ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT COUP D'ETAT ATTEMPT IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290021-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: July 12, 1951
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000!41 j
Dissemination Authorized
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
12 duly' 1951
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP91 TO1172R000300290021-2
 Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP9 1728000300290021-2
SET
Intelligence Memorandum
sis of the .event Cd'Etat Attemut in Thailand
The consequences of the abortive coup d'etat
i
are qu
ckly becoming
apparent. The govern nt is already inflictin
sev
r
i
g
e
e pun
shment on the
navy3 many senior naval officers have been retired, dismissed or imprisoned
and others are scheduled for similar disciplinary action. The navy's
personnel strength has been reduced by three-fourths, and naval activities
have been placed under army.command pending a general reorganization by
a 12t-man committee, only one member of which is a naval officer. For the
present, at least, the navy has been eliminated as an effective political
or military force in Thailand.
Army and police influence ove' the governmentq on has beon greatly increased; and the air orcehithertotwithout~muchd9
political power, is likely to assume a more important role in Thai affairs
as a result of its successful bombing of naval installations. The
government will undoubtedly be subject to an even more dictatorial control
by the military than it was formerly.
The "victorious" generals, however, have not yet seized the govern-
mentQ Although Phibun s position undoubtedly has been weakened, his
political acumen and his ability to maintain a delicate balance among
numerous rival political and military eliques may prevent him from being
deposed. It is quite possible that his authority will gradually be
.restored as a result of the development of rivalries among or within
the various military groups. In this connection, Phibun's control of
the government is essential to insure the continuance of Thailand's
policy of extremely close cooperation with the US and strong support of
the UN0
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M S.
Although the Communists in Thailand, mostly resident Chinese, have
not as yet involved themselves in the recent events, they may be expected
to take advantage of the deepened political cleavages and exploit a number
of propaganda possibilities to discredit the government in the eyes of the
people. While there is little danger of a pro-Communist government
emerging in the immediate future, loss of popular respect for the govern-
ment in Thailand would facilitate Communist penetration among the Thai
people, who have heretofore almost completely resisted Communism's appeal.
Although order has been restored to Thailand, lasting stability has
not necessarily been achieved. Some observers believe that the navy
will not accept near destruction without further resistance, possibly in
the form of guerrilla operations or by attempted assassinations of those
chiefly responsible for the navyab defeat. The navy is currently incap-
able of, developing as a serious threat to the government, but the large
number of unemployed, disgruntled navy men, many possessing extensive
military training., offers the Communists and other dissatisfied elements
excellent targets for future exploitation. A such greater and more
immediate threat to Thai stability is the possibility of a struggle for
dominance among the ruling generals. A new t could easily
develop from such a struggle. the forces which
joined against the navy are no altogether firm supporters of the Phibun
regime and certain groups could be utilized by other aspirants for control
of Thailand at some opportune moment in the future, Should Phibun be
deposed, or should he fail to maintain a balance of power between the
military and police leaders, t1 resultant struggle might well cause
the disintegration of the That governmental system.
Approved For Release 2007/03/03: CIA-RDP91 TO 11728000300290021-2