SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 17, 1999
• Content Type: BULL

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320002-9
SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN
State Dept. review completed
HIGHLIGHTS
The evening session of 5 September was high-lighted by the hour-long
Soviet declaration against the treaty, during which Gromyko presented 13
amendments. Ten non-Communist countries are scheduled to present their views
on the draft treaty in the 6 September session,
25X1
DEVELOPMENTS AT SAN FRANCISCO
1. The Soviet performance on the first day of the conference has almost
exhausted the USSR's capabilities for obstructing conclusion of a treaty
through procedural-,wrangles and similar delaying tactics.
As expected, Gromyko demanded participation of Communist China and sub-
mitted proposed amendments to the treaty which were, for the most part, re-
statements of the previous Soviet position. Chief additions to this position
were the proposals that Japanese reparations be determined by a conference of
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma and Japan; that the treaty not come
into force without Outer Mongolian as well as Chinese Communist ratification;
that Japan's armed forces be restricted to certain specific limits as outlined
by Gromyko. and that experiments with atomic bombs or other weapons of mass
destruction be prohibited.
Rules of procedure adopted by the conference exclude consideration of
any amendments to the treaty, and Gromyko is therefore limited to circulating
Soviet amendments among the other delegations for whatever propaganda value
they may have.
Soviet and Satellite delegations will walk out,
The Soviet delegation will not have another opportunity to present its
views until all other delegations have been heard, and may be reserving any
surprises it has planned until then. After this, it seems likely that the
2. The Netherlands delegation at San Francisco has revised its previous
opinion and now feels that Pakistan will sign the treaty. The Dutch representa-
tives also are reported to be incensed at President Trumants speech, which they
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suggested that anty nation failing to sign the treaty is "beyond the pale,"
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SAN FR .NCISCO CONFEREN BULLETI
6 September 1951
3. The ten nations scheduled to present their views in the session of
6 September are expected to support the treaty in most of its aspects. Egypt
is expected to make a declaration opposing the proposed US-Japan security
agreement and Article 3 of the draft which gives the US temporary administra-
tion over the Fyukyus and Bonin Islands. The Fh.ilippines and Laos may present
comments on the reparations clauses, with the former's rea`.rks designed primarily
OTHER DEVELOPN F2 TS
1. Indonesia's largest political party, the Masjumi (Moslem League),
agreed on 6 September to the signing of the Japanese peace treaty,
COMMENT: Indonesia's coalition government, which includes the Masjumi,
has been hesitant in deciding to sign the treaty in view of strong press and
political opposition particularly from one strong Masjumi faction. The Prime
Minister recently indicated determination to authorize Indonesian signature.
Masju:zmi support now leaves Indonesia's decision to sign no longer in doubt.
2. The Indian Mission in Japan has proposed directly to the Japanese that
the state of war between the two nations be terminated by an Indian unilateral
declaration to be announced on or about the signing of the multilateral treaty.
The Japanese Foreign Office replied that under present regulations, such an ap-
proach must be made through SCAP.
C01 NT: The Indians, aware of this diplomatic restriction, may have intended
to reassure.Japan of India's intentions followi its refusal to attend the San
Francisco Conference. 25X1
4, The Japanese Foreign Office announced that 11 of the 13 Soviet amendments
proposed at San Francisco on 5 September had been anticipated. The two exceptions,
reparations and limitations on rearmament, were characterized as designed to appeal
to other Asian nations.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320002-9