WEEKLY INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300190002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 19, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
INDOCHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Political
GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Communist Position
Vietnamese Position
Cambodian and Laotian Positions
French Position
British Position
SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Soviet Union
Communist China
FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS . . . . . Page 21
France
Great Britain
West Germany
Australia and New Zealand
India
Pakistan
Burma
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Japan
Korea
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The Political Situation: The Vietnamese government's
authority continues to deteriorate
Chief of Staff Hinh is openly bidding for a dictator's
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Bao Dai is continuing his tactic of purchasing
support among dubious individuals and war lord groups
rather than attempting to reform his government and
obtain mass support.
A spurious "separatist movement" is being revived
in Cochinchina.
The political atmosphere in Laos and Cambodia is
marked by continuing nervousness regarding the Viet
Minh's next move.
Geneva Conference
The third week of the conference ended with a speech
by Soviet foreign minister Molotov which was apparently
designed to move the Communist position on Indochina
nearer to that of the French and to strengthen the Commu-
nist negotiating position. The Communists' tactics seem
also to be aimed at winning time for the Viet Minh forces
to press their military advantage and at frustrating
American efforts to achieve collective security in South-
east Asia.
The Communists also continued to support the claim
to legitimacy of the Communist puppet governments in Laos
and Cambodia.
While avoiding any action which seems likely to pro-
duce a deadlock at Geneva or to provide grounds for
American or United Nations intervention, the Communists
appear confident that the course of events in Indochina
and France will work to their advantage. They seem to
anticipate that the fighting will continue simultaneously
with negotiations for some time.
Chinese Communist premier Chou En-Lai played a minor
role, confined largely to supporting the proposals presented
by Molotov and the Viet Minh. Chou gave British foreign
secretary Eden the impression he would like to know
whether the UN would admit the Communist Chinese "if they
behaved themselves."
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Vietnamese chief of staff Sao Dai stated that he
was alarmed by the French proposals for an armistice.
France continued to insist on negotiations for an
armistice agreement, with provisions for international
controls before a cease-fire is arranged.
Britain continued to act as spokesman for the Western
Allies in dealing with the Communist delegations.
Policies, Propaganda and Opinions
To these diverse and in part threatening stimuli,
governments and private citizens back home reacted
variously.
In Communist countries, the propaganda stentor spoke
with a single brazen voice, as usual. China is the ex-
ponent of nonaggression and peaceful coexistence through-
out Asia, the voice proclaimed. "Bellicose elements" in
the United States were the villains it anathematized, and
it promised to teach them "new lessons" if they insisted
on having their "bullheaded way."
In the free world, the response, being free, was
diversified.
In France, Premier Laniel convoked the High Council
of National Defense to consider "Draconian measures," and
the National Assembly created a commission to inquire into
Indochina affairs. The council decided to send 30,000
reinforcements to Indochina in the "immediate future .11
The position of the cabinet continued to be precarious.
Remaining in office by virtue of only a two-vote Assembly
majority on 13 May, the cabinet faced the likelihood of
a new crisis "this week," in the judgment of Deputy Foreign
Minister Schumann. There was reason, moreover, to suppose
that the next premier might be Pierre Mendes-France, who
favors abandonment of Indochina.
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In West Germany, already chafing under delays in
French action on DC, the prospect of further postpone-
ments which the Indochina crisis threatened to impose
on French policy decisions seemed all but intolerable,
Chancellor Adenauer sent word to High Commissioner Conant
that he doubted his ability to go on cooperating with
the Western allies on the present basis for more than
a few more months.
In Britain, Prime Minister Churchill reaffirmed
London's hope for an "acceptable" and effectively
guaranteed settlement in Indochina but reiterated that
until such a settlement is clearly seen to be unobtain-
able, Britain will make no final decision committing
itself on a Southeast Asia defense system. Meanwhile
London continued its efforts to strengthen its ties
with the three Asian members of the Commonwealth-India,
Pakistan and Ceylon--and with Burma and Indonesia, and
to win them over to Western policies.
In the smaller free nations, there was a tendency
to wait for the great powers to agree on united policies.
Most seemed well disposed toward the West, but some also
seemed naive and at least a few sharply criticized the
United States and France.
In India, Prime Minister Nehru suggested a loose
union between North and South Korea and the setting up
of an authority to discuss political problems later,
and proposed that the same principle be applied in
Indochina. He did not suggest how the basic differences
on the two areas could be reconciled.
In Indonesia, "Foreign Ministry circles" said that
the t ing most needed for the achieving of peace was
the abolition of French colonialism.
In Thailand, the government stood firm, as it had
done from the irst. Foreign Minister Prince Wan
agreed in principle at Geneva to an American suggestion
that Thailand revive its plan of a year ago to appeal to
the UN against Communist aggression in Laos. The French
strongly opposed this plan when it was first put forward
and the Thais dropped it'at the suggestion of the United
States.
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In South Korea, President Rhee was bitter over the
American proposa or a Southeast Asia defense system
from which he would be excluded. Rhee said that first
the United States "stole his idea" for an alliance
"and then left him out and included weak sisters and
colonial powers," according to Ambassador Dean.
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The Vietnamese government's authority continues to
deteriorate,
Chief o a Hinh, openly bidding for a
c ator s role, told American officials several days
ago that he had sent an ultimatum to Bao Dai demanding
control of the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
Bao Dai is continuing his tactic of purchasing
support among dubious individuals and war lord groups
rather than attempting to reform his government and
obtain mass support for the anti-Communist effort-
French delegates at the Geneva conference doubt
that Bao Dai's return to Vietnam would bring any immedi-
ate improvement in the political. situation there. These
officials add that they prefer that Bao Dai stay near
Geneva--he is now in the nearby French resort town of
Evian--otherwise the Vietnamese delegation would hold up
decisions at every point while awaiting instructions from
Bao Dai. Moreover, in Saigon, the French counselor to the
Vietnamese vice president doubts that Bao Dai can take
control of the political situation after five years of
what he termed a deliberate French policy of keeping Bao
Dai dissipated, corrupt, and dependent on bad advice.
A particularly serious threat to the maintenance
of some semblance of life in the Vietnam government is
the tentative revival of the Cochinchina separatist
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"movement," which actually consists of a handful of
unpopular and self-seeking opportunists in the south.
The scheme is to set up a separate "Cochinchina Republic"
with the backing of powerful French interests there.
Former premier Tam, who was associated with an earlier
and abortive French-backed Cochinchina government, admits
that he favors such a scheme and has been urged by certain
Frenchmen to undertake it. Such a maneuver would be
regarded as treasonable by the vast majority of Vietnam-
ese.
Rapid progress is being made in the negotiation of
conventions supplementing the recently drafted French-
Vietnamese treaties of independence and association,
according to an official of the French Foreign Ministry.
He expects the conventions to be concluded within a matter
of weeks.
Wilfred Burchett, Communist newsman now in Geneva,
states that Ho Chi Minh personally briefed him on 1 April
on the situation at Dien Bien Phu. A recent consensus of
several Frenchmen who are well informed on Indochinese
matters agrees that Ho is still alive.
The political atmosphere in Laos and Cambodia is
marked by continuing nervousness regarding the Viet
Minh's next move. The government of Laos has stated
it will appeal to the United Nations if the Viet Minh
again invades in force. General Tiou Long, the new
Cambodian commander in chief, has set about energeti-
cally reorganizing his armed forces. Tense French-
Cambodian relations were further strained by the failure
of the French to accord Tiou Long appropriate honors
when he recently called on Navarre.
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GENEVA CONFERENCE
Communist Position
Molotov's Speech: The third week of the Geneva
conference en a wit a speech by Soviet foreign minister
Molotov on 14 May which was apparently designed to move
the Communist position on Indochina closer to that of
the French and to strengthen the Communists' negotiating
position. The Communists' tactics at Geneva seem also
to be aimed at winning time for the Viet Minh forces to
press their military advantage, and at frustrating
American-led collective security efforts in Southeast
Asian
In his speech Molotov acknowledged that Viet Minh
plans for an Indochina settlement did not provide for
"appropriate" international supervision and proposed that
a neutral nations supervisory commission be created to
assist the parties "in implementing the terms of the
agreement on the cessation of hostilities." He also
accepted "in principle" Bidault's proposal that the
agreements reached at Geneva should be guaranteed by
the nine participants in the conference. Molotov's
amendments slightly modified the Viet Minh plan but did
not essentially alter its fundamental provisions, which,
if accepted, would open the way for the extension of
Viet Minh authority over all of Indochina.
The neutral supervision proposal apparently applies
only to a cease-fire agreement. Molotov, while not men-
tioning the Viet Minh rejection of foreign supervision
of elections in the three states, did endorse the Viet
Minh plan for the formation of local commissions to
prepare for and conduct such elections.
Similarly, while accepting the proposal that the
Geneva participants guarantee the agreements reached by
the conference, Molotov rejected the French concept of
individual guarantees and spoke only of consultations on
"collective measures to ensure the implementation of
the agreement." This arrangement would enable the Commu-
nist participants to paralyze the enforcement machinery
and would place the non-Communist powers in a position
of guaranteeing a situation which they could not control.
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Molotov appeared deliberately to have left uncertain
the exact relationship between a cease-fire and a political
settlement. The Communists have thus far suggested that
the two questions are inseparable, and Molotov specifically
rejected an armistice along the lines proposed by Bidault,
that is, a military settlement apart from a political
settlement. Nevertheless, Molotov was careful not to
close the door to the possibility of serious cease-fire
negotiation
settle
Molotov said that the task of the Geneva conference
is "to secure an early cessation of hostilities" and at
the same time to reach such an agreement as would "make
it possible to satisfy the legitimate demands of the
peoples of Indochina." He specified that the drawback
of Bidault's formula was that it did not deal with politi-
cal problems and asserted that it is impossible to separate
the termination of the war from the solution of "at least
some" problems of this nature.
Molotov's formulation was evidently intended as an
inducement to the French to open cease-fire negotiations
and at the same time as a warning that the French would
have to accept some part of the Communist terms as the
price for a cease-fire. The Communists can be expected
to press for acceptance of their maximum demands as ex-
pressed in the Viet Minh proposal of 10 May. If these
are not met, however, Molotov's proposal leaves room to
maneuver the negotiations toward a cease-fire based on
the status quo.
Molotov also warned that the creation of a "new
aggressive bloc" and the establishment of American bases
in Southeast Asia "cannot be regarded indifferently by
those states whose. security is affected" by such plans
and by extended American intervention in Indochina. The
American delegation in Geneva commented that Molotov, by
linking such threats with an apparent disposition to
negotiate, hopes to exploit the negotiations to act as a
brake against American efforts to organize collective
security in Southeast Asia. The delegation judged that the
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Communists believe, by combining these diplomatic tactics
with full exploitation of military possibilities in Indo-
china, they can thwart American defensive efforts, as it
would be difficult to build collective security in an
atmosphere of defeat.
The Communists further continued to attempt to
strengthen their bargaining position by supporting the
claims to legitimacy of the Communist puppet governments
in Laos and Cambodia. Molotov stated that "one cannot
limit the question of the situation in Indochina to
developments in Vietnam" and one Soviet commentary stated
that "Khmer" (Cambodia) and "Pathet Lao" (Laos) partici-
pation at Geneva was "indispensable." The Communists
apparently believe this issue will be an effective bar-
gaining counter, but they have not yet attempted to use
it to block the conference.
While the Communists are avoiding any action which
seems likely to produce a deadlock at Geneva or to provide
the United States with ground for United Nations or Amer-
ican intervention, they appear confident that the course
of events in Indochina and France will work to their
advantage. They appear to anticipate that fighting will
continue simultaneously with negotiations for some time.
This line was reflected in a Viet Minh commentary which
stated, "We still remember the Korean lesson which taught
us that one could negotiate and fight at the same time and
that for two years."
Chinese Communist Role: Premier Chou En-lai played
a minor role in t hi conference, confined largely to
supporting the proposals presented by the Viet Minh and
by Molotov. He told Foreign Secretary Eden on 14 May
that China wished to obtain recognition as a great power
but "was not making this a condition for any settlement."
While the term "UN" was never mentioned in the conversa-
tion, Eden inferred from Chou's remarks and general
approach that he was asking obliquely whether the Chinese
would be admitted to the UN if they behaved.
Viet Minh Role: Since the presentation of their
10 May armistice proposal at Geneva, the Viet Minh repre-
sentatives seem to have retired, leaving their case to
Molotov's sponsorship. Under Secretary Smith reported
that on one occasion Molotov, looking at the Viet Minh
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delegates, pointedly expressed his understanding that
both the French and the Viet Minh would do everything
to facilitate contacts in the field and at Geneva on the
problem of evacuation of the Dien Bien Phu wounded, and
the Viet Minh delegate nodded agreement to his statement.
Molotov on 15 May suggested direct French contact
with the Viet Minh delegation at Geneva as well as field
negotiations on the question of evacuation of wounded.
Vietnamese Position
Bao Dai told Ambassador Heath on 16 May that he
was alarmed by the French proposals for an armistice,
that Vietnam should not be bound by these terms, and
that Vietnam was willing to fight on to the end. He
said he intended to approach the French government to
determine whether French forces would continue to fight
on alongside the Vietnam army.
Bao Dai also stated that an unspecified former
minister of his had received a request for an interview
from Phan Anh of the Viet Minh delegation, and that
Bao Dai had encouraged this meeting, thinking that
Phan Anh and other Viet Minh officials might want to
defect to his government.
Cambodian and Laotian Positions
The Laotian and Cambodian representatives at Geneva
have adopted the position that since they are the legal
governments of their respective territories, there is
no need to hold the elections called for in the Viet Minh
proposal. At the 17 May session the Laotian delegate
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stressed the importance of treating Laos and Cambodia
separately in a working subcommittee of the conference
and achieving a cease-fire as soon as possible.
France continues to maintain its original position
demanding negotiations on an armistice agreement with
internationally supervised controls set up before a
cease-fire is arranged, but Bidault is continuing his
efforts to keep the negotiations open, particularly on
the immediate problem of evacuation of the wounded from
Dien Bien Phu. In the restricted Indochina session on
17 May, he agreed with Molotov's suggestion that con-
tact between delegations interested in this problem
might be maintained at Geneva while the details of evac-
uation were worked out in the field. Bidault asked the
Viet Minh delegate to designate a representative with
whom France might pursue the problem.
As the Indochina conference moved into restricted
sessions, Britain continued to serve as spokesman for
the Western Allies in dealing with the Communist side.
In his capacity as co-chairman of the conference, Foreign
Secretary Eden on 16 May approached Chou En-lai on ways
of hastening concrete negotiations, and suggested the
restricted sessions. Eden also adverted to the dangers
of Viet Minh insistence on "too much" in the way of
Communist gains through an Indochina settlement, and
reportedly also cautioned Chou about pushing the United
States "too far.
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Soviet Union
Molotov's speech on 14 May was given heavy coverage.
Comment on the speech quoted Molotov's warning that the
ending of hostilities in Indochina must not be turned
into a cleverly arranged breathing space for one of the
sides which wished to extend the war, The press and radio
criticized Bidault's proposal as dealing only with condi-
tions for a cease-fire, "leaving the burning problems of
a political settlement to a distant and undetermined
future," in the words of one commentator. "It is clear
that the stopping of the prolonged war in Indochina can-
not be separated from the settlement of at least a few
problems of this type."
Moscow media also criticized American official
sources for alleging that the USSR and Communist China
were interfering in Indochina; this charge is designed
to justify American intervention, Communist propaganda
asserted.
Pravda correspondents writing from Geneva accused
the West o conducting secret negotiations for an exten-
sion of the fighting at the very time that the first
closed meetings at Geneva promised progress. Secretary
of State Dulles' maneuvers against peace were the subject
of most East European Satellite comment. The Americans
are being frustrated by British opposition and by an
awakened public opinion, this comment declared.
Soviet propaganda continued to emphasize the "legit-
imacy" of the three Communist governments in Indochina.
Pravda asserted that the "people of Khmer consider the
resistance government, headed by Son Ngok Min, their only
legal government" and claimed that the "liberated regions"
in Khmer now run in a wide belt from the border of
southern Vietnam to the Khmer-Thai border. Another Pravda
article--captioned "the people of Pathet Lao insist on
their national rights"--asserted that the "liberated
regions constitute more than half the country" and half
the total population.
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Peiping's propaganda on Indochina has continued to
portray China as the exponent of nonaggression and peace-
ful coexistence throughout Asia, a theme also stressed
by Chou in his conversation with Eden. The Asian collec-
tive pact suggested by Chou on 28 April has received
little propaganda play. Peiping has continued to attack
the United States for "wrecking" the Geneva conference
and has warned that if "bellicose elements" in the United
States have their "bullheaded" way, they will be taught
"telling lessons."
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France
Following Laniel's two-vote victory in the vote of
confidence on 13 May, the French National Assembly adopted
a resolution creating a commission representing all non-
Communist parliamentary groups to examine Indochinese
affairs. At the same time, Laniel called a special
meeting of the High Council of National Defense--a body
including the President of the Republic and the heads of
the key civil and military departments--in order to con-
sider what the premier in his speech to the Assembly on
13 May had termed "Draconian measures."
The council decided at its meetings on 14 and 15 May
to send 30,000 reinforcements to Indochina in the "immedi-?
ate future" and to send Generals Ely, Salan, and Pellis-
sier to Indochina on a fact-finding mission. The
generals are to establish a new "high military council"
to replace the Navarre Plan and to be ready for action
if the Viet Minh renews extensive military operations.
Virtually all Paris press comment agreed that Laniel
had merely won a temporary respite on 13 May. Popular
Republican Deputy Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann
admitted he expects a new question of confidence this
week.
The French consul general in New York, anticipating
that Laniel would be defeated in the vote of confidence
on 13 May, expressed to an American representative at the
UN that day the opinion that the government would probably
be replaced by a cabinet under Radical Socialist Pierre
Mendes-France, who favors total abandonment of Indochina.
In Paris, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, publisher of the
French weekly "L'Express," told Ambassador Dillon on 11
May that a group of deputies representing all non-
Communist political parties hoped to replace Laniel with
a government headed by Mendes-France. Servan-Schreiber
said Laniel would fall as soon as "the immediate problem
of Hanoi" is settled.
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Mendes-France's chances, which were not destroyed by
Laniel's 13 May victory, will probably be determined by
members of his own party. While most Radical Socialists
supported the government in the 13 May vote of confidence,
they seem to have made an effort to rally support for him
as a successor to Laniel. Many reject his economic pro-
gram, however, and would probably desert him in a showdown;
hence his actual prospects are probably poorer than they
appear.
If, as the French press is speculating, Laniel's fall
will be delayed until a successor acceptable to a majority
of the assembly deputies is arranged, the premier may be
able to hold on for several weeks. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that he can continue for long to use Geneva as an
excuse to prolong his tenure.
Great Britain
In a House of Commons statement on 17 May, Prime
Minister Churchill reaffirmed Britain's hope for an
"acceptable" and effectively guaranteed settlement in
Indochina, but reiterated that until such a settlement
is clearly seen to be unobtainable, Britain will make no
"final decisions" committing itself on a Southeast Asia
defense system. There is every indication that he has
the full support of public opinion in this position.
Meanwhile, Britain continues to exploit the oppor-
tunity provided by the Geneva conference and the crisis
in Indochina to strengthen relations with the three Asian
Commonwealth members--India, Pakistan and Ceylon--and
Burma and Indonesia, in the hope that they can be per-
suaded to adopt policies more closely aligned with those
of the West. In particular, London wants them to accept
responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing a possi-
ble Indochina settlement. Foreign Secretary Eden has sent
new personal messages to the Indian, Pakistani, and Ceylon-
ese prime ministers, cautioning them that the Viet Minh
proposals at Geneva, if adopted, would surely result in
the eventual absorption of the Associated States by
Communist puppets.
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The American embassy in London has been informed that
Eden attaches great importance to such informal and per-
sonal contacts with Asian leaders. The current presence
of Malcolm MacDonald in Rangoon at the same time as
Madame Pandit is probably related to the British effort.
MacDonald is British commissioner general for Southeast
Asia.
West Germany
Already chafing under what is considered long-drawn-
out French obstructionism on EDC, West Germany found all
but intolerable--and dangerous--the still further delays
which the Indochina crisis threatened to impose on French
policy on this as on other issues.
Chancellor Adenauer sent word to American high commis-
sioner Conant in Bonn that he was under increasing pressure
from party leaders and public opinion as a result of polit-
ical developments in France, lack of progress and the dis-
couraging outlook for the Paris and Bonn agreements, and
the growing confusion and uncertainty in the international
situation. The chancellor said he doubted his ability to
continue to hold the line with the Western Allies for more
than a few months on the present basis of their relations
with Germany. Current indications were that he would be
forced to raise these questions with the Allies this
summer.
Australian minister of external affairs Casey called
publicly on 15 May for a meeting of the American, British,
Australian, New Zealand and French chiefs of staff for the
purpose of reviewing the situation in Southeast Asia.
Without committing Australia to any course of action,
because of pending elections, Casey stated that the only
effective means of preventing Communist expansion in South-
east Asia was through a system of collective security. He
stressed the necessity of obtaining the support of govern-
ments in the area.
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New Zealand's minister of external affairs, Clifton
Webb, expressed himself in almost identical terms on 13
May. There was an urgent need for a Southeast Asian
alliance, he said, and his government had no objection to
opening discussions immediately.
Prime Minister Nehru, opening a foreign affairs
debate in parliament on 15 May, said that Asia's future
depends on what happens in Indochina and Korea. He sug-
gested a loose union of North and South Korea with an
authority created to discuss political problems later
and proposed that the same principle be applied to Indo-
china if and when a cease-fire goes into effect there.
In neither case did Nehru suggest how the basic East-
West differences on the two areas could be reconciled.
He also stated, for the first time publicly, that
India would consider a role in promoting peace settle-
ments in Indochina and Korea. India was not "angling"
for an invitation to Geneva, he said, but if asked could
not avoid going and would "act as we did in Korea."
The Australian delegation in Geneva told Under
Secretary Smith on 16 May that the Indians are worried
about the possibility that France might withdraw pre-
cipitately from Indochina.
The Indian press asserted that Eden's proposals for
Indochina represent the first genuine attempt to find the
greatest common measure of agreement and argued that the
proposals put Communist sincerity to a supreme test. The
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Times of India on 14 May featured a Geneva dispatch
headlined "India likely to head armistice body--Five-
nation supervision in Indochina--Red approval of plan
foreseen."
Pakistan has agreed to participate in a supervisory
arrangement for Indochina if all parties, including the
Communists, agree on a settlement, according to the
British acting high commissioner in Karachi. Pakistan
apparently is not averse to contributing troops for this
purpose.
The Burmese continue to show deep concern over
developments in Indochina. In commenting on the fall of
Dien Bien Phu, the general consensus in the Rangoon press
was that American prestige had suffered. The tone of the
comments was, however, unmistakably sympathetic to the
defenders and there were frequent admonitions to the West
to close ranks and stand firm against the Communists.
The American embassy in Rangoon also discerned--between
the lines--a grim understanding of what might conceivably
happen to Burma.
A recent Reuters dispatch reports "sources close to
the government" have stated that Burma would consider
with "great sympathy" a request from the Geneva powers
to help guarantee peace in Indochina. The American
embassy interprets this to mean that the Burmese assume
such a request would be endorsed by "both sides" and
there would be no need to violate Burma's neutral foreign
policy.
The embassy feels that Burma would take part in an
Indochina settlement only in concert with other Asian
countries. Nevertheless, this report is a further indi-
cation of growing Burmese concern over the establishment
of Communist control in Indochina and suggests a signifi-
cant departure from Burma's strictly "hands-off" policy.
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Indonesia
Press and official comment on Indochina has dropped
off sharply. "Foreign Ministry circles" are reported by
the press to be hopeful that the fall of Dien Bien Phu
will hasten a cease-fire. These circles also reiterate
the government line that the most important factor in
achieving peace is the abolition of French colonialism.
Official comment has been directed primarily
against American proposals for a united front in South-
east Asia. Foreign Minister Sunario stated in a speech
on 11 May that an "independent" foreign policy which led
to the loss of freedom would be useless and that any
Southeast Asian defense arrangement should be composed
only of countries in the area in order to prevent the
return of colonialism.
Philippines
Molotov's speech of 13 May, in which he made much of
the victorious march of communism, was widely criticized
by the Philippine press and radio, particularly because
it contradicted Malenkov's assertion that "coexistence"
is feasible. The Soviet foreign minister's proposal for
an all-Asian alliance was also ridiculed in view of the
fact that Communist China and the USSR were the only
imperialist countries threatening the free countries of
Asia.
While there was appropriate praise for.the defenders
of Dien Bien Phu, the French were accused in the press of
being laggard in the granting of independence to the
Associated States and thereby confusing the issue of
democracy versus tyranny. Manila editors also indicated
concern over what they considered to be Western vacilla-
tion and warned that the acceptance of any "compromise"
plan would result in turning Indochina over to the
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Communists or lead to an even greater war. There has been
a general air of expectancy, however, regarding the
development of an American-led collective defensive
arrangement.
Thailand
Prince Wan, the Thai foreign minister., who is in
Geneva, has agreed in principle to a suggestion by Under
Secretary Smith that Thailand revive its plan of a year
ago to appeal to the United Nations against Communist
aggression in Laos. He felt that his government would
also agree, although there might be some question as to
timing and it may desire to wait until new incidents
occur. The original Thai plan was strongly opposed by
the French and dropped at the suggestion of the United
States.
Meanwhile, both the Thai and Chinese press in Bang-
kok called for Western unity and for action rather than
words.
Japan
In Japan the press interpreted Dulles' 11 May state-
ment that the defense of Southeast Asia is possible even
if Indochina falls as a change by the United States to a
"more elastic" policy reflecting the influence of British
opinion. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun fears the statement will
weaken the French negotiating position.
Although Indochina does not play a major part in
Japanese trade, a Communist victory there would strength-
en current demands from both conservatives and leftists
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for an accommodation with the Peiping regime for economic
reasons. French high commissioner Dejean, who was ambas-
sador to Japan until 1953, believes that Communist
domination of Vietnam would bring about a change in Japa-
nese policy in the direction of a rapprochement with
Peiping.
Press reports indicate that President Rhee, during
his talks with Defense Secretary Wilson, again demanded
the inclusion of South Korea and Nationalist China in
any Southeast Asian defense alliance. Rhee has been
extremely bitter about South Korea's exclusion and,
according to Ambassador Dean, considers the United
States "stole his idea and then left him out and
included weak sisters and colonial powers."
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