNG Lieutenant Colonel,
Defence Attache
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BELGIUM
Mr Felix STANDAERT Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Ms Lucie de MYTTENAERE Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Colonel Franz LEBLANC Military Expert
Ms E. JANSSENS
Mr Louis ENGELEN
Mr Demetrio ORT/GUEIRA
Attach?o the Delegation
First Secretary at the Embassy
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Mr Stephan TODOROV
Mr Zahari RADOUKOV
Lieutenant Colonel
Stoyan STOYANOV
Mr Ivan KOEDJIKOV
Mr Georgy GOTEV
Mr Todor STOYANOV
Mr Dobrin ANASTASOV
Mr Lab o LALOV
BULGARIA
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Ambassador of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria in
Stockholm
First Secretary at the
Embassy
Second Secretary at the
Embassy
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Mr W.T. DELWORTH
Mr C.J. ANSTIS
Colonel C. NAMIESNIOWSKI
CANADA
Ambassador, Permanent Head of
Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Military Adviser
Mr R. VANIER Adviser
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mrs Sharon MALOTT Administrative Assistant
Miss T. NEWTON Secretary
Miss B. SCHULTZ Communicator
Mr Roy F. SOUTHERN Security Guard
Mr Joakim SUNESON Driver
Mr William J. ROBERTS Counsellor
Mr D'Arcy THORPE Counsellor
Mr Marc LEPAGE First Secretary
Mr Alan KESSEL Third Secretary
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr J. BERANGER Office Manager
Mr Sven CLAUG Administrative Assistant
Mr Joseph Richard PARENT Security Guard
Mr G. CLERMONT Communicator
Miss T. LORRAIN Secretary
Mr T. LINDELL Driver
Mr Benny KARLSTRoM Driver
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CYPRUS
I
Dr Andrestinos N. PAPADOPOULOS Minister-Counsellor,
Head of Delegation
,
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CYPRUS
I
Dr Andrestinos N. PAPADOPOULOS Minister-Counsellor,
Head of Delegation
,
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DENMARK
Mr Skjold G. MELLBIN Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Bent ROSENTHAL Minister-Counsellor, Deputy
Head of Delegation
Mr Niels Aadal RASMUSSEN Counsellor of Embassy
Commander Patrick HOWARD Military Adviser
Ms Charlotte PEKKARINEN Administrative Officer
Ms Merry SLUNK Administrative Officer
Mr Niklas BECKER Chauffeur
Mr Nils JAEGER Minister-Counsellor, Danish
Embassy
Mr Flemming Andra LARSEN Press Counsellor, Danish Embassy
Ms Kirsten LARSEN Administrativ Officer,
Danish Embassy
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Dr Klaus CITRON Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Johann Georg DREHER Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Mr Werner SCHMIDBAUER Brigadier General,
MOD Representative
Mr JUrgen Hans tiTTINGER Colonel
Mr Gunter KOLBECK Captain (Navy)
Mr Klaus METSCHER Counsellor
Mr Detlef WEIGEL First Secretary
Mr Horst GRZEGORZ Attache
Mr Oliver NOWAK Attach?Communication Officer)
Mr GUnter KANDLER Senior Master Sergeant
Mrs Ines OETLING Language Secretary
Ms Gisela SCHRoDER Secretary
Ms Corinna PAUL Secretary
Mrs Brunhild LARSSON Secretary
Mr Herbert KEMPER Administrative Staff
Mr Hans JAGER Technical and
Administrative Staff
Mr Anton KERP Technical and
Administrative Staff
Mr Dirk FATH Technical and
Administrative Staff
Dr Gerhard RITZEL Ambassador
Dr Claus von KAMEKE Counsellor
Mr Rolf-Eckart ROLFS Commander S.G.
Mr Kay SCHUHR Political Adviser
Mr Friedrich Wilhelm CATOIR Counsellor (Press Affairs)
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Mr Manfred KoSTNER Second Secretary
(Administrative Affairs)
Mr Rolf TRAUT Attach?Press Affairs)
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.?
Mr Matti KAHILUOTO
Dr Markku REIMAA
Mr Jussi LXHTEINEN
Mr Tuomas PEKKARINEN
Mr Yrjo KUKKO
Mr Antti TURUNEN
Mr Seppo PIETINEN
Mr Bjorn-Olof ALHOLM
Mr Jukka VALTASAARI
Mr Pertti TORSTILA
Mr Hannu HIMANEN
Dr Pauli JARVENPA
FINLAND
Ambassador, Head of Delegation,
Special Mission of Finland
Minister-Counsellor, Delegate,
Special Mission of Finland
Commander, Delegate, Special
Mission of Finland
First Secretary, Delegate,
Special Mission of Finland
Major, Expert,
Ministry of Defence
Attach?
Director for Political Affairs,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador of Finland to Sweden
Deputy Director for Political
Affairs, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs
Assistant Director, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
First Secretary, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
Expert, Ministry of Defence
Miss
Pirjo LEINO
Special
Mission of
Finland
Miss
Riitta GUSTAFSSON
Special
Mission of
Finland
Miss
Sinikka FLINK
Special
Mission of
Finland
Mr Pertti AIRIKAINEN
Special
Mission of
Finland
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Mr Paul GASCHIGNARD
Mr Jean FELIX-PAGANON
Colonel Christian MERIC
Mr Gerard FAUVEAU
Lieutenant Colonel
Pierre MACE
Miss Monique GUILLAOUET
Miss Lyliane CHAPELLET
FRANCE
Ambassador, Chief of Delegation
Deputy Chief of Delegation
Military Counsellor
First Secretary
Military Counsellor
Secretary
Secretary
Mr Benoit d'ABOVILLE
Mr Serge SMESSOW
Mr Henri ZIPPER
Deputy Director, Arms Control
and Strategic Affairs Division.
Ministry for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Arms Control and Strategic
Affairs Division, Ministry
for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Arms Control and Strategic
Affairs Division, Ministry
for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Mr Robert MAZEYRAC Ambassador of France to Sweden
Mr Jean-Francois NOUGAREDE Counsellor at the Embassy
Lieutenant Colonel
Andr?AURENT Military Adviser
Adjudant chef Herve LAUDREN Deputy Military Adviser
Mr Francis HURTUT First Secretary of Embassy
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Mr Gabriel SAUVEZON
Mr Christophe DESSOUDE
Mrs Catherine CYWIER
Mrs Bodil PERSSON
Mr Julien QUARTINO
Mr Claude QUARTINO
Mr Claude MEDARD
Mr Franck BERNAD
Mr Serge LECOMTE
Mr Ren?ESVAGERS
Mr Emile SOULIER
Consul
Communicator
Communicator
Press Attach?f Embassy
Administrative Assistant
Administrative Assistant
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Dr GUnter BUHRING
Mr Manfred GRACZYNSKI
Mr Gunter FUNK
Mr Thomas GEORG:
Dr Erika BUHR:NG
Mr Detlef GRUDE
Mr Bodo BAUMGARTEN
Mr Manfred SCHMIDT
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Captain of the Navy, Member of
Delegation
Lieutenant Colonel,
Member of Delegation
Second Secretary,
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Technical Staff Member
Technical Staff Member
Mr Eberhard GLoCKNER
Mr Bernd HUBNER
Ambassador of the German
Democratic Republic to Sweden
First Secretary at the Embassy
Third Secretary at the Embassy
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GREECE
Mr Dimitri PAPADAKIS Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Ms Marina Nicoletta IOANNOU Administrative Officer
Mr Emmanuel PONIRIDIS Ambassador
Mr Efthymios PARASHOS First Secretary
Mr Iasson-Andreas RALLIS Attach?
Miss Simerouda GIANNOULI Administrative Officer
Mr Anastasios TSIAPALIS Administrative Officer
Mr Kyriakos GAVRILIDIS Administrative Officer
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Archbishop Henri LEMAITRE
Monsignor Francois BACQUt
Reverend Jan SMITH
Reverend Raymond CROCHET
HOLY SEE
Apostolic Pro-Nuncio to the
Kingdom of Sweden, Head of
Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Attach?
Attach?
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Mr Karoly SZIGETI
Dr Istvan KoRMENDY
Lieutenant Colonel
Lajos IMRE
Ms Maria KANYORSZKY
Mr Istvan KOMOROCZKI
HUNGARY
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Military Expert
Secretary
Attach?f the Embassy
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ICELAND
Mr Benedikt GRoNDAL Ambassador, Permanent Head
of Delegation
Mrs Sigridur Berglind Counsellor, Deputy Head of
ASGEIRSDOTTIR Delegation
Ms Aslaug SKOLADOTTIR
Ms Elln OSKAR$DOTTIR
Mr Bert HARNELL
Administrative Secretary
Administrative Secretary
Administrative Assistant
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Mr GearOid 0 BROIN
IRELAND
Ambassador of Ireland to
Sweden and Poland,
Head of Delegation
Mr Philip Mc DONAGH First Secretary, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Mr Keith MCBEAN Second Secretary
Colonel Donal O'CARROLL Military Adviser
Ms Yvonne ANDERSSON Secretary
Ms Lena DAHLBERG-TUNANDER Secretary
Mr Johan MOLIN
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Mr Antonio CIARRAPICO
Mr Sandro DE BERNARDIN
Mr Mauro CARFAGNINI
ITALY
Ambassador, Permanent Head of
Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Counsellor
Brigadier General
Giorgio BLAIS Military Adviser
Navy Captain Ettore Military Adviser
DI GIOVANNI
Mr Ruggero VOZZI First Counsellor
Mr Manlio GIUFrRIDA Counsellor
Administrative and Technical Personnel
Mr Giovanni PAPA
Mrs Albertina BARBIERI
Mrs Carla DI PAOLO
Miss Maria Pia PAGL/NO
Mrs Margherita BENSAIA
Mrs Valeria DI SORA
Mr Francesco D'ORTA
Mr Alessandro PUZIO
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LIECHTENSTEIN
Count Mario LEDEBUR
Mr Daniel OSPELT
Mrs Claudia FRITSCHE
Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
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Mr Robert BLOES
Mr Robert KAYSER
Mr Alphonse BERNS
Mr Raymond PETIT
LUXEMBOURG
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Deputy Head of Delegation
Counsellor of the Embassy
Secretary of the Embassy
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MALTA
Mr Victor J. GAUCI Ambassador, Head of Delegation
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MONACO
Mr Hans Bertil WESTERBERG Consul General of Monaco
in Stockholm
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NETHERLANDS
Mr Petrus BUWALDA
Dr Jan SIZOO
Brigadier General
Henny J. van der GRAAF
Mr Laurens V.M. van GORP
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Delegate
Delegate
Technical and Administrative Personnel
Mr Gerard SCHROTH
Miss Gwendolyn MACLEOD MANUEL
Miss Dorothy ZWIERS
Mr A.J.M. van MEER
Watze J.J.D. Baron thoe
SCHWARTZENBERG
Mr Siewert H. STEENWIJK
Miss Margaret HELMER
Counsellor, Embassy of the
Netherlands
Accounting Officer, Embassy
of the Netherlands
Secretary, Embassy of the
Netherlands
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NORWAY
Mr Leif MEVIK Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Hans Jacob BION LIAN Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Morten AASLAND
Colonel Gullow GJESETH
Mr Ole Martin ENGH
Second Secretary
HQ Defence Command
Deputy Director General,
Ministry of Defence
Ms Anne Elise NORDVIK Secretary-Archivist, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Mr Knut Arne HOLTHE Communications Officer,
HQ Defence Command
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POLAND
Mr Wlodzimierz KONARSKI Ambassador, Head of the Permanent
Delegation
Colonel Edmund STANIEWSKI Delegate
Mr Krzysztof OPALSKI Delegate
Dr Maria REGENT-LECHOWICZ , Ambassador of the Polish
People's Republic in the
Kingdom of Sweden
Mr Slawomir PETELICKI
First Secretary at the
Embassy of the Polish People's
Republic in Stockholm
Ms Grazyna'B/ERUT
Mr Wladyslaw STASZEWSKI
Mr Jerzy MOZDZENSKI
Technical Secretary
Administrative Assistant
Administrative Assistant
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PORTUGAL
Mr Jose CUTILEIRO Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Jos?aria BRANCO ALEIXO Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr Joao de MATOS SEQUEIRA Second Secretary
Lieutenant Colonel Military Adviser
Antonio PINTO GUEDES
Mrs Gloria MORALES DE Administrative Officer
LOS RIOS
Mrs Luisa Cristina HAMMARBERG Administrative Officer
Mr Carlos Manuel ZACARIAS Administrative Officer
FRANCO
Mr Jos?e Noronha GAMITO Ambassador of Portugal
to Sweden
Mr Antonio BOTELHO DE SOUSA Secretary of Embassy
Ms Arminda Albarran BARATA Administrative Officer
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Mr loan CETERCHI
Mr Ovidiu IONESCU
Mr Marin BUHOARA
Mr Nicolae IORDACHE
Mr Dumitru CEAU$U
Mr Nicolae CORDUNEANU
ROMANIA
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Counsellor,
Counsellor,
Counsellor,
Member
Member
Member
of Delegation
of Delegation
of Delegation
Colonel, Member of Delegation
Mr Petre MOGOSEANU
Mr Petru-Dumitru BORDEA
Mr Mihai ALBU
Counsellor, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
Counsellor, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
Second Secretary, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
Mrs Floarea STOENICA
Mrs Ana-Mariana MOGOSEANU
Secretary of the Delegation
Secretary of the Delegation
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SAN MARINO
Mr Giordano Bruno REFFI
Mr Oscar PASQUINI
Mrs Maria Antonietta BONELLI
Mr Jose Manuel de MOLLINEDO
MARTINEZ
Mr Fredrik W. LETTSTRoM
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister
Director, Office for Political
and Diplomatic Affairs
Member of Delegation
Consul General of San Marino,
Stockholm
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SPAIN
Mr Jos?anuel
ALLENDESALAZAR
Mr Joaquin PEREZ-VILLANUEVA
Captain Jos?uis RIPOLL
Mr Emilio LORENZO
Ambassador of Spain in
Stockholm, Head of Delegation
Deputy Head of Delegation
Defence International Affairs
Division, Ministry of Defence,
Adviser
Embassy of Spain in Stockholm,
Delegate
Mr Carlos FERNANDEZ-ESPESO
Director General for Inter-
national Security and Dis-
armament in the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs in Madrid,
Adviser
Mr Juan DURAN-LORIGA Ambassador of Spain in Oslo,
Adviser
Administrative and Technical Staff
Miss Maria Isabel SANZ REGATERO
Mr Jos?anuel GONZALEZ ROSSI
Mr Jose TOLEDANO
Mr Francisco REVUELTA
Mr Mats ERIKSSON
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
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Mr Sten ANDERSSON
Mr Pierre SCHORI
Mr Curt LIDGARD
Mr Bjorn ELMER
Mr. Gustav EKHOLM
Dr Lars-Erik LUNDIN
Mr Arne KALLIN
SWEDEN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
- Head of Delegation -
ex officio when in attendance
Permanent Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister Plenipotentiary,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegate
Head of Section, Delegate
First Secretary, Delegate
Mrs Maj Britt THEORIN
Mrs Gunnel JONANG
Mr Sture ERICSON
Mr Rune ANGSTROM
Mr Stig ALEMYR
Mrs Anita BRAKENHIELM
Mr Jan ELIASSON
Mr Carl-Magnus HYLTENIUS
General Nils SKoLD
Mr Jan PRAWITZ
Chairman of the Swedish
Disarmament Commission,
Ambassador, MP, Delegate
Member of
Member of
Member of
Member of
Member of
Parliament,
Parliament,
Parliament,
Parliament,
Parliament,
Delegate
Delegate
Delegate
Delegate
Delegate
Ambassador, Under-Secretary
for Political Affairs,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Assistant Under-Secretary,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Ministry of Defence, Expert
Special Adviser on Disarmament,
Ministry of Defence, Expert
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Colonel Bertil JOHANSSON
Captain (Navy) Jan AKERHIELM
Lieutenant Colonel
Vulf HESSULF
Mr Johan TUNBERGER
Mr Lars LoNNBACK
Mr Bertil JOBEUS
Mr Herman GYLLENHAAL
Mr Ove BRING
Mr Bo ERIKSSON
Ministry of Defence, Expert
Defence Staff, Expert
Ministry of Defence,
Expert
Senior Security Policy Analyst,
National Defence Research
Institute, Expert
Ambassador, Assistant Under-
Secretary, Head of Press and
Information Department, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Head of Press Division, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Press Officer, Head of Section,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Doctor of Laws, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, Expert
Head of Section, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs
Ms Britt-Marie HEDIN
Ms Ingrid REHN-BUKAI
Senior Administrative Officer
Senior Administrative Officer
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SWITZERLAND
Mr Blaise SCHENK Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Benoit JUNOD Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Mr Josef SCHARLI
Mr Urs STEMMLER
Miss Susanna JUTZI
Major EMG, Military Adviser
First Secretary
Secretary of the Delegation
Mr Girard STOUDMANN Second Secretary
(non-permanent)
Mr Fritz BOHNERT Ambassador of Switzerland to
Sweden
Colonel Hans SToSSEL Defence Attach?
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TURKEY
Mr Haluk oZGOL Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Deniz BoLOKBASI Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Administrative Staff
Mr Duran AYDOCMUS
Mrs Guner ERCETIN
Mr Mustafa TORKKAN
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UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
O.A. GRINEVSKY
V.M. TATARNIKOV
1.5 .ROZANOV
Y.N. RAHMANINOV
V.I. EROFEEV
V.I. SOLOMENKO
I.S. BOGDANOV
B.B. KAZANTSEV
V.A. VOLOSSATOV
V.V. LEJEN
A.S. ANDROSSOV
A.N. GROCHEV
A.V. PIROGOV
Head of Delegation
Member
Member
Member
Member
of Delegation
of Delegation
of Delegation
of Delegation
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
B.D. PANKIN
N.S. CHAMORTSEV
N.S. SELIVERSTOV
Y.V. KISSILEV
P.N. KOUGOUENKO
A.V. ZOLOTAREV
V.V. OREKHOVSKII
G.S. BAKHTINE
V.I. BAIKOV
V.I. TATARINTSEV
D.V. BONDAR
V.G. GROMOVIK
Ambassador to Sweden
Minister-Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Military Attache
First Secretary
Second Secretary
Third Secretary
Attach?
Attache
Secretary to the Ambassador
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UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
O.A. GRINEVSKY
V.M. TATARNIKOV
1.5 .ROZANOV
Y.N. RAHMANINOV
V.I. EROFEEV
V.I. SOLOMENKO
I.S. BOGDANOV
B.B. KAZANTSEV
V.A. VOLOSSATOV
V.V. LEJEN
A.S. ANDROSSOV
A.N. GROCHEV
A.V. PIROGOV
Head of Delegation
Member
Member
Member
Member
of Delegation
of Delegation
of Delegation
of Delegation
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
B.D. PANKIN
N.S. CHAMORTSEV
N.S. SELIVERSTOV
Y.V. KISSILEV
P.N. KOUGOUENKO
A.V. ZOLOTAREV
V.V. OREKHOVSKII
G.S. BAKHTINE
V.I. BAIKOV
V.I. TATARINTSEV
D.V. BONDAR
V.G. GROMOVIK
Ambassador to Sweden
Minister-Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Counsellor
Military Attache
First Secretary
Second Secretary
Third Secretary
Attach?
Attache
Secretary to the Ambassador
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UNITED KINGDOM
Mr J.M. EDES, CMG
Mr I.W. MACKLEY
Colonel R.W. BACK
Dr J.P.G. FREEMAN
Mr J.L. TAYLOR
Mr S.R.H. PEASE
Miss S.A. CHURCHLEY
Miss L. MOXHAM
Miss K.E. GILLMORE
Mr I. JONDORF
Mr J. BERG
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Counsellor
Military Adviser
First
First
First
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Personal Assistant
Personal Assistant
Administrative and Technical
Assistant
Sir Richard PARSONS,
KCMG
Mr R.M. JACKSON, CVO
Mr B.S. ROBERTS
Mr J. WHITE
Mrs M. BRADFIELD, MBE
Mr M. DANIELS
HM Ambassador
Counsellor
Counsellor
First Secretary
First Secretary
Attache
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr C. GLASS
Mr J. BENTLEY
Miss N. TETLOW
Miss H. DONALDSON
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Personal Assistant
Personal Assistant
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Mr Robert L. BARRY
Dr Lynn HANSEN
Mr Gregory J. NEWELL
Ambassador, Head of
Delegation
Ambassador, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Ambassador of the United
States to Sweden, Delegate
Major General Jonas BLANK Delegate
Ms Katharine C. CRITTENBERGER Delegate
Mr Jeremy F. CURTIN Delegate
Ms Priscilla GALASSI Delegate
Mr Jon GUNDERSEN Delegate
Mr Kenneth MUCK Delegate
Colonel William LOFGREN Delegate
Major Evan C. MACGIBBON Delegate
Mr Rolf MOWATT-LARSSEN Delegate
Mr Edwin NOLAN Delegate
Ms Suzanne PARRY Delegate
Dr Harlan STRAUSS Delegate
Lieutenant Colonel Delegate
Joseph TY0
Administrative and Technical Personnel
Ms Beverly AMES
Ms Mary CARDOSO
Ms Donna PETRICH
Ms Nancy WALKER
Ms Sonja WALSH
Ms Marlou WOODWARD
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Mr Sherrod McCALL
Mr John D. DANIELS
Mr Ints SILINS
Colonel Leo J. WEEKS
Counsellor, American Embassy,
Stockholm
Counsellor for Administrative
Affairs, American Embassy,
Stockholm
Counsellor for Political
Affairs, American Embassy,
Stockholm
Army Attach?
Mr Allen F. SCHEEL Attach?Security)
Mr Jan FRIBERG
Mr Karl-Erik STENBACK
Mr Guy ROSENQVIST
Mr Ake BLIXT
Ms Marie JAGLUND
Mr David L. BLEYLE
Mr Richard G. SIMPSON
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YUGOSLAVIA
Mr Aleksandar BOZOVIC
Colonel Branislav MIHAILOVIC
Dr Ljubivoje ACIMOVIC
Dr Vladimir BILANDZIC
Mr Marjan OSOLNIK
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Deputy Head of Delegation
Special Adviser
Member of Delegation
Mr Dobrosav VEIZOVIC
Mr Nedzad HADZIMUSIC
Ambassador to Sweden
Counsellor of the Embassy,
Stockholm
First Secretary of the
Embassy, Stockholm
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr Miodrag MARKUS
Mrs Ratomirka DJORDJEVIC
Mr Vojislav DJORDJEVIC
Administrative Secretary to
the Delegation
Secretary
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s3itivwwns IN3W31VIS
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SECRET
SUMMARY OF
PLENARY STATEMENTS
28 January 1986
MALTA
- Claims US sanctions against Libya, naval presence in Mediterranean
are destabilizing factors.
- Reviews Malta's efforts to "stall instability."
- Urges conference to consider independent air and naval activities.
UNITED STATES
- Replies to Malta's remarks.
- Defends US actions on terrorism - Libya issue.
FRG
- Presents FRG and France's joint ideas on the CDE.
- Urges conference to consider all parts of the final act.
- Reminds delegations that CDE is the responsibility of all
participants, not just the superpowers.
- Emphasizes the need to devote as much attention to conventional
stability as the nuclear balance of power.
- Assesses recent Soviet proposals (January 15).
- Contends that reliable verification is a crucial element of CDE.
- Reviews non-use of force (NUF) principle.
- Urges conference to reach a substantive agreement before Vienna
review.
- Argues that a community of equals is necessary for confidence and
security building measures ( CSBMs ) to become reality.
SECRET
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FRANCE
- Notes time remaining before follow-up meeting is short.
- Discusses proposals made by Gorbachev on 15 January.
- Argues that conventional armaments need to be discussed along with
nuclear arsenals.
- Reviews conditions necessary for France to participate usefully in an
effective and verifiable process of nuclear disarmament.
Outlines conditions which must be satisfied if conference is to
succeed.
Reaffirms French support for the functional approach to independent
air and naval activities.
- Reviews French policy on NUF.
- Urges conference to consider all aspects of the final act equally.
- Thanks Swedish Government for hospitality.
USSR
- Reviews Gorbachev's 15 January proposal.
- Recognizes the need for Europe to be an active participant in CDE.
- Criticizes the West for limiting notification to ground force
activities.
- Reaffirms desire for limitation of the scale of military maneuvers.
- Urges intensification of CDE's work on NUF principle.
- States that a substantive concluding document is possible.
28 February 1986
UNITED STATES
- Reaffirms US commitment to begin drafting stage.
- Urges delegations to keep focus of conference on CSBMs.
- Confirms US desire to seek better US/Soviet working relationship.
14 March 1986
USSR
- Claims that recent Party Congress demonstrates USSR foreign policy
aims to preserve and strengthen universal peace.
- Reviews progress made by conference.
- Outlines measures undertaken by Soviet Union to give a "fresh
impetus" to the negotiations.
-2-
SECRET
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SECRET
USSR
- Criticizes NATO for not being responsive to recent Soviet proposals.
- Argues that the drafting process needs to speed up.
- Concludes that a substantive and meaningful document is possible
before Vienna.
UNITED STATES
Reflects upon the accomplishments of the conference.
- Provides "evidence" that world political leaders want conference to
reach an agreement.
Suggests that the drafting process has gained momentum during the
session.
Outlines those areas where delegations are in agreement.
Proposes the conference begin drafting on issues where there is
considerable common ground.
Emphasizes that the concluding document will not accommodate all of
the proposals before CDE.
Urges the conference to honor Olaf Palme's memory by seeking
consensus on measures to reduce suspicion and increase confidence and
cooperation.
15 April 1986
NETHERLANDS
- Presents the positions of EC-12 on NUF, verification, notification.
- Criticizes US military actions against Libya.
- Calls upon all parties to use restraint.
POLAND
- Alleges that US is pursuing a policy of military conflict in
Mediterranean.
- Condemns US act of state terrorism against Libya.
- Endorses Warsaw Pact proposal call for a nuclear weapons free zone.
- Praises Gorbachev's January 15 proposal.
- Outlines conditions which must be met if negotiations are to succeed.
-3-
SECRET
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SECRET
BULGARIA
- Argues that US action in Libya is a violation of the NUF principle.
- Claims that Ambassador Barry has been hostile to Bulgaria since his
tour of duty there.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR, HUNGARY
- Condemn US military action.
USSR
- Asserts that US justification to the act is "weak indeed."
- Argues that action is latest in trend of US interference.
- Suggests that "military aggression" disrupts atmosphere of confidence.
MALTA
- Accuses the US of violating the principles of the Helsinki Final Act,
NUF and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.
- Offers GUM assistance in improving relations between Libya, US.
- Insists that US actions have demonstrated the need for naval
activities in the Mediterranean to be included in any CDE agreement.
UNITED STATES
- Defends US military actions against Libya.
- Presents evidence US has linking Libya with recent terrorist attacks.
- Reaffirms US commitment to CDE.
- Urges the conference to speed up the drafting process.
UNITED KINGDOM
- Stresses that the US has the right of self-defense.
FRG
- Notes his surprise at the number of hypocritical statements made by
various delegates.
- Declares that US had reasons for military action.
-4-
SECRET
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SECRET
23 May 1986
USSR
- Looks at the progress made by the working groups during CDE X.
- Claims that it is impossible to name a single area in which the
Soviet Union and the socialist countries have not made constructive
proposals.
- Stresses that little progress has been made on notification.
- Outlines the latest Soviet proposal on notification.
- Criticizes the US and its allies for not meeting compromise proposals
advanced by other participants.
- Argues that US actions have tightened the knot of differences rather
than help solve unresolved problems.
- Concludes that positive results can be reached by the end of the
first stage in Stockholm.
UNITED STATES (Hansen)
- Asserts that East is to blame for the delay in drafting.
- Emphasizes that the Soviet proposal for notification of air
activities is not comprehensive.
- Declares that the new Soviet threshold for land activities ignores
NATO and NNA proposals for lower, more significant thresholds.
YUGOSLAVIA
- Stresses that a mini-package would not be an acceptable outcome to
CD E.
FRANCE
- Welcomes Soviet acknowledgement that notification is the central
issue.
ITALY
- Reviews progress in each working group and what still needs to be
accomplished.
- Implies that the conference will have work to do after Vienna,
regardless of results achieved before the review.
-5-
SECRET
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SECRET
Working Group AB
10 February 1986
POLAND
- Distributes a 10-point text for the invitation of observers.
USSR
- Cites the "sinister" nuclear explosion and US action against Libya as
evidence of worsening US-Soviet relations.
YUGOSLAVIA
- Condemns US action against Libya; all forms of terrorism.
MALTA
- Alludes to its efforts to mediate between Libya and the US.
CYPRUS
- Promises to press the Euro-Mediterranean security link in the non-use
of force working group.
ROMANIA
- Stresses it would accept no excuses for the use of force.
TURKEY
- Notes the special importance it attaches to combating terrorism.
PORTUGAL
- Deplores the hypocritical propaganda introduced by those praising
Libya in CDE and stressed that terrorism is the primary issue.
-6-
SECRET
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qrrOFT
FRG
- Chastises the Soviets for praising Libya while noting UN condemnation
of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
POLAND
- Outlines three aspects of the Gorbachev proposal on conventional
weapons which have relevance for CDE.
UNITED STATES
- Responds to nonaligned and Soviet criticism of US actions against
Libya.
28 April 1986
YUGOSLAVIA
Reaffirms Yugoslavia's commitment to the prevention of terrorism.
- Stresses that terrorism cannot be condemned in one region and be
treated as potential strategic reserve in another.
Shares the opinion that Stockholm conference has to single out
terrorism as a threat to cooperation, peace and security in Europe
Suggests that each participating state should take effective steps to
prevent subversive and terrorist activities on their territories
first.
Proposes a special meeting of all participating states that should
elaborate a regional agreement on prevention of subversive and
terrorist activities.
Recalls previous efforts by the nonaligned countries to prevent
terrorism.
Reads the text on international terrorism adopted at the Ministerial
Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Movement.
-7-
SECRET
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X3ONI ID319f1S
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SECRET
MAIN SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p plenary meeting
a working group A
b - working group B
c working group AB
d post-plenary or other informal conversations
e NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 19p, 75d, 127a, 144p, 158b, 178d,
320d
ALERTS: 157b
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES:
145p,
204p,
211p,
366p, 374p
CDE-IX:
General references to:
15p,
18p,
21p,
36d, 74d, 207p,
210p
Structual issues: 104d
CDE-X:
General references to: 369p, 364p
CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS; 19p, 127a, 157b, 178d,
278p, 304c, 320a
COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5; 39d, 367p
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 17p, 19p, 21p, 29p,
39d, 39d, 128a, 130a, 158b, 204p, 212p, 282p, 299p, 317d,
320d, 367P, 375d, 404d
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 1d, 36d, 207p, 327d, 347,
404d
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
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SECRET
1
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SECRET
DISARMAMENT: 17p, 28p, 129e, 141p, 299p, 304c, 320d
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 320d
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2
Military calendars: 170a
Annual forecasts of military activities: 170a, 203p, 211p, 346a,
365p, 403d
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1
General references to: 75d, 403d
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FINAL DOCUMENT: 18p, 21p, 28p, 203p, 216p
GRINEVSKIY, 0.A.: 17p, 28p, 36d, 104d, 172d, 169d, 203p, 209p, 282p,
299p, 303c, 317d, 320d, 364p, 374p, 375d
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 18p, 75d, 146p, 278p, 281p, 282p, 320d, 367p
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 2p, 15p, 19p, 28p, 73d, 74d,
145p, 172d, 176d, 178d, 205p, 211p, 302p, 317d, 320d, 343, 403d
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 38d, 38a, 40d, 300p, 375p
Areas of inspection: 38a, 129d
Methods: 38d, 38a
JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL: 17p, 28p, 36d, 73d, 140p, 176d, 204p, 211p,
278p, 327d, 365p
MADRID MANDATE: 19p, 28p, 74d, 144p, 157b, 178d, 180d, 205p, 213p,
320d
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 18p, 19p, 29p, 204p
Of ground forces: 179d, 302p, 365p
SECRET
2
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Of air forces: 179d, 302p, 366p
MALTESE MEDITERRANEAN ZONE OF PEACE: 15p, 23d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 18p, 36d, 39d, 74d, 128a, 173d, 204p,
374p, 343, 366p, 403d
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS
MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS
MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION
MIKHAYLOV: 403d
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 17p, 28p
MISCELLANEOUS CABLES:
Analysis of statements of French and FRG Foreign Ministers: pp. 25-27
CDE issues at Evere: p. 35
US statement at Chatam House: pp. 58-64
Whither CDE?: pp. 96-97
Text of Ambassador Barry's speech in Bern: pp. 132-138.
Ninth Round wrap-up and assessment: pp. 217-220
Russian language services at CSCE meetings: pp. 231-234
Key CDE issues for intersession: pp. 234-235
Public affairs rationale for Stockholm: pp. 248-249
Grinevsky visit to Washington: p. 254
Grinevsky visit: p. 255
Odinzov request: p. 256
Notification on Finnish exercise: p. 257.
Comparison of MBFR associated measures and CDE CSBM: pp. 258-261
Moving away from independent air: pp. 267-269
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Soviets expelled from France turn up at CDE: p. 270.
CDE Deputy travel to Berlin and Warsaw: p.271.
Non-use of force: suggested demarches: pp. 290-293
CDE: Dead in the water?: pp. 309-311
Soviet glacier begins to move: pp. 343-345
Western strategy for the closing phase of CDE: pp. 377-379
Handling the Gorbachev conventional arms initiative: pp. 394-396
Russian language in the CSCE forum: pp. 406-407
Proposed western human rights language: p. 408
Gonzalez visit to Moscow: p. 409
Proposed White House statement on CDE: p.410
MORITORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING: 17p, 140p
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM;
VERIFICATION; 38a, 39d, 129d, 227, 300p
NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 29p, 75d
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 2p, 20p, 29p, 203p, 206p, 214p, 281p, 282p,
301p, 327d, 365p
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 27p
NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 9p, 36d, 127a, 143p, 177d, 203p, 214p, 278p,
327d, 342b
Designation of the activity: 346a
Duration of the activity: 346a
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 346a
Names of participating states: 346a
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Type of forces involved: 19p
Number of troops participating: 2p, 19p, 39d, 127a, 144p, 173d,
178d, 203p, 302p, 327d, 346m, 365p, 374p, 375d
Number of naval vesssels involved: 2p, 19p, 28p, 127a, 144p, 177d,
204p, 327d
Number of military aircraft involved: 2p, 19p, 28p, 127a, 144p, 173d,
178d, 204p, 302p, 327d, 346a, 365p, 374p
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 19p, 127a,
173d, 178d, 346a, 365p
Information to be included: 157b, 177d, 206p
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 17p, 277p
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 36d, 40d, 171b, 289b, 312b, 323b
Coordination of observation with other states: 81c, 197d
Host country responsibilities: 81c, 156b
Invitations of observers: 81c, 156b, 203p, 204p, 212p, 365p, 404d
Scope of observation: 40d, 81c
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 128a, 157b
RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N.: 75d
ROZANOV, I.S.: 39d, 74d, 227d
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 39d, 40d, 347
SC.6: 29p
SC.7: 38d, 39d, 40d, 205p, 212p, 228
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SMIRNOV: 327d
TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 38a, 75d, 129d
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 19p, 39d, 127a, 144p, 302p, 317d
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 21p, 207p
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 38d, 38a, 39d, 129d, 130a, 227d, 227,
300p, 302P, 320d, 375d, 404d
Verification by cadres: 38d, 39d
WEEKLY WRAP-UP CABLES: January 27-31 pp. 42-46; February 3-7 pp. 77-80;
February 10-14 pp. 91-95; February 17-21 pp. 109-113; February 24-28
pp. 151-155; March 3-7 pp. 182-187; April 14-18 pp. 295-298;
April 21-25 pp. 313-316; April 28-May 2 pp. 324-326; May 5-9
PP- 333-336; May 12-16 pp. 353-357; May 19-23 pp. 368-373
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see CDE ZONE
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BULGARIA SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b working group B
c working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e NATO caucus
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 281p
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 281p
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EAST SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 127a
CDE ZONE: 127a
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 128a
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY 'ACTIVITIES: 347
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):
Annual forecasts of military activities: 346a,
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 38d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 128 a
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: 227
NOTIFICATIONS:
General references to: 127a
Designation of the activity: 346a
Duration of the activity: 346a
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Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 346a
Names of participating states: 346a
Number of troops participating 127a, 346a
Number of naval vessels involved: 127a
Number of military aircraft involved: 127a, 346a
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 392c
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 127a, 346a
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
Host country responsibilities: 156b
Inviation of observers: 156b
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 128a
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 347
SC.7: 38d, 228
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 127a
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 38d, 227
Verification by cadres: 38d
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GDR SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AS
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 38a
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 38a
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HUNGARY SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
Scope of observation: 40d
SC.7: 40d
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MALTA SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
CDE IX:
General references to: 15p
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 282p
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 282p
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 2p, 15p
MALTESE MEDITERRANEAN ZONE OF PEACE: 15p, 23d
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 282p
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 2p
Type of forces involved: 2p
Number of troops participating: 2p
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Number of naval vessels involved: 2p
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
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POLAND SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
CDE ZONE: 278p, 304c
DISARMAMENT: 304c
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 278p, 281p
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL: 278p
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 278p
NUCLEAR WEPONS FREE ZONE: 277p
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
Coordination of observation with other states: 81c
Host country responsibilities: 81c
Invitations of observers: 81c
Scope of observation: 81c
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USSR SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other
informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
Speaker Key
A - Grinevskiy
B - Rakhmaninov
C - Rozanov
D - Solomenko
E - Tatarnikov
F - Mikhaylov
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 19p/A, 75d/E, 144p/A, 178d/A, 320d/A
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 145p/A, 204p/A, 221p/A, 366p/A, 374p/A
CDE-IX:
General references to: 18p/A, 21p/A, 36d/A, 204p/A, 210p/A
Structural issues: 104d
CDE-X:
General references to: 364p/A
CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS; 19p/A, 178d/A, 320d/A
COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5; 39d/C, 367p/A
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 17p/A, 19p/A, 21p/A, 29p/A,
39d/E, 39d/C, 204p/A, 212p/A, 299p/A, 317d/A, 320d/A, 367p/A, 375d/A,
404d/F
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 1d, 36d/A, 207p/A, 327d/D, 404d/F
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DISARMAMENT: 17p/A, 28p/A, 129d/E, 141p/A, 299p/A, 320d/A
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EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 320d/A
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2;
Military calendars: 403d/F
Annual forecasts of military activities: 203p/A, 211p/A, 365p/A
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1;
General references to: 75d/E, 403d/F
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FINAL DOCUMENT: 18p/A, 21p/A, 28p/A, 203p/A, 216p/A
GRINEVSKIY, 0.A.: 17p, 28p, 36d, 104d, 172d, 176d, 203p, 209p, 282p,
299p, 303c, 317d, 320d, 364p, 374p, 375d
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 18p/A, 75d/B, 146p/A, 320d/A, 367p/A
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 19p/A, 28p/A, 73d, 74d/C, 145p/A,
172d/A, 176d/A, 178d/A, 205p/A, 211p/A, 302p/A, 317d/A, 320d/A, 343,
304d/F
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 300p/A, 375d/A
Areas of inspection: 129d/E
Methods: 38a/E
JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL: 17p/A, 28p/A, 36d/A, 73d, 140p/A, 176d/A, 204p/A,
211p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A
MADRID MANDATE: 19p/A, 28p/A, 74d/C, 144p/A, 178d/A, 180d/A, 205p/A,
213p/A, 320d/A
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 18p/A, 19p/A, 29p/A, 204p/A
Of ground forces: 179d/A, 302p/A, 365p/A
Of air forces: 179d/A, 302p/A, 366p/A
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MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 18p/A, 36d/A, 39d/E, 74d, 173d/A,
204p/A, 343, 366p/A, 374p/A, 403d/F
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS
MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS
MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION
MIKHAYLOV: 403d
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 17p/A, 28p/A
MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING: 17p/A, 140p/A
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION; 38a, 39d, 129d/E, 300p/A
NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 29p/A, 75d/B
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 2p/A, 20p/A, 29p/A, 203p/A, 206p/A, 214p/A,
301p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 29p/A
NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 19p/A, 36d/A, 143p/A, 177d/A, 203d/A, 214p/A,
327d/D
Type of forces involved: 19p/A
Number of troops participating: 19p/A, 39d/E, 144p/A, 173d/A, 178d/A,
204p/A, 302p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A, 374p/A, 375d/A
Number of naval vesssels involved: 19p/A, 28p/A, 144p/A, 177d/A, 204p/A,
327d/D
Number of military aircraft involved: 19p/A, 28p/A, 144p/A, 173d/A, J78d/A
204p/A, 302p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A, 374p/A
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 19p/A, 173d/A,
178d/A, 365p/A
Information to be included: 177d/A, 206p/A
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NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 17p/A
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 36d/A
Invitations of observers: 203p/A, 204p/A, 212p/A, 365p/A, 404d/F
RAKBNANINOV, Yu.N.: 75d
ROZANOV, I.S.: 39d, 74d, 227d
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 39d/E
SC.6: 29p/A
SC.7: 39d/E, 39d/C, 205p/A, 212p/A
SMIRNOV: 327d
TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 38a, 75d, 129d
THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 19p/A, 39p/E, 144p/A, 302p/A, 317d/A
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 21p/A, 207p/A
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 38a/E, 39d/C, 129d/E, 227d/C, 300p/A, 302p/A,
320d/A, 375d/A, 404d/F
Verification by cadres: 39d/c
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see CDE ZONE
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YUGOSLAVIA SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
CDE X:
General references to: 359p
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 40d
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 40d
SC.1: 40d
SC.7: 40d
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"CONSTRAINTS"
REF: 85 STOCKHOLM 9814
1. CDE IX - 016
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. U.S. (GUNDERSEN, GALASSI) AND SOVIET DELOFFS
(YEREFEYEV, SOLOMENKO, GROSHEV) MET JANUARY 27 TO
RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF HOW TO TRANSLATE THE WORD
CONSTRAINTS" INTO RUSSIAN (SEE REF FOR BACKGROUND).
USDEL STRESSED THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT AT ODE IS
DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HAS BEEN USED IN PREVIOUS NEGO-
TIATIONS AND THAT, AS A RESULT, THE U.S. AND NATO
CONTINUED TO PREFER THE TERM "SDERZHIVAYUSHCHIYE MERY"
(RESTRAINING MEASURES). AS SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR
BARRY TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AT THE END OF THE
LAST ROUND, USDELOFFS PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: WHEN WE (NATO) OR THE EAST
DISCUSS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE WORD "OGRANICHENIYA"
(TRANSLATED "LIMITATIONS" INTO ENGLISH) WOULD BE USED;
WHEN WE (NATO) OR THE EAST DISCUSS THE WESTERN CONCEPT
OF CONSTRAINTS, IT WOULD BE TRANSLATED BY THE INTER-
PRETERS INTO RUSSIAN AS "SDERZHIVAYUSHCHIYE MERY." THE
SOVIETS AGREED TO THIS APPROACH. WE BOTH AGREED THAT
THIS WOULD BE A TEMPORARY SOLUTION TO EXPEDITE THE WORK
OF THE CONFERENCE AND WOULD NOT PREJUDICE FUTURE
DOCUMENTS. SOVIETS SUGGESTED THAT INTERPRETERS USE
"CGRANICHENIYA" WHEN REFERRING TO THE WHA PROPOSALS ON
CONSTRAINTS, BUT USDELOFF NOTED THAT THIS WAS AN NNA
DECISION THAT COULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS UNDER-
STANDING. SOVDELOFFS DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS ASSESSMENT.
USDELOFFS THEN REPORTED THIS U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING
TO NATO COLLEAGUES, WHO SUPPORTED IT. U.S. AND SOVIET
DELEGATES CONVEYED THIS SOLUTION ON JANUARY 28 TO THE
ODE SECRETARIAT BEFORE THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION. THE
SECRETARIAT, NOT DISGUISING ITS RELIEF, READILY AGREED
TO IMPLEMENT THIS TEMPORARY SOLUTION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00645
SUUJECT: CDE PLENARY, JANUARY 28, 1986
1. CDE IX - 009
2. FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER DUMAS ACCENTED FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN
THEIR JOINT APPEARANCE AT JANUARY 28 PLENARY OPENING 9TH
SESSION OF CDE (SEE SEPTELS FOR FULL TEXT AND ANALYSES
OF STATEMENTS). MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER SCEBERRAS
TRIGONA INSISTED ON NOTIFICATION OF AIR, LAND AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES; HE ALSO ATTACKED U.S. ACTIONS ON TERRORISM/
LIBYA ISSUE, PROMPTING RIGHT OF REPLY BY AMBASSADOR
BARRY (ALSO REPORTED IN A SEPTEL). STRESSING GORBACHEV'S
-
JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL, GRINEVSKY (USSR) CITED NEED TO
PROGRESS ON NUF AND LIMITATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(TEXT OF SPEECH SENT SEPTEL). ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12
BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) WELCOMED SPAIN AND PORTUGAL INTO
THE EC, AND NOTED EC-12 READINESS TO DRAFT AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE TO REACH A POSITIVE RESULT BEFORE VIENNA REVIEW.
BARRY
END CF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00651
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT CDE
L. CDE IX - OLO
2. FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER M. ROLAND DUMAS DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION
OF THE NINTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON
JANUARY 28TH.
3. BEGIN TEXT: MY STATEMENT TO YOU ON BEHALF OF
FRANCE IS AN IMPORTANT MOMENT FOR MY COUNTRY'S
DIPLOMACY AND FOR ME PERSONALLY, AS WELL AS FOR THE
FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. I WAS ANXIOUS
TO BE HERE, TOGETHER WITH MY FRIEND HANS DIETRICH
GENSCHER, TO BEAR WITNESS JOINTLY TO THE IMPORTANCE OUR
TWO COUNTRIES ATTACH TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
IN EUROPE, AND THUS TO GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT SHOULD
BE HENCEFORTH THE FRENCH-GERMAN COOPERATION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SCENE. THIS IS WHY I ASSOCIATE MYSELF
FULLY WITH HIS STATEMENT AND THE VIEWS HE HAS JUST
EXPRESSED.
I ALSO ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH THE REMARKS OF M. BUWALDA
WHO, ON BEHALF OF THE CURRENT PRESIDING COUNTRY OF THE
EEC, HAS WELCOMED HIS SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUES
WHO CONTRIBUTE TODAY FOR THE FIRST TIME TO THE ACTION
OF THE EEC COUNTRIES IN THIS CONFERENCE.
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE HAS A MAJOR
SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR CONTINENT AS WELL
AS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR EUROPE OF AN AGREEMENT IN
STOCKHOLM NEXT SUMMER IS CLEAR. ON ONE POINT EVERYBODY
IS AGREED; NO ONE SET OF NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING
EUROPEAN SECURITY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN, OR HAS
PRIORITY OVER, ANOTHER SET. THEREFORE, I WISH TO
RECALL OUR COMMITMENT TO THE DIALOGUE ON SECURITY
ISSUES BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES FROM THE EAST
AND THE WEST AND THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE, OF WHICH OUR
CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART.
OUR CONFERENCE IS TODAY EMBARKING ON ITS FIRST SESSION
OF L986. WE JOINTLY AGREED TO BRING ITS WORK TO A
CONCLUSION ON THE L9TH OF SEPTEMBER NEXT, AT THE
LATEST, IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
IN VIENNA TO ASSESS ITS RESULTS. TIME IS RUNNING SHORT
AND THE ADOPTED WORK PROGRAM ENCOURAGES US TO INTENSIFY
OUR EFFORTS: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS THUS ENTERING
ITS DECISIVE PHASE. OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS TO ARRIVE,
WITHIN THAT TIME-FRAME, AT A SUBSTANTIAL RESULT THAT
WOULD FULFILL THE MANDATE WE ADOPTED IN MADRID IN
L983. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AGREED ON BY
THE 35 COUNTRIES SHOULD REPRESENT A CONCRETE
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND
CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE AND BE APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE OF
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THE ZONE CONCERNED, INCLUDING THAT PORTION OF SOVIET
TERRITORY THAT IS SITUATED WEST OF THE URALS.
IT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO EFFECT A MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT
IN THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF HELSINKI.
INDEED, WHAT IS REQUIRED, BY COMPARISON WITH THOSE
MEASURES, IS IN THE NATURE OF A QUALITATIVE LEAP.
BUT BEFORE SETTING OUT THE POSITION OF MY COUNTRY ON
THE PROCEEDING OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE, I WISH TO
RECALL THE IMPROVEMENT, THE RESUMPTION OF THE EAST/WEST
DIALOGUE WHICH IS ALREADY STARTING TO EMERGE IN THE
LAST FEW WEEKS BUT WHICH MUST NOW BE CONSOLIDATED.
FRANCE FAVOURED SUCH A DEVELOPMENT AND CONTRIBUTED TO
IT WHEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, M. FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND, WELCOMED THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR, M. GORBACHEV, TO PARIS.
IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO RECALL THE DETAILS OF THE
PARIS AND GENEVA SUMMITS. BUT I SHOULD BE DOING LESS
THAN YOU EXPECTED IF I DID NOT MENTION IN THIS CONTEXT
THE PROPOSAL MADE BY M. GORBACHEV ON L5 JANUARY LAST.
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT ODE
THE SCOPE OF THIS PROPOSAL AROUSES INTEREST. IT CALLS
FOR REFLEXION AND REQUIRED THAT IT BE ANALYSED IN
DEPTH. WE ARE DOING THIS MOST CAREFULLY AND IN A MOST
OPEN-MINDED SPIRIT. AT THIS STAGE, HOWEVER, I WOULD
RATHER CONFINE MYSELF TO ONE OR TWO POINTS THAT ARE
LINKED WITH THE VERY PURPOSE OF OUR CONFERENCE.
(L) MR. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR
ARSENALS OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES ARE A STEP
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, AND ONE THAT WE OURSELVES HAVE
ADVOCATED. BUT ONE CANNOT FORGET AT THE SAME TIME
CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS EXISTING IN EUROPE
WHICH ALSO THREATEN OUR COUNTRIES. FOR US, EUROPEANS,
THEN, THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS CANNOT BE PUT
FORWARD AS SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF. SECURITY, IN ALL ITS
CONSTITUENT PARTS, MUST BE OUR CRITERION. FOR US, THE
PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS CANNOT RECEIVE ONLY
SECONDARY PRIORITY AS COMPARED WITH NUCLEAR
NEGOTIATIONS.
(2) MR. GORBACHEV STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES THAT OUR
CONFERENCE IS EXPECTED TO ADOPT. WE ARE INDEED
CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD BE A STEP TOWARD GREATER
TRANSPARENCY IN MILITARY MATTERS, AND WOULD CONSTITUTE
A POSITIVE ELEMENT FOR MORE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY
AMONG ALL OUR COUNTRIES AND THE PREREQUISITE FOR
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE 35 NATIONS CONCERNING
THE LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE.
THE SAME JUDGMENT APPLIES TO THE REFERENCE IN THE
SOVIET PROPOSAL TO THE PRESENT-DAY IMPORTANCE OF
VERIFICATION IN ARMS CONTROL. THIS TOO, IN OUR VIEW,
IS VERY MUCH IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CDE.
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(3) NOR WOULD I WISH TO OVERLOOK THE CONSIDERATIONS
WHICH, IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, MORE PARTICULARLY
CONCERN FRANCE, NAMELY THOSE AFFECTING THE NUCLEAR
POWERS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.S.R.
AS REGARDS FRANCE, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC SET
OUR AS LONG AGO AS L983 THE CONDITIONS WHICH, IN THE
FRENCH VIEW, WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFIED TO ENABLE
FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE USEFULLY IN AN EFFECTIVE AND
VERIFIABLE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT:
--FIRSTLY, THE REDUCTIONS IN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN
ARSENALS WOULD HAVE TO HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE THE
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DISPARITY BETWEEN THOSE
ARSENALS AND THE ARSENALS OF THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS
HAD BEEN FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED.
--NEXT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS NOT
TO BE STRENGTHENED. WE MADE PROPOSALS ALONG THESE
LINES AT THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN L984.
--FINALLY, ELIMINATION OF THE EXISTING IMBALANCES IN
CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE CHEMICAL
THREAT.
FRANCE THUS FAVOURS DISARMAMENT. WE SUBSCRIBE TO THE
VIEW THAT IT CANNOT, IN THE LONG-TERM, BE AN
EXCLUSIVELY BILATERAL UNDERTAKING. WHEN THE TIME
COMES, AND IF THE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS THEN OBTAIN,
FRANCE WILL NOT BE FOUND WANTING.
THIS IS ALSO WHY FRANCE WAS THE FIRST TO ADVOCATE THE
CDE AS EARLY AS THE END OF THE L970'S. WE STILL THINK,
AS WE DID THEN, THAT THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF
CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE TACKLED AMONG ALL THE
COUNTRIES HAVING FORCES ON THIS CONTINENT AND NOT IN
CENTRAL EUROPE ALONE. THIS JUDGMENT HAS BEEN ENDORSED
BY THE 35 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS. FULL
RECOGNITION HAS THEREBY BEEN GIVEN TO THE CONTRIBUTION
THAT CAN BE MADE BY OUR CONFERENCE ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCES IN EUROPE, SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE AMERICAN-SOVIET
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SPACE
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT CDE
ARMAMENTS.
WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SET OUT ARE THE PRECISE CONDITIONS
WHICH MUST BE SATISFIED IF THIS CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS TO SUCCEED.
L) IN MY OPINION REALISM AND PRAGMATISM CONSTITUTE THE
FIRST CONDITION. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE
OF THE CONFERENCE TO SEEK A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF
THE MILITARY FORCES OR ACTIVITIES ON OUR CONTINENT. ON
THE OTHER HAND, WE DEEM IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE BETTER
PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. FOR THIS REASON, FRANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
ITS ALLIES HAS PROPOSED SIX MEASURES PROVIDING FOR
PRIOR NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION OF
LAND OR COMBINED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. MUCH
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HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE TO IDENTIFY THE ELEMENTS OF
CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THESE PROPOSALS AND THOSE MADE BY
OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY BY
THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. IN THIS REGARD
I WELCOME THIS INITIATIVE WHICH IS IN ITSELF AN EXAMPLE
OF WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL
CLEAVAGES OF MILITARY ALLIANCES. WE ARE WELL AWARE OF
THE SPECIFIC SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.
2) HOWEVER, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE SPECIFIC
MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE APPLIED TO LARGE-SCALE
ACTIVITIES ONLY AND NOT TO ACTIVITIES SMALLER IN
SCALE. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE DEGREE OF
NOTIFICATION, OF OBSERVATION AND OF VERIFICATION SHOULD
GROW TOGETHER WITH THE SCALE OF AN ACTIVITY. BUT THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONE SET AND THE OTHER IS ONE OF
DEGREE NOT KIND.
3) FINALLY, I WISH TO MENTION THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH
HAVE ARISEN CONCERNING NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT WE
OUGHT TO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE APPROACH AGREED ON AT
MADRID, KNOWN AS THE "FUNCTIONAL" APPROACH. TO CALL IT
INTO QUESTION MIGHT, IN OUR OPINION, JEOPARDIZE THE
OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE.
HERE ARE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE THREE CONDITIONS WE
CONSIDER ESSENTIAL FOR THE CONFERENCE TO REACH AN
AGREEMENT ON A FINAL DOCUMENT. WHAT STATUS THEN SHOULD
THE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE BE GRANTED
IN SUCH A DOCUMENT? THIS PRINCIPLE APPEARS ALREADY IN
THE HELSINKI DECALOGUE. HAVE NOT ALL OUR STATES
AFFIRMED THAT THIS PRINCIPLE ALREADY GOVERNED THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE WITHIN A GIVEN
POLITICAL OR MILITARY ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS THEIR
RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES? REAFFIRMATION OF THIS
PRINCIPLE CANNOT THEREFORE BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT THE
PRINCIPLE HAS LOST ITS FORCE, BUT TO THE CONTRARY THAT
IT MUST BE STRENGTHENED, THAT IT SHOULD BE GIVEN
"EFFECT AND EXPRESSION" AS WE AGREED IN MADRID WHEN WE
ADOPTED THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE. OUR INTENTION
IS INDEED TO GIVE THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE A
CONCRETE CONTENT THROUGH SIGNIFICANT MEASURES AND
PRECISE CRITERIA. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SHALL HAVE TO
PREFACE THESE CONCRETE MEASURES BY A POLITICAL
"STATEMENT OF GROUNDS". IN SHORT, THIS WOULD BE
DESIGNED TO CLARIFY THE LINK BETWEEN SUCH PROVISIONS
AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR CONFERENCE HAS THE UNIQUE ATTRIBUTE
OF BELONGING TO THE CSCE PROCESS. ABOVE AND BEYOND ITS
OWN IMMEDIATE OBJECT, IT IS THE EXPRESSION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF A GRAND POLITICAL DESIGN WHICH
TRANSCENDS IT. THE FUNDAMENTAL RAISON D'ETRE OF THAT
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PROCESS IS THE SEARCH FOR WAYS OF OVERCOMING THE STATE
OF AFFAIRS THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS IN EUROPE THROUGH
COOPERATION, EXCHANGE AND DIALOGUE. THAT IS AN
AMBITION WHICH MY COUNTRY PROCLAIMS AS RESOLUTELY TODAY
AS IT DID TEN YEARS AGO. THE SITUATION OF OUR
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT CDE
CONTINENT MUST NOT AND WILL NOT BE CHANGED BY WEAPONS
OR MISTRUST. BUT THE HISTORY OF EUROPE DID NOT STOP 40
YEARS AGO. OUR PEOPLES HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO DO
TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE CIRCULATION
OF PERSONS AND IDEAS. THEY HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO SAY TO
ONE ANOTHER. CAN A STATE WHICH IS NOT AT PEACE WITH
ITS OWN CITIZENS REALLY GAIN CONFIDENCE OF ITS
NEIGHBORS?
IT IS BECAUSE A SINGLE POLITICAL DESIGN UNDERLIES THE
VARIOUS MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES GENERATED BY THE CSCE
THAT MY COUNTRY IS DETERMINED THAT THE BALANCE BETWEEN
ALL THE ASPECTS OF THE FINAL ACT SHALL BE RESPECTED.
ANY PRIORITY GIVEN TO ONE OF THOSE ASPECTS WOULD BE AT
THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHERS, AND OF THE PROCESS AS A
WHOLE. LET US NOT FORGET IN PARTICULAR THE HUMAN
CONTACTS: IN THIS REPECT I WISH THE FORTHCOMING BERN
MEETING TO BE SUCCESSFUL.
IT IS THEN, LATER, THAT THE RESULTS WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE
IN STOCKHOLM WILL BE PLACED IN.THEIR OVERALL CONTEXT,
SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE OTHER 35-NATION MEETINGS THAT
HAVE BEEN HELD SINCE MADRID. THIS WILL BE DONE IN
VIENNA THIS FALL, AT THE FOLLOW-UP CSCE MEETING. IT IS
IN THE LIGHT OF THIS COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT THAT IT
WILL THEN BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THE CONDITIONS IN
WHICH THE CDE COULD CONTINUE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IN CONCLUDING MY
REMARKS, I MUST NOT FORGET ALL THAT HAS BEEN DONE TO
PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE BY THE SWEDISH
GOVERNMENT, WHICH I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF THANKING
FOR ITS HOSPITALITY.
DESPITE DIFFICULTIES AND SHORTCOMINGS, THE SPIRIT OF
HELSINKI MUST CONTINUE TO GUIDE OUR 35 STATES. IT IS
MY HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE NEXT AUTUMN TO SAY THAT
STOCKHOLM FULFILLED THE HOPES RAISED IN HELSINKI.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
!MN
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00664
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF FRG FOREIGN MINISTER
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, JANUARY 28, 1986
1. CDE IX - 012
2. THERE FOLLOWS THE FULL TEXT OF THE SPEECH DELIVERED
BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 28, 1986.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR CHAIRMAN,
- EXACTLY TWO YEARS AGO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF
EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA INAUGURATED THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. THE COMMON GOAL IS TO ACHIEVE
MORE CONFIDENCE AND MORE SECURITY IN EUROPE. MORE
CONFIDENCE AND MORE SECURITY -- THAT IS THE GREAT HOPE
OF OUR NATIONS. IT IMPOSES ON US A HISTORICAL
RESPONSIBILITY THAT WE MUST LIVE UP TO.
- I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TODAY TO
PRESENT TOGETHER WITH MY FRIEND AND COLLEAGE, MONSIEUR
ROLAND DUMAS, FOREIGN MINISTER OF FRANCE, OUR JOINT
IDEAS ON THE CDE. WE SEEK A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME TO THIS
CONFERENCE THIS YEAR STILL, BEFORE THE START OF THE CSCE
FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN VIENNA.
- OUR JOINT APPEARANCE AT THE CONFERENCE REFLECTS THE
CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION LINKING OUR TWO PEOPLES
AND STATES. IT ALSO REFLECTS OUR FULL AGREEMENT ON THE
GOALS OF THE CSCE PROCESS, OF WHICH THE CDE IS AN
INTEGRAL PART. WE REGARD THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR
COUNTRIES AS AN EXAMPLE FOR THE WHOLE OF EUROPE: THE
GERMANS AND THE FRENCH HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO
REPLACE ANIMOSITY AND RIVALRY WITH LASTING FRIENDSHIP
AND COOPERATION. THE SAME HOLDS TRUE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY WHICH -- NEWLY STRENGTHENED BY THE DEMOCRACIES
OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL -- HAS BECOME A FORCE FOR
STABILITY, RECONCILIATION AND PEACE IN EUROPE. THE
COMMUNITY, WHICH IS INCREASINGLY FORMULATING AND
PURSUING ITS INTERESTS, NOT LEAST IN THE FIELD OF
SECURITY, IS TO A GROWING EXTENT ABLE AND WILLING TO
ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHAPING EUROPE'S DESTINY. IT
IS A MODEL OF SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION AMONG EQUAL AND
INDEPENDENT STATES. IT IS AND REMAINS A MOTOR IN THE
CSCE PROCESS.
- EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INCORPORATION INTO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE CORNERSTONES OF OUR POLICY.
WE REALIZE THAT EUROPE DOES NOT END AT THE RIVER ELBE.
PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN TO OTHERS, THIS APPLIES TO THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH IS CONSCIOUS OF ITS
HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A COUNTRY IN THE HEART OF
EUROPE AND WHOSE CITIZENS WILL NEVER FORGET THAT GERMANS
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ALSO LIVE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DIVIDING LINE.
- WITH THE CSCE, EUROPE HAS RETURNED TO THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA. THE CSCE IS THE INSTRUMENT THAT
EUROPE HAS GIVEN ITSELF TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF LASTING PEACE ON OUR CONTINENT. THE
PARTICIPATING STATES ARE UNDER OBLIGATION TO MAKE FULL
USE OF THIS INSTRUMENT. THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN
VIENNA AT THE END OF THIS YEAR WILL PROVIDE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE CSCE
PROCESS. THIS ASSESSMENT MUST INCLUDE THE WORK OF THE
NUMEROUS CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS OF EXPERTS THAT WERE
AGREED UPON IN MADRID AND HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN PLACE.
- ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES MUST STRIVE TO GIVE
EFFECT TO ALL PARTS OF THE FINAL ACT IN A BALANCED
FASHION IN THE AWARENESS OF THEIR INNER COHERENCE.
EVERYONE WILL THEN BENEFIT FROM THE FRUITS OF THE FINAL
ACT. IT MUST NOT BE TORN APART IN DISPUTES OVER
PROMOTION OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS AND ABANDONMENT OF OTHERS.
THIS WOULD DEPRIVE IT OF ITS EFFECT AS A MAGNA CHARTA OF
COOPERATION, THEREBY CAUSING EVERYONE TO LOSE OUT.
- IN TAKING STOCK IN VIENNA AND PREPARING FURTHER
PROGRAMS, WE SHALL HAVE TO TAKE HUMAN RIGHTS JUST AS
SERIOUSLY AS SECURITY, POLITICAL COOPERATION JUST AS
SERIOUSLY AS ECONOMIC COOPERATION. WE SEEK COOPERATION
AND EXCHANGES IN ALL SPHERES -- IN THE SPHERES OF
HUMANITARIAN IMPROVEMENTS, TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, INFORMATION AND CULTURE. WE
WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ALSO
ACKNOWLEDGES THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY. REGARDING THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES AS A
FACTOR IN THEIR OWN RIGHT WITH AN EQUAL CLAIM TO
SECURITY IS JUST AS IMPORTANT AS RECOGNIZING THE
ESSENTIAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA AS
CSCE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK AFFORDED BY
THE CSCE. IN THE CSCE PROCESS, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE SUPERPOWERS FOR IMPROVING THE OVERALL SECURITY
CONDITIONS MUST INTERACT WITH THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, A CONTRIBUTION
WHICH FILLS OUT THE FRAMEWORK THROUGH DIVERSE FORMS OF
COOPERATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE RELATIONS.
NOBODY MAY RULE HIMSELF OUT OR BE EXCLUDED HERE. THE CDE
IS PROOF THAT SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT ARE NO BILATERAL
MATTERS, BUT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.
THE CDE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT ALL NEGOTIATIONS THAT DEAL
WITH EUROPEAN SECURITY ARE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE AND EQUAL
URGENCY.
MR CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
- IN JANUARY 1984 I REMARKED IN THIS FORUM THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION GAVE REASON FOR CONCERN. TODAY
WE CAN STATE QUITE CLEARLY THAT THE APPREHENSIONS HAVE
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NOT MATERIALIZED. THE CSCE NET HAS STOOD THE STRAIN.
THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED FOR THE BETTER. EAST AND WEST
HAVE EMBARKED ON AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE GENUINE PROGRESS IN
THE SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL WHICH IS SO
VITAL TO THE FUTURE OF MANKIND. IN GENEVA AND IN THE
MULTILATERAL FORA FAR-REACHING WESTERN PROPOSALS HAVE
BEEN SUBMITTED. THEY REPRESENT A SOLID BASIS FOR THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS.
- MY GOVERNMENT SUBSCRIBES TO AN ACTIVE POLICY OF
SAFEGUARDING PEACE. OUR GOAL IS A STATE OF LASTING
STAUILITY WHICH WILL RELIABLY EXCLUDE ANY KIND OF WAR.
- IN THE FINAL DECLARATION ISSUED AFTER THE GENEVA
SUMMIT, ALL PARTS OF WHICH MEET WITH OUR APPROVAL, IT
SAYS: "RECOGNIZING THAT ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR
AND THE U.S. COULD HAVE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES, THEY
EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING ANY WAR BETWEEN
THEM, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. THEY WILL NOT
SEEK TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY."
- THIS IMPORTANT STATEMENT APPLIES NOT ONLY TO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. IT MUST APPLY TO
ALL COUNTRIES. INDIVIDUAL DEFENSIVE EFFORTS ALONE WILL
NOT ENSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE. THUS ALL
EFFORTS MUST BE DIRECTED TO COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS LEADING
TO LASTING STABILITY AND THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF
ARMS AND FORCES.
- EVERY ATTEMPT TO REVERSE THE SPIRALING ARMS BUILD-UP
MUST PROVE ITS WORTH HERE IN EUROPE. THE PROBLEM OF
SECURITY IN EUROPE CANNOT BE SEEN MERELY IN ITS SEPARATE
ELEMENTS. ITS ROOTS AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS HAVE TO
BE IDENTIFIED: THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF TENSION, THE
CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY OF THE CONTINENTAL SUPERPOWER,
THE RESPONSE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.
- WE LIVE IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF SECURITY IN WHICH THE
DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR ARMS RULES OUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF USING WAR AS A MEANS OF GAINING POLITICAL
POWER. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
IN THE MILITARY EQUATION IS A HIGH PRICE FOR THE BANNING
OF WAR. IN THE COMPETITION TO CONSTANTLY INCREASE AND
PERFECT SUCH SYSTEMS THAT PRICE REACHES SENSELESS
PROPORTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE EFFORTS TO STOP AND
REVERSE THIS PROCESS HAVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL NATIONS.
- THESE EFFORTS MUST LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN STABILITY.
THEY MUST NOT SERVE TO HEIGHTEN THE RISKS OF DANGERS
FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT HAVE BEEN OFFSET BY NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE. WE MUST NOT REACH A SITUATION WHERE IT
APPEARS A WAR IN EUROPE CAN AGAIN OE WON.
- IF WE IN EUROPE WANT TO BRING ABOUT A RADICAL CHANGE
FOR THE BETTER THEN WE SHALL HAVE TO DEVOTE AS MUCH
ATTENTION TO CONVENTIONAL STABILITY AS TO THE NUCLEAR
BALANCE OF POWER.
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- HERE THERE EXISTS AN INNER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL
THE ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER. OUR AIM
MUST BE TO PREVENT ANY WAR IN EUROPE, EVEN A CONVENTIONAL
ONE, WHICH, GIVEN MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WOULD EXCEED
THE HORRORS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO AN UNIMAGINABLE
DEGREE. THE CREATION OF LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE DEMANDS
MORE THAN THE REMOVAL OF MILITARY IMBALANCES.
- WE DO NOT WANT TO REVERT TO THE TIMES WHEN MILITARY
ALLIANCES WITH HEAVILY ARMED CONVENTIONAL FORCES
CONFRONTED ONE ANOTHER, EVER READY FOR COMBAT. THUS IN
THE LONG TERM WE MUST DISCUSS NOT ONLY NUMBERS BUT ALSO
ARMAMENTS, MILITARY DOCTRINES, ENEMY IMAGES. THE
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE THE
SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE IN STOCKHOLM SHOULD NOT
MERELY BE THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES
IN THE CONVENTIONAL SPHERE. THEY SHOULD ALSO LAY THE
FOUNDATIONS FOR COOPERATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH
REMOVE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE USE OF FORCE AS WELL AS THE
FEAR OF SUCH FORCE. THAT IS WHY OUR READINESS TO CARRY
OUT SUCH MEASURES IS A TEST OF OUR WILL TO BAN WAR FROM
EUROPE FOREVER AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL AIMS.
- THE NEW PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY GENERAL SECRETARY
GORUACHEV ON 15 JANUARY 1986 CAN GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS
MAJOR IMPULSES AND OPEN UP POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVEMENT.
- FOR THIS IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE NEW ELEMENTS OF
THESE PROPOSALS PROVE USEFUL IN BOTH THE BILATERAL AND
THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE STUDYING THESE
PROPOSALS WITH OUR ALLIES AND CONSTRUCTIVE NEW ELEMENTS
WILL BE MET WITH CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSES.
- THE PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS
AGAIN SHOW HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO SEEK ALSO CONVENTIONAL
STABILITY IN EUROPE. THIS IS WHERE EUROPE'S FUNDAMENTAL
SECURITY INTERESTS BECOME APPARENT WHICH HAVE TO TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THE NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL
THREATS. EACH OF THESE AREAS HAS ITS IMPORTANCE FOR
OVERALL STABILITY.
- OF COURSE THE SOVIET IDEAS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE
MISSILES ARE OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO US BECAUSE HERE TOO
WE ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO
THE OPINIONS OF OUR FRENCH AND BRITISH FRIENDS ON THESE
MATTERS.
- MR. GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO VERIFICATION
DESERVES SPECIAL ATTENTION. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET
UNION IS NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT STRICT CONTROLS INCLUDING
INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
A UNIVERSAL CONVENTION BANNING THE USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IS ALSO OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE MULTI-
LATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE A BREAKTHROUGH
CAN BE ACHIEVED IF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS
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NOW PROVE POSSIBLE.
- AS REGARDS CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IT WILL BE CRUCIAL TO
AGREE ON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WHICH WILL MAKE IT
POSSIBLE TO CLARIFY CASES OF SUSPICION AS WELL AND TO
ENSURE THAT NO PRODUCTS INTENDED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES
CAN BE DIVERTED TO THE MANUFACTURE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
- IN THE CASE OF MBFR IT IS A QUESTION OF AGREEING ON
A SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION MEASURES TO
PROVIDE THE DATA BASE FOR THE OBLIGATION OF BOTH SIDES
NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCE LEVELS, AND FOR SUBSEQUENT
REDUCTIONS.
- SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AT THE CDE ALSO ASSUME GREATER
IMPORTANCE BECAUSE THE AREA OF MBFR REDUCTIONS COMPRISES
ONLY CENTRAL EUROPE.
- MR. CHAIRMAN, THE NINTH ROUND OF THE ODE MARKS THE
BEGINNING TODAY OF THE DECISIVE THIRD YEAR OF
NEGOTIATIONS. THE AIM IS TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY BY MEANS OF A SET OF POLITICALLY BINDING,
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE MEASURES WHICH
WILL HAVE TO BE APPLIED THROUGHOUT EUROPE. ALL INVOLVED
HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY AWARE THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF A POLICY AIMED AT DETENTE
AND COOPERATION. ONLY ON THE BASIS OF GROWING CONFIDENCE
FOUNDED ON CONCRETE MEASURES WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE
PROGRESS IN MUTUAL COOPERATION AND TOWARDS AN ACCOMMODA-
TION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AMONG THE PARTICIPATING
STATES.
- OUR AIM IS TO EFFECTIVELY AND VISIBLY REDUCE THE
DANGER OF THE USE OF MILITARY POWER BY MEANS OF
COOPERATIVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WE SHARE MR.
GORBACHEV'S VIEW THAT THE ROAD LEADING TO THE USE OF
FORCE AND TO COVERT PREPARATIONS FOR WAR MUST BE
BLOCKED. ACTUAL OR SUPPOSED THREATS CAN BE REDUCED BY
MEASURES WHICH SUBJECT THE MILITARY CONDUCT OF
PARTICIPATING STATES TO SPECIFIC RULES, THUS MAKING IT
CALCULABLE. RELIABLE VERIFICATION IS A CRUCIAL ELEMENT
OF SUCH MEASURES.
- CONFIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE "BLIND." THE ONE SHOWING
CONFIDENCE MUST HIMSELF BE ABLE TO SEE THAT THE MILITARY
EFFORTS OF THE OTHER SIDE EXCLUSIVELY SERVE TO MAINTAIN
ITS OWN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. AFFORDING PROOF OF ONE'S
GOOD INTENTIONS IN A MILITARILY RELEVANT MANNER MEANS
CONVINCING OTHERS OF ONE'S OWN PEACEFUL AIMS.
- THE DETAILED PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE WEST
CORRESPOND WITH THIS CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.
THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY OTHER DELEGATIONS CONCUR
WITH THAT CONCEPT IN MANY RESPECTS. WE NEED CONCRETE
ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL PROVE CAPABLE OF DISPELLING
MISTRUST IN THEIR AREA OF APPLICATION IN THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE -- FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS -- AND OF
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ENHANCING MILITARY STABILITY. THIS AIM IS OF CONSIDER-
ABLE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE TODAY. THAT SIGNIFICANCE
WILL INCREASE FURTHER STILL IF IT PROVES POSSIBLE BOTH
TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DRASTICALLY AND WHERE POSSIBLE
ELIMINATE THEM ALTOGETHER, AND TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED
RELATIONSHIP OF POWER IN THE CONVENTIONAL SPHERE AND DO
AWAY WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS COMPLETELY.
- AS YOU ALL KNOW, THE U.S.-SOVIET DECLARATION OF
8 JANUARY 1986 MEETS WITH OUR FULL APPROVAL, ALSO WHERE
IT CALLS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND
ITS TERMINATION ON EARTH.
- THE MANDATE OF THIS CONVERENCE ESTABLISHED A
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECIFIC MEASURES AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE. ITS TASK IS TO LEND EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE EXISTING PROHIBITION OF FORCE BY MEANS
OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION.
- THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THIS CONFERENCE
COMMITTED THEMSELVES IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO THE
NON-USE OF FORCE, ONE OF TEN PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL
IMPORTANCE. TO RENOUNCE FORCE DOES NOT MEAN RENOUNCING
CONVICTIONS, VALUES AND POSITIONS ON CONTROVERSIAL
ISSUES. RATHER, IT LIMITS THE MEANS BY WHICH STATES MAY
RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERING AND OFTEN OPPOSING INTERESTS.
THE NON-USE OF FORCE IS INDIVISIBLE. IT MUST APPLY
WORLDWIDE AND BETWEEN ANY STATES. THAT ALSO MEANS THAT
A STOP MUST BE PUT TO FORCE WHEREVER IT IS BEING APPLIED.
- BY REAFFIRMING THEIR RENUNCIATION OF FORCE IN CONNEC-
TION WITH AGREEMENT ON NEW CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-
BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM, THE PARTICIPATING STATES
WOULD TRANSLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE
EMBODIED IN THE UN CHARTS INTO REALITY. THEY WOULD
THEREBY LEND CONVINCING EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THEIR
DETERMINATION TO OBSERVE STRICTLY THE PROHIBITION OF
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
IN THIS WAY, A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION COULD BE MADE TO
PREVENTING WAR.
- TIME IS NOW SHORT FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, AND
THE NEGOTIATING AGENDA IS EXTENSIVE AND DIFFICULT. IT
CAN BE MASTERED ONLY IF ALL SIDES DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH
AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. THIS IMPLIES THAT THE
MADRID MANDATE MUST NOT BE PUT INTO QUESTION.
- WE MUST MAKE USE OF THE AVAILABLE TIME TO REACH A
RESULT THAT CONSTITUTES A "LEAP FORWARD" FROM THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE TAKEN CLEAR SHAPE BY THIS SUMMER.
A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM WOULD BE AN
IMPORTANT STEP IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND A GOOD BASIS FOR
PROGRESS IN OTHER SPHERES OF THE CSCE AT THE FOLLOW-UP
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MEETING IN VIENNA.
- 1986 WILL BE A YEAR OF DECISION AS FAR AS LONG-TERM
DEVELOPMENTS ARE CONCERNED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE
OPTIONS FOR THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE SEEN CLEARLY AND THAT
THE INTENTIONS OF THE AFFECTED PARTIES ARE KNOWN. BOLD
NEW PLANS STILL AROUSE GREAT SCEPTICISM. HOWEVER, THE
NATIONS MUST SEEK FIRMER FOUNDATIONS ON WHICH TO BUILD
LASTING PEACE. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL MUST TAKE
ACCOUNT OF EVERY FACTOR THAT GOES TO MAKE UP STABILITY.
THE MEASURES AIMED AT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THAT WE ARE
ABLE TO AGREE ON HERE WILL ALSO SERVE AS A TEST WHEN IT
COMES TO EVALUATING THE CHANCES OF MORE EXTENSIVE
PROGRESS IN THE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHOSE REALIZATION
OR PROSPECTS WE SHALL REVIEW IN BERNE AND VIENNA, WILL
BE AN IMPORTANT YARDSTICK OF THIS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.
- WHAT IS NECESSARY IS THAT CONFIDENCE BE CREATED
AMONG STATES AND PEOPLE IN THE SERIOUS COMMITMENT OF ALL
CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE AIM OF CREATING A
LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE IN WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
FINAL ACT AND OF THE OTHER DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI
PROCESS HAVE BECOME REALITY. THIS REALITY MEANS A
PEACEFUL COMMUNITY OF EQUALS WHOSE LARGER MEMBERS ENJOY
NO GREATER DEGREE OF SECURITY THAN THEIR SMALLER
PARTNERS.
- IT MUST BE A COMMUNITY OF STATES WITHIN WHICH THE
RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION HAS BECOME REALITY, WHERE
NATIONS DEVELOP THEIR CULTURAL IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUALS
ENJOY THEIR RIGHTS AND ENGAGE IN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH IN THE PAST HAS
CONTRIBUTED TO REDUCING TENSION IN EUROPE, WILL DO ITS
BEST TO HELP ENSURE THAT USE IS MADE OF TODAY'S OPPOR-
TUNITIES TO BRING ABOUT A FAR-REACHING TRANSFORMATION OF
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 00638
SUBJECT: LIBYA-TERRORISM ISSUE RAISED IN CDE
1. CDE IX - 008
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE OPENING
PLENARY (SEE SEPTEL), MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER SCEBERRAS
TRIGONA ATTACKED U.S. ACTIONS ON LIBYA-TERRORISM ISSUE,
PROMPTING RIGHT OF REPLY BY U.S. END SUMMARY.
4. AT JANUARY 28 PLENARY, MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER
SCEBERRAS TRIGONA ATTACKED U.S. ACTIONS ON TERRORISM-
LIBYA ISSUE. SCEBERRAS TRIGONA CONTENDED THAT THE
MEDITERRANEAN HAS BEEN DESTABILIZED BY A "SPIRAL OF
ACTIONS" IN RECENT MONTHS. HE CONDEMNED TERRORIST ACTS
SUCH AS THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORT BOMBINGS, BUT ALSO
ATTACKED U.S. (AND ISRAELI) RESPONSE TO TERRORISM,
CITING U.S. SANCTIONS ON LIBYA AND U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS DESTABILIZING FACTORS. HE THEN
REVIEWED AT LENGTH GOM ACTIONS TAKEN TO "STALL
INSTABILITY," I.E., USE OF DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO
VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE CITED GUM
OFFER TO U.S. TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY WITH LIBYA WHICH,
HE NOTED, WAS REFUSED BY THE U.S. (BEGIN COMMENT:
SCEBERRAS TRIGONA NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TERRORISM
ITSELF IS THE ISSUE; NOR DID HE TAKE NOTE OF THE U.S.
CONTENTION THAT LIBYA SUPPORTS TERRORISM. END
COMMENT.) WITH REGARD TO THE "MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION"
OF THE CDE, SCEBERRAS TRIGONA STATED THAT RECENT EVENTS
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY OF
APPLYING THE SAME CONCRETE MEASURES TO AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES AS TO GROUND ACTIVITIES. HE STOPPED JUST
SHORT OF THREATENING TO SABOTAGE AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT
SUCH MEASURES WHEN HE NOTED THAT IF "THIS DIMENSION (AIR
AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES) IS NEGLECTED IT WILL DISRUPT" THE
WHOLE CDE PROCESS.
5. IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO SCEBERRAS TRIGONA'S REMARKS,
AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- JANUARY 21 STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON CDE
REFLECTS U.S. DETERMINATION TO CONCENTRATE ON ISSUES
BEFORE US WITHOUT UNNECESSARY DETOURS INTO ISSUES WHICH
ARE NOT PART OF OUR WORK HERE. REGRETTABLY, SUCH AN
ISSUE -- TERRORISM AND LIBYA -- HAS BEEN RAISED AT THE
CONFERENCE. IT REQUIRES A RESPONSE.
-- COMMENTS EQUATING COWARDLY, SENSELESS TERRORIST ACTS
IN ROME AND VIENNA WITH U.S. ACTIONS TO DETER AND PREVENT
TERRORISM ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S.
-- LIBYA'S ROLE IN TERRORISM HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY PROVEN
BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WE HAVE SHARED WITH OUR
ALLIES AND BY COLONEL KADAFI'S PERSONAL ADMISSION.
-- ATTEMPTS TO USE THIS CONFERENCE TO DEVISE MEASURES
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TO INTERFERE WITH THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
OR FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE WILL
FAIL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00690
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF USSR REPRESENTATIVE,
JANUARY 28, 1986
1. CDE IX - 013
2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY USSR
AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, AT THE PLENARY OF
JANUARY 28, FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
- THIS SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE IS RESUMED AFTER A
RECESS THAT WAS FILLED WITH IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS
CONDUCIVE TO ITS WORK.
- AN ACT OF HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE STATEMENT BY
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL
GORBACHEV OF JANUARY 15, 1986, WHICH SET FORTH A PROGRAM
FOR DURABLE PEACE, ELIMINATION OF THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT
LOOMING LARGE OVER MANKIND -- THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.
THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS COVER ALL CRUCIAL AREAS OF
ACTIVE ACTIONS FOR DISARMAMENT, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND
ASSURED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.
- IT IS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ITS HISTORY THAT MANKIND
HAS A PLAN, FEASIBLE IN AN HISTORICALLY BRIEF TIME-SPAN,
FOR A STAGE-BY-STAGE ELIMINATION, BY THE YEAR 2000, OF
THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS OF WAR THAT CREATE A DEADLY
THREAT TO LIFE ITSELF ON EARTH -- NUCLEAR ARMS.
OBVIOUSLY, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH DISARMAMENT WILL
NOT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR
DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE ARMS IS BANNED.
- AS A PRACTICAL STEP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT PROGRAM, THE SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED THE
EXTENSION, TILL MARCH 31, 1986, OF THE UNILATERAL
MORATORIUM ON ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WHICH WAS PUT INTO
ACTION ON AUGUST 6, LAST, ON THE 4oTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
HIROSHIMA TRAGEDY. THE DECISION OF THE USSR TO EXTEND
ITS MORATORIUM PROVIDES THE UNITED STATES WITH ADDITIONAL
TIME TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS ON THE CESSATION OF
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND TO SET OFF ALONG THE ROAD OF
REALISM AND RESPONSIBILITY.
- THE SET OF NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES PROVIDES ALSO FOR
ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, RIDDING EUROPE OF
NUCLEAR ARMS, BOTH INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND TACTICAL,
REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN
EUROPE, AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IN ORDER TO
IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM, THE ENTIRE EXISTING SYSTEM OF
NEGOTIATIONS HAS TO BE SET IN MOTION AND THE HIGHEST
POSSIBLE EFFICIENCY OF DISARMAMENT MACHINERY ENSURED.
IT IS THE ONLY WAY FOR MANKIND TO ENTER INTO THE NEW
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MILLENIA UNDER PEACEFUL SKIES AND SPACE, FOR THE PRESENT
AND SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS TO LOOK INTO THE FUTURE WITH
HOPE AND CONFIDENCE.
- IT IS NOT AN ACCIDENT THAT THE NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES
IN THEIR CONSIDERABLE PART ARE DIRECTLY ADDRESSED TO
EUROPE. IN ACHIEVING A RADICAL TURN TOWARDS THE POLICY
OF PEACE, EUROPE COULD HAVE A SPECIAL MISSION. THAT
MISSION IS ERECTING A NEW EDIFICE OF DETENTE.
- FOR THIS EUROPE HAS THE NECESSARY HISTORICAL
EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS OFTEN UNIQUE. SUFFICE IT TO RECALL
THAT THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE EUROPEANS, THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA PRODUCED THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IF
THERE IS A NEED FOR A SPECIFIC AND VIVID EXAMPLE OF NEW
THINKING AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN APPROACHING THE
PROBLEMS OF PEACE, COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRUST,
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
THAT HISTORIC DOCUMENT COULD IN MANY WAYS SERVE AS SUCH
AN EXAMPLE.
- THE STOCKHOLM FORUM IS THE CHILD OF THE CSCE PRCCESS
INITIATED IN HELSINKI, IT'S PART AND PARCEL. IT IS
CALLED UPON TO PLACE BARRIERS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE
OR COVERT PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, WHETHER ON LAND, AT SEA
OR IN THE AIR. THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF MANY STATES,
PARTICULARLY AS THE RESULT OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGS IN
PARIS AND GENEVA, THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THIS HAVE NOW
BECOME EVIDENT. IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE
TRANSITION TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS ON A RANGE OF
QUESTIONS WHICH COULD FORM THE SHAPE OF A POSSIBLE
AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. AGREEMENT WAS ALSO ACHIEVED ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING MECHANISM TO NEGOTIATE
AGREEMENT ON THOSE QUESTIONS. ON THE WHOLE THE
CONFERENCE HAS COME CLOSE TO ELABORATION OF THE TEXT OF
THE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD COMPLETE THE PRESENT STAGE OF
ITS WORK.
- HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A GROSS MISTAKE, AND IT HAS
BEEN RIGHTLY NOTED HERE BY MANY DELEGATIONS, TO CLOSE
ONE'S EYES TO OR UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES OR
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, SOMETIMES PROFOUND, WHICH ARE
YET TO BE OVERCOME IN ORDER TO ATTAIN SUBSTANTIVE
RESULTS AT THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROPOSALS
AND IDEAS RELEVANT TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND
VOICED BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ARE DESIGNED
PRECISELY TO HELP OVERCOME THOSE DIFFERENCES AND FIND
SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS.
- ENHANCED CONFIDENCE WOULD BE PROMOTED, IN OUR VIEW,
PARTICULARLY IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, BY REDUCTIONS IN
THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN MAJOR MILITARY
MANEUVERS THAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
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- THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES TO NOTIFY MAJOR MANEUVERS
OF GROUND TROOPS, MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF FORCES, AS
WELL AS MAJOR MANEUVERS OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES. IT IS
ONLY NATURAL AS THESE SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES ARE
CAPABLE OF THREATENING EUROPEAN SECURITY. THE LAST WAR
AS WELL AS CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS DEMONSTRATE THE
IMPORTANT, AND OFTEN DECISIVE, SIGNIFICANCE OF AIR AND
NAVAL FORCES IN CONDUCTING COMBAT ACTIVITIES AND THEIR
GREAT DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT WITH THE USE OF ONLY CONVEN-
TIONAL WEAPONS.
- THESE PROPOSALS OF OURS ARE IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH
THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE PRODUCED BY THE CSCE
MEETING IN MADRID. IT STATES CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY
THAT "MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS
THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE." THE SOVIET UNION
HAS STRICTLY ADHERED AND WILL CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THESE
PROVISIONS OF THE MANDATE.
- UNFORTUNATELY, CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES STICK TO A
DIFFERENT POSITION. THEY ATTEMPT TO REDUCE NOTIFICATION
ONLY TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND DO NOT WISH TO
CONSIDER NOTIFICATION REGARDING AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN
ITS ENTIRETY. I DO NOT THINK THERE IS NEED TO ELABORATE
ON THE SUBJECT NOW. NO DOUBT THAT ALL DELEGATIONS STILL
HAVE FRESH MEMORIES OF THE ACUTE DEBATE ON THE ENTIRE
RANGE OF THESE ISSUES THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE PREVIOUS
SESSION. AS A RESULT, NOTIFICATION REGARDING GROUND
TROOPS, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES BECAME THE BOTTLENECK AT
THE CONFERENCE.
- THE CLUE TO THE SOLUTION OF THE NOTIFICATION PROBLEMS
THAT HAVE ARISEN IS GIVEN IN THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV. HE SAID, "OF COURSE, THOSE ARE
SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND THEY MUST BE ADDRESSED IN A SERIOUS
MANNER IN THE INTERESTS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE.
HOWEVER, IF THEIR COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION CANNOT BE
ACHIEVED AT THIS TIME, WHY NOT EXPLORE WAYS OF THEIR
PARTIAL SOLUTION, FOR INSTANCE REACH AGREEMENT NOW ABOUT
NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE
EXERCISES, POSTPONING THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES
UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE." SUCH SOLUTION
WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT NOT ONLY OF THE SITUATION AT THE
CONFERENCE BUT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL ITS
PARTICIPANTS AS WELL. CERTAINLY, THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE
MATTER; IT REQUIRES JOINT EFFORTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS,
PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THEY ARE SO DESIROUS.
- ANOTHER SERIOUS OUTSTANDING QUESTION IS LIMITATION
OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS. THIS IS A MOST
IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN THE SYSTEM OF CSBM'S. AND DIVER-
GENCIES HERE ARE FAR FROM BEING SEMANTIC AS REPRESENTA-
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TIVES OF CERTAIN DELEGATIONS TRY TO PORTRAY THEM. IT IS
NOT WORDS THAT MATTER BUT THE REAL SITUATION WHERE
MANEUVERS CONDUCTED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY NATO COUNTRIES
ACQUIRE SUCH PROPORTIONS THAT THEY ARE USED, IN FACT, AS
A MEANS OF POLITICAL PRESSURE, AS THE THREAT OF FORCE.
FURTHERMORE, LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS ARE DIFFICULT SOME-
TIMES TO DISTINGUISH FROM TROOPS DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTUAL
COMBAT. IS IT NOT A SERIOUS SOURCE OF MISTRUST AND
SUSPICION IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES?
- THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE FAVORED
AND WILL CONTINUE TO FAVOR A SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION OF
THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS. THE RELEVANT PROPOSALS
OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES PURSUE THE SAME
OBJECTIVE.
- IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO INTENSIFY WORK ON GIVING
CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-USE OF FORCE. A NUMBER OF BASIC PROVISIONS ON THE
MATTER WAS SUBMITTED IN A PROPOSED TREATY ON THE MUTUAL
RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
PEACEFUL RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS CERTAIN MOVEMENT
IN THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE, IT LAGS BEHIND THE
GENERAL PROGRESS OF WORK. UNLESS THE TEMPO OF WORK IN
THIS AREA IS ACCELERATED, IT COULD BECOME AN IMPEDIMENT.
OBVIOUSLY, THIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.
- AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION SHOULD SATISFY THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND ABOVE ALL PREVENTION
OF ANY WAR, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. NATURALLY,
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CANNOT BUT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
THIS FUNDAMENTAL PROVISION IN ELABORATING FORMULAS
REGARDING NON-USE OF FORCE. SO MUCH SO THAT IT FOUND
ITS EXPRESSION IN A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS,
INCLUDING THE JOINT SOVIET-U.S. STATEMENT OF
NOVEMBER 21, 1985.
- SUCH ARE SOME OF OUR VIEWS THAT WE WISHED TO EXPRESS
TODAY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE A DECISIVE TURN TOWARDS
ELABORATION OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION STANDS READY TO
CLARIFY ITS PROPOSALS ON AND SEEK MUTUAL SOLUTIONS TO
ALL THESE AS WELL AS OTHER QUESTIONS THAT ARE ON THE
AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE.
- WE ARE PREPARED TO GO OUR PART OF THE ROAD FOR A
SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE. NATURALLY, IF WE ARE TO GO ALL THE WAY DOWN
THE ROAD, ALL DELEGATIONS WILL HAVE TO MAKE THEIR
CONTRIBUTIONS. WE CAN NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY SPECIFIED
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THEIR POSITIONS IN FAVOR OF THE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENT.
WE COUNT ON OTHER PARTICIPANTS TOINTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS,
TOO, TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THE
CONFERENCE HAS A RIGHT TO EXPECT ACCOMMODATING STEPS OF
THEM.
- WE BELIEVE THAT CONCRETE RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM ARE
QUITE POSSIBLE, PROVIDED FUTILE SCHEMES TO SECURE
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES ARE ABANDONED AND THE PRINCIPLES
OF EQUALITY AND RECIPROCITY AND OF EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE
SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES ARE
ABIDED BY.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
- MOST PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE BELIEVE, AND WE
SHARE THEIR OPINION, THAT POSSIBILITIES HAVE BECOME
EVIDENT IN STOCKHOLM TO COMPLETE ITS CURRENT STAGE THIS
AUTUMN BY ADOPTING A SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
WHICH WOULD INCLUDE BOTH CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS REGARDING
NON-USE OF FORCE AND SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THE CONFERENCE ENTERS A
NEW PHASE, I.E., DRAFTING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. HOW
SHOULD IT START?
- MANY HAVE REFERRED HERE TO, AND RIGHTLY SO, THE NEED
FOR A SMOOTH ENTERING INTO DRAFTING. NOW, AT THE INITIAL
STAGE OF WORK, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RECORD THOSE
ELEMENTS AND FORMULAS WHERE THE SIDES' POSITIONS ARE
CLOSE OR CONVERGING. OBVIOUSLY, WHEN THIS WORK IS UNDER
WAY WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND MORE COMPLEX
QUESTIONS WHERE DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES PERSIST.
PROCEEDING FROM THE SIMPLE TO THE COMPLEX WE SHOULD NOT
FORGET THAT SOLUTION OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS
WOULD ACCELERATE ADVANCEMENT IN GENERAL.
- WE CONCUR THAT DRAFTING SHOULD BE DONE IN STAGES AND
THROUGH COORDINATORS WHO, HAVING IDENTIFIED WORKING
METHODS IN GROUPS, WOULD FOCUS DISCUSSIONS ON THOSE
ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE BETTER CHANCES OF REACHING
CONSENSUS. WITH THIS ORGANIZATION OF WORK MAIN ELEMENTS
OR IMPORTANT COMPONENTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE
WOULD GET IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCESS.
- NATURALLY, THESE WORKING METHODS MUST BE APPLIED TO
ALL WORKING GROUPS, TO ALL AREAS PROVIDED FOR IN THE
AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1985.
- CONCLUDING MY STATEMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT
A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
WOULD FACILITATE A TURN FROM CONFRONTATION TO PEACEFUL
COOPERATION OF STATES. A PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD CONTRIBUTE ALSO TO THE
SOLUTION OF AN HISTORIC OBJECTIVE OF OUR TIME -- TO DO
THE UTMOST SO THAT 1986 WILL BECOME NOT JUST A YEAR OF
PEACE BUT WOULD HELP END THE XXTH CENTURY UNDER THE SIGN
OF LASTING PEACE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.
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END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
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C ONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 00637
ON TERRORISM, LIBYA AND CDE
1. CDE IX-006. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, I FELT COMPELLED TO REPLY TO
MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER TRIGONA'S SPEECH TO THE CDE
PLENARY BECAUSE OF HIS CRITICISM OF US POLICY TOWARD
LIBYA. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DUMAS WERE PRESENT
FOR TRIGONA'S SPEECH BUT NOT FOR MY REPLY.
3. DURING THE RECEPTION FOLLOWING THE PLENARY I APPROACH-
ED TRIGONA AND SAID I WAS SORRY I HAD TO TAKE HIM ON
PUBLICLY BUT THAT I FOUND HIS EQUATION OF LIBYAN TERRORISM
AND THE US RESPONSE TO IT UNACCEPTABLE. WE HAD HARD
EVIDENCE LINKING LIBYA TO TERRORISM IN GENERAL AND THE
ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORT MURDERS SPECIFICALLY AND HAD
SHARED THIS EVIDENCE WITH OUR ALLIES. THE MALTESE
DEFENSE OF LIBYA WAS UNCONVINCING, AND MALTA SHOULD HAVE
NO DOUBT THAT THE US WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY MEASURES TO BE
APPROVED AT THIS CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD LIMIT OUR ABILITY
TO RESPOND TO TERRORISM OR EXERCISE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH
SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE.
4. TRIGONA RESPONDED BY DENYING THAT HE HAD EQUATED
TERRORISM AND THE US RESPONSE, POINTING OUT PLACES IN
HIS SPEECH WHERE HE HAD CONDEMNED TERROR. HE UNDERLINED
MALTESE CONCERN ABOUT F-14 INTERCEPTS OF ALGERIAN AND
KUWAITI AIRCRAFT ENROUTE TO MALTA AND THE DAMAGE WHICH
TENSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS DOING TO THE MALTESE
ECONOMY. HE PUT IN A PLUG FOR THE MALTESE IDEA OF A
REGIONAL MEETING OF MEDITERRANEAN STATES AND AGAIN
EXPRESSED HIS "AMAZEMENT" AT US OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA
OF A DIALOGUE WITH QADHAFI.
5. ON CDE, TRIGONA EXPRESSED SOME BITTERNESS AT BEING
"ABANDONED" BY THE SOVIETS, REFERRING TO GORBACHEV'S
JANUARY 15 STATEMENT OFFERING TO DEFER NAVAL ISSUES
UNTIL A FUTURE STAGE OF CDE. TRIGONA SAID MALTA DID NOT
EXPECT TO GET ALL IT WAS ASKING FOR IN STOCKHOLM, BUT
DID EXPECT SOME ACCOMMODATION TO MALTESE NATIONAL INTERESTS
IN THIS CONNECTION HE MENTIONED HOW MUCH MALTA DEPENDED
ON EMPLOYMENT IN LIBYA AND LIBYAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT.
6. I RESPONDED THAT NATIONS MUST HAVE A MORAL SCALE OF
VALUES WHICH RANKED CONCERN FOR HUMAN LIFE AND DETERRENCE
OF TERRORISM AHEAD OF TRADE. IT SOUNDED TO ME AS IF LIBYA
WAS TRYING TO BLACKMAIL MALTA AND MALTA WAS RESPONDING.
AS TO CDE I SAID WE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE
MALTESE NATIONAL INTERESTS BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR VITAL US DEFENSE
INTERESTS. WE WOULD ACCEPT NO OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE
WHICH IN ANY WAY INFRINGED ON OUR ABILITY TO DO JUST WHAT
WE ARE DOING NOW; ASSERTING OUR RIGHT TO USE INTERNATIONAL
WATERS AND THE AIR SPACE OVER THEM FREELY.
7. IN CONCLUSION TRIGONA EXPRESSED HIS HIGH REGARD FOR
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AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS AND SAID HE WANTED TO WORK WITH US
TO FIND A COMMON GROUND ON CDE. I SAID WE WOULD BE GLAD
TO DISCUSS THE CDE ISSUES.
8. COMMENT: WE IN STOCKHOLM WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY
VALLETTA'S BEST JUDGMENT ON HOW FAR THE MALTESE WILL
PUSH THEIR ISSUES HERE. CLEARLY THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY
TO WRECK THE CONFERENCE; THE QUESTION IS DO THEY HAVE THE
WILL. NO ONE HERE PRETENDS TO HAVE THE ANSWER OR A PRES-
CRIPTION ON HOW BEST TO MINIMIZE THE RISK.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 00681
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS OF FRENCH AND FRG
FOREIGN MINISTERS AT CDE
REF: A) PARIS 3646, B) STOCKHOLM 651, C) STOCKHOLM 664
1. CDE IX - 015
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS ACCENTED FRANCO-GERMAN
COOPERATION IN THEIR JOINT APPEARANCE AT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 28. THEY BOTH STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A STABLE CONVENTIONAL FORCE
RELATIONSHIP, OF ENSURING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN ALL
MULTILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND OF MAINTAINING THE
BALANCE WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS. GENSCHER ALSO
DESCRIBED THE GROWING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN
EUROPEAN SECURITY DECISIONS. WHILE GENSCHER AND DUMAS
WERE AT PAINS TO ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE IN THEIR
STOCKHOLM VISIT, CERTAIN DIFFERENCES WERE EVIDENT. IN
GENERAL, THE FRENCH TOOK A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE
CDE, E.G., ON CONSTRAINTS, WHILE THE GERMANS WERE MORE
FORTHCOMING ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF).
END SUMMARY.
U. AS NOTED IN REFTEL A, FRENCH AND FRG OFFICIALS
CLOSELY COORDINATED THE STATEMENTS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
DUMAS AND GENSCHER AT THE CDE ON JANUARY 28. THESE
EFFORTS WERE OBVIOUS IN STOCKHOLM. BOTH FOREIGN
MINISTERS STRESSED FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN THEIR
STATEMENTS AND JOINT APPEARANCES. THEY BOTH UNDERSCORED
THE NEED TO GIVE THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN
EUROPE EQUAL ATTENTION TO THE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP, TO
REDUCE THE RISK OF CONVENTIONAL WAR, TO ELIMINATE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TO ENSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN ALL
MULTILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND TO MAINTAIN THE
BALANCE OF THE CSCE PROCESS. IN ADDITION, THEY BOTH
WELCOMED SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF
"DEMOCRATIC" NATIONS. THIS MUCH OF FRANCO-GERMAN
COOPERATION ALSO REFLECTED THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE CDE
AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. HOWEVER, FRANCO-GERMAN
"PARALLELISM" ON OTHER SUBJECTS DIVERGED FROM U.S.
THINKING. FOR EXAMPLE, GENSCHER'S STATEMENT, WHILE
EMPLOYING THE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY IN REFERRING TO THE
IMPORTANCE OF "PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE," COULD
NONETHELESS BE READ AS AN IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO SDI.
5. WHILE DUMAS AND GENSCHER WERE AT PAINS TO ACCENTUATE
THE POSITIVE, CERTAIN DIFFERENCES IN THE FRENCH AND
GERMAN APPROACH TO THE CDE COULD NOT BE HIDDEN. IN
GENERAL, THE FRENCH TAKE A MORE CAUTIOUS CYNICAL APPROACH
TO THE CONFERENCE. THE FRG, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS EAGER
FOR AN AGREEMENT -- SOME WOULD SAY ANY AGREEMENT -- IN
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STOCKHOLM. THESE DIFFERENCES EMERGED MOST CLEARLY ON
THE NON-USE OF FORCE SUBJECT WITH DUMAS ARGUING FOR WHAT
IS IN EFFECT A MINIMALIST POSITION, I.E., THE NON-USE OF
FORCE PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE GIVEN CONCRETE CONTENT THROUGH
CSBM'S. GENSCHER IMPLICITLY TOOK THE NUF REAFFIRMATION
OUT OF THE CSBM'S CONTEXT BY DEALING WITN NUF AND CSBM
AS SEPARATE ISSUES. GENSCHER ALSO EMPHASIZED THE GROWING
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN DEFINING AND REPRESENT-
ING ITS OWN SECURITY INTERESTS.
6. IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT(REF B), THE FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER ALSO STRESSED:
-- THE NEED TO AGREE ON A "QUALITATIVE LEAP" OVER THE
LIMITED MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WOULD
INCLUDE "SOVIET TERRITORY . . . WEST OF THE URALS."
-- THE "AMBITIOUS" NATURE OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15
PROPOSAL. REGARDING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT HE REITERATED
TRADITIONAL FRENCH PRECONDITIONS, TO ENABLE FRANCE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS (READ: IT AIN'T GONNA
HAPPEN). ON THE CDE/CONVENTIONAL SIDE, DUMAS SUGGESTED
THAT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL SHOULD BE JUDGED IN THE
LIGHT OF THE NEED FOR GREATER VERIFICATION AND
TRANSPARENCY.
-- THE "CONDITIONS" NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM:
- 1) REALISM AND PRAGMATISM; E.G., IT IS PREMATURE TO
SEEK "TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF MILITARY FORCES OR
ACTIVITIES," I.E., ON CONSTRAINTS.
- 2) ALL MEASURES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
"FUNCTIONAL APPROACH," I.E., NO NOTIFICATION OF
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (COMMENT: WE
COULDN'T HAVE SAID IT BETTER OURSELVES. END COMMENT.))
-- THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FREE
CIRCULATION OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS. "CAN A STATE WHICH IS
NOT AT PEACE WITH ITS OWN CITIZENS," DUMAS QUERIED,
"REALLY GAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS?"
(COMMENT: AGAIN, OUR SENTIMENTS EXACTLY. WE MIGHT ALSO
FRUITFULLY USE THESE IDEAS IN OUR NUF DISCUSSIONS. END
COMMENT.)
7. IN HIS UPBEAT PRO-DETENTE ADDRESS, FRG FOREIGN
MINISTER GENSCHER EMPHASIZED:
-- THE INTRA GERMAN ANGLE. WE WILL "NEVER FORGET THAT
GERMANS ALSO LIVE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DIVIDING
LINE."
-- THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING LASTING STABILITY AND
ELIMINATING "ANY KIND OF WAR." GENSCHER QUOTED THE
GENEVA SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ABOUT "PREVENTING ANY
WAR . . . , WHETHER NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL."
(COMMENT: IN THE CDE CONTEXT THIS STATEMENT MAY PLAY
INTO EASTERN HANDS BY LENDING LEGITIMACY TO SOVIET
ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE THE NUCLEAR ANGLE INTO THE NUF
WORKING GROUP. END COMMENT.)
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-- THE NEED FOR COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS TO SECURITY
QUESTIONS; "INDIVIDUAL DEFENSIVE EFFORTS ALONE WILL NOT
ENSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS (PREVENTING WAR)
OBJECTIVE."
-- GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS "CAN GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS
MAJOR IMPULSES AND OPEN UP POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVEMENT."
(COMMENT: GENSCHER DID NOT ELABORATE IN THE CDE
CONTEXT, PERHAPS BECAUSE FRG ANALYSIS IS NOT COMPLETE OR
IS DIFFERENT, AT THIS STAGE, THAN THE FRENCH VIEW. THE
LATTER REASON WAS SUGGESTED TO US BY A FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTRY OFFICIAL WITH THE DUMAS PARTY. END COMMENT.)
-- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT AT THE OPENING OF THE
NINTH ROUND OF THE CDE, I.E., THE CDE HAS IMPORTANT
IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST SECURITY. GENSCHER CONCLUDED
BY PLEDGING THE FRG TO "BRING ABOUT A FAR-REACHING
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEST AND
EAST."
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 00755
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF JANUARY 28 CDE PLENARY ADDRESS BY
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
1. CDE IX - 018
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S
JANUARY 28 CDE PLENARY ADDRESS WAS UPBEAT AND OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE BUT OFFERED
LITTLE THAT WAS NEW. SURPRISINGLY, GRINEVSKY OFFERED NO
ELABORATION OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 CDE PROPOSALS,
CONFINING HIMSELF TO A MERE REITERATION. HE DID MAKE IT
CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PACKAGE THE DEFERMENT OF
NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS A
SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION FOR WHICH THEY WILL EXPECT A
CORRESPONDING WESTERN MOVE. THE SOVIET STATEMENT ALSO
EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF MILITARY
MANEUVERS. GRINEVSKY APPEARED TO SHARE OUR POSITION
THAT DRAFTING, AT LEAST INITIALLY, SHOULD FOCUS ON AREAS
OF CONVERGING VIEWS. HE ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO LAY
DOWN AN ADDITIONAL MARKER THAT THE EAST WILL INSIST ON
PARALLEL DRAFTING OF NUF AND CSBM'S. END SUMMARY.
U. SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S PLENARY STATEMENT
OF JANUARY 28 WAS UPBEAT IN TONE, BUT CONTAINED NO MAJOR
SUBSTANTIVE SURPRISES. GRINEVSKY FOCUSED ON THE
JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV STATEMENT WHICH HE SAID COVERED ALL
CRUCIAL AREAS OF DISARMAMENT, AND WAS "AN ACT OF
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE." HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IT
COULD ONLY BE IMPLEMENTED IF "THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING
OR DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE ARMS IS BANNED." TURNING
TO CDE, GRINEVSKY DID NOTE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN USDEL'S
RECOLLECTION, THAT "THE STOCKHOLM FORUM IS THE CHILD OF
THE CSCE PROCESS," THUS, IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGING THE
SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP OF STOCKHOLM TO THE FULL VIENNA
CSCE REVIEW MEETING. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT SERIOUS
SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED AT THE
CONFERENCE, HE WAS SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE ABOUT THE
CONFERENCE TO DATE WHICH HE SAID, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF
THE POLITICAL IMPETUS PROVIDED BY THE GENEVA AND PARIS
SUMMITS, "HAS COME CLOSE TO ELABORATION OF THE TEXT OF
THE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD COMPLETE THE PRESENT STAGE OF
ITS WORK." GRINEVSKY SAID THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS ON
CDE WERE DESIGNED TO OVERCOME THE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES
AND FIND SOLUTIONS, PARTICULRLY TO THE CONFERENCE'S
"BOTTLENECK," THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVI-
TIES. HE, HOWEVER, OFFERED NO AMPLIFICATION OF THOSE
PROPOSALS BUT SIMPLY REITERATED GORBACHEV'S STATEMENTS ON
LOWER THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION AND ON DEFERRMENT OF
THE NAVAL ISSUE. GRINEVSKY GAVE NO GROUND ON THE SOVIET
INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE, CONTINUING TO CONTEND
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THAT THE NOTIFICATION OF BOTH AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES
WAS IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH IT. GRINEVSKY CHARACTERIZED
GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS A SIGNIFICANT
SOVIET CONCESSION FOR WHICH THEY WILL EXPECT SOMETHING
IN RETURN ("WE ARE PREPARED TO GO OUR PART OF THE ROAD
. . . IF WE ARE TO GO ALL THE WAY DOWN THE ROAD OTHER
DELEGATIONS WILL HAVE TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS").
5. GRINEVSKY MADE A MAJOR PITCH FOR A "SIGNIFICANT
LIMITATION ON THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS," WHICH HE
CALLED A MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE
SYSTEM OF CSBM'S. EMPLOYING SOME UNIQUE MIRROR IMAGING,
HE ALSO CONTENDED THAT LARGE-SCALE NATO MANEUVERS ARE
USED AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL PRESSURE AND "AS THE THREAT
OF FORCE." TURNING TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF)
GRINEVSKY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT "CERTAIN MOVEMENT HAD
OCCURRED" ON THIS ISSUE BUT THAT NUF DISCUSSIONS LAGGED
BEHIND THE GENERAL PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE, HINTIN
THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD IMPEDE PROGRESS ON CSBM'S IF ThE
PACE OF WORK ON OF IS NOT ACCELERATED. THIS WAS ANOTHER
IN A SERIES OF SOVIET MARKERS THAT THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT
A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH TO DRAFTING REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT
PROGRESS ON CSBM'S PRIOR TO ANY NUF PROGRESS. GRINEVSKY
AGAIN PLUGGED THE SUBSTANCE OF SC.6 BUT DID NOT MENTION
THE TREATY IDEA. HE NOTED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT HAD
CALLED FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL
WAR AND THAT THE CDE COULD NOT "IGNORE" THIS ISSUE.
(BEGIN COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT THE IDEA OF A "NUF
TREATY" IS A DEAD ISSUE; HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS REMAIN
ADAMANT ABOUT INTRODUCING THE "NO FIRST USE" CONCEPT
INTO THE CDE CONTEXT. END COMMENT.)
6. GRINEVSKY CLOSED WITH SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE
MODALITIES FOR DRAFTING WHICH TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE
PARALLELED OUR VIEW THAT DRAFTING INITIALLY SHOULD FOCUS
ON AREAS OF CONVERGENCE. AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING,
THIS SOVIET POSITION SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO
AVOID DEMANDS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF BRACKETED LANGUAGE
INTO COORDINATOR'S TEXTS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 00680
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING
1. CDE IX - 014
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING WERE AGREED TO
BY THE CDE NATO CAUCUS ON JANUARY 29. GASCHIGNARD
(FRANCE), MELLBIN (DENMARK), AND CITRON (FRG) WERE
SELECTED AS CAUCUS REPRESENTATIVES TO MAKE AN
APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE WORKING GROUP COORDINATORS
ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT AND WILL BE MEETING WITH
THEM ON JANUARY 30. THE CAUCUS ALSO DECIDED THAT THE
TEXT ITSELF WOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL, FOR INTERNAL NATO
USE ONLY.
BEGIN TEXT.
DRAFTING
- THE PRESENT PAPER IS INTENDED TO REFLECT THE
DISCUSSION ONO THE ABOVE SUBJECT WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE
MEETING ON JANUARY 23, 1986, AT THE PALAIS D'EGMONT.
- THE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS
DEFINITELY AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED WILL APPLY.
- DRAFTING SHOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF A PRINCIPLE
OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM." THIS MEANS THAT DRAFTING
WOULD NOT HAVE TO START AT EXACTLY THE SAME TIME OR
PROCEED AT THE SAME PACE IN ALL CLUSTER GROUPS.
HOWEVER, THE PRINCIPLE OF DRAFTING IS ACCEPTED AB INITIO
FOR ALL CLUSTER GROUPS AND NO MAJOR DELAY IS FORESEEN IN
INITIATING THE DRAFTING IN ANY GROUP. THERE ARE
SUFFICIENT MEANS TO ENSURE THAT DRAFTING ON ANY SUBJECT
DOES NOT GAIN AN UNACCEPTABLE LEAD IN RELATION TO
DRAFTING ON OTHER SUBJECT.
- DRAFTING WILL TAKE PLACE IN ENGLISH ONLY.
- INITIALLY, CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ALLIED DELEGATIONS TO
DRAFTING SHOULD BE BASED ON QUOTATIONS FROM
SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
- THE COORDINATORS MUST BE EXPECTED TO PRESENT DRAFT
TEXTS ELABORATED ON THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY AND
INTENDED TO ESTABLISH COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. WITH REGARD
TO SUBJECTS ON WHICH THERE ARE NO OTHER PROPOSALS THAN
THOSE IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED COORDINATORS WILL NOT HAVE THE
USUAL BASIS FOR ELABORATING COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. ALLIED
COUNTRIES WILL MAINTAIN SUCH PROPOSALS AND DECIDE IN DUE
COURSE HOW THEY BEST CAN ENSURE THAT THEY ARE INCLUDED
IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS.
- IN ALL PROBABILITY, COORDINATORS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH AGREED TEXTS WILL HAVE TO APPLY A "BITS AND
PIECES APPROACH," I.E., TO NAIL DOWN AGREEMENT ON
WHATEVER SENTENCES OR OTHER PARTS OF TEXTS LEND
THEMSELVES THERETO AT THE ACTUAL MOMENT. IN GENERAL A
DEDUCTIVE APPROACH CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO YIELD THE
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DESIRED RESULTS.
- COORDINATORS SHOULD NOT INTRODUCE TEXTS WHICH
COMPARE POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS ON THE
TABLE.
- TEXTS SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO THE COORDINATOR'S
NOTEBOOK WHEN THEY ARE AGREED BY CONSENSUS AND SHOULD
CONTAIN NO BRACKETS TO INDICATE DISAGREEMENT. THE USE
OF DOTS (. . . ) WILL BE INHERENT IN THE "BITS AND
PIECES APPROACH," INDICATING THAT AGREEMENT ON PART OF A
TEXT, INCLUDING SPECIFIC FIGURES, IS STILL OUTSTANDING.
- IN RESPECT TO POSSIBLE DRAFT TEXTS WHICH ARE NOT
READY TO BE ENTERED INTO THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK
DISAGREEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY ORAL DECLARATIONS.
- IT IS TO BE FORESEEN THAT AS DRAFTING PROCEEDS A
CERTAIN INDIVIDUALIZATION OF THE WORKING MODALITIES IN
THE VARIOUS CLUSTER GROUPS WILL DEVELOP.
- A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE GUIDELINES; BUT MAJOR CHANGES
SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 00693
SUBJECT: NATO AMBASSADORS DISCUSS CDE WITH LORD CARRINGTON
1. CDE IX-017. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE CDE NATO AMBASSADORS HAD A GOOD SUB-
STANTIVE DISCUSSION ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND
EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH CARRINGTON DURING HIS STOCKHOLM
VISIT JANUARY 29. KEY ISSUES WERE WHETHER CDE WAS LIKELY
TO BE THE ONLY SECURITY-RELATED AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED
IN 1986, WHETHER EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE SATIS-
FIED BY SUCCESS IN CDE, IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON
NUCLEAR ISSUES AND WHETHER WE COULD GET ON-SITE INSPEC-
TION IN A CDE AGREEMENT. THE ROLE OF A US-SOVIET SUMMIT
IN THE CDE CONTEXT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED. CARRINGTON
EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH PAST NAC DISCUSSIONS OF CDE
AND SUGGESTED THAT A FREE-WHEELING LUNCHEON DISCUSSION
INCLUDING PERMREPS AND CDE AMBASSADORS WAS HIS PREFERRED
FORMAT FOR THE NEXT NATO CDE CONSULTATION. END SUMMARY.
3. DURING HIS BILATERAL VISIT TO STOCKHOLM ON JANUARY
29, LORD CARRINGTON MET WITH THE NATO AMBASSADORS AT THE
HOME OF DANISH AMBASSADOR MELLBIN WHO HAD BEEN THE SPOKES-
MAN FOR THE STOCKHOLM CAUCUS AT THE JANUARY 24 NAC. HIS
INTENTION WAS TO HAVE THE KIND OF FREE-WHEELING DISCUS-
SION WHICH HE FELT HAD BEEN SO LACKING IN PREVIOUS NAC
MEETINGS ON CDE, AND HE LED THE WAY.
4. IN DISCUSSING THE PROSPECTS FOR A CDE AGREEMENT
THIS YEAR, BARRY (US) SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD
CONFIRMED THAT THE US BOTTOM LINE WAS VERIFIABILITY -
I.E. SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION. ABSENT THAT, WE WOULD
NOT APPROVE A MINI-PACKAGE. WE THOUGHT ON-SITE
INSPECTION WAS ATTAINABLE, IF ONLY IN THE END-GAME.
THIS WAS THE PRICE THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR
CONTINUING THE CDE PROCESS. ALSO, CDE IS THE LEADING
CANDIDATE FOR A SECURITY-RELATED AGREEMENT IN 1986, AND
THIS SHOULD AFFECT THE SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTIONS.
5. CARRINGTON WONDERED IF CW WAS NOT A BETTER CANDIDATE.
CITRON (FRG) SAID THAT HE DOUBTED THIS; CW INSPECTIONS
WOULD BE FAR MORE INTRUSIVE THAN CDE INSPECTIONS.
SEVERAL NATO WETS (NORWAY, DENMARK, SPAIN, CANADA)
DOUBTED THAT THE USSR WOULD EVER AGREE TO INSPECTIONS
IN THE CDE CONTEXT, ALTHOUGH THEY SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT THIS MIGHT MEAN NO AGREEMENT BEFORE
THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE.
6. CARRINGTON WAS SKEPTICAL THAT CDE (IN WHICH NO
FOREIGN OFFICE IS REALLY INTERESTED) WOULD SATISFY
NORTHERN EUROPEAN APPETITES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.
CITRON OPINED THAT A SUCCESSFUL CDE WOULD BE A BIG HELP
IN THE FRG; THE SITUATION WAS FAR EASIER THAN AT THE
HEIGHT OF THE INF CONTROVERSY. MODEST STEPS IN STOCK-
HOLM WHICH PROMISED A CONTINUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS
AND COULD STIMULATE PROGRESS IN OTHER FORA COULD HAVE A
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MAJOR IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION. OTHERS (PERHAPS
REFLECTING THEIR FOCUS ON CDE) GENERALLY AGREED.
7. CARRINGTON ASKED HOW CDE COULD FIT INTO A JULY
REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. BARRY SAID THAT MULTILATERAL
CDE ISSUES COULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY, BUT THE
SUMMIT PROCESS COULD BE USED TO RESOLVE CRUCIAL OUT-
STANDING QUESTIONS - E.G. ON-SITE INSPECTION. MEVIK
(NORWAY) OBJECTED TO THE IDEA OF SUPERPOWER NEGOTIATION
OF CDE, BUT OTHERS SAID THAT THE MORE ISSUES THAT CAN
BE RESOLVED IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR,
THE BETTER - E.G. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF FORECASTS DURING
GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO PARIS.
8. CARRINGTON DOUBTED THAT THE US OR EUROPEAN PUBLICS
WOULD BE CONTENT WITH A SECOND US-SOVIET SUMMIT AT
WHICH NOTHING WAS DECIDED. BARRY SAID THAT THE US HAD
LONG SAID THAT THE PROCESS WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE
RESULTS; SUMMITS SHOULD NOT BE PLACES TO SIGN AGREEMENTS
BUT TO SEEK PROGRESS ON ISSUES WHICH ARE STALLED.
CARRINGTON DOUBTED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH COULD BE SOLD
TO THE MEDIA.
9. IN CONCLUSION CARRINGTON REITERATED HIS FRUSTRATION
WITH PREVIOUS NAC CONSULTATIONS ON CDE AND URGED BRIAN
FALL TO ORGANIZE A FREE-WHEELING CDE LUNCHEON MEETING
FOR THE NEXT CDE EVENT. FALL SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS
TO ACCOMMODATE 36 BUT HE THOUGHT IT COULD BE DONE.
MANY OF THE CDE AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT A GENERAL DIS-
CUSSION OF THIS SORT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO THE USUAL
TOUR DE TABLE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 00751
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF GORBACHEV'S
JANUARY 15 CDE PROPOSAL
1. CDE IX - 023
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE CDE NATO CAUCUS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED JANUARY 31 HOW
THE ALLIANCE SHOULD HANDLE GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15
PROPOSAL TO DEFER THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION OF
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE OF
CDE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE WEST SHOULD
MAKE NO FORMAL REFERENCES TO THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL.
MOST SHARED THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY CIARRAPICCO (ITALY)
THAT NATO SHOULD NOT SEEK INFORMAL CLARIFICATION FROM
THE SOVIETS BUT POCKET THE SOVIET OFFER. EDES (UK)
NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO OFFER SOME
ELABORATION IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING A NOTIFICATION
MEASURE. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH EDES'
OBSERVATION THAT THE GORBACHEV OFFER WAS IN NO WAY A
CONCESSION" AND THAT NATO DELEGATIONS SHOULD BE CAREFUL
NOT TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS SUCH.
4. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING THE POINT IN THE NATO CAUCUS AND
AMONG MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN
WHETHER THE NAVAL ISSUE HAS REALLY GONE AWAY OR WILL
SIMPLY REAPPEAR UNDER THE GUISE OF "FUNCTIONALLY RELATED"
NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE ALSO STRESSED OUR POSITION SO
THAT INDEPENDENT AIR IS EXCLUDED ALSO. SO FAR, THIS
SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED BY ALL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 00750
SUBJECT: CDE ISSUES AT EVERE
REFS: A) USNATO 543, B) USNATO 485, C) USNATO 429
1. CDE IX - 019.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. USDEL HAS TAKEN NOTE OF UK PERMREP'S EFFORTS TO
ENGAGE THE NATO MACHINERY TO WORK ON CDE ISSUES (REF A).
DELEGATION VIEWS ARE FORWARDED BELOW FOR WASHINGTON
CONSIDERATION.
4. FOR OUR PART, WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO CONSIDERATION
OF THE NNA CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL AT EVERE. WE WOULD
POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE
JUST COMPLETED CONSTRAINTS STUDY APPLY ALSO TO SC-7;
FURTHER, WE REMAIN UNCONVINCED THAT THERE IS A REQUIRE-
MENT FOR NATO TO IDENTIFY A MEASURE OF CONSTRAINT FOR
USE IN STOCKHOLM.
5. AS NOTED IN REF C, USDEL DID NOT OBJECT TO AN EXAMINA-
TION AT EVERE OF SC-7 TO DETERMINE OTHER ASPECTS WITH
NEGOTIATING RELEVANCE FOR STOCKHOLM. THIS IS MOST
LIKELY A REFERENCE TO THE SC-7 LANGUAGE ON NUF. DESPITE
OUR WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO THE SUGGESTED WORK IN NATO,
WE BELIEVE SUCH AN EXAMINATION IS PART OF THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS AND CAN BE MOST SATISFACTORILY CARRIED OUT IN
STOCKHOLM ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS.
6. WE ARE PUZZLED BY THE UK ATTEMPT TO FORCE RESOLUTION
OF THE ANOMALIES IN THE WESTERN CSBM PACKAGE AT EVERE.
THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE PRE-NAC HEADS CAUCUS
THAT THESE ISSUES -- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RESTRICTED
AREAS -- COULD BEST BE RESOLVED DURING NEGOTIATIONS
IN STOCKHOLM. USDEL SUPPORTS THAT VIEW.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 00789
SUBJECT: SOVIET NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY ON CDE
1. CDE IX-027. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SOVIET CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM
IN A POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND AFTER HIS MEETING (TOGETHER
WITH OTHER NEGOTIATORS) WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
IN THE COURSE OF PREPARING HIS JANUARY 15 STATEMENT. HE
SEEMS TO BE INSTRUCTED TO GET ON WITH AN AGREEMENT.
3. HE DID NOT OBJECT WHEN I SAID THAT THE BOTTOM LINE
FOR THE US WAS ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE ISSUE COULD BE
DEFERRED BUT NOT AVOIDED. WE WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED
WITH OBSERVATION ON REQUEST AS IN THE NNA PROPOSAL;
WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS A FORM OF INSPECTION WHICH COULD
NOT BE DENIED.
U. GRINEVSKY SAID WE WERE CORRECT IN INTERPRETING THE
CDE SEGMENT OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 SPEECH AS REFERRING
TO LOWERING THE HELSINKI NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
THRESHOLDS AND NOT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS ON EXERCISES
(CONSTRAINTS). HE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE
THRESHOLD ISSUE BILATERALLY IN AN EFFORT TO NARROW THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.
5. I SAID IT REMAINED OUR VIEW THAT INDEPENDENT AIR AS
WELL AS NAVAL ACTIVITIES COULD NOT BE PART OF A STOCK-
HOLM AGREEMENT; WE WERE STICKING TO THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH. GRINEVSKY SAID THE SOVIETS HAD NOT CHANGED
THIS POSITION IN THE MEANING OF THE MANDATE, BUT THAT
THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT WAS AN EFFORT TO FIND A PRACTICAL
WAY OUT OF THE BLIND ALLEY WE WERE IN. (COMMENT: THE
IMPLICATION OF GRINEVSKY'S COMMENT WAS THAT THEY WOULD
NOT MAKE TOO MUCH OF A FUSS ABOUT INDEPENDENT AIR EITHER,
BUT WE SUSPECT THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION
WILL NOT BE SO PHILOSOPHICAL.)
6. ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS SUCH AS DRAFTING MODALITIES
AND LANGUAGE, GRINEVSKY SOUNDED RELAXED AND FLEXIBLE.
HE PROMISED TO CONSIDER OUR NO-BRACKETS DRAFTING MODEL,
SAYING THAT HE SAW NO PROBLEMS OF PRINCIPLE WITH IT.
HE SEEMED READY TO ACCEPT A LOOSE AND INFORMAL STRUCTUR-
ING OF DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS FOLLOWING THE
MODEL DEVELOPED BY COORDINATOR KAHILUOTO RATHER THAN
MORE DETAILED AND UNFLEXIBLE MODELS SUGGESTED BY
EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES. AND HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS
NO QUESTION THAT ENGLISH WAS THE ONLY LANGUAGE IN WHICH
DRAFTING WOULD PROCEED, ALTHOUGH HE INSISTED ON THE EAST'S
RIGHT TO SUBMIT TEXTS IN RUSSIAN AS WELL AS ENGLISH.
7. COMMENT: GRINEVSKY HAS BEEN QUITE ILL FOR SEVERAL
DAYS, AND THIS IS THE FIRST MEETING WE COULD ARRANGE
SINCE THE SESSION BEGAN. FOR THE FIRST TIME HE HAD A
NOTETAKER, INDICATING THAT THERE IS A SENSITIVITY IN
HIS DELEGATION ABOUT THE CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL DIS-
CUSSIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE DID NOT RAISE THE
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ARGUMENT THAT WE WERE DRAGGING OUR FEET ON NON-USE OF
FORCE. JUDGING BY HIS DEMEANOR, GRINEVSKY IS EAGER TO
MOVE AHEAD. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THE GENERAL STAFF
OR THE KGB WILL FOLLOW.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET STOCKHOLM 00844
SUBJECT: CDE DEVELOPMENTS ON VERIFICATION ISSUE,
WEEK OF JANUARY 27-31, 1986
1. CDE XI -30. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. DURING FIRST WEEK OF CDE ROUND NINE
THE EAST SIGNALED POTENTIAL ACCEPTANCE OF A CSBM VERIFICA-
TION REGIME ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE NEUTRAL/NON-
ALIGNED (SC.7, "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST"). SOME NEUTRAL/
NON-ALIGNED SEEMED TO BE EXCITED BY SUCH SIGNALS, WHILE
NATO IS FIRMLY MAINTAINING ITS INSISTENCE THAT NOTHING
SHORT OF MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION IS ACCEPTABLE. END
SUMMARY.
3. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF CDE ROUND NINE THE EAST WAS
BUSY SENDING SIGNALS THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY OPEN-MINDED ON
HOW TO RESOLVE THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM BUT MAY WELL BE
PREPARED TO ACCEPT A VERIFICATION MEASURE ALONG THE LINES
SET OUT IN THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED (NNA) PROPOSAL (SC.7,
"OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST"). THESE MOVES REFLECT, NO
DOUBT, A FOLLOW-UP ON THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL
AS WELL AS A GRUDGING REALIZATION THAT THE EAST'S
SPLENDID ISOLATION ON THIS ISSUE DOES NOT SERVE IT IN
GOOD STEAD -- BOTH NATO AND THE THE NNA HAVE PROPOSED
PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INVESTIGATION OF QUESTIONABLE
ACTIVITIES, ALBEIT THE NNA PROPOSAL IS BY A JUSTIFIABLE
REQUEST WITH RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT
MANDATORY. THE EAST HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO PROMOTE
THE SC.7 APPROACH AS OSTENSIBLY MEETING NATO'S REQUIRE-
MENT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.
4. WORKING GROUP A (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION,
COMMUNICATION) -- JANUARY 29, 1986. DURING THE
WEDNESDAY WORKING GROUP A DISCUSSION JANUARY 29 ON
VERIFICATION BOTH THE GDR AND USSR SENT SUCH SIGNALS.
IN RESPONSE TO PROBING BY NATO ON HOW THE GORBACHEV
PROPOSAL, WHICH MENTIONS BOTH NTM'S AND ON-SITE
INSPECTION AS VERIFICATION METHODS, WOULD BE APPLIED
IN THE CDE CONTEXT, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WERE MADE:
-- GDR AMBASSADOR BUEHRING REGRETTED NATO STATEMENTS
WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, INDICATED THAT NATO IS STILL NOT
PREPARED TO MAKE A QUALITATIVE MOVE ON INSPECTION. HE
THUS IMPLIED THAT THE EAST IS READY TO MAKE SUCH A
MOVE. HE SAID THAT THE GDR HAD AN "OPEN-MINDED ATTITUDE"
CONCERNING VERIFICATION.
-- USSR GENERAL TATARNIKOV REITERATED THE WTO'S INTEREST
IN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS WHICH
REQUIRED ADEQUATE (A WORD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED) FORMS
OF VERIFICATION CORRESPONDING TO THEIR CONTENTS. WE
ARE WILLING, HE SAID, TO GO IN FOR ANY FORM OF VERIFICA-
TION REQUIRED. GORBACHEV, HE NOTED, HAD SPOKEN OF BOTH
NTMS AND ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MONITORING
(KONTROL) OVER WEAPONS WHICH LEND THEMSELVES TO MONITOR-
ING. IT IS ONE MATTER TO VERIFY WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
ELIMINATED, HE NOTED, AND ANOTHER TO COUNT TROOPS IN
MANEUVERS -- ONE, TWO, OR ONE AND ONE-HALF DIVISIONS
(BEGIN COMMENT: TARTARNIKOV MAY HAVE BEEN SIGNALLING WHAT
THRESHOLDS WOULD BE SUITABLE TO THE SOVIETS FOR NOTIFI-
CATION. END COMMENT.) AND, HE ADDED, IT WAS ONE
MATTER TO CHECK ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THEY ARE 50 OR 150 KT AND ANOTHER TO VERIFY HOW
MANY AIRCRAFT SET OUT TO TAKE PART IN A MANEUVER. THE
USSR IS FOR "REASONABLE" VERIFICATION, AND, IN THE
CONTEXT OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING ISSUES,
SUCH A REASONABLE APPROACH MIGHT BE TACKLED BY NTM'S,
MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, OR CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSIONS IF THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION.
SC.7 (NNA PROPOSAL) SETS OUT "REASONABLE" VERIFICATION
MEASURES FOR THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WE ARE TO
ELABORATE AND, TARTARNIKOV SAID, WE ARE STUDYING THESE
PROPOSALS AND WILL LOOK AT THEM ALONG WITH OTHERS
INSOFAR AS THEY ARE EFFECTIVE MEASURES. IN THE CONTEXT
OF NOTIFICATION MEASURES, HE SAID, INSPECTIONS (AS SET
OUT BY NATO IN SC.1) ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. VERIFICATION
MEASURES, HE NOTED, CAN BE OF A VARIED SORT AND WOULD
INCLUDE NOT SIMPLY INSPECTIONS ALONE. IT (VERIFICATION)
MUST COVER ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES -- LAND, AIR AND
NAVAL. THESE FORMS CAN BE VARIED CASE-TO-CASE, I.E.
VERIFICATION OF CONFIDENCE MEASURES FOR MAJOR NAVAL
MANEUVERS MIGHT INVOLVE USE OF TECHNICAL MEANS AVAILABLE
TO EVERY STATE. TROOP TRANSFERS MUST ALSO BE VERIFIED
AND FORMS OF INSPECTION VERIFICATION ARE AVAILABLE AND
HAVE BEEN ENUMERATED (BEGIN COMMENT: HE MAY WELL BE
TALKING ABOUT OBSERVATION METHODS RATHER THAN VERIFICA-
TION TECHNIQUES THAT WOULD APPLY IN THE CASE OF DOUBTS
CONCERNING COMPLIANCE. END COMMENT.)
-- USSR REP ROZANOV TOOK ISSUE WITH NATO'S INSPECTION
MEASURE AS A "ROUTINE" AND AUTONOMOUS MEASURE, ASSERTING
THAT VERIFICATION MUST BE LINKED WITH SPECIFIC MEASURES.
YOU CAN'T, FOR EXAMPLE, AGREE TO SEND IN INSPECTION TEAMS
TO VERIFY CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION BEFORE YOU REACH
AGREEMENT ON A REGIME BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH
NATO REPS ADROITLY REFER TO THE NNA PROPOSAL AS AN
"INSPECTION" MEASURE, ROZANOV SAID, HE "CAN'T FIND THE
WORD INSPECTION IN SC.7." SEEMING TO DRAW A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN "ROUTINE" VERIFICATION AND StTUATIONS THAT RAISE
QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE, ROZANOV SAID THAT ADEQUATE FORMS
OF VERIFICATION ARE INCLUDED IN THE CONTEXT OF EACH
AGREED CSBM; WHETHER OR NOT WE OBSERVE OR COMPLY IS
ANSWERED BY ANOTHER QUESTION. HE ASKED NATO WHAT WAS
WRONG WITH THE APPROACH REFLECTED IN SC.7, NOTING THAT
SC.7 ALLOWS THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL FOR "OBSERVATION"
REQUESTS GENERATED BY DOUBTS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE.
5. CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS. FOLLOWING THE WORKING
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GROUP MEETING REPS FROM AT LEAST THREE NATO COUNTRIES
WERE SEPARATELY TOLD BY INDIVIDUAL WTO REPS (OVER LUNCHES)
THAT THE WTO WAS LOOKING FAVORABLY AT SC.7'S "OBSERVATION
UPON REQUEST" PROPOSAL. A DAY LATER, USDEPREP HANSEN
WAS TOLD THE SAME THING BY HUNGARIAN DEPREP KORMENDY.
LATER KORMENDY ALSO TOLD USDELOFF (HUCK) THAT SC.7'S
"OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" IS THE WTO RESPONSE TO NATO'S
GOAL OF ON-SITE INSPECTION.
6. NNA ATTITUDE. THE AFOREMENTIONED SIGNALS HAVE NOT
GONE UNNOTICED BY THE NNA. AWARE THAT NATO'S APPROACH
IS ANATHEMA TO THE WTO, SOME OF THE NNA HAVE MADE EFFORTS
TO DISTANCE THEIR APPROACH FROM NATO'S. FOR EXAMPLE,
IN THE AFOREMENTIONED WORKING GROUP MEETING YUGOSLAV
AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC WAS QUICK TO CAUTION AGAINST DRAWING
PARALLELS BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES, STRESSING THAT
THEY ARE NOT THE SAME. SC.7, HE NOTED, TALKS OF
"OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST," WHILE SC.1 TALKS OF "ON-SITE
INSPECTION." SOME OTHER NNA HAVE ENGAGED MORE ACTIVELY
BEHIND THE SCENES WITH NATO REPS IN PUSHING THEIR OWN
APPROACH ARGUING THAT IT MIGHT BE THE MOST THAT CAN BE
OBTAINED OUT OF THE CONFERENCE.
7. NATO REACTIONS. MEANWHILE, NATO REPS HAVE NOT TAKEN
THE BAIT. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO INSIST STRONGLY THAT
NOTHING SHORT OF MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION
MEASURE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE IN AN AGREEMENT EMERGING
FROM STOCKHOLM. THIS POINT HAS BEEN MADE ACROSS THE
BOARD WITH INTERLOCUTORS FROM BOTH WTO AND NNA AND AT
A VARIETY OF LEVELS.
8. WHY SC.7? WHY MIGHT SC.7 PROVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO
THE WTO? THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE REASONS:
-- IT COULD PROVIDE THE SEMBLANCE OF ACCEDING TO THE U.S.
AND NATO REQUIREMENT FOR VERIFICATION THROUGH ON-SITE
INSPECTION.
-- THE SC.7 ESCAPE CLAUSE, OR RIGHT OF REFUSAL, WOULD
ALLOW WTO TO DENY REQUESTS (IN ORDER TO PROTECT NATIONAL
SECURITY).
9. IMPLICATIONS.
USSR/WTO NOW SEEM TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE NECESSITY OF
ADDRESSING NON-COMPLIANCE. HERETOFORE, SOVIETS ARGUED
THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WAS NOT A PROBLEM INASMUCH AS
EVERYTHING NOTIFIABLE WOULD BE NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED;
OBSERVATION WOULD THUS SERVE THE ROLE OF VERIFICATION.
ROZANOV HIMSELF, HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QUESTIONS OF
NON-COMPLIANCE COULD ARISE AND BOTH TARTARNIKOV AND
ROZANOV IMPLIED THAT THE SOLUTION MAY LIE WITH SC.7'S
"OBSERVATION BY REQUEST" PROPOSAL. THIS LOGICALLY
LEADS TO AN IMPLICIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT NOT ONLY
NOTIFIED ACTIVITES REQUIRE VERIFICATION, BUT THAT MEANS
MUST EXIST TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS RAISED CONCERNING A
NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITY THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED.
-- ANOTHER KEY IMPLICATION LIES IN THE NATURE OF SC.7
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ITSELF. SC.7 PROVIDES LOOPHOLES -- A REQUEST MUST BE
JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE REQUESTER BELIEVES
HIS NATIONAL SECURITY IS THREATENED OR THAT THE AGREEMENT
ITSELF IS JEOPARDIZED, AND MAY BE DENIED ON GROUNDS OF
"SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS." NATO WOULD THUS
HAVE TO JUSTIFY ANY REQUEST AND MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE,
HAVE DIFFICULTY JUSTIFYING A REQUEST TO OBSERVE A
SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE A
NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT STATE. THE REQUEST COULD BE
DENIED ON GROUNDS THAT THE ACTIVITY POSED NO THREAT TO
NATO, OR THAT AN INSPECTION WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE
EFFECT ON "SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS."
ADDITIONALLY, EVEN EGREGIOUS BREACHES OF THE NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLDS WE ARE PROPOSING COULD HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED
AS THREATENING THE SECURITY OF MOST PARTICIPANTS.
-- "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" COULD UNDERCUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF USING INSPECTIONS AS PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO FORECAST.
HANSEN
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 00810
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
JANUARY 27-31, 1986
REF: STATE 31397
1. CDE IX - 028
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ENJOYED A
BRIEF MOMENT IN THE SUN AS THE WORLD PRESS FOCUSED ON
THE COORDINATED APPEARANCES OF THE FRENCH AND FRG
FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE OPENING OF THE NINTH SESSION.
THE INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT DISAPPEARED AS QUICKLY AS
THE SCANDINVAIAN MID-WINTER SUN, HOWEVER, LEAVING THE
CDE TROOPS TO BEGIN DRAFTING AN AGREEMENT. MOST
DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED QUALIFIED OPTIMISM THAT THIS TASK
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SEPTEMBER 1986. HOW TO GET
THERE, HOWEVER, REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION. FOR EXAMPLE,
DESPITE HINTS AT FLEXIBILITY IN GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15
STATEMENT, THE SOVIET POSITION ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES
REMAINS OPAQUE. THE ACTUAL DRAFTING OF AN AGREEMENT GOT
OFF TO AN UNEASY, BUT NOT INAUSPICIOUS, START. DRAFTING
LANGUAGE WAS INTRODUCED IN THE NOTIFICATION AND
OBSERVATION WORKING GROUPS, AREAS WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO
SEE RAPID PROGRESS, BUT NOT IN THE CONSTRAINTS OR
NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUPS, WHERE WE WILL HAVE MORE
DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING THE DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NINTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED
IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF OPTIMISM. AFTER TWO YEARS OF
LABORING QUIETLY IN THE TRENCHES, CDE DELEGATIONS FOUND
THE INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT FOCUSED ON STOCKHOLM FOR THE
FIRST TIME SINCE THE OFFICIAL OPENING IN JANUARY 1984.
IN CLOSELY COORDINATED STATEMENTS, FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER DUMAS AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
ACCENTED FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION AND THE KEY ROLE OF
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IN MAINTAINING EUROPEAN
STABILITY IN THEIR JOINT APPEARANCE AT THE CONFERENCE.
SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV INCLUDED THE CDE IN
HIS JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS INDICATING SOME GIVE ON THE
SOVIET NEGOTIATING STANCE (WE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO
READ THE FINE PRINT OF HIS PROPOSAL -- YET TO BE
PROVIDED -- DURING THIS ROUND). SO FAR, FOR EXAMPLE,
THE SOVIET POSITION ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES REMAINS OPAQUE.
PRESIDENT REAGAN ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL FEELING
OF OPTIMISM WHEN HE EXPRESSED IN A JANUARY 21 STATEMENT
HIS BELIEF THAT "AN ACCORD WITH IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP CAN BE ACHIEVED
IN STOCKHOLM THIS YEAR." THE MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER
USED THE OPENING PLENARY AS A FORUM FOR FLOGGING HIS
COUNTRY'S MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSALS. WHILE THE HONCHOS
SPOKE OF AN AGREEMENT BY SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR, THE
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TROOPS SORTED OUT HOW TO GET THERE FROM HERE.
5. SOME CONFUSION EMERGED ON JUST HOW TO BEGIN DRAFTING.
THE EAST ARGUED FOR A STRUCTURED AND EXTENSIVE DRAFTING
AGENDA IN MOST WORKING GROUPS, WHILE NATO FAVORED A MORE
UNSTRUCTURED APPROACH IN ORDER TO RETAIN WESTERN
FLEXIBILITY IN EACH WORKING GROUP. THE NNA COORDINATORS
CONSULTED ANXIOUSLY IN THE CORRIDORS, EAGER TO MOVE
THEIR RESPECTIVE WORKING GROUPS IN A STRUCTURED WAY BUT
WARY OF ALIENATING EITHER EAST OR WEST.
6. NON-USE OF FORCE: WHILE THE WEST CAME UNDER SOME
PRESSURE FROM THE EAST TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, THE EAST AND
THE NNA SEEMED TO ACCEPT, RELUCTANTLY, THAT THE
EXPLORATORY PHASE WAS NOT YET EXHAUSTED. HUNGARY CALLED
ON THE WORKING GROUP TO RECORD ELEMENTS WHERE POSITIONS
ARE CLOSE OR CONVERGING AND TO CONDUCT DRAFTING IN
STAGES. (THE NNA COORDINATOR IS SYMPATHETIC TO THIS
APPROACH.) THE SOVIETS, MEANWHILE, WARNED THAT A LACK
OF PROGRESS ON NUF WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MOVE
FORWARD IN OTHER AREAS, I.E., CSBM'S. THE WEST, HOWEVER,
HAS YET TO GET ITS COLLECTIVE NUF ACT TOGETHER.
NEVERTHELESS, WITHIN NATO DELEGATIONS THERE SEEMS TO BE
A CERTAIN EVOLUTION AWAY FROM THE MOST CONTENTIOUS
LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN EARLIER ALLIED DRAFTS, E.G., ON
THE BONN DECLARATION AND THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, AND
TOWARDS A COMMON LINE EMPHASIZING THE NUF-CSBM'S LINKAGE,
UN CHARTER TYPE LANGUAGE, AND THE BALANCE OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT PRINCIPLES. IN ADDITION, WESTERN DELEGATIONS
APPEAR READY, AT LEAST FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, TO CONSIDER
ELEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE
LANGUAGE. TO KEEP THE EAST -- AND SOME OF OUR ALLIES --
OFF-BALANCE, THE U.S. (GUNDERSEN) BEGAN TO INTRODUCE NEW
ELEMENTS FOR WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION -- THIS WEEK
COMPLIANCE WITH TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS AND THE
UNDENIABLE RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-
USE OF FORCE. OVER THE NEXT WEEKS, WE HOPE AT LEAST TO
IDENTIFY COMMON ELEMENTS/CONCEPTS BASED ON REFTEL TO
INTRODUCE INTO WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. TO START WITH,
WE WILL DISCUSS THE NUF CSBM'S LINKAGE, PUTTING THE NUF
REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONCRETE MEASURES TO
BE AGREED TO IN STOCKHOLM.
7. INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION: IN
CONCERTED AND COORDINATED CONTACTS THE EAST PUT OUT THE
WORD TO WESTERN DELEGATES THAT IT WAS OPEN TO THE NNA
CONCEPT OF "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" AS A FORM OF ON-
SITE VERIFICATION. KORMENDY (HUNGARY) PRIVATELY
INDICATED TO US THAT THE EAST COULD, IN FACT, ACCEPT
SC.7'S OBSERVATION ON REQUEST APPROACH, WHICH INCLUDES
THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL CLAUSE. NATO DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING
THE OFTEN NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ITALIANS AND NORWEGIANS,
HAVE INFORMED THE EAST IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT ON-SITE
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INSPECTION (OSI) IS A SINE QUA NON TO AGREEMENT IN
STOCKHOLM AND THAT THE SC.7 APPROACH DOES NOT MEET
NATO'S REQUIREMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, NATO TRIED TO
POCKET GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT IN THE CDE
CONTEXT, ACCEPTING THE OSI CONCEPT IN PRINCIPLE, WHILE
THE SOVIETS AWKWARDLY TRIED TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM
THEIR LEADER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISSUE.
NEXT WEEK, THE WEST INTENDS TO HIGHLIGHT "INFORMATION,"
PERHAPS INTRODUCING DRAFTING LANGUAGE FROM SC.1 INTO THE
RELEVANT WORKING GROUP. ON PROCEDURE, THE NATO MINI-
CLUSTER AGREED ON THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN WORKING
GROUP DISCUSSIONS, SO AS NOT TO GET LOCKED INTO
STRUCTURED OR AD SERIATIM DISCUSSIONS THAT WOULD
INEVITABLY LEAD TO ENTIRE MEETINGS DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION
OF COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS.
8. CONSTRAINTS: LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON
CONSTRAINTS, PERHAPS REFLECTING REAL-LIFE SOVIET DISLIKE
FOR ANYTHING THAT CONSTRAINS ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
NEVERTHELESS, THE EAST CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DROP THIS
ISSUE AS LONG AS IT BELIEVES IT CAN PIN THE BLAME FOR
FAILURE TO COME UP WITH A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE ON THE
WEST. (ALONG THESE LINES, THE SOVIETS -- AND THE
CONFERENCE -- HAVE TEMPORARILY AGREED TO USE THE U.S.-
SUPPLIED WORD -- "SDERZHIVAYUSHCHIYE MERY" -- TO CONVEY
OUR CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINTS, THEREBY PROVIDING THE SOVIETS
A CONVENIENT OUT IF THEY SHOULD DECIDE TO DROP THIS
ISSUE.) MEANWHILE, THE YUGOSLAVS PUBLICLY AND EVEN SOME
CLOSET CONSTRAINT PROPONENTS (E.G., THE NETHERLANDS)
PRIVATELY CONTINU: TO AGITATE FOR SOME KIND OF
CONSTRAINTS MEASURE. WHILE THE COORDINATOR (JUNOD OF
SWITZERLAND) HELD FRENETIC MEETINGS BEHIND THE SCENES TO
WORK OUT A WORKABLE STRUCTURE FOR DISCUSSION AND DRAFTING
ON FORECASTS AND CONSTRAINTS, THE NNA AND THE EAST
ACCEPTED THE WESTERN FOCUS ON ANNUAL FORECASTS -- AT
LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.
9. ANNUAL FORECASTS: MALTA, APPARENTLY PICKING UP
WHERE THE SOVIETS LEFT OFF LAST ROUND, FOCUSED ON
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AS A WAY TO CAPTURE NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN AN ANNUAL FORECAST. MALTA'S GAUCI ASKED
WHETHER NATO'S FORECAST OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES WOULD
INCLUDE BOTH MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT. HIS EMPHASIS ON
"EQUIPMENT" SUGGESTS THAT MALTA IS HOPING TO CAPTURE IN
A CSBM'S REGIME NOT ONLY THE TROOPS CARRYING OUT
AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, BUT THE NAVAL VESSELS INVOLVED IN
SUCH AN OPERATION AS WELL. THE EAST NEITHER FORGED
AHEAD WITH THE BULGARIAN LANGUAGE ON FORECASTS TABLED AT
THE END OF LAST ROUND NOR INSISTED THAT THE MEETING
ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS. INSTEAD THE BULGARIANS CALLED FOR
A STRUCTURING OF THE GROUP'S WORK WITH THE AGENDA AGREED
ON IN ADVANCE. TURKEY PLANS NEXT WEEK TO INTRODUCE
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LANGUAGE ON ANNUAL FORECASTS FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
10. NOTIFICATION: THE WEST MADE NOTIFICATION THE
LEADING CANDIDATE FOR DRAFTING WHEN THE U.S. (HANSEN)
INTRODUCED THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS OF MEASURE 3 ALMOST
VERBATIM AND PROPOSED THAT TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BE
RECORDED ON A PHRASE THAT PREJUDICED NO POSITION, I.E.,
"WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION . . . DAYS BEFORE SUCH ACTIVITY
BEGINS." CAUGHT OFF GUARD, THE EAST AND THE NNA DID NOT
RESPOND TO THIS INITIATIVE. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS DID
NOT INDICATE EITHER PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY HOW THEY PLAN
TO IMPLEMENT GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT IN
STOCKHOLM. THE EAST CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR DRAFTING IN
BOTH RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH BY TABLING NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE
IN RUSSIAN -- CLEARLY VIOLATING THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT
SETTING UP THE DRAFTING STAGE. (UNFORTUNATELY, THE EAST
CLAIMS NOT TO RECOLLECT THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT REACHED
LAST ROUND THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE ONLY DRAFTING
LANGUAGE AND THE NNA ARE RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED). AT
THIS POINT, WE INTEND TO WORK THIS OUT WITH THE SOVIETS
ON THE SIDELINES. THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR, BITTER AT
HAVING BEEN ABANDONED BY GORBACHEV'S DEFERRAL OF
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL A SECOND STAGE OF THE
CDE, LAID DOWN A MARKER: MALTA WOULD GO ALONG WITH
WESTERN NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE (SEE ABOVE) PROVIDED THAT
THE QUESTION OF THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY (LAND, AIR, NAVAL)
WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY THIS STATEMENT. AFTER WINNING
PUBLIC POINTS FOR GORBACHEV'S FORTHCOMINGNESS ON THE
ISSUE OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES, SOVIET RETICENCE
SO FAR IN STOCKHOLM ON THIS ISSUE MAY INDICATE RELUCTANCE
ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO LET THE WEST
POCKET GORBACHEV'S CONCESSION WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY
ANYTHING FOR IT.
10. OBSERVATION: THE FINNISH COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO)
OF THE WORKING GROUP OPENED THE FIRST OBSERVATION
MEETING WITH SOME DISQUIETING REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR
A MORE FORMAL STRUCTURE FOR DISCUSSIONS, BUT BACKED OFF
A BIT WHEN CAUTIONED ABOUT THIS APPROACH BY WESTERN
DELEGATES IN THE CORRIDORS. THE STRUCTURED APPROACH
SUGGESTED BY KAHILUOTO IN THIS PARTICULAR WORKING GROUP
MAY, IN FACT, WORK TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE; HOWEVER, IT
MIGHT ALSO CREATE DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS IN OTHER WORKING
GROUPS. THE WORKING GROUP ITSELF QUICKLY MOVED INTO
DRAFTING WHEN THE EAST, SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY,
INTRODUCED A TEXT ON THE PURPOSES OF OBSERVATION. THE
EASTERN LANGUAGE, PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCE TO THE
OBSERVERS' CONFIRMING THE "PEACEFUL INTENTIONS" OF THE
INVITING COUNTRY, IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.
NEXT WEEK, THE WEST WILL STRESS THIS POINT WHILE
UNDERSCORING THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF INVITATIONS TO
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OBSERVERS. THE NNA, LED BY AUSTRIA, CLAIMED THAT BOTH
THE EASTERN AND WESTERN APPROACHES IN THE OBSERVATION
ISSUE ARE ACCOMMODATED IN SC.7.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET STOCKHOLM 00819
SUBJECT: MEASURE ONE AND THE TURKISH PROBLEM
1. CDE IX - 029.
2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: USDEL OFFICERS MET WITH THE TURKISH DCM TO
DISCUSS THE LONG-STANDING MEASURE ONE INFORMATION
PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE OSD
STUDY. REPS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE INITIAL TURKISH
RESPONSE. HOWEVER, WE MAY NEED TO HAVE OUR IDEAS
REINFORCED, POSSIBLY DURING ASD PERLE'S TURKISH HLG
LATER THIS MONTH (SEE PARA 7). END SUMMARY
4. ON SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1986, DCD AMBASSADOR LYNN
HANSEN TOGETHER WITH SECDEFREP HARLAN STRAUSS, AND ASG
DEL MEMBER KEN HUCK MET WITH THE TURKISH DEPUTY DENIZ
BOLUKBASI. AMBASSADOR HANSEN BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY
TELLING BOLUKBASI THAT IF THERE IS TO BE A SUCCESS ON
NATO'S TERMS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE PRIOR TO THE
MID-SEPTEMBER ADJOURNMENT, OUR TACTICS MUST BE ADJUSTED,
WHICH MEANS WE MUST FIND BETTER WAYS OF DEALING WITH
SOME OF OUR KEY CONCEPTS. IN THIS REGARD, WE NEED TO
CONSIDER AGAIN AND TRY TO RESOLVE THE MEASURE ONE
PROBLEM, WHICH HANSEN DESCRIBED AS PIVOTAL.
5. USING THE IG "BLESSED" OSD "THOUGHT PAPER" AS HIS
GUIDE, HANSEN DESCRIBED ITS CONCEPTS FOR DEALING WITH
MEASURE ONE, EMPHASIZING THE FACT THAT BOLUKBASI IS THE
FIRST NON-USG OFFICIAL TO BE BRIEFED ON THE SUBJECT:
- A. IN THE FINAL END GAME, MEASURE ONE INFORMATION
EXCHANGE MIGHT BE REMOVED AS A SEPARATE MEASURE WITH ITS
REQUIREMENTS INTEGRATED INTO THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF
FORECASTS AND NOTIFICATION. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE
TO PRESS FOR MEASURE ONE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AT
LEAST DOWN TO DIVISION LEVEL.
- B. A NEW INFORMATION REQUIREMENT MAY CONSIST OF A
LIST OF UNITS WITH SUBORDINATION DOWN TO
BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL FOR FORCES WITHIN THE ZONE; UNIT
LOCATIONS NEED NOT BE CORRELATED WITH UNIT.
- C. PARTICIPATING STATES WILL DESIGNATE THE
LOCATIONS OF ITS RESTRICTED AREAS AS DEFINED IN
PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE VERIFICATION MEASURE AS GARRISONS.
- D. IF ITEM C IS UNACCEPTABLE, AT THE TIME OF THE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR THE ANNUAL CALENDAR A LIST
OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS AS PROVED UNDER MEASURE V
WILL BE PROVIDED, AND,
- E. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL SPECIFY THE
COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION BY MAJOR
COMBAT ELEMENTS.
6. BOLUKBASI THANKED AMBASSADOR HANSEN FOR THE CLOSE
CONSULTATIONS AND SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT THE
AFOREMENTIONED TO ANKARA. HE INDICATED THAT ITEM 5B
(ABOVE) WOULD BE PATENTLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE TURKISH
GENERAL STAFF AS WOULD ANY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WHICH
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GAVE SUBORDINATION DOWN TO BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL.
BOLUKBASI PERSISTENTLY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
DELINKAGE OF UNIT WITH LOCATION, NOTING THAT EVERY
TURKISH BRIGADE/REGIMENT LOCATION CAN SIMPLY BE
IDENTIFIED BY GOING TO THE TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES. HE
ASKED IF A RESTRICTED AREA CAN BE A CITY, SINCE NEARLY
EVERY TURKISH CITY IS HEADQUARTERS FOR AT LEAST ONE
REGIMENT. THUS, TURKISH CITIES/TOWNS ARE "GARRISON
CITIES" WITH TRAINING AREAS LOCATED OUTSIDE CITY
LIMITS. IN BOLUKBASI'S OPINION, AN EXCHANGE OF
RESTRICTED AREAS WOULD BE QUITE SIMPLE, SINCE HE COULD
EASILY PROVIDE A MAP OF TURKEY WITH BLACK DOTS OVER ALL
CITIES TO INDICATE RESTRICTED AREAS. LIKEWISE,
BOLUKBASI BELIEVED A STATEMENT OF DIVISION EQUIVALENCY
CAN BE READILY PROVIDED. NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERING HOW
SLOWLY TGS WORKS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT ALL ACTION
OFFICERS ARE FULLY ENGAGED IN WORKING ON THE
U.S.-TURKISH BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT, IT
IS UNLIKELY THAT A TGS ANSWER CAN BE OBTAINED BEFORE
MID-SEPTEMBER. HANSEN EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH A DELAY IS
UNACCEPTABLE, SINCE OUR ODE TACTICS MAY BE HINGED TO
THIS PROPOSAL. BOLUKBASI SAID HE WOULD EMPHASIZE
URGENCY, BUT HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. ON THE OTHER HAND,
BOLUKBASI SAID HE WOULD NOT PERSONALLY OPPOSE
INTER-ALLIANCE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT.
7. BOLUKBASI INDICATED A PROBABLE TGS WILLINGNESS TO
IDENTIFY BY LOCATION ANY TURKISH BRIGADE/REGIMENT
PARTICIPATION IN A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY. THIS
INFORMATION, HE OPINED, COULD BE PROVIDED IN BOTH THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR AND THE NOTIFICATION.
8. COMMENT: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED U.S. DEL REPS WERE
ENCOURAGED BY THE COMPARATIVELY POSITIVE NATURE OF
BOLUKBASI'S REMARKS, CONSIDERING HIS PAST OBJECTIONS TO
MEASURE ONE. HE APPRECIATED THE FULL PRESENTATION AND
THE CONSIDERATION BY THE USG OF TURKISH INTERESTS.
STILL, IF NO SATISFACTORY RESPONSE IS RECEIVED FROM THE
TGS BY MID-FEBRUARY, U.S. DEL SUGGESTS THAT ASSISTANT
SECRETARY PERLE RAISE AND TRY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE
DURING THE LATE FEBRUARY U.S.-TURKISH HLG IN ANKARA. WE
WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY ANKARA'S VIEWS ON THE
USEFULNESS OF RAISING THIS ISSUE THROUGH NORMAL
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN ANKARA. END COMMENT.
HANSEN
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 00752
SUBJECT: NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS ANALYSIS OF NON-USE OF
FORCE SECTION ON SC.7 DRAFT
REF: 85 STOCKHOLM 8885
1. CDE IX - 019
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE END OF LAST ROUND THE NATO
CAUCUS REQUESTED THE A-1 CLUSTER CAUCUS (NON-USE OF
FORCE) TO ANALYSE THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE
HNA WORKING DOCUMENT SC.7. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS WAS
COMPILED BY THE DANISH DEPUTY AFTER INTENSIVE CONSULTA-
TIONS WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER INTERESTED DELEGATIONS
(U.S. ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN REFTEL). THE PAPER IS MERELY
INTENDED FOR BACKGROUND USE FOR NATO DELEGATIONS IN THE
A-1 WORKING GROUP. THE CLUSTER CAUCUS IS MEETING ON
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3 TO CONCLUDE ITS WORK ON THE DOCUMENT.
SECTIONS I AND II (GENERAL AND SPECIFIC REMARKS) ARE
LARGELY DESCRIPTIVE AND REQUIRE NO SPECIFIC ACTION.
SECTION III (PARTICULAR PROBLEMS) HIGHLIGHTS THE ISSUE
OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THE "ONE DELEGATION"
IN QUESTION REFERS TO CANADA. SECTION IV (TACTICS) IS
MORE PRESCRIPTIVE. GIVEN DISCUSSIONS AMONG INTERESTED
NATO DELEGATIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARD FORMULATING A COMMON
NATO APPROACH ON THE SUBJECT, USDEL BELIEVES THE
APPROACHES SUGGESTED IN THE "TACTICS" SECTION IS
PREMATURE AND WILL SUGGEST AT MONDAY'S MEETING THAT IT
BE DROPPED. END SUMMARY.
4. BEGIN TEXT.
DRAFT
SC.7: SECTION ON NON-USE OF FORCE
OBSERVATIONS BASED ON DISCUSSIONS IN CLUSTER CAUCUS A.1.
I. GENERAL REMARKS
- 1) IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE EXACTLY TO WHAT
EXTENT THERE IS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF THE
NNA COUNTRIES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES SINCE THE ALLIES
HAVE NOT YET AGREED ON A POSITION CONCERNING NON-USE OF
FORCE OTHER THAN ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF A REAFFIRMA-
TION OF THE PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON
CONCRETE AND MEANINGFUL CSBM'S.
- 2) IT IS THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT THAT THE NNA TEXT
IS CLOSER TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE NATO COUNTRIES
THAN TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE WTO COUNTRIES.
- A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS FEEL THAT MOST OF ITS
ELEMENTS ARE UNEXCEPTIONABLE AND THEY BELIEVE THAT IT
WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIES TO ADOPT A POSITION ON
THE NNA TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS A FIRST IMPORTANT
STEP IN DEVELOPING WESTERN STRATEGY AND TACTICS ON THE
NON-USE OF FORCE ISSUE.
- 3) THE NNA COUNTRIES ARE GENERALLY THOUGHT TO ACCEPT
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THE IDEA THAT THE FORMULATIONS THEY HAVE PROPOSED MAY BE
USED IN VARIOUS WAYS, PROBABLY AS PART OF A FUTURE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, BUT POSSIBLY ALSO AS A SEPARATE
TEXT. A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PREAMBULAR SECTION AND AN
OPERATIVE SECTION IS NOT FORESEEN, BUT MAY NOT BE
EXCLUDED. THE QUALIFICATION OF THE TEXT AS A "SOLEMN
DECLARATION" IS FAVORED IN PARTICULAR BY CYPRUS AND
YUGOSLAVIA. NONE OF THE NNA COUNTRIES SEEM TO ADVOCATE
THE IDEA OF A TREATY.
- 4) THE TEXT IS IN ITS NEAR TOTALITY A COMPILATION
OF SENTENCES DRAWN FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
("DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES . . . ," "MATTERS RELATED TO
GIVING EFFECT . . .," "QUESTIONS RELATING TO . . . THE
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
MEDITERRANEAN," ETC.) AND FROM THE MADRID CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT ("PRINCIPLES," CDE SECTION, ETC.) IN SPITE OF
THEIR DIFFERENT ORIGINS THESE VARIOUS SENTENCES ARE ALL
PUT ON THE SAME LEVEL. FURTHERMORE, MANY OF THESE
SENTENCES HAVE BEEN TRUNCATED OR SLIGHTLY MODIFIED AND
THEY ARE OFTEN REPRODUCED IN A SOMEWHAT MODIFIED CONTEXT.
THIS MAY OF COURSE HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR SIGNIFI-
CANCE AND THIS IS ALSO -- PERHAPS IN PARTICULAR -- TRUE
WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCES DRAWN FROM THE UN CHARTER OR
REFLECTING GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUT
WHICH IN THE TEXT AT HAND ARE QUOTED WITHOUT DIRECT
REFERENCES EITHER TO THE CHARTER OR TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
(PAGE 17 SECTION 6; PAGE 18 SECTION 3).
- IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE NNA TEXT IN ONE WAY
OR ANOTHER REFERS TO, OR DRAWS ITS SUBSTANCE FROM, SIX
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, NAMELY THE
PRINCIPLES ON REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE, ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES, ON PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, ON NONINTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
AFFAIRS, ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS AND ON FULFILLMENT IN GOOD FAITH OF OBLIGATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IT THUS LEAVES FOUR PRINCIPLES
ASIDE AND IT MAY THEREFORE BE ARGUED THAT IT DOES NOT
RESPECT IN AN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY WAY THE BALANCE
ACHIEVED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
5) THE PRECISE ORDERING OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF
THE TEXT DOES NOT SEEM TO REFLECT ANY PARTICULAR LOGIC.
THE TEXT IS INDEED A COMPROMISE WHICH TO A CERTAIN
DEGREE SIMPLY JUXTAPOSES SECTIONS WHICH REFLECT
DIFFERENT NATIONAL CONCERNS: A SWISS CONCERN WITH HUMAN
RIGHTS, A YUGOSLAV CONCERN WITH TERRORISM AND AN
AUSTRIAN CONCERN WITH PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
A NUMBER OF MORE DETAILED PROVISIONS IN THE TEXT ALSO
REVEAL PARTICULAR NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE INTEREST OF
MALTA IN "SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA" AND THE
INTEREST OF CYPRUS IN -- INTER ALIA -- THE CONCEPT OF
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"DIRECT OR INDIRECT MANIFESTATION OF FORCE."
- MORE FUNDAMENTALLY THE TEXT IS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN
DELEGATIONS DESIRING AN AMBITIOUS RECONFIRMATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE (IN PARTICULAR CYPRUS AND
YUGOSLAVIA) AND DELEGATIONS HAVING A MORE CONSERVATIVE
ATTITUDE (IN PARTICULAR SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA).
6) WHEREAS THE TEXT OF COURSE UNEQUIVOCALLY PRESENTS
ITSELF AS A POLITICAL STATEMENT IT IS NEVERTHELESS THE
FEELING THAT THERE ARE SOME INSTANCES WHERE THE WORDING
-- FOR VARIOUS REASONS -- MAY BE SAID TO TEND TOWARDS
BLURRING THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PURELY
POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENT AND THE LEGAL -- OR QUASI-LEGAL
-- REASONING (PAGE 17 SECTION 4; PAGE 19 SECTION 1).
II. SPECIFIC REMARKS
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 1 LINE 2:
IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS
THAT THE REFERENCE TO AN "IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT
IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS DUE TO THE
VARIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT
WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE.
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 1 LINES 5-6:
A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN AREA IN THE VERY FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE
TEXT DOES NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE AND IT COULD
POSSIBLY LEAD THINKING IN THE DIRECTION OF SPECIAL
CSBM'S FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA.
REFERENCES IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND IN THE MADRID
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY
IN EUROPE AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA ARE
LINKED BY A REFERENCE TO "THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD
SECURITY." IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF MALTA THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE
PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE READ IN THE LIGHT OF THE PARAGRAPH
AS A WHOLE -- WHERE ONE DOES FIND THE WORDS "PEACE AND
SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE."
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 2:
THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE EQUAL STATUS OF ALL THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THEIR EQUAL IMPLEMENTATION REFLECT A
WESTERN POSITION.
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 3:
THIS SENTENCE IS A DIRECT QUOTE FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT EXCEPT THE LAST THREE WORDS "WITHIN THE CSCE."
THESE WORDS HAVE BEEN ADDED (ACCORDING TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS) IN ORDER TO GIVE THE
REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE A
PARTICULAR CSCE DIMENSION OR (ACCORDING TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA) IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE THAT
THE CDE PROCESS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS
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-- SINCE ONE MIGHT IN THE ABSENCE OF THESE THREE WORDS
HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE COMPLEMENTARITY TO WHICH THE
SENTENCE REFERS IS ONLY RELEVANT IN A CDE CONTEXT.
IT MUST, HOWEVER, BE NOTED THAT THE CONCEPT OF
COMPLEMENTARITY AS USED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES WHEN
REFERRING TO THE CSCE PROCESS NORMALLY REFERS TO THE
BALANCE BETWEEN THE THREE "BASKETS."
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 4:
THIS PARAGRAPH SEEMS TO ILLUSTRATE A TENDENCY TOWARDS
CONFUSING POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS SINCE IT
REALLY APPEARS AS AN EMBRYONIC LEGAL REASONING. THIS
REASONING, HOWEVER, IS PURELY TAUTOLOGICAL, FOR IF
NON-USE OF FORCE IS AN OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW THIS OBVIOUSLY IMPLIES THAT ITS NONOBSERVANCE
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 4 LINE 3:
THE REFERENCE TO "NONCOMPLIANCE" IS UNCLEAR. IT COULD
POSSIBLY BE THOUGHT THAT DECISIONS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES
"NONCOMPLIANCE" WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES, BUT THIS WOULD SUGGEST A SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE
REFERENCE TO NONCOMPLIANCE SHOULD THEREFORE EITHER BE
CLARIFIED, THAT IS, CLEARLY LINKED TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, OR IT SHOULD BE DROPPED.
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 5 LINE 3:
THE ADVERB "EFFECTIVELY" SHOULD BE REMOVED BECAUSE A
SIMPLE OBSERVANCE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE
RENDERS IT EFFECTIVE.
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 5 LINES 3-5:
THE SENTENCE "NC CONSIDERATION . . . THIS PRINCIPLE"
MIGHT BE BETTER PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF A REFERENCE TO
THE UNITED NATIONS AS IT APPEARS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 6:
IT IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IS EXPLICITLY STATED IN A CSCE
TEXT, BUT THE IDEA IS ALREADY IMPLICITLY CONTAINED IN
VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.. IT HAS
BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SWEDEN THAT THE
TEXT IN QUESTION, ALTHOUGH IT DIRECTLY REPEATS THE
WORDING OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, IS
NOT SUPPOSED STRICTLY SPEAKING TO BE A QUOTE FROM THE
CHARTER, BUT RATHER A RESTATEMENT OF A PRINCIPLE OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 8:
A QUESTION FROM AN EASTERN REPRESENTATIVE CONCERNING THE
ABSENCE OF ANY MENTIONING OF "ARMED FORCE" AND HAS BEEN
ANSWERED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SWEDEN TO THE EFFECT
THAT ARTICLE 2.4 OF THE UN CHARTER WAS A COMPLETE AND
ALL-ENCOMPASSING PROVISION AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE AND
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THAT ONE THEREFORE HAD TO BE CAUTIOUS NOT TO SPECIFY
PARTICULAR KINDS OF "FORCE" IN ORDER NOT TO CREATE
UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLY "LESS PROHIBITED"
NATURE OF THE USE OF SUCH OTHER KINDS OF FORCE WHICH
WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.
- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 1 LINE 1:
THE CONCEPT OF "DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE" AND THE
CONCEPT OF "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" BOTH EXIST IN THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT THE LINKAGE OF "DIRECT AND
INDIRECT" WITH "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" IS NEW. FROM A
CONCEPTUAL POINT OF VIEW IT IS PRESUMABLY THE MOST
IMPORTANT INNOVATION IN THE NNA TEXT. THE INNOVATION IS
DUE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS WHO IN VARIOUS
INTERVENTIONS HAS EXPLAINED THAT THE EXPRESSION
"MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" REFERS TO TYPES OF ACTION WHICH
HAVE A MORE CONCRETE CHARACTER THAN TYPES OF ACTION
WHICH CAN BE QUALIFIED AS THREATS. IT IS, HOWEVER,
UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SUGGESTED IMAGINARY ESCALATION IS TO
BE CONSTRUED AS A) THREATS (DIRECT MANIFESTATIONS OF
FORCE); 2) DIRECT MANIFESTATIONS OF FORCE; 3) INDIRECT
USE OF FORCE; 4) DIRECT USE OF FORCE OR AS 1) THREATS
(COVERING BOTH INDIRECT AND DIRECT MANIFESTATIONS OF
FORCE) 2) INDIRECT USE OF FORCE 3) DIRECT USE OF FORCE
OR POSSIBLY IN ANY OTHER WAY.
IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
CONCEPT OF "DIRECT AND INDIRECT MANIFESTATION OF FORCE"
MAY POSSIBLY OPEN UP FOR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT VARIOUS TYPES
OF MANIFESTION OF FORCE.
-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 2:
THIS PARAGRAPH CONSTITUTES A STRONG ARGUMENT AGAINST THE
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. IT MIGHT BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT
IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE WORD "CULTURAL" --
RATHER THAN FOR INSTANCE THE WORD "IDEOLOGICAL" -- HAS
BEEN INCLUDED.
-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 3:
THIS PARAGRAPH SEEMS TO NEED A REFERENCE WHICH CLEARLY
LINKS IT EITHER TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (AS IN THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT) OR TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER SINCE IT
MIGHT OTHERWISE BE UNDERSTOOD TO IMPLY THAT -- FOR
INSTANCE -- A TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY IN
CONFORMITY WITH ACTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER
WOULD BE ILLEGAL.
-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 4 LINE 3:
ACCORDING TO THE TEXT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THE
PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A
"COMPLEMENT" TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
USE OF FORCE; IN THE TEXT AT HAND IT IS QUALIFIED AS
BEING "AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT."
-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 5 LINES 2-3:
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ACCORDING TO THE TEXT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THE
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR
"PEACE, JUSTICE AND WELL-BEING;" IN THE TEXT AT HAND IT
IS SAID TO BE "AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS
AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY." THERE IS
THUS ESTABLISHED A PARTICULARLY CLOSE LINKAGE BETWEEN
THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY WITHIN THE
CSCE PROCESS WHICH MAY PROVE USEFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE WTO COUNTRIES.
-- ADD PAGE 19 PARA 1 LINES 2-3:
THE SENTENCE: "THEY DECLARE . . . PRESENT DOCUMENT" IS
UNCLEAR AND ADMITS OF SEVERAL DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS.
IN THE FIRST PLACE IT MAY BE USED TO SUBSTANTIATE A
CLAIM TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DOCUMENT AT HAND HAS A
PARTICULARLY ELEVATED STATUS AND IT MAY EVEN BE ARGUED
THAT IT TENDS TO EQUATE IT WITH A LEGALLY BINDING TEXT.
FURTHERMORE, IF THE SENTENCE IS SEEN AS TURNED TOWARDS
THE PAST, IT MAY BE UNDERSTOOD TO "WHITEWASH" AND
CONFIRM PRIOR COMMITMENTS SINCE THEY ARE ALLEGEDLY NOT
IN CONFLICT WITH THE DOCUMENT AT HAND. IT WOULD THUS
MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CRITICIZE THE PROVISIONS OF
EXISTING BILATERAL TREATIES WHICH REFLECT THE BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE.
ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SENTENCE IS SEEN AS TURNED
TOWARDS THE FUTURE, IT MAY BE UNDERSTOOD TO EFFACE THOSE
ASPECTS OF PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS WHICH REFLECT THE
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE SINCE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL HAVE
TO INTERPRET PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE
DOCUMENT AT HAND. THIS LAST UNDERSTANDING SEEMS TO BE
SUPPORTED BY STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SWEDEN
AND AUSTRIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES
WERE TO CONSIDER THAT NONE OF THE OBLIGATIONS THEY HAD
ENTERED INTO PREVIOUSLY WERE IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE
DOCUMENT AT HAND.
-- PAGE 19 PARA 2:
THE REFERENCE TO THE PRIMACY OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
CHARTER IS WELCOME BUT THIS REFERENCE OUGHT TO HAVE A
MORE PROMINENT PLACE WITHIN THE TEXT.
-- PAGE 19 PARA 3 LINES 1-2:
IT HAS BEEN QUESTIONED WHETHER "THE SITUATION IN EUROPE"
AND "THE EQUAL RESPECT FOR . . . " CAN LOGICALLY BE PUT
ON THE SAME FOOTING.
-- PAGE 19 PARA 3 LINES 3-5:
IT HAS BEEN QUESTIONED WHETHER THE IDEAS OF "BUILDING
MUTUAL CONFIDENCE," "LESSENING MILITARY CONFRONTATION,"
STRENGTHENING SECURITY" AND "PROMOTING DISARMAMENT" CAN
LOGICALLY BE PUT ON THE SAME FOOTING. IT MAY FOR
INSTANCE BE ARGUED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
"PROMOTING DISARMAMENT" AND "STRENGTHENING SECURITY" IS
THAT OF A MEANS TO AN END.
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-- PAGE 19 PARA 4:
THE REFERENCE TO CSBM'S IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE
TEXT BUT IT OUGHT TO BE STRENGTHENED TO A VERY
CONSIDERABLE DEGREE.
THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORDS "GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION" MAY POSSIBLY GIVE RISE TO DIFFICULTIES SINCE
IT HAS BEEN ARGUED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS (AS
WELL AS BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES) THAT THE WORD
"EXPRESSION" REFERS TO A REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF
FORCE PRINCIPLE AND THE WORD "EFFECT" TO THE ADOPTION OF
CSBM'S -- WHEREAS THE NATO COUNTRIES TAKE THE EXPRESSION
AS A UNITY AND UNDERSTAND IT AS REFERRING IN ITS
ENTIRETY TO THE ADOPTION OF CSBM'S.
IT CAN BE NOTED THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA HAS
EXPLAINED THAT THE EXPRESSION "SERVE" (TO GIVE EFFECT
AND EXPRESSION) HAS THE SAME MEANING AS THE USUAL
EXPRESSION "SO AS" (TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION) AND
THAT IT HAS SIMPLY BEEN CHOSEN BECUASE IT ALREADY WAS TO
BE FOUND IN SC. ..3 (SECTION I).
-- IT COULD FINALLY BE NOTED THAT A QUESTION CONCERNING
THE REASONS FOR THE PARTICULAR ORDERING OF THE VARIOUS
ELEMENTS OF THE TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE HAS BEEN
ANSWERED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE TEXT FIRST STRESSES THE COMMITMENT TO THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THAT IT SECONDLY STRESSES THE
COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT AND THAT
IT THIRDLY ELABORATES ON A NUMBER OF THESE PRINCIPLES.
IT WAS, HOWEVER, AT THE SAME OCCASION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
THE PRESENT ORDERING OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE TEXT
COULD OF COURSE BE MODIFIED.
-- THE PRECEDING COMMENTS ARE OF COURSE NOT EXHAUSTIVE
AND A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS ARE STILL WAITING FOR
COMMENTS FROM THEIR AUTHORITIES; THIS IS TRUE IN
PARTICULAR WITH RESPECT TO THE SECTION ON TERRORISM
(PAGE 18 SECTION 6).
III. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS
- ONE DELEGATION HAS SUGGESTED THE INCLUSION OF THE
.FOLLOWING COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:
- "IN THE VIEW OF ONE DELEGATION THE EMPHASIS PLACED
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
THE ffNA DOCUMENT IS A POSITIVE FEATURE. IN FACT, THE
TREATMENT OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN ISOLATION FROM
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES, PARTICULARLY THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, WOULD BE INCOHERENT WITH THE
GENERAL WESTERN POSITION, ESPECIALLY AS EXPRESSED IN THE
SIXTH COMMITTEE OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT
SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT ARTICLE 1 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY STATES: 'THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE, AS SET FORTH IN
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THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SETTLE ANY
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE IN WHICH THEY MAY BE INVOLVED BY
PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ARE NOT ENDANGERED, AND TO
REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE IN ANY MANNER INCONCISTENT WITH THE
PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.' REFERENCE TO THE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE
FULFILLMENT OF OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM THE OTHER
PRINCIPLES MENTIONED IN THE NNA DRAFT WOULD CONTRIBUTE
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ENHANCE
SECURITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND MAKE RECOURSE TO
FORCE LESS LIKELY. THIS IS NOT ONLY A MORE REALISTIC
APPROACH THAN THAT ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION; IT IS
MORE COMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN VIEWS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS
INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PRINCIPLES. IN OTHER
WORDS, A GREAT ADVANTAGE OF THE NNA APPROACH IS THAT IT
EXTENDS THE PARAMETERS OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE
STOCKHOLM MEETING BY BRINGING IN OTHER RELEVANT
CONSIDERATIONS SO AS TO REMOVE THE NARROW FOCUS ON THE
ELEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN CHOOSING, NAMELY, THE
NON-USE OF FORCE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT TO TREAT THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN ISOLATION FROM ITS
NATURAL LINKAGE WITH OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES IS
ARTIFICIAL AND POSSIBLY DAMAGING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE PRINCIPLE IN QUESTION."
- IT SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE RECALLED THAT OTHER
DELEGATIONS ARE OF THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY
UNWISE TO ENGAGE IN ANY MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON
THE ISSUE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
STOCKHOLM SINCE THIS MIGHT POSSIBLY RESUSCITATE --
WITHOUT ANY PROSPECT FOR AGREEMENT -- ALL THE PROBLEMS
ALREADY THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN MONTREUX AND ATHENS, AND
THUS IN THE END BE DAMAGING TO THE WESTERN EFFORTS TO
CONCENTRATE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CSBM'S.
IV. TACTICS
- THE COORDINATOR OF CLUSTER GROUP A.1 HAS (IN THE
BEGINNING OF JANUARY) SUGGESTED TO STRUCTURE THE WORK OF
THIS GROUP BY CONCENTRATING -- FOR THE TIME BEING -- THE
DISCUSSIONS ON THE NNA PROPOSAL. THIS MAY BE AN
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION SEEN FROM A WESTERN POINT OF VIEW
SINCE IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PUSH THE SOVIET AND
ROMANIAN PROPOSALS INTO THE BACKGROUND.
- FURTHERMORE, THIS WAY OF PROCEEDING MIGHT BE A FIRST
STEP TOWARDS ENGAGING CLUSTER CAUCUS A.1 IN A DRAFTING
PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA TEXT. THIS MIGHT ALSO
BE CONSIDERED AS ACCEPTABLE FROM A WESTERN POINT OF VIEW
SINCE IT IS THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT THAT THE NNA TEXT IS
CLOSER TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE NATO COUNTRIES
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THAN TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE WTO COUNTRIES. IT
IS, HOWEVER, OBVIOUS THAT IF THE NNA TEXT BECOMES THE
BASIS FOR DRAFTING, WESTERN DELEGATIONS WILL AS AN
URGENT MATTER HAVE TO DEFINE DETAILED POSITIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THIS PROPOSAL.
- IT SHOULD IN THIS CONTEXT BE RECALLED THAT AN
ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO TABLE A WESTERN
DRAFT ON NON-USE OF FORCE.
- IN AWAITING A DECISION ON THIS MATTER, OR IN
AWAITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED WESTERN POSITIONS
WITH RESPECT TO THE NNA PROPOSAL, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT
THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS DURING THE FIRST WEEKS OF THE
NINTH SESSION FOLLOW THE SAME TACTICS AS IN THE EIGHTH
SESSION, THAT IS, TRYING TO MAINTAIN A GENERALLY
CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THIS PROPOSAL WHILE
ASKING QUESTIONS OF CLARIFICATION -- OF A RATHER
CRITICAL CHARACTER -- ON VARIOUS POINTS OF DETAIL.
GENERALLY SPEAKING THE PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO THE NNA
TEXT WAS, AND STILL IS, TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE
PITFALLS OF ADOPTING ON THE ONE HAND AN EXCESSIVELY
POSITIVE ATTITUDE, WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN
THE AMBITIONS OF THE WTO COUNTRIES, AND ON THE OTHER
HAND AN EXCESSIVELY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, SINCE IT WOULD
OBVIOUSLY BE BAD TACTICS FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES TO
ENGAGE IN AN ALL-OUT CRITICISM OF A TEXT WHICH THEY CAN
PRESUMBABLY MAKE GOOD USE OF LATER ON.
STOCKHOLM, 13TH JANUARY, 1986
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00811
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 2/4/86
L. CDE VII - 024
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY OF
REMARKS AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD, USDEL CDE,
WILL MAKE TO THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS AT CHATHAM HOUSE, LONDON, TOMORROW, FEBRUARY 4,
L986
3. BEGIN TEXT: TITLE: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
RESUMED WORK ONE WEEK AGO WITH A MEETING ATTENDED BY
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY AND FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS OF FRANCE. THE
REMARKS OF THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE THEIR COUNTRIES ATTACH TO THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE AS A KEY INSTRUMENT FOR ENHANCING EUROPEAN
STABILITY AND SECURITY. THEY SPOKE AS EUROPEANS AND
DESCRIBED STOCKHOLM AS A DIMENSION OF A EUROPEAN
PROCESS, THE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS OF COOPERATION AND
SECURITY-BUILDING. THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES EQUALLY
GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, AND WE
SHARE WITH OUR ALLIES THE VISION OF A EUROPE OF
INDEPENDENT STATES JOINED IN COOPERATION RATHER THAN
SEPARATED BY MISTRUST AND CONFRONTATION. WE ARE NOT
GEOGRAPHICALLY A EUROPEAN NATION, BUT WE ARE TIED. TO
EUROPE: MILITARILY TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE;
POLITICALLY TO THE COMPLEMENTARY GOALS OF INCREASED
WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE LOWERING OF THE
BARRIERS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. OUR PARTICIPATION IN
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS A DEMONSTRATION OF THIS
COMMITMENT TO EUROPE.
JUST BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON FOR STOCKHOLM, I MET
WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE ISSUED A STATEMENT STRESSING
THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE,
MILITARY AND POLITICAL, AND THE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS
SUCCESS THERE WOULD HAVE FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST
RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT UNDERLINED THE
CONTRIBUTION STOCKHOLM COULD MAKE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY
IN THE LARGER SENSE, THAT WHICH ENCOMPASSES POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN -- HUMAN RIGHTS --
AS WELL AS STRICTLY MILITARY MATTERS. "THE ATTAINMENT
OF THIS BROADER CONCEPT OF SECURITY," THE PRESIDENT
SAID, "IS THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES."
THE PRESIDENT ALSO EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD SUCCEED IN REACHING AN
ACCORD THIS YEAR, A BELIEF ECHOED BY MINISTER GENSCHER
AND MINISTER DUMAS LAST WEEK. THERE IS, IN FACT, A
VERY GOOD CHANCE THE CONFERENCE WILL ACHIEVE WHAT IT
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WAS SET UP TO DO: ESTABLISH A MILITARY
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE RISK
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. IN DOING SO, IT
WOULD INCREASE STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN MILITARY
SITUATION IN THE NEAR TERM AND GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE
TO GREATER OPENNESS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST.
IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN STOCKHOLM, IT WILL BE
SIMILAR IN OUTLINE TO THE PROPOSALS NATO TABLED AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE IN JANUARY, L984. IT WILL
ESTABLISH A MANDATORY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME
CONSISTING OF MEASURES REQUIRING EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AND
REQUIRING THAT SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENTS FROM NORMAL
LOCATIONS BE FORECAST A YEAR IN ADVANCE, DESCRIBED IN
MORE DETAIL SEVERAL WEEKS IN ADVANCE, AND OBSERVED BY
TEAMS FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THERE WILL BE
ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MEASURES, INCLUDING ON-SITE
INSPECTION. THERE WILL BE LANGUAGE REAFFIRMING, BUT
NOT REDEFINING, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. IN
CONTRAST TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE
L975 HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WERE LARGELY POLITICAL
IN SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE THEY WERE VOLUNTARY AND LACKED
ANY PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION, THESE MEASURES WOULD
HAVE A REAL IMPACT ON THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS.
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 2/4/86
INDEED, THE BROADER POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A
STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT WOULD FLOW FROM THE PRACTICAL
MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEASURES WE AGREED ON.
IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES, THIS
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME COMING OUT OF STOCKHOLM
SHOULD ACCOMPLISH SEVERAL ENDS:
RISK REDUCTION:
AN AGREEMENT WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION ARISING FROM AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE NATURE
OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THEM.
IT WOULD DO THIS BY REQUIRING
A ROUTINE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY
FORCES AND THEIR NORMAL EXERCISE PRACTICES WHICH WOULD,
OVER TIME, DEVELOP A PATTERN OF NORMAL MILITARY
ACTIVITY IN EUROPE. ESTABLISHING THE DATA BASE WHICH
DEFINED THIS PATTERN MAY TAKE A FEW YEARS, BUT ONCE
ESTABLISHED, IT COULD BECOME THE NORM AGAINST WHICH ALL
MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE CONTINENT WAS JUDGED.
CONFORMITY WITH SUCH A NORM COULD CONTRIBUTE TO
INCREASED STABILITY AS WELL AS GREATER PREDICTABILITY
IN THE OVERALL MILITARY SITUATION. ON THE OTHER HAND,
EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY ACTIVITY, DETERMINED BY
REFERENCE TO THE ESTABLISHED NORM, WOULD BECOME READILY
IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE RESULT THAT APPROPRIATE POLITICAL
AND, IF REQUIRED, MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES COULD BE
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TAKEN. CONFORMITY WITH A PATTERN WOULD SERVE THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ASPECT OF A CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING REGIME, WHILE IDENTIFYING DEVIATIONS
FROM THE NORM WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE SECURITY-BUILDING
ASPECT.
USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION:
BY CREATING A SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES FAR IN ADVANCE TO
WHICH ALL STATES WOULD HAVE TO ADHERE, THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WE ARE DISCUSSING WOULD
INHIBIT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL
PURPOSES. EUROPE HAS SEEN TOO MANY EXAMPLES OF THE USE
OF SO-CALLED MILITARY EXERCISES FOR THE PURPOSE OF
POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, FOR EXAMPLE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN
L968 AND POLAND IN L98L. A MANDATORY
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME PROVIDING FOR FORECASTING,
NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION WOULD NOT
PREVENT SUCH EVENTS IN THE FUTURE. BUT IT
WOULD RAISE THE POLITICAL PRICE TO A THREATENING STATE
AND THUS HELP TO DETER THE THREAT. AND INSPECTION AND
OBERVATION WOULD PROVIDE A CLEARER INDICATION OF THE
INTENT BEHIND SUCH SUDDEN, LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES.
SINCE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT INTENT IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN
INTIMIDATION, AN EFFECTIVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME
WOULD HELP COUNTER INTIMIDATION.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND OPENNESS:
REQUIRING STATES TO ANNOUNCE IN ADVANCE A SCHEDULE FOR
THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY
TO PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY. CONSIDER THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIRTY-FIVE COUNTRIES WITH VERY
DIFFERENT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND POLITICAL TIES
AGREEING THAT THEY WOULD INITIATE NO SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHOUT FIRST ANNOUNCING AND
EXPLAINING THEM FORMALLY AND IN DETAIL IN ADVANCE.
BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, ESTABLISHING THE
PRINCIPLE OF OPENNESS AND THE RIGHT OF STATES TO KNOW
ABOUT THE MILITARY INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF OTHERS,
EAST, WEST AND NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED, WOULD BE OF
PRECEDENT-SETTING IMPORTANCE.
MILITARY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND, I BELIEVE, THE
STABILIZING EFFECT THAT THE CORRECT DEGREE OF OPENNESS
IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AFFORDS. THEY ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CAN INDICATE, WITN A
CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF ASSURANCE, WHETHER THEIR
MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE ROUTINE AND NON-THREATENING IN
CHARACTER. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WHICH WE
ENVISION WOULD EXPAND OPENNESS AND THUS INCREASE THIS
ASSURANCE ABOUT THE NATURE OF ACTIVITIES THROUGH OVERT
MUTUAL COOPERATION. EXAGGERATED CLAIMS FOR MILITARY
SECRECY BELONG TO THE PAST; REAL CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING REQUIRES THAT WE PUT OUT-MODED
PRACTICES BEHIND US.
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WHEN WE DISCUSS OPENNESS AMONG STATES, WE TOUCH UPON
THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF UNITED STATES POLICY WHICH
PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPHASIZED, A EUROPE WITHOUT BARRIERS,
WHERE PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES CAN COMMUNICATE WITH ONE
ANOTHER, TRAVEL FREELY, EXCHANGE IDEAS OF ALL KINDS,
FOR THE ENRICHMENT OF ALL. IN STOCKHOLM, WE DEAL WITH
MILITARY EXCHANGE, AND THE NEED TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE
TO SECRETIVENESS AND CONFRONTATION IN THE MILITARY
FIELD IS PERHAPS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT. BUT RELATIONS
AT THE MILITARY LEVEL ARE A REFLECTION OF RELATIONSHIPS
ON MORE BASIC POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC LEVELS.
STOCKHOLM CAN EASE SUSPICION AND INCREASE OPENNESS AND
UNDERSTANDING THROUGH A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME IN
THE MILITARY FIELD, BUT SUCCESS THERE WILL ALSO
CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ACROSS
THE SPECTRUM OF THE RELATIONSHIP.
THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS, WHETHER IN MILITARY AFFAIRS OR
IN OTHER FIELDS, IS AN ISSUE OF GREAT SENSITIVITY TO
SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE,
ESPECIALLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. BUT MY IMPRESSION IS
THAT THIS SENSITIVITY IS LESSENING AS A NEW GENERATION
COMES TO POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION. I AM PARTICULARLY
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SEEMS TO HAVE
ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A
NECESSARY ELEMENT OF VERIFIABILITY, AS EVIDENCED BY A
NUMBER OF RECENT STATEMENTS, INCLUDING GENERAL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S JANUARY L5 PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH
THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION YET THAT THE PRINCIPLE HAS
BEEN ACCEPTED FOR RISK REDUCTION ACTIVITIES AS OPPOSED
TO ARMS REDUCTIONS ACTIVITIES, I SEE NO REASON WHY IT
SHOULD NOT BE; WESTERN INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION
PROPOSALS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONTEXT ARE LESS INTRUSIVE
THAN ELSEWHERE BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE DYNAMIC ACTIVITIES
WHICH, UNLIKE STATIC ONES, DO NOT REQUIRE ENTRY INTO
SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS.
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IS EVOLVING POSITIVELY IN OTHER
AREAS AS WELL. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE, THE
EAST TOOK A VERY POLEMICAL APPROACH AND ADVANCED
PROPOSALS NOT FOR PRACTICAL, CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES BUT RATHER FOR DECLARATORY
MEASURES ON NO-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FREE ZONES, REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS AND
THE LIKE, WHICH REPRESENTED THEIR POLITICAL AGENDA FOR
WESTERN EUROPE. IN THE PAST YEAR, THE EAST HAS
GRADUALLY ADOPTED A MORE PRACTICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE
APPROACH. THEY HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING ON IMPORTANT
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. IN OCTOBER, THEY
JOINED WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN ACCEPTING AN
INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH FOCUSSED THE
ATTENTION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SPECIFIC MEASURES WITH
REAL MILITARY CONTENT.
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WHEN WE DISCUSS OPENNESS AMONG STATES, WE TOUCH UPON
THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF UNITED STATES POLICY WHICH
PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPHASIZED, A EUROPE WITHOUT BARRIERS,
WHERE PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES CAN COMMUNICATE WITH ONE
ANOTHER, TRAVEL FREELY, EXCHANGE IDEAS OF ALL KINDS,
FOR THE ENRICHMENT OF ALL. IN STOCKHOLM, WE DEAL WITH
MILITARY EXCHANGE, AND THE NEED TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE
TO SECRETIVENESS AND CONFRONTATION IN THE MILITARY
FIELD IS PERHAPS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT. BUT RELATIONS
AT THE MILITARY LEVEL ARE A REFLECTION OF RELATIONSHIPS
ON MORE BASIC POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC LEVELS.
STOCKHOLM CAN EASE SUSPICION AND INCREASE OPENNESS AND
UNDERSTANDING THROUGH A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME IN
THE MILITARY FIELD, BUT SUCCESS THERE WILL ALSO
CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ACROSS
THE SPECTRUM OF THE RELATIONSHIP.
THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS, WHETHER IN MILITARY AFFAIRS OR
IN OTHER FIELDS, IS AN ISSUE OF GREAT SENSITIVITY TO
SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE,
ESPECIALLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. BUT MY IMPRESSION IS
THAT THIS SENSITIVITY IS LESSENING AS A NEW GENERATION
COMES TO POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION. I AM PARTICULARLY
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SEEMS TO HAVE
ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A
NECESSARY ELEMENT OF VERIFIABILITY, AS EVIDENCED BY A
NUMBER OF RECENT STATEMENTS, INCLUDING GENERAL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S JANUARY L5 PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH
THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION YET THAT THE PRINCIPLE HAS
BEEN ACCEPTED FOR RISK REDUCTION ACTIVITIES AS OPPOSED
TO ARMS REDUCTIONS ACTIVITIES, I SEE NO REASON WHY IT
SHOULD NOT BE; WESTERN INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION
PROPOSALS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONTEXT ARE LESS INTRUSIVE
THAN ELSEWHERE BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE DYNAMIC ACTIVITIES
WHICH, UNLIKE STATIC ONES, DO NOT REQUIRE ENTRY INTO
SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS.
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IS EVOLVING POSITIVELY IN OTHER
AREAS AS WELL. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE, THE
EAST TOOK A VERY POLEMICAL APPROACH AND ADVANCED
PROPOSALS NOT FOR PRACTICAL, CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES BUT RATHER FOR DECLARATORY
MEASURES ON NO-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FREE ZONES, REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS AND
THE LIKE, WHICH REPRESENTED THEIR POLITICAL AGENDA FOR
WESTERN EUROPE. IN THE PAST YEAR, THE EAST HAS
GRADUALLY ADOPTED A MORE PRACTICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE
APPROACH. THEY HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING ON IMPORTANT
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. IN OCTOBER, THEY
JOINED WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN ACCEPTING AN
INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH FOCUSSED THE
ATTENTION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SPECIFIC MEASURES WITH
REAL MILITARY CONTENT.
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE TWO TRACKS OF ARMS REDUCTION,
ON THE ONE HAND, AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING LEADING TO
RISK REDUCTION, ON THE OTHER, ARE MUTUALLY
REINFORCING. WE HOPE FOR SUCCESS IN GENEVA AND IN
VIENNA -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR AND
CONVENTIONAL ARMS. IF WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THESE
REDUCTIONS, THEY WILL IN THEMSELVES BUILD CONFIDENCE
AND THUS RESULT IN A MORE STABLE WORLD. IN THE
MEANTIME, SUCCESSFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING CAN HELP TO
PAVE THE WAY FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE KIND OF REGIME
WE ARE TRYING TO CREATE IN STOCKHOLM WOULD, IF COMPLIED
WITH, GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE TO OTHER NEGOTIATIONS.
STOCKHOLM IS ALSO BREAKING NEW GROUND IN ANOTHER AREA.
IT IS THE ONLY SECURITY FORUM WHICH INCLUDES ALL THE
EUROPEAN STATES, EXCEPT FOR ALBANIA. IT HAS STIMULATED
THE FIRST SERIOUS FORMAL EXCHANGE AMONG THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED STATES ON SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES,
RESULTING IN THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMON POSITION ON THE
ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. THIS, IN TURN, HAS MADE
THEM SEE MORE CLEARLY SOME OF THE COMPLEXITIES AND
DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED WITH THE ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS,
WHICH ARE ALSO IMPORTANT TO THEM.
SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM COULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON
THE ENTIRE RANGE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AS BOTH
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAVE
INDEPENDENTLY RECOGNIZED. TO CITE JUST ONE EXAMPLE, IT
COULD MOVE THE ENTIRE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS AHEAD. THE
CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, WHICH OPENS IN VIENNA IN
NOVEMBER OF THIS YEAR, WILL EVALUATE PROGRESS IN ALL
ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THAT MEANS EXAMINING
DEVELOPMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS PROGRESS IN THE
SECURITY FIELD. FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO
ALLIES, BALANCE AMONG ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE IS
ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS.
DEVELOPMENTS ON HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN
THE EAST SINCE THE MADRID REVIEW MEETING OF L980-4_983
HAVE NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. NOR CAN WE POINT TO NOTABLE
SUCCESSES AT THE POST-MADRID MEETINGS SUCH AS THE
OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM OR THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL
FORUM. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCCESS AT THE BERN HUMAN
CONTACTS MEETING LATER THIS YEAR, BUT IN ANY CASE THE
VIENNA CONFEREES WILL NOT HAVE A VERY BRIGHT PICTURE TO
CONTEMPLATE. A MEANINGFUL AND POLITICALLY BINDING
STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT, STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH BY ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES, WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR VIENNA TO
DECIDE ON CONTINUING THE STOCKHOLM SECURITY FORUM IN
SOME FORM AFTER THE CSCE REVIEW CONCLUDES ITS WORK.
IN CONCLUSION, LET ME NOTE THAT OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM
LACKS THE DRAMA OF DEALING WITH VITAL NUCLEAR ISSUES,
AS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS DO. AS LORD CARRINGTON
POINTED OUT IN A SPEECH TO THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAST WEEK, THE PACE OF OUR WORK
HAS BEEN SOMETHING LESS THAN ELECTRIC, ALTHOUGH HE ALSO
POINTED OUT THAT COMPARED TO OUR MBFR COLLEAGUES IN
VIENNA WE HAVE BEEN ALMOST RECKLESS IN OUR HASTE. SO
IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT OUR EFFORTS HAVE GONE LARGELY
UNNOTICED, BOTH IN THE MEDIA AND IN OUR FOREIGN
OFFICES. BUT AS THE CLOCK RUNS OUT ON OUR
DELIBERATIONS, THINGS ARE BEGINNING TO HAPPEN. KEEP
YOUR EYE ON US FOR THE TWENTY-THREE NEGOTIATING WEEKS
REMAINING TO US, AND YOU MAY SEE SOMETHING INTERESTING
-- AND IMPORTANT -- BEGIN TO EMERGE.
HANSEN
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 00975
SUBJECT: CDE AMB. BARRY'S CONSULTATIONS AT UK FCO
1. CDE IX-033 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY MET ON
FEBRUARY 5 WITH ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY TIMOTHY
DAUNT, FCO, AND A GROUP MADE UP OF MOD AND FCO CDE/MBFR
SPECIALISTS. UK OFFICIALS PROBED US THINKING ON
STATIC INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, CONSTRAINTS,
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NUF. BARRY REFERRED BRIEFLY TO
"INFORMAL THINKING AMONG US DEL AND WASHINGTON COMMUNITY"
ON DIRECTIONS IN WHICH THE US POSITION MIGHT EVOLVE
DURING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. DAUNT WAS PARTICULARLY
INTERESTED IN CDE/MBFR LINKS. END SUMMARY.
3. BARRY RAISED STATIC INFORMATION, POINTING OUT THAT
NATO CAUCUS HAD DECIDED ON TWO-TRACK APPROACH; WE
WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS INFORMATION AS AN INDEPENDENT
MEASURE BUT WOULD ALSO ACCEPT SOUND DRAFT LANGUAGE ON
INFORMATION UNDER FORECASTING AND NOTIFICATION. WE
FORESAW CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING MEASURE 1
ADOPTED AS SUCH, GIVEN TURKISH, YUGOSLAV, SWISS, SWEDISH
AS WELL AS WTO OPPOSITION. THIS DID NOT MEAN BACKING
AWAY FROM IT BUT TRYING TO GET REAL CONTENT THROUGH
OTHER MEASURES AS WELL.
U. FOR THE US, BARRY SAID, VERIFICATION (INSPECTION)
IS THE KEY ISSUE. WE SEE INFORMATION AS A NECESSARY
ADJUNCT OF VERIFICATION, BUT HAVE CHOSEN TO PUT OUR
EMPHASIS ON THE LATTER. DAUNT RUEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT THAT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE US POSITION ON MBFR
AS WELL. HE CONFESSED TO "SOME SURPRISE" AT OUR POSITION
ON INFORMATION, BUT COLONEL HALL OF MOD INDICATED THAT
IT DID NOT CREATE GREAT PROBLEMS FOR THEM.
5. NOTING THAT CONSTRAINTS WAS ON THE UK AGENDA, BARRY
SAID THAT WE DID NOT THINK A CONSTRAINT MEASURE WAS
REQUIRED AT STOCKHOLM. WE HAD BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT
TO A PROVISION REQUIRING FORECASTS 2 YEARS IN ADVANCE
FOR ESPECIALLY LARGE EXERCISES AND/OR A "FREE" INSPECTION
FOR LARGE-SCALE UNFORECAST ACTIVITIES. DAUNT ASKED IF WE
HAD THOUGHT ABOUT THE UK PROPOSAL ON MORE DEMANDING
OBSERVATION/INSPECTION FOR LARGE SCALE ACTIVITIES; WE
SAID WE TENDED TO PREFER A SIMPLE APPROACH.
6. THE BRITISH HAD ASKED THAT INDEPENDENT AIR BE ON OUR
AGENDA: BARRY SAID WE WERE FIRM ON EXCLUDING THIS, AND
WOULD STICK WITH THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. DAUNT ASKED
ABOUT OUR POSITION ON TRANSFERS; WE SAID THAT IF POSSIBLE
WE WERE EVEN FIRMER. DAUNT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE
CONTRADICTION BETWEEN OUR POSITION ON REINFORCEMENTS INTO
THE ZONE IN MBFR AND OUR EXCLUDING TRANSFERS IN CDE.
7. ON NUF, BARRY CONFIRMED THAT THE NATO CAUCUS IN
STOCKHOLM WAS THINKING OF PUTTING TOGETHER PARAGRAPHS
WHICH COULD BE TABLED IN THE COURSE OF NUF NEGOTIATIONS,
NOT A FULL-SCALE DRAFT. THE BRITISH SAID THEY HAD BEEN
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THINKING OF DEVISING NEW LANGUAGE TO EXPAND THEORETICALLY
ON THE NUF/CSBM LINK. BARRY CAUTIONED THAT INVENTING NEW
TEXTS COULD CREATE A BAD PRECEDENT WHEN IT CAME TO SOVIET
EFFORTS TO "ELABORATE" ON THE NUF PRINCIPLE.
8. BARRY SAID THAT USDEL WAS GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO THE
THRESHOLD ISSUE; WE MIGHT WANT TO SETTLE ON A NOTIFICA-
TION AND/OR OBSERVATION THRESHOLD OF ONE-HALF OR MORE
OF TWO DIVISIONS, 12,000 MEN AND X/Y EQUIPMENT; THIS
WOULD FILTER OUT INSIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES AND MAKE
OBSERVATION EASIER. MOD REPS SAID THEIR THINKING HAD
BEEN ALONG SIMILAR LINES -- 1 DIVISION, 10,000 MEN
(WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR A DIVISION LEAVING SOME ELEMENTS
IN GARRISON). BUT THEY WEREN'T TOO WORRIED ABOUT THE
BURDENS OF OBSERVATION AS LONG AS HOSPITALITY WAS
ELIMINATED.
9. DAUNT RAISED THE FUTURE OF MBFR AND CDE, SUGGESTING
THAT IF THE EAST REJECTED THE WESTERN INITIATIVE WE MIGHT
WANT TO RECESS MBFR. BARRY SAID HE SAW REAL DANGERS IN
HAVING MBFR ISSUES SUBSUMED INTO CDE.
10. ON THE QUESTION OF POST-VIENNA CDE, BARRY SAID NO
ONE REALLY EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO STAGE II EVEN GIVEN A
SUCCESSFUL CDE OUTCOME. HE ALSO SAID WE WANTED TO GET
THE MESSAGE ACROSS THAT THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT
VIENNA WOULD AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STAGE IB, THOUGH
THE SOVIETS NO DOUBT REALIZED THAT MANY IN NATO WOULD
FAVOR IT. DAUNT WONDERED IF FOCUS OF DISCUSSIONS DURING
A POSSIBLE STAGE IB MIGHT NOT SHIFT TO "CRISIS MANAGEMENT"
CSBMS. BARRY SAID THIS SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS
SINCE THIS WOULD MEAN MULTILATERAL CRISIS MECHANISM OUT-
SIDE NATO. DAUNT AND BARRY AGREED THAT US AND UK SHOULD
THINK ABOUT NEW PRE-CRISIS CSBMS WHICH COULD BE UNVEILED
AS EXAMPLE OF WHAT A STAGE IB STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD
DEAL WITH; LEFTOVER MEASURES FROM THIS STAGE WOULD
PROBABLY NOT BE SUFFICIENT. (DELEGATION WILL TRY TO COME
UP WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION.)
11. DAUNT WONDERED HOW WE WOULD GET ALLINACE AGREEMENT
ON NEW ELEMENTS IN WESTERN POSITION. BARRY SAID WE WERE
NOT THINKING OF REVISING SC.1; THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME,
AND POSITIONS DISCUSSED IN EVERE WOULD LEAK. WE WERE
SIMPLY TRYING TO LOOK FOR AREAS WHERE WE COULD BE FLEXIBLE
AS THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVED AHEAD. CHANGES COULD EMERGE
NOT AS NEW NATO SUGGESTIONS BUT RATHER AS SUGGESTIONS
FROM THE NNA (PERHAPS INSPIRED BY THE WEST).
12. COMMENT: WE CAUTIONED DAUNT THAT WE HAD NOT SHARED
THESE INFORMAL IDEAS WITH OTHERS AND DID NOT INTEND TO.
HE PROMISED TO HOLD OUR THINKING CLOSELY, BUT WELCOMED
LEARNING WHAT WE WERE THINKING OF ON THE EVE OF HIS
WASHINGTON TRIP.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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INTERVENTION
en seance pleniere
de l'Ambassadeur Stephan Todorov,
chef de la delegation de la RP de Bulgarie
a la Conference de Stockholm
le 7 fevrier 1988
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Monsieur le Fresident,
Un travail considerable a 4-:4 accompli par
Conference pendant les dernieres deux annees, qui a prepare
le passage vers la redaction d'un document. Le prcgres a ete
marque par 'adoption des themes sur lesquels notre attention
devrait se concentrer, et qui pourraient devenir elements
d'un document. Une structure organisationnelle, cui garant:rai7
l'examen des propositions sous tous leurs aspects a ete creee.
Avec la nouvelle annee, la Conference est entree dans une oeric
decisive de son travail avant l'ouverture de la reunion CIE Vie:
Le developpement inherent de la Conference coincide
avec des developpements positifs importants dans les relations
internationales. Le retablissement du dialogue politique au
niveau entre l'Union des Republiques Sccialistes
Sovietiques at les =tats-Unis d'Amerique, ainsi cue les --.-cort-
adoptes la rencontre 1 Geneve en novembr,- dernier,
des conditions qui contritueraient 1 imprimer une dynamique
aux negociations en cours aux differents forums internationaux
sur les questions de la securite at du desarmement.
La plan de perspective riche d'initiat'v== concrLt=-
---oose
par Ia Secrsta're zgnera du cc du ?CUE M'khai"
_
tohev indique la tonne direction pour la
nite ;usqu'l la f'n du des armes
et autres armes de destruction massive. Ce plan as: tout auss:
amt:t4eux cue realiste.
objectif est r4:a"sah'e, oarce cu'" rpond
aux
interets '0ndamentaux de taus les homes, sans aucune d'st'n-
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Om ?
ction de classe, de race, de nationalitg, de differences de
z , 4
ou d'idgologie" - a dit le Secrgtaire ggngral du CC du
'PCB et President du Conseil d'Etat de la RPB Todor jivkov.
Aujourd'hui, monsieur le President, pour avancer
vers cet objectif sont ngcessaires une nouvelle facon de penser
une restrainte dans le domaine militaire, une preuve de haute
responsabilite de la part de tous les gcuvernements pour la
sgcuritg des peuples, pour les interets de l'humanitg et de
sa civilisation.
Ces dans ces circonstances internationales et dans le
dontexte d'un travail preparatoire pour la redaction acheve
que la Conference pcursuit son travail cette annge. Aussi,
la Conference a devant soi des probIemes complexes et difficile
:ela exige, come il nous semble, que tcutes les delggations
adoptent une nouvelle approche, qu'elles manifestent un espri
ouvert face aux problemes en discussion.
Un exemple d'une telle approche de flexibilit=.
d'efforts pour avancer dans les domaines c il est possible o=
rassembler l'accord des participants est la proposition
te Mikhail Gorbatchev pour le possible solutionnement des
-"fcicultes survenues en relation avec la notification des
manoeuvres, mouvements et transfers de t-cuces, propos:I:ion
:-..:vrirait la vole pour obtenir le consensus sur une si import-en-
q.lestion qu.'est la notification des manoeuvres militaires et
transfer/mouvement de troupes des pays participants la
-T^7
Personne ne saurait nier que depuis le debut de la
t
_-,_erence jusqui=
ce jour
certaines delegations ont fait une
sgrie de pas pour rapbrocher les positions, tout en dgmcntrant
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3.
d'une facon tangible leur volonte d'arriver a des accords
?
acceptables pour tous. En meme temps, il y a des delegations
qui nJont pas encore bouge de leurs anciennes positions, defi-
nies au debut meme de la Conference. L'absence de volontg de
faire preuve d'une flexibilite, le refus de tenir compte des
interets ggaux de la securite de tous les participants ne
manquerait pas de crier des difficultes, d'autant plus 1 l'eta;
de redaction. Nous sommes dejl, pendant tette session, face 1.
de telles difficultes. it ce n'est pas en clamant
de commencer tout de suite, sans plus tarder la redaction, cue
sera neutralise l'influence nefaste d'une telle approche de
notre travail.
Dans cc contexte, je voudrais prevenir contra l'inter
pretation erronnee des signes constructifs faits par un groue
de pays, exprimant leur disponibilite I rediger des ,.^-cr''s
mutuellement acceptables. Pour le suoces de notre travail,
faut interpreter ces signes dans la lumiere de. la volonte de
contribuer effectuer un tournant vers un meilleur
choses dans les relations Est-Cuest, dans 'es relations =nt-7e
les pays participants. Leur interpretation a la lum;.1.-- des
stel-eotypes et facons de penser anciens, propres o=irt-z:ns
depuis des periodes plus
?d4C.C4.-.41=5"
de ces relations, ne
pourrait qu'entrainer les negociations dans une impasse, d'ol
serait difficile de s'en sortir.
La delega-Lion bulgare continue a esperer due orauve
sera faite par touS 1 la Conference de r4a'isme et de volonzg
cscperer
, cc qui permet-trail:, en conformitg avec 1=.mand=:
t'adopter des mesures de confiance et de securi:4 qui seraien:
meme de marquer un developpement substantial du regime de
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=fiance de l'Acte final.
Monsieur le ?resident,
L'un des domaines decisifs dans lesquels il est
neoessaire d'arriver a des accords mutuellement acceptable
pour realiser le developpement qualitatif menticnne est le
domaine des mesures de limitation.
L'adoption de tales mesures serait 1 meme de
le sentiment d'insecurite genere par les manoeuvres de part
culierement granc:e envel-gure, manoeuvres qu'il est difficila
distinguer dans des termes appropries de la preparation
reelle d'agression. Nous pensons qu'il ne serait pas exager
d'affirmer que le danger d'un conflit militaire resultant
d'erreur ou de malentendu augmente dans une progression gezmi:-
trique avec l'augmentation du nombre des participants dans
las activites militaires.
Du point de vue politique, l'introduction de mesur..=
de limitation serait une preuve du refus de la pclitique
mitation par demonstration de force militaire at par -cn=equ..-nz
- une expression du principe de non-reccurs 1le force cu? 1
la 'menace de la force. Ceci serait une preuve de la vo-..ont
de developper les relations entre les pays-memtres a la tasE
de la cooperation , dans l'esprit du processus de 'la
Comme la discussion l'a demontre, tcu-e.
:ions sont d'accord que l'elaboration de mesures de con-train:4-,
en conformite avec le principe du respect egal des interts
de la securite de tous les Etats participants, contrituerai:
maniere directe I reduire le danger de la con'="flont.-"-
militaire et par cell, atteindre les objectifs fixes par
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le mandat de l'etape actuelle de la Conferenze sur les mesure:
de confiance et de securite et sur le desarmement en :rope.
. - -
Nous avons etudie avec attention le: 4-'4==, =xor4mx.
par toutes les delegations au sujet des mes'.:res de contr=:nt
ainsi que le document SC-7, presente par les :as neutres et
ncn-alignes. Il nous semble que pour l'avancement des negccia
tions il est necessaire de prendre pour point de cdpart l'id.
csntenue dans la proposition SC-7 de liar 1= nomt-= m=ximum
d-a-s--.1s4-o-?7.4...e aux activites militaires eve: le niveau be
notification be ces activites, ainsi que d':ntrodu:-= des
limitations be la duree des exercices militaires. je vcudrais
aujourd'hui, au nomHdes co-auteurs du dccuMent WGA-1
delegations be la PA, be l'URSS et be la RI:
soumettre a l'attention des participants un texte qui, selcn
pourrait devenir le pas suivant pour parvenir I de= =sosr.-:=
mutuellement acceptables:
Les pays participants ne con''u'-cnt ca=,
ou conjcintement avec d'autres pays partici:ants, be:
dont le niveau n'excederait pas :lus be
le niveau be notificaticn. Aussi, la turee be toute mans=ure
militaire; notifiable n'excedera-t-elle pas IS jours.
Nous espersns, monsieur le ?resident, que
G. 7 ''?.7
proposition sera examinee au sours du t-ava:1 bans .r.
non-formel, en conformite avec nctre accord 14 ostotre
Je voudrais faire appel 1 tous les 'participants be
csnsiderer cette proposition avec'un esprit ouvert, dans 1
csntexte be la cooperation et be la ccmpre'nension reciprocue.
L'esprit meme be notre temps exige ..ne r==tr=int=
des activites militaires des Etats.
Merci pour votre attention.
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01002
C ORRECTEDCOPY(PARAGRAPHS MIS-NUMBERED)
ORIGINAL CDS NUMBER UNKNOWN
SUBJECT: U.S./SOVIET CONTACTS, FEBRUARY 3-7, 1986
1. CDE IX - 039
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET
DELEGATION DURING THE PAST WEEK SUGGEST THAT THEIR
PRIMARY GOAL IS TO RETRIEVE AS MUCH AS THEY CAN OF
GORBACHEV'S "DEFERRAL" OF THE NAVAL ISSUE BY INSISTING
THAT WE AGREE HERE AT STOCKHOLM THAT INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES BE ON THE AGENDA IN THE POST-VIENNA
CONTINUATION OF CDE. THEY ARE READY TO EXPLORE
THRESHOLDS AND THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT BILATERALLY
BUT SO FAR SHOW NO FLEXIBILITY . THEY HAVE RECEIVED OUR
MESSAGE ON THE NEED FOR INSPECTIONS WITH RESIGNATION AND
MILD PROTEST. END SUMMARY.
4. USDEL HAD INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET DELEGATION
DURING THE WEEK OF FEBRUARY 3-7. ALL SENIOR MEMBERS OF
THE SOVIET DELEGATION ATTENDED A BUFFET DINNER AT
AMBASSADOR BARRY'S RESIDENCE FEBRUARY 6; IN ADDITION
THERE WAS A GRINEVSKY-BARRY BILATERAL FEBRUARY 3 AND A
BARRY-HANSEN/GRINEVSKY-TATARNIKOV WORKING LUNCH
FEBRUARY 7, BOTH LAST-MINUTE SOVIET INITIATIVES. THE
SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED CONTINUING THE WEEKLY WORKING
LUNCH AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. BECAUSE MOST OF THE
ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED REPEATEDLY, THIS REPORT COVERS
TOPICS WITHOUT REGARD TO WHERE THEY WERE BROUGHT UP.
5. GORBACHEV STATEMENT: THE MAIN POINT WHICH THE
SOVIETS WISHED TO DISCUSS WAS THE "U.S. RESPONSE" TO THE
GORBACHEV JANUARY 15 STATEMENT WITH ITS PROPOSAL TO
DEFER NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES UNTIL THE SECOND
STAGE OF THE CDE. WHAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WANTS IS
AGREEMENT BY THE STOCKHOLM CONFEREES TO HAVE INDEPENDENT
NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE AGENDA OF THE POST-VIENNA PHASE
OF CDE. SOME IMPLIED THAT UNLESS THE WEST AGREED TO
THIS, THE GORBACHEV OFFER WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND THERE
COULD BE NO DRAFTING ON NOTIFICATION, FORECASTING, OR
OBSERVATION. (BEGIN COMMENT: WE THINK THIS IS A
BLUFF. END COMMENT.) OUR REACTION WAS THAT IT WAS NOT
IN THE CONFERENCE'S POWER TO DECIDE WHAT WOULD BE
DISCUSSED DURING THE NEXT PHASE. THIS WOULD BE THE TASK
OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. IN ANY CASE, WE HAD
NOT CHANGED OUR MINDS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE MADRID
MANDATE. INTERESTINGLY, THE SOVIETS CONFIRMED THAT THEY
THOUGHT THERE WAS NO POSSIBLITY OF VIENNA DECIDING ON A
NEW STAGE OF CDE.
6. THRESHOLDS: WE EXPLORED SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON
THRESHOLDS BY ASKING FOR SOVIET THOUGHTS ON THE NNA
PROPOSAL WITH ITS THREE CATEGORIES OF PARAMETERS
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(STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT). ALTHOUGH WE HAD
RAISED THIS QUESTION PUBLICLY IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE
SOVIETS SAID THEY WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE AND NEEDED TIME
TO THINK THE QUESTION OVER. THEY TRIED -- WITHOUT
SUCCESS -- TO STEER CONVERSATION TOWARD A DISCUSSION OF
SPECIFIC NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. GENERAL TATARNIKOV DID
NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PARAMETERS OTHER THAN
NUMERICAL PARAMETERS BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS
THE ISSUE IN DETAIL. HOWEVER, THEY DID EXPRESS INTEREST
IN PURSUING THE ISSUE AT FUTURE LUNCHES.
7. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: MUCH OF OUR BILATERAL
DISCUSSION, AS USUAL, INVOLVED PROCEDURE. THE SOVIETS
HAVE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF BRACKETLESS
DRAFTING AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT THEY ARE
STILL SMARTING OVER WESTERN REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE
SOVIET RESPONSES TO NATO COMPROMISE TEXTS IN ENGLISH.
IT WAS CLEAR THAT ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR SOVIET
INSISTENCE ON TIME TO REACT IS TATARNIKOV'S INABILITY TO
DIGEST ENGLISH TEXTS ON THE SPOT AND UNWILLINGNESS TO
RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO THEM. TATARNIKOV DESCRIBED TWO
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES: 1) TO INTRODUCE TEXTS THROUGH
THE COORDINATOR OR 2) TO HAVE CONTACT GROUP MEETINGS TO
INFORM OTHERS OF WHAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED OR TABLED.
8. WE URGED FLEXIBILITY ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS, I.E.,
THAT WE NOT INSIST ON A GIVEN METHODOLOGY FOR DRAFTING
BUT USE DIFFERENT METHODS IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS. WE
SAID THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO MEET IN CONTACT GROUPS AND
THE COORDINATORS ARE NOT READY TO TO DRAFT TEXTS. BUT
WE AGREE THAT IN THE FUTURE IT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL TO
GIVE TEXTS TO THE COORDINATOR SHORTLY BEFORE A GIVEN
MEETING SO THAT HE COULD STUDY, BUT NOT MODIFY, THEM.
HANSEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE METHOD WHICH THE WEST MIGHT
TRY WOULD BE TO EXAMINE TABLED PROPOSALS, EXPRESS
WESTERN VIEWS IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUPS
REGARDING POSSIBLE AREAS FOR CONSENSUS, GIVE THE EAST
AND THE NNA THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, THEN
ALLOW ANY PARTICIPANT, INCLUDING THE COORDINATOR, TO
DRAFT A TEXT.
9. GORBACHEV ON CONSTRAINTS/THRESHOLDS. IN RESPONSE TO
OUR REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATON AS TO WHETHER THE CDE
SECTION OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL REFERRED TO
CONSTRAINTS (LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF EXERCISES) OR
THRESHOLDS (LOWERING THE HELSINKI PARAMETERS ON
NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION), GRINEVSKY UNHESITATINGLY SAID
THAT THRESHOLDS WERE WHAT WAS MEANT.
10. INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES: ROZANOV OBSERVED THAT
INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT
WERE WITHIN THE MADRID MANDATE. WHEN QUERIED AS TO HOW
SUCH AIR ACTIVITIES COULD BE VERIFIED, ROZANOV STATED
THAT A SWISS STUDY SHOWED HOW AN AWAC'S PLANE COULD BE
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USED, I.E., AWAC'S AIRCRAFT COULD BE RENTED AND OPERATED
ON A MULTINATIONAL BASIS. AT THE SAME TIME, NONE OF THE
SOVIETS GAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO
DROP NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE
ADJOINING SEA AREA. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO
NOT BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED.
11. INFORMATION: TATARNIKOV INDICATED THE SOVIETS
MIGHT BE WILLING TO GIVE SOME "STATIC" INFORMATION IF WE
WOULD PROVIDE "STATIC" INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND
COMMAND STRUCTURE OF OUR GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN
THE ZONE. (BEGIN COMMENT: WHILE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT
THE SOVIETS ARE COMING AROUND TO ACCEPTING THE SUBSTANCE
OF OUR MEASURE 1, THIS MAY INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO
PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND IDENTITY OF
UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES. END
COMMENT.)
12. INSPECTION: WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT FOR US
INSPECTION IS A SINE QUA NON. THE SOVIETS HAVE LISTENED
RESIGNEDLY AND OCCASIONALLY PROTESTED, BUT THE MESSAGE
HAS GOTTEN THROUGH.
13. NUF: RAKHMANINOV EXPRESSED SOME STUDIED
FRUSTRATION AT THE "SLOW PACE" OF THE NUF DISCUSSIONS.
HOWEVER, HE ALLOWED THAT IT WAS PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE TO
ACHIEVE CONSENSUS AGREEMENT TO A FULL STRUCTURE FOR NUF
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. HE AGREED TO CONSIDER AN
APPROACH BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS. FOR THE NEXT
FEW WEEKS OF NUF DISCUSSION: THE LINKAGE BETWEEN NUF
AND CONCRETE CSBM'S, THE COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT, AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF. (BEGIN
COMMENT: IF THE WEST IS ABLE TO GET EASTERN CONCURRENCE
TO A WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION BASED ON SOMETHING
RESEMBLING THE ABOVE FORMULA, WE WILL HAVE BOUGHT SOME
MUCH-NEEDED TIME TO DEVELOP A COMMON NATO LINE ON NUF.
FURTHERMORE, THE THREE ELEMENTS MENTIONED ABOVE ARE
ABOUT AS CLOSE AS WE CAN GET TO A CORE POSITION ALL NATO
DELEGATIONS CAN ACCEPT. WE CANNOT GUARANTEE, HOWEVER,
THAT THE EAST -- OR SOME OF THE UNA -- WILL ACCEPT THIS
APPROACH OR WILL DELAY INTRODUCING NUF DRAFTING TEXTS IN
THE COMING WEEKS. END COMMENT.)
14. OVERALL ASSESSMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE REACTING WITH
SOME CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY TO THE NEW PROCEDURAL
SITUATION (I.E., DRAFTING) AND THEY ALSO SEEM CONFUSED
ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT. THE
GENERAL STAFF SEEMS TO BE LEADING THE (HOPELESS) EFFORT
TO FIX INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE
POST-STOCKHOLM CDE AGENDA. BUT ON THE WHOLE THE SOVIET
APPROACH IS NON-POLEMICAL AND GENERALLY FLEXIBLE ON
PROCEDURAL ISSUES. HOWEVER, THEY ARE INSISTENT THAT
THEY HAVE MADE THEIR LAST "UNILATERAL CONCESSION" AND
ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT NOBODY RECOGNIZES IT AS SUCH. WE
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DOUBT THAT MUCH OF SUBSTANCE WILL COME FROM WEEKLY
MEETINGS BUT CONTINUING THE EXPLORATION IS CLEARLY IN
OUR INTEREST. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01034
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
FEBRUARY 3-7, 1986
1. CDE IX - 044
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WAS MADE
LAST WEEK AS THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, AS IS THEIR
WONT, CONCENTRATED ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES -- IN THIS CASE,
HOW TO FACILITATE THE DRAFTING PROCESS. THE SOVIETS ARE
CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE DRAFTING IN THE MORE FLUID
ATMOSPHERE OF THE WORKING GROUPS AND PREFER SMALL COFFEE
GROUPS WHERE THEY HAVE A VIRTUAL VETO OVER THE TEXTS
EMERGING INTO THE LARGER GROUP. IN THE NOTIFICATION
WORKING GROUPS, THE WEST SEIZED THE INITIATIVE BY
TABLING A COMPROMISE TEXT BASED ON SWISS AND IRISH
PROPOSALS. IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE
MEETING OF THE MINDS. ON NON-USE OF FORCE, THE EAST
BEGRUDGINGLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NUF
PRINCIPLE AND CONCRETE CSBM'S MUST BE REFLECTED IN A
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. ON THE SIDELINES, SOVIET DELEGATES
HAVE SAID THEY WANT THE CONFERENCE TO AGREE THAT
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WILL BE ON THE AGENDA OF
CDE AFTER VIENNA. OUR RESPONSE HAS BEEN THAT ONLY THE
VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE CAN DECIDE WHAT CDE WILL
DISCUSS AFTER VIENNA. END SUMMARY.
4. OVERVIEW: LITTLE FORWARD PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED
THIS WEEK AS THE CDE SHIP ENTERED THE UNCHARTED WATERS
OF DRAFTING A EUROPEAN SECURITY ACCORD. THE 35
PASSENGERS ON THE STOCKHOLM SHAKEDOWN CRUISE STILL
DISPLAY MORE SUSPICION THAN CONFIDENCE REGARDING EACH
OTHER'S METHODS AND MOTIVATIONS. AS HAS ALL TOO OFTEN
BEEN THE CASE WHEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE FOCUSED ON
PROCEDURE (IN THIS CASE HOW TO DRAFT), IT IS SUBSTANCE
THAT SUFFERS. AS USUAL, IT IS SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS THAT
ARE AT THE ROOT OF THE PROCEDURAL WRANGLING. THE
SOVIETS, UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE FLUIDITY AND
UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE WORKING GROUPS, PREFER TO MOVE
THE REAL NEGOTIATIONS TO THE BACK ROOM WHERE A FEW
SELECT DELEGATIONS MIGHT ENGAGE THE COORDINATORS IN SOME
REAL GIVE-AND-TAKE. WE BELIEVE SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE
PREMATURE, AND WOULD HARM OUR ABILITY TO DRAFT IN THE
LARGER WORKING GROUPS. ODDLY, THE NEUTRALS SEEM EVEN
MORE HESITANT ABOUT MOVING TO DRAFTING THAN THE EAST,
PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY FEAR THEIR OWN PROPOSALS WILL BE
IGNORED BY EAST AND WEST.
5. NOTIFICATION: THE WEST SEIZED THE INITIATIVE IN THE
WORKING GROUP ON FEBRUARY 4 BY TABLING A COMPROMISE TEXT
BASED ON A SWISS TEXT TABLED THE PREVIOUS WEEK AND AN
IRISH PROPOSAL TABLED THIS WEEK. THE SOVIET GENERAL
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(TATARNIKOV), CAUGHT OFF GUARD, REACTED NEGATIVELY, IN
PART BECAUSE HE DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH. WE HAVE AGREED
TO PROVIDE THE COORDINATOR WITH TEXTS SHORTLY BEFORE
TABLING THEM FOR HIS INFORMATION BUT NOT FOR
MODIFICATION.
6. OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP THE MAIN SOVIET
PREOCCUPATION HAS BEEN THE U.S. RESPONSE -- OR LACK
THEREOF -- TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO DEFER NOTIFICATION
OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CDE.
THEY WANT THE CONFERENCE TO AGREE THAT INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES WILL BE ON THE POST-VIENNA CDE AGENDA. THEY
WARN DARKLY THAT WITHOUT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING THERE
WILL BE NO AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19
(THE CDE ADJOURNMENT DATE). OUR RESPONSE HAS BEEN THAT
ONLY THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING (NOT THE CDE) CAN DECIDE
WHAT A FUTURE STAGE OF THE CDE WILL DISCUSS. WE THINK
THE SOVIETS ARE BLUFFING ON THIS.
7. OBSERVATION: REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE GROUPS
INTRODUCED TEXTS ON OBSERVATION IN THE WORKING GROUP ON
FEBRUARY 6. NATO ONCE AGAIN SUBMITTED SC.1/AMPLIFIED
LANGUAGE, THIS TIME ON THE MANDATORY INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS FROM ALL STATES AND ON THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS
(MAXIMUM OF TWO PER STATE) TO BE INVITED. POLAND
(STANIEWSKI) INTRODUCED LANGUAGE WHICH FUZZED THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER STATES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SEND INVITATIONS
TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES (ON BEHALF OF THE EAST,
POLAND HAS LONG ADVOCATED SENDING INVITATIONS ONLY TO
STATES WHOSE SECURITY IS AFFECTED BY EXERCISES, I.E.,
NEIGHBORING STATES) AND ON WHETHER ALL NOTIFIED MILITARY
ACTIVITIES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION. SWITZERLAND
(SCHARLI) TOOK ISSUE WITH LANGUAGE IN THE POLISH TEXT
TABLED THE PREVIOUS WEEK WHICH DESCRIBED THE PURPOSE OF
OBSERVATION AS BEING THE CONFIRMATION OF "PEACEFUL
INTENTIONS." NOTING THAT INTENTIONS ARE NOT VERIFIABLE,
THE SWISS MILREP TABLED LANGUAGE WHICH EMPHASIZED
CONFIRMATION OF THE "ROUTINE" AND "NON-THREATENING"
CHARACTER OF AN ACTIVITY AS THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF
OBSERVATION. HE ALSO NOTED THAT OBSERVERS WOULD BE ABLE
TO CONFIRM THAT THE ACTIVITY ITSELF CORRESPONDED TO THE
NOTIFICATION. AUSTRIA AND SWEDEN OUTLINED POSSIBLE
COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE NNA (SC.7) AND NATO (SC.1
AMPLIFIED) PROPOSALS, DROPPING REFERENCES IN SC.7 TO
MANEUVERS AND PRIOR NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER, FINLAND
REINSERTED THE CONTROVERSIAL LANGUAGE FROM THE UNA
PROPOSAL IN ITS INTERVENTION.
8. NON-USE OF FORCE: FOR THE FIRST TIME THE EAST
PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NUF
PRINCIPLE AND CONCRETE CSBM'S HAS TO BE INCLUDED IN A
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. AS COULD BE EXPECTED, EASTERN AND
WESTERN CONCEPTS OF THIS LINKAGE DIFFERED SOMEWHAT. THE
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WEST, WITH THE U.S. (CUNDERSEN) AS THE LEAD SPEAKER,
ARGUED THAT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE NUF
PRINCIPLE IS CENTRAL TO THE DISCUSSION OF NUF, THAT
CSBM'S CREATE OPERATIONAL BARRIERS WHICH MAKE THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY AND THAT THE FINAL ACT AND
THE MADRID MANDATE CONTAIN ELEMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED IN DRAFTING LANGUAGE TO DESCRIBE THE LINKAGE
BETWEEN THE TWO. USSR (RAKHMANINOV) TRIED TO PLAY DOWN
THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE NUF/CSBM'S LINKAGE BY ARGUING
THAT IT IS ONLY ONE OF THREE LINKAGES BETWEEN NUF AND
THE PURPOSES OF THE CONFERENCE, PRIDE OF PLACE BEING
ACCORDED EXPRESSION OF THE PRINCIPLE ITSELF. THE USSR
AND YUGOSLAVIA (BOZOVIC) PRESSED FOR AN"ELABORATION" OF
NUF WHICH WOULD ENCOMPASS THE "MULTIPLE PURPOSES" OF THE
CONFERENCE, I.E., CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, SECURITY-BUILDING
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS), EVER
EAGER FOR PROGRESS ON NUF, TRIED -- WITHOUT NOTICEABLE
SUCCESS -- TO SERVE AS GO-BETWEEN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.
9. THE GENERAL EASTERN APPROACH TO THE NUF WORKING
GROUP IS AIMED AT ASSURING A LEADING POSITION FOR NUF IN
ANY AGREEMENT EMERGING OUT OF STOCKHOLM BY NEGOTIATING
AN EXTENSIVE AGENDA FOR WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON
NUF. HUNGARY (KORMENDY) TRIED TO PURSUE THIS TACK BY
PRESENTING A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS WHICH COULD FIGURE IN A
PREAMBLE TO A NUF SECTION -- OR, CONCEIVABLY COULD MAKE
UP A SEPARATE DECLARATION IF THE EAST DECIDES TO PUSH
FOR SEPARATE NUF AND CSBM'S AGREEMENTS. SO FAR, EXCEPT
FOR IMPLICITLY ABANDONING THE UNSALEABLE IDEA OF A TREATY
ON NUF, THE EAST HAS NOT INDICATED WHAT FORM IT WOULD
LIKE A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO TAKE, ALTHOUGH
IT HAS IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED THE IDEA THAT SUCH A
REAFFIRMATION WOULD BE CONTAINED IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT.
ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT
FOR NATO TO HAMMER OUT A COMMON POSITION AND LANGUAGE ON
NUF. AN AUGMENTED HEADS-ONLY NATO CAUCUS DEDICATED TO
NUF HAS BEEN CALLED FOR FEBRUARY 19.
10. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: NATO TABLED LANGUAGE
FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED. IN THIS WORKING GROUP, WHERE THE
WEST TABLED MEASURE 1 LANGUAGE, THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED
TO "CONSIDER" IT OR EVEN TO "NOTE IT DOWN" BECAUSE IT
ADDRESSED "INDEPENDENT" INFORMATION AND, IN THEIR VIEW,
INFORMATION ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION SHOULD
BE DISCUSSED IN THIS GROUP. THEY RAISED HACKNEYED
ARGUMENTS THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AMOUNTED TO
"LEGITIMIZED ESPIONAGE." THE EAST SUBSEQUENTLY
SUBMITTED A TEXT PROPOSING THAT INFORMATION BE EXCHANGED
IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION, AN ISSUE WE BELIE7E
SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUP DEALING WITH
NOTIFICATION. THIS TRIGGERED A DEBATE BOTH ON WHERE
SUCH A PROPOSAL SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AS WELL AS ON THE
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SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. SWEDEN
SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR STATIC INFORMATION WHICH, IN ITS
VIEW, DID NOT "NECESSARILY" HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN A
SEPARATE CHAPTER (LIKE SC.1'S MEASURE 1). SOME ALLIES
APPEAR READY TO EMPHASIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF STATIC
INFORMATION WHICH IN OUR VIEW COULD MISTAKENLY SIGNAL A
WILLINGNESS TO FALL OFF OF MEASURE 1. WE HAVE SO FAR
HELD THEM AT BAY.
11. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE EAST TRIED TO
STEAL THE SHOW IN THE PLENARY ON FEBRUARY 7 WHEN
BULGARIA (TODOROV) INTRODUCED AN EASTERN PROPOSAL ON
CONSTRAINTS WHICH CRIBBED HEAVILY FROM THE 4NA PROPOSAL.
THE EASTERN PROPOSAL CALLED FOR A CEILING ON EXERCISES
FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFICATION LEVEL AND LIMITED THE
DURATION OF EXERCISES TO 15 DAYS (VICE 17 IN SC.7). THE
EAST THUS WAS ABLE TO WIN POINTS FROM THE NNA BY BUYING
ON TO SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THEIR CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINTS;
AT THE SAME TIME, IT TRIED FURTHER TO ISOLATE AND
PRESSURE THE WEST ON THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE. (IN A
PRIVATE CONVERSATION SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HINTED
THAT HE EXPECTED A THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION WHICH
WOULD RESULT IN AN 80,000 CONSTRAINT CEILING. HOW MUCH
OF THE EAST'S MUCH PROFESSED AFFINITY FOR CONSTRAINTS IS
REAL AND HOW MUCH TACTICAL IS ANOTHER QUESTION, HOWEVER.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01046
SUBJECT: POLAND OBSERVATION TEXT
L. CDE IX - 037
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
3. AT THE FEBRUARY LO WORKING GROUP A B MEETING,
AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) DISTRIBUTED A LO-POINT
TEXT FOR THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. TEXT IS AS
FOLLOWS:
ON THE QUESTION OF THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS (AS
REFERRED TO IN THE INTERVENTION OF AMBASSADOR
WLODZIMIERZ KONARSKI, HEAD OF THE POLISH DELEGATION):
(L) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS
FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES (TO BE DEFINED).
(2) INVITATIONS WILL BE EXTENDED TO PARTICIPATING
STATES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.
(3) INVITATIONS WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO PARTICIPATING
STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.
(4) A REPLY TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN NOT LATER
THAN 15 DAYS BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE OBSERVATION.
(5) A PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED AN
INVITATION MAY SEND NO MORE THAN TWO OBSERVERS TO A
MILITARY ACTIVITY.
(6) THE PRINCIPAL AIMS OF OBSERVATION ARE TO PROMOTE
CONTACTS AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, AND TO ESTABLISH THE
PEACEFUL INTENTIONS OF THE HOST STATE AND TO ASCERTAIN
THE CONFORMITY OF THE OBSERVED ACTIVITY WITH THE PRIOR
NOTIFICATION.
(7) TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION, PARTICIPATING STATES
WILL RECEIVE GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE OBSERVATION
PROGRAMME, ITS ORGANIZATION, AND ON THE MEANS OF
OBSERVATION, PRINTED MATERIALS, INCLUDING THE
DESCRIPTION OF THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
(8) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL DECIDE FOR ITSELF
WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS.
(9) THE OBSERVERS WILL RECEIVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
ON THE AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
(LO) WHENEVER POSSIBLE, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE ENTITLED
TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITIES OF COMMANDING STAFF, MILITARY
UNITS AND SUB-UNITS, AND TO ENTER INTO DIRECT CONTACT
WITH ALL RANKS OF THE FORCES ENGAGED.
4. THE ABOVE-MENTIONED POINTS ARE INTENDED TO BE OF
HELP IN THE DISCUSSION AND MAY BE DEVELOPED OR
SUPPLEMENTED ACCORDING TO THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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pranancee
d. _a ae2_7.ir,
aour,ene
7,-vrier
7a Confr.nc sur is mesures de canfLance et
CV,
e=t
Aanc: ct7
= rn=e de 7n _
ES
tr7vux de 7=- Can=!:.rence son: d' ores et d or'.nt: dans
tarn,- dlr.ction, comma LI a Lite- jut. -
cette an-e'nte.
res trent. cinc 7art cs a ls
ont ex.:rlme
crcs
L.OUS,
rcr Les deux
leur vo.L.ant
ans
d'uti7'qer 7es
travaLl at de recLerches
d. 1-,a-v.n'r a r acc^-4 sur un ensemtle de mesures c. tu'=e-r:
c:-':r .==ect'v,,,a:=nt l'=coroisse=nt de la confiance et a'e
lz A,?urtti et ouvrir anst. la voie au dsarmemert an Lurora.
_ _
:ES travsux de
7ctu.17,'m.nt 4s'ne- un context. nt.rnat'an,.7 cu' recl== et
tem7s faLt zost.t7 conc7u.'ar d'un accord.
e'et, la s'_tuaton internatLonsle cont:_nue
rast.r =t c. L anrer c_ rerr=,=ent. :our tous les
77t=t(, tar cats
Conf irenc 7 'ZiCC';7 rtt.or. dE 1a cursa
aux armements, notamment nucliaires, n'est 7as ecarte. O's t 7ourc-uoi
Ll est nc===a'ro de tout mnttre en oeuvre, de n'e7arrnr
aucun ==fo-t 7cur z-Tster lc cour denrarr,ux d.s Avnements, rar
c.,ue tous les :tat:: s'enEacant riso'ument une to7'taue
d. comtr,',h,-nsion et de' cooperat_on.
? ?/
? ?
AC-
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ect vrzi cue ce drnier tcmm= d.s
er.ccura,:eant, =ont a 7 'horizon ce qui ourraient anr.or.cer
Ie rasserer.ement de la vie interne tionale Pourtar.t , les lourdc
ncuaLes de 7 molitique de force, de
tension et de enc es continuant assombrar les rapports
internat...
intensi"ication des contacts entre les factrs
r..zon.ahl.s des differenta r.a;.'s peuve.nt?nous en so:a-Les persua-lcis?
cor.tr':-....r ssim.r LamLfi..s.r.C, 7 es ae ndua, =urm..r.ter
La con'iznce et la coopiration. r=ultate ,,nr-ri=trescu
sovieto?amLrica d. C.r2.ve en temoizn.nt. l.s fa'ts, v'e
devront nous montrer Is vrsie siEnification de c.tt. r-nr.ontr..
.:pres 1e sommet de r.r.ve il faut .s.r a des actions concrates
, dans 7 esrit des .ngeE.mer_ts asaui?et des d?a'raticns
faites sur La 14 CU4dnt' on des missiles r.ucleaires'a port
, da toutes les
nueleaires, sur
to..te action vsant La mt.' tzr' se tion du COS:70c.
2ans cc contexte , La da:cn rou.-azine
sculjrncr Iir..-;:ortance _cue revel: le c.=,xe de pro7ositions r?
7,'Ll^ 7 i'Sn'on F.ov' cue, desin? contr
' arre...t de la CO'UrSE aux armezents nucleaires, de la militz,risa..?
t-i on du Coco:oc, ' cn total. des rrr.EF. nucleaires , la
-.erre, I yaccro_sz.......__.t de lz
cor.fiance et au renforc..ement d. La secur-i
La ao.,..Lt-..anie ect profondoment p.reoccu7.44 ma'-, 1?
actuel de la situation internationFle et acit par tous les mo:..er.e
dont elle dispose pour le dialocue La d?nte. , Is confience et
le rapprochement entre les nations, ro'..zr le desez-mement
'
secur.,
et is. cooperation en urope et dans le rzonde. ds mr.iocc'apationz
cor.stantes de mon pa,ys est le 6.1 i7.ination de la :zenace r.uclea ire sur
?44/??
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notre continent, d toute 7-enPcP
scus-rionzl,
1+Mr-,,,,+, 0
destruction massive, au niveau
lotal. je ne voudrais 7ES m'a-rter
les initiatives prises 7ar la 7noumanie dans ce domzine dans differents
fora je voudrait simplement info-mP- la C
sur Lin= 'nit'ative commune recente roumanc-tue v4sant i'Ll'7'nPt'on
des ars chimiou.es de ] :one r'ec
Comma il a ete :lent ^nrL au msme des tra-vaux
de 7E zrsente ceee'on de Conference, 1 des ar:nes nucler,ires,
-es P-mec c'cuee un reel danrer pour lz
?
eurom;ennP.
7ou- ou- 7'1'rination de la 7-enr^c cou so
devenue real'te, 1P prLe'r'ent de 'P ae'out''cue Socie"st.de
Ceauescu
4,t
pre' 4 ent d e 7 icu:!
70- - ? +.4 v.r
cnt c'rne
z-_
lit-. 4"a-m=5 cPe dans 'Ps 1:all:ans.
7xaminant l'evo'ut'on
= carst, v 22
- 4. ?j ?D 7
et n-ta=ent les protllm-- ,.oncern,.nt la csco eta
4- ' ceourit:', en 7_,urore et ?_-_,....atant ieS P7 r.,---,7=s dEn: ers c?uo e
_
de la
co-re PrP:Pments ,
r_rtdot'on et .4-'L.71o:ement 4e nouvellee armes nuoleaires et d'autres
77.0:.ena d: destruction mEssive, lee 4eux tr3cidentc ont 1Pnci un
soler-ts' aux ch's d'"_tat et EouverncrnPrt 17is
pour unir Pt couruer lec fforts tou--, 1-c lt,:tec cette ririon
Pn vue de tr,--nsform=r 'es =a1-zane en une zone l'brc d'Pr7cs ch'm'cuec.
7-es deux voisins et amis sont persuades que
la Proclamation des Pa1kans COm7:-. zone d'armes chimicues seroit
+4. -
P'teratn comp1'et _ i io ,
v... v
cE3r
r"armec extr2Imer,=nt da;-Pees Pt contriturr4t Pu r,-ffe-miceP-nt
de la confiance et de 'P. coo-Lron entre lee loa-s et les Izeuplcs
do cette recion.
34 ? ? //'
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La rcise en oeuvre de cette initiative serail de
nature a contrituer effective_mentaux efforts
ALn101,4s
a
our
l'interdiotion Eenerale et comnlate des az-roes chinliques et Is des-
truction des stocks existants, et a sti=uler les necociations
qui
on lieu a ct eff=t.
I'evo'ution de la -ituation internationale actuelle
=pose, d'autre part, une Lntensification des efforts de tous 7ns
7:?-tats dans 7.=== orran'smes de nez-ociations multilat6rales
aur 7 =
cue la Conf4r.nce de Genave , lea tratatives
de 7ienne, ainsi cue la ConfL-nc. de 'tock.ho'=.
7.onsieur 1. 7rL.iA.nt,
:a
Conference de Stockhol= a un r51e i=mortant
cpuer dans la consolidation de la pax et de Is securit6 en Iurone,
d=-1= le developpement de Is confiance et de la cooperation entre
les na:-s europeens, dc..ns les efforts qui ont pour nut lz retion
d'une 7Urope unie, fondee sur le respect de la diversite des
S.:!S7:n2S socizux, du droit qu'a chacue neunle de choisir le s7stame
sans
La place et le r6le de Is
r'-"7"zr7C'D An tOCkhOl=
danale processus de la CFC =is en doute par aucun
-
narticicznt. :a volonte co--un.= de na-venr "n accord z trcu7L
son exrreasicr. concrate aussi b en dans les =tructur=s d
n
dans la mise en evidence d=. do=='nns A'un cons nau.a
potentiel. Coe nous l'avons dit avant la fin d= 71ann,ee cassce,
nous som=es persuadeeque, dans les circonstznces actuelles, ar.
peut parvenir un accord dont les composantes princimales seralcnt
les suivantes:
s)'e deve'onm==ent et l'amelioration des mesures
dc confiance trZvuea car l';cte final dc
notre avis, .les efforts d=vrzi.nt '6tre concentris
85 ? ?//? ?
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me
aans ce domaine dan: la direction de 1'do7tion Ac sures
canfiance et de securite Cu: aient tour 'cut:
-la notification priala'cle obli;atoire des manoeuvres
des mouvements de troumes et d'autres activites mi_ta
_eur ammleur 7.ttent en da_er la securite d'autres
est a noT..-, dans cc ccnt.xt., cue 7Sc
enr.c-=tri- ce
",?=C
temps par d.c ammroches nouvelles pourrsient fzciliter dans
larr= m.sur. 7e cons.nsus);
-73 dmi--_uton du nv.r,u d.. .ff=ct-if= dcc reu7.=
des arme7nents en:a:es dens IES manoeuvres mtl't,"r---
mouvements de tr. .doivent Ztre l'ext,-sion d=lai
-".rnonciation mren7=t1e de ces activitis;
-l'extcnsion de la notificat'on mral=t7.
mcr zux menor,uvres aucu,s7les
. f.
.
C2.7. =i.a7 rmant des uni 'cis a Lrom ees e ? _s ,
-lormation ',-utue77. sur
lee -clann= annuels de
manesuvrs, 4e mouvm=nt= d= trourc= at d'autrn= arstvd.t= m'ltE4r==
notifiaM7=s (Ia roumaine velt le calendrer annuel c=me
une ---mt2ere 4:7a7e du rir...me de cataen un cartT'n
r.antr,"nt.e-;;
-un L.ol_anf:c accru de dcc d' for7c.t:-,n= =ur
zettv'..ts :.:rem neta'Laltles, lel.: but, sc
Ice forces Frr,L,-= cut. rrenncnt 7r:;
-l'ir.vtat'on de= orsc,rvateurs des :utras
. Cce mou-
aux mouvments
trour a,s d'autres ectivites itires cui
mourrai.nt m.ttr- er.drnr..r la --curtc: d'autrE-s ::as.
Acte
b)la tior. ds r.tivLtLs m41ita'rTs suscitent
sus-picions marticul'zbre=,
cue deb a.f.actifs cui..cLrtacl-
rent aux manoeuvres lituires, du nom'cre et dc
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- - ? . _ - -
manoeuvres, noamment cuand elloc sont orcanisees de sorte cu'elles
ruissent corvir d- demonstration de force ou dc mo7en de pression
cur d'autres Itats.
JC voudrais evoquer ce propos 1'importanc9 CL ma
1ar=-'?=c.--o aux
44Li,c
contenu=c dzn= "fc tro,j.et mrsente rar
'ec tays neutres et non-=liEnes(17C-7), a'nc' cue 'a simi'itud.
r"a77roch.s et de sol,utions
tar cc Ere ,;?
7ET la Houmanie. .%ous so--es 1-..uroux do conotator cu'"
mouver.=rtc .=Ens co domane et cue d'=utres ta:cs sont r=lliAa
ovonc coutcnu
c=cc4on
7r.c.sicnte .
1,ous ne considerons nu"ement est Va.:.
rechercheor 1 stade de 'z Con-'4ronc= uno 'in'tat4onesact'vt4=
et doc 'orces--'litaroc
notre continent. 0ous estimons au
contra4re qu'il est de notre devoir de le. faire et de le faire
71us vite tos=itle si nous voulons raliser-comme?nous nous so=0=
'rs-p.s?
de co...?Lnce et
dE securit..i , czr Ia
???????-?????????
espernce de nos na6ionsest justamont-co-.-o il a et,.; dit dans cett=
les
t'uo de confd.ance et 4= 71us de sec -it'.
c)la cr,=?=tion d'un cadre or _ 4'4nr-r,
?
".???????.????????? ??????? ...ow.
????,
- - -
'2. 1 t. r c ont-- _cs
oir=nts sur les 7roi.emes re'ztif= 7a confiance et la =4curte
et 70..:r prevenir et t:ouver d.= co'utons aux c'tuationc
7ar=i' L:adr
l'avcns deL
Cr.n
etate- come no
precise -7=r 11,Ltalc'icsem=nt l'a'scnc
72." .t.1.=X ?Iltr? 1== 35 'tats 7articitants, zinsi cue par,
l'or;-anisation des reunions des re-oresentants de cas pa:s ap7e1(!es
examnor 1 is en cuvr d.es mcsuroc de confianc,- et de sj?curit
coront a,4omtoes par la Conference.
?
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dYL'adoption d'un= L,er?1ar=t4,-,n
1'.mr1oi de le force.
Dans cc domain i1 y a Aral.ment un certain prorrLs,
mas nous sommes encore loin de cc cue devrait contenir 19 futur
accord. de1e?7ation voudrait creciser quiune sie -,-,L=ff'---.7,tion
du principe du non-r=-cours a i m.n=c= ou 1?.mm1o' d. lz force
ne nous sat'.f=-, m=s. Lea detata on montr4 qu'un nomtre croissent
d'Ztata participants son: du m;Ime avis.
AL:)
-a :-.cumani. = 77' Corf--1r=-:- les
on: drr.r a
4,,,
:eclaration sur 1. non-recours a '7 r=nae?= cu a 1'.r '710 dr 7;7'
force est plus cue necessaire dans les circonstances nt.rnationales
actu.11== ..t =n mgr. temrs conforme aux dispositions
de 11:,cte final de 1-:e1sin,:i et du :ocument d= cl3tur. de 1= ..eunon
de :adrid. Je n'ai :as l'intention revenir. Ce voudrais
c-'un. par.'11. Lec1=."-atior m=-7uersit
pa= vera un 4vrntu.1 1r=4te europL.n en la matis.re, devrait
so,-'omorr.rrer as
ecalem=nt indiquer les v-ice las
"-, -2-"-c,-,,,
Am 4".1 ??? ??? -.... .4.?
s'=bst=nir r'an= leurs r=1at4on= mutuell.s, ainsi
..urs rel=ton. 'nt.rn7tion=1e. .n t--neral, de recour
men=c,_ al'=mplo' 1= foren
Cu
'
'-comp=ttl. ev=c 1=s buts
rim=
soit contre
t=rr'toriz_
_ta 4. t so": toute eut- mar :1,r
, .
:setions SPr'n,ipes
inscrits dans final de Helsini.
7our cc cul est de la verific'ation, ma d.ilerztion
=',=r ti=nt tou,jourc aux ccn=4derations c:u'elle a da
d.vant 17 Con'erence,
?
son tznt cor=-- ."-- a- 7 d
:4 4 e a c, indicue
-
cue les mesures de confiance et de securit,5 .oi=nt assorties de
formes adequates de verification corres.pondent a leur contenu.
88
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I,onsieur le 7-'r=dPnt,
?.Jos
La Conference dispose actue'lem=nt du cadre officiel
et non-officil de travail. ln definissant la structure de travail de
la Conference ,nous avons etcbli,en principe,la structure M;ME du
futur accord et, a notre connaissance, aucun ta:'s participant n'a
:as retire son accord sur le compromis realise a la session precidente.
:1 faut donc poursuivre le chemin sur lequel nous nous somm.s
at marveni- un accord accettab'e pour tous, 1 un accord qui puisse
la heunion
d. Vi.nn. d'elaborer
7 ?????, .;
??? C. C.
tour la
deuime ;hose atte7Le dr%-7otte,-. Ic 1770CeSZE
Stockholn et 1 convenir des m.=ur.s de desarm.m.nt.
sores du meme avis ex7rime
faut procresser en allant
*64
tar d'autres
au comm7e;._e
et qu'il n. faut 7as attendre la solution des probnmes controverses
::cuspouvons avanc.r mar=71.'e-..nt: risoudre d'atord 1.= questions
7_us sizzles oL l'accord est possible et chercher en maie tea,
un .mr4t dc borne volonte et de cooperation, des solutions auY.
7ro'cl'emes mlus diffici'es. :1 ne faut tas m.-Are de re non r'u-
que le temps dont nous disposons est limite et qu'il passe
tr.es vie.
:;ous avcns l'avanta,7e, ?rs'd-nt,
sccourus ,'=n= c.tt. ie, par d,_'s ccordonoteurs dont
1,.enne fot,
la coo.rtence et la Eent_llesse sont au-duc de tot sou7;on.. :1
donnr tout notr., ,--- et de leur
confionce.
Cont-&-nc
I.onsieur le ?resident ,
J'ai commence mon intervention en disant cu= 'a
Stockholm est entrac dams as :ase decissive- la phase
de la redaction du document final. Le temps pour les dissertations,
la 7n losophie et les de:cats thecriques est deja 'revolu. Les orEanes
89
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_o_
dr, tr.,-va" ont cress 1;cur necocier e rd-icer les textes A?,
document final de la Conference. :;os delezations se sont enEares
resccter ausai tien les structures de nerociation que les fanctions
qui leur cnt ete attritu4==. la'heu-=u==m=nt 7;as tou,;ours et tas
par -tout cet eeent est
r==^=cte'
:La delecation rouma4n= a 'ait 7r.uve, c7-7 d'=ut-=.7.
de1.4.7a--..tions 1 'ont fait aUSSi, d' esTrit de corr.-cromis et de cooreration
=n revenant sur ce-ta.'r== d= sespa cr.= ou =n "=' ==ant :our u-ne
etars u" t=ri sure 1c.ies ,..zn== des prop'ositions qu. elle
prscnC..
'=- Conf=r=ncr.. ::ou= att=ndon= et nous
-taus nos zartersaircs de necociations ssent leur it d=
car c' est la .seule voie qui pourrait nous amener accord..
1a de' ;ration de mon pays est prte 1 oeuvrer aussi
dans les ==ma'n=s
-
conc=rt avec 7 =s autres d-a:ans,
recherche des =0" u.t4 ons d.c com-oromis qui tiennent compte des
inte-sts dE sAcurita de tou.s 1=s Ltats rdarticimants.
Calles sant , ' den , 7 == rZ.r7 7.-i on.:
cuela on de 7r..ouz?z?nie youdrait tarta:er, stade- 11
? -
t-a7au.7. r=nc= ,aux di=tin.;:u== r=mr=s,=?tta.:_
7Zy.T.
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01191
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
FEBRUARY 10-14, 1986
1. CDE IX - 051
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT: THE
CONFERENCE CONTINUED TO MOVE IN FITS AND STARTS TOWARDS
DRAFTING. THE EAST HAS CLEARLY BEEN THROWN OFF BALANCE
BY NATO'S ACTIVISM ON DRAFTING; EASTERN DELEGATES ARGUE,
UNCONVINCINGLY, THAT WESTERN "COUNTERCONCESSIONS" TO THE
JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV STATEMENT ARE NEEDED BEFORE SERIOUS
DRAFTING CAN BEGIN. HOWEVER, THEY APPEARED TO BE READY
TO DRAFT ON UNCONTENTIOUS ISSUES. THIS TIME IT WAS THE
NNA WHO INDICATED THAT THEY WERE NOT READY TO DRAFT. THE
SWEDES AND OTHER NNA WANTED TO DELAY DRAFTING TO BE SURE
THAT SC.7 POSITIONS DID NOT GET LOST AS EAST AND WEST
AGREED ON COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. THIS APPROACH IS BOTH
DILATORY AND DANGEROUS AND WE HAVE TOLD THE NNA SO IN NO
UNCERTAIN TERMS. (A WORLDNET INTERVIEW BY AMBASSADOR
BARRY LAMENTING NNA "HESITANCY" ALSO HAD AN IMPACT IN
NNA CAPITALS.) BY THE END OF THE WEEK THE NNA WERE BACK
ON TRACK EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR DRAFTING. NATO CONTINUED
TO TABLE TEXTS BASED ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED IN ALL OF THE
GROUPS WHERE WE HAVE PROPOSALS. SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT
WAS REGISTERED ON THE OBSERVATION ISSUE WHEN THE EAST,
FOR THE FIRST TIME, PROPOSED THAT OBSERVERS MUST BE
INVITED FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES; THE EAST ALSO
IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT VERIFICATION MAY BE
CONSIDERED BEFORE OTHER MEASURES ARE AGREED AND SOMETHING
BEYOND NTM'S AND "GOOD WILL" MAY BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY
COMPLIANCE. FOR PRIMARILY TACTICAL REASONS, THE EAST
CONTINUED TO COURT THE NNA BY INCORPORATING SOME OF THE
NNA APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS IN THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. IN
THE ABSENCE OF A WESTERN POSITION ON NUF, THE U.S.
CONTINUED TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A NUF SECTION,
E.G., EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ON
THE MARGINS OF THE CONFERENCE THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE IT
CLEAR THAT THEY ARE EAGER TO PIN DOWN A CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE
AGENDA OF A RESUMED STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE EAST IS
BEGINNING TO ACKNOWLEDGE, IF NOT ACCEPT, OUR MESSAGE
THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION IS THE BOTTOM LINE FOR THE U.S.
TO ACCEPT A CDE AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY AND GENERAL
ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: ON FEBRUARY 11 THE GDR TABLED LANGUAGE
ON THE METHOD OF NOTIFICATION OF MULTINATIONAL MILITARY
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED "IN THE SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR
SPACE ADJOINING EUROPE." TAKEN AT FACE VALUE, THE TEXT
AGAIN REGISTERS EASTERN REJECTION OF THE FUNCTIONAL
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APPROACH IN THE ADJOINING AREAS. ANOTHER INDICATION OF
THE SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS
REFLECTED IN EASTERN RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS PARAMETERS
FOR NOTIFICATION OR TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED.
THE ISSUE OF WHERE TO NEGOTIATE THE CONTENTS OF A
NOTIFICATION CONTINUES TO BE CONTENTIOUS. SINCE THE EAST
INSISTS ON DISCUSSING SUCH INFORMATION IN THE
INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUP (SEE PARA 7), IT FINDS
ITSELF IN THE UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION OF HAVING NOTHING TO
SAY WHEN, AS OCCURRED THIS WEEK, THE NNA (SWITZERLAND)
AND NATO (U.K.) TABLED TEXTS DESCRIBING THE CONTENTS OF
NOTIFICATION. IT APPEARS THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE
SOVIETS HAVE ISOLATED THEMSELVES FROM BOTH THE WEST AND
THE NNA ON THIS ISSUE. THEY PRESUMABLY WILL CONTINUE TO
ADDRESS NOTIFICATION CONTENTS IN THE INFORMATION/
VERIFICATION GROUP AS A COUNTERBALANCE TO NATO'S
MEASURE 1. DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUP INDICATES
THAT THE NNA AND NATO SHARE SIMILAR CONCEPTIONS OF THE
KIND OF INFORMATION A NOTIFICATION SHOULD CONTAIN.
HOWEVER, THE NNA, CONCERNED WITH FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY
AS INDICATORS OF MILITARY POTENTIAL WHICH COULD PROVE
THREATENING, REQUIRE A MUCH MORE DETAILED ACCOUNTING OF
EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.
5. NUF: ALL SIDES STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED COMMITTING
THEMSELVES TO ACTUAL DRAFTING: THE WEST BECAUSE IT HAS
YET TO GET ITS COLLECTIVE ACT TOGETHER ON NUE; THE NNA
BECAUSE THEY BOTH ANTICIPATE AND FEAR EAST-WEST COLLUSION
ON THE SUBJECT; AND MOST SURPRISINGLY THE EAST, THE
ORIGINAL DEMANDEUR OF NUF, PARTIALLY BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN
THROWN OFF-BALANCE BY WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND THE NUF
AGENDA THIS ROUND. IN FACT, WHEN THE EASTERN NUF
SPOKESMAN (KORMENDY - HUNGARY) WAS ASKED ABOUT THE
NATURE OF THE THREE EASTERN TEXTS INTRODUCED THAT WEEK,
HE REPLIED THAT THEY MERELY REPRESENT "ELEMENTS WHICH
COULD FIGURE IN A NUF ACCORD" RATHER THAN ACTUAL DRAFT
TEXTS. THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) HAS
REGISTERED SOME COMMON GROUND IN THE WORKING GROUP BY
NOTING THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS HAVE AGREED THAT THERE MUST
BE A NUF-CSBM'S LINK AND SOME REFERENCE TO COMMITMENT TO
THE HELSINKI FINAL DOCUMENT IN ANY STOCKHOLM ACCORD. THE
U.S. STRESSED THAT THIS COMMITMENT MUST REFLECT ALL THE
PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT, INCLUDING
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE ACT. THE MERE MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AN
UNDERSTANDABLY NEURALGIC POINT FOR THE EAST, PROMPTED
THE (USSR) AND (YUGOSLAVIA) TO ACCUSE THE U.S. OF
INTRODUCING INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECTS INTO THE NUF DEBATE.
DESPITE THE LACK OF AN AGREED ALLIED NUF TEXT, WE HAVE
MADE SOME PROGRESS BOTH WITH OUR ALLIES AND IN THE
RELEVANT WORKING GROUP IN DEFINING THE AGENDA. MOST OF
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OUR ALLIES NOW SEEM TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NON-FIRST-USE
LANGUAGE FROM THE BONN DECLARATION AND LANGUAGE
DELIMITING AND DEFINING THE NUF PRINCIPLE DOES NOT
BELONG IN THE NUF SECTION OF ANY FINAL DOCUMENT. IN THE
WORKING GROUPS WE ARE GRADUALLY INTRODUCING WESTERN
CONCEPTS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND TREATY COMPLIANCE INTO
THE NUF DIALOGUE, MUCH TO THE CONSTERNATION OF THE
EAST. OUR EFFORT TO REDEFINE THE NUF AGENDA HAS MET
WITH PREDICTABLE EASTERN OPPOSITION, BUT ALSO WITH A
DISTURBING LACK OF SYMPATHY BY SOME OF THE NNA.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE LEAST SYMPATHETIC OF THE NNA (CYPRUS,
YUGOSLAVIA, AND MALTA) SEEM TO BE ON THE ASCENDANCY IN
THE WORKING GROUP AS THE MORE PRO-WESTERN DELEGATIONS
(AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) ARE CONCENTRATING
THEIR EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS.
6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THIS
WEEK'S DEVELOPMENTS CENTERED ON VERIFICATION BOTH IN AND
OUTSIDE OF THE WORKING GROUP. THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IN
WORKING GROUP A-2 ITSELF WAS TABLING OF EASTERN DRAFT
LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION WHICH EMPHASIZED NTM'S AS THE
PRIMARY INSTRUMENT OF VERIFICATION AND PROPOSED THAT ANY
QUESTIONS ABOUT NONCOMPLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE
ACCOMPANIED BY PROOF AND RESOLVED THROUGH A CONSULTATIVE
PROCEDURE. THE EAST PROBABLY WOULD INSIST ON A
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS -- WITH THE BURDEN ON THE PARTY
QUESTIONING COMPLIANCE TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS DOUBTS --
BEFORE AGREEING EVEN TO AN NNA-STYLE OBSERVATION ON
REQUEST. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EASTERN TEXT IS THAT
IT REPRESENTS THE FIRST WTO ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT
1) DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION CAN BEGIN BEFORE AGREEMENT
ON SPECIFIC MEASURES IS REACHED, AND 2) SOMETHING BEYOND
NTM'S AND "GOODWILL" MAY BE RECUIRED TO VERIFY
COMPLIANCE. THE U.S. POCKETED THE TWO TACIT
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND SUGGESTED THAT WE NOW BEGIN DRAFTING
A VERIFICATION MEASURE. THE EAST FINALLY SEEMS TO HAVE
GOTTEN THE MESSAGE THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS ISSUE.
THE SOVIETS ALSO APPEAR TO VIEW THE NNA'S "OBSERVATION
ON REQUEST" PROPOSAL AS POINTING THE WAY TO A POSSIBLE
VERIFICATION COMPROMISE (POSSIBLY TIED TO DROPPING
CONSTRAINTS), ALTHOUGH THEY PUBLICLY LINE UP BEHIND THE
YUGOSLAV POSITION THAT SUCH A MEASURE IS TIED TO
CONFERENCE ACCEPTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS. WE ARE MAKING IT
PLAIN THAT OBSERVATION ON REQUEST IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US.
THERE WERE NO SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENTS ON INFORMATION,
BUT THE USSR CONTINUED ITS UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO
PREVENT DISCUSSION OF INDEPENDENT INFORMATION IN THE
INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUP. NATO HAS BEEN FIRM IN
RESISTING THIS SOVIET PLOY.
7. OBSERVATION: THERE WAS MOVEMENT IN OBSERVATION THIS
WEEK ON THE ISSUE OF INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL
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PARTICIPATING STATES. POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI'S
TABLING OF TEN IDEAS FOR OBSERVATION IN WORKING GROUP AB
REPRESENTS THE EAST'S FIRST CONCRETE OBSERVATION
PROPOSAL. WHILE SOME OF KONARSKI'S IDEAS ARE
UNACCEPTABLE, HE DID OFFER THE FIRST EXPLICIT RECOGNITION
THAT THE EAST ACCEPTS THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM
ALL PARTICIPATING STATES; THIS WAS CONFIRMED IN DRAFTING
LANGUAGE TABLED BY POLAND IN THE WORKING GROUP MEETING.
THE EAST HAS YET TO ACKNOWLEDGE, HOWEVER, THAT OBSERVERS
FROM ALL STATES WILL BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES. THIS POSITION, AS WELL AS THEIR REFUSAL TO
SERIOUSLY DISCUSS THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION, IS CLEARLY
TIED TO THE EASTERN VIEW THAT THE TYPE OF ACTIVITIES TO
BE NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED MUST BE DECIDED FIRST. THE NNA
MADE AN EFFORT TO DOWNPLAY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR
POSITION ON DURATION OF OBSERVATION (ONCE THE NOTIFIABLE
THRESHOLD IS REACHED) AND NATO'S (FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE ACTIVITY); SOME SENTIMENT IS BEING EXPRESSED THAT
THIS COULD BE A RIPE AREA FOR AN ACCOMMODATION AT THE
RIGHT MOMENT. THE WEST CONTINUED TO TABLE SC.1 TEXT BUT
SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO REACH CONSENSUS ON ISSUES RIPE FOR
DRAFTING (E.G., INVITATION). IN THIS REGARD THE FINNISH
COORDINATOR HAS DISCREETLY OFFERED A COMPROMISE TEXT TO
REPRESENTATIVES ON BOTH SIDES ON THE INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE.
8. ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINTS: AS IN PREVIOUS WEEKS,
THE WEST FOCUSED ON FORECASTS; THE EAST AND NNA PREFERRED
TO DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS -- THE EAST FOR TACTICAL REASONS
(TO ISOLATE THE WEST AT NO RISK TO WARSAW PACT SECURITY
INTERESTS), THE NNA BECAUSE IT IS THEIR "BABY," BUT ALSO
BECAUSE MOST OF THEM BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MEASURE WOULD
BEST PROTECT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS.
FORECASTS: THE WEST TABLED MORE LANGUAGE FROM
SC.1/AMPLIFIED. BULGARIA AND TURKEY CONTINUED THEIR
EXCHANGE FROM LAST WEEK ON HOW THE CDE ZONE SHOULD BE
REFERRED TO IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST TEXTS. THE NNA, FOR
THE FIRST TIME, TOOK UP DISCUSSION OF DRAFT FORECAST
LANGUAGE IN THIS WORKING GROUP (RATHER THAN INSISTING ON
DISCUSSING THEIR FORECAST MEASURE WITH NOTIFICATION).
WHILE THE NNA WELCOMED THE WESTERN FORECASTS TEXT, THEY
DID CRITICIZE THE PROVISION IN THE NATO MEASURE WHICH
WOULD ALLOW A STATE TO CHANGE INFORMATION IN THE
FORECAST, OR TO ADD NEW INFORMATION, AT THE TIME OF
NOTIFICATION, SEEING IN IT A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE.
CONSTRAINTS: IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE BLUNTLY
TOLD THE SWEDES AND OTHERS THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT
CONSTRAINTS SUCH AS THE NNA/EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A LIMIT
ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES; WE HAVE SUGGESTED
THAT THE NNA FOCUS ON THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF
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FORECASTS INSTEAD. BULGARIA INTRODUCED A TEXT DRAWN
FROM ITS NNA-INSPIRED PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 7 CALLING FOR
A CEILING FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFICATION LEVEL AND A LIMIT
OF 15 DAYS ON THE DURATION OF NOTIFIABLE MANEUVERS. THE
WTO HOPES TO COURT FAVOR WITH THE NNA BY ADOPTING
ELEMENTS OF THEIR APPROACH ON CONSTRAINTS, BUT THE
NEUTRALS ARE SUSPICIOUS; THEY DO NOT BELIEVE SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR CONSTRAINTS IS SINCERE AND FEAR THAT THE
EAST WILL USE THE ISSUE AS TRADING MATERIAL WITH THE
WEST.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01149
SUBJECT: WHITHER CDE?
1. CDE IX-048. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TEETERS ON
THE BRINK OF DRAFTING. NATO SOUNDS EAGER TO START; THE
WARSAW PACT ARGUES UNCONVINCINGLY THAT WESTERN "COUNTER-
CONCESSIONS" ARE NEEDED FIRST. THE NNA ARE MOST HESITANT
OF ALL, FEARING AN EAST-WEST DEAL OVER THEIR HEADS. US
"OPTIMISM" IS DRIVING THE RUSSIANS WILD, AND EVIDENT GAPS
ARE APPEARING BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MEMBERS OF
THEIR DELEGATION. WE EXPECT PRESSURE TO BUILD ON US TO
INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES IN NOTIFICATIONS BUT
ARE SIGNALING THAT THIS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THRESH-
OLDS AND NUF ARE THE TWO KEY ISSUES FOR NATO AT PRESENT;
A FIRM IDEA OF WHERE WE WANT TO GO WILL BE NEEDED BY THE
BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY
3. AS I HAVE DONE PERIODICALLY I'D LIKE TO GIVE MY
PERSONAL OVERVIEW OF HOW CDE IS DEVELOPING. IT CONTINUES
TO BE A MADDENINGLY SLOW PROCESS. NOW THAT WE HAVE
DECIDED WE WANT TO DRAFT, THE EAST AND THE NNA THINK IT
IS A TRICK AND ARE RUNNING THE OTHER WAY. WITH LUCK,
WE'LL CATCH UP WITH THEM IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS AND MADRID-
STYLE UNBRACKETED DRAFTING WILL BEGIN. BUT IT WON'T BE
EASY.
4. THE EAST ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT BEFORE PRODUCTIVE
DRAFTING CAN BEGIN, THE WEST MUST ANNOUNCE SOME "COUNTER-
CONCESSIONS" TO RECIPROCATE FOR GORBACHEV'S "DEFERRAL"
OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE ALSO THREATENING TO
REOPEN PROCEDURAL DISPUTES ABOUT INTERPRETATION OF THE
OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT CONSIGNING SUBJECTS TO WORKING
GROUPS. ON THE WHOLE THEY ARE LOOKING CLUMSY AND DIS-
ORGANIZED; THEY KNOW IT AND THIS MAKES THEM ANGRY AND
NERVOUS.
5. THE NNA, IRONICALLY, ARE LOOKING EVEN WORSE. THEY
FEAR THAT EAST AND WEST WILL STRIKE A DEAL WHICH LEAVES
THEM AND THEIR PROPOSALS OUT. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED THAT THE EAST WILL DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR CON-
STRAINTS IF THE WEST STOPS INSISTING ON INSPECTIONS (IN
FACT THE SOVIETS ARE DROPPING SUCH HINTS). THE SWEDES
IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN SAYING IT'S TOO EARLY TO DRAFT,
THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE AN "OVERVIEW" FIRST. (THIS LED
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AND ME TO MARCH UP TO THE HEAD OF
THE SWEDISH DELEGATION AT A FEBRUARY 12 RECEPTION BY THE
SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER AND TELL HIM THAT EAST AND WEST
AGREED THAT IT WAS TIME TO QUIT STALLING AND DRAFT.) MY
COMMENTS ABOUT NNA "HESITANCY" IN A FEBRUARY 11 WORLDNET
INTERVIEW HAVE ALSO REVERBERATED IN NNA CAPITALS, WITH
THE RESULT THAT MOST NNA DELEGATIONS ARE BEING FORCED TO
PROCLAIM THEIR INNOCENCE TO THEIR MINISTRIES.
6. THE SOVIETS ARE BEING DRIVEN WILD BY OUR LINE -
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USED OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE WHERE THEY CAN'T RESPOND -
THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT OF JANUARY 15 MAKES US
OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION IN
STOCKHOLM. IN THE CORRIDORS, NATO IS ECHOING OUR VIEWS
THAT THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT INSPECTION,
FORCING THE SOVIETS TO PROTEST DEFENSIVELY THAT ARMS
REDUCTIONS WARRANT INSPECTION BUT CSBMS DO NOT. MOST
ALLIES ARE STICKING WITH THIS POSITION BUT SOME (FRANCE,
IN PARTICULAR) ARE PRIVATELY PERSUADED THAT THE MOST WE
CAN GET IS THE LEAKY NNA CONCEPT OF "OBSERVATION ON
REQUEST."
7. IF WE ARE ABLE TO GET SOME NON-CONTROVERSIAL LANGUAGE
DRAFTED THIS ROUND IN SEVERAL, IF NOT ALL WORKING GROUPS,
WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED OUR OWN GOAL AND KEPT THE TACTICAL
ADVANTAGE. BUT IN THE APRIL-MAY ROUND PRESSURE WILL
BUILD FROM THE NNA AND OUR OWN ALLIES TO AGREE TO THE
SOVIET POSITION ON INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES.
OUR ANSWER WILL OF COURSE BE NO. BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT
A NEW POSITION ON THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION, OBSERVA-
TION AND FORECASTING WILL TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF AND
PERMIT DRAFTING TO GO FORWARD ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.
THE DELEGATION RECOMMENDATION ON THRESHOLDS IS BEING SENT
BY SEPTEL; I SIMPLY WANT TO FLAG THE ISSUE AS BEING
CRITICAL TO PROGRESS ON ALL OF OUR CSBMS.
8. BY SPRING WE WILL ALSO NEED TO HAVE OUR NATO DUCKS
IN LINE ON NUF SO THAT WE CAN TABLE PARAGRAPHS PIECEMEAL
AS THE NUF DISCUSSION PROGRESSES. GIVEN THE VARIETY OF
VIEWS ON NUF WITHIN NATO AND THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE IS
BEING DEALT WITH IN THE EC AS WELL, GETTING OUR ACT
TOGETHER WILL NOT BE EASY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CAN
EXPECT INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THE EAST TO BEGIN DRAFTING
ON NUF TO MAINTAIN "PARALLEL" PROGRESS ON ALL PARTS OF A
FINAL AGREEMENT.
9. IN MY VIEW WE WILL ONLY GET WHAT WE NEED ON INSPEC-
TIONS IF THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT ON OTHER AREAS BY JULY
AND IT IS PLAIN TO THE SOVIETS THAT A FINAL CONCESSION
ON INSPECTIONS WILL GUARANTEE SUCCESS HERE. I AM NOT
NEARLY SO OPTIMISTIC AS I SOUND PUBLICLY THAT THIS CAN
BE DONE IN THE TIME REMAINING, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE.
BARRY
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C ONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01257
SUBJECT: DATES FOR NEXT PRE-ROUND CDE-NAC MEETING
1. CDE IX - 056
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ON FEBRUARY 19 THE CDE NATO CAUCUS AGREED
AD REFERENDUM TO SYG CARRINGTON'S PROPOSAL FOR A
PRE-ROUND X REINFORCED NAC ON MONDAY MORNING APRIL 14,
TO BE FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SYG FOR
HEADS OF DELEGATION AND PERMREPS. THE CAUCUS ALSO
AGREED TO HOLD ITS PRE-NAC MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON
SUNDAY, APRIL 13. HEADS OF DELEGATION WOULD PLAN TO
RETURN TO STOCKHOLM ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 14.
BARRY
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01296
SUBJECT: NUF: RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO THE EC-12 AND
U.S. TEXTS AND FUTURE DRAFTING
REF: STOCKHOLM 1259
1. CDE IX - 062
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 20 NATO CAUCUS
AMBASSADORS FOCUSED ON THE EC-12 NUF TEXT AND WHAT TO DO
WITH IT. U.S. REGISTERED ITS STRONG OBJECTIONS TO
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN "SECURITY" MATTERS.
NEVERTHELESS, IN THE INTERESTS OF DRAFTING A COMMON NUF
TEXT FOR THE 16 SOONEST, WE ARE PREPARED TO USE THE
COMMUNITY'S DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING A COMMON NATO
POSITION ON THE SUBJECT. DELEGATION INTENDS TO
INTRODUCE ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. DRAFT INTO THE EC-12
DRAFT TO MAKE IT MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THE BROADER U.S.
APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE. WE ALSO PREFER TO
INTRODUCE THE EVENTUAL NATO DRAFT IN A PIECEMEAL FASHION
IN ORDER TO BETTER CONTROL THE PACE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF
DRAFTING IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP. THE FRENCH HAVE
PLAYED A PARTICULARLY MISCHIEVOUS AND TROUBLING ROLE IN
THIS WHOLE QUESTION. ACTION REQUESTED PARA 9. END
SUMMARY.
4. THE NATO CAUCUS CONVENED A SPECIAL HEADS-PLUS-ONE
MEETING TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE ON WEDNESDAY,
FEBRUARY 20. THE MAIN TOPIC ON THE AGENDA WAS THE EC-12
NUF DRAFT, WHICH HAS BEEN TABLED IN THE HAGUE (SEE
REFTEL). THE AD REFERENDUM TEXT IS SUBJECT TO THE
SILENCE PROCEDURE UNTIL MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24. IF THERE
ARE NO NATIONAL COMMENTS BY THAT TIME THE TEXT WILL BE
INTRODUCED INTO THE CAUCUS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE 16
ON TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25.
5. AMBASSADOR BARRY LED OFF CAUCUS DISCUSSION BY
REACTING STRONGLY AND NEGATIVELY BOTH TO THE MEDIUM AND
THE MESSAGE OF THE EC-12 DRAFT. ON THE MEDIUM (THE
COMMUNITY'S SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE) BARRY STRESSED
THAT NATO -- NOT THE EC-12 -- WAS THE PROPER VENUE TO
DISCUSS SECURITY ISSUES; ONLY IN ALLIANCE COUNCILS AND
CAUCUSES CAN THE INTERESTS OF ALL ALLIES BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT. NOT SURPRISINGLY, TURKEY, CANADA, AND NORWAY
SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITION. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS),
SPEAKING IN THE CAPACITY OF THE DUTCH EC-12 PRESIDENCY,
MAINTAINED THAT COMMUNITY EFFORTS WERE INTENDED TO
CONTRIBUTE TO NATO'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON NUF;
I.E., THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO INTRODUCE AN EC-12 TEXT
INTO THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL. BUWALDA DEFENDED THE
RIGHT OF THE COMMUNITY TO TAKE UP "POLITICAL" MATTERS
AND NOTED, SOMEWHAT SARCASTICALLY, THAT THE 12 HAD TAKEN
UP NUF BECAUSE NATO EFFORTS ON THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN
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"BLOCKED" BY "CERTAIN" COUNTRIES, I.E., THE U.S. A
LENGTHY EXCHANGE FOLLOWED BUWALDA'S INTERVENTION WITH
OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS FEELING COMPELLED TO DEFEND,
ALBEIT TEPIDLY. THE COMMUNITY'S PREROGATIVES ON
"POLITICAL" MATTERS. WE SEE THE NOT-SO-INVISIBLE HAND
OF PARIS IN BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND THE TACTICS OF THE
COMMUNITY NUF EFFORTS. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE OF
THE EC-12 TEXT WE ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS, I.E., IT GOES TOO
FAR ON DELIMITING THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND NOT FAR ENOUGH
IN DETAILING COLLATERAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS.
NEVERTHELESS, THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF
SOME URGENCY THAT THE WEST FORMULATE A COMMON NUF TEXT
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"BLOCKED" BY "CERTAIN" COUNTRIES, I.E., THE U.S. A
LENGTHY EXCHANGE FOLLOWED BUWALDA'S INTERVENTION WITH
OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS FEELING COMPELLED TO DEFEND,
ALBEIT TEPIDLY. THE COMMUNITY'S PREROGATIVES ON
"POLITICAL" MATTERS. WE SEE THE NOT-SO-INVISIBLE HAND
OF PARIS IN BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND THE TACTICS OF THE
COMMUNITY NUF EFFORTS. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE OF
THE EC-12 TEXT WE ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS, I.E., IT GOES TOO
FAR ON DELIMITING THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND NOT FAR ENOUGH
IN DETAILING COLLATERAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS.
NEVERTHELESS, THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF
SOME URGENCY THAT THE WEST FORMULATE A COMMON NUF TEXT
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FOLLOWING POINTS ARE COVERED:
-- THE CSBM-NUF LINK; I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S GIVE EFFECT
AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE;
-- THE UNIVERSAL NUF COMMITMENT AS SET FORTH IN THE UN
CHARTER;
-- PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT PRINCIPLES;
-- ELEMENTS CLEARLY AIMED AT SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
THE NUF PRINCIPLE SUCH AS ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND
AFGHANISTAN REFERENCES.
-- FINALLY, THE TEXT SHOULD CONVEY THE OVERALL WESTERN
CONCEPT OF SECURITY, WHICH INCLUDES SUCH PRINCIPLES AS
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
HUMAN RIGHTS.
6. WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. UNDERSTANDABLY FROM ITS
PERSPECTIVE, THE EAST HAS BEGUN TO PRESS THE WEST TO
JOIN THE EAST AND THE NNA IN INTRODUCING NUF TEXTS FOR
WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION. THE SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN
(THE EASTERN SPOKESPERSON) REPS WARN DARKLY THAT IF
THERE IS NO PROGRESS DRAFTING ON NUF THERE CAN BE NO
PROGRESS ON DRAFTING CONCRETE CSBM'S. SINCE NATO HAS
INTRODUCED VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED
VERBATIM, THE EAST NOW THREATENS TO FOLLOW A SIMILAR
PROCEDURE WITH THE SOVIET DRAFT NUF TREATY (SC.6).
HUNGARY HAS ALREADY INTRODUCED THE EAST'S NO-FIRST-USE
LANGUAGE FROM SC.6. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE EASTERN
HUFFING AND PUFFING, WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION, UNDER THE
GUIDANCE OF THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) HAS
FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CORE NUF ELEMENTS: NUF-CSBM'S
LINK, THE COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; AND THE
UNIVERSAL CHARACTER OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THIS HAS BEEN
DUE, IN NO SMALL MEASURE, TO ALLIED SOLIDARITY IN THE
WORKING GROUP. THE U.S. DELEGATION, MOREOVER, HAS BEGUN
TO INTRODUCE GRADUALLY NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE NUF
DIALOGUE, MUCH TO THE CONSTERNATION OF THE EAST AND TO
THE INITIAL CONFUSION OF THE NNA AND EVEN SOME OF OUR
ALLIES. OVER THE PAST WEEKS WE HAVE DISCUSSED, FOR
EXAMPLE, THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TREATY
COMPLIANCE TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE. IN THE WORKING GROUP
WE HAVE ALSO BROACHED THE TOPIC OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AND
EQUAL DUTIES OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. IT IS OUR
INTENTION TO MAKE SURE THAT THESE, AS WELL AS OTHER
WESTERN CONCEPTS, BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND ACCEPTED PART
OF THE NUF AGENDA IN STOCKHOLM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01648
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:
AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN, AMBASSADOR BARRY,
WARREN ZIMMERMANN; WITH HEAD OF SOVIET CDE DELEGATION,
AMBASSADOR O.A. GRINEVSKY, FEBRUARY 21, 1986
1. CDE IX - 088
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN AND AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY BRIEFLY
DISCUSSED THEIR PERSONAL VIEWS OF EACH OTHER'S
NEGOTIATION. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD BEEN
READING AMBASSADOR BARRY'S REPORTING CABLES, HE WAS
COMPELLED TO RATION HIS READING TIME AND THEREFORE WAS
NOT TOO FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE STOCKHOLM
NEGOTIATIONS. IN GENEVA HE HAD JUST HAD OCCASION TO
MEET WITH FIRST DEPUTY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO
AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING
TEAM IN GENEVA HAD VERY CAPABLE PEOPLE IN IT WITH MANY
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN ARMS CONTROL MATTERS.
GRINEVSKY THOUGHT THAT THE TEAMS IN GENEVA ON BOTH SIDES
WERE VERY CAPABLE.
KAMPELMAN NOTED THAT HE WAS THE LEAST EXPERIENCED AMONG
OUR PEOPLE IN GENEVA.
GRINEVSKY SAID THAT PERHAPS IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE SOMEONE
LIKE THAT BRING A FRESH VIEWPOINT TO THE NEGOTIATING
TABLE.
KAMPELMAN SAID THAT IN OUR SYSTEM WHEN ANYONE WAS
APPOINTED AMBASSADOR, THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE HOLDS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS. WHEN HE WAS
APPOINTED, A SENATOR WHO WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF HIS AND
THUS NOT AT ALL OPPOSED TO THE NOMINATION, HAD ASKED HIM
IF HE WOULD NOT FEEL AT A DISADVANTAGE IN GENEVA WHEN HE
COUNTED THE TOTAL YEARS OF EXPERIENCE OF PEOPLE LIKE
KARPOV, OBUKHOV, AND KVITSINKY, WITH WHOM HE WOULD HAVE
TO DEAL. AT THAT POINT ANOTHER SENATOR MADE THE POINT
GRINEVSKY HAD JUST EXPRESSED -- THAT SOMETIMES IT IS
DESIRABLE TO BRING IN SOMEONE WITH A NEW PERSPECTIVE.
HE ASKED GRINEVSKY WHAT HE HEARD FROM GENEVA.
GRINEVSKY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE TEAMS THERE WERE HARD
AT WORK, YET SO FAR THERE WERE NO VISIBLE RESULTS HE
COULD DISCERN.
KAMPELMAN REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID TO THE PRESS HERE IN
STOCKHOLM TODAY. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE HAD BEEN MORE
MOVEMENT IN GENEVA THAN HE HAD EXPECTED TO SEE AT THIS
STAGE. IN REALITY, ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES THE TWO SIDES
WERE STILL VERY FAR APART BUT IT SHOULD BE REALIZED THAT
THOSE TALKS WERE VERY COMPLEX, THAT THE SIDES HAD VERY
DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL
INTERESTS AND DIFFERENT VALUES, AND THAT THERE WAS STILL
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A GREAT DEAL OF MISTRUST BETWEEN THEM. IT TAKES TIME TO
ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES HAD MADE
SOME MOVEMENT WAS IN HIS VIEW USEFUL. HE COULD VERY WELL
UNDERSTAND THE FEELING OF IMPATIENCE BUT HE THOUGHT THAT
ALL HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS NO ADVANTAGE IN
DELAY. HE APPRECIATED THAT AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT WE
WERE LOOKING FOR DELAY. IT WAS SIMPLY THAT THE PROCESS
INVOLVED TOOK TIME; WE THEREFORE HAD TO BE PATIENT WITH
EACH OTHER.
BARRY NOTED THAT UNLIKE THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS, THE
GENEVA TALKS WERE NOT COVERED BY AN ESTABLISHED ADJOURN-
MENT DATE.
KAMPELMAN THOUGHT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO HAVE A
CERTAIN ADJOURNMENT DATE FOR THE GENEVA TALKS AS WELL.
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS THE SOVIET SIDE
HAD SUGGESTED SETTING SUCH A DATE BUT THE U.S. HAD
OBJECTED. TOWARD THE END OF THE MADRID ROUND HE HAD
CONSULTED WITH KOVALEV AND KONDRASHEV AND TOLD THEM THAT
HE WAS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THAT A FINAL DATE BE SET.
BOTH HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO RAISE
NEW ISSUES IN MOSCOW.
GRINEVSKY POINTED OUT THAT IN SOME WAY KAMPELMAN'S TALKS
WERE IN ANY EVENT GOVERNED BY A TARGET DATE. HE RECALLED
THE SITUATION AT THE SALT I NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE STAFFS
HAD TO WORK DAY AND NIGHT IN ORDER TO MEET THE PRACTICAL
DEADLINE OF THE 1972 MOSCOW SUMMIT.
KAMPELMANN POINTED OUT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING A FIRM DATE
BE SET FOR COMPLETION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, FOR EVENTS
ELSEWHERE WOULD PROBABLY OVERTAKE A FIRM DATE IN ANY
EVENT. HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO
HAVE ONE FOR THE VIENNA TALKS.
GRINEVSKY ASKED KAMPELMAN HOW THE STOCKHOLM CDE WORK
LOOKED TO HIM FROM GENEVA.
KAMPELMAN SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED THAT QUESTION AT THE
PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY. HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE DETAILS
OF CDE WORK HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN GENEVA IN ANY SUBSTAN-
TIVE DETAIL. HE DID READ BARRY'S CABLES OF COURSE. A
COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO SOME IMPORTANT PEOPLE FROM THE SOVIET
UNION HAD VISITED GENEVA -- PRIMAKOV, ZHURKIN, AND
SHISLIN. HE HAD MET WITH ALL THREE. PRIMAKOV HAD ASKED
HIM IF HE DID NOT FEEL LEFT OUT WHEN HE SAW HOW FAST THE
WORK WAS PROCEEDING IN STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA. HE HAD
REPLIED THAT IT WAS A GOOD RACE. IT WAS CLEAR, OF
COURSE, THAT IN THE BROAD PICTURE CDE WAS A VERY IMPOR-
TANT PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE IN TERMS OF ATTENTION OR
DECISION AT A SUMMIT MEETING. IN GENEVA, WHILE START
AND INF HAD A FAIRLY LONG HISTORY, THE SPACE TALKS HAD
NONE. THIS WAS A TOTALLY BRAND NEW NEGOTIATION. SOME
MOVEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BUT MUCH WORK REMAINED TO BE
DONE. FOR THIS REASON HE FELT THAT STOCKHOLM WOULD BE
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READY FOR SUMMIT ATTENTION SOONER THAN THE SPACE TALKS.
NONETHELESS HE FELT THAT AGREEMENT HERE WOULD BE A
POSITIVE FACTOR FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OUR
RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES WOULD FEEL ENCOURAGED BY THE
ELEMENT OF TRUST THAT IT WOULD MEAN. THIS IS WHAT HE
HAD SAID TO THE PRESS THIS MORNING -- THAT THERE WAS A
RELATIONSHIP. HE HAD SAID THE SAME THING TO KORNIYENKO
AND KVITSINSKY YESTERDAY. RECOGNIZING THAT AS A LAWYER
HE HAD ACQUIRED MOST OF HIS NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE IN
NONGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, AS A NEGOTIATOR HE HAD ALWAYS
FELT IT USEFUL AFTER INITIAL EXPLORATION TO TRY AND
EMPHASIZE THAT WHICH WAS COMMON EVEN IF IT DID NOT
APPEAR IMPORTANT; IN THIS WAY THE PARTIES GOT USED TO
SAYING "YES" RATHER THAN "NYET."
BARRY WANTED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A WAY OF
PROCEEDING AT THIS STAGE IN THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS, NOT
JUST BETWEEN TWO NATIONS BUT 35. AT PRESENT THERE WERE
STILL TOO MANY ISSUES TO BE HANDLED OR EVEN JUST NARROWED
BY OUR SENIORS. HE FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT AT THIS
SESSION TO GET THROUGH THE BARRIER TO START DRAFTING.
THE SITUATION WAS QUITE UNPRECEDENTED.
KAMPELMAN SAID HE HAD NOT TRIED TO APPLY HIS ARGUMENTA-
TION TO THE STOCKHOLM TALKS. TO HIS SATISFACTION THE
NOVEMBER 21 AGREEMENT BETWEEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WAS
CAST IN LANGUAGE THAT FITTED HIS OWN PREJUDICES
REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS.
GRINEVSKY REMARKED THAT IT WAS EASIER OF COURSE TO CREATE
A SITUATION IN WHICH ONE COULD SAY "NYET" RATHER THAN
"YES." HE HOPED THAT BY NEXT WEEK SOME PROGRESS MIGHT
BE ACHIEVED. IT WILL NOT SOLVE THE MAIN PROBLEM,
HOWEVER. THAT WAS WHY HE WANTED TO ASK KAMPELMAN IF HE
COULD CLARIFY THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO AN ANSWER TO
GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE.
KAMPELMAN REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO SECRETS HERE. HE
HAD NOTHING TO HIDE. HE EXPECTED THE ANSWER TO BE GIVEN
VERY QUICKLY. HE COULD TELL GRINEVSKY WITH COMPLETE
HONESTY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN GORBACHEV'S LETTER
VERY SERIOUSLY. FROM THIS STANDPOINT THE GENEVA SUMMIT
MEETING WAS VERY IMPORTANT. THE PRESIDENT HAD LIKED
GORBACHEV; IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SAY THAT HE RESPECTED
HIM BUT HAD LIKED HIM TOO. HE HAD COME AWAY WITH THE
FEELING THAT GORBACHEV TRULY WANTED TO DO SOMETHING TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE
PRESIDENT WANTED THAT ALSO. OBVIOUSLY IN THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT AS IN OURS THERE ARE PEOPLE WITH DIFFERENT
EMPHASES AND DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS. KAMPELMAN HATED TO
ADMIT IT BUT SOMETIMES HE HAD AN ARGUMENT WITH HIS WIFE.
GRINEVSKY REMARKED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD FAMILY
THAT DID NOT OCCASIONALLY ENGAGE IN ARGUMENTS.
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KAMPELMAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE (THE
PRESIDENT WAS NOT AMONG THEM) HAD QUESTIONED THE BONA
FIDE NATURE OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 LETTER. A NUMBER
OF FACTORS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO SUCH QUESTIONING. ONE WAS
THE FACT THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN
PUBLICIZED AT THE SAME TIME THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED IT.
IT SO HAPPENED THAT ON THAT SAME DAY HE AND ZIMMERMAN
HAD LUNCH WITH KARPOV. IT WAS A NICE LUNCH THAT ENDED
AT A QUARTER BEFORE 3:00 P.M. HE LIKED WORKING WITH
KARPOV BECAUSE HE WAS STRAIGHT AND SMART AS WELL. TWO
OR THREE HOURS LATER HIS PRESS OFFICER TOLD HIM THAT A
UPI MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW CONTAINED AN IMPORTANT ANNOUNCE-
MENT WHICH KARPOV HAD NOT MENTIONED TO HIM AT ALL.
KAMPELMAN HAD REPORTED THIS TO WASHINGTON. THAT KIND OF
THING COULD BE THE REASON THAT HAD LED SOME PEOPLE TO
SAY THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE
WAS PROPAGANDA. MOREOVER, NAMING THE YEAR 1999 AS A
TARGET TO END ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS LED SOME TO SAY THAT
THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT REALISTIC. THE WAY THE PRESIDENT
FUNCTIONS IS TO HAVE EVERYBODY HAVE THEIR SAY AND
EXPRESS THEIR POINT OF VIEW. THEN THE PRESIDENT EXAMINES
IT AND REACHES A DECISION. OBVIOUSLY MUCH OF THE
JANUARY 15 LETTER DEALT WITH MATTERS AFFECTING OUR
ALLIES; THEY LIKE TO BE CONSULTED. THEREFORE THE
PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT HE WANTED NITZE TO CONSULT WITH
OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND ROWNY WITH ALLIES IN ASIA, TO
TALK TO THEM AND TELL THEM: "THIS IS WHAT I INTEND TO
SAY; TELL ME WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT IT, BECAUSE IT AFFECTS
YOU." ALL THIS TAKES TIME. HE HAD NOTED THAT SOVIET
AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO SLOW TO COMMENT IN SUCH CASES.
GORBACHEV'S LETTER HAD NOT INDICATED THAT A QUICK REPLY
WAS EXPECTED. THE PRESIDENT LOOKED AT THIS EXCHANGE AS
ONLY AN EARLY STAGE OF MANY EXCHANGES. KAMPELMAN HAD
ASSURED HIS COLLEAGUES IN GENEVA THAT THIS WAS AN OBVIOUS
EXPLANATION. HIS GUESS WAS THAT THE ANSWER WOULD BE
FORTHCOMING SOON.
ZIMMERMANN POINTED OUT THAT IF ONE LOOKED AT THE COURSE
OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, ONE WOULD NOT REGARD THE
FIVE WEEKS SINCE JANUARY 15 AS VERY MUCH TIME. THE U.S.
HAD MADE PROPOSALS IN START AND INF AT THE OUTSET IN
MARCH, THEN HAD TO WAIT SIX MONTHS FOR THE SOVIET
RESPONSE SEPTEMBER 30-OCTOBER 1. THE U.S. CAME BACK
WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL A MONTH LATER (NOVEMBER 1).
THEN TWO AND A'HALF MONTHS LATER CAME GORBACHEV'S
JANUARY 15 LETTER. KAMPELMAN, REFERRING TO THE SIX
MONTHS' WAIT, SAID WE HAD NOT BEEN CRITICAL, BEARING IN
MIND, FIRST, CHERNENKO'S DEATH AND THEN THE APPOINTMENT
OF A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, THEREFORE NOT JUMPING TO ANY
CONCLUSIONS. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE IF THE
SOVIET SIDE WERE TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS IN THIS INSTANCE.
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ON THE OTHER HAND, WE REALIZED THAT THE 27TH CONGRESS WAS
IMMINENT, AT WHICH GORBACHEV WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WANT TO
SPEAK ON THE SUBJECT.
GRINEVSKY ASKED IF WE WERE WAITING FOR THAT STATEMENT.
ZIMMERMANN AND KAMPELMAN BOTH DENIED THIS EMPHATICALLY.
KAMPELMAN SAID WE ASSUMED THAT GORBACHEV WOULD SAY WHAT
HE HAD SAID IN HIS LETTER.
ZIMMERMANN ALSO WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT BETWEEN
JANUARY 15 AND TODAY MOST OF THE TIME HAD BEEN TAKEN UP
BY CONSULTATIONS. KAMPELMAN SAID THESE CONSULTATIONS
HAD NOT BEEN EASY BUT WERE HEALTHY.
BARRY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE EXPECTED RESPONSE
WOULD RELATE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE. IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY CONCENTRATE
ON NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES SUCH AS INF. HE WOULD DOUBT THAT
MBFR, CW, AND CDE WOULD RECEIVE MORE THAN PASSING
MENTION. THAT DID NOT MEAN, OF COURSE, THAT WE WOULD
NOT HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID IN
REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER.
KAMPELMAN AGREED THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE
DECISIONS MADE AS A RESULT OF GORBACHEV'S LETTER DEALING
WITH GENEVA THAN WITH CDE. IN THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS WE
WERE WITHIN RANGE OF AGREEMENT ON SOME ISSUES BUT FAR
APART ON OTHERS. IF KARPOV AND KVITSINSKY WERE HERE
THEY WOULD CAUTION NOT TO OVEREMPHASIZE WHAT WAS WITHIN
RANGE. WE HAD AGREED ON LOTS OF POINTS AND SHOULD MAKE
AN EFFORT TO AGREE ON MORE. AS A MATTER OF FACT THERE
WERE SOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WHICH AT SOME POINT WOULD
REQUIRE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION.
GRINEVSKY MENTIONED THAT HE HAD KNOWN KARPOV AND
KVITSINSKY FOR MANY YEARS AND UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL THAT
WHENEVER THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES MAKE A STATEMENT IT IS
UP TO THEM HOW AND WHEN TO PUBLICIZE IT. GORBACHEV'S
STATEMENT WAS CERTAINLY NOT MADE FOR PURPOSES OF
PROPAGANDA. HE WOULD STRESS ONE POINT: IT WAS, OF
COURSE, UP TO THE U.S. SIDE TO DECIDE WHEN AND HOW IT
WOULD PROVIDE AN ANSWER. PERSONALLY, HE BELIEVED THAT
THE DELAY HERE WAS DELIBERATE; IF ONE FOLLOWED THE CABLE
TRAFFIC ONE WOULD SEE THIS CLEARLY. THE CONFERENCE NOW
HAD ARRIVED AT A BOTTLE-NECK. WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT
GROUND FORCES, NAVAL FORCES AND AIR FORCES WOULD BE
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH
DECISIONS ABOUT OBSERVATION AND ABOUT EXCHANGE OF
CALENDARS, AS WELL AS SOME VERIFICATION ISSUES. SOME
PROGRESS HAD NOW BEEN MADE BUT TAKING SUBSTANCE AS A
WHOLE FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS THE SUBSTANCE HAD REMAINED
UNCHANGED -- WHAT TO NOTIFY, WHAT TO OBSERVE.
GORBACHEV'S SUGGESTION PROVIDES A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE
-- IT MUST BE SUCH THAT NEITHER SIDE LOSE SIGHT OF THE
PRINCIPLES AGREED AT MADRID. IT WAS THEREFORE LOGICAL
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TO POSTPONE A DECISION REGARDING NAVAL FORCES UNTIL A
LATER STAGE. HE REGARDED THE MERE FACT THAT THERE WAS
NO ANSWER TO THIS PROPOSAL AS VERY DISCOURAGING. HE
HOPED THAT BARRY WOULD SOON GET INSTRUCTIONS ENABLING
HIM TO GO BEYOND JUST GENERALITIES. HE SAW THIS
CONFERENCE AS BEING IN REAL DIFFICULTY NOW.
KAMPELMAN SAID THAT NEITHER HE NOR BARRY KNEW WHAT WOULD
BE IN THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY.
BARRY HATED TO INTERRUPT THE DISCUSSION BUT HAD TO POINT
OUT THAT THEY WERE EXPECTED AT A HEADS OF DELEGATION
MEETING. BESIDES, IF KAMPELMAN AND GRINEVSKY MANAGED TO
RESOLVE ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES HE, BARRY, WOULD NOT BE
IN A POSITION TO CLAIM CREDIT.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01343
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
FEBRUARY 17-21, 1986
REF: STATE 31397
1. CDE IX - 064
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW: THIS WAS ANOTHER WEEK
IN WHICH THE DOG DID NOT BARK. IN OTHER WORDS, REAL
DRAFTING DID NOT BEGIN. ONLY IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST
WORKING GROUP MEETING WAS THERE ANY CLOSE APPROXIMATION
OF DRAFTING. THE EVER SUSPICIOUS SOVIETS SUSPECTED
WESTERN MOTIVES IN PRESSING FOR DRAFTING; THE NNA FEARED
EAST-WEST COLLUSION BEHIND THE SCENES (LAST YEAR THEY
WORRIED ABOUT EAST-WEST ENMITY). THE WEST HAS
CONTRIBUTED ITS FAIR SHARE TO THE SLOWDOWN. THE 16 VERY
INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE ILL PREPARED TO
DEAL WITH THE NEW AND CUMBERSOME MACHINERY OF THE
CONFERENCE (I.E., TEAMS, CLUSTERS, CAUCUSES, WORKING
GROUPS, ETC.) WHERE THERE IS A PREMIUM ON DISCIPLINE AND
INTERNAL COHESION. ON THIS SCORE, THE EAST HAS NO SUCH
PROBLEM. SUBSTANCE IS ANOTHER MATTER, HOWEVER. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PRESS BEHIND THE SCENES
FOR TAKING UP NAVAL ACTIVITIES DURING A CDE FOLLOW-UP
PHASE AND IN THE WORKING GROUPS, STRESSED THE NEED TO
INCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE CURRENT
PHASE, AND HAVE REINTRODUCED THEIR NON-FIRST-USE
PROPOSAL INTO THE NUF WORKING GROUP. OUR EASTERN
COLLEAGUES TELL US, WITH A WINK AND A NOD, THAT THIS
OBDURATE BEHAVIOR IS ONLY A RESPONSE TO OUR TABLING OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED UNCHANGED. MEANWHILE, RESPONDING TO
WESTERN PRESSURE, THE NNA HAVE BEGUN TO TABLE SC.7. END
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW.
4. NOTIFICATION: WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO DRAFT
CONTINUES TO THROW THE EAST AND NNA OFF BALANCE. BOTH
ARE SUSPICIOUS OF OUR MOTIVES: THE EAST BELIEVES THAT
WE HAVE SOMETHING MOMENTOUS UP OUR SLEEVE, AND THE NNA
FEARS THAT WE WILL CUT A DEAL WITH THE EAST OVER THEIR
HEADS. THE SOVIETS ALSO ARE DISPLEASED THAT WE HAVE NOT
RESPONDED TO THE CDE SECTION OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15
STATEMENT. WHILE WE HAVE TOLD THEM PRIVATELY THAT THE
PRESIDENT WILL RESPOND TO GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15
STATEMENT AFTER CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES, THE SOVIETS
HERE ARE APPARENTLY (RIGHTLY) READING THE WEST'S ONGOING
REFUSAL TO RESPOND, EVEN, PRIVATELY, TO THAT STATEMENT
AS A REJECTION OF THE GENEROUS PROPOSAL TO DEFER
CONSIDERATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE.
MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS ARE NOT HAPPY DISCUSSING DRAFT
LANGUAGE IN THE WORKING GROUPS WHERE ALL 35 PARTICIPANTS
ARE REPRESENTED; THEY ARE PUSHING INSTEAD FOR LANGUAGE
PRODUCED BY THE COORDINATOR IN SMALLER COFFEE GROUPS
WHERE NNA, WESTERN AND EASTERN REPS COULD NEGOTIATE A
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TEXT WITH THE COORDINATOR BEFORE PRESENTING IT TO THE
WORKING GROUP. IN THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ON FEB 18
THE EAST REFUSED TO CONSIDER PARAMETERS UNTIL AGREEMENT
HAD BEEN REACHED ON TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED,
IN WHICH THEY INCLUDE NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES,
MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, INCLUDING TRANSFERS ORIGINATING
OUTSIDE THE ZONE. IN ADDITION, THEY CONTINUED TO REFUSE
TO CONSIDER DRAFT TEXTS ON THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION
AS PART OF NOTIFICATION, ARGUING INSTEAD THAT THEY
SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION
MEETING. WHILE THE EAST SULKED, THE WEST AND NNA TABLED
DRAFT TEXTS ON PARAMETERS BASED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE
PROPOSALS. NOTING THAT BOTH NATO AND NNA PROPOSALS
FOCUS ON THE DIVISION AS THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENT
FOR NOTIFICATION, AND THAT THE USSR HAS ALSO EXPLAINED
THAT THEIR PROPOSED PARAMETER (20,000 TROOPS) REPRESENTS
A DIVISION WITH EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT GROUPS, WE POINTED
OUT THAT THERE IS COMMON GROUND ON A PARAMETER BASED ON
A DIVISION.
5. NON-USE OF FORCE. PROGRESS OF SORTS WAS MADE WITHIN
THE ALLIANCE AT ARRIVING AT A COMMON POSITION ON NON-USE
OF FORCE. THE EC-12 RECENTLY COMPLETED A NUF DRAFT
WHICH THEY PLAN TO INTRODUCE INTO THE NATO CAUCUS IN
STOCKHOLM AS EARLY AS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25. WHILE THE
TEXT IS MARGINALLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE EARLIER
DRAFTS FLOATED BY INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITY MEMBERS, IT IS
FAR FROM IDEAL. IN FACT, WE OBJECT TO BOTH THE MESSAGE
AND THE MEDIUM OF THE DRAFT. THE TEXT'S SUBSTANTIVE
MESSAGE GOES TOO FAR IN DELIMITING THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND
NOT FAR ENOUGH IN DETAILING COLLATERAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS
HUMAN RIGHTS. ITS MEDIUM (THE COMMUNITY'S SPECIAL
POLITICAL COMMITTEE) IS EVEN MORE OBJECTIONABLE. WE
HAVE TOLD OUR ALLIES IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT NATO --
NOT THE EC-12 -- IS THE PROPER VENUE FOR DISCUSSION OF
SECURITY MATTERS. WE SEE PARIS' NOT-SO-INVISIBLE AND
MISCHIEVOUS HAND BEHIND THE COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS.
NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE STILL FACED WITH THE NECESSITY OF
TRANSLATING THE BROADER WESTERN CONCEPT ON NUF INTO A
CONCRETE NATO TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR BOTH TACTICAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS. ACCORDINGLY, IN DRAFTING A
COMMON NATO TEXT WE PLAN TO WORK FROM THE COMMUNITY TEXT
WHILE INTRODUCING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DRAFT
(SEE REFTEL). AT THAT POINT WE WILL MOST LIKELY WANT TO
INTRODUCE THE NATO TEXT PIECEMEAL INTO WORKING GROUP
DISCUSSIONS IN ORDER TO BETTER CONTROL THE PACE AND THE
SUBSTANCE OF NUF DRAFTING. AGAIN, WE EXPECT THE FRENCH
TO BE THE ODD MAN OUT IN THIS ENDEAVOR.
-. IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP, THE EAST INTRODUCED ITS
NON-FIRST-USE CONCEPT INTO THE DISCUSSION. NOT
SURPRISINGLY, THIS PROMPTED A HEATED EXCHANGE WITH THE
WEST ARGUING THAT THE EAST WAS BLOCKING PROGRESS BY
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REINTRODUCING A CLEAR NON-STARTER INTO THE DISCUSSIONS
AND THE EAST, SAFE IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT NATO HAD NO
AGREED TEXT, EXHORTING THE WEST TO TABLE ITS OWN
LANGUAGE IF IT DIDN'T LIKE THE EASTERN CONTRIBUTION. AT
THE SAME TIME, WESTERN EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE MORE
SOLID NEUTRALS (SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA, AND SWEDEN) TO
TAKE THE PLAY AWAY FROM SOME OF THEIR MORE UNPREDICTABLE
NONALIGNED COLLEAGUES (YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA, AND CYPRUS)
BORE SOME FRUIT. THE NEUTRALS, FOR EXAMPLE, MADE
CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENTS ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE NUF
PRINCIPLE, WHICH WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE
EAST TO DEFINE OR DELIMIT THE PRINCIPLE IN THE NUF
SECTION OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: WHILE NO
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WAS EVIDENT, THE WORKING GROUP
MEETING WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE IN THAT IT FOCUSED ALMOST
EXCLUSIVELY ON STATIC/INDEPENDENT INFORMATION. SOME NNA
REITERATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE INCLUSION OF "STATIC"
OR "STRUCTURAL" INFORMATION IN A SET OF CSBM'S BUT
REFERRED TO SUCH INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
NOTIFICATION AND ANNUAL CALENDARS RATHER THAN AS AN
INDEPENDENT MEASURE. THE EAST TRIED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO
STEER DISCUSSION TO INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF
NOTIFICATION. WHEN THIS TACTIC FAILED, THE SOVIETS
ATTACKED MEASURE 1 AS "ONE-SIDED, UNBALANCED, AND READY
FOR THE TRASH-CAN." BUT WHILE EASTERN DELEGATES STATED
SUBSTANTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE MEASURE THE SOVIET MILREP
CONFUSED THE ISSUE BY OFFERING TO CONSIDER IT IF IT WERE
EXPANDED TO INCLUDE NAVAL FORCES AND BASES. WE
CHALLENGED THE SOVIETS TO TABLE SUCH A PROPOSAL FOR
CONSIDERATION. SINCE SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE
TANTAMOUNT TO ACCEPTING MEASURE 1, THERE WAS NO RESPONSE.
-. THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION ISSUE
OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP. THE WEST ENCOURAGED THE
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
COORDINATOR (SCHENK - SWITZERLAND) TO DEVELOP MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE BASED ON THAT PART OF THE
FEBRUARY 12 HUNGARIAN VERIFICATION TEXT WHICH RECOGNIZED
THE NECESSITY FOR ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION FOR
AGREED CSBM'S. WHILE AN AGREED TEXT ON THIS SUBJECT
WOULD BASICALLY REITERATE MANDATE LANGUAGE AND BE OF
LIMITED SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE, IT COULD HAVE THE
IMPORTANT RESULT OF DRAWING THE EAST INTO DRAFTING ON
VERIFICATION. SCHENK IS CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS TO FIND
AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION. WHILE INITIALLY ENTHUSIASTIC
ABOUT THE IDEA, THE EAST HAS HESITATED, APPARENTLY
REFLECTING THEIR RECOGNITION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
RECORDING SUCH AN AGREED SENTENCE EVEN IF BASED ON THEIR
OWN PROPOSAL.
7. OBSERVATION: LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK,
ALTHOUGH NATO HAS ESSENTIALLY FINISHED THE HOUSEKEEPING
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TASK OF GETTING SC.1 LANGUAGE ON THE TABLE. THE NNA
REACTED TO NATO'S CRITICISM OF NNA FOOTDRAGGING ON
DRAFTING BY TABLING A BARRAGE OF TEXTS; BOTH NATO AND
THE NNA MADE CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS TO FIND CONSENSUS
LANGUAGE ON THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AND ON INFORMATION
TO BE PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS. HOWEVER, IT TAKES THREE
NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO TANGO IN STOCKHOLM AND THE EAST
SEEMS PREPARED TO SIT OUT THE DANCE UNTIL THE QUESTION
OF WHAT TYPE OF ACTIVITIES WILL BE NOTIFIED HAS BEEN
RESOLVED IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP. THIS WEEK'S EASTERN
TACTIC WAS TO PRESS THE WEST FOR MORE ON THE OBSERVATION
OF AMPHIBIOUS AND, PARTICULARLY, AIR ACTIVITIES
CONDUCTED "IN ASSOCIATION" WITH GROUND ACTIVITIES
INCLUDING THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO AIR BASES.
THIS REFLECTED THE CURRENT SOVIET LINE WHICH, WHILE NOT
ABANDONING NAVAL ACTIVITIES, HAS EMPHASIZED THE
INCLUSION OF AIR ACTIVITIES -- OBVIOUSLY THE "QUID" THE
EAST WANTS IN RETURN FOR GORBACHEV'S OFFER TO DEFER THE
CONSIDERATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT PHASE OF
CDE. THE CURRENT TIGHT SOVIET LINKAGE OF OBSERVATION TO
PROGRESS ON NOTIFICATION COULD MAKE IT PARTICULARLY
DIFFICULT TO ENGAGE IN ANY SERIOUS DRAFTING ON
OBSERVATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ON THE BRIGHT SIDE THE
COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) IS CONTINUING HIS
INFORMAL EFFORTS OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP TO FIND
CONSENSUS LANGUAGE ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS AND
HAS PRODUCED A TEXT WHICH WE FIND GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE.
8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: WEST, EAST AND NNA ALL TABLED
LANGUAGE IN THE WORKING GROUP ON FEBRUARY 20 AND THEN
ENGAGED IN THE CLOSEST APPROXIMATION OF DRAFTING WE HAVE
WITNESSED TO DATE. EVER SINCE GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE IN
PRINCIPLE OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST (DURING HIS PARIS
SUMMIT), IT HAS BEEN CLEAR THAT THIS IS AN
UNCONTROVERSIAL AREA WHERE PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE. SINCE
THEN, HOWEVER, SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO BROADEN THE ZONE HAVE
BEEN PROMINENT IN THE DISCUSSION OF FORECASTS, WITH THE
BULGARIANS AND TURKS PERIODICALLY ARGUING OVER EASTERN
EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE ZONE AGREED IN MADRID. THE TURKS
HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN CONVINCING THE REST OF NATO BEHIND
THE SCENES THAT AGREEMENT ON THE ZONE AS AGREED IN
MADRID MUST BE REGISTERED EARLY AND NOT LEFT UNTIL THE
LAST MINUTE. THE NNA, FINALLY FELL OFF THEIR INSISTENCE
POSITION THAT FORECASTS MUST BE NEGOTIATED TOGETHER WITH
NOTIFICATION AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, INTRODUCED A TEXT
ON THE SUBJECT. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION OF TEXTS, IT
WAS CLEAR THAT NONE OF THE OBJECTIONS RAISED WAS
INSURMOUNTABLE AND THAT -- BARRING AN UNFORESEEABLE
BLOW-UP -- THE FIRST SENTENCES OF A TEXT ON FORECASTS
COULD BE AGREED AND THEN REGISTERED BY THE COORDINATOR
AS CONSENSUS LANGUAGE.
- CONSTRAINING MEASURES: THERE IS NO PROSPECT FOR
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PROGRESS IN THIS GROUP AS LONG AS THE EAST DEFINES
CONSTRAINING MEASURES AS CEILINGS ON THE LEVEL OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE WEST HAS BEEN EXTREMELY FIRM
IN ITS PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION TO SUCH CONSTRAINING
MEASURES BUT, AWARE THAT THE WEST STANDS ALONE IN ITS
CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF CEILINGS, THE EAST SHOWS NO
SIGN OF MOVING OFF ITS POSITION. IT CONTINUED IN THE
WORKING GROUP TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSAL FOR LIMITATIONS ON
THE SCALE AND DURATION OF LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS,
STRESSING ITS SIMILARITY TO THE NNA PROPOSAL AND TAKING
UP THE YUGOSLAV ARGUMENT THAT ADOPTION OF CONSTRAINTS IS
THE KEY TO SUCCESS AT STOCKHOLM. MEANWHILE, THE NNA ARE
HINTING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER "CONSTRAINTS", I.E.,
THEIR VERSION OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST CONSTRAINT WHICH
WOULD COMBINE THE FORECAST WITH A LIMITATION ON
UNFORECAST ACTIVITIES. THEY ALSO CONFIRMED EARLIER
HINTS THAT ALERTS WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM THEIR
CONSTRAINT. IN PRIVATE THE SWEDES HAVE JUSTIFIED THIS
POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE BY NOTING THAT UNDER SWEDISH LAW
ALERTS ARE CLASSIFIED AS SECRET AND PRIOR NOTIFICATION
OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IS ILLEGAL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01444
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S DISCUSSION WITH CDE
NATO CAUCUS
REF: STOCKHOLM 975 (NOTAL)
1. CDE IX - 071
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING A ONE-DAY VISIT TO STOCKHOLM,
HEAD OF USDEL NST AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN MET WITH CDE NATO
CAUCUS FEBRUARY 21. HIS PRESENTATION AND ENSUING
DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTED KEY POLICY QUESTIONS WHICH NATO
WILL NEED TO ADDRESS AS CDE APPROACHES ADJOURNMENT AND
WE PREPARE FOR THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING: HOW BEST CAN
CDE'S SUBORDINATION TO CSCE BE PROTECTED AND EMPHASIZED?
SHOULD CDE IMPLEMENT ANY MEASURES IT ADOPTS, OR SHOULD
IMPLEMENTATION BE LEFT TO VIENNA? WE ALSO THINK THAT AT
SOME POINT NATO OUGHT TO CONSIDER SUCH ADDITIONAL ISSUES
AS: HOW TO RELATE PROGRESS IN THE THE DIFFERENT CSCE
BASKETS TO PRESSURES TO MOVE BEYOND THE CURRENT CDE
PHASE? SHOULD NATO BE CONSIDERING NEW OPTIONS IN THE
CSBM'S FIELD FOR A POSSIBLE PHASE IB AND, IF SO, WHAT
MEASURES?. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE CAUCUS
THAT BRUSSELS NEEDS TO CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS MORE
INTENSIVELY THAN IT PRESENTLY SEEMS TO BE DOING. END
SUMMARY.
4. IN A BRIEF PRESENTATION TO THE CDE NATO CAUCUS
FEBRUARY 21 AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN
POINTS, WHICH HIGHLIGHTED ISSUES THAT SHOULD RECEIVE
CAREFUL STUDY IN NATO:
-- THE CDE WOULD PROVIDE THE FIRST TEST OF SOVIET
SINCERITY ON THE ISSUE OF VERFICATION IN GENERAL AND
ON-SITE INSPECTION IN PARTICULAR AND RESULTS IN
STOCKHOLM WILL PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE GENEVA
NEGOTIATIONS.
-- THE IMPORTANCE OF BALANCE IN THE CSCE IS THE KEY TO
MAINTAINING THE FUNDAMENTAL UTILITY OF THE HELSINKI
PROCESS FOR THE WEST; HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO RESIST
LONG-STANDING EASTERN EFFORTS TO TURN HELSINKI INTO A
STRICTLY MILITARY-SECURITY PROCESS.
-- THE CDE ITSELF SHOULD NOT IMPLEMENT ANY MEASURES
ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM BUT RATHER REFER THEM TO THE VIENNA
FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHERE THEY CAN BE REVIEWED IN THE
LIGHT OF PROGRESS MADE IN OTHER AREAS OF CSCE. IN
KAMPELMAN'S VIEW, IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT BY
STOCKHOLM WOULD GIVE THE CDE A LIFE OF ITS OWN AND
REMOVE THE SOVIETS' INCENTIVE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING THE OTHER PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT
(I.E., HUMAN RIGHTS).
5. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION NATO CDE AMBASSADORS WERE IN
GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH KAMPELMAN ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
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BALANCE IN THE CSCE PROCESS, BUT SEVERAL DISAGREED WITH
KAMPELMAN'S VIEW THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF A CDE AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE LEFT TO VIENNA. SOME ARGUED AS FOLLOWS:
-- IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO OUR PUBLICS
WITHOLDING IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE SAY
INCREASES EUROPEAN SECURITY; IF THE AGREEMENT IS
WORTHWHILE IN ITS OWN RIGHT IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS
SOON AS IS PRACTICAL (NORWAY).
-- WHILE OVERALL CSCE BALANCE IS CENTRAL, WE SHOULD
MAKE OUR DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF A CDE AGREEMENT
IN LIGHT OF ITS INTRINSIC VALUE AND NOT HAVE
IMPLEMENTATION OVERTLY TIED TO BALANCE IN VIENNA (ITALY,
NETHERLANDS, CANADA).
-- WE SHOULD WEIGH THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF ALL CSCE
MEETINGS (E,G, OTTAWA, BERN, BUDAPEST, STOCKHOLM) PLUS
PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST A DECISION TO CONTINUE
THE CDE PROCESS, NOT AGAINST IMPLEMENTATION OF A SOLID
CDE AGREEMENT.
-- IT WILL BE VALUABLE TO OPEN UP "EUROPE TO THE URALS"
FOR OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
WITHOUT WAITING MONTHS FOR RESULTS TO COME OUT OF VIENNA
(FRG).
-- HE MADRID MANDATE GIVES CDE THE AUTHORITY TO "ADOPT"
CSBM'S AND THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING AGREED THE
CDE WOULD "IMPLEMENT" AGREED MEASURES (FRG AND UK).
6. IN RESPONSE, KAMPELMAN STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE
INTEGRITY OF THE ENTIRE HELSINKI PROCESS REQUIRES THAT
THE IMPLEMENTATION DECISION BE TAKEN BY THE FULL CSCE.
HE CAUTIONED THAT IF THE MILITARY-SECURITY COMPONENT OF
HELSINKI IS ALLOWED TO ACQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT LIFE THE
REST OF THE CSCE PROCESS WILL DIE. HE SUGGESTED THAT
IMPLEMENTATION OF A CDE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT COULD BE
DECIDED UPON AT THE OUTSET OF VIENNA, NOT AT ITS
CONCLUSION, THUS PRESERVING THE OPTION OF RAPID
IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S.
7. THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT THESE QUESTIONS NEED TO BE
GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN PREPARATION FOR THE
END-GAME AT CDE AND THE VIENNA START-UP. BUWALDA
(NETHERLANDS), HOWEVER, NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL
COMMITTEE AT NATO IS NOT PLANNING TO START DISCUSSIONS
FOR THE VIENNA MEETING UNTIL APRIL AND HAS SCHEDULED
ONLY ONE MEETING A MONTH THEREAFTER FOR THAT PURPOSE.
IN BUWALDA'S VIEW, SHARED BY OTHERS INCLUDING USDEL, THE
IMPORTANCE OF VIENNA REQUIRES A MORE INTENSIVE WORK
PROGRAM IN BRUSSELS THEN IS PRESENTLY BEING CONTEMPLATED.
AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN NOTED THAT A MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS
APPROACH HAD BEEN TAKEN PRIOR TO THE MADRID MEETING.
8. COMMENT: WE SHARE THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED DURING
THIS DISCUSSION AND FOUND AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S
PARTICIPATION PARTICULARLY VALUABLE AS IT HIGHLIGHTED
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CENTRAL ISSUES BEYOND DAY-TO-DAY NEGOTIATING CONCERNS.
IN PARTICULAR WE STRONGLY SUPPORT HIS VIEW ON THE
NECCESITY OF BALANCE AMONG ALL AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT
AND, IN LIGHT OF THIS, SUGGEST THAT NATO BEGIN
INTENSIFIED CONSIDERATION OF THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITY
BASKET SHOULD THERE BE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM (I.E,
CAN THERE BE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY AREA
UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE IS BALANCED PROGRESS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS?). HOWEVER, WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT NATO BEGIN TO
CONSIDER ISSUES RELATED TO A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA PHASE
OF CDE, WHICH WERE RECENTLY RAISED IN AMBASSADOR BARRY'S
BILATERAL MEETING IN LONDON (REFTEL). AS ONE TACK TO
PREVENT VIENNA FROM FOCUSING ON DISARMAMENT OR "CRISIS
MANAGEMENT" CSBM'S NATO MAY WANT TO BEGIN THE
CONSIDERATION OF NEW OPTIONS IN THE CSBM FIELD WHICH
COULD BE COMBINED WITH CSBM'S NOT FULLY ADDRESSED IN
STOCKHOLM AND WOULD BE HELD FOR CONSIDERATION AT A
POSSIBLE "PHASE 1B" CDE. NATO MAY ALSO WISH TO BEGIN
CONSIDERATION OF AN ALLIANCE POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO
ANTICIPATED SOVIET ATTEMPTS IN VIENNA TO CHANGE THE
CDE'S MANDATE. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDEITIAL STOCKHOLM 01259
SUBJECT: EEC DRAFT TEXT ON NUF
1. CDE IX - 055
2. C NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A NON-USE-OF-FORCE DRAFT
WHICH WAS AGREED UPON IN THE EEC WORKING GROUP ON
CDE/CSCE. IT HAS BEEN PUT OUT TO EEC CAPITALS UNDER
THE SILENCE PROCEDURE, AND, IF NO OBJECTION IS RAISED,
IT WILL BE APPROVED MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24. WE HAVE BEEN
GIVEN THIS TEXT IN CONFIDENCE BY A MEMBER OF AN EEC
DELEGATION HERE; IT SHOULD BE HELD CLOSELY AND NOT SHOWN
TO ANYONE IN THE EEC.
U. BEGIN TEXT:
(1.1) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THIRTY-FIVE STATES OF
THE CSCE MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19
SEPTEMBER 1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY
COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE
AGREED AT THE MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL
PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.
(1.2) ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S
WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING,
PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH
COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE
MENTIONED MANDATE.
(L.3) IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED
IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE
DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR
MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE
RISE TO APPREHENSION, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE
THE PARTICIPATING STATES LACK CLEAR AND TIMELY
INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES.
(L.4) THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION,
BY IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE
AMONG THEM AND THUS 0 CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING
STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY,
TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG
THEM AND THEREFORE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO
THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.
(L.5) THEY RECOGNIZED, MOREOVER, THAT THIS SET OF
CSBM'S ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY
THEIR NATURE, WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE
CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVE THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH
IS TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE
ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN
EUROPE.
(L.6) IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH
MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE
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WITH THE MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT, SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE.
(2.L) CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES
REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO
PRACTICE THIS PRINCIP.E LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS
FOLLOWS:
(2.2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY
STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE
INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE
OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
(2.3) ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL
REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR
DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE. LIKEWOSE, THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM
ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING
ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL
EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. LIKEWISE, THEY WILL
ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF
REPRISAL BY FORCE.
(2.4) NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED
AS A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO
GIVE RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.
(3.L) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR
COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
(3.L.L) NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN
BE INVOKED TO JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT
OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE. THEY RECALL THAT THE USE OF
FORCE IS ONLY JUSTIFIED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE INHERENT
RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN
ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS.
(3.L.2) THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY
MANIFESTATION OF FORCE OR COERCION FOR THE PURPOSE OF
INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE
TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS
AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS LIBERTY AND POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP
ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
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SYSTEM. (NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION
RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE WILL BE
RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.)
(3.L.3) THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS
WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR
NOT THEY ARE PARTY OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL, AS WELL
AS TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.
(3.L.4) THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
(3.2) THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE
CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS
CONTR BUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND
SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING OF ALL
PEOPLES.
(3.3) THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND
UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01470
SUBJECT: REVISED EC-12 NUF PAPER
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 1259; B) STATE 31397
1. CDE IX - 074
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. DUTCH AMBASSADOR BUWALDA INTRODUCED THE FOLLOWING
TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE TO THE CAUCUS AS A
"CONTRIBUTION" TO THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON
NATO POSITION ON NUF IN STOCKHOLM (SEE PARA 4). THE
TEXT, OF COURSE, IS THE SLIGHTLY AMENDED EC-12 TEXT
REPORTED IN REF A; HOWEVER, BUWALDA STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED
CALLING IT AN EC-12 TEXT. THE COMMUNITY DRAFT WAS
FINALLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE TO THE 16 ONLY AFTER
CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE OBSTREPEROUS FRENCH IN
VARIOUS PLACES, MOST PARTICULARLY IN THE HAGUE,
ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES ON EC-12 DELEGATIONS. THE
CAUCUS REMANDED THE TEXT TO THE A-1 CLUSTER FOR STUDY
AND COMMENT. MEANWHILE, BEARING IN MIND THE TACTICAL
SITUATION IN THE CONFERENCE, THE CLUSTER WAS CHARGED
WITH FOCUSING ON ONE OR TWO SECTIONS OF THE TEXT WITH A
VIEW TOWARDS RECOMMENDING LANGUAGE TO THE CAUCUS WHICH
WOULD BE AGREED BY THE 16. THE CAUCUS WOULD THEN DECIDE
HOW AND WHEN TO USE THIS LANGUAGE IN THE CONFERENCE.
BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS (REF B) USDEL WILL PRESS TO HAVE
THE EVENTUAL NATO TEXT REFLECT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF
THE U.S. APPROACH TO NUF AND WILL REPORT THESE
DISCUSSIONS TO WASHINGTON AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.
SEPTEL FOLLOWS WITH DELEGATION'S COMMENTS ON THE EC-12
TEXT WHICH, AT OUR REQUEST, IS NOW REFERRED TO IN OUR
DELIBERATIONS AS THE "FEBRUARY 26 TEXT."
4. BEGIN TEXT:
1.1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 STATES OF THE CSCE
MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER
1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY
CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE
MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT
IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE
MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.
1.2. ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S
WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING
PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH
COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED MANDATE.
1.3. IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED IN THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS
OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULA-
TION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO
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APPREHENSION.
1.4. THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, BY
IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG
THEM AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING STABILITY AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE
CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THEREFORE
TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING
OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.
1.5. THEY RECOGNIZED MOREOVER THAT THIS SET OF CSBM'S
ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY THEIR NATURE,
WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO
ACHIEVING THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS
DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
1.6. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT,
SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE.
2.1. CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED
THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS
PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS FOLLOWS:
2.2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY
STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE
INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE
OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
2.3. ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN
FROM ANY ACTS CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR DIRECT
OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE. LIKEWISE THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION
OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPAT-
ING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN
RIGHTS. LIKEWISE THEY WILL ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL
RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF REPRISAL BY FORCE.
2.4. NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS
A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO GIVE
RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.
3.1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMIT-
MENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS.
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3.1.1. NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO
JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT
USE OF FORCE.
THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT
OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE IF AN ARMED
ATTACK OCCURS.
3.1.2. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION
OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPAT-
ING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXER-
CISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS
LIBERTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY
TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.
3.1.3. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH
OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR
OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRA-
VENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISI-
TION BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM.
NO SUCH OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS
LEGAL.
3.1.4. THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH
EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR NOT
THEY ARE PART OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL AS WELL AS TO
THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.
3.1.5. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
3.2. THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE
CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND
SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL
PEOPLES.
3.3. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND
UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
FOOTNOTE:
AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN WORDING SIMILAR TO
OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AS LAID DOWN IN THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF THE RELEVANT
PARAGRAPH IN THE DRAFT NNA PROPOSAL ON THE NON-USE OF
FORCE. IN CASE THIS WOULD APPEAR NOT TO BE POSSIBLE
DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM COULD MAKE USE OF PARAGRAPH
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3.2. IN THE DRAFT DOCUMENT.
END TEXT.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01633
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE UPDATE
REF: STOCKHOLM 1584
1. CDE IX - 086
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS WERE PROPOSED TO THE TO THE
FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS OF THE FEBRUARY 26 TEXT (REFTEL)
WHICH DESCRIBES THE RATIONALE AND BACKGROUND TO THE NUF
REAFFIRMATION. AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE SUGGESTED
LANGUAGE, OF COURSE, IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FINAL
FORM OR DISPOSITION OF THE NATO TEXT WE ARE CURRENTLY
TRYING TO HAMMER OUT IN THE NUF CLUSTER GROUP. HOWEVER,
IF WE ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO LANGUAGE ON THE AIM, I.E.,
CONCRETE CSBM'S, AND KEY LINK, I.E., CSBM'S JUSTIFY A
NUF REAFFIRMATION, WE WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO COUNTER
EASTERN THREATS THAT THEY WILL HOLD BACK PROGRESS INCSBM
WORKING GROUPS IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS IN THE NUF
WORKING GROUP. WITH THIS IN MIND, DELEGATION WELCOMES
WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THESE FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS AND
AMENDMENTS BY COB, MARCH 7.
BEGIN TEXT WITH AMENDMENTS.
1.1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 STATES OF THE CSCE
MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER
1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY
CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE
MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT
IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE
MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
USA: LINE 3 DELETE "TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY
COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S . . ." TO BE REPLACED BY: "TO
BEGIN A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, AND ADOPTION OF MUTUALLY
COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S . . . ." LINE 6: DELETE "AS A
SUBSTANTIAL . . . CSCE."
1.2. ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S
WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING
PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH
COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED MANDATE.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
TURKEY: LINE 3 DELETE "AND WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MANDATE."
TO BE REPLACED BY: "WILL BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS AS
COVERED BY THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MANDATE."
1.3. IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED IN THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS
OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULA-
TION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO
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APPREHENSION.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
USA: LINE 4 DELETE "WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO
APPREHENSION."
NORWAY AND ITALY SUGGESTED THAT THE WHOLE SENTENCE OF
THE FINAL ACT COULD BE INTRODUCED: "WHICH COULD GIVE
RISE TO APPREHENSION, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE
THE PARTICIPATING STATES LACK CLEAR AND TIMELY
INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES."
1.4. THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, BY
IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG
THEM AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING STABILITY AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE
CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THEREFORE
TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING
OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
UK: LINE 4 DELETE "AND THEREFORE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY
IN THE WORLD."
USA: LINE 4 DELETE " . . . TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF
TENSION . . . " OR DELETE EVERYTHING AFTER THE WORD
"EUROPE" IN LINE it.
NORWAY: LINE 3: " . . . IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY,
TO ELIMINATING THE CAUSES OF TENSION . . . " INSTEAD OF
THE EXISTING " . . . IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO
ELIMINATE . . . ."
CANADA: LINE 3: "IN EUROPE AND TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES
OF . . . ."
1.5. THEY RECOGNIZED MOREOVER THAT THIS SET OF CSBM'S
ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY THEIR NATURE,
WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO
ACHIEVING THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS
DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
UK: LINE 1 AFTER "MOREOVER THAT" ADD "THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SET OF CSBM'S . . .
USA: LINE 2 DELETE "IMPORTANT AND." LINE 4 AFTER THE
WORD "IS" ADD "AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE
CSCE PROCESS, . . .
FRG: LINE 2 DELETE "IMPORTANT" TO BE REPLACED BY:
"ESSENTIAL."
CANADA INTRODUCED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZING THAT IN ENHANCING
OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY IN MILITARY ACTIVITY,
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CAN, BY THEIR
VERY NATURE, CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING THE RISK OF
MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE AND THUS REINFORCE THE
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PROHIBITION AGAINST THE THREAT OOR USE OF FORCE, HAVE
CONSEQUENTLY AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING CONCRETE MEASURES:"
CANADA ASKED THAT SOME OF THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THIS
TEXT BE SOMEHOW REFLECTED IN PARA 1.5 AND 1.6, PARTICU-
LARLY THE REFERENCE TO "OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY."
1.6. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT,
SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION
TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
USA: LINE 1 AFTER "THAT" ADD "A SET OF CSBM'S ADOPTED
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION . ? ? ? If
END TEXT AND AMENDMENTS.
BARRY
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01519
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRAFT LANGUAGE ON NOTIFICATION
1. CDE IX - 079.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: ON 25 FEB, GDR MILREP TABLED DRAFTING
LANGUAGE IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP. THE FIRST
SECTION DEALS WITH NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS
IN A MANNER REMINISCENT OF FINAL ACT LANGUAGE AT A
THRESHOLD OF 20,000 TROOPS. THE SECOND SECTION PROPOSES
THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE MANEUVERS, INDEPENDENTLY
OR IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND TROOPS AND/OR NAVAL
FORCES, AT A LEVEL OF 200 AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY
AIRBORNE IN EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA
AND AIR SPACE. SECTION THREE COVERS THE MOVEMENT OF
GROUND TROOPS WITH A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 20,000
TROOPS AND/OR AIR FORCE MOVEMENTS OF ONE HUNDRFED
MILITARY AIRCRAFT. A FOURTH PARAGRAPH CONTAINS ONLY
ELIPSES PROVIDING FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.
4. EASTERN PROPOSAL. BEGIN TEXT.
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION ARE:
A) MANOEUVRES OF GROUND TROOPS CONDUCTED BY THE
PARTICIPATING STATES INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION
WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE
TROOP COMPONENTS UNDER A COMMON PLAN, IF THEY INVOLVE
20,000 TROOPS OR MORE.
NOTIFICATIONS WILL BE GIVEN OF MANOEUVRES OF GROUND
TROOPS CONDUCTED IN EUROPE ON THE TERRITORY OF ONE OR
MORE PARTICIPATING STATES AS WELL AS, IF APPLICABLE, IN
THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE;
B) MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES CONDUCTED UNDER A COMMON
PLAN INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND TROOPS
AND/OR NAVAL FORCES, IF IN THE COURSE OF THE MANOEUVRE
IT IS FORESEEN THAT TWO HUNDRED MILITARY AIRCRAFT OR
MORE WILL BE IN THE AIR SPACE OVER THE NOTIFIED AREA AT
THE SAME TIME.
NOTIFICATIONS WILL BE GIVEN OF MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES
CONDUCTED IN EUROPE AS WELL AS IN THE AJOINING SEA
(OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE.
C) MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF GROUND TROOPS OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES EFFECTED IN THE WHOLE .OF EUROPE
AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE, AS
WELL AS INTO THAT ZONE OR OUT OF IT, WHEN THESE
MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) INVOLVE 20,000 TROOPS OR MORE AND
WHEN THE OVERALL DISTANCE OF THE MOVEMENT (TRANSFERS)
IS 250-300 KM OR MORE ALONG A STRAIGHT LINE DRAWN FROM
THE INITIAL POINT OF THE MOVEMENT.
NOTIFICATIONS WILL BE ALSO GIVEN OF TRANSFERS (FLIGHTS)
OF AIR FORCE AVIATION TOTALLING ONE HUNDRED MILITARY
AIRCRAFT OR MORE AND EFFECTED FROM OTHER CONTINENTS OR
FROM OTHER REGIONS TO EUROPE AND TO THE ADJOINING SEA
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(OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE, INSIDE THE ZONE AND OUT OF IT.
D) ? ? ?
END TEXT.
5. IN ADDITION TO SOME WORDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THIS PROPOSAL AND THE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENT PRE-
SENTED A YEAR AGO, WGB.1, THE CONCEPT "IF APPLICABLE"
IS INTRODUCED IN A MANNER ROUGHLY ANALOGOUS TO ITS
USAGE IN THE FINAL ACT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS
CONCEPT HAS SURFACED IN PROPOSALS IN THE CDE.
6. IN WGB.2, AIR FORCE MANEUVERS HAD BEEN DEFINED TO
INCLUDE AIR FORCES, NAVAL AVIATION AND AVIATION OF AIR
DEFENSE FORCES. THE DRAFTING LANGUAGE MENTIONS ONLY
"AIR FORCES" INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND
TROOPS AND/OR NAVAL FORCES. IT RETAINS, HOWEVER, THE
THRESHOLD OF 200 AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUS AIRBORNE.
7. WGB.11, DEALING WITH THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES SPOKE OF
FORMATIONS AND UNITS WITH A NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF 20,000
TROOPS IN THE ZONE AS WELL AS IN AND OUT OF IT. THE
DRAFTING LANGUAGE MAKES NO REFERENCE TO FORMATIONS AND
UNITS BUT RETAINS THE 20,000 TROOP THRESHOLD. INSTEAD
OF A REFERENCE TO THE AREA COVERED BY CBMS (SIC), THE
NEW LANGUAGE REFERS TO THAT ZONE AS BEING THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR
SPACE. IT ALSO INTRODUCES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
STOCKHOLM THE CRITERION THAT NOTIFIABLE MOVEMENTS MUST
COVER A STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE OF 250-300 KM.
THE NEW LANGUAGE SPECIFIES AIR FORCE AVIATION (EXCLUDING
ARMY, NAVAL AND AIR DEFENSE AVIATION) AND MAKES CLEAR
THAT THIS COVERS ONLY MILITARY AIRCRAFT. OTHERWISE,
THIS NEW LANGUAGE REPEATS THE BASIC CONCEPT OF NOTIFYING
THE MOVEMENT OF 100 AIRCRAFT AS IN WGB.4.
8. WGB-3 WHICH ADDRESSED THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF
MAJOR MANEUVERS OF NAVAL FORCES DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE
LANGUAGE TABLED BY THE GDR. PARA 4, FOLLOWED BY
ELLIPSES, WAS EXPLAINED BY THE GDR MILREP AS BEING
DESIGNED TO LAY DOWN THE MARKER THAT SPACE IS PROVIDED
FOR ADDING NAVAL FORCE MANEUVERS IF THE WEST DOES NOT
RESPOND TO THE 15 JAN GORBACHEV IDEA.
HANSEN
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01575
SUBJECT: SOVIET STATEMENTS ON INSPECTIONS
REF: (A) MBFR VIENNA 157; (B) STOCKHOLM 844
1. CDE IX - 068
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT MADE
FORMAL CDE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT INSPECTIONS ARE
WARRANTED AS A VERIFICATION MEASURE FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS,
BUT HAVE ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE IN INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS
AND IN BACKGROUND COMMENTS TO THE PRESS. IN A MEETING OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMU-
NICATIONS FEBRUARY 26, THE DUTCH MILREP (VAN DER GRAAF)
PRESSED THE SOVIETS FOR FURTHER ELABORATION OF THEIR
POSITION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION. HE CITED GORBACHEV'S
FEBRUARY 20 STATEMENT TO THE CD DELIVERED BY SOVIET
FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS KORNENKO AND A
FEBRUARY 17 TASS REPORT BY VASILY KHARKOV (WHICH MBFR
DEL MAY FIND INTERESTING) WHICH SAID IN PART, "THE USSR
HOLDS THAT CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ON DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE
VERIFIED BOTH BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND ON-SITE
INSPECTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES. . . . BUT
THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSCORES THAT THE POINT AT ISSUE
SHOULD BE CONTROL OVER DISARMAMENT AND NOT ARMAMENT,
WHICH HAWKS IN THE UNITED STATES AND NATO ARE ACTUALLY
AFTER." IN RESPONSE, THE SOVIET MILREP (GENERAL
TATARNIKOV) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FEBRUARY 20 GORBACHEV
STATEMENT TO THE CD REFLECTED OFFICIAL POLICY. HE NOTED
THAT IF AGREEMENT WERE ACHIEVED ON DISARMAMENT, THEN,
AND ONLY IN THAT CASE, WOULD VERIFICATION BY VARIOUS
MEASURES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION BE APPROPRIATE.
VERIFICATION OF CSBM'S AGREED AT CDE, TATARNIKOV ADDED,
WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE "ELEGANT AND STREAMLINED" AND HE
POINTED TO EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR VERIFICATION BY NTM'S
AND CONSULTATIONS AS "WORTHY" METHODS IN THE STOCKHOLM
CONTEXT.
4. WE ALSO CALL MBFR DEL'S ATTENTION TO REF B WHICH PRO-
VIDES AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE VERIFICATION
ISSUE AT CDE, INCLUDING ANOTHER WORKING GROUP STATEMENT
MADE BY THE SOVIET MILREP IN WHICH HE ACKOWLEDGED
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 OFFER OF ON-SITE INSPECTION "IN
THE CONTEXT OF MONITORING OVER WEAPONS WHICH LEND
THEMSELVES TO MONITORING." WE WILL PASS ALONG ANY
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT STATEMENTS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.
HANSEN
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01469
CORRECTEDCOPY(TEXT CHANGED)
ORIGINALLY PROCESSED AS CDS #0056828
SUBJECT: CDE: FIRST DRAFTING BREAKTHROUGH RECORDED IN
VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP
L. CDE IX - 070.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. ON FEBRUARY 26, THE CONFERENCE FINALLY
RECORDED ITS FIRST DRAFT TEXT IN THE WORKING GROUP DEALING
WITH "INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION", WHEN
NO OBJECTIONS WERE RAISED TO THE COORDINATOR'S
(SWITZERLAND-SCHENK) PROPOSAL THAT HE NOTE A SPECIFIC ONE
SENTENCE TEXT ON VERIFICATION IN HIS NOTEBOOK. END
SUMMARY.
4. INTENSIVE BEHIND THE SCENES DISCUSSIONS LED TO
AGREEMENT ON FEBRUARY 26 IN WORKING GROUP A ON
INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION THAT A TEXT
ON VERIFICATION BE "NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S AND
PARTICIPANTS NOTEBOOKS." REFERRED TO AS A "NOTEBOOK
TEXT," IT READS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.
"THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE
AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT. . ." END
TEXT.
IN NOTING THIS DRAFTING SUCCESS THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK)
RECALLED THAT THE DRAFTING EXERCISE ITSELF TAKES PLACE
UNDER THE CONDITIONS AGREED INFORMALLY ON OCTOBER L4 IN
THE "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT," I.E. THAT "ALL DRAFT TEXTS
WILL BE CONSIDERED PROVISIONAL AND WILL NEITHER IMPLY NOR
PREJUDICE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE ELEMENTS
DISCUSSED."
5. COMMENT. USDEL AND NATO OBJECTIVES IN AGREEING TO
"NOTE" THIS TEXT WERE TWOFOLD: TO ACTUALLY BEGIN THE
DRAFTING PROCESS ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURE
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH DRAFTING ON OTHER SUBJECTS AND, BY
ENSURING THAT SUCH LANGUAGE HAS BEEN "NOTED" IN THIS
WORKING GROUP, TO REINFORCE OUR POSITION THAT VERIFICATION
IS A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT MEASURE. WE JUDGED THAT THE
ONLY WAY TO ENGAGE THE EAST IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS WAS TO
WORK WITH A TEXT BASED ON THE MANDATE. AS A REITERATION
OF MADRID MANDATE LANGUAGE, THE LANGUAGE IN ITSELF IS NOT
REVOLUTIONARY. IN GETTING THE LANGUAGE "NOTED" HOWEVER,
WE WERE ABLE TO GET A FOOT IN THE DOOR -- VERIFICATION AS
A PRINCIPLE, AND AS AN INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE MEASURE.
THE DOTS AT THE END OF THE SENTENCE, INCLUDED AT WESTERN
INSISTENCE, INDICATE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREE THAT MORE
TEXT IS TO BE ADDED. WEST WILL WORK CAREFULLY TO ENSURE
THAT FUTURE TEXTS TO BE "NOTED" DEVELOP AND PROTECT THE
POSITION THAT NTMS ARE NOT ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION. THUS WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO AGREE, FOR
EXAMPLE, TO "NOTE" AS A NEXT STEP, ONLY A SENTENCE
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RELATING TO NTMS, BUT RATHER TO ENSURE THAT SOME
ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF OUR APPROACH ARE "NOTED" AT THE SAME
TIME, SINCE, ONCE NTM LANGUAGE IS "NOTED," THE EAST MAY
WELL REFUSE TO ACCEPT ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE ON THE GROUNDS
THAT MORE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE
TAILORED INDIVIDUALLY TO SPECIFIC CSBMS. END COMMENT.
HANSEN
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01421
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB BARRY SPEECH IN BERN, 2/27/86
L. CDE IX - 069
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH, ENTITLED
"CDE, CSCE AND U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE,"
WHICH AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE U.S.
DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILD NG MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
WILL GIVE IN BERN SWITZERLAND THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27.
IF IT IS CARRED ON THE WIRELESS FILE FOR THURSDAY, IT
SHOULD BE EMBARGOED UNTIL L800 GMT.
BEGIN TEXT: IT IS A P.EASURE FOR ME TO BE HERE
TODAY. AS HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO
THE S OCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
THE CDE, I AM VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE CENTRAL ROLE
SWITZERLAND PLAYS BOTH IN OUR CONFERENCE AND IN ITS
PARENT, THE CSCE PROCESS. THIS WILL BE DEMONSTRATED
BY THE CSCE EXPERTS' MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, WHICH
OPENS HERE IN BERN IN APRIL. I CAN THINK OF NO MORE
APPROPRIATE PLACE THAN THE CAPITAL OF SWITZERLAND TO
SPEAK ABOUT EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND THEIR
RELATION TO THE WIDER CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST AFFAIRS.
OF COURSE, I SPEAK NOT AS A EUROPEAN BUT AS AN
AMERICAN, AND THUS I TAKE AS MY STARTING POINT U.S.
SECURITY POLICY TOWARD EUROPE.
-- I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH AN IMAGE FROM ANATOLI
SHCHARANSKY, WHO, ON ARRIVING IN ISRAEL FROM MOSCOW,
SPOKE OF A "TREE OF PRINCIPLES" WHICH HE CONSTRUCTED
IN HIS MIND TO MAINTAIN HIS BALANCE WHILE IN PRISON.
HIS IMAGE IS AN APT ONE BECAUSE IT EMBODIES BOTH
CONNECTIONS AND PRIORITIES, AND WHEN WE CONSIDER U.S.
POLICY WE SEE FUNDAMENTAL CONNECTIONS AND PRIORITIES
BINDING THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ARMS REDUCTION TALKS,
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING EFFORTS, AND THE
BROADER POLITICAL PROCESSES, EMBODIED IN THE CSCE,
WHICH ATTEMPT TO GIVE CONSTRUCTIVE SHAPE TO THE
EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. EACH OF THESE AREAS HAS ITS
OWN SPECIFIC FOCUS; BUT, FOR THE UNITED STATES, EACH
REPRESENTS AN ASPECT OF WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS
CALLED "THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES" IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT; THAT IS, TO
CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE LARGER SENSE,
ENCOMPASSING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND
HUMANITARIAN MATTERS AS WELL AS STRICTLY MILITARY
MATTERS.
-- WITH ATTENTION NOW CONCENTRATED ON ARMS CONTROL,
THERE IS NO BETTER TIME TO DISCUSS THE OBJECTIVES OF
U.S. SECURITY POLICIES. SECURITY, BY DEFINITION,
DEPENDS ON MAINTAINING THE NECESSARY STRENGTH TO
DEFEND ONESELF AND ONE'S ALLIES AND DETER ATTACK;
THIS MUST BE THE BASIC GOAL OF ANY SECURITY POLICY.
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CONSONANT WITH THAT FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT, THE
UNITED STATES PURSUES A COMPLEMENTARY GOAL; THAT IS,
NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH ENHANCE
NATIONAL SECURITY. AT THE CENTER OF PUBLIC AWARENESS
ABOUT SECURITY ISSUES TODAY ARE THE ARMS REDUCTION
TALKS: STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR
FORCES AND SPACE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS N BILATERAL
US-SOVIET TALKS IN GENEVA AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, ALSO IN GENEVA. ALTHOUGH
DETAILS VARY, OUR OBJECTIVE IN ALL OF THESE
NEGOTIATIONS IS THE SAME: RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN
FORCE LEVELS LEADING, ULTIMATELY, TO ELIMINATION OF
WHOLE CLASSES OF WEAPONS FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH.
WE ARE REALISTIC ABOUT THIS OBJECTIVE; TOTAL
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
WILL BE A LONG-TERM PROPOSITION. BUT WHILE KEEPING
THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE IN MIND, WE ARE SEEKING
BALANCED STEP-BY-STEP REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE
STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR.
-- IN START, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, WE HAVE PROPOSED 50 CUTS IN LAND-BASED
ICBMS. IN INF, ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES,
WE PROPOSE REMOVING ALL U.S. AND SOVIET
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES FROM EUROPE AS WELL AS
ELIMINATING THEM FROM ASIA WITHIN THREE YEARS. IN
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, WE HAVE PROPOSED A
WORLD-WIDE BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION,
STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
-- BEYOND THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNIFICANT CUTS, ALL OF
THESE EFFORTS HAVE IN COMMON THE BASIC REQUIREMENT
THAT THEY BE EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AND STABILIZING.
THESE QUALITIES SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. NO GOVERNMENT
WOULD ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH FAVORED ONE SIDE
MORE THAN ANOTHER. NO GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS TRULY
SERIOUS ABOUT SIGNIFICANT ARMS REDUCTIONS COULD EVER
ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH LACKED EFFECTIVE MEANS
OF VERIFICATION, WHICH LACKED THE MEANS TO ENSURE
COMPLIANCE. EQUITABILITY AND VERIFIABILITY THUS ARE
ESSENTIAL. BUT THE THIRD QUALITY, STABILITY, MAY BE
SEEN AS THE ESSENTIAL CORE TYING THE WHOLE TOGETHER.
-- THUS, IN START, FOR EXAMPLE, U.S. EFFORTS CENTER
FIRST ON REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF LARGE LAND-BASED
MIRV'D MISSILES. SINCE THEY HOLD THE POTENTIAL FOR A
FIRST STRIKE, THEY ARE MOST DESTABILIZING. WE ARE
EXPLOR NG THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC
DEFENSE -- AND DISCUSSING IT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS
WELL AS OUR ALLIES -- BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT COULD
SERVE BOTH AS A MOTIVE FOR REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE
NUCLEAR MISSILES AND ALSO AS A STABILIZING FACTOR IN
THE TRANSITION TO THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TALKS, FOR ANOTHER
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EXAMPLE, WE SEEK A WORLD-WIDE BAN BECAUSE, GIVEN THE
NATURE OF THESE WEAPONS, ANYTHING LESS, SUCH AS A
REGIONAL BAN, WOULD BE INHERENTLY UNSTABLE AND COULD
BE EASILY CIRCUMVENTED IN A CRISIS.
-- IMPORTANT AS THEY ARE, NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION
EFFORTS ARE ONLY PART -- ONE SET OF BRANCHES -- OF
THE WHOLE TREE OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY
POLICY. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY
STEPS TO REDRESS THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES
IN EUROPE; THESE STEPS WE ARE PURSUING IN THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE
REDUCTIONS. NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE PROVIDED A
NECESSARY FACTOR IN DETERRING WAR IN EUROPE FOR MORE
THAN FORTY YEARS. IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE TO
ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONLY TO MAKE CONVENTIONAL
WAR MORE LIKELY. MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE,
GIVEN THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF TODAY'S ARSENALS,
WOULD BE DEVASTATING BEYOND OUR EXPERIENCE. IN
VIENNA, THE WEST HAS TAKEN A MAJOR NEW STEP DESIGNED
TO BREAK A DEADLOCK OF A DECADE; WE HAVE AGREED TO
SIDESTEP THE ISSUE OF HOW MANY TROOPS ARE NOW IN THE
REDUCTION ZONE AND PROCEED WITH REDUCTIONS, PROVIDED
THAT VERIFICATION OF THE REDUCTIONS AND OF THE FORCES
REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS IS POSSIBLE.
-- A STABLE PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL ALSO REQUIRES
THAT EXISTING MILITARY FORCES BE SUBJECT TO RULES OF
BEHAVIOR TO MAKE THEIR ACTIVITIES MORE PREDICTABLE
AND THUS REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION OR
CONFLICT. ENACTING SUCH A SET OF RULES IS THE
OBJECTIVE OF THE CDE. IN STOCKHOLM, WE SEEK TO
REDUCE THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK OR WAR BY
MISCALCULATION OR MISINTERPRETATION BY CREATING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD.
WE WANT TO PREVENT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR
POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. OUR DIRECT OBJECTIVE IS
ENHANCED PREDICTABILITY AND, THUS, STABILITY IN THE
EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION. WE WANT TO PREVENT THE
USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION.
OUR BROADER OBJECTIVE IS TO CONTR BUTE TO AN IMPROVED
EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, TO INCREASE OPENNESS AND HELP
TO LOWER THE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS WHICH NOW DIVIDE
EAST FROM WEST IN EUROPE.
-- AS AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION, THE STOCKHOCM
CONFERENCE COMPLEMENTS NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ARMS
REDUCTIONS. WE SEEK TO ENACT A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
REGIME THROUGH WHICH ALL THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION WILL BE REQUIRED TO
EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR FORCES IN EUROPE AND
ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES THEY PLAN TO ENGAGE
IN. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WOULD AMOUNT TO A
SET OF RULES REGULATING THE MILITARY BEHAVIOR OF
SECRET
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NATO, THE WARSAW PACT AND ALSO THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED STATES. THE REGIME SHOULD LEAD TO BETTER
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH TAKE PLACE ON THE
CONTINENT. BY ESTABLISHING SCHEDULES FOR ACTIVITIES,
THE REGIME CAN HELP US DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE
ROUTINE AND THE THREATENING. ON THE ONE HAND, THIS
CAN PREVENT OVER-REACTION TO NORMAL TRAINING
ACTIVITIES. ON THE OTHER, IT CAN HELP US TO REACT TO
WHAT IS ABNORMAL: POLITICAL INTIMIDATION OR EVEN
PREPARATION FOR ARMED AGGRESSION. THE TASK OF
STOCKHOLM IS SECURITY-BUILDING AS WELL AS
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. A REGIME WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO
BOTH GOALS MUST REST FIRMLY ON POLITICALLY BINDING
MECHANISMS AND NOT DEPEND ON GESTURES OR GOODWILL.
-- BUT IF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AN ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATION AIMED AT A MILITARY
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME AND A MORE STABLE MILITARY
ENVIRONMENT, THE PR NCIPLE WHICH UNDERLIES OUR
APPROACH AND THE MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED TRANSCENDS
PURELY MILITARY ISSUES. THAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF
OPENNESS. SOME OF YOU MAY HAVE HEARD THIS REFERRED
TO AS TRANSPARENCY. THE SUCCESS OF ANY
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME ENACTED BY THE SOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE WILL DEPEND UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT
BY ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES THAT GREATER OPENNESS
AND IMPROVED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ABOUT MILITARY
INTENTIONS AND PRACTICES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCED
STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.
-- THIS CONCEPT IS, IN FACT, GAINING INCREASED
ACCEPTANCE. WHEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED IN
L984, THE EAST REJECTED "TRANSPARENCY" AS "LEGALIZED
ESPIONAGE." TODAY, THE AGREEMENT WHICH IS SLOWLY
EMERGING IS ALMOST ENTIRELY ABOUT "TRANSPARENCY" --
INFORMATION, FORECASTS, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND
INSPECTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN A BROADER
SENSE, IT IS RELEVANT THAT A CENTRAL THEME OF THE
SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS NOW IN PROGRESS IN
MOSCOW IS "OPENNESS" -- "GLASNOST" IN RUSSIAN;
OPENNESS TO CRITICISM AND TO REFORM; PUBLICITY; EVEN,
IF YOU WILL, TRANSPARENCY.
-- I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE
EAST IS PREPARED TO EXTEND THAT CONCEPT TO COVER
VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS AS WELL.
THIS IS CENTRAL TO OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN
STOCKHOLM, AS IT IS IN VIENNA, GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE
WHERE WE ARE DISCUSSING ARMS REDUCTION. COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IS ESSENTIAL TO
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILD NG; THEREFORE, THE
AGREEMENTS MUST HAVE VERIFICATION MEASURES BUILT INTO
THEM. THE ONLY FORM OF VERIFICATION OF MILITARY
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ACTIVITIES ACCESSIBLE TO ALL THIRTY-FIVE STOCKHOLM
PARTICIPANTS IS INSPECTION; ON THOSE VERY FEW
OCCASIONS WHEN PARTICIPATING STATES FEEL THEY MUST
CONFIRM WHETHER AN ACTIVITY IS OCCURRING WHICH
THREATENS THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
REGIME, THEY MUST BE ENTITLED TO SEND INSPECTORS TO
HAVE A THOROUGH BUT NON-INTRUSIVE LOOK AT WHAT IS
GO NG ON IN THE FIELD. THE ADMISSION OF INSPECTORS
MUST BE PROMPT; THE ACTIVITIES WHICH CONCERN US DO
NOT LAST LONG, AND CONSULTATION AS A PRELUDE TO
INSPECTION, WHICH SOME HAVE SUGGESTED, COULD TOO
EASILY BE ABUSED AS A DEVICE TO DELAY.
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB BARRY SPEECH IN BERN, 2/27/86
-- SO FAR, IT SEEMS TO BE THE SOVIET POSITION THAT
INSPECTION IS FOR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, NOT
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS WE ARE
NEGOTIATING IN STOCKHOLM. BUT IF THEY ARE NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT INSPECTION OF TROOPS EXERCISING
IN THE FIELD, WHY WOULD THEY EVER ACCEPT THE MUCH
MORE INTENSIVE INSPECTIONS OF MILITARY GARRISONS,
NUCLEAR TEST SITES AND MISSILE LAUNCHING FACILITIES
WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS OR A
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN? IN MY VIEW, SOVIET
ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN THE STOCKHOLM CONTEXT
WILL BE A BELLWETHER OF 1HE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR
STATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSPECTION ON
COOPERATIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES IN START, INF,
MBFR, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TALKS, AND OTHER ARMS
CONTROL FORUMS.
-- FROM THIS EXCURSION INTO SOME OF THE SPECIFICS OF
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, LET ME RETURN TO THE TRUNK
OF MY TREE OF PRINCIPLES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT
MILITARY-SECURITY AFFAIRS CAN BE DEALT WITH IN
ISOLATION. THAT IS WHY WE EMPHASIZE THAT CDE IS
SUBORDINATE TO THE CSCE PROCESS AS A WHOLE. I KNOW
THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND SHARES THIS VIEW. WITH
THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING APPROACHING
RAPIDLY, WE HAVE TO LOOK AHEAD, TO CONSIDER HOW
BALANCE IN THE PROCESS CAN BEST BE ENSURED.
-- OUR REFERENCE POINT FOR THIS BALANCE IS, OF
COURSE, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IN L975 THE
THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES, WITH SWITZERLAND
AMONG THE LEADERS, CODIFIED A SYSTEM OF VALUES FOR
EUROPE WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY WESTERN AND DEMOCRATIC.
THE EAST WANTED TO LEGALIZE THE DIVISION OF EUROPE;
THE FINAL ACT LOOKS TOWARDS ITS UNIFICATION. THE
EAST WANTED TO ENSHRINE THE STATE AS THE CENTRAL
ACTOR; THE FINAL ACT RESTS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS. THE EAST WANTED A VOICE IN WESTERN
SECURITY POLICIES; THE FINAL ACT ESTABLISHES A
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SFCRFT
LEGITIMATE WESTERN INTEREST IN HOW EASTERN
GOVERNMENTS TREAT THEIR CITIZENS.
-- EASTERN BEHAVIOR IN CSCE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE
HELSNKI HAS SOMETIMES SEEMED LIKE A SERIES OF
REAR-GUARD ACTIONS TO RECAPTURE LOST GROUND. WE ARE
CONCERNED ABOUT EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A CO-EQUAL
SEPARATE MILITARY-SECURITY FORUM WHICH COULD
OVERSHADOW EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL
CONTACTS AND POLITICAL OPENNESS AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN PEOPLES ACROSS BORDERS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO
SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, IN PART BECAUSE IT SHOULD
CONTR BUTE TO LOWER NG THE BARRIERS IN EUROPE. BUT
NO MATTER HOW SUCCESSFUL, STOCKHOLM MUST NOT BE
ALLOWED TO DOMINATE THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CSCE.
IN NOVEMBER, THE CONFEREES IN VIENNA WILL HAVE TO
CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS
MEETING, THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM AND THE
FORTHCOMING BERN HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING, AS WELL AS
THE OUTCOME OF THE CDE.
-- BUT MEETINGS ARE ONLY GENERAL INDICATORS. MORE
IMPORTANT IS THE QUESTION OF HOW WELL THE
PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE LIVED UP TO THEIR FINAL ACT
PLEDGES. THE IMPRISONMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS
IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS
GROUPS IN ROMANIA AND THE TURKISH MINORITY IN
BULGARIA, THE THREAT OF FORCE HANGING OVER THE PEOPLE
OF POLAND, EASTERN INSISTENCE ON STATE DOMINATION OF
CULTURAL AND HUMAN CONTACTS -- ALL OF THESE ARE
NEGATIVE FACTORS WHICH WILL BE WEIGHED ALONG WITH
WHAT WE ARE OR ARE NOT ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH IN
STOCKHOLM. WE DO NOT SEEK A MECHANICAL BALANCE IN
ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS, BUT WE DO INSIST ON
MOVING AHEAD IN ALL AREAS BECAUSE WE BELIEVE ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT HAVE EQUAL WEIGHT AND
VALIDITY. THE QUESTION OF HOW AND WHETHER THE CDE
PROCESS WILL CONTINUE WILL DEPEND ON OUR REVIEW OF
THE ENTIRE "TREE OF PRINCIPLES," NOT JUST THE
MILITARY-SECURITY BRANCH WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO
FASHION IN STOCKHOLM.
-- UNDERLYING OUR VIEW OF THE CSCE PROCESS IS A
VISION OF EUROPE: STABLE, COOPERATIVE, OPEN, WHERE
CONFIDENCE IS BUILT ON RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS, AND WHERE STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
TIES PRODUCE GREATER SECURITY AND PROSPERITY FOR
ALL. THIS IS A DIFFICULT TASK, FULL OF POTENTIAL
CONTRADICTIONS. I BEGAN BY SPEAKING OF ANATOCI
SHCHARANSKY; LIKE SO MANY SOVIET POLITICAL PRISONERS,
HE WAS BOTH A VICTIM AND A BENEFICIARY OF THE CSCE
PROCESS -- VICTIM BECAUSE HE SOUGHT TO PURSUE THE
PROMISES OF HELSINKI WHILE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES
WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEIR PEOPLE THAT THOSE
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PROMISES WERE NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. BENEFICIARY
BECAUSE, TEN YEARS LATER, THE SOVIET LEADER PERHAPS
REALIZED THAT THE WEST DOES TAKE THE PROMISES OF
HELSINKI SERIOUSLY AND THAT THE COSTS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF KEEPING MR. SHCHARANSKY IN
PRISON EXCEEDED ANY BENEFITS IN OTHER AREAS. IF SO,
OTHERS, LIKE ANDREI SAKHAROV, MAY EVENTUALLY BE FREED
AS WELL. LET US WORK FOR THESE HUMAN GOALS BECAUSE
THERE CANNOT BE REAL PROGRESS ON SECURITY IN ITS
NARROW SENSE UNLESS IT IS BUILT ON THE FOUNDATION OF
SECURITY FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY.
END TEXT. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
SECRET
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Unofficial tTsar91ation
STATEMENT
by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,
Ambassador at Large,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence? and Security?
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe
Stockholm, February 28, 1986
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Comraae Chairman,
The Soviet delegation would lime to araw the attention of
the participants in the Stockholm Conference to important
assessments of the development of the international situation aait
the basic provisions of the foreign policy progre of the
Soviet Union set forth by ueneral Secretary of the CPU Central
Committee Mikhail 6. Uorbachev in the Political Report to the
27th Congress of the Cormunist Party of the Soviet Union.
In the past year the soviet Union put forth a number of
major initiatives to improve the international situation and
strengthen peace. we maae several un-ilateral steps - we put
a moratorium on the deployment of intermeaiate - range missiles
in =rope, cut back the number of those missiles, and stoPPea
all nuclear explisions. The Soviet-rrench and the Soviet-U.S.
summits were necessary and useful stens.
The Soviet Union has made energetic efforts to give a
fresh impetus to the negotiations in Ueneva, stocknolm and Vienna,
the purpose of which is to scale down the arms race and build
confiaence between states. Negotiations are always a delicate
and complex matter. of cardinal importance here is to lead up to a
mutually acceptable balance of interests.
The comprehensive set of foreign policy initiatives containea
in the Statement by Ueneral secretary of the cFSU Central Committee
Mimhails. Gorbachev of January -15 forms an organic part of the
foreign policy progrPmme of tne soviet Union set forth at the
Party Congress. Our progrpmme is essentially an alloy of the
philosophy of shaping a safe world in the nuclear-space age with
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2.
a platform of concrete actions. Our integral programme to
eliminate completely weapons of mass destruction by the end of
this century is an historic progrR7me by its scope and sis--rtf`',.cance.
Its implementation would open for marknd an essentially new
avenue of development, a possibility to concentrate only on
creation. The USSR intends to work perseveringly for its
realization, regarding it as the central direction of our foreign
policy for the coming years.
It was stressea at the Uongress that in Yresiaent Reagan's
reply to the Statement of January 15 certain positive pronouncement
are swampea in various reservations, "linkages" ana "conditions"
which in_ract block the solution of radical problems of disarmament
including the elimination of Soviet ana U.S. intermediate?range
missiles in Europe. The reluctance to embark on the patt or nuclea:
aisarmament mPnifests itselr most clearly in the question of
terminating nuclear explosious.
However, despite the complexity of the current international
situation, stated Miknail Gorbachev, one can see that, by all the
evidence, the prerequisites ror improving the international
situation are beginnlng to form. idut prerequisites for a turn are
not the turn itself. The arms race continues and the threat of
nuclear war remains.
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3.
Having thorougnly considered the situation and navrs-
analyzed the nature and and the scope of the nuclear threat,
Mikhail Gorbachev elaborated a fundamental basis for
-;tablishing a comprehensive system of Liternational security in
military, political, economic and humanitarian fields.
This broad and comprehensive programme of international
security meets the urgent requirements of our time. Objective
logic itself of the development of international relations in
the nuclear age calls for an awareness that the world cannot
be saved and Preserved if the tYnking and actions built up
over the centuries on the acceptability and permissibility of
wars
and.
armed conflicts are not shed once and for all, irrovocatl:
The policy from strength, of total contention and military
confrontation has no future. It is a flight into the past and
not a response to the challenges of the future. In conditions of
the total unacceptability of nuclear war it is not confrontation
but rather Peaceful coexistence of different systems that should
become the law of interstate relations.
This means that security can be, if we take international
relations in general, only universal. The ultimate wisdom is not
in caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment
of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally
secure, for the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate
uncertainty in,politics and concrete actions.
As Mikhail Gorbachev stated, we regard the Europeen direction
as one of the main directions of our international activity.
Europe's historic opportunity and its future lie in peaceful
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cooperation among the nations of the continent. And it is
important, while preserving the assets that have already been
accumulated, to move further: from the initial to a more lasting
phase of detente, to mature detente, and then to the building of
dependable serity on the basis of the Helsinki procss, of a
radical reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons.
The Soviet delegation has distributed the report by
Mikhail S.Gorbachev to the githCongress of the CPSU and all
delegations can study in greater detail its important provisions.
The Stockholm Conference also has a role to Play in lessening
military confrontation and promoting disarmament. The agreements
to be agreed upon a-b.-the Conference would become a component part
of a comprehensive system of international security as regards,
in the first place, the elaboration of a set of measures designed
to strengthen confidence between states.
In order to move forward in the solution of those tasks it is
necessary to manifest readiness for mutually acceptable compromise:
and orientation not on confrontation but on dialogue and mutual
understanding. Acting in this spirit the Soviet Union suggested
getting down to grips with outstanding issues at the Stockholm
Conference.
The key to the solution of those problems ? questions
regarding notifications ? is provided in the Statement by Mikhail
Gorbachev of January 15. Discussions at the Conference and in its
corridors demonstrate, in our view, that his Proposal is met with
understanding as it gives a way out of the existing difficult
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5.
situation. In this respect, the plenary statement of February 7
made by the distiruished head of the Italian delegation,
Ambassador Ciarrapico is most characteristic. He said: "It is
indeed encouraging tat the Soviet Government shows interesw
for the problem of how to overcome the bottleneck encountered
in the field of notification': Obviously, we can understand if
one needs time to study in depth and constructively our proposals.
However, we should also take account of the fact that the
Conference does not have that much time to delay any solution
to this Question.
So much so as beyond the wells of the Conference attempts
are being publicly made to distort the essense of the Soviet
proposal, to describe it as if the Soviet Union nearly accepted
the position of those who consider that only those types of naval
activities are subject to notification which are directly linked
to land forces activities. Sometimes they surround this proposal
with various reservations which would bring the discussion back
to the old cirles.
In this connection we wish to make this question perfectly
clear. The Soviet Union has favoured and continues to favour
notification measures covering major manoeuvres of land, naval
and air forces, movements and transfers of troops in, the whole
of Europe and in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.
This is only natural pq those types of forces can seriously
threaten Europeen security. This position is in full accord with
the mandate of the Conference enacted by the Madrid meeting of
the CSCE participating States.
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Regrettably, certain Viestern countries take a different
approach. They attempt to reduce notification to land forces
activities alone and do not wish to consider the question of
notifications concerning air and naval forces in its entirety.
Where is, then, a way out of the situaldon? Is it in
continued fruitless discussions on the subject or In concrete
actions ained at eliminating the obstacle? The Soviet Union and
the socialist countries give munequivocal answer: we sugest,
moving from words to deeds and solve this problem too.
It goes without saying that questions regarding notification
of major manoeuvers of land, naval and air forces should be solved
thoroughly, in the interests of enhancing security in Europe. But,
as Mikhail Gorbachev stated on January 15, "if their comprehensive
solution cannot be achieved at this time, why not explore ways of
their solution in part-s,for instance reach agreement now about
notifications of major ground force and air force manoeuvres,
postponing the question of naval activities until the next stage
of the Conference". Such a solution to the question would take
account not only of the situation that has evolved at the Confere=
but of the security interests of all its participants.
We are speaking of postponing till the next stage not some
part of naval activities, whether independent or functiorP1, the
more so since such categories do not exist in the Madrid mandate,
but all naval activities, so as to address them thoroughly prici
adopt a solution corresponding to the Madrid mandate.
Sometimes a question is asked: how activities of amphibious
and airborne troops would be dealt with in this case? Speaking
of notification of major land force manoeuvrestwe also have innim
manoeuvres conducted independently or in combination with
components of amiShibious or airborne troops, as recorded in the ?
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Helsin1,7i .F7P-1 Act -Por that Tnatter. So our solution gives an
Prswer to this question too.
Silmming up, I would like to stress that such a solution to
the question of postponing naval activities until the next stage
of the Conference would enable it to focus now on notification of
major manoeuvres of land and air forces as well as of movements
and tr2rlf;fe-7's of troops in the whole of Europe and in the
adjoining sea (ocePn) area and air space.
Understandin to this effect should, in our view, be
registered in the form of a recorded agreement, as at hand is
a serious matter which has fundamental significance. This would
be fully in accord both with the mandate of the Conference and it
the decisions of the Helainki Preparatory Meeting of November 11,
1983,that provide for undertakin, in stages, new, effective and
concrete actions. The same documents enviaage that the provisions
established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms
and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.
Comrade Chairman,
Negotiation of agreements that has started in the working
groups is, by all means, a useful thing.Te,Iikemany oth, particfpants
in the Conference, exserted much effort to get this positive
process started and intend to maintain it in every way. However,
it is no secret that in not so distant a future the Process of
drafting will, in this way or another, come up against the main
question ? what should be notified. An answer to it affects not
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only groups dealing with notification but with excheres of
annual plers of notifiable military activities and with the
invitation of observers. In fact, solution to .this question
determines whether the Conference will be able to
achieve positive result:, 1)efore the Vienna meeting.
In our contacts with all delegations we explained the way
out of the situation proposed by the Soviet Union. We did this
publicly as well. The Soviet delegation expects a reply to this
proposal so as to elaborateipintlya mutually acceptable agreement.
In conclusion I can only say that time is limning out on us.
Each working group has only nirPteen meetings left.
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SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01499
SUBJECT: CDE: U.S. PLENARY RESPONSE TO SOVIET PLENARY
STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 28, 1986
1. CDE IX - 075.
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. U.S. RESPONDED TO SOVIET STATEMENT IN CDE PLENARY
FEBRUARY 28. TEXT OF RESPONSE BY U.S. DEL, AMBASSADOR
LYNN M. HANSEN FOLLOWS. GRINEVSKY PARODIED GOBACHEV'S
SPEECH TO THE PARTY OF THE 27TH CONGRESS WHICH INCLUDED
CRITICISM OF THE US RESPONSE TO GOBACHEV'S JANUARY 15
PROPOSAL. BEGIN TEXT.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
FOR NEARLY FIVE WEEKS, MY DELEGATION HAS WORKED
INTENSIVELY WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO
BRING DRAFTING TO SOME RESULTS AND TO BEGIN DRAFTING
LANGUAGE FOR WHAT COULD BECOME A FINAL AGREEMENT IN OUR
CONFERENCE. TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER SPONSORS OF
DOCUMENT SC.1, WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR WILLINGNESS
TO DRAFT ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE
AUTHORSHIP OF THE TEXT WHICH SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR
DRAFTING. WE EXPECT THE SAME APPROACH TO BE ADOPTED
BY OTHERS. ALONG THESE LINES, I CAN STATE EMPHATICALLY
THAT MY DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO SEE AGREED LANGUAGE
NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK IN EVERY, I REPEAT,
IN EVERY WORKING GROUP BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION.
WHILE WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE PROCESS SEEMS FINALLY
TO HAVE BEGUN, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE RESULTS
ARE STILL MEAGER.
MEANINGFUL RESULTS, SIGNIFICANT IN TERMS OF INCREASING
SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS THE BUSINESS
-- THE ONLY BUSINESS -- OF THIS CONFERENCE. THIS IS
NOT A UNILATERAL NOR A BILATERAL EFFORT BUT ONE THAT
INVOLVES EACH OF THE 35 SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATES
PARTICIPATING IN THIS NEGOTIATION IN A COMMON SEARCH
FOR CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH
MEET THE CONDITIONS AND OBJECTIVES SET FOR US IN THE
MADRID MANDATE.
PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS INSTRUCTED THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION TO PURSUE CONCRETE RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM. HE
HAS EXPRESSED THE DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR AN
ACCORD, INDEED HIS PERSONAL BELIEF THAT AN ACCORD CAN
BE REACHED THIS YEAR WHICH WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.
BUT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AND WILL NOT MAKE UNILATERAL
DECISIONS IN A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION.
THE FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BE IN STOCKHOLM, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ITS MANDATE, FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS IN VIENNA, FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, AND FOR NUCLEAR AND SPACE
ISSUES IN THE APPROPRIATE FORUM IN GENEVA. IT IS IN
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THESE SPECIALIZED FORUMS THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE
THE EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH THE INTRICATE
AND COMPLICATED SUBJECTS WHICH AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS
SEEN FIT TO INTRODUCE AGAIN INTO THIS MEETING.
THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IS CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL.
WE SEEK A STABLE WORLD IN WHICH MANKIND CAN ENJOY ITS
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS.
WHILE WE WILL PURSUE THESE OBJECTIVES WITHOUT APOLOGY,
WE WILL CONTINUE OUR SEARCH FOR WAYS TO REDUCE, AND
EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE, BOTH THE ROOT CAUSES OF WAR AND
THE WEAPONS WITH WHICH WAR, NOT ONLY NUCLEAR WAR, IS
WAGED. DEEP, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIED REDUCTIONS IN
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS AND A TOTAL GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ARE KEY REQUIREMENTS IN THE PURSUIT OF THESE
LONGER TERM OBJECTIVES. BUT THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS MUST NOT MAKE WAR WITH CONVENTIONAL MEANS
ATTRACTIVE OR MORE LIKELY AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OR RESOLVING DISPUTES.
OUR CONFERENCE PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN ATTEMPTING
TO AGREE ON VERIFIABLE MEASURES WHICH GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES. PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS SO INDIVIDUALS EVERYWHERE
CAN FREELY PARTICIPATE IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN DESTINY
WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IS ALSO KEY TO CREATING A
PEACEFUL AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT.
THE CSCE PROCESS, OF WHICH OUR CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL
PART, ALSO HAS A VITAL ROLE IN CREATING THE STABLE
ENVIRONMENT MY GOVERNMENT SEEKS. IT IS THIS LARGER
PROCESS WHICH OFFERS REAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFIDENCE-
BUILDING IN THE LARGER AMD MORE MEANINGFUL SENSE. IN
NOVEMBER OF THIS YEAR, WE SHALL GATHER IN VIENNA TO PUT
ALL THE PIECES OF THE CSCE PROCESS BACK TOGETHER BY
REVIEWING OUR ADHERENCE TO ALL THE COMMITMENTS MADE AT
HELSINKI INCLUDING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH IS OF
FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.
THERE, IN VIENNA, WE MUST RE-ESTABLISH THE BALANCE OF THE
CSCE PARENT PROCESS WHICH IS NECESSARY TO THE SUCCESS OF
ANY OF ITS OFF-SPRING AND THERE WE WILL DETERMINE THE
FUTURE OF CSCE AS WELL AS OF ITS COMPONENT PARTS INCLUDING
THIS CONFERENCE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, MY GOVERNMENT SEEKS A BETTER U.S./SOVIET
WORKING RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS BETTER WEST/EAST RELATION-
SHIPS. WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IN STOCKHOLM IS PART
OF THAT SEARCH. IT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL AND UNREASONABLE TO
IMPEDE PROGRESS IN THIS IMPORTANT FORUM BECAUSE THE
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN OTHER AREAS IS MORE DIFFICULT.
INDEED, SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND
PRESIDENT REAGAN AT GENEVA TO EMPHASIZE AND BUILD ON
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AREAS OF COMMON GROUND.
WITH THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE TO US BEFORE
SEPTEMBER 19, WHEN WE WILL CONCLUDE OUR EFFORTS HERE TO
PREPARE FOR VIENNA, WE MUST USE THE DRAFTING UPON WHICH
WE HAVE EMBARKED TO EXPAND AREAS OF COMMON GROUND INTO A
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT. IT IS
IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, IN HAND WITHIN THE
DRAFTING PROCESS WHERE WE MUST DECIDE THE OUTCOME OF
THIS CONFERENCE. END TEXT.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP
FEBRUARY 24-28
REF: A) STATE 31397, B)
1. CDE IX - 080
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
STOCKHOLM 01536
AND ANALYSIS,
, 1986
STOCKHOLM 1469
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THE DRAFTING PROCESS
HAS BEGUN. THE FIRST ELEMENTS OF A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT HAVE BEEN NOTED IN THE COORDINATORS' NOTEBOOKS
ON THE SUBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. THESE
WORDS, THOUGH INNOCUOUS, REPRESENT THE FIRST STEP TOWARD
AGREEMENT ON SOME COMMON LANGUAGE IN ALL THE OTHER WORK-
ING GROUPS (NOTIFICATION, ANNUAL FORECASTS, AND NON-USE
OF FORCE), POSSIBLY BEFORE THE END OF THE WINTER SESSION
IN TWO WEEKS. WHILE THE REAL WORK OF THE CONFERENCE --
DRAFTING AN ACCORD ON CONCRETE MEASURES -- ADVANCES,
ALBEIT IN FITS AND STARTS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PRESS
THE U.S. FOR A FORMAL REPLY TO THE CDE ELEMENTS OF
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, THEY
WANT THE CONFERENCE TO REGISTER AGREEMENT THAT CONSIDERA-
TION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES WILL BE POSPONED WITH THE
EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL BE TAKEN UP IN A
LATER PHASE. THE SOVIETS HAVE USED THE LACK OF AN
OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE TO PRESS SOME OF OUR MORE SUSCEP-
TIBLE ALLIES TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON RELATED SUBJECTS
SUCH AS INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. IN RESPONSE, WE HAVE
SAID THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST ABIDE BY THE
TERMS OF ITS MANDATE WITH DECISIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE TO
BE MADE AT THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. CONCERNING
CONSTRAINTS, ANOTHER NETTLESOME AREA, THERE IS GOOD NEWS
AND BAD NEWS: THE BAD NEWS IS THAT THERE IS GROWING
INSISTENCE THAT SOME KIND OF CONSTRAINING MEASURE MUST BE
INCLUDED IN A FINAL DOCUMENT; THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT THE
NNA ARE STRONGLY INCLINED TO TIE CONSTRAINING MEASURES TO
THE ANNUAL FORECAST. THE EAST, FOR POLITICAL REASONS,
AND SWEDEN, FOR PROPRIETARY INTERESTS, DO NOT SEEM TO
HAVE HEARD THE GOOD NEWS. FINALLY, THE DRAFTING METHOD-
OLOGY SEEMS TO BE EVOLVING IN THE WESTERN DIRECTION,
I.E., DRAFTING IS BEING DONE IN THE WORKING GROUPS AND
WITH ELLIPSES (DOTS) RATHER THAN BRACKETS. END SUMMARY.
4. NOTIFICATION: THE WORKING GROUP MOVED CLOSER TO
AGREEMENT ON DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THE METHOD AND PERIOD OF
NOTIFICATION. FRUSTRATED BY THE LACK OF EFFORT BY THE
SWEDISH COORDINATOR OR SWEDISH UNWILLINGNESS TO DRAFT ON
THIS OR ANY OTHER SUBJECT, THE WEST SEIZED THE INITIATIVE
IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECORD SOME LANGUAGE ON THE METHOD/
PERIOD OF NOTIFICATION. IN ORDER TO MAKE SOME FORWARD
PROGRESS ON THE WORKING GROUP FIELD, RATHER THAN HAGGLE
WITH THE EAST IN MORE RESTRICTED SIDELINE HUDDLES, THE
WEST PROPOSED THAT A CZECH TEXT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR
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NEGOTIATION. IN A PARALLEL ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE
COORDINATOR'S FUMBLE, THE NNA ALSO INTRODUCED A TEXT. A
TIME-OUT WAS CALLED, DURING WHICH EASTERNERS CLAIM THEY
SUCCEEDED IN PRESSING THE SOVIET GENERAL TO ACCEPT THE
NATO SUGGESTION. WHEN THE GROUP REASSEMBLED, THE EAST
AND THE NNA INDICATED ACCEPTANCE OF NATO'S PROPOSED
CHANGES AND THE USE OF "DOTS" (VICE SQUARE BRACKETS),
THUS CONFIRMING THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE DRAFTING METHOD-
OLOGY PREFERRED BY THE WEST. IT IS NOW THE BASIS FOR
BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONSULAT IONS.
THE GDR TABLED A TEXT ON TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE
NOTIFIED (SEE SEPTEL) CONTAINING SEVERAL NOTABLE
FEATURES, INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO THE ZONE IN TERMS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE. SUSPECTING SOVIET
PERFIDY, THE WEST (WITH THE TURKS IN FRONT) HAS SAID
THAT IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO DRAFTING ON SUBSTANCE UNTIL
ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE REFERRING TO THE ZONE IS DRAFTED.
AT U.S. SUGGESTION THE COORDINATOR CONVOKED A CONTACT
GROUP OF INTERESTED PARTIES FROM THE THREE GROUPS TO
RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THE EAST DID NOT SHOW. ONE
EASTERNER LATER TOLD US THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD
RECEIVED TWO SETS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW. THE
MESSAGE RECEIVED VIA THE POLITICAL CHANNEL HAD ENCOURAGED
MEETING IN SMALL CONTACT GROUPS -- THE PREFERRED SOVIET
DRAFTING METHODOLOGY -- WHILE THE MILITARY WERE
REPORTEDLY TOLD NOT TO TOUCH THE ZONE ISSUE AT THIS
TIME. NEVERTHELESS, A CONTACT GROUP ON LANGUAGE
REFERRING TO THE ZONE WAS HELD THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH
SOVIET MILITARY PARTICIPATION. THE MOST LIKELY SOLUTION
APPEARS TO BE REFERENCE TO THE ZONE FOLLOWED BY AN
ASTERISK WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A FOOTNOTE REPEATING THE
THREE PARAGRAPHS OF THE MANDATE DEALING WITH THE ZONE.
5. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE FRENCH-INSPIRED EC-12 TEXT
WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE CAUCUS AS A "CONTRIBUTION" TO
NATO EFFORTS TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON POSITION ON NUF.
HOWEVER, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR PECK'S BAD BOY BEHAVIOR
ON THIS ISSUE, THE FRENCH HELD UP THE TEXT AT THE LAST
MINUTE BY INSISTING THAT THE 12 SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO THE
DRAFT BEFORE IT INTRODUCING IT INTO THE NATO ARENA.
PARIS WAS FIRMLY REBUFFED BY ITS INCREASINGLY EXASPERATED
COMMUNITY PARTNERS. AS IT STANDS THE "FEBRUARY 26" PAPER
(OUR UNOFFICIAL DESIGNATION FOR THE EC-12 DRAFT) IS NOT A
BAD STARTING POINT FOR NATO DELIBERATIONS. HOWEVER, WE
HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR LARGER CONCEPT OF SECURITY
OUTLINED IN NUF INSTRUCTIONS (REF A) MUST BE REFLECTED
IN ANY FINAL NATO POSITION. MEANWHILE, THE NNA
COORDINATOR HAS INFORMALLY CIRCULATED TWO COORDINATOR'S
TEXTS -- ONE ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE TAKEN FROM THE
MADRID MANDATE AND THE OTHER ON THE NEED FOR IMPROVED
AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
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COMMITMENT. IN OUR VIEW, THESE PHRASES ARE CONSISTENT
WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE AND WE PLAN
TO GIVE OUR ASSENT TO NOTE ONE OR BOTH OF THESE PASSAGES
IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK BEFORE THE END OF THE
SESSION. SUCH A MOVE WOULD TAKE MUCH OF THE EDGE OFF
EASTERN ALLEGATIONS THAT THE WEST IS FOOTDRAGGING ON NUF
AND THAT THE EAST IS THUS JUSTIFIED IN DOING THE SAME IN
OTHER WORKING GROUPS. ONLY THE FRENCH STRONGLY OPPOSE
THE COORDINATOR TABLING TEXT AND THREATEN TO OBJECT
PUBLICLY IN THE WORKING GROUP IF HE TAKES SUCH AN INITIA-
TIVE. THE NNA CONTINUE TO BE DIVIDED INTO TWO DISTINCT
AND PERHAPS IRRECONCILABLE CAMPS, THE NEUTRALS (AUSTRIA,
SWEDEN, AND SWITZERLAND) WHO FAVOR A MINIMALIST NUF TEXT,
AND THE NNA (YUGOSLAVIA, CYPRUS, AND MALTA) WHO PREFER AN
ELABORATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THE ENIGMATIC FINNS
REMAIN MORE NEUTRAL THAN THE NEUTRALS AND MORE NONALIGNED
THAN THE NONALIGNED ON THIS ISSUE.
6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS:
SURPRISINGLY, THIS GROUP NOTED THE CONFERENCE'S FIRST
DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION (REPORTED
SEPTEL). THE GROUP AGREED TO NOTE IN THE COORDINATOR'S
NOTEBOOK A SENTENCE BASED ON THE MANDATE ON THE NEED FOR
ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF CSBM'S. ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL
TEXT WAS FAR FROM EARTH-SHAKING, ITS MERE EXISTENCE MAY
HELP US TO-ADVANCE OUR POSITION THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD
BE A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT MEASURE AND MAY AID OUR
EFFORT TO DRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY ON VERIFICATION AND OTHER
MEASURES. THE EASTERN POSITION HAS BEEN THAT DRAFTING ON
VERIFICATION SHOULD FOLLOW THE ELABORATION OF CSBM'S. IN
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS THE EAST CONTINUED PRO-FORMA
TO REJECT ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR CHECKING COMPLIANCE WITH
CSBM'S AND REITERATED EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT INSPECTION
WAS ONLY APPROPRIATE FOR DISARMAMENT OR ARMS REDUCTIONS
AGREEMENTS. THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT CSBM VERIFICATION
MEASURES NEED TO BE MORE "ELEGANT AND STREAMLINED".
OTHER EASTERNERS, PARTICULARLY THE GDR, CONTINUED TO MAKE
FAVORABLE NOISES ABOUT THE NNA'S "OBSERVATION UPON
REQUEST" PROPOSAL AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND THE NNA
CONTINUED TO FLOG THE PROPOSAL TO THE WEST. THIS WEEK
SWITZERLAND VOICED WHAT APPEARS TO BE ITS NATIONAL
POSITION, EMPHASIZING THAT THE "RIGHT OF REFUSAL" CLAUSE
WOULD BE USED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES OF "SUPREME
NATIONAL INTEREST," I.E., IN A CRISIS SITUATION WHERE THE
ENTIRE CSBM SYSTEM HAD ALREADY BROKEN DOWN. THE COORDI-
NATOR'S PERFORMANCE IN THIS GROUP, ADMITTEDLY ONE OF THE
MORE DIFFICULT, IS IMPROVING AND WE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS
IN REVERSING HIS EARLIER INCLINATION TO MOVE DRAFTING
OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP STRUCTURE INTO INFORMAL "COFFEE
GROUPS."
7. OBSERVATION: BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND ATMOSPHERIC
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PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK. THE HIGHLIGHT WAS AGREEMENT
TO A COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK TEXT ON THE INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS WHICH CONFIRMED: 1) EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF
OBLIGATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL CDE STATES
(ALTHOUGH THE EAST HAS YET TO AGREE THAT OBSERVATION WILL
BE FOR ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES), AND 2) AN APPARENT NNA
CONCESSION THAT A MAXIMUM OF TWO OBSERVERS MAY BE SENT TO
A MILITARY ACTIVITY (SC.7 HAD HELD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY
OF MORE OBSERVERS FOR "PARTICULARLY LARGE" ACTIVITIES).
THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIS WEEK'S WORKING
GROUP SESSION, HOWEVER, MAY HAVE BEEN EQUALLY AS IMPOR-
TANT AS ALL SIDES MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO BE BUSINESS-
LIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THE EAST'S EARLIER RELUCTANCE TO
DRAFT ON ANY PART OF OBSERVATION BEFORE A DETERMINATION
HAS BEEN MADE ON WHAT TYPE OF ACTIVITIES WOULD BE
NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED IS FAST DISSOLVING, AND THEY NOW
SEEM PREPARED TO DRAFT ON THE "HOUSEKEEPING" ASPECTS OF
OBSERVATION (E.G, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, TRANSPORTA-
TION, COSTS, ETC.). POLEMICAL EASTERN STATEMENTS ON THE
NECESSITY OF OBSERVING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES VIRTUALLY
DISAPPEARED FROM THIS WEEK'S DISCUSSION AND THE EAST
JOINED NATO AND THE NNA IN ENCOURAGING THE COORDINATOR
(KAHILUOTO, FINLAND) TO ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP COORDINATORS
TEXT WHEREVER POSSIBLE. FOR ITS PART, NATO EMPHASIZED
PROGRESS BOTH BY IDENTIFYING NNA LANGUAGE WE COULD ACCEPT
(I.E., ON EQUAL TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS) AND BY ENCOURAG-
ING THE COORDINATOR TO MAKE EFFORTS EVEN ON ISSUES IN
WHICH THE EAST HAS YET TO OFFER A PROPOSAL. REASONS FOR
THIS IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE ARE VARIED BUT MAY REFLECT AN
EASTERN DECISION THAT FURTHER FOOTDRAGGING ON DRAFTING
PERIPHERAL ISSUES IN THE MOST NONCONTENTIOUS WORKING
GROUP WAS UNLIKELY TO WORK TO THEIR LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE
(PARTICULARLY GIVEN NATO'S VOCAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF DRAFT-
ING PROGRESS) AS WELL AS THE HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE
ALL GROUPS HAVE IN THE FINNISH COORDINATOR'S HONEST
BROKER ABILITIES.
8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: SINCE THE ZONE ISSUE FIRST CAME
TO A HEAD SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING A DISCUSSION OF
FORECASTS, THE WEST HAS REFUSED TO AGREE TO THE RECORDING
OF TEXTS ON THIS SUBJECT UNTIL THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE
ZONE MAKES SOME PROGRESS. WITH THE EASTERN SCUTTLING OF
THE FIRST PROPOSED CONTACT GROUP MEETING, NATO REPS
LIMITED THEIR WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES TO TABLING THE
REST OF MEASURE 2, PROVIDING A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE
INFORMATION A FORECAST WOULD CONTAIN AND ENGAGING THE
NNA IN A DETAILED EXCHANGE ON THE CONTENT. THE NNA, EAST
AND WEST ARE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST TWO ITEMS
IN THE CONTENT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST: THE TYPE/
DESIGNATION OF THE ACTIVITY AND ITS MAIN PURPOSE(S).
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YUGOSLAVIA ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A CASE FOR INCLUDING
UNNOTIFIABLE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE FORECAST,
ARGUING THAT THE GREATER THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION
EXCHANGED, THE MORE CONFIDENCE -- ESPECIALLY NNA
CONFIDENCE -- WOULD BE ENHANCED.
9. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST APPEARED TO BE GRASPING AT
STRAWS TO GET THE WEST TO AGREE TO CONSTRAINTS IN
PRINCIPLE. THE GDR INTRODUCED A TEXT PLACING A 7,000-
TROOP CEILING ON AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS. THE
POLISH AMBASSADOR ADDRESSED THE WORKING GROUP LATE IN
THE DAY TO EXPRESS HIS "DISSATISFACTION" WITH THE STATE
OF AFFAIRS REGARDING CONSTRAINTS AND RAISING A LONGSTAND-
ING POLISH CALL FOR PARALLEL PROGRESS, HE MADE UNVEILED
THREATS ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR "HARMONIOUS DEVELOPMENTS"
IN ALL AREAS. SINGLING OUT THE WEST AS THE FOOTDRAGGERS,
HE NOTED THAT A "MAJORITY" OF STATES NOW ACCEPTS THE SC.7
APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS. KONARSKI'S SELF-SERVING STATE-
MENT WAS MISLEADING IN THAT THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED ONLY
THE PORTION OF THE SC.7 CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL CALLING FOR
A CEILING TIED TO THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD. MUCH TO
THE CHAGRIN OF THE EAST, THE IRISH DEPUTY EARLIER LEAPT
INTO THE VOID LEFT BY THE ALL TOO PARTISAN NNA, PRESENT-
ING TENTATIVE IDEAS DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE CONSTRAINING
EFFECT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST, E.G., LONGER FORECAST
PERIODS FOR LARGER EXERCISES.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C ONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01617
SUBJECT: AGREED COORDINATOR'S TEXT ON OBSERVATION
1. CDE IX - 085
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE FIRST TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2
(OBSERVATION) WHICH WAS AGREED FOR NOTATION IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON FEBRUARY 27. THE TEXT DEALS
WITH THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS AND CONTAINS A SIGNI-
FICANT CONCESSION IN THAT THE EAST HAS AGREED THAT
OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED FROM "ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES." THE TEXT ALSO REFLECTS AN APPARENT NNA
CONCESSION IN THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF OBSERVERS FROM
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE IS SET AT TWO (SC.7 HAD HELD
OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING MORE OBSERVERS TO
"PARTICULARLY LARGE ACTIVITIES.) DOTS IN THE TEXT
INDICATE ISSUES ON WHICH THERE IS NO CONSENSUS.
BEGIN TEXT:
A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO . . . .
THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT
LATER THAN . . . DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION.
IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE
ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.
END TEXT.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01634
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION TEXT
1. IX - 084.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AFTER MUCH WRANGLING, WORKING GROUP B AGREED TO NOTE
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK:
BEGIN TEXT:
PRIOR NOTIFICATION
THE PARTICIATING STATES WILL GIVE ... IN WRITING THROUGH
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT TO ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ... DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE
OF THE START OF NOTIFABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES (ASTERISK)...
(ASTERISK-TO BE DEFINED)
... WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE
PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED
IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES
OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE ..., IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT
IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL. END TEXT.
4. THE WORKING GROUP HAS DETERMINED THAT EXCEPTIONS
(I.E., ALERT ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN PACKAGE) ARE
STILL TO BE DISCUSSED AND TEXT NOTED. ACCEPTANCE OF
THE HEADING PRIOR NOTIFICATION DOES NOT PREJUDGE THE
HANDLING OF ALERT ACTIVITIES OR WHAT IS TO BE INSERTED
IN PLACE OF ELLIPSES AT A LATER DATE; FINAL ACT LANGUAGE
USES PRIOR NOTIFICATION AS A HEADING AND NOTIFICATION
AS OPERATIVE LANGUAGE.
5. THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES INDICATES THAT EITHER
NOTIFICATION OR PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE ADDED AT A
LATER DATE. THE SECOND SET OF ELLIPSES INDICATES SPACE
TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF DAYS IN ADVANCE NOTIFICATION
OF A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY WILL BE GIVEN. THE THIRD SET
OF ELLIPSES ARE RESERVED PLACE FOR "IN THE ZONE".
(THAT ISSUE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL
CONTACT GROUP. SEE BELOW) THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES IN
THE SECOND PARAGRAPH INDICATE EITHER NOTIFICATION OR
PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE ADDED AT A LATER DATE.
6. WE HAVE REFUSED TO AGREE TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AS
OPERATIVE LANGUAGE, DESPITE PRESSURES FROM OUR MORE
WOBBLY ALLIES, PENDING A THOROUGH DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
OF THE NNA CONCEPTS IN RELATION TO DOCUMENT SC.1.
7. THE ISSUE OF HOW TO REFER TO THE ZONE IN THE
DRAFTING LANGUAGE WAS RESOLVED IN AN AFTERNOON CONTACT
GROUP CONVENED FOR THAT PURPOSE. THE SOLUTION, AGREED
AD REF, IS AS FOLLOWS: A SPECIAL BODY OF TEXT WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT WHICH FOR THE TIME BEING
WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE "FLOATING", I.E., THE TEXT IS
AGREED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHERE IT EVENTUALLY MAY
FIND ITS PLACE IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. THE FLOATING
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TEXT WOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:
- -- "UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE
OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S IS AS FOLLOWS:"
- -- THE THREE PARAGRAPHS FROM THE MADRID MANDATE
WILL BE QUOTED VERBATIM, INCLUDING THE USE OF THE
ASTERISK DEALING WITH ADJOINING SEA AREA;
- -- THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT APPEARS IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE THREE MANDATE PARAGRAPHS: "HEREINAFTER, THE
ABOVE WILL BE REFERRED TO AS THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBM'S." THIS FORMULATION WOULD THEN BE USED
EVERYWHERE IN THE DRAFT LANGUAGE WHERE THE NEED TO
REFER TO THE ZONE APPEARS.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01726
SUBJECT: CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR
AND THE IRISH PROPOSAL
1. CDE - 090
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE IRISH HAVE PRESENTED A PROPOSAL
FOR DEVELOPING THE ANNUAL CALENDAR AS A CONSTRAINING
MEASURE. ALTHOUGH THIS SPECIFIC PROPOSAL HAS WEAK-
NESSES, USDEL BELIEVES U.S. SHOULD BEGIN CONSIDERING
WAYS TO ENHANCE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE CALENDAR.
END SUMMARY.
4. AT THE 27 FEBRUARY WORKING GROUP MEETING OF A-3
(ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINING MEASURES), THE IRISH
ORALLY PRESENTED A TEXT (AT PARA 4), PRIVATELY
CIRCULATED IN WRITING, WHICH FOCUSES ON THE CONSTRAINING
ELEMENTS OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE IRISH APPEAR TO
HAVE TAKEN ON THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKER IN A-3 BY
PROPOSING THAT THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BE MADE MORE
"CONSTRAINING." THE NNA HAVE EXHIBITED EXTREME
AMBIVALENCE ON THIS ISSUE: THEY SEEM TO MOVE IN THE
DIRECTION OF USING THE CALENDAR AS A MEANS OF SATISFYING
THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONSTRAINING MEASURE WHILE ALSO
STRESSING THE URGENCY OF AGREEING ON CEILINGS. THE EAST
HAVE NOT YET EVEN RECOGNIZED THE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF
THE CALENDAR AS AN OPTION AND, IF ONLY TO MAKE NATO
UNCOMFORTABLE, WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT MORE
TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS (I.E., CEILINGS) FOR SOME
WEEKS. AS THE EAST AND NNA GROW MORE STRIDENT IN THEIR
SUPPORT FOR TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS, THE WEST MORE
VIGOROUSLY INDICATES ITS OPPOSITION TO THAT APPROACH.
DELEGATION DOES EXPECT THE NNA WILL--AFTER A LONG AND
STRIDENT BATTLE--SEE THE LIGHT OF THE "CONSTRAINING
ASPECTS OF THE CALENDAR" APPROACH AND THAT THE IRISH
BRIDGE-BUILDING EFFORT WILL EVENTUALLY BE THE SUBJECT OF
GROWING ATTENTION BY MOST PARTICIPANTS.
5. BEGIN TEXT OF IRISH PROPOSAL: EACH PARTICIPATING
STATE WILL ANNUALLY TRANSMIT TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES A TABLE, TO BE KNOWN AS THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE PURSUANT TO ...,
WHICH IT INTENDS TO CARRY OUT IN THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR
YEAR. ANNUAL CALENDARS WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN WRITING
THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS NOT LATER THAN
1 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR.
- IF A PARTICIPATING STATE MAKES CHANGES IN A MILITARY
ACTIVITY INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, SUCH CHANGES
WILL BE COMMUNICATED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF THE ACTIVITY
PURSUANT TO ....
- IF, IN ADDITION TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES INCLUDED
IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, A PARTICIPATING STATE CARRIES
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OUT ONE OR MORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ...., NO SUCH ADDITIONAL
MILITARY ACTIVITY SHALL INVOLVE MORE THAN 50,000 TROOPS,
AND THE NUMBER OF SUCH ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES
SHALL BE NO MORE THAN ... OF THE NUMBER OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THAT PARTICIPATING STATE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
- ANNUAL CALENDARS SHALL PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO EACH MILITARY ACTIVITY
INCLUDED:
- IN AN ADDENDUM TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, PROVIDE
INFORMATION ON MAJOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE
PURSUANT TO ...., WHICH IT INTENDS TO CARRY OUT IN
CALENDAR YEARS SUBSEQUENT TO THE NEXT CALENDAR YEAR.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ABIDE BY THE
CONSTRAINT THAT
NO MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO ... AND INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000
TROOPS SHALL BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF
ANY PARTICIPATING STATE UNLESS INCLUDED IN THE
ADDENDUM TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR TRANSMITTED IN
THE YEAR FALLING TWO YEARS EARLIER THAN THE
YEAR IN WHICH THE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE AND
NO MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO .... AND INVOLVING MORE THAN
100,000 TROOOPS SHALL BE CARRIED OUT ON THE
TERRITORY OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATE UNLESS
INCLUDED IN THE ADDENDUM TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR
TRANSMITTED IN THE YEAR FALLING THREE YEARS
EARLIER THAN THE YEAR IN WHICH THE ACTIVITY
TAKES PLACE.
END TEXT OF IRISH PROPOSAL.
6. INITIAL NATO REACTION TO THE IRISH PROPOSAL HAS BEEN
MIXED. SEVERAL NATO AMBASSADORS BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT
IT PROVIDES NATO A WAY OUT OF THE CONSTRAINTS
"DILEMMA." AT THE WORKING LEVEL, IT HAS BEEN POINTED
OUT THAT EITHER A PERCENTAGE OR A NUMERICAL CEILING ON
NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES IS UNACCEPTABLE IN MILITARY
TERMS. IN PRIVATE, MOST NATO COUNTRIES HAVE SUGGESTED
THAT THEY COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A "TIME
CONSTRAINT" (I.E., FORECASTING LARGER ACTIVITIES SEVERAL
YEARS IN ADVANCE). RECOGNIZING THE TACTICAL PRESSURES
NATO WILL FACE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, HOWEVER,
MOST ARE WARY OF INDICATING POLITICALLY ANY SUPPORT FOR
"TIME CONSTRAINTS" AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION AT THIS
STAGE. IN DELEGATION'S VIEW, THESE TYPES OF
"CONSTRAINTS" ARE TROUBLESOME BECAUSE THEY COULD
IMPLICITLY SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT THAT LARGE-SCALE
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ACTIVITIES (OF WHICH NATO HAS FAR MORE THAN THE WARSAW
PACT) ARE INHERENTLY MORE THREATENING THAN OTHER
ACTIVITIES, AND, THEREFORE, CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST
THREAT TO EUROPE. THE U.K. IS LIKEWISE WARY OF "TIME
CONSTRAINTS" FOR THAT REASON.
7. ALTHOUGH IN THE DELEGATION'S VIEW IT WILL BE SOME
TIME BEFORE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR
DEVELOP A STRONG CONFERENCE-WIDE FOLLOWING, WE
NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THERE ARE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN
PURSUING THAT APPROACH. DELEGATION BELIEVES WASHINGTON
SHOULD CONSIDER DEVELOPING THE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF
THE CALENDAR, AND WE WILL PROVIDE INITIAL SUGGESTIONS
SEP TEL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01535
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT AT CDE ON OLOF PALME DEATH
1. IX - 081.
2. U - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS GIVEN ON BEHALF OF
CO-SPONSERS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, BY DEPUTY HEAD OF USDEL
CDE, AMBASSADOR LYNN HANSEN, IN 3 MARCH MEETING OF
WORKING GROUP AB WHICH WAS DEDICATED TO CONDOLENCE
STATEMENTS.
BEGIN TEXT.
THE GROUP OF SIXTEEN STATES, ON WHOSE BEHALF THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION IS SPEAKING TODAY, WISHES TO ADD ITS
COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL VOICES TO THOSE FROM EVERY
CORNER OF THE GLOBE TO EXPRESS PROFOUND SORROW AND
INDIGNATION AT THE INSANE ACT OF VIOLENCE WHICH ENDED THE
LIFE OF A MAN WHO HIMSELF OPPOSED EVERY FORM OF VIOLENCE.
PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME WAS NOT ONLY A LEADING POLITICAL
FIGURE IN SWEDEN, HE WAS AN INTERNATIONAL SYMBOL OF
COMPASSION AND HUMANITY, A MAN KNOWN FOR HIS UNTIRING
EFFORTS IN PURSUIT OF PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND DISARMAMENT.
WE, WHO ARE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS CONFERENCE, HAVE A SHARE
IN THE VISION OF THIS MAN AS WE PURSUE OUR WORK HERE.
TO THE PALME FAMILY, WE EXPRESS OUR DEEPEST FELT SYMPATHY
IN THE MOMENT OF LOSS OF HUSBAND AND FATHER. WE PRAY
THAT MRS. PALME'S PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL WOUNDS SOON
MAY BE HEALED.
TO OUR SWEDISH COLLEAGUES IN THE CONFERENCE, MEMBERS OF
THE SWEDISH DELEGATION AND THOSE WHO SERVE US IN THE
SECRETARIAT, WE EXTEND OUR SINCEREST CONDOLENCES.
USING THE MEANS AVAILABLE TO US, WE WISH TO CONVEY TO
THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF SWEDEN OUR EMPATHY AND
UNDERSTANDING AS THEY GRIEVE THE SENSELESS DEATH OF ONE
OF SWEDEN'S GREATEST SONS AND AN INTERNATIONAL STATESMAN,
OLOF PALME. THE WORLD WILL BE POORER BECAUSE OF THIS
MAN'S UNTIMELY DEPARTURE FROM US.
END TEXT.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01584
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: UPDATE AND ANALYSIS OF
"FEBRUARY 26" TEXT
REF: A) STATE 31397, B) STOCKHOLM 1470
1. CDE IX - 083
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE UPDATES THE STATUS OF THE
CAUCUS' EFFORTS TO FORMULATE A COMMON NATO POSITION ON
NON-USE OF FORCE AND PROVIDES INITIAL DELEGATION COMMENTS
ON THE EC-12 NUF TEXT (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE
FEBRUARY 26 TEXT). THE CABLE ALSO OUTLINES DELEGATION
APPROACH TO NUF AT THIS STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE,
INCLUDING HOW TO INCORPORATE AS MUCH OF THE U.S. DRAFT
AS POSSIBLE INTO AN EVENTUAL ALLIED TEXT. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NATO NON-USE OF FORCE CLUSTER CAUCUS BEGAN WORK
ON A COMMON ALLIED TEXT ON MONDAY, MARCH 3. THE
"FEBRUARY 26" NUF TEXT, I.E., THE EC-12 TEXT, FORMS THE
BASIS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS; HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE IT
CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THE INCLUSION OF KEY CONCEPTS SUCH AS
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE IS
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO US AND COULD BE USEFUL IN
DIRECTING THE NUF EXERCISE TO SERVE WESTERN INTERESTS.
FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE INDICATED THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH
ON NUF MUST REFLECT THE LARGER CONCEPT OF SECURITY
OUTLINED IN REFTEL. WE HAVE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT WE
PREFER THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH ON INTRODUCING WESTERN
LANGUAGE IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE PACE AND THE SUBSTANCE
OF NUF DRAFTING. ALTHOUGH OUR APPROACH HAS FOUND A GOOD
DEAL OF SYMPATHY EVEN AMONG MANY EC-12 DELEGATIONS, WE
EXPECT TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF FORGING THE "FEBRUARY 26"
TEXT INTO AN ACCEPTABLE FINAL PRODUCT; HOWEVER, WE
ANTICIPATE SOME ASSISTANCE FROM OUR CANADIAN AND
NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUES; THE UK AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT,
THE FRG SHOULD SUPPORT SOME OF OUR AMENDMENTS. THE
CAUCUS, OF COURSE, WILL MAKE THE FINAL DETERMINATION
WHEN AND HOW TO USE THE AGREED UPON TEXT. AS NOTED
REF B, WE WILL CONTINUE TO REPORT THE TEXT TO WASHINGTON
AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.
5. PARA 6 CONTAINS SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS DELEGATION
INTENDS TO INTRODUCE. IN GENERAL WE WILL TRY TO
INCORPORATE AS MUCH OF THE U.S. DRAFT AS POSSIBLE INTO
AN ALLIED TEXT, BEARING IN MIND THAT SOME OF THE
ELEMENTS CAN BEST BE USED FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, E.G.,
WE CAN INTRODUCE THE "FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION" ELEMENT
TO COUNTER INTRODUCTION OF LANGUAGE "OUTLAWING WAR
PROPAGANDA" SUCH AS THAT CONTAINED IN THE ROMANIAN
PROPOSAL. OUR OVERALL APPROACH WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT
NUF LANGUAGE IS INCORPORATED INTO A POLITICALLY BINDING
DOCUMENT, WHICH FOCUSES ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. IN ORDER TO
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MAINTAIN THIS SUBORDINATE AND FUNCTIONAL STATUS OF NUF
OUR INITIAL THINKING IS THAT THE NUF SECTION SHOULD BE
PREAMBULAR WHILE THE CSBM'S SECTION SHOULD BE THE
OPERATIONAL HEART OF THE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WE WILL
RESERVE OUR POSITION ON THE PLACEMENT OF CERTAIN PARTS
OF THE NUF TEXT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TYPE OF LANGUAGE
CONTAINED IN THE FIRST FOUR OR FIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE
"FEBRUARY 26" TEXT COULD WELL FORM PART OF A "CHAPEAU"
TO A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. FINALLY, WE WILL
SEEK TO MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE
POLITICALLY BINDING STATUS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
6. WASHINGTON WILL NOTE THAT THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT IS
IN THE INDICATIVE (THEY AGREED, THEY REAFFIRMED) RATHER
THAN THE MORE TRADITIONAL PREAMBULAR (REAFFIRMING,
RECALLING) FORM. OUR COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING
THE FRENCH, ASSURE US THAT THIS FORM HAS BEEN CHOSEN TO
STRESS THE CSBM'S/NUF LINK AND NOT TO UPGRADE THE STATUS
OF THE NUF SECTION. IN FACT, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR
ASSURED US IT DOES NOT INDICATE THAT PARIS WANTS A
SEPARATE NUF DOCUMENT OR A POLITICAL DECLARATION ON THE
NON-USE OF FORCE AS IT HAD CONTEMPLATED LAST YEAR. THE
USE OF THE FUTURE TENSE, E.G., WILL, RATHER THAN THE
CONDITIONAL, E.G., WOULD, WAS INTENDED TO MAKE
COMMITMENT TO THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S
LESS CONDITIONAL (SEE PARAS 1..5, 1.6, FOR EXAMPLE).
FINALLY, IT IS DOUBTFUL -- EVEN WITH THE BEST OF
INTENTIONS (AND, GIVEN THE FRENCH NEGOTIATING HISTORY ON
THIS SUBJECT, THEIR INTENTIONS CAN BE QUESTIONED) --
WHETHER THE ALLIANCE CAN AGREE ON A FULL TEXT IN THE TEN
DAYS REMAINING IN THIS SESSION. THEREFORE, WHILE
WORKING ON THE FULL TEXT, WE WILL PRESS THE CLUSTER TO
AGREE ON SOME LANGUAGE TO INTRODUCE INTO THE WORKING
GROUP, E.G. LANGUAGE ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE
(CONCRETE MEASURES) AND/OR LANGUAGE IN THE NUF/CSBM'S
LINKAGE.
7. BEGIN TEXT AND COMMENTS:
1.1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 STATES OF THE CSCE
MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER
1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY
CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE
MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT
IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE
MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.
- DELETE "IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY
COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S." SUBSTITUTE "BEGIN A PROCESS OF
NEGOTIATIONS AND ADOPTION OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY
CSBM'S." THIS CHANGE WOULD KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF
DISCUSSING CSBM'S RATHER THAN DISARMAMENT IN PHASE 1B OF
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THE CDE PROCESS.
1.2. ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S
WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING
PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH
COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED MANDATE.
- LANGUAGE SHOULD REFLECT THE COFFEE GROUP DISCUSSIONS
CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS ON "THE ZONE" ISSUE.
1.3. IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED IN THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS
OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULA-
TION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO
APPREHENSION.
- THIS LANGUAGE REFLECTS HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE
(P.84); HOWEVER, IT DELETES THE KEY PHRASE TYING
APPREHENSION" WITH THE "LACK OF CLEAR AND TIMELY
INFORMATION." IN ANY CASE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE
ALLIANCE, ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, SHOULD INTRODUCE THE
TERM INTO THE NUF DIALOGUE. FIRSTLY, IT IS INEXACT AND
SUBJECTIVE; THE NUF PRINCIPLE RELATES NARROWLY TO THE
ACTUAL THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN
CHARTER; ACTIONS WHICH "GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION" ARE
NOT NECESSARILY WITHIN THE NUF PRESCRIPTION. SECONDLY,
AND MORE IMPORTANT FROM OUR SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, THE
CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE IS BASED ON APPREHENSION. WE WANT
OUR ENEMIES TO BE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE
AGAINST US. THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PHRASE
"WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION" BE DELETED.
1.4. THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, BY
IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG
THEM AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING STABILITY AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE
CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THEREFORE
TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING
OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.
- DELETE "AND, MORE GENERALLY, . . .
THE LINK TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY IS ALREADY COVERED
IN 3.2. FURTHERMORE, CSBM'S ALONE OR EVEN PRIMARILY
CANNOT "ELIMINATE THE CAUSE OF TENSIONS" IN EUROPE.
(WASHINGTON SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS AGAIN IS HFA
LANGUAGE, P.84).
1.5. THEY RECOGNIZED MOREOVER THAT THIS SET OF CSBM'S
ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY THEIR NATURE,
WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO
ACHIEVING THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS
DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
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- LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE AND A
SHORTHAND VERSION OF THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE TAKEN
FROM THE MADRID MANDATE. BY SHORTENING THE MANDATE
LANGUAGE THE "INTEGRAL" LINK BETWEEN THE CDE AND THE
CSCE PROCESS, FOR EXAMPLE, IS ELIMINATED. IT MIGHT BE
ADVISABLE TO RESTORE THE FULL TEXT OF THE CONFERENCE'S
MANDATE. THE CSBM'S ELEMENT OF THIS PHRASE, MOREOVER,
MERELY NOTES THAT CSBM'S WILL MAKE "AN IMPORTANT AND
APPROPRIATE" CONTRIBUTION TO THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE.
THEREFORE, THE IMPORTANT LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S, THE AIM OF
THE CONFERENCE AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE MIGHT BE BETTER
PROTECTED IN THE NEXT PARAGRAPH. A FINAL NOTE, PARAS
1.1-1.5 DO NOT NECESSARILY BELONG IN THE NUF SECTION OF
A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT; THESE PHRASES COULD JUST AS
EASILY SERVE AS A CHAPEAU TO SUCH A DOCUMENT, I.E., THEY
DISCUSS THE LINK BETWEEN THE CSBM'S AND THE AIM OF THE
CONFERENCE AND NOT BETWEEN CSBM'S AND NUF (1.6).
THEREFORE, THE WEST SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER WE
SHOULD TABLE SUCH LANGUAGE IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP.
1.6. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT,
SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION
TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
- IN ORDER TO MAKE THE LINK MORE EXPLICIT IN THIS
PARAGRAPH "SUCH MEASURES" CAN BE REPLACED WITH "THE SET
OF CSBM'S ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM."
2.1. CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED
THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS
PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS FOLLOWS:
- THIS SENTENCE LINKS THE OVERALL APPROACH OF THE
"FEBRUARY 26" TEXT CONTAINED IN 1.1-1.6 AND THE NUF AND
COLLATERAL PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN 2.2-3.3.
2.2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY
STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE
INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE
OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
2.3. ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN
FROM ANY ACTS CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR DIRECT
OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE. LIKEWISE THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION
OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPAT-
ING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN
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RIGHTS. LIKEWISE THEY WILL ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL
RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF REPRISAL BY FORCE.
2.4. NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS
A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO GIVE
RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.
- PARAS 2.2 AND 2.4, THE HEART OF THIS PAPER'S NON-USE
OF FORCE SECTION, ARE DIRECTLY LIFTED FROM THE FINAL
ACT'S PRINCIPLE II. THE FRENCH INSISTED ON THIS FULL
QUOTATION IN ORDER TO AVOID QUARRELS ABOUT HOW THE
PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED OR RECALLED. WHILE IT IS
DIFFICULT TO ARGUE AGAINST HFA LANGUAGE, PRINCIPLE II OF
THE ACT IS MUCH MORE PROBLEMATICAL THAN THE UNAMBIGUOUS
LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER. FOR EXAMPLE, THESE TWO
PARAGRAPHS CALL ON PARTICIPATING STATES TO REFRAIN FROM,
INTER ALIA, "DIRECT AND INDIRECT FORCE," MANIFESTATIONS
OF FORCE," AND "REPRISAL BY FORCE." WE WILL HAVE TO
FIGHT THESE BATTLES LATER, NO DOUBT, BUT WHY SHOULD THE
WEST FOCUS ON THEM IN OUR OWN PAPER? THE NUF PRINCIPLE
SHOULD, THEREFORE, REFLECT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE
ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE CHARTER TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE PRIME
EXCEPTION OF THE NUF PROHIBITION, THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DEFENSE, SET FORTH IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.
THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT DOES NEITHER.
3.1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMIT-
MENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS.
- AN UNNECESSARY REPETITION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE.
3.1.1. NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO
JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT
USE OF FORCE.
THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT
OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE IF AN ARMED
ATTACK OCCURS.
- AGAIN, REPETITIVE OF 2.2-2.3. SUCH A LINK BETWEEN
THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE AND THE SELF-DEFENSE
CLAUSE IS NECESSARY -- BUT ONLY ONCE.
3.1.2. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION
OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPAT-
ING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE. THE FULL EXER-
CISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS
LIBERTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY
TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.
- AGAIN, THIS OTHERWISE UNEXCEPTIONABLE PARAGRAPH
CLEARLY AIMED AT SOVIET INTIMIDATION OF EASTERN EUROPE,
REFERS TO "MANIFESTION OF FORCE" RATHER THAN THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE.
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3.1.3. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH
OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR
OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRA-
VENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISI-
TION BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM.
NO SUCH OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS
LEGAL.
- THIS PARAGRAPH WAS INSERTED AT GREEK INSISTENCE IN
DELIBERATIONS IN THE 12 AND IS CLEARLY AIMED, IN ATHENS'
VIEW, AT TURKISH OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN CYPRUS. IT IS
BOUND TO CAUSE THE ALLIANCE DIFFICULTIES.
3.1.4. THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH
EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR NOT
THEY ARE PART OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL AS WELL AS TO
THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.
- ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE. THIS OR A STRONGER
PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY WESTERN TEXT.
3.1.5. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
- WE PREFER THE LANGUAGE OF THE U.S. TEXT, PERHAPS
WEDDED TO THIS ELEMENT.
3.2. THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE
CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND
SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL
PEOPLES.
- THIS IS A VERY WATERED DOWN "HUMAN RIGHTS" PARAGRAPH
WHICH IS IN FACT WEAKER THAN THE NNA TEXT, SC.7. IT IS
NOT ENOUGH AND WE WILL TRY TO GET AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF
OUR HUMAN RIGHTS SECTIONS INTO THE FINAL TEXT.
3.3. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND
UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
- THIS IMPORTANT "BALANCE" PARAGRAPH TAKEN FROM THE
FINAL ACT PERHAPS SHOULD BE QUOTED IN TOTO AS IT IS IN
SC.7 OR PARAPHRASED AS IN THE-U.S. TEXT.
FOOTNOTE:
AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN WORDING SIMILAR TO
OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AS LAID DOWN IN THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF THE RELEVANT
PARAGRAPH IN THE DRAFT NNA PROPOSAL ON THE NON-USE OF
FORCE. IN CASE THIS WOULD APPEAR NOT TO BE POSSIBLE
DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM COULD MAKE USE OF PARAGRAPH
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3.2. IN THE DRAFT DOCUMENT.
- THIS FOOTNOTE REFLECTS THE INABILITY OF THE 12 TO
AGREE ON A SEPARATE HUMAN RIGHTS PARAGRAPH.
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE "FEBRUARY 26" DOES NOT DIRECTLY
REFLECT MANY VITAL CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. TEXT
BESIDES HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WILL WORK TO GET SUCH OTHER
KEY IDEAS TIED TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE AS THE
IMPORTANCE OF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION, VERIFICATION, EQUAL
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, ETC., INTO THE FINAL NATO
TEXT.
END TEXT AND COMMENTARY.
HANSEN
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01738
SUBJECT: NOTEBOOK TEXT ON ANNUAL CALENDAR
1. CDE IX - 097.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AT THE 6 MARCH MEETING OF WORKING GROUP A-3, THE
FOLLOWING TEXT WAS NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK.
NATO AGREED TO THE USE OF THE MORE PRECISE TERM "ANNUAL
CALENDAR" RATHER THAN "ANNUAL FORECAST" WHILE WESTERN
ATTEMPTS TO USE THE IRISH FORMULATION "A TABLE, TO BE
KNOWN AS THE ANNUAL CALENDAR," WERE SABOTAGED BY THE
COORDINATOR, AS WELL AS EASTERN AND NNA PARTICIPANTS.
THE TEXT DOES ESTABLISH EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT
OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR.
4. BEGIN TEXT: EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE,
WITH ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR
OF ITS NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES(//), WITHIN THE ZONE
OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT
CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN
WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN ...
FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.
- (//) TO BE DEFINED.
END TEXT.
BARRY
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C ONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01725
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE IX - 095
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING TEXT ON EQUAL TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS
WAS AGREED MARCH 6 FOR NOTATION IN THE COORDINATOR'S
NOTEBOOK IN WORKING GROUP B-2.
BEGIN TEXT:
OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.
END TEXT.
BARRY
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SECRET STOCKHOLM 01778
SUBJECT: CDE: U.S. DEMARCHE ON GORBACHEV CDE PROPOSALS
REF: STATE 69324
1. CDE IX - 098
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. OEGIN SUMMARY: AT A MARCH 7 MEETING INVOLVING CDE
AMBASSSADOR GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV ON THE
SOVIET SIDE AND AMBASSADORS BARRY AND HANSEN ON THE U.S.
SIDE, BARRY MADE THE POINTS IN REFTEL, EMPHASIZING THAT
OUR REACTION HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON
AND WAS A POSITIVE APPROACH WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE
CONFERENCE TO MAKE PROGRESS. GRINEVSKY'S REACTION WAS
GUARDEDLY NEGATIVE. AS THE DISCUSSION WORE ON, HE BECAME
INCREASINGLY INSISTENT ON "REGISTERING" AN AGREEMENT ON
THE POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES
UNTIL AFTER VIENNA. BARRY SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET
DELEGATION WAS TRYING TO LEAD US BACK INTO THE STALEMATE
THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT SEEMED DESIGNED TO RESOLVE.
END SUMMARY.
4. AT A MARCH 7 MEETING INVOLVING GRINEVSKY AND
TATARNIKOV ON THE SOVIET SIDE AND BARRY AND HANSEN ON
THE U.S. SIDE, BARRY MADE THE POINTS IN REFTEL, EMPHASIZ-
ING THAT OUR REACTION HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN
WASHINGTON. THE ENSUING DISCUSSION LASTED OVER AN HOUR.
A DETAILED MEMCON IS BEING SENT BY SEPTET?.
5. IN SUM, GRINEVSKY'S REACTION WAS GUARDEDLY NEGATIVE.
HE ASKED WHETHER OUR PROBLEM WITH AGREEING TO POSTPONE
NAVAL ACTIVITIES WAS SUBSTANTIVE OR JURIDICAL; IF WE WERE
MAINLY WORRIED ABOUT PRESERVING THE STATUS OF THE VIENNA
CONFERENCE, HE IMPLIED THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND.
6. BARRY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION OBVIOUSLY WOULD
WANT TO RAISE THE NAVAL ISSUE IN THE POST-VIENNA PHASE
OF THE CONFERENCE AND THAT, SINCE ANY COUNTRY CAN RAISE
ANY QUESTIONS IT WISHES, NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE
DISCUSSED IN THE POST-VIENNA PHASE. PART OF OUR PROBLEM
ON "AGREEING" THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE DISCUSSED
AFTER VIENNA WAS JURIDICAL. PART WAS PRACTICAL; THERE
WILL BE MANY ISSUES WHICH WILL NOT BE AGREED AT
STOCKHOLM; SINGLING OUT ONE WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. IN
ADDITION, WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM; WE THINK THAT
AGREEING TO DISCUSS ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES AFTER VIENNA
WOULD UNDERMINE THE MADRID MANDATE. THE U.S. HAD NOW
WELCOMED THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AND HAD RECOGNIZED THAT
AN IMPEDIMENT TO DRAFTING HAD BEEN LIFTED. MOREOVER, THE
INSTRUCTIONS AUTHORIZED THE U.S. TO DISCUSS AIR ACTIVI-
TIES, RECOGNIZING THE FACT THAT 90 PER CENT OR MORE OF
SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE RELATED TO GROUND FORCE EXERCISES.
BARRY STRESSED THAT THE OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE IS A
POSITIVE APPROACH WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO
MAKE PROGRESS.
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7. AS THE DISCUSSION WORE ON, GRINEVSKY BECAME
INCREASINGLY INSISTENT ON "REGISTERING" AN AGREEMENT ON
THE POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES
UNTIL AFTER VIENNA. BARRY SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET
DELEGATION WAS TRYING TO LEAD US BACK INTO THE STALEMATE
THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT SEEMED DESIGNED TO RESOLVE.
8. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT WOULD BE
CAREFULLY STUDIED IN MOSCOW; HOWEVER, HIS INITIAL
REACTION WAS NEGATIVE. HE CRITICIZED THE U.S. REACTION
FOR "DISTORTING" THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL; HE HAD NOT
SUGGESTED "DROPPING" THE NAVAL ISSUE BUT POSTPONING IT.
THE U.S. STATEMENT CONTAINED OTHER "RESERVATIONS AND
PRECONDITIONS." GRINEVSKY SAW NO DESIRE ON THE PART OF
THE U.S. TO "FOLLOW THE SOVIET APPEAL" TO RESOLVE BASIC
ISSUES.
9. BARRY PREDICTED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED
WITH GRINEVSKY'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE SINCE THE U.S. HAD
THOUGHT IT WAS BEING AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WARNED THAT WASHINGTON MIGHT CONCLUDE
THAT PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT WERE NOT GOOD AT ALL. HE
THEN REITERATED THAT THE U.S. WAS EAGER TO MOVE AHEAD.
EXPRESSING PUZZLEMENT THAT GRINEVSKY COULD THINK THAT
THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE ITS OPINION REGARDING NAVAL
ACTIVITIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE MANDATE, BARRY
EXPLAINED WHAT HAD BEEN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPIRIT
OF THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT: HE THOUGHT IT WAS DESIGNED
TO PERMIT THE CONFERENCE TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT ON AREAS
WHERE THERE WAS COMMON GROUND. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS
SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT BECAUSE THE U.S. COULD NOT
ACCEPT THE SOVIET VIEW ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THERE COULD
BE NO MOVEMENT. THIS, BARRY INSISTED, WAS A RECIPE FOR
STALEMATE.
10. GRINEVSKY REITERATED THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A FIXED
UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS PUTTING OFF
UNRESOLVABLE ISSUES FOR THE MOMENT, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT
THROWING THE BABY OUT WITH THE BATH WATER." HE STRESSED
THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO DO THIS IF BOTH SIDES SHARED
THE SAME APPROACH. HE INDICATED THAT THE ISSUE WILL BE
AT THE TOP OF HIS AGENDA IN WASHINGTON.
11. THE DISCUSSION THEN MOVED ON TO COVER NOTIFICATION
OF GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITIES; THE SOVIETS ASSERTED THAT
WHILE AGREEMENT ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS WOULD NOT BE
DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DEAL
WITH THIS SEPARATELY FROM THE QUESTIONS OF NOTIFYING AIR
ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS.
12. AT A SUBSEQUENT HEADS-OF-DELEGATION ONLY NATO CAUCUS
ON MARCH 7, BARRY REPORTED ON THE U.S. DEMARCHE AND THE
SOVIET RESPONSE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT WE HAD
BEEN AS POSITIVE AS WE COULD BE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
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AND PUZZLEMENT ABOUT THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON "AGREEMENT"
TO POSTPONE THE DISCUSSION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES. VARIOUS
THEORIES WERE PUT FORWARD TO EXPLAIN THIS:
-- GENERAL STAFF OBJECTIONS TO THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT
DROPPING NAVAL ACTIVITIES FOR THIS ROUND, RESULTING IN
AN EFFORT TO BACKTRACK;
-- A DESIRE TO STALL ON DRAFTING TO INCREASE THE
CHANCES OF A MINI-PACKAGE;
-- COLD FEET IN THE FACE OF A REAL TRANSPARENCY AGREE-
MENT AND A DESIRE TO STICK THE BLAME FOR FAILURE ON THE
WEST;
-- EAGERNESS TO ESTABLISH THE CONCEPT OF POST-VIENNA
CDE CONTINUITY BY GETTING STOCKHOLM TO AGREE TO ISSUES
FOR DISCUSSION IN A RESUMED "PHASE IB;"
-- CONTINUED UNHAPPINESS WITH THE MANDATE AND A DESIRE
TO CHIP AWAY AT IT WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
13. THE NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE OBJECTED TO THE U.S.
REJECTION OF INDEPENDENT AIR, SAYING THAT WE HAD GOTTEN
AHEAD OF NATO POLICY. BARRY REPLIED THAT SC.1
REPRESENTED NATO APPROVAL OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.
14. SEVERAL OTHERS (UK, FRG, NETHERLANDS) SAID WE
NEEDED STRONGER ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDEPENDENT AIR; OUR
MAIN POINT AT PRESENT IS VERIFIABILITY BUT FUNCTIONALLY
RELATED AIR IS NO MORE VERIFIABLE THAN INDEPENDENT AIR.
BARRY SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO PROVIDE SOME ARGUMENTATION
BASED ON THE MANDATE AND THE PRACTICAL POINT THAT UNDER
THE SOVIET APPROACH THERE WOULD BE ALMOST NO NOTIFICA-
TIONS; ONLY THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WOULD HAVE ANY REAL
EFFECT.
15. COMMENT: SEVERAL EAST EUROPEANS SAY THEY SHARE OUR
PUZZLEMENT OVER THE SOVIET TACTIC OF INSISTING ON AGREE-
MENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
THEY CLAIM GRINEVSKY WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THIS CONDI-
TION PUBLIC IN HIS FEBRUARY 28 SPEECH BUT THAT THE
DELEGATION IS LOOKING FOR A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT. SOME
SUGGEST THEY WOULD SETTLE FOR AS LITTLE AS AN ORAL
AGREEMENT THAT ANY STOCKHOLM PARTICIPANT COULD CARRY OVER
ANY UNRESOLVED ISSUE UNTIL A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CDE, A
STATEMENT OF THE OBVIOUS. UNFORTUNATELY, SOME OF THE NNA
ARE "OFFERING" CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN THIS, AND POSSIBLY
THE "WET" ALLIES ARE TOO.
16. AS FOR INDEPENDENT AIR, WE COULD USE THE NEW
ARGUMENTATION THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY IS WORKING ON
BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01811
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR
ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF U.S. CDE DELEGATION,
AND AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF
SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE CDE
REF: STATE 69324
1. CDE IX - 102
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR BARRY FIRST READ INSTRUCTIONS
CONVEYING THE OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE TO THE CDE
PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN GORBACHEV'S JAN 17 STATEMENT.
GRINEVSKY INITIAL REACTION WAS CAUTIOUSLY NEGATIVE,
ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CAREFULLY STUDY THE U.S.
DEMARCHE AND WOULD REPORT IT TO WASHINGTON. BARRY
STRESSED THAT THE U.S. RESPONSE HAD BEEN CAREFULLY
CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AND WAS DESIGNED TO BE POSITIVE
AND TO HELP MOVE THE CONFERENCE FORWARD. WHILE
GRINEVSKY APPEARED WILLING EARLY IN THE MEETING TO
ACCEPT A VAGUE INFORMAL AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION
OF THE NOTIFICATION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE
NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, AS THE MEETING PROGRESSED
HE BECAME INCREASINGLY INSISTENT THAT SUCH AN
UNDERSTANDING HAD TO BE "REGISTERED". BARRY SAID THAT
HE COULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE
U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE OR WOULD DECIDE WHAT
WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POST-VIENNA CDE PHASE; THAT WAS
UP TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING TO DECIDE. THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR EVADED BARRY'S SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO COULD
USE THEIR TIME MORE PROFITABLY DISCUSSING ISSUES WHERE
COMMON GROUND EXISTED, I.E., GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND
FUNCTIONALLLY RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES MORE CONCRETELY.
END SUMMARY.
4. BEGIN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:
- MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DATE : MARCH 7, 1986
TIME : 10:30-13:00
PLACE : U.S. DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR BARRY'S OFFICE
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S.
AMB. ROBERT L. BARRY
AMB. LYNN M. HANSEN
MS. PRISCILLA H. GALASSI
NOTETAKER/INTERPRETER
5. BARRY OPENED THE MEETING BY ASKING FOR AN EXPLANATION
OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE QUESTION OF
THRESHOLDS FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT HE
WAS NOT TRYING TO BREAK THE SOVIET LINKAGE BUT NOTED THAT
THE U.S. DELEGATION WOULD SOON RETURN TO WASHINGTON WHERE
THE GROUND FORCE ISSUES AS WELL AS THE AIR ISSUES WOULD
USSR
AMB. OLEG A. GRINEVSKY
GEN. VICTOR TATARNIKOV
MR. ANDREY GROSHEV
NOTETAKER/INTERPRETER
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BE EXAMINED. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, HE SAID, TO HAVE THE
SOVIET ATTITUDE ON THESE ISSUES.
6. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE HE WAS READY TO
LOOK AT THE GROUND FORCE ISSUES, BUT WANTED FIRST TO
KNOW WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE ISSUES
WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED PRIVATELY BEFORE, I.E., THE
GORBACHEV JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL. HE SAID THAT THE QUESTION
WAS STILL ACTIVE ("BEFORE US") AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS
AWAITING A RESPONSE IN ORDER TO START TO CONSIDER HOW DO
WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD. HE NOTED THAT
PREVIOUSLY BARRY HAD HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS.
7. BARRY REPLIED THAT HE NOW HAD INSTRUCTIONS AND WAS
ABOUT TO MAKE AN INSTRUCTED DEMARCHE. HE THEN READ FROM
THE INSTRUCTION CONTAINED IN REFTEL.
8. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY
WHAT BARRY HAD CHARACTERIZED AS THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO
THE SOVIET JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL. HE THEN POSED SEVERAL
QUESTIONS "TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE ESSENCE OF THE U.S.
RESPONSE:" WAS THE U.S. WILLING TO CONSIDER THAT SOME
ISSUES LINKED WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES COULD BE POSTPONED TO
THE NEXT PHASE, BUT THAT "JURIDICALLY" IT WAS NOT
POSSIBLE TO TAKE A DECISION HERE? GRINEVSKY INSISTED
THAT NO ONE COULD FORBID THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION
IN STOCKHOLM TO DISCUSS OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE WHAT
ISSUES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT PHASE. HE NOTED
THAT IT WAS NATURAL FOR THE U.S. TO ASK THE SOVIET UNION
WHAT THE LATTER'S POSITION WOULD BE AT THE VIENNA
CONFERENCE AND AFTER. IN HIS VIEW THE REAL ISSUE WAS THE
FORM SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE. HE WANTED TO KNOW
WHETHER THE U.S. WAS READY (FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT) AND
SIMPLY WAS BOTHERED BY HOW TO AGREE.
9. BARRY SAID THAT HE HAD THREE POINTS TO MAKE ON WHAT
GRINEVSKY HAD SAID: 1) ON THE ESSENCE OF THE ISSUE, HE
NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WANT TO RAISE THE
NAVAL ISSUE IN A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF THE
CONFERENCE. NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THUS, WOULD BE DISCUSSED
IN A POST-VIENNA PHASE BECAUSE ANY COUNTRY COULD RAISE
ANY ISSUE; 2) REGARDING THE JURIDICAL ASPECT OF THE
ISSUE, BARRY POINTED OUT THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS CONVEY
THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS NOT
EMPOWERED TO TAKE DECISIONS WHICH WILL AFFECT THE
POST-VIENNA PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. ADDITIONALLY, IN
PRACTICAL TERMS, HE SAID, THERE ARE MANY ISSUES WHERE WE
WON'T SUCCEED IN GETTING OUR PROPOSALS ACCEPTED AT THIS
STAGE. IF THIS OCCURS, GRINEVSKY WOULDN'T BE IN A
POSITION TO AGREE THAT WESTERN ISSUES SHOULD BE SINGLED
OUT TO BE AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION AT THE NEXT PHASE
OF THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, GRINEVSKY WOULD RECOGNIZE
THAT SUCH ISSUES WOULD BE RAISED DURING THE NEXT PHASE.
FOLLOWING SUCH AN APPROACH, THERE WOULD BE A LIST WITH
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LARGE NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS WHICH COULD NOT BE AGREED AT
THIS STAGE, E.G., CONSTRAINTS FOR THE NNA. BARRY SAID
THAT HE COULD THINK OF A WHOLE LIST OF ITEMS WE WOULDN'T
AGREE ON DURING THIS PHASE. THERE IS ANOTHER PRACTICAL
PROBLEM: PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT A PREAMBLE TO
THE AGREEMENT. THIS, IN BARRY'S VIEW, WOULD BE AS HARD
TO DRAFT AS THE CSBM'S THEMSELVES; THERE IS NO TIME FOR
THAT; 3) IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH BARRY HAD CONVEYED,
THE SOVIETS HAD SEEN THE U.S. DO WHAT THE SOVIETS
WANTED: THE U.S. HAD WELCOMED THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL;
IT HAD RECOGNIZED THAT AN IMPEDIMENT TO DRAFTING HAD
BEEN LIFTED; THE INSTRUCTIONS TOLD THE DELEGATION TO
FOCUS ON AIR ACTIVITIES, RECOGNIZING THAT 90 PER CENT OR
MORE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE RELATED TO GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES. THUS, IT IS A POSITIVE APPROACH WHICH WILL
ALLOW US TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS.
10. GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THAT IT IS THE NATURAL RIGHT OF
EACH STATE TO RAISE ANY QUESTION IT WISHES AT THE
CONFERENCE NOW, OR DURING A SECOND OR EVEN A THIRD
PHASE. OF COURSE, HE CONTINUED, THE SOVIET UNION HAS
THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION OF ALL
NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS
READY TO AGREE WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT THAT ISSUE
COULD BE DISCUSSED DURING A LATER PHASE.
11. BARRY RESPONDED THAT THAT WOULD PREJUDICE THE U.S.'
INTERPRETATION OF THE MADRID MANDATE. GRINEVSKY WOULD
BE ASKING HIM TO GIVE UP FUNCTIONALLY RELATED ACTIVITIES
WHICH ARE PART OF THE MANDATE. THUS, HE SAID, HE WAS
NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSITION BECAUSE
IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE MANDATE.
12. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND
UNDERMINING THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE.
13. BARRY SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND SOVIET
MOTIVATIONS: WERE THEY TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT WOULD
NOT BE DISCUSSED HERE? WERE THEY INTERESTED IN
EXCLUDING NAVAL ACTIVITIES, EXCEPT FOR AMPHIBIOUS
ACTIVITIES, FROM DISCUSSION DURING THIS PHASE OR WERE
THEY INTERESTED IN WHAT WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED
IN A FUTURE PHASE? IN ESSENSE, WERE THE SOVIETS
INTERESTED IN ENSURING THAT NO NAVAL ACTIVITIES, BESIDES
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, WOULD BE DISCUSSED NOW?
14. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THIS ALREADY HAD BEEN DISCUSSED
IN DETAIL, BUT THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN THE SOVIET POSITION
AGAIN. THE SITUATION AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AS THE
SOVIETS SAW IT, BASED ON STATEMENTS MADE AT THE LAST
SESSION BY BARRY, HANSEN AND BY THE USSR, WAS THAT THE
GREATEST STUMBLING BLOCK (LIT. "DIFFICULTY") WAS THE
ISSUE OF WHAT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THE
SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT NOTIFICATION WOULD INCLUDE
LARGE SCALE EXERCISES OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES,
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AND MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES. THIS, THE
SOVIETS WERE CONVINCED, FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE
MANDATE. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT GO INTO HOW OR WHY.
UNFORTUNATELY, GRINEVSKY ADDED, THE U.S. HAS A DIFFERENT
APPROACH: IT LINKS NOTIFICATION WITH GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES AND THUS EXCLUDES A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. HE THEN ASKED HOW TO PROCEED IN
SUCH A SITUATION: SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO PROVE
WHOSE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE IS MORE CORRECT OR,
CONSIDERING THE SHORT TIME REMAINING, SHOULD WE MAKE A
RATIONAL DECISION TO FOCUS ON RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF
NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES OF GROUND AND AIR
ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, AND CARRY OVER NAVAL
ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT PHASE. THE LATTER, HE SAID, WAS
THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE "COMPOSITE
"KOMPLEKSNOYE" UNDERSTANDING," I.E., WHAT TO DO NOW
AND WHAT TO PUT OFF UNTIL LATER, SHOULD BE WORKED OUT
AND "FIXED" (REGISTERED). HE ARGUED THAT THERE ARE MANY
VARIATIONS WHICH COULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD NOT
AFFECT THE PREROGATIVES OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE.
SUCH A FIXED UNDERSTANDING WOULD PROVIDE A GUARANTEE,
HOWEVER, THAT NOTHING WOULD BE FORGOTTEN, THAT "THE BABY
WOULD NOT BE THROWN OUT WITH THE BATH WATER."
15. REGARDING BARRY'S COMMENT THAT OTHER IDEAS COULD BE
TAKEN UP, GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THAT OTHERS COULD NOT BE
FORBIDDEN TO ADD IDEAS. HOWEVER, HE INSISTED, THE NAVAL
ISSUE IN THE MANDATE FRAMEWORK HAS A SPECIAL STATUS. HE
THEN REFERRED TO "CONCESSIONS" THE SOVIETS HAD MADE IN
MADRID, EXTENDING THE ZONE TO THE URALS, AND THE
"CORRESPONDING" STEPS THEY HAD EXPECTED FROM THE WEST IN
THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. ACCORDING TO THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR, THE MADRID MANDATE REFLECTS WHAT THE
SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL
EXERCISES. THE ISSUE IS CLEAR-CUT, GRINEVSKY STATED:
ARE WE (THE CONFERENCE) READY TO PUT OFF RESOLUTION OF
COMPLEX QUESTIONS WHICH WE CANNOT RESOLVE DUE TO LACK OF
TIME WITHOUT ANY RESOLUTION IN ANYONE'S FAVOR OR ARE WE
NOT READY TO POSTPONE THESE ISSUES? IF THE LATTER IS THE
CASE, WE ARE BACK TO SQUARE ONE.
16. BARRY SAID THAT IT IS NOT THE U.S. WHICH IS ENGAGING
IN UNPRODUCTIVE ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE MANDATE. U.S.
ARGUMENTS ARE WELL KNOWN; THEY WERE STATED IN FULL DURING
THE LAST ROUND. WE STAND BY THESE VIEWS. HE SUGGESTED
THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION NOT WASTE TIME
DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES BILATERALLY OR IN THE CONFERENCE
BECAUSE SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE. HE
THEN POINTED OUT THAT SINCE IT IS ONLY THE SOVIETS WHO
WOULD RAISE THIS (THE MANDATE DISPUTE), THE SOVIETS WOULD
BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY STALEMATE. THE U.S. HAS NO
DESIRE TO REARGUE THESE QUESTIONS.
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17. TURNING TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES, HE SAID THAT HE DID
NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HAD HAPPENED: HE AGREED THAT
GORBACHEV HAD TAKEN A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP. HOWEVER, IN AN
ABSTRACT WAY THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS TAKING US BACK
DOWN A BLIND ALLEY ("TUPIK"). HE SAID THAT THE NAVAL
QUESTION WAS BEING PUT AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION AS A
PRECONDITION, I.E., THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD NOT GET ON
WITH DRAFTING WITHOUT AGREEING FIRST TO TAKE UP ALL NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT PHASE. THIS PUT US BACK WHERE WE
WERE LAST ROUND. IN BARRY'S VIEW, GRINEVSKY SEEMED TO
BE SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS UNLESS THE
U.S. SAID ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE WAS FALSE.
18. BARRY STRESSED THAT THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME LEFT AND
THAT NEXT ROUND WE WOULD HAVE TO DRAFT FASTER AND MORE
INTENSIVELY. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS READY TO DO THIS
ON GROUND FORCES AND ON FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR
ACTIVITIES. THIS, HE CONCLUDED, IS WHERE WE COULD MAKE
PROGRESS.
19. BARRY THEN SUGGESTED MOVING ON TO A MORE CONCRETE
DISCUSSION. HE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS
WOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER HIS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE
DESIGNED TO BE POSITIVE AND TO PERMIT US TO MOVE AHEAD.
20. GRINEVSKY FIRST SAID THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO
FOLLOW BARRY DOWN "THE PATH OF ACCUSATIONS" AND THAT THE
U.S. WOULD NOT HEAR A SINGLE WORD OF ACCUSATION FROM THE
SOVIET SIDE. HE THEN ACCUSED BARRY OF NOT BEING SERIOUS
WHEN HE TOOK THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT AND ACCUSED THE
DELEGATION OF DISTORTING IT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS
BARRY'S "DUTY" TO CITE GORBACHEV ACCURATELY WHEN HE
REPORTED BACK TO WASHINGTON; BARRY, AFTER ALL, WAS NOT
AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BUT AT A NEGOTIATION. HE THEN
INSISTED THAT NOWHERE IN THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT COULD
THE IDEA OF THROWING OUT NAVAL ACTIVITIES BE FOUND. HE
QUOTED GORBACHEV: "TO REACH AGREEMENT (HE STRESSED
"AGREEMENT") NOW ABOUT NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR GROUND
FORCE AND AIR FORCE EXERCISES, POSTPONING THE QUESTION
OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE." HE THEN ASKED WHETHER, IN THE U.S. VIEW,
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT FORECLOSED,
BUT COULD CONTINUE TO BE DISCUSSED.
21. BARRY FOCUSED FIRST ON THE ISSUE OF ACCUSATIONS:
EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENTS REPEATEDLY HAVE ACCUSED THE
WEST OF FOOTDRAGGING. BARRY NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT
SAID ANYTHING BUT HE WARNED THAT HIS PATIENCE HAD BEEN
TRIED WHEN HE HEARD SUCH ACCUSATIONS IN THE PLENARY AND
IN WORKING GROUP SESSIONS. HE THEN SAID THAT HE HAD
READ GORBACHEV CAREFULLY AND THAT THE GORBACHEV
STATEMENT DID NOT SAY THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO AGREE TO
NOTIFY LARGE-SCALE GROUND AND AIR EXERCISES AND TO AGREE
TO CARRY OVER NAVAL ACTIVITIES. LOOKING AT THE RUSSIAN
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SYNTAX, CARRYING OVER NAVAL ACTIVITIES WAS NOT A TOPIC
OF AGREEMENT (WOULD HAVE READ "DOGOVORIT'SYA 0 PERENOSE"
VICE "PERENOSIT.'" ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ISSUE
WOULD REMAIN OPEN, OF COURSE IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE
DISCUSSED, BUT IT WAS NOT THE MOST PRACTICAL ISSUE TO
FOCUS ON. THEREFORE, BARRY SUGGESTED DISCUSSING OTHER
ISSUES.
22. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY
MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE GORBACHEV TEXT, THE
SOVIET DELEGATION'S EXPLANATION HAD BEEN CLEAR AND THE
U.S. SHOULD PROCEED FROM THIS. HE INDICATED THAT THE
SOVIETS WOULD STUDY WHAT BARRY HAD CONVEYED AND WOULD
ASK ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS IF THEY ARISE. HE SAID,
HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ACTING PROPERLY IF HE DID
NOT SAY THAT, BASED ON WHAT HE HAD HEARD, THE U.S.
RESPONSE COULD HARDLY BE CALLED CONSTRUCTIVE. HE SAID
THAT, FIRST OF ALL, IT DISTORTED THE ESSENCE OF THE
GORBACHEV PROPOSAL; IT WAS FULL OF RESERVATIONS AND
PRECONDITIONS; IN ESSENCE, THE U.S. RESPONSE BOILED DOWN
TO A READINESS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASIS OF
THE U.S. POSITION ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. IN
GENERAL, HE ADDED, HE SAW NO DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE
U.S. TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET APPEAL TO RESOLVE BASIC
ISSUES. THESE, HE SAID, WERE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
BASED ON WHAT HE HAD HEARD THAT DAY. HE SAID THAT HE
WOULD STUDY THE U.S. RESPONSE CAREFULLY AND REPORT IT TO
MOSCOW.
23. BARRY SAID THAT HE WOULD RELAY TO WASHINGTON
GRINEVSKY'S NEGATIVE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND THAT
WASHINGTON WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED. THE U.S. HAD THOUGHT
THAT IT WAS BEING AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WARNED THAT WASHINGTON MAY CONCLUDE
THAT PROPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ARE NOT GOOD AT ALL. HE
REPEATED THAT THE U.S. IS EAGER TO MOVE AHEAD. BARRY
SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW GRINEVSKY COULD
THINK THAT THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE ITS OPINION REGARDING
NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE MANDATE.
HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE SPIRIT OF THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT
HAD BEEN TO ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO GO AHEAD "IN PARTS"
TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT ON AREAS WHERE THERE WAS COMMON
GROUND. IN BARRY'S VIEW THERE WAS COMMON GROUND ON
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPING COMMON GROUND ON
AIR ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE
SAYING THAT BECAUSE THE U.S. COULDN'T ACCEPT THE SOVIET
VERSION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THERE COULD BE NO MOVEMENT:
THIS WOULD LEAD TO STALEMATE.
24. GRINEVSKY RESPONDED THAT IF THIS WAS THE BARRY'S
REACTION, HE WAS DISTORING THE SOVIET POSITION ON
PURPOSE. THE SOVIETS HAD NO INTENTION OF IMPOSING THEIR
INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE ON THE U.S. OR OF ACCEPTING
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THE U.S. INTERPRETATION. WHAT THE SOVIETS WANTED WAS A
FIXED UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE PUTTING OFF UNRESOLVABLE
ISSUES FOR THE MOMENT, THAT WE WERE NOT THROWING THE BABY
OUT WITH THE BATH WATER. THE MANDATE REMAINS, HE SAID,
AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO INTENTION OF IMPOSING ITS
INTERPRETATION. HOWEVER, HE CONCLUDED THAT WE POSSESS
SUFFICENT INTELLECT SO THAT IF WE SHARE THE SAME
APPROACH WE WILL BE ABLE TO EXPRESS WHAT WE WANT IN A
FIXED UNDERSTANDING.
END TEXT OF MEMCON.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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C ONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01727
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, MARCH 3-7, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 1634
1. CDE IX -
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT: TWO DISTINCT
-- AND SUPERFICIALLY CONFLICTING -- TENDENCIES APPEARED
DURING THE WEEK. ON ONE HAND, DRAFTING HAS TAKEN PLACE
IN FOUR OF THE FIVE WORKING GROUPS. THE NOTIFICATION AND
ANNUAL CALENDARS' GROUPS JOINED THE INFORMATION/VERIFICA-
TION AND OBSERVATION GROUP IN AGREEING ON CONSENSUS
LANGUAGE. ONLY THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP, MOSTLY DUE TO
GALLIC PRIDE, HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON ANY LANGUAGE.
HOWEVER, THE FRENCH NOW SEEM PREPARED TO AGREE TO A
MINIMAL TEXT NEXT WEEK. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST
SEEMS TO HAVE ADOPTED A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN PARLIAMEN-
TARIAN TECHNIQUE IN MANY OF THE WORKING GROUPS: THE
FILIBUSTER. IN THE CONSTRAINTS MEETING, THE EAST
FILIBUSTERED FOR THREE HOURS AS A WAY OF PRESSURING THE
WEST TO MOVE ON THE ISSUE. ON INFORMATION, A WELL-
REHEARSED CHORUS OF EASTERN SPEAKERS MONOPOLIZED THE
ALLOTTED TIME ARGUING THAT ONLY INFORMATION PROVIDED WITH
NOTIFICATION WAS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE WORKING GROUP,
I.E., NO STATIC INFORMATION. ON CLOSE EXAMINATION THESE
TWO CONTRADICTORY TENDENCIES -- DRAFTING AND EASTERN
FILIBUSTERING -- ARE NOT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN. THE
CONFERENCE WILL CONTINUE TO DRAFT, BUT ONLY ON MARGINAL
ISSUES. ON THE CORE ISSUES -- INSPECTION, INFORMATION,
NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS, FOR EXAMPLE -- NO PROGRESS IN
THE CONFERENCE WILL BE POSSIBLE UNTIL BOTH EAST AND WEST
MAKE SOME HARD DECISIONS. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO HOLD
OUT FOR PUBLIC AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF ALL
NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL A POST-VIENNA CDE. AT THE SAME
TIME THEY SAY THEY WON'T DISCUSS NOTIFICATION OF GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE WEST AGREES TO PARAMETERS FOR
NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS. THUS, FOR
ONCE, THE CONFERENCE FACES A SUBSTANTIVE DEADLOCK RATHER
THAN A PROCEDURAL ONE; IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THE
SOVIETS WILL BE PREPARED TO SHOULDER THE BLAME FOR
PUTTING US THERE. END SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: THE WORKING GROUP FINALLY AGREED ON
LANGUAGE REGARDING THE METHOD AND PERIOD OF NOTIFICATION
WHICH THE COORDINATOR NOTED IN HIS BOOK (REFTEL). IN
THIS TWO-PARAGRAPH TEXT THERE WERE ELLIPSES INDICATING
TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES: PRIOR NOTIFICATION (EAST AND NINA
WORDING) VS NOTIFICATION (NATO WORDING); AND THE NUMBER
OF DAYS FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. (THE NINA APPROACH HAS
BEEN TO DIVIDE NOTIFICATION INTO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND
NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE
READ ALERTS; THE LATTER IS DESIGNED TO AVOID OBSERVA-
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TION OF MOBILIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS CONDUCTED AS ALERTS
-- ONLY A SUBSEQUENT MANEUVER PHASE OF SUCH AN ALERT
COULD BE OBSERVED.) THE CONSENSUS TEXT FOLLOWS THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT PRACTICE OF USING "PRIOR NOTIFICATION"
AS THE TITLE OF THE SECTION AND USES ELLIPSES IN THE BODY
OF THE TEXT TO PERMIT USE OF "NOTIFICATION" ALONE (AS IN
THE FINAL ACT).
- THE LACK OF A CLEAR WESTERN POSITION ON THRESHOLDS,
I.E., FILLING IN THE BLANKS IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED OR RAISING
THE THRESHOLDS, WILL SOON BECOME A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO
FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP. ONLY THE
SOVIETS NOW HAVE A CLEARLY DEFINED THRESHOLD WHICH IS
20,000 TROOPS. SOON THE CONFERENCE WILL HAVE TO MAKE
SOME HARD DECISIONS REGARDING, INTER ALIA, NOTIFICATION
PARAMETERS (BOTH THE ACTUAL LEVEL AND THE TYPE OF
PARAMETER, I.E., STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL, EQUIPMENT).
5. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE NUF WORKING GROUP STOOD IN NOT
SO SPLENDID ISOLATION AS THE ONLY GROUP NOT TO HAVE
RECORDED ANY TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK, MUCH TO
THE CONSTERNATION OF THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL -
AUSTRIA). THE EAST, NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, IS TRYING TO
EXPLOIT THIS BY ACCUSING THE WEST OF FOOTDRAGGING ON NUF
AND THUS SABOTAGING PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE. THE
FRENCH, COMFORTABLE IN THEIR SPOILER ROLE, HAVE SO FAR
WITHHELD A NATO CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE WEST TO
GO ALONG WITH THE NOTATION OF TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S
NOTEBOOK. AT THE SAME TIME, PARIS HAS SOUGHT TO SPLIT
THE EC-12 FROM THE U.S. APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE AS
MUCH FOR REASONS OF GALLIC PRIDE AND PERSONAL PIQUE
(D'ABOVILLE'S) AS SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, AS ONE AFTER
ANOTHER OF THEIR COMMUNITY PARTNERS DESERTED THEM, THE
FRENCH IN STOCKHOLM REALIZED THAT THEY WERE DAMAGING
THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE EC. THUS
THEY GRUDGINGLY SEEM TO HAVE ACCEPTED A CAREFULLY CRAFTED
COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE NUF GROUP TO JOIN THE
REST OF THE CONFERENCE IN NOTING LANGUAGE. THE
COMPROMISE: 1) A REPRESENTATIVE OF NATO WOULD READ A
CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT ELABORATING THE WEST'S APPROACH TO
NUF AND INCLUDING U.S. LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, AND COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS. THE STATEMENT WOULD OUTLINE THE MANDATED
AIMS OF THE CONFERENCE, I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUCH MEASURES AND THE NUF COMMIT-
MENT; 2) AFTER THIS STATEMENT, THE WEST WOULD INTRODUCE
INTO THE WORKING GROUP THE FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS OF THE
"FEBRUARY 26" TEXT (ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE, THE
ADOPTION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S, AND ON THE LINK BETWEEN
CSBM'S AND THE NUF COMMITMENT) AS AMENDED BY THE U.S.,
NOTING THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS TABLED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO ITS ULTIMATE FORM OR PLACEMENT IN ANY CONCLUDING
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DOCUMENT. 3) FOLLOWING AND BASED UPON THE INTRODUCTION
OF ELEMENTS FROM THE NATO PAPER, THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT
THE NOTATION OF AN INNOCENT QUOTATION FROM THE MADRID
MANDATE ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE, I.E., TO NEGOTIATE
CONCRETE MEASURES, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO
THE NUF PRINCIPLE. IF THIS WORKS WE WILL BE IN A BETTER
POSITION TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE EAST FOR PROGRESS ON
CONCRETE CSBM'S DURING THE NEXT SESSION WHILE HOLDING
BACK ON NUF. MEANWHILE, THE NATO CLUSTER GROUP CONTINUES
TO HAMMER AWAY AT A FULL WESTERN TEXT ON NON-USE OF
FORCE, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, COMPLIANCE, AND ANTI-
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE.
6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: IN THE
WORKING GROUP THIS WEEK THE EAST STONEWALLED ANY
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPAL TOPIC,
INDEPENDENT INFORMATION. THE MEETING QUICKLY TURNED
INTO AN EASTERN FILIBUSTER IN SUPPORT OF THEIR INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE OCTOBER 14, 1985 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT THAT
ONLY INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED WITH NOTIFICATION IS
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THIS GROUP. A LINE-UP OF EASTERN
SPEAKERS PUSHED FOR AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST SENTENCE OF A
USSR PROPOSAL ON INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE
CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. NATO, IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN
SOME AGREED TEXT ON ITS MEASURE 1 INFORMATION BEFORE THE
END OF THE SESSION, SUGGESTED LANGUAGE ON INFORMATION
EXCHANGE WHICH WAS CAREFULLY DRAFTED NOT TO PREJUDICE
ANYONE'S POSITION. THE NATO LANGUAGE RECEIVED SOME
LUKEWARM SUPPORT FROM SWITZERLAND AND SWEDEN BUT THE
MEETING RAPIDLY DISSOLVED INTO A DIVISIVE TWO-HOUR
EXCHANGE OVER THE TYPE OF INFORMATION TO BE DISCUSSED AS
BOTH EAST AND WEST PRESSURED THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK -
SWITZERLAND) TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON ITS RESPECTIVE
PROPOSAL. AS EXPECTED, THE EAST SEEMS INTENT ON BLOCKING
ANY PROGRESS IN THIS GROUP. THE EASTERN TACTIC IS TO USE
THE TIME IN THE A-2 WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS ONLY
INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION, THUS
DENYING THE WEST A FORUM FOR "INDEPENDENT" INFORMATION.
ANOTHER RESULT OF THE INFORMATION FILIBUSTER WAS TO
PREVENT ANY DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION THIS WEEK. WE
ARE CONSIDERING VARIOUS WAYS OF DEALING WITH A SITUATION
IN WHICH WE ARE NOT ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE TWO KEY
ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION.
- CONSULTATIONS/COMMUNICATIONS WAS ADDRESSED IN SOME
DETAIL BY THE NNA, MORE TO LAY DOWN A MARKER THAT THE
SUBJECT REMAINS ON THE TABLE THAN IN ANTICIPATION OF ANY
EARLY PROGRESS ON THE SUBJECT. SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA
PRESENTED SIMILAR BUT NOT IDENTICAL VIEWS ON CONSULTA-
TIONS, THE SWISS STRESSING QUICK AD HOC CONSULTATIONS ON
COMPLIANCE, AND THE AUSTRIANS FOCUSING ON A MECHANISM FOR
ROUTINE DISCUSSIONS PERTAINING TO CSBM IMPLEMENTATION.
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OF INTEREST WAS SWITZERLAND'S OPEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT IT
FAVORED A VERIFICATION REGIME WITHOUT ANY "RIGHT OF
REFUSAL." NATO REACTED WITH SKEPTICISM TO THE CONCEPT OF
CONSULTATIONS, WHILE THE EAST COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON
URGENT CONSULTATIONS REGARDING COMPLIANCE, BUT DID NOT
SUPPORT ANY INSTITUTIONALIZED MEETINGS TO REVIEW
IMPLEMENTATION.
7. OBSERVATION: SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK,
ALTHOUGH EASTERN TACTICS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT NATO AND
THE NNA MAY BE TRYING TO PUSH THE WORKING GROUP TOO FAR
TOO FAST FOR THEIR TASTE. THE EAST UNVEILED ITS LONG
ANTICIPATED POSITION THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD NOT BE INVITED
TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. CITING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
BURDEN OF OBSERVATION, POLAND ASKED THAT THE GROUP
CONSIDER A "QUOTA" ON THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES EACH STATE
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO EACH YEAR AND
SUGGESTED FIVE AS THE MAXIMUM. NATO WAS SUCCESSFUL IN
FOCUSING THE DISCUSSION ON THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AT A
VERY PRECISE MILITARY-TECHNICAL LEVEL, IDENTIFYING COMMON
ELEMENTS IN NATO, NNA AND IRISH PROPOSALS. THE U.S.
FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON COMMON VIEWS CONCERNING THE
IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVING STRUCTURE. THE EAST, HOWEVER,
WAS CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS DISCUSSION AND THE
SOVIETS REFLEXIVELY TROTTED OUT STANDARD POLEMICAL
ARGUMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVATION OF AIR
ACTIVITIES AND TROOP TRANSFERS. OF PARTICULAR NOTE WAS
A SOVIET STATEMENT THAT OBSERVATION MODALITIES HAD TO BE
GENERAL ENOUGH TO COVER ALL "TYPES" OF MILITARY ACTIVI-
TIES. THEY ALSO IMPLIED THAT BOTH NATO AND NNA PROPOSALS
IN THIS AREA ARE TANTAMOUNT TO INSPECTION, NOT OBSERVA-
TION. THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE AND COMPLEMENTARY REASONS
FOR EASTERN BEHAVIOR ON THIS SUBJECT: 1) THEY HAVE
GENUINELY BEEN THROWN OFF BALANCE BY THE DETAILED LEVEL
OF OBSERVATION THAT NATO, THE NNA AND IRELAND ARE
PROPOSING AND, AS OF YET, HAVE NO DEVELOPED POSITION OF
THEIR OWN TO DISCUSS; AND 2) THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO
DISCUSS THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL DETAILS OF GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITY OBSERVATION FOR FEAR THAT IT WOULD PREJUDICE
THEIR POSITION ON NAVAL AND, PARTICULARLY, AIR ACTIVI-
TIES. THIS SIGNALS THAT, WHILE PROGRESS IS LIKELY TO
CONTINUE ON THE PERIPHERAL ISSUES (COSTS, TRANSPORTATION,
ETC.), PROGRESS .ON THE CORE ISSUES (I.E., WHAT OBSERVERS
WILL BE ALLOWED TO OBSERVE) WILL CONTINUE TO BE DIFFICULT
AND DEPENDENT ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE PARAMETERS OF
NOTIFICATION.
8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: AFTER THE THREE-HOUR CONSTRAINTS
FILIBUSTER, THE COORDINATOR (SWITZERLAND - JUNOD)
CIRCULATED A TEXT FOR NOTATION IN HIS NOTEBOOK ON THE
COMMITMENT TO EXCHANGE ANNUAL FORECASTS. YUGOSLAVIA
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IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED IT WITH ONE UNSPECIFIED CONDITION,
AN APPROACH WHICH THE U.S. IMMEDIATELY REJECTED. WHILE
EVERYONE ASSUMED THAT BOZOVIC'S CONDITION WAS PARALLEL
PROGRESS ON CONSTRAINTS, IT APPEARS THAT HE PLANNED TO
TIE HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE FORECASTS LANGUAGE TO THE
NOTING OF NUF LANGUAGE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON
MARCH 11. THE NUF COORDINATOR (AUSTRIA - LOIBL),
APPARENTLY AWARE OF BOZOVIC'S REAL MOTIVATION, PREVAILED
UPON HIM TO DROP HIS CONDITION SO THAT THE FORECASTS
LANGUAGE COULD BE NOTED AND THAT PRESSURE WOULD BE
GREATER ON THE WEST TO NOTE NUF LANGUAGE ON MARCH 11.
EARLIER IN THE WEEK, THE WEST HAD TRIED TO CONVINCE THE
COORDINATOR TO INCLUDE IN HIS FORECASTS TEXT SOME
LANGUAGE FROM THE IRISH PROPOSAL, WHICH WHILE NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT IN SUBSTANCE, WAS A SUPERIOR
FORMULATION. JUNOD REFUSED TO RAISE THIS SUGGESTION WITH
THE EAST IN CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS IN THE DAYS BEFORE THE
MEETING AND DURING THE MEETING ITSELF HE REFUSED TO
CONVEY NATO'S REQUESTS FOR AN EASTERN DISCUSSION OF THE
IRISH PROPOSAL, TRYING INSTEAD TO RAILROAD ACCEPTANCE OF
HIS OWN TEXT. DURING A COFFEE BREAK, IT EVENTUALLY
BECAME CLEAR THAT ALL COULD AGREE TO THE COORDINATOR'S
LANGUAGE ALTHOUGH NATO SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED WITHHOLDING
CONSENSUS ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS AND IT WAS NOTED IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. WHILE THE COORDINATOR ULTIMATELY
PREVAILED AND THE TEXT WAS NOTED, HIS VICTORY MAY PROVE
TO HAVE BEEN PYRRHIC: HIS APPARENT ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE
CONSTRAINTS FILIBUSTER AND HIS STRONG-ARM TACTICS ON THE
FORECASTS LANGUAGE DEEPLY ANGFRED SEVERAL NATO DELEGA-
TIONS WHO PUBLICLY EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT AND
"BITTERNESS" AT HIS HANDLING OF THE MEETING. IN ORDER TO
MARK ITS EXTREME DISPLEASURE AT EASTERN/NNA/COORDINATOR
BULLYING THIS WEEK NATO HAS DECIDED TO FILIBUSTER ON
FORECASTS AT THE NEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING (MARCH 13)
AND TO BE SILENT ON CONSTRAINTS FOR THE NEXT FEW
MEETINGS.
9. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST, JOINED BY THE NNA,
FILIBUSTERED FOR THREE HOURS IN THE WORKING GROUP THIS
WEEK AS A MEANS OF PRESSURING THE WEST TO MOVE ON
CONSTRAINTS. BULGARIA REINTRODUCED LANGUAGE ON THE
COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CEILINGS ON THE SIZE OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. BOTH THE EAST AND THE NNA BADGERED
THE WEST TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO THE INCLUSION OF
CONSTRAINTS IN A FINAL DOCUMENT. THE FRENCH REITERATED
NATO'S STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.
THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE GDR PROPOSAL FOR A
7,000-MAN CEILING ON AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES, WITH
THE EAST AND NNA SUPPORTING THE IDEA OF LIMITING SUCH
ACTIVITIES AND THE FRG POINTING OUT THE PROPOSAL'S LACK
OF BALANCE. THE WEST BRIEFLY MENTIONED THE IRISH
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PROPOSAL (DISCUSSED SEPTEL) FOR ENHANCING THE
CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BUT THE NNA
AND EAST WERE STRIKINGLY SILENT ON THE SUBJECT.
10. THE SOVIETS: THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE WEEK WAS THE
REACTION TO GRINEVSKY'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF;IFEBRUARY 28
HIGHLIGHTING GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT. IN
PRIVATE, GRINEVSKY IS INSISTING THAT THERE MUST BE AGREE-
MENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL
A POST-VIENNA STAGE OF CDE; ABSENT SUCH AGREEMENT HE WILL
HAVE TO PUT THE NAVAL ISSUE BACK ON THE TABLE. PUBLICLY
HE HAS STOPPED SHORT OF SUCH A CATEGORICAL STATEMENT,
PERHAPS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF COMMENTS BY NATO DELEGATES
UNDERLINING THEIR POSITION ON THE MANDATE AND THE
SUBORDINATION OF STOCKHOLM TO VIENNA. OTHERWISE, THE
SOVIETS HAVE BEEN STRESSING THAT THEY WILL NOT BE
PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES UNLESS
NATO AGREES FIRST ON INCLUSION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND
TRANSFERS. (THEIR BOTTOM LINE HERE IS PROBABLY
FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR.) IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER
THE SOVIETS WILL RESUME THE EFFORT TO STRESS SUBSTANTIVE
BLOCKAGE IN THE NEXT ROUND; IF THEY DO, THEY WILL HAVE
TO WORK HARD TO PLACE THE BLAME ON THE WEST.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01911
SUBJECT: "FEBRUARY 26" NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT
WITH AMENDMENTS
1. CDE IX - 103
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE REMAINDER OF
THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT WITH AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS,
MOSTLY SUBMITTED BY THE U.S. SEE PARA 5 FOR ACTION
REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.
4. IN THE MARCH 11 WORKING GROUP ON NON-USE OF FORCE,
NATO TABLED ITS FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS OUTLINING THE
WESTERN APPROACH TO THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S
AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE (SEE SEPTEL).
THE NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS IS CURRENTLY DISCUSSING THE
SUBSTANCE AND TACTICS OF HANDLING THE REMAINDER OF THE
WESTERN TEXT. THE FOLLOWING TEXT (SEE PARA 6) REFLECTS
THE EC-12/"FEBRUARY 26" TEXT WITH SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS
AND ADDITIONS, MOSTLY SUBMITTED BY THE U.S. NATO
DELEGATIONS WERE ASKED TO FORWARD THIS TEXT WITH
AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO CAPITALS OVER THE SPRING
BREAK FOR CONSIDERATION WITH A VIEW TOWARDS ARRIVING AT
A FINAL NATO TEXT EARLY NEXT ROUND WHICH BEGINS ON
APRIL 15. WHEN NATO AGREES UPON A FULL TEXT WE WILL BE
BETTER ABLE TO DECIDE UPON THE TACTICS OF PIECEMEAL
INTRODUCTION OF THE TEXT. ALL 19 PARTS OF OTHE U.S.
ILLUSTRATIVE TEXTS ARE ADDRESSED IN SOME FORM IN THE
"FEBRUARY 26" TEXT WITH U.S. AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS.
5. ACTION REQUESTED: SINCE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ALL
U.S. SUGGESTIONS WILL BE ACCEPTED, IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE
TO CONVENE A CDE WORKING GROUP ON NUF DURING THE COMING
BREAK, E.G., SOMETIME BETWEEN MARCH 24 AND APRIL 9, TO
DISCUSS U.S. APPROACH TO NUF DURING THE TENTH ROUND.
6. BEGIN TEXT:
2.1. CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED
THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS
PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS FOLLOWS:
- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT. USA REQUEST THAT PARAS 2 1
- TO 2.4 BE REPLACED BY THE FOLLOWING TEXT:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THEIR OBLIGATION TO
REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, AS REAFFIRMED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WITH
RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THEIR MUTUAL
RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS."
2.2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
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AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPEN-
DENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN
PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS
MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.
2.3. ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN
FROM ANY ACTS CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR DIRECT
OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE. LIKEWISE THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION
OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPAT-
ING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN
RIGHTS. LIKEWISE THEY WILL ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL
RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF REPRISAL BY FORCE.
- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.
2.4. NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS
A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO
GIVE RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.
- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.
3.1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMIT-
MENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
GREECE: LINE 1, DELETE "RECOGNIZED," TO BE REPLACED BY
"STRESSED."
UK : THIS PARAGRAPH COULD BE COMBINED WITH PARA 3.1.4
AS FOLLOWS:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMITMENT TO
REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL
RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES,
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY ARE PARTIES TO THE SAME
ALLIANCE, OR NEUTRAL OR NONALIGNED, AS WELL AS IN THEIR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS."
3.1.1. NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO
JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT
USE OF FORCE.
THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT
OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE IF AN ARMED
ATTACK OCCURS.
- PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
CANADA: LINE 2, AFTER "MILITARY" ADD "IDEOLOGICAL."
USA : LINE 3, DELETE "THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT."
USA : ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:
"THEY CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER
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THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS
UNDER ANY OTHER TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT,
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL."
3.1.2. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION
OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPAT-
ING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXER-
CISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS
LIBERTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY
TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
UK: LINE 5, DELETE "LIBERTY" TO BE REPLACED BY
FREEDOM."
3.1.3. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH
OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR
OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVEN-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION
BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH
OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.
3.1.4. THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH
EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR NOT
THEY ARE PART OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL AS WELL AS TO
THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.
- PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
UK : PARAGRAPH TO BE COMBINED WITH PARA 3.1
CANADA: TRANSPOSE THIS PARAGRAPH TO APPEAR IMMEDIATELY
AFTER PARA 3.1.
3.1.5. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE.
- PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
USA: LINE 2, ADD "NECESSARY" BEFORE "COMPLEMENT."
UK : LINE 3, ADD AFTER "USE OF FORCE," " . . . BOTH
BEING ESSENTIAL THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVE FACTORS
FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE
AND SECURITY."
USA : ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
"THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION
ENSURING STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH CSBM'S ARE INDISPENSABLE
FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
"THEY CONFIRM THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN
EQUALITY OF ALL STATES AND NOTE THAT ALL SOVEREIGN
NATIONS HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AMONG NATIONS AND EQUAL
DUTIES."
CANADA: ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
"THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE DEPENDS FOR ITS
ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND ON
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THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE-SETTLING
MECHANISMS AND INSTITUTIONS. THE FAILURE TO SETTLE A
DISPUTE THROUGH ANY PEACEFUL MEANS SHOULD AT NO TIME
CONSTITUTE A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE.
"IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE
OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, STATES
WILL SETTLE DISPUTES AMONG THEM BY EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL
MEANS IN GOOD FAITH AND THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION SO AS
TO REACH A RAPID AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES, PARTIES TO A DISPUTE AMONG
THEM, AS WELL AS OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WILL REFRAIN
FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION TO
SUCH A DEGREE AS TO ENDANGER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THEREBY MAKE A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE MORE DIFFICULT."
3.2. THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE
CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND
SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL
PEOPLES.
- PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
UK : LINE 7, ADD "AND THE NEED TO PROMOTE AND
- ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS
- AND FREEDOMS."
USA: DELETE PARA 3.2, TO BE REPLACED EITHER BY THE
- FOLLOWING TEXT:
"THEY STRESSED THE NECESSITY TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE
THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, ALL OF WHICH DERIVE FROM THE INHERENT DIGNITY
OF THE INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING, AND ARE ESSENTIAL FOR HIS
FREE AND FULL DEVELOPMENT, AND TO ASSURE CONSTANT AND
TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT,
AIMING AT FURTHER AND STEADY DEVELOPMENT IN THIS FIELD
IN ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS.
"THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH
IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY."
- OR ALTERNATIVELY BY THE FOLLOWING TEXT:
"THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN
ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND WELL-BEING
NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES AND
THE NEED TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE
OF THOSE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. THEY REAFFIRMED THE
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UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR
FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY."
3.3. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND
UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.
THE U.S. ALSO ADVANCED THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE FOR NATO
CONSIDERATION TO BE USED DEPENDING ON THE TACTICAL
SITUATION IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP AND IN THE CONFERENCE
IN GENERAL:
A) ON TERRORISM
"THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE
MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM
BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR
COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THOSE
DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR
CITIZENS, AND FURTHER INCLUDING MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON
THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS
AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN
THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM (MCD)."
AN ALTERNATIVE TERRORISM PARAGRAPH DERIVED FROM THE NNA
DRAFT AND UNGA RES 38/130 COULD PROVIDE:
"THEY CONFIRMED THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR
INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE AND EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO
TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRES-
SION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE
MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM
BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMIS-
SION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES TO PRO-
HIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS,
GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR
ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM."
B) ON HUMAN RIGHTS
"THEY AFFIRMED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A
LEGITIMATE, PARAMOUNT INTEREST IN PROMOTING AND
ENCOURAGING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES
CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS."
THEY RECALLED THE PRINCIPLE IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO KNOW
AND ACT UPON HIS RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AS EMBODIED IN THE FINAL
ACT, AND THAT THEY WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES TO EFFECTIVELY ENSURE THIS
RIGHT."
"THEY RECOGNIZED THAT AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN THE
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EXERCISE OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS IS THE FREE AND UNRESTRICTED FLOW OF
INFORMATION ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES."
THEY RECOGNIZED THAT TO FURTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
TRUST AMONG NATIONS, ALL STATES SHOULD PROMOTE AND
ENCOURAGE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING THE RIGHTS FREELY
TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS BY FREE ELECTIONS, TO
EMIGRATE, TO PRACTICE THEIR RELIGIOUS FAITHS, TO ENJOY
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS, TO ESTABLISH AND JOIN FREE
TRADE UNIONS AND TO PARTICIPATE EQUALLY IN THE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE OF THEIR NATIONS."
END TEXT AND AMENDMENTS.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01910
SUBJECT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE AT
THE CDE
REF: A) STATE 73789, B) ROME 6146
1. CDE IX - 105
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AFTER WEEKS OF EXCRUCIATING DEBATE,
NATO WAS ABLE TO INTRODUCE ITS OWN LANGUAGE ON THE
CSBM'S-NUF LINK, TO DELIVER A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT, TO
PUT THE NUF COMMITMENT IN THE BROADER WESTERN APPROACH
TO SECURITY, AND TO AGREE TO A NOTATION IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK OF AN INNOCENT TEXT WHICH DOES
NOT PREJUDICE THE NATO POSSIBILITIES. THE NOTATION OF
THIS LANGUAGE ENABLES US TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS ON
DRAFTING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN ALL WORKING GROUPS, THUS,
WE WILL HAVE A BETTER CASE TO PUSH THE SOVIETS FOR
MOVEMENT IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS. WHILE WE HAVE
REACHED OUR MODEST OBJECTIVES IN NUF THIS ROUND,
DIFFERENCES WITH THE ITALIANS (ON HUMAN RIGHTS), BETWEEN
THE TURKS AND GREEKS (ON TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION), AND
WITH THE FRENCH (ON JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING ELSE) REMAIN
UNRESOLVED. END SUMMARY.
4. AFTER MUCH DIVISIVE DEBATE, WE FINALLY SUCCEEDED IN
GETTING WHAT WE WANTED: 1) NOTATION IN THE COORDINATOR'S
NOTEBOOK OF AN INNOCENT TEXT WHICH DID NOT PREJUDICE THE
WEST'S POSITION; 2) A NATO CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT WHICH
OUTLINED THE BROADER WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY AND
NUF, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-BREZHNEV LANGUAGE;
AND 3) MODIFICATION OF THE EC-12 FEBRUARY 26 TEXT WHICH
WAS TABLED TO BRING IT MORE IN LINE WITH U.S POSITION ON
NUF.
5. THE COORDINATOR'S TEXT: THE TEXT NOTED IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK READS AS FOLLOWS: " . . . THE
AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL
PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE
ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO
AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES
TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN GENERAL. . . . ." THIS FORMULATION
REFLECTS MORE ACCURATELY THE MADRID MANDATE TEXT UPON
WHICH IT IS BASED THAN EARLIER VERSIONS. IN ADDITION,
THE EAST HAD WANTED THE SENTENCE TO END AFTER "MUTUAL
RELATIONS," WHILE THE NNA SUPPORTED THE MORE COMPLETE
FORMULATION. IN CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS WE WERE ABLE TO
SUPPORT THE NNA IN ADDING THE FINAL NON-MANDATE PHRASE
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"AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
GENERAL." WHEN PUSH CAME TO SHOVE DURING A COFFEE BREAK
AT THE WORKING GROUP MEETING, THE EAST, DESPERATE TO GET
LANGUAGE NOTED ON NUF, AND UNWILLING TO OPPOSE THE NNA,
ACCEPTED THIS LANGUAGE. THE NOTATION OF NUF LANGUAGE IN
THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK NOW ENABLES US TO ARGUE THAT
PROGRESS ON DRAFTING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN ALL WORKING
GROUPS AND THAT WE HAVE BEEN FAITHFUL TO THE NAC DICTUM
OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM." AS A RESULT WE WILL BE ABLE
TO PUSH THE SOVIETS HARDER IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS WHERE OUR REAL INTERESTS LIE. IT WILL BE
HARDER, MOREOVER, FOR THE SOVIETS TO ARGUE THAT THE WEST
IS FOOTDRAGGING ON NUF. WE WILL SEE NEXT ROUND WHETHER
THE SOVIETS, HAVING LOST ONE RATIONALE, WILL MOVE ON
CSBM'S.
6. THE CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT: THE LONG DAYS AND FULL
WEEKENDS SPENT ON THE EXCRUCIATING NEGOTATION OF A
CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT HIGHLIGHTED THE DIFFICULTIES OF
TRYING TO BLEND THE VIEWS OF THE 16: THE TURKS INSISTED
ON INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM (WE SUPPORTED THEM);
THE ITALIANS WERE ALLERGIC TO EVEN THE MINIMALIST EC-12
HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, SAYING THAT THEY WERE CARRYING
OUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI; THE
FRENCH INSISTED THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE INTRODUC-
TION OF ANYTHING LESS THAN AN ENTIRE NUF TEXT UNLESS A
CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT ACCOMPANIED IT; AT THAT POINT WE
INSISTED ON INTRODUCING A LINKAGE OF OUR OWN: IN ORDER
FOR US TO AGREE TO THE FRENCH SCENARIO, IT MUST BE
ACCOMPANIED BY NATO ACCEPTANCE OF THE COORDINATOR'S TEXT
AND A CONCEPTUAL STAT'MENT WHICH FULLY REFLECTED THE
VIEWS OF THE 16. AS A RESULT OF U.S./CANADIAN/NORWEGIAN
(IN OTHER WORDS NON-EC-12 MEMBERS) HAGGLING, WE WERE
ABLE TO MAKE THE CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT REFLECT A BROADER
CONCEPT OF NUF THAN THE NARROW EC-12 VIEW. THE
CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT, DELIVERED BY THE FRENCH DELEGATE
AT PARIS' INSISTENCE (IN FRENCH) DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE FRENCH RAISED THE MOST OBSTACLES DURING DRAFTING AND
THAT THE U.S. AND OTHERS WERE THE PRIMARY DRAFTERS,
EMPHASIZED THAT ONLY THE ADOPTION OF MEANINGFUL CSBM'S
TOTALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE CRITERIA (THE
OPERATIONAL HEART" OF OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM) WOULD
JUSTIFY A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE
NUF PRINCIPLE. FURTHERMORE, THE STATEMENT STRESSED THAT
THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WAS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND OF A WIDER SECURITY
PERSPECTIVE WHICH "ENCOMPASSES NOT ONLY STRICTLY
MILITARY MATTERS BUT ALSO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL
AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS." FINALLY, IN OUTLINING
COLLATERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
RELATED TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE, THE STATEMENT RECALLED THE
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"ERGA OMNES" (ANTI-AFGHANISTAN) AND ANTI-BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE CONCEPTS, THE "UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS" AND "THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AND EQUAL DUTIES OF STATES" INCLUDING THE IMPORTANCE OF
COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS."
7. PROBLEM AREAS: WHILE WE WERE ABLE -- ALBEIT WITH
SOME PAIN -- TO PLAY OUT OUR SCENARIO, CERTAIN PROBLEMS
FESTER WITHIN NATO: THE FRENCH ROLE, ITALIAN INABILITY
TO AGREE TO EVEN MINIMALIST HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE,
TURKISH INSISTENCE ON -- AND FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO --
INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM, AS WELL AS POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY ON LANGUAGE REGARDING
THE PROHIBITION OF TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION, I.E.,
CONTAINED IN THE "FEBRUARY 26" (EC-12) TEXT. WHILE WE
ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH AND THE GREEKS AND
TURKS, THE ITALIAN PROBLEM IS MORE PERPLEXING. ACCORDING
TO THE ITALIAN DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM, ANDREOTTI HAS
TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE
DISCUSSION AT THE CDE. HE REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT BY
INTRODUCING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE CDE CONTEXT WE
PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY TO PREVENT THE EAST FROM BRINGING
UP INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECTS SUCH AS SOVIET DISARMAMENT
PROPOSALS IN OTHER CSCE FORA. HIS EC-12 PARTNERS HAVE
BEEN UNABLE TO DISSUADE HIM ON THIS ACCOUNT, HENCE THE
TEPID HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT.
JUST TO GET ITALIAN AGREEMENT TO A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT
READ IN A WORKING GROUP REQUIRED CONSTANT PRESSURE BY
ALMOST ALL OTHER NATO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM AND
NUMEROUS CALLS TO ROME, AS WELL AS A U.S. DEMARCHE TO
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN ROME (REF A). IT IS STILL NOT
CLEAR WHAT THE ITALIAN POSITION REALLY IS. IF IT IS
THAT THEY WANT TO ENSURE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS DOES NOT
ENTER INTO THE DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC CSBM'S, AS
SUGGESTED IN REF B, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE UPON
APPROPRIATE HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCES IN NATO'S NUF TEXT;
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ITALIANS VETO THE
INTRODUCTION OF ANY NATO NUF LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER SOME HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHES IN
ROME. WITH THIS IN MIND, AMBASSADOR BARRY HAS SCHEDULED
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 01910
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
CONSULTATIONS IN ROME ON APRIL 21, SOON AFTER THE
BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 01952
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE IX - 109
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO ENTER THE
FOLLOWING TWO TEXTS IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON
MARCH 13:
(1) BEGIN TEXT:
THE INVITING STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBI-
LITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGED IN
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE INVITING
STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE INVITING STATE WILL SPECIFY
THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO
OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY.
END TEXT.
(2) BEGIN TEXT:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL
PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR
REPLY TO THE INVITATION.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01953
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB. BARRY SPEECH IN CDE, 3/14/86
1. CDE IX - L07
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH AMBASSADOR
ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) TODAY, MARCH
14, THE FINAL DAY OF CDE ROUND IX.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN:
SO FAR DURING THIS ROUND I HAVE MADE MY CONTRIBUTION TO
THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE BY MAKING MY SPEECHES
ELSEWHERE. BUT FACED WITH THE END OF THE ROUND, I FIND
THE TEMPTATION TO BREAK MY SELF-IMPOSED VOW OF SILENCE
TOO STRONG TO RESIST. AFTER ALL, END-OF-ROUND
SUMMARIES ARE A TRADITION, AND EVEN IN A CONFERENCE
WHICH HAS ONLY LASTED TWO YEARS, TRADITION PLAYS AN
IMPORTANT ROLE.
THE FIRST PROBLEM ONE FACES IN SUMMATIONS OF THIS SORT
IS WHETHER TO DESCRIBE THE GLASS AS PARTLY EMPTY OR
PARTLY FULL. LOOKING AT WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED HERE
IN THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS, IT WOULD BE ALL TOO EASY TO
CONCENTRATE ON WHAT WE HAVE NOT DONE. BUT, AT THE RISK
OF BEING THOUGHT UNREALISTIC, I'D LIKE TO BEGIN WITH
WHAT WE HAVE DONE. WE ARE ALL MORE OR LESS OPTIMISTS,
OR ELSE WE WOULDN'T BE HERE; BUT MORE IMPORTANT, IF WE
CHOOSE TO ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE IT WILL BE ALL TOO
EASY TO CONVINCE OURSELVES AND OUR GOVERNMENTS THAT IT
IS TOO LATE TO NEGOTIATE THE KIND OF CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT WE WERE SENT HERE TO ACHIEVE. WE ARE NOT
GOING TO SETTLE FOR MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS ON THE
HELSINKI CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES -- WHAT WE CALL A
MINI-PACKAGE. THE MANDATE TELLS US NOT TO. SO LET'S
THINK ABOUT HOW WE CAN ACCOMPLISH MORE.
THE MAIN FACTOR WHICH ENCOURAGES ME IS THAT I BELIEVE
THAT THE THIRTY-FIVE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED HERE WANT
TO REACH AGREEMENT. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF THIS IN WHAT
OUR POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE SAID.
--THE US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED IN GENEVA ON
NOVEMBER 2L, L985, COMMITS BOTH COUNTRIES TO SEEK AN
EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE. THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT GAVE POLITICAL
MOMENTUM TO OUR CONFERENCE, AND WE HOPE THAT A
CONTINUING PROCESS OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WILL
FACILITATE OUR WORK HERE.
--PRESIDENT REAGAN STRESSED TO ME THE IMPORTANCE HE
ATTACHES TO CDE WHEN I MET HIM ON JANUARY 2L BEFORE
THIS ROUND BEGAN. HIS STATEMENT OF THAT DATE
EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS SUCCESS HERE
COULD HAVE FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. HE
ALSO NOTED THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD "HELP TO LOWER THE
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BARRIERS WHICH NOW DIVIDE EUROPE ARTIFICIALLY EAST FROM
WEST, THEREBY MAKING THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE LESS
LIKELY."
--THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS GENSCHER AND DUMAS
AT OUR OPENING PLENARY DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE
FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ATTACH TO
OUR CONFERENCE AS A KEY INSTRUMENT FOR ENHANCING
EUROPEAN STABILITY AND SECURITY.
--MY DELEGATION ALSO WELCOMED THAT SECTION OF GENERAL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S JANUARY L5 STATEMENT RELATING TO
CDE. FIRST, IT CONTAINED SOME GOOD ADVICE WITH WHICH
WE AGREE, IN THAT IT SUGGESTED CONCENTRATING ON AREAS
WHERE COMMON GROUND EXISTED OR COULD BE DEVELOPED.
SECONDLY, IT REMOVED AN OBSTACLE TO DRAFTING BY
RECOGNIZING THAT THE ISSUE OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED IN STOCKHOLM.
ASIDE FROM THE POLITICAL IMPETUS PROVIDED BY OUR
LEADERS' STATEMENTS, I WAS ENCOURAGED THAT ALL
DELEGATIONS RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM LAST JANUARY WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO BEGIN DRAFTING. NOT ONLY THAT, BUT I
BELIEVE THERE WAS AN UNSPOKEN CONSENSUS THAT WE COULD
BEGIN PRODUCING TEXT ON NON-CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WHILE
AT THE SAME TIME TRYING TO DEAL WITH THE MAJOR
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED
BEFORE SOME IMPORTANT SECTIONS OF A FINAL DOCUMENT
COULD BE DRAFTED.
I THINK IT IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT DELEGATIONS LIKE MY
OWN, WHICH BELIEVE THAT THE MANDATE TELLS US TO
CONCENTRATE ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, DID NOT INSIST THAT ALL
DRAFTING ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE COME ONLY
AFTER DRAFTING OF THE CSBMS THEMSELVES. THE WESTERN
PROPOSALS ON NON-USE OF FORCE, AND OUR AGREEMENT TO A
PARAGRAPH OF TEXT, ARE THE RESULTS OF AN EFFORT ON OUR
PART TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF THOSE WHO STRESS THE
IMPORTANCE OF THIS ASPECT OF OUR WORK.
GIVEN THAT WE ALL HAD ORDERS TO GET ON WITH THE
BUSINESS OF DRAFTING, WE CANNOT BE TOO PROUD OF WHAT
OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS HAVE PRODUCED -- A FEW SPARSE
SENTENCES, MANY RECYCLED FROM THE MADRID MANDATE OR THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT. BUT I REFUSE TO BE DISCOURAGED BY
THE UNDENIABLE MODESTY OF OUR ACCOMPLISHMENT. AS SOME
OF YOU HAVE POINTED OUT, WE HAVE VENTURED INTO TERRA
INCOGNITA. THERE IS NO "BRIDGE PROPOSAL" ON THE
TABLE. THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS SUPPLY
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NEUTRAL AS COORDINATORS, BUT THEY
ALSO SUPPORT THE CONCEPTS AND LANGUAGE OF SC-7. GOING
FROM ONES' OWN PROPOSALS TO COMPROMISE POSITIONS IS
NEVER EASY; WHEN MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES AND GROUP
MECHANISMS ARE INVOLVED, THE PROCESS IS EVEN MORE
HESITANT AND PAINFUL.
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I DO THINK THAT THE DRAFTING PROCESS HAS GAINED
MOMENTUM AS THE SESSION HAS WORN ON. THROUGH A
COMBINATION OF PROCESSES -- DRAFTING IN THE WORKING
GROUPS, SUBMISSION OF TEXTS BY COORDINATORS, RESOLUTION
OF SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES IN SMALL"CONTACT GROUPS" --
PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED AND TEXT HAS EMERGED. WE
HAVE NOW BROKEN THE ICE IN ALL FIVE WORKING GROUPS.
LET'S HOPE THAT THE TRANSITIONAL PAINS ARE OVER AND
THAT WHEN WE RETURN OUR PROBLEMS WILL BE SUBSTANTIVE,
NOT PROCEDURAL.
I EVEN SEE THE SUBSTANTIVE GLASS AS HALF-FULL, NOT
HALF-EMPTY.
--WE ALL AGREE THAT WE MUST EXCHANGE CONSIDERABLE
INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY UNITS IF FORECASTING,
NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION ARE TO BE
MEANINGFUL.
--WE ALL AGREE THAT ACTIVITIES WHICH WE WILL NOTIFY
SHOULD BE FORECAST ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.
--WE ALL AGREE THAT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS SHOULD BE
WELL BELOW THOSE SET IN HELSINKI.
--WE ALL AGREE THAT THE ROLE OF OBSERVATION SHOULD BE
MORE IMPORTANT THAN UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THAT
OBSERVERS SHOULD BE INVITED FROM ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES, AND THAT OBSERVERS OUGHT TO BE AFFORDED EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY TO SEE MORE OF THE EXERCISES THAN IN THE
PAST.
--WE ALL AGREE THAT THE MEASURES WE ADOPT MUST BE
VERIFIABLE.
--AND WE ALL AGREE THAT THE ADOPTION OF CSBMS SHOULD
GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE
OF FORCE, WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO REAFFIRM.
ON THAT BASIS, LET ME SUGGEST SOME PRIORITY SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND
IF WE ARE TO ACCELERATE THE DRAFTING PROCESS. UNLESS
WE ARE PREPARED TO TACKLE THESE PROBLEMS
CONSTRUCTIVELY, WE WILL NOT MAKE PROGRESS WHEN WE
RETURN BUT WILL DRIFT INTO A NEW STALEMATE.
--LET US AGREE ON THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFYING GROUND
FORCE AND COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITY, SINCE SO MUCH DEPENDS
ON THIS. WE HAVE A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THIS ISSUE
SINCE ALL HERE HAVE, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, RECOGNIZED
THAT THE THRESHOLD SHOULD BE BASED ON A COMBINATION OF
STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL PARAMETERS INCLUDING BOTH
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. AND ALL RECOGNIZE THAT
LARGE-SCALE AIR EXERCISES OVER EUROPE ARE CONNECTED
WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY.
--LET US SET ASIDE PROCEDURAL DISPUTES AND BEGIN TO
DRAFT ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AND FORECASTING
WHERE THERE IS, IN FACT, CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND.
--LET US ACCEPT, ONCE AND FOR ALL, THE PRINCIPLE THAT
ALL ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE NOTIFIED WILL BE OBSERVED.
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-- LET US BEGIN TO DEVISE A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH
MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MANDATE. BECAUSE OF OUR
CONCERNS OVER COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS,
ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IS THE SINE QUA NON FOR MY
DELEGATION. TO US, ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MEANS
INSPECTION.
WHEN WE RETURN HERE IN APRIL WE HOPE TO CONTRIBUTE TO
RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES. WE ARE PREPARED TO BE
FLEXIBLE, AND WE EXPECT THE SAME FROM OTHERS.
MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME LOOK AHEAD SOMEWHAT TO SEPTEMBER.
AGAIN, PROCEEDING FROM MY OPTIMISTIC ASSUMPTION, LET US
SAY THAT WE HAVE A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO WHICH OUR
GOVERNMENTS WILL AGREE. OBVIOUSLY, SUCH A DOCUMENT
WILL NOT ACCOMMODATE ALL OF THE PROPOSALS NOW BEFORE
US; SOME OF SC-L WILL NOT BE THERE, SOME OF SC-7 WILL
BE MISSING, AND NOT ALL EASTERN IDEAS WILL BE
REFLECTED. WHAT HAPPENS TO THE LEFT-OVERS? CLEARLY,
AS THEY ARE THE IDEAS OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, THEY
MAY LIVE ON AFTER STOCKHOLM AND CAN BE RAISED AGAIN IN
OTHER APPROPRIATE FORUMS -- INCLUDING A POSSIBLE
POST-VIENNA CDE IF THE PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH
THE MADRID MANDATE, AS IS OR AS SUPPLEMENTED IN
VIENNA. BUT IT IS NOT OUR JOB HERE TO DETERMINE WHAT
OUR SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS WILL OR WILL NOT RAISE IN THE
FUTURE; IT IS NOT IN OUR POWER, WE DO NOT HAVE TIME,
AND WE DO NOT KNOW THE POST-VIENNA MANDATE.
TWO WEEKS AGO, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE WORLD WAS SHOCKED BY
THE BRUTAL AND SENSELESS ASSASSINATION OF PRIME
MINISTER OLOF PALME. WORLD LEADERS ARE GATHERING HERE
IN STOCKHOLM TO PAY TRIBUTE TO HIS MEMORY AND TOMORROW
WILL JOIN THE SWEDISH PEOPLE IN THEIR GRIEF AND
MOURNING. MY COUNTRY, AND ALL OF US HERE, HAVE
SUFFERED FROM SENSELESS AND COWARDLY ACTS OF VIOLENCE.
WE ARE REMINDED NOW AGAIN THAT WE CANNOT MEANINBFULLY
TALK ABOUT BUILDING SECURITY IND CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE
WITHOUT CONSIDERING WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF
TERRORISM, WHICH REPRESENTS THE USE OF FORCE IN ITS
MOST BRUTAL AND DIRECT FASHION. THE UNITED STATES
BELIEVES IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE PARTICIPANTS
IN THIS CONFERENCE, IN REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE
NON-USE OF FORCE, TO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO
TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM.
I ALSO THINK IT APPROPRIATE, MR. CHAIRMAN, FOR US IN
THIS HALL TO RECALL THE HOPES WHICH PRIME MINISTER
PALME HAD FOR US. THE FIRST ITEM ON OUR AGENDA IN
JANUARY OF L984 WAS MR. PALME'S WELCOMING SPEECH. HE
SPOKE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS -- THE COMM4 MENT OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES TO "WORK TOGETHER TOWARDS A MORE
STABLE ORDER IN EUROPE, REDUCTION OF TENSIONS,
PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, RESPECT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND -- GENERALLY SPEAKING -- GREATER MUTUAL
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UNDERSTANDING." HE SPOKE OF A "GRAND STRATEGY OF PEACE
-- ENCOMPASSING ALL FIELDS OF HUMAN ENDEAVOR AND
RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS." HE REMINDED US THAT "THE
STRICT OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATY
OBLIGATIONS IS A SHIELD" PROTECTING SMALLER STATES
"AGAINST ATTEMPTS TO SUBJUGATE THEM TO THE WILL OF
OTHERS." HE URGED US TO SEEK CONSENSUS ON MEASURES TO
REDUCE SUSPICION AND INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND
COOPERATION.
AS PARTICIPANTS IN THIS CONFERENCE, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE
CAN PAY HONOR TO MR. PALME'S MEMORY BY SEEKING TO
FULFILL THE VISION WHICH HE ARTICULATED AND WHICH WE
SHARE. LET US RETURN WITH A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY AND
DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED. TIME IS RUNNING OUT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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