IMPLICATIONS OF THE MDAP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300280028-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 22, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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ICATIONS or THE 14DAP
T. OF
1, Overaali World Reaction to NDAP
tK and Cana" .. . . . . ? ? ? .
Western Europe ? . ? e ? ? ? ? ?
+Scandinavia
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ar ELast ? ? . O
USSR , ? ? ? ? ?
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22
Page
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Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Liberia
China
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Burw ? ? ? ? a
The Philippines.
Indmasiae
Turkey` ? ? ? d . ?16 Malaya o ?
Greece, a7
Portugal ? . ? ? ? ? ? ?q1,
Spain . . . ? e . ?
Iran?????????.16
France ? ? ? ? ? . ? * 40 Korea . ?
Benelux. . ? ? ? ? a ? .12 Indochina..
][tali. O ? ? ? r ? ? ? .12 hallat
?
2, Reaction to NDAP by Countries
United Sin}dc.. ? a ? ? 9
Canada e ? O ? O ? e a a 9
Noxvay a ? ? ? ? ? ? ? a 9
Demmark?.???????10
.17
?17
.18
wlq.
?20
1nes
Military Budgets of MAP Countries a ? a ? ? ? ? ? ? Appenffix I
Military Personnel Strength of MDAP Countries. ? . ? Ap ILT
Chinese Nationalist Nilitrry Strength.. ? ? ? ? ? a
ARMY review(s) completed.
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 CON FI EN h 1,'
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T k- OF 1.113 1VL%1 P
I Df CUSSI :m THE MUTUAL DEFENSE AS$] S ANCE PR RA.M,
t TF IpKK :'T `k FAI` STATEMENT TO SAY '' aTTHE PROGRAM 1:7,13
t ~'t GENER. iL 'SEEN !A F7 ?.~L?~1',~.4~ $4 ,~'6A:#' EIVEs' y: :`!~~1: 6~1-XHV.,J$ THE
N'c 9 -SOVfl:T WORLD, IN SUWARY SUPPORT FOR TRH'. PRO(RAM
S`I'I !^x GE +'.li THE Imo: AND CANADA; S-
WESTERN EIS 'CP3~ aR
NATIONS T A Z?E D UBTS AS TO ITS EFFEC !VEYME S; KO U G1,,,11VT
?y r3L,EMS HAVE A LSI N IN THE NEAR EAST; AND IN THE F.gA
!?~ "?.S`' VARYOUS F: CTO1 S WILL LIMIT ?I~ HE F' ` '?E~:F' EI~ESS OF
MILITARY AIL), ALTHOUGH THE PROGI AM HAS BEEN
SI TO VICL:7TN ' SOVIET PROPAGANDA A'TTiAC S.. IT BIAS NOT ALONE
PRODUCED ANY DRAS C CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY,
1. OVER-ALL WORLD REACTION TO MDAP
A. UK AND CANADA.
THE UNITED KZTGDOM AND CANADA OVERWHELMINGLY
APPROVE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND THE OB CTI ES OF TIE
GOVERNPJIE TS AND PEOPLES ARE BOTH SOLIDLY BEHIND THE
" CIE IS T THE BUILDING OF I LITARY STRENGTH IN WESTERN
EUROPE IS r =BEST BEST INSURANCE AGAINST SOVIET A GGRESSIO 1.
Ni BOTH C offN:TIES T 5 POSITION IS NON --PARTISAN; FT' IS N(YF
^, ; D WELL NOT EEC : A POLITICAL ISSUE, IN 31OT COI FR ESS,
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CONFINI 1.
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THE COMMUNISTS AND EXTREME-LEFT DISSENTERS, NEGLIGIBLE
IN NUMBERS, ARE POWERLESS TO INFLUENCE ANY APPRECIABLE
BODY OF OPINION BY THEIR PROPAGANDA, ALTHOUGH AN
OCCASIONAL ACT OF SABOTAGE BY A COMMUNIST MILITANT
CANNOT BE COMPLETELY RULED OUT.
B. WESTERN EUROPE or rrmaseasr
WITH THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MDAP AT
HAND, THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE ARE SHARPLY AWARE
THAT A NEW MILITARY ALLIANCE IS SLOWLY TAKING SHAPE.
HERETOFORE, THESE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES HAD THOUGHT
IN TERMS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND ECONOMIC RESTORATION.
THE NEED ACTIVELY TO SUPPORT TREATY COMMITMENTS HAS
DISPELLED SUCH NOTIONS AND HAS OCCASIONED THOROUGH SOUL-
SEARCHING,
THE LESSER MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE ARE SELDOM
ALTOGETHER HAPPY, AND IF THEY OCCUPY A STRATEGICALLY
EXPOSED POSITION THEIR DISCOMFORT IS LIKELY TO BE ACUTE,
THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES ARE AFRAID -- ON THE ONE HAND OF
THE USSR AND COMMUNISM, ON THE OTHER OF THE UNITED
STATES. AS LONG AS IT WAS US POLICY TO REVIVE THEIR
ECONOMIES, THEY WERE CONTENT; WHEN IT BECAME US
POLICY TO INTEGRATE THEIR ECONOMICS, THEY
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WERE DUBIOUS; NOW THAT IT IS US POLICY TO MOBILIZE THEIR
RESOURCES IN A MILITARY ALLIANCE THEY ARE FEARFUL. THE
IDEA THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WAS A DETERRENT
TO WAR SEEMS TO BE GIVING PLACE TO THE IDEA THAT IT IS
A PREPARATION FOR WAR, WHILE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE USSR
POSSESSES THE ATOMIC BOMB CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEELING OF
U EASINESS* .
TO CREATE BY 1954 A WESTERN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE USSR IS OUT OF THE QUESTION,
FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES. NO EUROPEAN COUNTRY OF
DEMOCRATIC PRETENSIONS WOULD MAKE THE SACRIFICES '
NECESSARY TO SUPPORT SUCH AN ESTABLISHMENT. NEVERTHE-
LESS, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE NATIONS OF
WESTERN EUROPE, WITH SUBSTANTIAL US ASSISTANCE, CAN
CREATE HIGHLY EFFICIENT "BALANCED COLLECTIVE FORCES"
STRONG ENOUGH TO INSURE THAT THE USSR COULD CONQUER
EUROPE ONLY BY LAYING IT WASTE BEYOND REPAIR. SUCH A
DEVELOPMENT WOULD PROBABLY DISSUADE THE USSR FROM
MILITARY ADVENTURES IN THE WEST. AT ANY RATE, THE NATIONS
OF WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE CONTENT WITH NO LESS; THEY
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WILL NOT EMBRACE ANY PLAN OR ADHERE TO ANY POLICY
THAT ENVISAGES ANOTHER INVASION AND AN EQUALLY DIS-
ASTROUS LIBERATION. UNLESS THEY CAN BE FURNISHED VISIBLE
EVIDENCE THAT AT LEAST A POTENTIAL DEFENSIVE FORCE OF
SUCH PROPORTIONS WILL BE CREATED, THEIR WILL TO RESIST
WILL CONTINUE NEGLIGIBLE, AND THEY WILL BE READY PREY
TO COMMUNIST "PEACE" PROPAGANDA. THE WILL -TO-RESIST
OF THESE PEOPLES HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPROVED BY THE
JOINT ACTION SO FAR TAKEN, BUT IT IS STILL NOT FIRM, ONCE
CONVINCED THAT SUCH MINIMUM FORCES CAN BE PLACED IN
THE FIELD, THEY WILL REJECT SOVIET "PEACE" OVERTURES
AND HONOR THEIR COMMITMENTS.
EVEN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH FORCES, HOWEVER,
AN INCREASING DIVERSION OF THE RESOURCES OF EUROPEAN
NATIONS FROM RECOVERY TO DEFENSE WILL BE NECESSARY.
THE PROBLEM WHICH NOW FACES THE TREATY POWERS IS TO
DETERMINE THE PROPER PROPORTION OF RESOURCES TO BE
THUS DIVERTED, AND, PARTICULARLY, TO PERSUADE THE
SEVERAL EUROPEAN PEOPLES TO AGREE TO SOLVE THIS PROB-
LEM EUROPEANS WILL EXPECT US LEADERSHIP AND A SUBSTANTIAL
UP) CONTRIBUTION.
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C. SCANDINAVIA
NORWAY AND DENMARK ARE COOPERATING SATISFACTORILY
WITH THE MDAP AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE MAXI -
MUM UTILIZATION OF THE MATERIAL BEING RECEIVED. NOR-
WEGIAN PARTICIPATION IS WHOLEHEARTED IN CONTRAST TO
THAT OF THE DANES, WHO HAVE MISGIVINGS OVER THE WISDOM
OF THEIR MEMBERSHIP IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.
APPARENTLY FEELING THAT THEIR MEMBERSHIP INCREASES
THE PROBABILITY OF ATTACK ON THEM IN A FUTURE WAR IN
EUROPE, THE DANES SEE LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN DANISH DE-
FENSE CAPABILITIES OR ASSURANCE OF EFFECTIVE AID IN CASE
OF ATTACK. ALTHOUGH FORMER NEUTRALITY SENTIMENT HAS
NOT DECREASED TO THE SAME DEGREE IN DENMARK AS IT HAS
IN NORWAY, BOTH COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO LIVE UP TO
THEIR OBLIGATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
PACT.
D. FAR EAST
A SOLUTION TO THE VARIED PROBLEMS FACING THE
INDIGENOUS NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF THE FAR EAST
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(EXCEPT IN JAPAN) COULD BE FACILITATED BY INCREASING
THE SIZE AND EFFICIENCY OF THEIR ARMED FORCES. THREE
FACTORS, HOWEVER, WILL LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF US
MILITARY AID TO THESE GOVERNMENTS. FIRST, EACH NATION
POSSESSES A VARYING BUT NONETHELESS LIMITED CAPACITY
TO ABSORB PROFFERED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. SECOND, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH ASSISTANCE DEPENDS IN LARGE PART
UPON THE WILL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF
EACH NATION TO OVERCOME INTERNAL DISSIDENCE AND RESIST
POSSIBLE EXTERNAL ATTACK. LAST, MILITARY AID, BY ITSELF,
IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SOLVE ALL OF EACH NATION'S PROBLEMS,
EVEN IF SUCH ASSISTANCE WERE UNLIMITED IN SCALE.
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL REACTION TO PROPOSED OR
ALREADY DELIVERED US MILITARY AID HAS BEEN FAVORABLE
IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF THE FAR EAST WHICH ARE HIGHLY
SENSITIVE TO NEWLY-WON SOVEREIGNTY OR TO THE NATIONALISTIC
ASPIRATIONS OF NEARBY PEOPLES, THESE FAVORABLE GOVERN-
MENTAL REACTIONS WILL BE CONDITIONED BY THE EXTENT
TO WHICH THEY BELIEVE NATIONALISM THROUGHOUT THE
REGION WILL BE AFFECTED. AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THESE
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COUNTRIES SIMILAR BUT LESS ARTICULATE REACTIONS TO
US AID AT ROME AND ELSEWHERE CAN BE ANTICIPATED.
EXCEPT FOR STRONGLY ADVERSE PROPAGANDA UTTERANCES,
NO REACTION ON THE PART OF ASIAN COMMUNIST POWERS OR
LOCAL DISSIDENTS IS AS YET DISCERNABLE.
E. THE USSR
THE SOVIET REACTION TO MDAP HAS THUS FAR MAINLY
BEEN EVIDENT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NIST PARTIES AND IN SOVIET AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA.
THE USSR HAS NOT PROTESTED OFFICIALLY AND NO OUTSTAND-
ING SOVIET LEADER HAS CONDEMNED MDAP SPECIFICALLY.
THE. PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ATTACK ON MDAP HAS
BEEN WOVEN INTO THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNIST
"PEACE EFFORT." ALTHOUGH THE CENTRAL TARGET OF THIS
EFFORT HAS BEEN "PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS," MDAP
SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN CITED AS OVERT PROOF OF US "WAR-
MONGERING" AND EFFORTS TO MAKE WESTERN EUROPE A
"PLACE D'ARMES" FOR ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION. COM-
MUNIST-LED DEMONSTRATIONS, STRIKES, AND ATTEMPTS TO
SABOTAGE MDAP SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL,
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LARGELY OWING TO EFFECTIVE POLICE ACTION AND LACK
OF POPULAR ENTHUSIASM. THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO
MDAP IS INDICATED BY THE KREMLIN'S WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES TO UNPOPULAR CAUSES,
EVEN AT THE RISK OF HAVING INDIVIDUAL PARTIES OUTLAWED.
ANTI-MDAP PROPAGANDA AND ACTIVITY CAN BE EXPECTED TO
CONTINUE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SOVIET "PEACE CAM-
PAIGN," BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT LOCAL COMMUNISTS WILL
BE ABLE TO HAMPER THE PROGRAM SERIOUSLY.
MEANWHILE, WESTERN EFFORTS TO DEFEND AND UNIFY
WESTERN EUROPE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SOVIET DESIRE
TO HASTEN THE CONSOLIDATION, OF THE SOVIET ORBIT. AS ONE
OF THE MORE IMPORTANT WESTERN MEASURES, MDAP HAS
PROBABLY AFFECTED SOVIET POLICY IN THIS MANNER AND
MAY BE USED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER SOVIET CONTROL
OF SATELLITES. MDAP IN ITSELF, HOWEVER,HAS HAD NO EFFECT
ON SOVIET POLICY WHICH CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THE TOTAL
EFFECT OF ALL WESTERN DEFENSIVE MEASURES.
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2, Reaction to :DAP by Countries.
A. The United Kingdom.
The UK Government strongly supports MBAP because it strengthens
Britain's armed forms, will incraase L'lestern 'Europe's military strength,,
and will broaden US responsibilities for slestern European defenses
The British electorate overwhelmingly favors Britain's participation
in IAP> and supports the Government's position in this matter. Only Britain's
negligible left wing is opposed to the program as conducive to ware The
issue is of no importance in British politics. No responsible press organ
and no responsible group of !3ritish citizens have at my time objected to
the presence in the UK of the US B?-29 groups. Although the insignificant
Communist Party has attempted from time to time to fan public resentment
over this question and over the government's policy of close military
collaboration with the US, it has had no success'
The Canadian Government supports the objectives of :,!DAP. Canada
itself is not receiving and will not request any equipment under the 11DAP
program. It does, however, desire to buy US material for cash and wishes
to reach agreement with the US on some form of reciprocal purchasing such
as the ,lorld ',gar II Hyde Park Agreement. The Canadian public supports the
government and the subject is not a political issue. Although the small
Communist Party and its sympathizers oppose IIDAP and the North Atlantic
Treaty and can be expected to continue to do so, they will be unable to
influence public opinion to any appreciable extent and the government not
at all.
C. Norway.
The Norwegian Government is cooperating wholeheartedly with 1:IDAP
and is taking measures to insure maximum utilization of the material being
received, The government and Nomegians generally are convinced that imple-
mentation of the Nr-T is the best available moans of preventing warm Norway's
continued cooperation is assured and as its defense becomes more effective
through arms aid and internal production the effectiveness of the small
minority opposition will decrease, The Communist Party is waging an active
propaganda campaign against Norwegian participation in the NiiT and the _DAP
program, is not strong enough to launch any effective interference with
!DAP implementation. The Norwegian Labor Party, the Defense Department,
and the Foreign Office have inaugurated an extensive public information
program to counter Communist anti :rDAP propaganda and keep the people in-
formed of progress toward rebuilding. Norway's defenses.
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D. Denmark,
Denmark is cooperating in the Military Aid Program and is making
efforts to ensure efficient utilization of the material being received,
The Danish Government has indicated misgivings, however which are shared
by the Danish people-over its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty be-
cause there is not yet any visible assurance that Denmark's defensive situation
has improved, The prospect of again being overrun and later liberated is
understandably real to the Danes and they reason that NAT membership increases
the probability of attack on them in a future war in Europe, Among some
members of the Government Party there is also concern over the economic
impact of increased defense costs incident to NAT membership, Although
Denmark will continue to live up to its obligations as a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty, Danish participation will lack vigor and resolution
until Denmark's defensive capabilities are increased by arms aid and in-
ternal military production and there is more tangible assurance of effective
aid in case of attack.
As in Norway, the Communist Party has levelled a vigorous propaganda
attack on Danish participation in MDAP, but antis.IDAP propaganda is not likely
to alter Denmark's fulfillment of its i;IDAP obligations and Communist strength
is insufficient to interfere with the implementation of the program.
, France o
p,, General attitude: The Government favors the I.IDAP as a means
of rebuilding French military strength, may be expected to give full co-
gperation, and is unlikely to withdraw. The public generally lacks confidence
in the ultimate success of the program, but presently is basically favorable,
There is considerable criticism of the 1.;DKP end lack of confidence in its
effectiveness in intellectual circles where neutrality sentiment is ;cost
evident, Opposition to .IDAP will increase if military expenditures are
required at the expense of continued economic progress and if T'rance's
role in N T strate.ic plans is to provide the infantry whereas others supply
sea and air power,
b. Will to resist: Prospective receipt of :DAP material has
improved the morale of the armed forces and probably increased their will
to resist, but it has had no appreciable effect in countering the general
lassitude of the people and their fear of war. Prospects that the will
to resist will be strengthened to any great extent are doubtful, because of
general public skepticism as to the efficacy of the :.IDAP in guaranteeing
their security.
_c., Ability to resist: '?IDa P has not to date increased French
ability to resist. Only three partial shiploads of materiel, consisting of
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a few guns, signal, and other equipment, have been received, when ship-
ment of all items programmed for France has been completed., ability to
resist will be improved.
do Communist intentions: The main effort of the Communist Party
will be to promote the 'peace campaign" in non-Communist circles, endeavoring
to create widespread pressure on the Government in favor of neutrality and
withdrawal from the ::DAPO Attempts to disrupt MIDAP shipments and sabotage
French munitions manufacture will not be abandoned.
e. Reaction to change in ;DnP law regarding machines for arms
production: There will be little reaction except among those officials
actually workin;T with the Program, who will favor the increased flexibility
possible under the revision*
fQ reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: Announcement that the
USSR was producing the atom bomb did not produce an immediate serious re-
action. Knowledge that the US no longer had a monopoly on atomic arms has,
however, increased the desire to avoid another conflict, strengthened
doubts of US ability to protect .Vestern Europe, raised questions concerning
the efficacy of MDAP rearmament to ward off a Soviet atomic attack.
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1' a lt.,.....Q aAe 4i~.Ld~ B,U(p
General attitude: The great majority of the people favor MDAP
and neither goverment is likely to withdraw from the IMT.
b.. Will to resist..- The knowledge that 2-MAP equipment is forthcoming
and the arrival of initial small shipments have probably increased slightly
the will of the people to resist aggression. Any appreciable increase in
Dutch and Belgian will to resist will depend upon further shipments and
the actual utilization of the equipment by the armed forces
r a Ability to resist: The Dutch and Belgians presently have little
ability to resist aggression and it will be some time before B'S military
aid., their otm efforts and over-all Western European defensive neasures,
make an effective defensive force of the Belgian and "Netherlands armed
forces. Financial commitments for the repatriation of Dutch forces in
Indonesia will prevent the concentration of Dutch resources on European
defense during 1950,
clo Cornrmuni.st intentions: The primary Communist objective is to pre-
vent the unloading of HDAP equipment and to obtain non-Communist labor
support in this objective. The Communists use every propaganda device
at their command and usually tie their anti-MAP campaign to some phase of
the "peace campaign."
e. reaction to change in Z AP law regarding machines for arms pro,
duotion: High Dutch and Belgian civilian and military officials will,
react favorably, but the great majority of the people are not well enough
acquainted with. the details of the program to have an opinion on the amend-
ment. The Dutch of-"'icials believe increased self-sufficiency in armament
production will alleviate the country's largo dollar deficit.
j o Reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: The initial anrnounce-
rent of the Soviet possession of the atom bomb was received calmly. If
anything, it strengthened determination to unite ?trope politically,
economically and mill tartly.
G. Yz?
a, General attitude: The Italian Government is in general favorably
disposed to the IMAP and views its implementation as important to the govern -
r. nt's prestige and stability,, it has no intention of withdrawing. It is
appreionaive, however, lest the program reduce US economic aid and lest
cost of implementing MIa&P jeopardize socio-economic progress and political
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stability,, The Italians also desire the approaches to the Pa Valley to
be part of the primary line to be defended by joint Western European forces.
There remains some resentment over the failure of Italy to obtain equal
representation with Prance and the UK on the top MAP committee.
General public apathy toward MAP is caused by the strong tendency to
regard Western economic benefits more' highly than military benefits.
Sao Will to resist: Italian will to resistx now quite low,, has been
affected only slightly by MW and will increase slowly as military and
economle integration of Italy vith the rent of Western mope grows.
a. Ability to resist: Although MAP will improve Ito-IV's ability to
rosiat, the extent of, improvement is severely limited by: (1) the Italian
Peace Treaty; (2) Italy's low economic potentials and (3) Italyts "frontier"
position.
d- Comnnmist intentions: The major active opposition to ?fAP is centered
in the Italian Comwtnlet Party (PCI), its allied Socialist groups (the PSI)
and the Communist dominated labor unions (CGIL). With little hope of pro-
venting the arming of the Italian Armed Forces under the I MAP program, the
Comnaunistn are not likely to initiate large-scale sabotage or strikes directly
against NA.P Implementation. Rather the Communists will probably concentrate
on merging their "peace" campaign with exploitation of local and national
socio-oconomLio issue. They will have some success in these efforts. At the
same t me,, strikes and demonstrations over unemployment and other economic
issues will probably be justified partly by blaming the government's pre-
occupation with the military adventures to the exclusion of Italian social
and economic problemsd
.q. Attitude toward arms machinery amendment: The government has ex-
pressed some dismay over the rigidity and red tape associated with a relatively
small, amount of dollar assistance under AMP. Therefore,. ar47thing which per-
mits greater flexibility.. such as the proposed machinery amendment, will be
greeted favorably.
X. Effect of the Soviet possession of the 1t-bomb: There is a con-
sidorable feeling of ftZtility ovor Italy's role in a U.SA-USSR conflict,, This
sense of futility was accentuated somewhat by USSR possession of the A-bomb.
H. P. . ,,,gall
a. Will to resist: The people as a whole passively support the Salasar
Government, and would resist aggression to the best of their ability, Receipt
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of IMP aid would i:n rove the morale of the armed forces and thus increase
the *41.1. to resist aggression.
b0 Ability to resists Portugal has received no IIDAP aid to date. The
receipt of coastal defense equipment would increase the ability of the
Portuguese to resist aggression but without large scale military aid they
would be unable to offer appreciable resistance to a sustained attack.
q. Communist intentions: V The small Communist Party in Portugal is so
closely repressed by the police and security forces that it would be able
to exert little influence In connection with MIS'.
d. Attitude toward arms machinery amendxnen't: The Salazar Government
would probably favor such a "national industryt' if it were equipped to
raanu:?aacture munitions, but its benefits would be severely limited by the
shortages of qualified technicians, raw materials, foreign exchange, and
investment capital.
. Reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: The Portuguese feel that
the need is now greater than ever for defense plans organized by the US and
closer military contacts between all Western nations. Generally, it in felt
that the US is still far ahead of the USSR in atomic weapons and research.
I. fit? gain ?
Will to resist: The Spanish people have always strongly resisted
foreign aggression.. hence military aid to the Franco Government would not
increase their will to resist.
u3 Ability to resist : Foreign aid would increase the ability of the
Span 'sh array to resist aggression. Spain would require a vast amount of
aid, however, to maintain an armed force on a modern war footing for any
extended period of time in view of shortages in capital, transport equip-
rient., industrial plant and power facilities, natural resources, and agri-
cultural capacity.
1-, Cos mtunis t intentions: The Spanish Communist Party is numerically
small and at present weakened by the growth of a "Titoista7 movement. Military
aid to the Franco Government would undoubtedly increase the present and
potential effectiveness of Communist anti-US and peace offensive propaganda.
d. Proposed araenda:zent on arms production machinery: The amendment would
be warmly received by the armed forces and government officials. Its use-
fulnsss would be severely limited by the inefficiency of the Spanish state
enterprises, especially r unitions manufaet-arres by the lack of technical ability;
sand by the shortage of foreign exchange to import such materials as special
ctee sand aluminum Ledo; Ts.
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e. Reaction to Soviet possession of the A--bombs The Spanish people
C.ro not permitted access to world news except as oonsored by the government?
Franco in public a Date nont has sitthaized the importance, and even exprossed
his doubt of Russian paasesnion of the .-bomb. The Spanish press rarely
dears with the subject of Russian air poorer, e., capacity to delver the
A-bomb behind the Pyronoes, presmably to support Franco: a expressed belief
that the Pyrenees vier forms a natural Mg:Inot Line t.
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SECPZV
The Iranian Government and the people in general strongly favor the
A;DAP. Opposition is confined almost wholly to the small pro-Soviet minority.
The Shah is determined to improve the capabilities of the armed forces in
order to improve internal security,, protect Iran's borders against Soviet
infiltration, and, in the event of Soviet invasion, to fight delaying actions
and conduct guerrilla warfare. His determination to strengthen the array is
so strong that he would probably divert funds needed for economic and social
Improvement if military aid were not forthcoming.
Recently Iran obtained from the US under a purchase agreement a
quantity of military supplies and equipment as a step toward modernizing the
Iranian armed forces. The Iranian Army is making efficient use of this
materiel, and training in its use and maintenance is proceeding satisfactorily.
Moreover, receipt of the materiel among the various units has had a telling
effect on array morale. In the light of this etperience, it may be assumed
that the Iranians will put to equally effective use any materiel received under
MDAP,
The Iranian armed forces are Irama.s most important bulwark against
instability and, if properly equipped and trained, could be an effective in-
strument for harassing a Soviet invasion if such should take place,
The government and people of Turkey, almost unanimous in their
determination to reairt Soviet demands which would infringe upon Turkey's
national sovereignty and territorial independence, are wholeheartedly in
favor of the continuation of US military aid programs. These programs have
already made considerable progress to:aard achieving their purpose; the
creation of a compact, mobile, modern, and efficient national defense force
increasingly capable of offering' resistance to aggression by a major power,
while at the same tine reducing the severe burden upon the national economy
of the maintenance of large forces under arms In the face of a continuing
Soviet threat, The NNDAP, together with US economic,, financial, and technical
aid programs, is also of major significance in bolstering the Turks' determina-
tion, as well as their military and economic ability, to resist aggression, and
to pursue their policy of close association with the US and other western
democracies in opposing Soviet/Communist imperialistic expansionism.
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Greece has demonstrated its ability and determination to resist
Communist aggression during the three-year guerrilla war which ended, at
least temporarily, in the fall of 1949, The Greek armed forces have been
gradually reduced since then from a peak of about 250,000 to a present
strength of about 170,0000 Further contemplated reductions will bring
the total strength down to about 1214,000 by January 1951. Of the roughly
8500 million military aid given by the US to Greece in the last three years.,
most has perforce been expended in fighting the guerrillas. Thus the
smaller Greek armed forces still need equipment and weapons to replace
worn-out items and to increase their mobility and striking power. While
the 350-odd guerrillas still within Greece present no great problem, perhaps
10,000 combat-.fit guerrilla res,.rves now across the borders in Albania and
Bulgaria are a potential threat to Greek security. By the fall and winter
of 1950 there is a distinct possibility that the guerrillas, with a combat
potential of perhaps 20,000 by then., may try to renew their attacks on Greece.
The Greek armed forces must be ready to meet such a threat from the start0
The Dhahran mirbase, built and operated by the US but legally-
belonging to the Saudi Arabian Government, has been leased to the UJ by
short--.tern agreements since 1944. The contract., which was to expire on
23 June, has now been extended to 1 Febru:.ry 1951. In e.changs for a long-
term agreement., I,:ng Ibn Saud would undoubtedly demand US military aid,
probably including a grant-in-aid for free arms. The King alleges fear of
aggression by his dynastic rivals, the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Jordan;
nevertheless, his calculation of the aid necessary to deter such aggression
appears excessivea it is believed that the King will continue to extend the
airbase agreement on a short-term basis even though his requests for aid are
not cornpl:)tely filled,
N. Union of South Africa
1o known formal request for military assistance from the US has been
made by the Union of South Africa, although if the nation were eligible for
military aid under the Korth Atlantic Pact; the military authorities in the
Union would be most desirous of obtaining US equipment 'as 'a gift,
The military planners of the Union generally think in terms of
internal security, although in case of hostilities bet-;eon Past and "Vest.,,
they plan to make available to the West one armored division with air support,
,van to achieve this objective., the Union will need considerable amounts
of technical equipment from the UK, the rdditional source, as well as aid
from the US. Without additional equipment., the Union co i ; id probably maintain
:internal security., but its contribution in foreign areas would be limited b.r
an equipment shorta-e and the isolationist feelings of a large segment of the
population,
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0. Liberia
The Liberian. Iirrry consists of a Frontier Force of about 1500 ,Hens
whose function is to maintain internal security and police Liberian borders,
The Frontier Force is badly trained and poorly equipped. Although the
Force was ablo to control the recent riots at the Firestone Plantations,
it would be unable to control a major native uprising, Since the Firestone
Plantations are of economic value to the US, and because of the strategic
importance of the port of Monrovia and Roberts Field, both controlled by
US companies, a well-trained and well-equipped Frontier Force is necessary
for protection of US interests as well as maintenance of internal security,
aA small organization trained in tropical warfare and equipped and trained
in the use of short-wave radio would be most effective, A survey of the
Liberian military situation has recently been completed by a US army officer,
and recommendations will shortly be presented to the Liberian Government.
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China.
`.ht: two forces potentially available for exploitation in opposition to the
consolidation of Communism in Chinn, (the Nationalist Government on Taiwan and
the dissident elerrents within Chinese Corn unist--controlled areas en the main-
land) hold little promise at this time for realization of US objectives throe :
military exploitation.
1. Nationalist tleime on Taiwan,
The US-recogriiZed National Government on Taiwan is a re *ime largely
discredited in the eyes of its oin people, whether their inclinations are pro-
or anti-Communist. In the past, provision of large (:,uantities of Ua military
aid did not prevent the decline of the Nationalist regi^.te. At the present
time the US is providin:y no military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists,,
~ . Present situation re: wiring military aid: From a , urely military
standpoint, the Chinese Nationalist Government holds a strong; defensive
position on Taiwan. Provided Nationalist military resources are employed vaith
determination, the rer;i.me possesses a considerable potential for resisting
Chinese Communist attack, Moreover, the provision of modest quantities of na.vd
and air force material. aid, primarily for maintenance, could substantially
increase the Nationalist capability for survival. It is believed, hov~evcr,
that the Chinese Nationalists lack both the will to resist a determined
Communist effort and the ability to utilize effectively the resources already
at their disposal. `,oreover, Communist infiltration and subversive activities
on Tair.an further reduce the potential effectiveness of US aid.
':chile past US aid has not been effective militarily, it has served
to perpetuate the Nationalist regime politically and, in the economic field,
has bolstered the regime's financial reserves.
b? Estimated results of renei%in- US militar; aid: Kenenal of US military
assistance -would be greeted favorably by the rka.tionalists and would increase
t!?e potential of the Nationalist armed forces. Granting- such aid viould: (1)
fail to rally popular Chinese support to the Nationalist cause; (2) neither
overcome existing Nationalist disunity and ineptness, nor assure effective
erg:r?loyment of the improved forces; (3) defer disintegration of the Nationalist
Government at the risk
, hovdever, of committing the US to prolonged financial
support and even future direct military involvement; (4) permit the
conservation of the renainin,:, Nationalist financial resources and tend to
promote economic stability; (5) probably accelerate Commu:iist preparations for
the takeover of Taiwan; and (6) intensify Chinese Communist propaganda
concerning the "imperialist role of the US in the Far East" and increase the
tendency to accept the charge at face value in those non--Communist countries
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of the Far East where nationalism is at present an issued
c. Estimated result of vithhold4.ng US aid: If US military aid to the
Nationalist Government is not renewed, Tai~vzn wi.il probably come under Chinese
Communist control within the next twelve months. Short of direct involvement
of US forces, however, there is no assurance against this eventuality.
2. 'issident Prouns on the Chinese mainland.
Present situation requiring military aid: Popular discontent with
the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland is believed to be increasing. in
addition to general popular dissatisfaction, the Chinese Coviiiunists have
admitted the existence of some 400,000 armed dissidents on the mainland, mainly
south of the Yari,^?tze River. The principal motivation of thesd groups is economic
and their numbers include professiona.1 bandits, isolated ex-Nation;,- ist troops
of various persuasions and disgruntled peasanLs. However, none of these
dissident eleraents identified to date appears suitable for effective external
exploitation. They lack leadership, unity of purpose, and over-all organization?
b. Estimated results of providing US military aid: Efforts to
support selected dissident groups through the provision of US military aid
could serve to annoy the Communist regime, at this time, but could accomplish
little more. The absence of leadership and cohesion would probably prevent
conclusive results from aid on a major scale for the purpose of causing the
downfall of the Communist regime. External military aid might, in fact,
stimulate a general xenophobic reaction among the mainland Chinese which would
bind them. more closely to the Communists and be interpreted by other Far Easteria
powers as evidence of U5 "imperialism"".
c. Estimated results of withholding US aid: Although the withholding
of US military aid from mainland groups may be interpreted in'
n some quarters as
evidence of a lack of US determination to oppose Communism,, such inaction
under circumstances would not, in fact, greatly accelerate the consolidation
of Communist control over China.
Q. Korea.
a. Present situation requiriny7 ;military aid: The Republic of Korea
established under US and UN guidance and support, is faced with the constant
possibility of open invasion by the Soviet-supported People's Army of northern
Korea and the daily problem of preserving internal security in the face of
Communist guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion, within its on boundaries.
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h. Effectiv4.ness of aid. already granted: US military aid to Korea has
been utilized to the rr ,xi xrnm, as a result of effective functioning of the US
Korean military advisory group and the favorable' attitude of the Korean
Government and people. The US-assisted Korean Array has: (1) maintained
sufficient internal security to permit progress in the ECA program for re-
habilitation and development of the Korean economy; and (2) acted as a
deterrent to possible northern Korean aggression,
c. Reactions to US military aid: Reactions to US military aid have been
entirely favorable in southern Korea although there have been complaints that
the military aid was insufficient, The US intention to continue Korean aid,
under MDAP, has been an important psychological. factor in maintaining the firm
will of the Republic's leaders and iri.litary personnel to continue resistance
to heavy Communist pressure, threats, and intimidation. Korean Communist
propaganda reaction has been unfavorable, but no effective Corm, nist attempts
have been made to stop US m litary aid to southern Korea.
d. Future Aid: Continued US aid will serve to: (1) maintain the southern
Korean will to resist Communism; (2) prevent open invasion from the north; and
(3) permit continued development of the Korean economy and democratic government.
US aid at levels higher than current authorizations would be effective in off
setting the superior military potential of the opposing forces, particularly
in artillery and aircraft. US military aid to Korea is, nonetheless, no
positive guarantee against successful Communist invasion. A marked curtailment
or halt of US military aid to Korea, however, would be followed by: (1) a
serious deterioration in Korean Army materiel; (2) a marked reduction in Korean
morale; (3) a significant increase in the susceptibility of Army personnel,
government leaders and the people to Communist pressure; and (4) a decisive
increase in the Communist capacity to exhaust the Republic's strength by
guerrilla warfare,;
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Indochina,
a. Present situation requiring military aid: strong nationalist
u,pris:ing is engaged in open revolt against French authority in Vietnam.
The French Government has attempted a political solution to this proble:i
and, by recognizing, the 17rench-sponsored "State of Vietnam" (as distinct
from Ho Chi ' Binh's Communist-led "Republic") the US f orrmally acknowledged
its satisfaction that the French were Taking a sincere effort to meet
Vietnamese nationalist de ca.nds. The growing threat posed by the military
activities of the Communist-led ,r epublic of Vietnam" (which has been
recognized as a legal government by the USSR and Communist China), as well
as the threat to US interests in Southeast Asia posed by developments in
Chiina. led to a decision to extend economic and m JAi-,ary aid to France and
the Indochinese states.
b. Effectiveness of US aid: A force of )SO,000 Western--trained troops
(40 percent of whom are European professional soldiers) under capable French
co nd is bearing the brunt of the combat in Vietnam, It is anticipated
that US aid will bring diminishing returns because of limitations on the ex-
pansion of French military strength., the divided attitude of the Vietnamese
population, and the strength, stability, and prospects for expansion of
VietnamOs Communist-led rebel movement* It is apparent that the activo sup-
port of the majority of the population cannot be obtained by military means
alone; consequently, US military aid can do little more than maintain the
stt,atua uo.
c. Reactions to US military aid: Although much of the French press in
?aigon suspects the US of ulterior motives and criticizes the ""parsimonious"
character of US aid, the reaction of the French Govermient is favorable.
There has been a noticeable apathy, however, among those Vietnamese most
inclined to be pro-US,, This attitude stems from suspicion that US add wIU
Permit the French to perpetuate their control.
ropaganda of the Communist-led rebel regime in Indochina is violer
critical of all US motives, actions and presumed intentions,
d.,, Future aid: A continuation or expansion of US .d would: (1) :intere
the effectiveness of the forces under trench military command, and thereby
provide additional tine and opporturdty for the implementation of a political solution to the Vietnarie:ze dispute; (2) provide for the development of a
Vietnamese army which., if tinder the control of the State: of Vietnam rather
than tinder the French High Command, would be potentially more effective
against the rebel force than alien troops. A curtailment or cessation of
US aid would insure ultiriate defeat of the French and their nominal Vie'tnarrete
allies and the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Indochina, Curt _1~<
lt;ent of military aid, in turn, would probably lead to the same eventual result,
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a. Present situation requiring military aid: Thailand r s adjacency
both to unsettled Indochina and Burma, and to Communist China., has raised
serious doubts anon,, the Thai as to their prospects for survival as a non-
Communist nation. Although the Communist movement in Thailand at present
is not militant and poses no immediate threat, it is doubtf.'ul that the Thai
Armed Forces, as currently organized and equipped, could long cope with a
Communist-led "liberation -iovemennt", and certain that they vo uld be unable
to resist an invasion in force. Military assistance would increase Thai-
land's capabilities to police and guard its frontiers and un uld maintain
a Thai ps,,rchological attitude favorable to the West: Thailand's present
political leaders are believed to be genuinely anti-Communist and pro-'US,
but it is only while they feel confident of the US interest in raai.ntai.nlng
a strong position in the Far East that they will continue this orientation.
b. I?ffectiveness of US military aid: No US military aid has yet been
received. Future US aid would raise the efficiency and morale of the Thai
armed forces, and increase their ability to maintain internal order. US
aid will not, however., appreciably increase Thailand's presently non-existent,
capabilities for resisting strong e.. ernal aggression. US aid should also
induce the Thai Goverment to take a more positive anti-Communist position,,
would increase i'rern.i eM i'hibul's prestige and political stature, and should
result in closer cooperation with the US.
c. Reactions to US military aid: Goverment and military leaders have
viewed forthcoming military aid with great enthusiasm and the non-Communist
press has indicated general approval. All vocal pro-Communist and Communist
11
elements have expressed disapproval of US military assistance.
d. Effects of US aid: Granting of US military assistance Muld: (1)
replace obsolete and heterogeneous materiel with modern, standardized equip-
ment; and (2) increase the capabilities of the Thai Armed Forces if accompanied
by an improved and expanded training program. Curtailment of US aid would
prevent increased efficiency and capabilities on the part of Thailand's
Armed Forces; termination of aid, at this time,, would leave the Armed Forces
in t heir present inefficient condition. The US would suffer a serious loss
of influence, and Thailand's presently pro-West Government leaders would
doubt the US will and ability to oppose Communism in the Far East, thus result-
ing in Thai accommodation to Soviet and Chinese Communist it assures,
* 23
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T. Burma
to Present situation requiring militar aid
Although Government armed forces have recently made progress
against both Communist and non-Communist insurgents in Burma, widespread
unrest will continue for some time. The UK and the Commonwealth, which
have provided Burma with almost all its military equipments are incapable
of providing all of the materiel needed by Burmese forces. In addition
to internal disorders, Burma faces the threat of Chinese Communist activities
along an undefined and ill-guarded border. The Burmese Government, heretofore
neutral in the East-WWest dispute., has recently made a number of requests for
US military assistance,
29 Effectiveness of US aid
The provision of patrol craft would increase the ability of
the Burmese Government to cope with insurgent activity which is currently
disrupting important river traffic. Such assistance, which is supplementary
to efforts of the Burmese themselves to maintain their own national security,
and complementary to military aid made available by the British Commonwealth
and the UIt, would assist in developing a pro- festern Burma,
3. Reactions to US aid
Delivery of these vessels would be well received in Burma.,
and wide, favorable reaction is expected. The Communists and their sympathizers,,
including certain Left-wing Socialists who ostensibly support the Government,
denounce the acceptance of aid as a step toward subservience to the US.
4. Future aid
Although contemplated US aid to Burma presently consists of this
single project, it would (1) fill a serious gap in the UK-Commonwealth military
aid program for Burma; and (2) assist Burma+s economic rehabilitation by
fully reopening the nation's waterways to commerce.
Failure of this aid to materialize would retard the growing trend
of Burmese cooperation with the West.
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tittvZo x~ec3^1e, ~n .tea
The Philippine Government W s chief problem the solution of which
requires military aid, is the containment of the Coiiuniet-led Huk vement
and the maintenance of law and order during the period needed to effect
basic economic and political reforms and thereby achieve long-range stability.
The fluke, for the most part disaffected peasant guerrillas, have generally
terrorized the Central Luzon countryside* Philippine Government Forces,
supplied and equipped entirely with US materiels have boen able to bread-,
up major Iluk concentrations, but have not been able to prevent destructive
Iiuk raids
2 c. Eff2ctivp eee off US aid
US aid has helped to maintain the pro-US orientation of the
Philippine Republic and to provide needed military support beyond the
financial resources of the Philippines a
3 Ft~. etiio~o STS~a
The reaction to US military aid has been generally favorable, al.
though them hive been complaints that the aid was ineuffic:lent-a criticisnrt
which may increase as Chinese Communist expansion continues., The Coe rapist
minority claims that US aid is aimed at r:za.intain ing imperlalirtic US
controls Increased LAS utilization of Philippine bases could rea It in
acceptance of this propaganda charge by some ardent nationalistic non-
Communists who view the US use of these bases as infringements of Philippine
sovereignty.
40 hit-IM-e-11" or exparsion Of US aid zldg (1) improve the
capabilities of the Armed Force to combat the Huk threat to internal
security; (2) maintain the presently strong US orientation of the Philippine
Government and people, Curtaflment of US aid would make it impossible for
the Philippine Government s s forces to maintain even their present capability
to provide internal security. In addition to Huk activities, therefore, general
lawlessness would increase. The 1FilIpinos would feel that the US was abandon-
Ing them to the Communist. orbit., and pressure on the Government to adopt
a nbutral policy or make a partial accommodation to Cotrrunisn would probably
result 4
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V, .
1. EM201 6 . .. n~ mi itr~r+r aid.
The new government of Indonesia is faced with the problem of de--
molilin-irg some 200,000 guerrillas who fought together with the Indonesian
AT l against the Dutch. Although some of these irregulars are Ccem niat-led
e.d stand in opposition to the present government of the USI:the great
%aSority are simply roving bands whose continued presence as an armed force
breatens to destroy the progress already made in the rehabilitation of
the country's econo r. If these bands are not dissrmed, their activities.
may well result in a general withdrawal of Western investors and technical
personnel from Indonesia, an event which would intensify the seriousness
of problems facing the young regime. The problem is largely one-of effec-
tive policing, and this burden now rests upon the Amnu , which is attempting
to perform police functions in addition to its other duties, including the
suppression of dissident political groups. Militaxyg aid is required for
the arming and training of such a police force in order to free the Arm
for national defense duties. Extensive smuggling has also created a serious
economic problem for the new governments A solution of this problem will.
depend on the development of an effective coastal patrol which, in turn,
depends on the availability of patrol craft and assistance in training.
20 Effectiveness of .
The provision of badly needed equipment could assist materially in
helping the new Indonesian goverment mot its primary problem -- the estab-
lishment and maintenance of law and order. This assistance would also help
maintain the present pro-Western orientation of the Indonesian Government.
`ir~e~IL 3O LCaA -s.
3o Li1G.~57f 202
A US military aid program would be generally welcomed by the gov-
ernmenta the armed forces, and business interests throughout Indonesia. There
will be some Dutch suspicion that such aid is designed to enhance the US
cosmercial position. US aid would be opposed by the Communists and other
political dissidents in propaganda utterances, but no effective resistance
to the development of a constabulary or the suppression of smuggling is
anticipated.
Continuation or expansion of US aid wouldt bolster the Government's
ability to quell lawlessness and disorder and assist the economic rehabilit&.
tion of the USI. Curtailment of US aid would increase the difficulty of
establishing and mair..taia law and order in Indonesia, thus aggravating
present economic dislocations and possibly leading eventually to a denial of
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of Indonesian tin and oil to the West, Under circumstances of increasing
inter l disorder, moreover, the USI's present Western orientation would
give way toaecomnodation to the growing strength of local Coudists and
pry-Ccmmmista,
No US mil,itarsr aid has been requested for Malaya and none is
presently being offered, For the past two years, however,, the British
in Malaya have attempted unsuccessfully to suppress a Co mv m st Chinese
terrorist movement, in which approximately 3,000 - 5,000 men are holding
down 36,000 British troops and 70,000 police and constabula,7 forces
Losses inflicted by the British on the terrorists have been offset by re..
eruitmgnt fran Mlavaos large Chinese population0 The situation has
steadily, deteriorated since Ncvenber 1949, terrorist forces he recently
shown a definite improvement in military technique, and der terrorist
successes are anticipated, Although Malaya's export economy has not yet
been seriously affected, exports of tin and rubber cannot be .maintained
if the present situation continues indefinitely,
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MMtaty Budgets of MW Co mtries
Fiscal Tear Begithg 1 AprU 1950
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of $2.80 to the L)
Defense Defense
Defense Total Nation. % %
Eapes diturel Bu+dget2 Iacone of total of National .
Budget Inco?e
2,326.2 10$934 28,,E 20 8
1. Defense Estimates as ma tted to Pali , plus CIA estimate of
other endiiuros attributable to d?fe.
CIA Estimate.
Fiscal Year Beginn3ng 1 4pril 1950
(millions of US dollars, converted at rate of US .9019 C 01.00)
Defense Defame
Defense Total National % %
Expendit Budget2 Inc=3 Of total of National
Budget moan
386 2x,099 11?817 18 303
I. Defense Estimates presented to Parliament.
2r~. As Presented to Parliamento
3. CIA Estimate
Fiscal Year Beginuii 1 Jvly 1950
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 7.14 Ironer a $1)
Net Defense Defense
Defense Total National S $
Expenditure Budget Produat2 of total of met
Budget National Prod1
1031 3591 10522 191.5 2.7
1. Estimates submitted to Parliament end passed substantially as su t .
2. ECA estimate of Not National Product? National Income estimate not available,,
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LMM
No ffilitary axpendituree.
am= a
Fiscal Year Beginning 3. April 1950
(mMiong of dollars, converted at rate of 6,92 Ironer ee $1)
Defense Defense
Defense Total Not % %
Expenditure Budget Nation of total of Net
Produces Budget National Product
511 .2971 2,57 17.1 2.1
1. Estimates au1nitted to Par3lament.
2. CIA estimate 4 National Ineome estimate not available
Fiscal Tear Big 1 January 1950
(mfllioas of dollars, convert at rate of 50 frnos a $i)
Defense Defense
Defense Total National % %
Expenditure Badgetl Incamme2 of total of rational
Budget3 Income
163.6 19595 16980 10025 3.28
1. Total goverrmaent expenditures budgeted.
2. Estimated national inoome for 1950.
Fiscal year BVIMIM 1 January 1950
(millions of dolars, converted at rate of 3.8 guilders a $1)
Defense Defense
Defense Total National % %
Expenditure Budget 7ncome1 of total of National
Budget Income
307 19193 39737 2507 8.2
1 a National income for 1949$ 1950 estimate not available.
1-2
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ABET
Pineal Year Begs 1 January 1950
( lions of dollars, converted at rate of 50 francs a 1)
Defense Defense
Aefensa Total Batt ,1 % %
Ezp nditure Budget incomerL of total of National
Budget Inc+ e
41,7342
lm National. Income for 1948 (latest available)
2 a Includes Gendarmerie and Police,
6.2 206
iscul Year Beginang I January 1950
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 350 f c ta $1)
Defense Defense
Defense Total National % %
] pendituae Budget Intel of total of National
Budge Income
1,20D2 6x391 23.9157 18,7 552
1. CIA ea$3vate
2 a Additional expenditured for military purposes of 4423 mi113ou ar3
included in bo4gets of other ministries,
Fiscal Yew BGginr I July 3.950
(millions of dollars, converted at rate of 624 lire . 1)
Defense Total. Defame Defense
Natic
Expenditure Budge l Inc . Of total of National
Budget Inc me
5172 29240 13.5200 23og 4.62
1. CIA estimate,
2. Includes Carabinieri (national police),
143
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 Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172 00300280028-0
BMW
Fiscal Year BeginaiM 1 January 1950.
(Millions of dollars, converted at rate of 29.75 ecvoloc a $1)
Defense Defame
Defense Total Nations % %
Expenditurol Budget Inca o of total of National
Budget Income
4317 183.2 1,300 23.9 3.4
la CIA esti te.
Fiscal Year 195041
Defense Total National
Expend tun, Budget Inter
Defense Defense
S
of total of Nabiona1
Budget Income
1193,96o,3oo $528sOOOOODO S,2,913,00O,00D 36077 6.66
1. Includes auxiliary services.
2. ECA Estimate
Fiscal. Your, endlag 20 ,March 1950
(There is no reliable estimate for FI 1950x51.)
Defense Defense
Defense Total National % 5
Expenditure1 B ot1 IncoMA2 of total of National
Budget incow
$78,125,000 $317,437,500 22.5
to Actual total expenditures cure only about $2503,0000000, Actual defense
expenditures are not known.
2. No figures exist on the national inoc .
1-4
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 Approved Forglease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172$000300280028-0
SE=
Pied. '!eas 1949--50
Dofa
To-cal
National
Dofenso
? %
Defense
1
ExpenAibuwl-
Budget
Them al
or
of Nation.
Budget
Income
3.46,667?oo
6383,000,000 $L,280,000,000
3803
1.05
3, EGA aubi o a
5
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 Approved For,&Iease 2007/02/08 x ZLUMP91 TO117W00300280028-0
3 al it-Mr- ersonr~el treng h of Ccau t 3o
Cot nt r
AM N
Air ~'o~rco
xo
taA
-
United Kingdom
369,000 144,400
202,400
715,800 A
Canada
20,670 9,440
16,670
47,060
Iceland
- -
-
-
Norway
17,650 6,200
4,125
27,975
Dentra.rk
17,500 4:400
850
22.750
Wince
500,300 59,082
66,764
626,146
Netherlands
71,000 30,000 d
8,000
109,100 b
Belgium
59000 1,282
9,767
70,049 b
Italy
245,000 34,887
26,479
306,366
Portugal
46,000 7,630 d
2,039
55.669
Turkey
273,000 ? 18,450
22,055
313,505
Iran
133,331 2,600
h
2,851
138,782
Greece
15,200
11,700 '
6,120
169,620
g Excludes 64,000 colonial troops
b Excludes colonials
Plum 60,000 Gendarmerie
Includes naval air arm
c Plus 7,,000 National Republican Guard and 5400 Fiscal Guard
AF Includes 75,000 Carabinieri
Includes Gendarmerie of 24,500 and Customs Guards of 13,500. The
,"array ul11 be reduced from 22 to 16 divisions under the advice and
guidance of US I;i.l.ttary Uission
1u of 30 April 1950 includes Gendarmerie of 23,200
2
A s of 30 Lrril 1950
As of 31 I?karch 1950
yp-1 Craft of TMAP
United _2ji.n i?
of
At~ril 1
,
L61
Op2rational
11on-0 erational
Rc wwrve
Battleship
5
1
-
4
lacat Carrier
6
4
1
~L
Light Fleet Carrier
6
5
Light Cruiser
24
14.
3
tP
Destroyer
112
48
4
60
Escort
169
39
7
1.2'
Gulaarine
63
30
3
30
Fleet I3.nesweper
.~6$
21-
'
`A
..
Totals
453
152
18
229
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 Approved FoIease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17Q000300280028-0
SECR
Be C a n a & As 2 ? J=e
Taw
Light Fleet Carrier 1
OMratiQwQ
1
Roa-OoeraMt M&I
0
0
Light Cruiser 2
1
0
1
Destroyer 21
4
1
6
Escort 6
2
~.
3
Fleet Minesweeper ?s
rQ
Totals 29
8
3
18
G. Yee3,rtand (As of 1
,
,
D. 121M (A oaf1,LM 19 O
Destroyer 5
3
2
0
Destroyer Coastal 5
1
0
Destroyer Escort 2
1
1
0
Corvette 3
2
0
Submarine 8
2
2
Fleet Minesweeper
Totals 29
A
13
10
E,
3
Destroyer, Coastel 10
3
2
5
Escort 3
2
0
1
Submarine ..
.,
16
'7
3
6
' T'
F. fit? CU (Al 29 1
12:91.
,
Fleet Minesweeper 1 2 2
1. Belgium is to receive 4 fleet mineatteepers from United K ngdoo
a. Frane? (Ai3 OaP 1 ~]zp :19 ,
Battleship 2
Old Battleship(obsolete) 1
SECRET
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 Approved For, (ease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T0117 ;000300280028-0
SECRET
IQUI Q , x41 &2:92WAUM.A. Began
Light Carrier 1
1
Escort Carrier l
1
Old Heavy Cruiser 3
Light Cruiser 7
a
7
on
Old Light Cruiser 1
1
go
00
Destroyer 12
7
Escorts (DE,O PG, PF4) 21
21
Submarine 10
9
1
Old Submarine 2
2
2
Fleet M2nesweeper
&
85
72
1
14
Ho Ita1 (A
2L1- = ISM).
Old Battleship
2
2
Light, Cruiser
4
2
1
Destroyer
4
3
1
Destroyer, Coastal
15
13.
4
Escort (PCE)
Totals
M
45
,'i
33
11
2.0 er1
(As of 1 Jun
3.$ 0
Light Carrier
.
1
1
Light Cruiser
2
1
Destroyer
6
5
3.
Escort (DLE,PG,PF)
71
41
1
Submarine
7
5
2
Fleet Minesweeper
3.2
11
1
Minelayer
Totals
38
30
due"
5
1 2 destroyer escorts received from US under )DAP on 1 June 1950
J. POr
a7. (As
of 1 Juba 2252).
?
Destroyer .
5
5
..
Escort (PF,PG)
8
7
1 ?*
Submarine
Old Sub!aarino
3
3
..
Totals
19
17
2
33`-3
CRET
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 Approved Forv&lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T0117 00300280028-0
SECS
Old hew4y Cruiser
Destroyw
Destroyer Eswrt
St bmorine
Corvette
Pecrc-ft
L
LOT
I %+
2 1
8 3
6 4
4 2
45 32
9 5
87 53
L. ~k o f ~s o 1jM 12M).
34
Turkey has 190 naval vessels of all types inol ng S old Battleship.,
2 old Light Cruisers., 8 Destsayrors, 2 Destroyer Escorts, and 10 Submarines,
Iran has 10 naval vessels of all types Including 3. repair ship,
1 Destz dyer Escort and 8 minor craft,
114
E~
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 Approved For please 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17g&00300280028-0
SECRET
3. =U= , rc a o,- , =CMM i
A. Belillum+ (raj? 1295)
To
Bomber
Attack
Fighter
Reconnaissance
Transport
Miscellaneous
Totals
...
160
26
405
In Tactical_7 to
Bo a O , S a t 1 9
Bomber
Attack
Fighter
Recorthnjssance
Transport
Miscellaneous
Totals
Bomber
Attack
Fighter
Reconnaissance
Transport
Miscellaneous
am
87
cow
25
2L
138
Air r
41 20
577
63. 235
309 175
2,832 583
NMI Air oroe
48 15
52 14
203 20
59 39
28 18
__1M
492
106
SECRET
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 Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA--RRDDP91 T0117 00300280028-0
SWT
C o Itsi~ BAs of`? , s = te5Q1 .
fact +c 1 Maui 919to
Bomber
Attack
Fighter
Recosn3eiseance
Transport
Miscellaneous
Totals
loom
_
172
58
97
,,.6i
392
...
158
32
72
v
262
D. NQt-herd
~A9 2C Z June l9SQl s
Bomber
..~
~..
Attack
~.?
-00"
Fighter
50
15
Reconnaissance
Ono
.?"
Transport
10
7
Miscellaneous
.
Totals
363
B_ ForoFa
32
Bomber
15
6
Attack
?.w
Fighter
77
53
Reconnaissance
22
12
Transport
14
7
Miscellanea
-
O
Totals
142
78
Air Ems f East Ina ft
,
')
Bomber
+Gl.
25
Attack
r..
so"
Fighter
59
27
Reconnaissance
--
isaw
Transport
27
21
Miscellaneous
-LU
ja
BECRLT
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Totals 264 116
 Approved FoQelease 2007/02/08 C -RDP91 T01172 000300280028-0
8
Be
idol
ALD=
Bomber
4
Attack
Map
Fighter
176
98
Reconnaissance
now
Transport
10
9
Miscellaneous
W
.1L
Totals 302
Bomber
Attack
Fighter 15
Reconnaissance
Transport 3
2iscellaneoua
Totals 79
124
-AirForte
OEM
.Uw.
F. 9Z$OO 4s 2f=? am a 9so1 R
Tn
Attack bombers
136
76
Dive Bombers
45
21
Military transport
57
22
Liaison/observation
60
38
Trainers
lg2
60
Totals
407 .
` urk~y (Aa of ? 7u a 795n .
G.
CIA does not have the latest breakdown by types of Turkey?e 264
military aircraft, The Turkish Air Force is being trained and developed
under guidance of the USA and consists of a balanced force of aircraft;
almost entirely of US and UK origin, with a heavyr stress at present upon
trainers. The balance consists principally of Intercept and penetration
fighters, light bombers, and transport airplanes. Therm are no medium or
heavy bombers or jet aircraft.
IL.?
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 Approved ForQprlease 2007/02/08 : CIA--RDP91 T0117100300280028-0
SECRET
H. I A of 1 19 0 ,
Iran has a total of 264 aircraft of which 89 are first line fighters-
Thunderbolts and Hurricanes, The remainder are transports and miscellaneous
aircraft,
114
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 Approved For4WeasGQ~/0 RDP91 TO117 00300280028-0
Chinese Nationalist Lilitary Strength
The present military strength of the Rationalists is reported to total
1495, 000. of these, 370.,00') are Army, 81, 300 Air Force, and 44,003 Navy
(including 12, 700 ; .arines) .
Of the total army strength some 65,000 troops are located on Quemoy
island with the remainder on Taiwan and in the Pescadores. The Army total
largely consists of infantry strength but, includes 29, 000 Armored Force per-
sonnel and 9,,000 in the Artillery Command.
The Air Force consists of two light. bomber groups, four fighter groups,
two transport groups, and one photographic reconnaissance; all based on
Taiwan. Aircraft strength is as follows:
Total
__..~.r
In Tactical
Units*
Light Bomber
1214
91
Fightor
196
179
Transport
265
148
Photographic
16
13
Trainer
235
Miscellaneous
9
9
Totals
8445
433
The Nationalist Navy has a total of 60 combat vessels, broken down
as follows :
In 0peration
Under Repair
Destroyers
1
0
Destroyer Escort
9
1
Patrol Craft
1
0
Submarine Chaser
0
2
Gun Boat
1
3
Motor Gun Boat
1
1
Mine Layer
0
1
Mine Sweeper
6
2
Landing S hip--Tank
8
3
Landing Ship--Pled
3
5
Landing Ship-Infantry
1
14
Auxiliaries
-3
4
Totals
34
26
In addition to these 60 ships, the Nationalists have a comparatively
number of smaller craft available for patrol operations.
CONFIDE NTJ L'
3 Sixty percent serviceable.
large
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