REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS NO. 49

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400230012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 12, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

TO? SECRET
No. 119
Approv ForRelease2002/01,2% 914
CONF1U 01
Rep
WATCH COMMITTER
of the
INTEILIOEHDE ADVISOR! COODINTES
f Soviet -Commie Ietentions
From% 4 July 1951
To 11 July 1951
Washington 25. D. C.
12 July 1951
/
P91Tfte2R000400230012-1
5) 3 /9 4--/- itoC
ocument e.
No Change In Class.
0 Declassified
WAS. Changed to: IS S
Field Review Dale: /ft.
fkuth.:A.,A7Q-.3
DMZ PERIOD
1. NORMkg The propaganda and attitude of the Communists at the eesse-
fire conference provide no indication that they have eodified their
previous stand on a Korean settlement or that they are prepared to
sake aoneeasions. Thu Conmunist demand for the withdrewel of all
foreign troops and the Conmunista" failure to mention guarantees
are consistent with their propaganda statements that they menelder
themselees the vietors and that their objeative is to secure the
withdrawal of UN forees. Enemy ground seelvity, including substantial
southbound ethicular truffle, indicate* that preparations for an
offensive tontinue although it does not appear imminent. Reports
of the training of North ger0211 troops in Manchurle end of the
?,)seeble forgotten of new NIA corps suggest that the build-up of
North NOTVOn fOrgate im Inteeded to prepare them ultimately to take
WNW Me OA CCIPD but reports seavehile indleste that s sUbstentiel
ftow at Chinese Communist reinforcements to Korea ocetinues. The
entry of 800CCO nee "volunteers" and possibly a new CCF Army group
tea been reported. A sudden resum ion or large-scale enemy air
operatloos aoineided with preliminary eeese-rire negotiations and
ineluded the sppearance of a oonslderable number or Type 15 jetmo
suggesting an increasingly aggressive attitude whiCh would be in
keeping with continued enemy grcund force build-up-during the
cease-fire discussionse k 00350 -tire without guarantees against
enemy ocoupation of forward airfields could greatly enhance Cemmunist
air espobilitlea against UN foroes. Several tanoonfirmd reports or
Stoo.Sovlet conferenves in Peiping have stated that the oease-fire
was intended to gain time for further Comsunist military preparations
and that oetion? possibly in the late summer, may be directed egeinst
Peewee, Japan, or Indochina, as well 'spree.
2. *AM Increasing Soviet propaganda emphasis en the Japanese Poste
treaty further suggests that the USSR may press this issue in the
mear future and that one objective of the easseerire proposal we
. WOWS been to inject the Japanese question into subsequent dISMOVOINIS,
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3. CHlakt Although there are no indications of substantial ailitary
preparations for operations against Pormosa,, there has been a
ing floe of materiel ineo South eillAa and the Mutnese have linked
their popular drive to purahase military equipment with the
"liberation of Pormoes.' There are con tinting reports of an inerease
in OCAV training activity in South and Central China, ineluding
combined fighter and bomber air-ground training in the Shanghai area
and heavy training sctivity in the Canton area.
4. IPDOCHIlk; Although the reported movement of two Viet Minh divisions
into Annum DOW 'appears erroneous the expected rearming of Viet MInh
regiments in this area suggests that an increase in Viet Minh activity
in Annam is to be expected. A report that the Viet Minh 308th
Division Is to be rearmed from China', that Anal0810 truth companies
have beam organized to supply the Viet Minh, and that the rail lino
to the Indochina border is to be completed by the end of July provide
further evident)* of continuing Chinese suppert of the Viet Minh.
There is, however, no aeceptable evidence that a Chines* Ceamunist
invasion is Imminent or that CCP units as such are now operating in
Indoehina.
5. GERNABT-AUSTRIA1 There are no indications of significant changes
in the training or dispoeition of Soviet forces in Germany. Reports
indicate that the recant influx at Soviet troops into GerManY has
exceedwidepartures by about 50,000 and that same 100000 new troops
have arrived in Austria and Hungary, but in view of further expected
releases it is too early to assess the overall effect on troop
strength. Known rail preparations for .the World Youth Pestival in
Berlin during, August provide no indication to date that the asseibll
of rolling steak to move participants Is a cover for a possible
troop movement.
SATELLTIRSz The reliable identifiestion of 00-1519 in the Pond% Air
'ores and reports of the training of Rumanian air personnel in jet
fighters it further evidence of the supply of Soviet jet aircraft,
Including the first-line M1045? to the Satellites. An advance in
call-ups to the Cse Amy has resulteciin an estimated 209000
looms* in strength to 1550000, and uneonfirsed reports freseRumania
indieate that a two-class eall-up may be under way there. Seemetions
elOng the Rumanian border adjacent to Yugoslavia apparently captious
and the planned evacuation of Rumanians as well as mindrity grape
has been reported.
IRANI Reports that Soviet troops *long the Iranian herder have been
reinforced are not substantiated. The ecumenist Tudeh Party is
Wyoming increasingly active in demonstrations.
8. USSR The Air Show in 11084011 an 8 July was marked by an impressive
display of new type siren" including the prototypes of four new
'jet 4ghters and a new long-range bomber tentatively considered to
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be a heavy bomber. There were also indications that jet aircraft
are possibly being developed for the Naval Air Force. The Air Show
indicated that the Soviets are making further progress in aircraft
development and that they are developing a variety of types of
aircraft.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readi-
ness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no
additional warning. Military and politioal indications are that
the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of oontroversial
problems strictly along lines which further Communiat world objectives.
There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies,
in pursuing their major objectives, intend. necessarily to avoid
future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. Political developments provide no indication of a modification of
Communist demands for a Korean settlement, and military preparations
continue to point to a Communist intention to resume hostilities if
they fail to secure their previously announced objectives by
political means.
3. There are no firm indications of Communist preparations for major
military operations in the Far East outside the Korean theater in
the immediate future, but substantial Chinese Coortunist support of
the Viet Minh continues.
4. Available Intelligence does not indicate Soviet intentions to initiate
hostilities in Europe or the Near East in the immediate future.
There are, however, continuing military and political indications
of Soviet and Satellite preparatiOns for war. Satellite ground and
air capabilities continue steadily to increase end further progress
In Soviet aircraft development is evident.
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ANALYSIS OF_INDICAT/ONd
Indications of Intentions in the Far Bast.
a. KORA
(1) Cease-fire Discussions. The Communists' propaganda and
their
announced proposals at the tease-fire discussiOns
have provided no indication that the Coormists have
modified their previous stand on a. Korean settlement or
that they are prepared to make concessions. The Communist
terms? as announced by the Peiping radio on )1 July's,
included three points: the simultaneous cessation of all
military action; the establishment of a military demarca-
tion line along the 38th Parallca and the withdrawalvf
all troops from a ten-kilometer tone an either side of
this line; and the withdrawal of all fore len troops "in
the shortest posAible time." It is noteworthy that the
Communist proposals not only made no mention of guarantees
for the enforcement of the ermlstice but also that they
assume that the withdrawal ,of rereign troops LS a military
and not a political question. . Although it is possible that
the Communiste, In initial disoussions, are making demands
which they intend later to modlfy, the, whole one of their
propaganda during the week portrayed the Communists as
victors and indicated that their objeotive in the discus-
sions was the withdrawal of UN forces. Bmadcasts from
both Pyongyang and Peiping assorted in effect that the
United States was being forced to sue for peace as the
result of her military failure in Korea End Sine?Korean
Invincibility. The Neocow radio on 5 Jul' quoted a North
Korean newspaper article to the effect that the withdrawal
.of foreign troops and the cessation of armed intervention
by the U.S. in Korea would provide the necessary conditiona
for the settlement of the Korean queotion and the establish-
memt'of peace in the Far Bast. Ther o were also suggestions
that the Communists intend again to raise the question of
Formosa and the admission of Communist China to the UN in
.subsequent discusaions. A cable tramemitted to the UN by
the North Korean Foreign Orris)* on 7 July set forth a
purported appeal of American and British PW's calling for
the withdrawal of all foreign troops troM Korea & the
a:inclusion of a Five-Pox' peace paeto the exposure of
U.S. atrocities in Korea& the withdrawel of all U.S.
military forces from Formosa,, and the odmisolOn of Communist
Chins to the UN. Despite a marked increeee In cordiality
by Soviet diplomats during the week, aria the statements Of.
at least two Soviet officials that "peace is to be
achieved, Soviet-Communist propaganda su actions provided
no evidence Of a Change in their objectives in Korea er a
genuine desire to lessen world tensions.
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(2) etfargeEktestay eta 2E8 %MOWN 04101
preparations ate under way for a resumption of the offen-
sive ehile reports from several sources indicate that the
build-up of North Korean and Chinese Communist military
strength is also continuing. The volume .of southbound
enemy vehicular traffic is approaching that which has
preceded previous offeneives? and a field estimate states
that purely tactical considerations suggest the period
of 15-25 July as the most likely for the resumption of the
enemy offensive. Should the present negotiations be pro-
tracted the most likely period for the resumption of offen-
sive operations would be later, possibly as late as mid-
August. In general? however, there has been a lessening of
enemy activity in forward areas of the type which in the
peat has indicated an imminent offensive. One or two Flits
have stated "the new offensive" is to begin on or about
28 July, while some other reports have suggested its post-
ponement until August. Although the information is not
fully substantiated, reports of the past several weeks
have indicated that substantial numbers of North Korean
troops are still being trained in Manchuria0 and unconfirmed
reports have mentioned the formation of two new North Korean
corps and a new tank division equipped with 300 T.34 tanks.
The number of Soviet advisers with North Korean units
reportedly has also increased, with units larger than
battalions now said to have at least six Soviet officers as
"advisors." Although these reports suggest that the North
Korean Army is being built up to take over from the Chinese
Communists, and at least one report has stated that North
Korean forces will eventually displace the CCP, there are
also continuing indications of the flow of Chinese Ccamunist
reinforcements to Korea. According to a recent report&
the ccamanders of the Third and Fourth Field Army logistical
commands informed General Peng Teh-huai on 30 June that a
total of 80,000 nu "volunteers" ha 6 been dispatched to
the Korean frene.
Other reports of? the eontinuing movement of Chinese Communise
troops towards or into Korea include the statements of Ms
that the 13th Army Group of the Fourth Field Army is to
participate in the next offensive, reports of the presence
in Korea of uncommitted elements of the First Field ArRy,
and a report that 1200000 troops from the First, Second
and Third Field Armies were to be moved to the northeast
border of China before the end of May. The entrance at
Soviet troops into Korea and their presence in Manchuria
aontinues to be reported. One PO recently has claimed to,
have seen acme 200 1-34 tanks in Manchuria operated by
Soviet troops. There is still no confirmation of the
presence of Soviet troops, other than advisers and AAA
personnel, in either Manehuria or Korea.
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in Air. Following a period of relative inactivity early in
The' 'week Whiehl was characterized by generally bad weather),
enemy jet fighters resumed operations on a considerable
scale. Approximately 50 11I045'5 were encountered on 7 July
in the Sinuiju area; 75-80 111045 'a and 20 aircraft described
65 Type 150a (high-wing, swept-wing jet fighters) were
encountered on 8 July in the Pyongyang and Sinuiju area;
and 4-8 11I045's were encountered on 9 July in the Sinanju
area. Although the enemy lost 5 Mira and had 4 others
damaged, without damaging UN aircraft? he was aggressiee
and his flying technique was described as generally
excellent. The engagement near Pyongyang was the fourth
time in two weeks that enemy jets had attacked UN aircraft
to that area. The sudden resueption of large -scale enemy
Jet counter-air operations coinciding with preliminary
*ease-tire negotiations Gould be designed to impress the
UN that the enemy is negotiating from $ position of strengeh.
It is also possible that the enemy is utilizing this period
of negotiations to commit the maximum number of pilots for
training and experience? a possibility Which is strengthened
by the apparent employment of Type 15 jets for the first
time in considerable nuebers. According to a FRAF estimates
a period of less than 30 days would probably be sufficient
to rehabilitate airfields in North Urea and would permit
the accommodatlon of a major portion of aircraft new in
Nenehuria. A cease-fire without guarantees against such
setivity could thus greatly enhance enemy capabilities for
both defensiwe and offensive air aoti ity against UN forces.
Ne ed Coinsunist Intentions. Since the Malik cease-fire
propose une a n r of reports have been received
purporting to set forth the results of various high-level
Slno-Soviet conferences in Peiping. None of these reports
has been substantiated and the details of the alleged
declaims have shown considerable variation. In general
however, and despite the numerous discrepancies? these
reports have fairly consistently stated that a primary
objective of the cease-tire proposal was to gain time for
ftrther Communist military preparations not only in gerea
bea also possibly for a ion against other targetao
ineluding Formosa? Japan, and Indochina. Various pewee
hove alleged that if cease-fire discussions break downy
the 4Intortationa1 Volunteer Army" will move into Korot.
At least two reports have stated that a major effort is to
be devoted to preventing the signing of the Japanese peace
treaty and that if this fails an attack ea Jew Is to be
launched. A mid-August date has been mentioned for a
25X1 Chinese Communlst attack on Forsiosau
iwniee various reports continue to alley
lest Communist military preparations are being timed for
se further military action in tate summer. One tntereet-
int tasters of several reports has been the clear smell/non
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that the cease-fire proposal was the result of prior
Sino-Soviet conferences and that Chinese Communist
Foreign Minister Chou En-lit possibly Reds a trip to Moscow
during June. In contrast to mast of the information,
there has been one report that the Soviet Government is
definitely seeking peace in Korea and is even withholding
military supplies and that the Chinese Communists, disturbed
by their heavy losses, are also anxious to bring hostilities
to a close.
b. JAPAN. The, Moscow radio within the pest week devoted considerable
attention to the proposed Japanese peace treaty, thus further suggest-
ing that the USSR intends to press the question in the near future and
to follow up a Korean cease-fire with agitation for the inclusion of
the Soviet Union and Communist China in Japanese peace treaty discussions.
Soviet emphasis on this question continues to suggest that the USSR
regards the Japanese issue as the most important in the Far East and
that one objective of the cease-fire proposal may have been to inject
Japan into the discussions with the objective of postponing the treaty.
The proposal for a Pive-Power Pact in the Far East continues to be a
favored theme in Communist propaganda but the USSR has not yet advanced
such a proposal an an official level.
e. CRINA. Despite some reports that the Chinese Communists may be
planning late summer operations against Formosa* military information
from South Chins does not indicate that any significant preparations for
such action are under way. Reports of the pest four weeks have indicated
25X1 a ontinual flow of materiel intq South China, however, and a Chinese
statement for the first time has linked the donation campaign for the
porches, of military equipment with the "liberation of Formosa" as well
as the Korean war. There are also continuing reports of an increase in
Chinese Communist Air Force training activity in South and Central China.
25X1
4. INDOCHINA. A report of last week that two Viet Minh divisions
had moved into northern Annum from Tonkin now appears to have been
erroneous. An increase in Viet Minh activity in northern Annam is
nevertheless to be expected, after the antleipated rearmament of regular
Viet Minh regiments in that area.
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-R--490that propel uttons are
under way for a massive invasion or =Jacobins by the CCF appear to hare
25X1 been primarily inspired by the Korean cease-tire negotiations, There
continues, meanwhile, t be a wide divergenee of opinion regarding the
number of Chinese Communists now operating in Indochina. The U.S.
Nilitary Attache in Saigon believes that there may be frets 4500 to
12,000 advisers but that it is practically impossible to compute the
numbers serving in disguise with the Viet Ninh. Although CCP units
eould be infiltrated into Tonkin without Immo:nate discovery, it is
unlikely that they could long remain undetected.
2. Indications of Intentions in Euror and the Near Zest.
a. GERNAMT.AUSTRIA.
(l) Soviet Greund Forams. Soviet field training in Germany
eon irnieP on essentIally the same pattern as in 1950.
No Urge-scale maneuvers or any important changes In the
disposition of Soviet forces are reported. Four divisions,
including the two tank diveslons previously reported,
remain In the Letslinger-Eolde training area. As of the
? third week or June, small elements or at least eight
divisions were reportedly in this area, but the bulk of
? these divisions were reliably reported training else:ahem,
and there is no indication that the assembly of odd elements
of these divisions jn I talinae?-SIdS is for other then
training purposes.
(2) Troop Movements. Although it is too early to *mess the
overall ettaii gif annual class inductions on Soviet troop
strength In Germany, observed troop movements during the
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sixty-day period ending 29 June indicate that 81,000 have
arrived in the Soviet Zone and that 31,000 have deported.
There le some indication', as yet not confirmed, that in
addition to members of the recently conscripted class of
1931 incoming movement may have includedeenits or cadres
for the activation of new units. The arrival of five
trains carrying both troops ard equipment, including AA
guns and tanks, has been reported, In Austria the last
sapient of Soviet recruits scheduled for Austria and
Hungary reportedly arrived at the Wilfleinadorf reception
center on 30 June. Total arrivals over a 30-day period
aggregated approximately 10,000, of which about 40$ were
assigned to garrisons in Hungary and the remainder to
Austria. The dieeharge of the 1927 class, already under
may in Germany, has not been reliably reported in Austria
but several secondary scurees claim that such eiseharge
shipments will begin during ju2y.
(3) RaileItItir for World Youth Festival. Information
PaRibi Ito Itioso agens se inGermany provides no indica-
tion that transportation plans for the World Youth Festival
to be held in Berlin during Augyat sae a *over for a
,
possible troop movement, Rsil useably points throughout
Gereany, for the planted movement of over 1,000,000 dole.;
gates, show the same gererel pattern as for the Whitsuntide
Festival last year, with Berlin ae the converging point.
?hers le no evidence that any of the Railroad Directorates
in the Soviet Zone have been alerted to assemble their
heavy rolling stock or reserve locomotives, or that the
head railroad *Moe for the Zone hae received any instrue-
time to order suit an assembly of stock as would be
required for an extensive moeement of troops and military
equipment.
b. SATELLITES.
(1) Rumanian and PoliW24,!Lls1441. There are continuing
3:6117Ziarir---etofirafiliieedsciviet willingness to provide
Jet aircraft, inauding the MI6450 to certain of the
European Satellites. In Poland, 7 KIG-15 fighter and -
trainer aircraft as well as 20 Type 28 jet fightee0
hearing Polish Air Force merkimgs were observed on. 7 :uly
at Wareswitornerowo Airfield, the first reliable indication
that this first-line jet has been assigned to' the Polish
Air Faros. Reanwhile, reports aontinua to point to the
further movement of Soviet Jets into Rumania and to the
training of Rumanian Air Fore* personnel in jet figAtere.
Reports of varying reliability have ccotinued to refer
to new airfield construction in RUMania at various looat
tlons, including Piteatio Bucharest and the Constants
meta, strengthening previous indications' of construetIon
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or improvements at no less than 18 installations in
Rumania.
(2) zpansion of Satellite Armies. There is evidenee of
am era ed call-ups in !nth the Czechoslovakian and
Rumanian krales. As it now appears certain that the
natal autumn cell-up in Cseohoslovadela was advanced to
this spring, the estimated strength of the fteeh Army has
been increased from 1350004) to 1550000o wish Pert or all
of four age groups now in Navvies. The advence in eall-up
of the new (1930) menacript class may be desegned in part
to lower the conscription age to 19 or 20 in accordance
25X1 with the Defense Law of 1949. In Rumanieol
'the remainder of the 1931 class
in Constants use vnauctoel in April, While in two other
elates the class of 1932 wee either called to a tive duty
or ordered to report for medics/ exasinations in early
spring. The ealleup of the 1932 class, if confirmed,
would indicate the senuleaneous conscription of the 1931
and 1932 classes. In adeltion, same Rumanian reserve
? officers previously oonsedered unreliable were reportedly
recalled to active duty during Nay along with a limited
number of reservist soldeers up to age 35. The officer
recall would not be unesual and probably was accomplished
to permit training in Soelet weapons. In estimetes sub-
mitted receetly by the C,S. Arty Aetaehes in Humgary,
Csechoslovskia, and Rumania on the status of the armies
of those Satellites, the following chem.:Wirt/es in common
were noted: (a) Sovietisation of equipment and tactical
doctrine Is being carried out; (b) the three countries art
in the primes* of expanding, or are planning to increase,
their army strenseh; (o) all three Satellites need logisti-
cal support from the USSR to obtain maximum efficiency;
and (d) the ermles of the three are steadily approaching a
state of readineas for offensive eperations.
(3) Evacuation of Rumanian Border. Evacuations along the
reirei-n Rissmien 1%ifWialeh Yugoslavia apparently
continue, with acme reports characterizing the evsouation
as partial and others as *angst*. Initial evacuees were
ednerity groups and dissident peasants, but according to
One unconfirmed report Ruesnians have been warned that
they will be severe after minority groups are resettled.
In addition, refugees have reported that foreign nationals
in Bucharest have been notified to prepare to return to
their elm countries on 5 to 10 4sysi notice. In the
absence of any reliable evldenoe of unusual troop move-
ments or or civil defense preporatione in the border area,
Western observers adhere to their original belief that
the evaeuation program represents a long-term security
measure,
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c. IRAN. There are no firm indications to date of any reaction
by Soviet ground forces to the current Anglo-Iranian oil dispute.
Reports that Soviet troops along the Soviet-Iranian border have been
reinforced have not been substantiated, and one report identifying a
new Soviet division in the area is believed to have been inspired by
Resviat mourean.
Internally, the Conmunist Tudeh
Tarty 13 beeomeng inereaeingey 41031V00 with recent demonstrations attri-
buted to them both in Tehran and Tabriz.
3, General Indleatiens of Soviet Intentions.
AIR FODOR DI1PLAY IN MOSCOW. The 8 July Air Show in Moscow,
demonstrating a total of 490 aircraft, was notable for the variety of
aireseft typed displayed, including helieopters, liaison aircraft, an
amphibian, a tein-engine flying boats a TO-70 transport modified tor
parachute operati ns, and a possible new heavy be:Ober. The demonstration
Included six confirmed new types t aireratt, five probable new types
end two modifications. Altheugh the Soviets appear to have adopted
the N70-15 as their standard jet fieht -interceptor at least for the
present) their eontinuing efforte to develop more advanced jet types
were revealed when prototypes of four new jet fighters were demonstrated.
Three of the four wire nwept-wing types similar to the Types 18, 19 and
21 displayed In the 2949 Air Shaw and could be further developments of
these alreraft. An indication of further development of leng-range
bomber aircraft wee the appearance of a new foureengine.bomber, approxi-
mately oneetbdrd larger than the TV-4, with tractor propellers. This
new type simian is tentatively considered to be a heavy bomber. The
observation of 9 grey WO-jet aircraft suggests that some units of
the Soviet Navy are no:mixing jet aircraft. Over all, the Air Show
indicated that the Soviets are making further progress in aireraTt
development, that they are developing a variety of types of aircraft
and that attention possibly is being given to development of jet aircraft
Tor the Pavel Air Fleet.
tiSc44 tOz?,
Brigadier General? CSC
Chairmen, Watch Committee
TOP SECRET
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Department of States
Mr. B. H. Xlosson
Mk, W. M. Marvel
Central Xnte1ligene A encys
ilia&91T01 7 000400230012-1
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2?
Brig Oen John Weekerling
Col X. F. Adams
Col J. K. Baker
Col R. 0. Duff
Col R. H. Smith
It Col 3, P. Merrill
It Col J. T. Mosley
Capt C. C. Quigley
Capt X. H. Walmorth
Copt L. D. Wooster
Miss Cynthia drab*
Mrs Keens Twyford
Mr R. X. Berkey
Mr Samuel Nate.
Mr R. P. McNair
mu. of Naval Intelligence:
Cdr S. C. Loomis
Cdr Weldon
I0dr 3. P. English
WO. X. Kidd
Nr N. 0. Holley
Direeterate of Intelligense? 03AF,1
Col R. L. Ocerder
Cal B. D. Neely
Col X. F. Williams
Cdr 1. R. Reedy
It Col B. J. Sauer
Atomic Vara Commission: Mr N. C. Henderson
Joint Intelligenee froup, JCSs Col F. P. Munson
Mks Ledr O. Hinman
Federal Bureau of Investigations Mr K. N. guhrte
TOP SE
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Brig Oen F. ii. Roberts, Military Advisor to Sp Asst to President
Department of State, Attn: Sp Assistant for Intelligence
Director or Central Intelligence
PAecative Secretary, OSD
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, USAF
Joint Intelligence 'Group. JCS
Atonic Energy Cceimission
Federal Bureau of 'investigation
Civil Defense Liaisons 03D
Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Coordinated by Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2. DA
Bets 552115 and 72591
Department of the Army Distribution:
Office. Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army (ON)
Chief of suet
Secretary, General Staff
Comptroller of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, DA
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-3, DA
Chief, P & 0 Off.. 0-2, DA
SWAPS. Attn: Senior U.S. Army 0-2 Representative
CUM, Attn: AC/S, 0.2
enema Attn: Director of Intelligence
Commander. Iceland Defense force. Attn: AC/S, 0.2
? enemas. Attn: Director of Intelligence
CIWCAL, Attn: Direetor of Intelligence
CONOINUSFA, Attn: AC/Sp 0-2
COUSANAL, Attn: ACA. 0-2
COUSAR'CARIB, Attn: AC/S, 0-2
COUSARPAC. Attn: ACA, 0-2
CO. TRUST, Trieste
Chief. Army Field Forces, Attn: AC/8. 0-2
CO. First Army, Attn: ACAS. 0-2
CO, Second Army, Attn: AC/S, 0-2
00, Third Army, Attn: AC/S, 0-2
CO. Fourth Army, Attn: AC/S.0-2
CO. Fifth Army, Attn: AC/8, 0-2
CO, Sixth Army, Attn: AC/8, 0-2
CO, Seventh Army, Attn: AC/S0 0-2
CO. Army Antiaircraft Colanind, Nut Air Force Base
CO, Wastinwi Army Antiaircraft Command, Stewart Air Force Base
03, Western Army Antiaircraft Command, Hamilton Air Force Base
(0,1111" 1
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