BURMESE GOVERNMENT WEAKENING UNDER COMMUNIST PRESSURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 9, 1951
• Content Type: IM

TOP SECRET
9 November 1951
Dissemination Authorized
Assistant Director
Office of Current Intelligence
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Date: d;w_ 4 -0
B y;
bath.: HR 70-2
Daaaasent Mi. -----
N. Change In Class.
7 Daalassitled
Class. Changed Ta: TS S C
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
Approved For Release
000300290033-9
 Approved For Re - 0033-9
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Burmese Government Weakening under Communist Pressure
Recent events in Burma reveal that the stability of the Burmese Govern-
ment continues to deteriorate as a result of military weakness and increasing
political subversion
Thi
.
s progressive disintegration of the Rangoon regime's
position i s leadin
t
C
-
g
o
omm n
of
Ai equally serious danger to the Government is the increasing strength and
activity of overt left-wing political elements. The Burma Workers and Peasants
Party, which actually represents the Communist party aboveground, is constantly
attacking the Government's domestic and foreign policies with considerable
effectiveness. Not only.is this group steadily gaining adherents, but it has
lately formed a "triple alliance" with two other influential leftist political
parties. Because of its superior organization, popular program and support from
the Chinese and Soviet Embassies, this party will, in all likelihood, dominate
the coalition and seek to transform it into an overt counterpart of the under-
ground "Peoples Democratic Front," into which the Burma Communist Party is
attempting to attract the several insurgent factions.
Another political threat lies in the activities of U Ba Swe, Secretary
General of the Burma Socialist Party and leader of that party's large pro-
Communist element. He is said to be dissatisfied with the moderate Socialist
leadership in the Government and is maneuvering for the Premiership. In order
to achieve his ambition it is entirely possible that he will effect a rapproche-
ment between his left-wing Socialist followers and the Burma Workers and Peasants
Party, Should Ba Swe become Premier,, the Burmese Government's drift to the right
would be abruptly reversed, US-UK influence would be reduced-to a minimum.el
Communist China would be developed
and the prospects of early
ommun s om na on o urma w ula gre y ved, 25X1
Burmese leaders, despite the clearly apparent deterioration of their regime,
Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-R?P91TO 11728000300290033-9
 nH1jIUV U 1 UI I\c .
continue to maintain a complacent. attitude toward the Communist threat and to
concentrate their energies on personal attainment of wealth
and prestige,. Iprevent a settlement
with the Karen ana cooperation with other ethnic groups against the Communists.
Finally, the Government's hypersensitivity to leftist criticism forestalls any
effort to obtain aid and advice from Western democracies.
Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300290033-9