COMMUNIST GAINS IN ITALY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290017-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 20, 1951
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300
Dissemination Authorized
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
P '. IF
l.eNwent No. ------ ___ ___________
N? Ckange In Class. El
25 Dealass3ied
Cia:s. Chang-id To: TS S C
Awth.: HP
Nate: By:
Office of Current Intelligence
CEN':AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-sieRZT--
20 June 1951
Copy No.
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290017-7
 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290017-7
r.w
-eEexET
Intelligence Memorandum
SubJecto Communist Gains in Italy
1-.` A series of local elections involving some two-thirds of the
electorate has revealed the paradoxical nature , of. Italian Communist strength.
On the one hand, despite a declining membership,, the Communists have
gained
in popular vote since the 1948 elections. On the other, they have lost
control of municipal administrations in the key industrial centers of north
Italy. The pro-Western, pro-Government parties, led by Premier de Gasperi's
Christian Democrats, have gained control of these centers. At the same
time, the Christian Democrats have lost in popular vote since 1948. The
chiefJource of Communist strength seems to be the failure ofthe Government
to represent working-class interests. Meanwhile, another series of'elec
tions will be held in the fall. largely in southern Italy, where depressed
economic conditions particularly favor the Communists.
2. Communist losses of control of municipal government resulted
largely from (1) an electoral alliance of pro-Government parties and
(2) rigged elections which permitted any bloc.havi
to exercise a two-thirds control of a given municipal administr tionvotes
Loss of control. in important municipal.centers somewhat reduces the
Communist*' ability to strengthen their forces through influence local politics. However, they continue to pospatronage to
sess ammplenfunds
and an excellent organization, and to maintain close contact, with the
workers through application of the Communists' own "social security" system,
applied where the people most need help. The Communists still control'
the municipal governments of Italy's principal naval bases: La Spezia,
Leghorn and Taranto. Further, the Party dominates Italy's largest trade
union organization, which'includes the heavy industry, transportation,
and comuruni,cations unions. Finally, the Communists are able to
extensive support for strikes on genuine economic issues gytrer
theJInitiative in these matters. , and they retain
3. The primary cause of continuing Communist strength is the
failure of the Italian Government to convince the workers that any`
substantial betterment in their standard of living can be expected. The
workers feel that they have little stake in the
in spite of the present economic order,
pre-1948 election promises of the Christian Democrats.
After three years, and with the expenditure of $1.3 billion of ECA aid,
the Christian Democrats have been unable to remove the basic sources
of Italian working-class discontents To date, some ten percent of the
labor force continues to be unemployed, no large-scale land-reform has
been achieved, distribution of national income is seriously unbalanced,
and the cost of living is steadily rising. The government's program has
been impeded by international inflationary pressures and the lack of
indigenous raw materials, ,as well as by important Italian pressure groups
2,-
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which lobby against social reform. As a polictical party the Christian
Democrats have become associated in the public mind with special
interests and corruption. The resurgence of Fascism in Italy, as
exemplified by the inclusion of former Fascists in.the government,
has further strengthened the Communists at.the expense of the Christian
Democrats. The Communist propaganda potential is also increased by the
electoral gains of the neo:Fascist Italian Social Movement, whose four
percent of the total vote represents a rise of some 200 percent over
1948. In some areas, notably Sicily,.the WeerFascists hold the balance
of power between the Communists and the Christian Democrats.
4. In the field of labor organization, the absence of a firm and
far-sighted policy on the
part of the Chi^isti,an Democrats has been
particularly marked. Largely because-of the lack of a strong non-
Communist organizationthat could represent the workers' interests,
only some two-fifths of Italy's workers are organized, and more than
half of these are controlled by the Communist labor confederation.
Christian Democratic inertia as regards economic reforms hasleft the
workers distrustful not only of the party, but also of its affiliated
trade union group, which has therefore failed to make important
since it was organized some three years ago. gains
A third labor confeders
eration,
sponsored
of the unorganized moderate Socialists, has a potential for drawing from
the ranks by
labor because it is both anti-Communist and
anti-clerical, and is not affiliated in the public mind with either
thr Italian Governmentor the USSR. It. has refused to merge with the-
Christian rprrnc'rr.tic vni_on because such a merger would lessen its
appeal both to unorganized labor and to uneasy members of the Communist
labor group.
5. Because of the Christian Democrats' Rightist affiliations,
and because of .dissension among the'moderate Socialists, no strong
anti-Communist working-class movement has so far developed. The
fact that the pro-Communist Socialists in many electoral districts
shod a proportionately greater increase in votes than the Communists
indicates that many Italians are seeking a left-of-center
a
directly, indentified with Moscow. Such a party was finally formed
o
by the amalgamation of two anti-Communist Socialist parties on I May,
but this occurred too late for the new party to make a showing in the
elections. The new Socialist Party, pro-Western but critical of the
government's domestic policies, has now withdrawn its representation
in the Cabinet and, by so doing, has increased its ability to draw
dissidents from the Communist bloc. Because of internal dissension,
the success of the new party is still in doubt. The development of a
left-of-center group representing workers and constituting a "loyal
opposition" to the Christian Democratic' Government is necessary to
Italian
political life if the government is to be forced to carry out
basic social and economic reforms. Without such reforms., Italy will
suffer from extremist political pressure that could compromise Italian
effectiveness as a participant in the NATO and improve the Comm mists'
chances in the 1953 national elections.
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