COMMUNISM IN BURMA, INDOCHINA, THAILAND AND INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 11, 1951
• Content Type: IM

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D
11 May 1951
Dissemination Authorized
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,,
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Isuant.nt No. ------- ---------
Ms Change In Class.
X DesIassi#icd
Class. Changed To: TS S C
Auth.: HH 70
Iats:/-4/0 1 * ?Y BY.-
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No<
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CO__ ISM IN BL, INDOCHINA,
A. B
1. Background
The BS: a Co ist Party (BCP), the'chief-instrument of International
Communism in B , played an improtant role in the nationalist movement which
won Bese independence after World War II It was frustrated, however. in
its efforts to gain. control of Burma by (a) the Socialists and other devia-
tionist ele meats, and (b) a split within its own ranke which resulted in the
formation of the Communist Party (Burma) -- a more nationalistic group,
The BCP took up arms against the Socialist Government of Burma in
March 1948, less than two months after Burma became independent. The osten-
sible disagreement which caused the revolt was whether or not expropriated
land and indu,st5iry sho ld be paid for by the government. However, it is be-
lieved the break derived from a more basic conflict'. Although the Socialists,
4 w. ccontroll.el. the new government, were zealous Marxists, they were at the
same time e reme nationalists and refused to take sides in the "cold ware"
The BCP, although not, strictly orthodox in much of its thinking, vau s&rmpa-
theti,c with the principles of International Communist and desired closer ties
with it.
Never capable of of overthrowing the government by ita own efforts,. BCP
capabilities have steadily declined in the farce. -of government pressure and
the necessity of fighting various other insurgent groups. However, by estab-
lishing its principal area of activity in central Bum across the main lines
of communication between northern and southern Burma.. it has seriously dis-
rupted the coant?y?s economy and practically eliminated the government's
control over large areas north of the delta.
2. Recent Deyeleo m nts
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~Mo *4W
Internally, BC? policy has changed from one of dogged adherence to a
'program of unilateral st7n gle. to gain power over all opposition to one of
advocating a xnited front of all insurgents,, at least in tactical matters,
with the chief o ,jecti.ve being to overthrow their mutual enemy--the Burmese
Goverment :MCP propag, nda is now boasting of victory "within two years."
30 Conclusion
The pattern of Communist activity in Burma is becoming apparent.
Until recent months, the Communist movement appeared to be' drifting more or
lee aimles'sly and was badly in need of coordination. Now, attempts are evi-
dently being made to draw together the various extreme leftist splinter groups,
indications point to a definite strategy for the ultimate overthrow of the
Burmese Government, and it is clear that Communism in Burma will receive aid,
and possibly leadership, from China.
1. Bac ?oe nd
Indochina is inhabited by several different racial groups including
the Laotians and Cambodians but, with. negligible exceptions, all Communists
are Vietnse o These Vietnamese Communists control the rebel government
headed by Ho Chi Minh, the Democratic: Republic of Vietnam (DRV) In general
usage,, the DRY has been.lumped together with the DRV Government, its army and
-3
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its adherents under the term "Viet Minh." This somewhat inaccurate term de-
rives from the fact that the High Command of` the Viet Minh League, which was
established during World War II by Ho Chi Minh as an anti-Japanese resistance
movement., played the leading role in the establishment of the DRV in August
1945 and has continued ever since to direct the DRV> Official spokesmen of
the DRV described the Viet Minh League, up to-the time of its dissolution in
February 19519 as one of several."patriotic organizations" which supported
the DRV.
Although it savagely attacked the several pro-Kuomintang parties in
Indochina., the DRV proclaimed a policy of "coalition government." The DRV
was indeed a coalition government in the sense that the majority of delegates
to the DRV National Assembly (elected in January 1946) were non-Viet Minh and
non-Coummist9 and included prominent independents and Catholics. But the
claim was misleading in that the Assembly had little power and was dominated
by the close-knit Viet Minh League bloc of delegates. Communist representation
in the Assembly was confined to a small "Marxist Group."
From Its inception until December 19469 when open warfare between DRV
forces and. French occupation troops in Tonkin developed over control of Hai-
phong custo s9 the DRV followed a policy of peaceful negotiation with the
F-rexich Gwen-mennt As the conflict in Tonkin expanded throughout Vietnam,
however,, and was prolonged over a period of years, DRV spokesmen began to
differentiate between the French "colonialist warmongers" and those leftist
groups in France who opposed the w in Indochina and advocated a settlement
with Ho Chi Minh.
In mid-1949 the DRV began to emerge as a full-fledged People's Democ-
racy. During the latter half of 19499 the major emphasis of DRV propaganda
continued to be, on the theme, of nationalism, but began to coincide with the
Soviet line on specific themes, notably those of praising "democratic" China
and making more or less veiled attacks on the US. During 1950 and 1951, the
DRV abandoned its earlier policy of avoiding propaganda themes not pertinent
to the struggle against the French and gradually adopted the Soviet line on a
wide variety of subjects which had no relation to Vietnamese nationalism, e.g.,
the Lysenko theory. and rebellion in Spain. The statement by the DRV radio on
6 March. 1950 that the "Vietnam working class has.. constant .y been led by the
Indochinese otmtunist Party" appears to have been the first such reference
since 1945. Concu-T-nently with the ascendancy of the Communists in China
during 1949 and the consequent Increase in .Communist prestige throughout the
Far East, the emergence of old-line Indochinese Comamunists to positions of
prominence was noticed.
2. Recent Developments
Until Co wrist control of China was established., DRV military oppo-
sition to the French was limited entirely to guerrilla tactics. In mid-1950,
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however, when material and advisory aid from Communist China apparently
developed a new confidence in MV military leaders, the French began to be
subjected to frontal attacks In Tonkin. The DRV strategy of more orthodox
warfare continued until early April when, after a series of costly, unsuc
cessful attacks, the DRV radio announced it would return to attrition fighting.
e most recent manifestation of Communist tactics was the creation
of the Vietnam Workers' Party in mid-February 1951. This was followed in
early March by the absorption of the Viet Minh into another, and purportedly
even broader., front organization known as the Lien Viet. The Workers' Party-
Lien Viet form la was apparently designed to bring the Communist apparatus of
Vietnam into closer conformity with the pattern prescribed for the Eastern
European countries. The decision to use the Lien Viet rather than the Viet
Minh label for the broad popular organization maybe related to the fact that
the full name of the Viet Minh ("League for the Independence of Vietnam")
smacked too much of "narrow nationalism" and to the fact that certain intel-
lec?tuaxl...s who did not consider themselves Viet Minh members bad been willing
to lend. their names to the Lien Viet. Another aspect of the DRV's departure
from "row nationalism" has been its effort to Establish closer control over
rebel movements in Laos and Cambodia. The DRV'has for some time past been
engaged in inflitrating these organizations. On 11 March 1951 the DRV radio
hailed the establishment of an "alliance" among the three rebel groups.
The current, policy of the DRV, as announced in recent weeks by Workers'
Party spokesmen, is (a) the expulsion of the French aggressors and. American
imperialists, (b) adherence to the world peace camp headed by the Soviet Unions
and (c) a careful but steady advancement on the path to socialism. The long-
run view taken by the. Vietnamese Communists on the question of socialism is
not unnatural in view of the largely pre-industrial nature of the Vietnamese
economy and the fact that the wage-earning proletariat (most of which is in
the French-held areas) makes up about 1 percent of the population. A signifi-
cant by-product of the creation of the Workers' Party is the increased atten-
tion given to the formation of labor associations in "enemy-occupied areas . "
The MV has attempted up to the present time to preserve the fiction
of "coalition government." A number of moderate intellectuals, mandarins and
religious leaders are still credited with ministries and other high offices
in the DTV regime. Propaganda appeals continue to be made to the 1,500,000
Viet- se Catholics, but the difference between "reactionary" and "progres-
sive" Catholics is now more sharply drawn than in the past and there are
signs that the groundwork for "national Catholicism" is being laid.
Conclusion
In its present form, the Vietnames Communist movement controls a
People's Democracy--the Democratic Republic of Vietnam-which has declared
its loyalty to the Soviet Union and to the ultimate goal of "socialism" for
Vietnam. The DRV enjoys the moral support of the USSR. It enjoys both the
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moral and material support of the People's Republic of China, which has pro-
vided sanctuary for DRV armed forces, as well as `training and arms for DRV
troops. The DRV further aspires to control all of Indochina and to become
a "bastion of democracy" in Southeast Asia. The adoption of the title
"Workers' Party of Vietnam" rather than Indochinese Communist Party probably
results from a desire to retain non-Communist support for the time being and
to avoid giving offense to rebel movements in Laos and Cambodia.
C THAILAND
1. 1ackgr ound
The Communist movement in Thailand is numerically small and composed
almost entirely of Overseas Chinese. In these respects it is markedly dif-
ferent from the indigenous Communist movements in adjacent Indochina and
Bum.
Legislation outlawing Communism in Thailand was repealed shortly
after World War II in order to forestall a Soviet veto of Thailand's appli4
cation for membership in the UN. The subsequent establishment of a Soviet
Legation in Bangkok did not prevent a decrease of overt Co.nist activity in
` is.Aland. They Comwanist victory in China, however, gave new impetus to the
Communist movement in Thailand,, since most of the large Chinese community at
least passively and opportunistically supported the Mao
government. On the
other hand, Communist activities in Thailand have been severely circumscribed
by the increasingly hostile attitude of the Thai Government towards Communism.-
2. Recent Pevelo~ame71ts
Growing external Communist pressure on Thailand has become clearly
discernible in the past six months. Propaganda attacks from Moscow, Peiping
and the Viet Minh have become increasingly menacing. One Viet Minh blast
went so far as to forecast civil war in Thailand in the near future. These
Communist blasts denounce the Thai Government as "fascist" and condemn its
pro-Western,, especially pro-Mforeign
a foreign policy and its wholehearted support
of the UN action in I rea. Prime Minister Phibun is accused of turning his
country into a haven for Kuomintang "remnants" and developing it into a US
military base aimed at Vietnam and "new" China. Another frequent topic of
this Communist propaganda is Thai discrimination against the local Chinese
and Vietnamese populations.
Another recent development of significance-is the increasing tendency
of the official. Chinese Communist newspaper in Bangkok to be the self-appointed
spokesman for the Chinese in Thailand. At the same time its editorial staff
has been acting as though it were the "official" representative of the Peiping
regime in Bangkok.
There is also some evidence of intensified covert Communist activities
in Thailand'. Chief among these are the procurement and/or smuggling of
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Krials in short supply for Communist China and the recruitment of both
Occasionally. imports of arms and ammunition to Chinese residents have been
uncovered a
jai And 14a.iland-born Chinese for political and military training in China.
x
3. Conclusion
There are at least two possible reasons why Thailand has been spared
tle,Communist violence which is so widespread in neighboring countries:
(a) Chinese domination of Communism in Thailand is so well known that, until
greater Mai participation can be secured,, a Communist uprising might serve
to an excuse for the Thais to direct swift. and ruthless retribution against
a Chinese in T ailand9 (b) the Communists expect that, if they can gain
control of neighboring Bu=a,and Indochina, they can extend their control over
Thailand without resorting to violence o
It is believed that the Communists in Thailand have sufficient arms
and numbers (only 4-5,OOC Communist insurgents in Malaya are occupying over
100.E security forces) to create a serious security problem for the Thai
aned forces at any time. They are not capable, however, of overthrowing the
Thai Gov-11-rnment,
The Thai Communist Party, organizationally, is a replica of the
Chinese- Communist Patty and undeviatingly parrots the latter ? s propaganda line.
D.,. INDONESIA
1 Eackgroea.
During World War II, Communists in Indonesia as elsewhere in the world
Ww,ng other things, the severance of negotiations with the Netherlands, a
"
joined the underground against the Japanese. Following the war--in November
1945--Tan Mala.,, a Communist exile, returned to Indonesia and organized a
People as Front,, which in 1916 attempted unsuccessfully to overthrow the Indo-
nelian Fepubl.ic (then engaged in a struggle with the Netherlands to maintain
its independence) In l947 Aliman, a Moscow-trained. Communist, returned to
Indonesia, discounted Tan Malaya ? s activity as Trotskyism and, apparently
for tactical reasons, supported the Republican Government as an expression of
the people?s will. In 1913 a third exile returned--Moscow-trained Muso--and
began reorganizing A1imar. ?s activity. which had probably not been considered
strictly orthodox by the USSR. Misc pushed a five-,point program that demanded,
tional front
government with Communists holding prominent posts, and
S. y action against the Dutch. a result of Muso ?,s activity, a Commu-
nist r gl a 1a eatab.ished at Madiun in central Java, which on 19 September
19+8 declared war upoan the Indonesian Republic. Within eleven. days Republi-
can t .pops had captured, Madiun; .Muso fled b1.it was overtaken and shot.
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Meanwhile, Tan Malaka and his followers were.released from prison to
offset the revolt launched by Muso.'s Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Tan
Malaka immediately organized the Partai Murba (Proletarian. Party), which has
continued to function as a "national Communist" party and has refused all
overtures of merger with thePKI. AlthoughPartai.Murba has never formally
broken with Moscow, the USSR recognizes only the PKI (which was never outlawed)
as its vehicle. Tan Malaka.himself was captured by the Army and reportedly
was executed for terrorist. activities in April 1949.
Since the Madium revolt, Altman: has reassumed leadership of the PKI
and has organized it into a small, well-trained group operating chiefly through
front organizations. It is opposed to the. government of President Sukarno,
which achieved sovereignty in December 1949 as an equal partner with the
Netherlands within the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. It this matter, it fol-
lows Moscow's lead and consistently proclaims that the Indonesian people have
not given up the fight for independence.
Since the.Madiun revolt in September 1948, PKI policy has closely
followed International Communist directives. Politically and militarily..
the party was severely weakened by the Madiun affair and therefore now exer-
cises its strength chiefly through the Stalinist-dominated SOBSI'(Central
Organization of All Workers of Indonesia), the. largest labor federation in
Indonesia. .
2. Recent Deyelo ments
Politically.. the PKI controls 40 seats out of 229 in Indonesia's
Parliament. Witt, insufficient strength to direct policy itself, the PKI has
increasingly supported the Indonesian,NationalParty (PNI)--the second largest
party in Indonesia, which in 1950 and 1951 has become increasingly socialistic
and has demanded nullification of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and revision
of agreements reached between the two countries in 1949. However, the new
coalition cabinet that was formed on 26 April 1951 did not include any PKI
representatives, even though its selection was strongly influenced by the PNI.
Unlike certain other Communist parties in Southeast Asia,. the PKIhas
no armed forces fighting for "national liberation." However, numerous Commu-
nist-led armed bands, chiefly in Java,. terrorize large areas and seriously
obstruct economic rehabilitation. Moreover, it is estimated that five percent
of the Indonesian Army Is Communist. This percentage, however, does not in-
clude any higher echelon personnel
Probably the most important Communist development in 1950 was the
mutual recognition and diplomatic exchange between Communist China and the
Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia maintains a Charge d'Affaires in Peiping,
but China has an Ambassador (arrived October 1950.in Djakarta) and four
Consulates (opened 1 April 1951), one in each of the four largest islands
of Indonesia--Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. The Chinese Ambassador
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is very active in local Communist activities,. particularly those of the large
Chinese community. The USSR also recognized Indonesia in January 1950, but
to date there has been no diplomatic exchange.
3. Conclusion
As in Burma, Communism in Indonesia has been suffering since World
War II from a lack of continuous central direction and coordination. It
has been weakened by doctrinal divergencies and by the racial antipathies
between the Indonesians and the Overseas Chinese.. Its reputation was adver-
sely affected by the Madiun revolt, which also raised deep-seated suspicions
of Communist motives in the minds of patriotic Indonesians. At the present
time, however, the Communists Are maintaining a "correct" attitude, are
working legitimately through labor unions to recoup their strength and are
apparently making some headway in coordinating splinter leftist groups.
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