THE 'LIBERATION' OF TIBET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 16, 1951
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP91T01172R0003002900'Ifl ~ s u P
Dissemination Authorized
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
16 June 1951
I I
opy o.
INTELLIGENCE N MORANDUM
I loewment No. _____
nw tonange in Class. 0
X Declassfied
Class. Changed To: TS S C
Muth.: HH 70
Date: 3D
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECTo The "Liberation}" of Tibet
The announcement by the Chinese Communist Government of the signing
of an agreement on 23 May with the Tibetan delegation in Peiping, defining
the status of Tibet, presages the extension of effective Chinese Communist
control over the area. The,agreement makes it clear that Tibet is to be
an integral pait of Communist China. Although the intentions of the Dalai
Lama and his circle are unknown, their alternatives are either to .imple -
ment the agreement,, depriving themselves of all significant power, or to
flee. The Peiping regime is certainly capable of introducing its military
forces into, Tibet. Although Communist occupation of Tibet will constitute
a potential threat to the northern frontier of India, the Indian Govern-
ment does not appear prepared to support actively any group in Tibet op-
posed to Communist control.
In October 1950 the Peiping regime ordered units of the 2nd Field
Army to "march into Tibet,," and at the same time notified the Tibetan
authorities to send delegates to Peiping to discuss "peaceful liberation."
At first, the dominant faction of the Tibetan Government was apparently'
disposed to resist. However, by the end of 1950, Chinese Communist forces
had advanced through western,Sikang to a point approximately 300 miles
from Lhasa, where they have remained; in this period, Peiping claimed that
its forces had "completely wiped out" the "main force" of Tibet,, stated
to be 5,700 troops. Chinese Communist propaganda, combining menacing
with conciliatory gestures, contributed to the ascendancy in Lhasa of
elements favoring accommodation to Peiping; this provisional government
was left in control in December 1950 by the Dalai Lama, who removed him-
self to a town near the Indian border where he is still located. The
Tibetan delegation in New Delhi, which had been engaged in preliminary
conversations with Communist China's Ambassador to India,, was instructed
to proceed to Peiping, and arrived there in April 19519 its chairman
having stated en route that he intended to accept Peiping's definition
of Tibet I a status.
The agreement reached in May provides that "the Tibetan people shall
return to...the Motherland" and that the "return" shall be ensured by a
military occupation, with the Tibetan authorities contracting to "actively
assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the
national defenses." The Chinese promise of "national regional autonomy"
to Tibet is negated in the same phrase'by the provision that such "autonomy"
is to be exercised "under the unified leadership" of Communist China.
Si4~
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*MOO
Peiping?s promise not to alter the status of the Dalai Lama is rendered
equally meaningless by provisions for the reinstatement of the Panchen
Lama (under Chinese Communist control since 19 9).to his former authority,
which would make him in fact superior to the Dalai Lama. The agreement
further states that Peiping is to have absolute authority over "all ex-
ternal affairs" of Tibet, that Tibetan troops are to be absorbed by the
"People's Liberation Army.." and that local "reforms" are to be initiated
by "the people." The agreement finally provides that, "in order to ensure
(its) implementation," Communist China is to set up a Military and Politi-
cal Affairs Committee and a Military Area Headquarters in Tibet.
Chinese Communist commentaries on the agreement indicate some dpubt
as to whether the Tibetan authorities will implement its Although Peiping
repeatedly cites the "full powers" of the Tibetan delegation, it is not
known whether the Dalai Lama or the provisional authorities in Lhasa
authorized the delegation to sign the agreement,, or whether they intend
to abide by it. The Dalai Lama and other Tibetan authorities, who have
made no public statement on the agreement, are reported, ?to be aware that
Peiping ?s promises are worthless and that they cannot expect to hold other
than temporary or nominal power under the Communists. On the other hands
the Tibetans are prey bly aware that they cannot expect otutaide assist-
ance, other than possible sanctuary in India or elsewhere if they should
choose to flee.
Despite the difficulties presented by the Tibetan terrain and climatic
conditions, the Peiping regime undoubte,y has the capability of extending
its military control over Tibet. More than 450,000 troops are disposed
north and east of Tibet, and an estimated 30, 000 of these could be intro-
duced into Tibet. Remaining Tibetan forces total at most 5,0OO these
forces, lacking numerical strength, materiel, morale and modern warfare
techniques, could at heat offer limited guerrilla resistance. While the
Tibetan ecclesiastical power is an obstacle to Communist political control,
Communist experience with ethnic and religious minorities in several other
border areas -- including the Tibetans of Southwest China -- suggests that
tLze Communists will steadily consolidate their political as. well as mUi-
tary, control.
The terms of the Sino-Tibetan agreemesnt, much stiffer than India had
anticipated,bAve led that country to review the Tibetan situation with
renewed interest and may lead it to accelerate steps already taken to
strengthen its eastern defense by establishing control points.in certain"
border areas. Publicly, however, India has expressed the view that there
is nothing to be done about Tibet, and has stated that it will not press
the matter of Tibetan autonomy if, as India assumes, the Tibetans do not.
India does not appear prepared actively to assist the Dalai Lama if the
latter chooses to oppose Peiping.
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SE
The extension of Chinese Communist control over Tibet will be of some
advantage to the international Communist cause. Although the Chinese are
not expected to invade northeast India and adjacent territories from Tibet,
the military threat posed by 208000 to 1+0,000 Chinese troops will serve
.Peiping 's political purposes. Tibet's economic resources are insigAificant
with the possible exce
ti
resources,
a Soviet
mission has reportedly surveyed this question, with u own re$ul se The
northern frontier of India will undoubtedly be vulnerable to political
exploitation.- the Kashmir dispute may attract Peiping ?s interest,, and
China may choose to support opposition elements in Ns pal,, engage in.sub
versive activity in Sikkim, and renew its historical claim to Bhutan.
Communist control of Tibet will consolidate control of all religious sects
of Lamaism. in Tibet., in the Mongolias and in the USSR.
p
on of exploitable mineral
d
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