JOINT PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 17, 1950
• Content Type: IR

Approv d F ale MP91 1 - 2R000400200007-0
JM PERIODIC INT]:T LICENCE REPORT O
SOVIET I!atCTIVITIES
ti"a C ante In Clan. Q
'rom:
10 August 1950
o ..
16 August 1950
asietant Chef of Staff,$O-2
partumnt of the Army
"~At IuEV?:%,.?1 Date: -------
113 70.3
No0 2
1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
ashington 25s D.CG
7 August 1950
25X1
a. The Soviet Union is in an advanced stage of preparation for.
war and could initiate offensive operations with no ath itional
warning. Reliable Intelligence on Soviet intentions to go to
war in the near future is lackingo
ba Indications are lacking of an immediate intent to reinforcd
North Korean ground forces from outside North Korea but addi-
tional e.ir support for North Korea may be forthcoming
a. Available information does not indicate preparations for an
iirminent attack on Formosa (Taiwan); weather conditions for
such an attack are normally favorable only through mid-
September.
d. Ascent indications point to a continuation of Soviet prepared-
ness measures in Europe and to growing Viet Minh capabilities
in Indo-China.
2. SOVIET -COL UNIST OPENATIONS DURIND PERIOD
a. Summary. Limited reconnaissance has revealad no concentra-
tions for attack on Formosa (Taiwan). Viers is no reliable
evidence of a movement of' Chinese Communist forces into Korea.
Viet Minh preparations for larger scale operations continue.
There is no evidence of a change in the disposition of Soviet
forces in Europe but larger scale maneuvers are expected
shortly. Petroleum conservation measures are apparently not
necessitated by lagging production. The U0S.S.R0 is tighten-
ing its politioa?. control, in.Austria and seeking a trade agree-
ment with Irano
b. Operations of enemy component elements.
(1) KOREA.--'See current situation reports. Them is no
reliable evidence of a mavenient of Chinese Coamsunist
units into Korea but, additional air support may soon be
furnished the Worth Koreans.
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(2) CHINA.-Limited reconnaissance and other sources have
revealed no preparations for an imminent attack on
Formosa (Taiwan) though such an attack could be mounted
within a period of a few days. Airfield improvements in
China are continuing Harassment of shipping in the Hong
Kong area may be intended to make the British position
untenable without direct attack.
() INDO-CHINA.--French concern over the growing capabilities
of the Viet Utah is increasing., and a Viet Minh offensive
may be initiated at any time after 1 September.
(4) EUROPE.-Larger scale Soviet maneuvers in Germany are
expected shortly though there is as yet no indication of
a change in the disposition of Soviet forces. Thuxa has
been renewed Communist propaganda against U. S. air
activities in Germany. There are unconfirmed reports of
a concentration of troops in Soviet or Rumanian Hu>.covina.
Despite indications of unusual conservation of fuel sup-
plies, Soviet oil production at Baku and in Austria is
increasing. The Soviets are attempting to tighten their
political control in Austria.
(5) NEAR EAST. The Soviets are making friendly gestures
towards Iran, apparently in an attempt to obtain trade
concessions.
3 See Tab "A" attached.
COMMU IST CAPABILITIES.-Viet Minh capabilities are continuing
to increase. North Korean air capabilities may soon be
increased. Capabilities in other areas remain essentially
unchanged.
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TAB '$At$
ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTIMTI0NS TO GO TO WAR IN THE IM DIATE FUTURE
Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
16 August 1950
a. Available information indicates no current, preparations
for an imminent attack on Formosa (Taiwan). Troops -,nd material are.
so located, horrever, that their loading for an attack could be accom-
plished in three to four days.
a an o er craft
had been arm and out ang t there were no signs
of their departure or of final preparations for a movement of craft or
troops. Limited U.S. Naval reconnaissance has continued to reveal no
unusual concentrations or movements of shipping on the Fukien coasts
although possible co3eatratione in estuaries cannot be observed. Na-
tionalist sources also have not reported any indications of preparations
for an immediate attack on Formosa (Taiwan). There have been reports,
hover, of continuing improvement and extension of airfields on the
Fukien coast. The Nationalists have also reported that a Soviet air
division was moved to Central China during early August and that crated
jet aircraft are being shipped to Foochow. Although this report is not
confirmed, the presence of Soviet air units in China has been previously
accepted and there are indications of Soviet bombers, as well as fighters,
in China. The several recent reports that the U.S.S.R. is turning over
submarines to the Chinese Communists are without confirmation.
b. There continues to be no reliable evidence of the movement,
of Chinese Communist units into Korea0 Korean troops, formerly attached
to the Chinese Communist Ari r, are reported to have stated recently that
no t2inese Communist unit as such is in Korea. Two Japanese who recently
escaped from the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army have confirmed that
the Korean elements of that field army, with full equipment, were trans-
:forred to Korea prior to the outbreak of hostilities, There are rods.:
cations that air opposition may soon be encountered in Korea. It is-
possible, though not confirmed, that some aircraft now in China are being
tra iaforred to Korea o
o. In Indo-China, French concern over the growing capabilities
of the Viet Minh is increasing. The French are particularly worried
about reported large-sole Chinese Communist training and ro.squtippif
of Viet Minh personnel on Chinese soil, and have confirmed the presence
of two Soviet observers during a recent Viet Minh attack on a French
border poet. Since the intention of the Viet Minh to launch a, general
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offensive in accepted and their capabilities are increasing rapidly,,
it is estimated that a Viet Minh offensive may be initiated at any
time after I September 1950o The initial phase of this operation,
h.ich is expected to include clandestine Chinese Gommmuniat partici-
pation, will probably be the systematic reduction of French border
postso
do There continues to be no indication of an imminent Chinese
Communist attack on Hong Kong. pert:intent firing on merchant shipping
just outside the Hong Kong harbor, however, has demonstrated that Hong
Kong is nearly surrounded by Com uitst artillery capable of firing on
the island.
On Soviet efforts to change the wording of the proceedings of
the UN Security Council have indicated an attempt to tone darn 2 elikos
original statement that the Chinese and Korean questions are "closely
and indissolubly linked" to a statement that they are "connected ques-
tions." While it has been suggested that this may indicate Soviet pre-
parations to accept a settlement on Korea, it appears more probable
that it in in preparation for continued Soviet efforts to secure the
representation of Communist China in the UN, with or without direct
connection to the Korean questiono
f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1) Available information does not indicate preparations
for an imminent attack on Formosa (Taiwan) but the
loading for an attack could be accomplished in three
to four days.
(2) There are indications that North Korean air capabili-
ties may soon be augmented, but there is no evidence
of an immediate intent to reinforce North Korean
ground forces from outside North Korea.
(3) There are continuing indications of growing Viet Minh
capabilities and of probable Viet Minh operations on
an enlarged scale in the near-future.
(4) Harassment of shipping in the Hong Kong area may be
intended to make the British position untenable with-
out direct attack.
2. Soviet Intentions in Euro and the Naar Fast.
a. In Germany, there has been no indication of change in the
disposition of Soviet troops in maneuver areas but it is expected that
large-scale maneuvers will begin shortly.
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ba A new development in the propaganda campaign against
alleged Ua S. illicit air activities in Germany was a Soviet protest
that a U.S. plans had dropped an incendiary object over the Soviet
Zone. The Feat German radio followed this with the statement that the
Ministerial Council of the Soviet Zone was requesting Soviet protection
against U. S, incendiary bombing. After one day, this propaganda was
abruptly omitted from German Communist propaganda, but was followed by
the charge that the U. S. was releasing toy balloons for reconnaissance
in connection with bacteriological warfare. The continuation of attacks
of this kind could be a preliminary to interference with U. So use of
the Berlin air corridors or may be intended as a preliminary buildup
for justification of the formation of an Last German Air Force. There
have been some other recent indications of preparations for such an air
force, including a report that directions have been issued to seek quali-
fied German aviators for the People's Police.
c. There have been several recent attempts by the Soviets to
tighten their control in Austria and to weaken the influence of the
Austrian government in the Soviet Zone. Soviet actions have included
the folllo ing : a refusal to accept 500 new gendarmes for the Soviet
Zoner stating that Soviet troops would guarantee internal security; an
order for the confiscation of police rifles in one district just out-
side Vienna followed by an indication that this order would also be
applied in other areas of the Soviet Zone; an announcement by one Soviet
commander that the execution of certain Austrian laws would be subject
to his approval; and an announcement that a goviot observer would hence-
forth attend all sessions of the provincial cabinet of Lower Austrian
Despite these developments, there has been no indication that the Soviets
intend to assume complete political control in their zone by forces
d. :&xtensive coverage of Hungary has continued to reveal no
reliable evidence of a build-up of Soviet troops although construction
of new and permanent barracks continueso Combined Soviet-Hungarian
Army training has been rioted. Mining in the restricted zone along the
Yugoslav border is considered probable.
e. all or most
of a Soviet artillery supply depot in Austria is to be moved to an
unknown location in Hungary during the month of August. It is believed
most probable that this transfer is intended to improve logistical sup-
port for Soviet units in Hungary, heretofore supplied from Austria. The
possibility e:cists, however, that this movement could be intended to
establish a supply depot for an attack on Yugoslaviao
f. Reports of a large concentration of Soviet and Rumanian
forces in Bucovina have been received, locations unspecified. Bucovina
is partially in the U.S.S.R. and partially in Rumania. Although no
Rumanian units are believed to be in this area, there is normally a
sizeable concentration of Soviet forces in the Carpathian Military
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District which includes Bucovina. A buildup of Soviet forces in thin
area could be a preliminary to a rove into Hungary, Czechoslovakia or
.Ibimania, but there is as yet no confirmation of increased troop strength
in the areac,
g. There has been no additional information on conservation
of fuel supplies in Germany or Rumania, reported last week. The Soffit
press has announced a steady increase in oil production at the Paku
fields during July, and Soviet oil, production in Austria is reliably
reported to be nearing a record mark It would thus appear that conser-
vation measures are not generally necessitated by lagging production but
do reflect increased storagea
h. After several weeks of unusually strong propaganda against
Iran, the U.S.S.R. has suddenly taken a more friendly attitude tan
heretofore, and is apparently willing to make concessions in return for
negotiation of a trade agreement with .:ran. There is no indication of
what trade concessions the U.S.S.R. may seek, but oil exploration rights
are a distinct possibility. The U. S. Senior Military Attache recently
visited the northern Iranian border and reported no indications of an
i+i.nent attack.
is From the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1)
(2)
(3)
There is no conclusive evidence of imminent hostilities
against Western Europe, the Balkans or the Naar Best.
There are continuing indications of preparation for
such action, particularly logistical activity.
An attack in any of these areas could occur without
additional warning.
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