WEEKLY INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300200005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 14, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENT S
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . .
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INDOCHINA . . . . . . . . . . .
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Political
GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . .
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Supervision and Guarantees of a Truce
DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
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Political: The Ngo Dinh Diem government's out-
spoken opposition to any partitioning remains its
principal asset in the struggle to prevent the com-
plete disintegration of the state of Vietnam. Diem
has offered little, however, in the way of an internal
reform program.
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The Vietnamese, despite assurances from the
French command that Hanoi will be defended, are
skeptical and are striving to create a defense force
to hold the city, and the Vietnamese delegation at
Geneva appears to be ready to walk out to prevent a
capitulatory peace or to disavow any French surrender
of Tonkin.
The American embassy in Saigon conjectures that
the French are holding Bao Dai in reserve to sign a
peace agreement if Diem and other Vietnamese national-
ists refuse.
But Bao Dai's position seems far from secure. A
French Foreign Ministry official has said his regime
has failed and a government representative of south
Vietnam would be necessary after a cease-fire.
Meanwhile, anti-French feeling among Vietnamese
remains at a high pitch;
Cambodia: The Royal Army troops which trembled
at the appearance of two Viet Minh battalions in April
are said more recently to have sought out, beaten, and
pursued the enemy. The new spirit is credited to
Commander in Chief Tioulong.
Laos: The American charge believes if all French
forces are withdrawn, under an armistice, the Laotian
army will fall apart and policing of the border will
be impossible.
Geneva Conference
The Communists at Geneva are expected to offer
Mendes-France an Indochina settlement, in advance of
his 20 July deadline, which the French premier will
find it difficult to reject.
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The Communist package is likely to include a
cease-fire, a partitioning of Vietnam and Laos, and
an outline for a political agreement. Ambiguities in
the proposals would tend to make French acceptance
easier, and further negotiations would be required.
Communist proposals are expected to shape up as
follows:
(1) Partition of Vietnam at some point
between the 14th and 18th parallels,
with general elections to follow.
(2) Communist control of some part of
Laos, with the remainder of Laos
neutralized and with an agreement
on the first steps toward a coalition
government.
(3) Neutralization of Cambodia, with some
form of recognition accorded the
"resistance movement" there.
Developments in France
French hopes for a cease-fire have increased con-
siderably, but Mendes-France still maintains he will
accept no form of capitulation.
If no cease-fire is obtained by 20 July, the
premier told the National Assembly, he will seek
permission to send conscripts to Indochina. Ambas-
sador Dillon believes permission will be granted
only if the expeditionary force is imperiled. Even
then, it would be very difficult for any French
government to guarantee an all-out military effort
to "win" the war.
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Vietnam: The Ngo Dinh Diem government's ability
to attract appreciable support among non-Communist
Vietnamese is still much in doubt, but Diem does not
appear to be losing ground and may well be gaining.
The new government's strong and outspoken opposi-
tion to the partitioning of Vietnam remains its princi-
pal asset in the struggle to prevent the complete dis-
integration of the state of Vietnam. On his visit to
Hue, Diem received a tumultuous ovation and in Hanoi
the press enthusiastically welcomed his creation of a
military defense committee to replace the regional
government.
The presence in Diem's cabinet of at least, six
persons who had previously spurned cabinet offers
indicates that a government whose nationalist bona fides
is not questioned is capable, even in the face of over-
whelming Viet Minh momentum, of persuading fence-sitters
to commit themselves on the anti-Communist side
Diem has offered little,in the way of an internal
reform program beyond promises of social justice and
an elected national assembly. His references to a
"complete change" and "peaceful revolution," coupled
with his known antipathy for Bao Dai, may both explain
and abet a tendency among Vietnamese leaders to repudiate
the chief of state.
The strongest sentiment yet heard along these lines
was the statement of a Cao Dai spokesman that his organi-
zation favors the creation of a Vietnamese republic,
but would take up arms against the government if Bao
Dai returned to Vietnam.
The Diem government has formulated terms for an
armistice which call for the regrouping of forces into
Communist and non-Communist zones in each of the three
major regions of the country, reflecting the overriding
concern of the Vietnamese to retain some foothold in
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H
the north. The formulation of these terms shows a
willingness to accomodate to the fait accompli presented
by the French withdrawal from southern Tonkin, while
manifesting at the same time Vietnam's determination
to prevent the division of the country into a Communist
north and a non-Communist south.
Vietnamese officials have stated on numerous occa-
sions that "to lose Hanoi is to lose the war," and they
are desperately striving to patch together a defense
force to hold the city, despite the virtual certainty
that the French will not attempt to hold it, despite
assurances from the French command to the contrary.
Plans are at least in the discussion stage for the
creation of a resistance movement.
In talks with American officials in Geneva and
Saigon, Vietnamese officials have laid the utmost stress
on the creation of an autonomous Vietnamese army equipped
directly by the United States so as to be in a position
to disregard any French attempt to pull out all non-
Communist troops from Tonkin.
In line with this concept, the Vietnamese delega-
tion at Geneva appears to be getting ready to walk out
of the conference in order to prevent a capitulatory
peace or to disavow any French surrender of Tonkin.
The American embassy in Saigon conjectures that the
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French may count on persuading Bao Dai to sign a peace
agreement which Diem and other Vietnamese nationalists
would find unacceptable.
Anti-French feeling among the Vietnamese remains
at a high pitch.
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Although the conference has ostensibly concerned
itself only with matters relating to prisoners of war,
the Vietnamese are fearful that a truce based on parti-
tion is in the making, and the American embassy states
that it is reasonable to assume that much more important
subjects than a prisoner exchange have been discussed.
A similar brush-off of Vietnamese representatives
at Geneva in the military talks there, and the agree-
ment between the French and the Viet Minh that the
armistice shall include certain "political" matters, are
certain to accentuate ill-feeling.
Symptomatic of this sentiment are the prevalent
reports concerning French atrocities toward Vietnamese
civilians, the fear expressed by the French delegate at
Hue that the population there might turn against the
French, and the threat voiced by Bishop Le Huu Tu, dean
of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Indochina, to organize
anti-French manifestations in Hanoi and Haiphong.
Ambassador Dillon was told on 12 July by a Foreign M nis-
try official that the Bao Dai regime had failed and that
after a cease-fire, a government representative of south
Vietnam would be necessary. The official noted that
Ngo Dinh Diem is from the north, but said it was essential
for him to stay in power prior to a cease-fire to assure
the loyalty of Vietnamese troops under French command.
Viet Minh: Peiping announced that on 7 July a
"protocol" on Sino-Viet Minh trade for 1954 was signed
in that city involving considerably larger amounts than
in 1953. Peiping agreed to supply cotton and yarn,
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machinery, transport and telecommunications equipment,
medicines, surgical apparatus, and paper in exchange
for Viet Minh nonferrous metals, coffee, pepper, cattle,
hides and leather.
This is the first public announcement of a trade
agreement
probably be small.
Cambodia: The American embassy in Phnom Penh reports
that the combat spirit of the Cambodian Royal Army over
the past several months has shown remarkable improvement.
The same troops which trembled at the appearance of two
Viet Minh battalions in April have more recently sought
out, beaten, and pursued the enemy. This new spirit
has resulted largely from the contagious confidence of
Commander in Chief Tioulong. It is also a reflection'
of anti-Vietnamese feeling among the Cambodians which
was stimulated by the disclosure at Geneva of Communist
aims to maintain a foothold in Cambodia.
Laos: With respect to the application of a Geneva
armistice in Laos, the American charge states that if
Xieng Khouang and Seno, the airfield near Savannakhet,
are stipulated as regrouping areas for French forces,
then French Union troops might as well be evacuated
completely, since policing of the border by the Laotian
army would be impossible. If all French forces and
foreign military personnel are withdrawn, the Laotian
army will fall apart, he said.
Militarily, the only future course for Laos, in his
opinion, would seem to lie in joining a regional defense
arrangement and in forming a well-trained and equipped
force of approximately 40,000 men, including advisers.
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The Communists at Geneva are expected to offer
Mendes-France an Indochina settlement,*in advance of
his 20 July deadline, which the French premier will
find it difficult to reject.
The French delegation is conducting a variety of
private talks with the Soviet, Chinese Communist and
Viet Minh delegations at Geneva. The Laotians and Cam-
bodians have been meeting with Viet Minh representatives
for military staff talks, and Vietnamese officials are
reported to have scheduled meetings with all three Commu-
nist delegations.
The Communist package emerging from these talks is
expected to include a cease-fire, a partitioning of Viet-
nam and Laos, and an outline for a political settlement.
It will probably contain ambiguities which will make
French acceptance easier, and will certainly require
further negotiations with the French, Laotians and
Cambodians.
Communist proposals are expected to shape up as
follows:
(1) Partition of Vietnam at some point between the
14th and 18th parallels, with general elections to follow.
(2) Communist control of some part of Laos, with
the remainder of Laos neutralized, and an agreement on
the first steps looking toward a coalition government.
(3) Neutralization of Cambodia, with some form of
recognition accorded the Communist "resistance movement"
there.
The Communists' final proposal on the partition line
in Vietnam may depend on the kind of settlement they be-
lieve feasible for Laos. They might well propose a
partition of both Vietnam and Laos along the Dong Hoi-
Thakhek line, midway between the 17th and 18th parallels,
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which is the reported French defense line for the two
states. Alternatively, they could accept the Dong Hoi
line for Vietnam along with control of an area in southern
Vietnam and a strip of Laos.
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Supervison and Guaraptees of a Truce
The nine-party discussions on supervision and guar-
antees of a truce have continued to move very slowly.
The Communists still insist that the "main responsi-
bility" for implementing a truce rests with mixed com-
mittees of the belligerents, that these committees work
parallel with an international commission rather than
subordinate to it, and that both bodies be responsible
to a "guarantor" body in which the Communists would have
veto power.
The French have drafted a compromise proposal which
seems to move a long way toward the Communist position..
Although obscure in several respects, the French plan
apparently gives a greatly enhanced role to the mixed
committees, retreats from the Western concept that
these committees must be subordinate to the international
commission, and accepts the Communist demand for unan-
imous decisions on major questions.
As of 8 July the Communists were still pressing for
a partition of Vietnam at approximately the 14th parallel,
while the French were insisting that the line be drawn
at a point north of Dong Hoi, midway between the 17th
and 18th parallels.
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French hopes that Mendes-France will obtain a
cease-fire have increased considerably in the last
week. The premier has continued to maintain that
he will not accept any form of capitulation and in
a radio address to the nation on 10 July based his
own hopes for an honorable settlement on France's
"indisputable will for peace," and the support
received from Great Britain and the United States
in the Churchill-Eisenhower joint communique.
Mendes-France announced to the National Assembly
on 7 July that if he fails to obtain a cease-fire by
20 July he will ask for permission to send conscripts
to Indochina. Besides trying to strengthen his hand
in the negotiations at Geneva, he was probably hoping
to induce his Gaullist and other rightist supporters
to accept drastic terms for a cease-fire by presenting
a politically unpalatable alternative. Ambassador
Dillon believes that only if the expeditionary force
is imperiled after 20 July will the assembly grant
permission for such a step.
At the same time, however, Dillon feels it is
possible that if Mendes-France falls and French
forces are imperiled by an all-out Viet Minh attack,
the next government may press for the fulfillment of
Secretary Dulles' terms for American intervention.
Set forth on 11 June, these included: complete
independence for Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; a
request by these countries for American intervention;
evidence of United Nations concern for the situation;
and guarantees that France will prosecute the war
until it is won.
Though there is already considerable political
support for assuring the safety of the expeditionary
force, it would nevertheless be very difficult for
any French government to guarantee an all-out military
effort to "win".the war.
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