SURVEY OF AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300090001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1953
• Content Type: STUDY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
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SURVEY OF AFRICA
A. Race Relations .
B. Political Development .
C. Economic Progress
D. Communist Influence
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. . . . 2
. . . 4
. . . 6
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iii
Part II Current Situation . . . . . 9
A. North Africa . .
B. West Africa .
1. British West Africa
a. Gold-Coast .
b. Nigeria . .
2. Liberia
3. French West Africa .
4. Togolands . .
C. Equat?rial Africa . . .
1. Belgian Congo .
2. French Equatorial Africa
3< French Camero?ns . .
D. East Africa . . . .
1. Bx?itish East Africa .
a o Kenya . . ~ . , .
b. Tanganyika . .
c. Uganda and Zanzibar
2. Ethiopia and Eritrea . .
3. British Somaliland-and Somalia
E. Central Africa . . . .
14 British Central~Africa .
2. Portuguese Africa . . .
3. Madagascar .
. Southern Africa . .
9
Territories
1': High Commission
2. Union of South Africa
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SURVEY OF AFRICA
FOREW?RD
This survey is divided into four sections. The intro-
duction, which treats the entire continent south of the Sahara
and north of the Union, emphasizes the overall problems
affecting Africa. These include race relations, political
development, economic progress and communist influence.
The second section describes the current political and
ecanomic situation in individual countries, with the excep-
tion of .French North Africa and the Union of South Africa,
which are extensively treated in recent NIE publications.
The continent has been divided into geographical areas: West,
Equatorial, East, Central and Southern Africa.
2 February 1953
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SURVEY OF AFRICA
Ie Introduction
Africa, a continent of wide geographic diversity, is cur-
rently experiencing the strains and frictions produced by the
introduction of Western culture, with its techniques of
political and economic organization, into a primitive, largely
non-literate societyo The problems arising from this develop-
ment are aggravated by the racial differences between Euro-
peans,. who direct or enforce these changes, and the Africans<
The pace of change and the seriousness of the resulting
frictions is strongly affected, however, by the peculiarities
of the individual African territories and the varying Euro-
pean-colonial policieso Four main problems have continent-
wide importanceo race relations, political evolution, econo-
mic development and Communist influenced
Ao Race Relations
The most explosive area in African race relations is
the belt of territory from the Cape of Good Hope to
Ethiopia which includes the Union of South Africa, and
the British areas of the Rhodesian, ATyasaland, Tanganyika
and Kenyae Here Europeans have settled in greater num-
bers than elsewhere and have laid claims to a permanently
predominating influence over Africans,
In East Africa their claim is contested by both
indigenous Africans and the Indian immigrantse But at -
tempts to unite these latter groups are hindered by the
Africans? resentment against the Indian traders.-who
dominate small business and money lendinga
Europeans have also settled in Portuguese Angola -and
Mozambique and in the Belgian Congo, but Portuguese and
Belgian policy and practice, combined with the limited
political influence of the settlers, have generally
avoided all save minor irritations between the races.a
In Uganda, British West Africa and French Black
Africa, Europeans are only temporary residents -- officials,
businessmen and missionariese Dissident movements in these
areas are protests against colonial political sta-tun
s
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rather than against the pressure of European settlement.
But here also racial issues are often injected into
purely political and economic disputes. Africans are
sensitive to the universal self-segregation of whites,
and publicity given the racial problems of South Africa
and Kenya has a pernicious effect on race relat~~ns
throughout the continent.
Similarly, the rapid development of the Gold Coast
toward the status of a native independent state has
important racial overtones and generally inspires other
Africans with the hope of self -governments To the
Europeans, it is a forecast of possible future develop-
ment in the settler communities of the Union, British
Central Africa and Kenya. This fear of an independent
African state, in which the European settler communities
would be a minority, influences many whites to judge less
harshly the South African Government, although individu-
ally they deplore many aspects of its racial policy.
B. Political Development
The political development of African territories is
largely conditioned by the traditions and policies of
the European governments.
The British are committed to granting colonial peoples
eventual independence within the Commonwealth. The partner-
ship of all races is regarded as an essential element in
the achievement of this goal. But white settlers, where
they live in significant numbers, believe that Colonial
Office concern for native rights inhibits economic develop-
ment, retards the growth of independent local political in-
stitutions and threatens their own ascendancyA This feeling
lies behind the Kenya Europeans? reiterated demand for
early self-government, schemes for a Central African Fed-
eration of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and a vision of
Capricorn Africa which would indlude all British Central
'and East Africa.
To date only Southern Rhodesia, under complete control
of a white minority, has come close to full dominion status,
a stage attained 3t~ years ago, The Colonial Ctffice retains
control in the other British settler territories--Northern
Rhodesia, Kenya and Tanganyika, European settlers have
gained varying degrees of influence in the legislative
bodies of these colonies, and Africans have been accorded
very limited representation,
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Since- World War II, evolution toward African self-
govern.ment has been rapid-in the Gold-Coast and Nigeria,
where there is no European settler population capable of
fighting British Colonial Office decisionsa The Gold
Coast now has an African prime min?ister9 a legislature
which is practically all-African and African ministers in
-all save ,justice, defense and external affairs and finance
departments, with the promise of complete African control
in the near futureo A relatively well-organized native
political party covers the whole country,~and an indigenous
nationalism is supplanting tribal loyalties,
Nigeria is less advanced, although there is a majority
of African ministers in both the regional and central govern-
mentso Self -government has been retarded by serious tribal
antagonisms and because the northern region, Moslem and
semi-feudal in culture, fears domination by the Europeanized
elite of the coasto During the 1951 elections, an increase
of nationalistic sentiment was reported, though the results
again underlined the regional basis of Nigeria?s political
parties, Sierra Leone, lagging behind the larger terri-
tories, is still troubled by the contrasts between a coastal
urban elite and the mass of interior "bush" nativeso The
Gambia is a political and economic backwatero
The direction taken by British West Africa is anathema
to the Malan government of South Africa and privately
alarms French, Portuguese and Belgian authoritieso
French policy emphasizes African assimilation of French
language and social habits, and the retention of African
territories as nominally autonomous units within the French
Unions Each French territory in West and Equatorial Africa
has been endowed by the 1946 French constitution with ad-
visory territorial assemblies and elaborate electora`1 pro-
ceduresa
In addition, French West Africa and French Equatorial
Africa have elected .Federation councils which advise the
government, "Citizenship" in the French Union has been
granted to all Africans, and each territory elects repre-
sentatives to the French National Assembly, the Council of
the Republic, and to the Assembly of the French Union. In
the most important, the French National Assembly, 80 per-
cent of the representatives from French territories south
of the Sahara are native Africansa
Senegal and the Ivory Coast of French West Africa are
the most politically sophisticated of the French territories,
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but the formal rights granted to French Africans have
been largely vitiated in practice by native inexperience
and incomprehension of political affairs, government pres-
sure for French-minded candidates, gerrymandering and
manipulation of elections, Suffrage is limited and the
territorial assemblies have no effective power,
The Portuguese territories of Guinea, tingola and Bdozam-
bique are constitutionally provinces of Portugal itself..
Colonials and a few qualified natives participate in Por-
tuguese presidential elections; but the administration of
the territories is in the hands of the governors general
and all policy originates in Lisbon< As in Portugal,
the National Union is the only overt political party,
Belgian policy is materialistic paternalism with heavy
emphasis on balanced economic and social development.
Native political advance has been nil, but in both 1951
and 1952 official pronouncements have expressed a belief
that Africans should be mare closely associated with the
administration. Conservative Belgians in the colony
objected strongly, and the only concrete expression of the
new outlook has been the appointment of some African nota-
bles to a council which advises the governor general.
There are no political parties and no elections.
There are three independent countries in the general
area under dfscussion, The Union of South Africa, as a
member of the Commonwealth, is fully self-governing and po-
sesses all the attributes of an independent nation,
Ethiopia, recently united in a federation with Eritrea,
has a long historical record of independent status, but
Western governmental practice and organization have not
penetrated deeply, and the benevolent despotism of the
emperor recalls European states of the 18th century, In
Liberia, an oligarchy descended from freed American
slaves rules the primitive native tribes. The government
party has never been defeated at the polls.
C, Economic Progress
African economic development is based on production
of raw materials for export, Among these are asbestos,
chrome, cobalt, copper, industrial diamonds, manganese,
tantalite, tin, uranium, vegetable fats and oils, cotton,
cocoa and sisal, zany African products are of strategic
importance to the United States and Western Europe.
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The economies of the continent have been relatively
vulnerable; their prosperity has depended on favorable
conditions in Europe and the United States, and a fall
in the world prices of a single commodity often spelled
economic disaster for European investors and brought un-
rest among the Africans of the territory affected. Since
1945 the growing use of commodity marketing boards in
many of the territories, a desire for international action
to soften the effect of price fluctuations, and heavy
world demand have decreased this vulnerability. Neverthe-
less, several African countries rely on a single product
fox? more than 50 percent of their exports< Liberia, rubber;
Gold Coast, cocoa; Northern Rhodesia, copper; and Uganda,
cotton.
In many territories -- especially in Northern and
Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo -- the exploita-
tion of mineral deposits has attracted heavy capital
investment and brought together a large African labor
force in an alien environment. In earlier periods, the
African could fall back in times of depression on his
traditional subsistence economy, but the progress of
specialization of labor and the increase in the number of
Africans who have severed their rural ties and adopted
permanent urban residence is making this increasingly
difficult, The Ten -Year Plan of the Belgian Congo seeks
to balance the economy by developing secondary industry
and an internal market; other territories have not
tackled this problem as systematically.
Two major factors hamper economic development in all
Africa. The first is a shortage of .native labor caused
largely by the uneconomic use of labor in native agri-
culture, poor health of the natives, and lack of skills
and education. The mines of South Africa and to a lesser
extent those of the Rhodesias,needing far more labor than
can be obtained from local sources, have been supplied
from Nyasaland and Portuguese Mozambique. Officials of
the two latter territories are concerned about the social
consequences of male emigx^ation, however, and there is
also a developing industrial need for labor in these
areas which threatens to reduce this supplye
In many regions not served by rails and roads, the
transportation problem limits exports to articles of
small bulk and high value. Even in areas with railroads,
narrow guages, light roadbeds, shortages of rolling stock,
and limited port facilities necessitate tonnage restrictions
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on strategically important mineral exported In general,
the railroad systems of Africa are designed to link
producing areas in .the hinterland with a port and
do not connect with each others Most of the road
syste~is, particularly in the Equatorial regions, are
passable only in the dry seasons
While the majority of Africans are engaged in agri-
culture, the organization of agricultural production
varies widely> Kenya's exports of wheat, pyrethrum,
sisal and coffee come largely from European-run planta-
tion farms, as do the sisal exports of Tanganyikan
Uganda's cotton is native grown, In West Africa, the
Gold Coast's cocoa is grown and gathex^ed by African far-
mers, but graded and sold by a government board. In
Nigeria, the peanut crop in the north and both palm
products and cocoa in the south, are produced by natives,
who also sit on local marketing boardso
As a rule, the level of skills which an African may
acquire and use is higher in areas where there are fewer
white settlerse Practice in-Kenya and Northern Rhodesia
and legislation in the Union and Southern Rhodesia
prevents the African from taking .skilled jobse But an
.African railroad engineer takes over from a white man.
when trains from Rhodesia enter Belgian territory, for
the Congo has a relatively large number of skilled
Africans and is training moreo Many West Africans in
French and British territories are developing industrial
skills, but the majority of those who seek education aim
at becoming white-collar "clerks" and professionals.
There is no color bar in Angola and Mozambique, but the
scarcity of educational facilities retards individual
development,
Although their prosperity is directly related to
world economic conditions, few educated Africans have a
firm grasp of the relations between the two, and the aver-
age African is easily led to believe that a fall in his
income is caused by European employers or buyers who
are increasing their profits at his expensed
D. Communist Influence
Of the.17O,OOO,OOO Africans, relatively few have
attained even a modest degree of education by Western
standards. Among those who have, however, many have
bad some contact with Communist ideas or activitye
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Communism enters Africa overtly by means of (1) prop-
aganda mailed from Europe or issued by orbit diplomatic
posts, (2) Africans, usually students, returning from
Europe or the United States with pro-Communist sympathies
they acquired there, and (3) through contact with Euro-
pean government officials and Labor leaders who are
Communists or through contact with members of UN committees.
Outside of the Union of South Africa, few Africans are
known to have become Communists while living in Africa.
Such anti-American sentiment as is found among Africans
is largely the product- of African visitors' experience
with racial discrimination in the United States.
The Communists adapt. their methods and programs to the
special conditions of Africa -- its lack of a large indus-
trial proletariat, lower educational standards and political
immaturity, inability of many Africans to comprehend polit-
ical ideologies, and the tribal outlook of the average
native. Communism seizes on and exploits local problems,
racial differences, social inequalities, feax?s of economic
exploitation by the whites, and normal resentments of
conquered against conqueror, The Communist leader's cry
is Africa for Africans, coincident with promises of the
spoils resultant from the expulsion of the white man.
The number of persons influenced by specifically
Communist ideology is believed to be greatest in British
West Africa, where Europeanized intellectuals are most
numerous and influea~tial. But even here, only one crypto-
Communist organization, the Peoples Committee for Inide-
pendence in Nigeria, is known to exist. The British party
is believed now to give only advice to West African
Communists, since funds given earlier were probably
embezzled,
The Rassemblement Democratique Africaine party of
French West Africa, centering in the Ivory Coast and with
affiliates in French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons,
was a vehicle for Communist penetration from 1946 until it
broke away in October 1950. Communist influence in French
territories seems to fluctuate more with the changing
prestige of the party in France, reflected by Communist
influence among French officials, than with local agitation.
The Belgian Communist Party has a colonial "commission,"
but the extent of its activity in the Congo is unknown,
Propaganda has been distributed by the Czech Consulate in
Leopoldville.
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There is conflicting information about the operations
of the Soviet Legation and Hospital- in Ethiopia and their
alleged conspiracies to incite Communist agitation in
eastern Africa. There are no Communist parties or overt
activity in the East African area.
Communism is not overtly active in the R~hodesias,
although there have been reports of Communist influence in
the mining unions of the copperbelt area,
In summary, the danger of Communist activity in Africa
is more potential than actual, and lies in the opportunities
presented by the dislocation of African society,- racial
conflict and nationalist activity.
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SURVEY OF AFRICA
II. Current Situation
A, North Africa
French North Africa is not included in this section
because it is treated in the recently issued NIE 69.
B. West Africa
1. British West Africa (Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Gambia)
Extensive constitutional changes leading toward self-
government were. instituted in the Gald Coast in 1950 and
Nigeria in 1951. These events are a source of inspira-
tion to native leaders throughout Africa south of the
Sahara, and the success or failure of this exper~..ment
will probably influence political development elsewhere
on the continent.
The road to West Afriean self-government is beset
with several dangers: (1) the small number of Africans
capable of effectively running an administrative machine;
(2) reliance of the economy on basic agricultural or min-
eral production and consequent inad~ility to adjust quick-
ly to world price changes.; and (3) the revivalistic and
emotional character of the present electorate, political
parties and their leaders.
There is no immediate prospect of any unusual dis-
turbance in British West Africa, certainly none that
threatens any conceivable US interests. British West
Africans' adherence to the free world, however, is not
based on strong democratic canvictions4 Local individ-
uals or groups may look to. Communist example and accept
Communist advice or money if these serve their purposes.
This attitude is not likely, however, to exercise any
extensive influence unless there is a swing toward the
Soviet bloc in the world power balance..
a. Gold Coast
There are no indications that the political course
of the Gold Coast will be altered in the immediate
future, The proposals on further steps toward full
self-government presented by Prime Minister Nkrumah
last October were moderate, and Nkrumah does not now
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seem to wish to proceed hastilyo While there is
always the danger that some new messiah, taking ad-
vantage of the economic problems and strife within
the government, may attempt to outbid Nkrumah, suer
a leader has not yet appearedo
Plans are under way to dam the Vota River and
provide hydroelectric power for smelting the Gold
Coast's bauxite depositso Although actual produc-
tion is several years away, a new port which will
handle the processed aluminum ie now being construc-
ted at Tema near the western frontiers
There is little organized Communist activity in
the Gold Coast, although the flow of propaganda into
the country is alleged to be considerableo The gov-
ernment recently banned the import of WFTU publica-
tions; this step was taken with reluctance by the
African ministers in the Gold Coast cabinet, whose
neutralist tendencies are a product both of their
preoccupation with local issues and of earlier left-
wing contacts of sympathies o'
bo Nigeria
Nigerian nationalism is in its adolescence, The
two principal parties, Azikiwe's National Council of
Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) and Awalowo's Action
Group, draw support almost exclusively from the two
politically awakened southern tribes to-which their
leaders belongs They are currently campaigning for
the support of the peoples of the Moslem emirates in
Northern Nigeria, where traditional native authori-
ties are stronger than in the coast provincesd
The effort to bring the north into the political
life of the whole of Nigeria has dust begun and is
likely to move slowlyo But its further progress will
make obsolete the present constitutional arrangements,
which divide Nigeria into three regions and safeguard
the Northern position, and may usher in a new period
of fermento
Nigeria is the seat of Comra-unist organization and
propaganda in British West African If, as has been
reported, the Communists have begun in the past year
to send hard core agents into Nigeria, it is probably
with an eye to potential unrest both in Nigeria end
'in West Africa generall~a
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In 1951 some Communist labor leaders in Nigeria .
were discredited as a result of financial scandals,
but a new crypto-Communist"group, the Peoples Com-
mittee for Independence, was organized-last springo
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While President ~fo V, So
The 2U,000 descendants of freed American Negro
slaves who compose Liberia's ruling caste are practi-
cally as alien as Europeans to the native Africans of
the country, The government payroll has long been the
principal means of support for Americo-Liberian fami-
man, a acto ctator o the republic, appears to be
in earnest in his attempts to raise the level of public
morality and efficiency, he still has a long way to goo
The government's only real opposition has come from
the aboriginal tribes es eciall the relatively alert
Kro? peopled Tubman is 25X1
establishing an ncreas ng persona ascen ancy over many
of the tribes and that relations have improved under his
regimen
Liberian finances are tied to the export of dubber,
the bulk of which is grown on the Firestone plantationse
Important deposits of high-grade iron ore are being de-
veloped by the American owned Liberia dining Company,
and shipments to the United'States have beguno The
Liberians can be expected to press for an ever larger
.share of the income tram these operationso
New riots, such as those of 1950 which endangered
the rubber plantationse .might temporarily interrupt the
production of Liberian rubber and iron oreo There are
at present, however, no indications of large-scale
labor troubled
Isolated Communist agitators have appeared in Li-
beria from time to time, but the presea~t government has
acted vigorously in these cases and has generally co-
operated with the United States in adopting anti-Soviet
trade control measures,
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3o French West Africa
The political climate of the large, sprawling fed-
eration of French West Africa, eight times the size of
continental France, has cleared since the principal
cause of political disturbance, the Rassemblement Dem-
ocratique Africaiue (RDA), broke with communism in Oc-
tober 1950, After four years of systematic opposition
to the govearnment and adherence to the party line, the
RDA shifted to a general policy of cooperation with the
.French administrationo This was brought about by a com-
bination of pressure from the administration and dissen-
sion in the leadership over the value of association
with communism,
The RDA had been the largest native political party
with an estimated peak strength of 1,000,000 in 1947-48,
but-the dissentious and disaff~ctions due to party tac-
tics, fluctuating enthusiasms of the native members,
counterfires set by other parties, and pressure from
the administration reduced the RDA strength to a proba-
ble 250,000 in 15.51, Though it is still the majority
party in the territory of the Ivory Coast and has some
support in the French Sudan, the RDA has now dropped its
agitation on international issues and concerns itself
with purely domestic problems,
Communism's loss of the RDA has so weakened the Com-
munist movement in French West Africa that for the pres-
ent it constitutes little danger, though Communists are
known to be in the area, The ,potential, however, is
there, and the RDA's earlier success is an example of the
ferment which may be produced by unscrupulous native
leaders-with promises of Africa for the .Africans, no
taxes, and the seizure of the white man's houses and
automobiles,
Outside the few urban centers, the great mass of the
16,500,000 natives are illiterate,and firmly rooted in
the old tribal customs and traditionse Interests are
largely centered on the immediate tribal area and there
is no feeling of nationalism, Anti-French sentiment
exists, but long-time tribal rivalry and mutual dis-
trusts preveut united action. Racial strife is not im-
portant, despite RDA propaganda, due partly to French
ati:itudes, but principally because French West Africa
is not a settlement colony, The relatively small white
population of about 52,000 consists of short-tour gov-
ernment officials, traders, planters, and a few tech-
nical and professional mend
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Politically and economically, the area is in a per-
iod of slow-transition. Native political parties have
only been formed since World War IL, and though-some
3,3?0,000 are eligible to vote on the-local-and terri-
torial level, only about half of this figure do so.
1~ost of them are more concerned with the problem of ob-
taining food. and clothing,
Natives participate in district councils and terri-
torial assemblies, as well as in the Grand Council of
the Federation at Dakar,. the French National Assembly,.
the Council of the Republic and the Assembly of the
French Union, With the exception of the National Assem-
bly, in which French-West Africa has 20 deputies of whom
75 percent are Africans, there bodies are largely advi-
sory. Firm control remains in the hands of the French.
French West Africa has an agricultural economy based.
on peanuts, palm products, rice, cocoa, coffee, cotton
and timber, which account for more than 80 percent of
exports by value. Mineral deposits, aside from diamonds,
bauxite and iron. ore, are relatively unexploited; how-
ever, their production will be greatly expanded in the
next few years. Canneries, sawmills, and plywood fac-
tories are located near the ports of Dakar, Abi,jan and
Conakry. But there is no-heavy industry ;development is
hindered by a shortage of trained labor, poor transpor-
tatioa, absence of large mineral deposits and lack of
capital,
4. Togolands
.The long-standing demand of the 700,000 Ewe-speaking
peoples in British and French Togoland and the Gold
Coast to unite is the outstanding issue in Togoland.
The Ewes have not been satisfied by the administrative
gestures made by French and British trust authorities in
this direction.
In French Togoland-the Ewes, some 175,004 of a total
population of about 1,000,000, initially asked only unity
for their own ethnic group; They are now demanding uni-
fication of the two Togolands and independence in five
years.
In the northern sections of the French territory,
this proposal has aroused strong opposition among the
non-Ewe inhabitants, Abetted by the French administra-
tion, the northerners regard "independence" as a blind
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far annexation to the Gold Coast, They have formed
their own political parties which propagandize locally
and petition the UN in support of either the status quo
or a unified Togoland under French controlo In the
northern sections of British Togoland the natives pre-
fer amalgamation with the northern territories of the
Gold Coasto
Available evidence indicates that the principle of
unification attracts almost all groups in Togoland,
but that wide disagreements over-its farm will not be
resolved easily, especially since they are encouraged
by the administering authorities,
Co Equatorial Africa
le Belgian Congo
The Belgian grip on the Congo remains tight and
paternalistice ?utstanding features of Belgian admini-
stration are its attempts at social engineering and
planned economy. Historical accident gave. the Congo
government a direct a~ad controlling interest in the
mayor mining enterprises; it has utilized this control
and its- profits to provide extensive health and medical.
services, to develop a permanent skilled labor-force,
to stabilize rural and urban populations, and to direct
investment according to a definite but flexible program,
Until very recently the government relegated native
political development to an indefinite future, but it
is now cautiously considering greater African participa-
tion in political affairs, Even the limited gestures
so far announced, however, have provoked strong opposi-
tion from Belgian colonists,
The government is reportedly concerned that there
may be reverberations of the 8enya uprisings among the
natives in eastern Congoa Dissident movements have in
the past sprung up with little warningo While none so
far have seriously menaced Belgian control, natives?
contact with European communication and transportation
techniques may increase their capabilities of disrupt-
ing the flow of strategic materialsa There is also a
danger that the Congo's booming economic development,
based an heavy demand far its mineral and agricultural
products and rapid growth of the European population,
may outstrip the ability of the government to meet the
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accompanying social problems, especially native detribal-
ization,
-The authorities are particularly alert to the possi-
bility of subversive infiltration across Congo fron-
tsetse Strict security measures are reported to have
been taken in the Katanga mineral area, and. the new..
%amina air base will provide. a center .from-which troops
.may be rapidly despatched to any scene of trouble, but
the Congo Surete does not now have effective .control of
many native border crossingso Contact with French Equa-
torial territory to the northwest remains easy, and the
Czech Consulate in Leopoldville has issued propaganda
whose effect and breadth of distribution are unknown,
2, French Equatorial Africa
.There is little present evidence of instability,
social unrest., or of extensive Communist agitation in
French Equatorial Africa,. Many political parties exist,
but no single party is generally supported throughout
t~i+e area> -The Communist Party is small, has little in-
fluence, and there is no present indication of Commu-
nist agitationo ;The Rassemblement ~emocratique Afri-
Caine (RDA), formerly the. vehicle. of. Communists, is
relatively inactive in this area,
The great mass of the 4,040,000 natives of Equa=
torial Africa are. uneducated, socially undeveloped,.
and politically immature,-.They vote for .personalities
rather. than. programs, and loyalties do not extend be-
yond their immediate tribal areaso
Here, as in French Equatorial Africa, there is
little evidence of political instability, .social un-
rest or of extensive Communist agitationo There are
several .political parties, but most of them are primar-
ily-.local in interesto The voters, as elsewhere in
Black Africa, tend. to follow personalities-rather: than
platforms and vote-for their fellow tribesmen, There
is no political party which has a country-wide appeal.
The Communist element is limited in influence, and
agitation comes principally from the Union du People
Camerounais (UPC), an affiliate of the~ormex? ?mmunist-
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The main problem at present, and a possible threat
to future stability because of its nationalistic appeal,
is the agitation for the unification of the two Trust
Territories of the British and French Cameroons, The
UPC from the French Cameroons met with interested groups
from the British Cameroons in August 1951 and formed the
Kamerun United National-Congress to establish a .movement
for .eventual unification. The congress has petitioned
the UN to take action; the movement is new and its
strength unknown. It may become an important factor in
the future.
D. East Africa
1. British East Africa
This area is composed of four separate administra-
tions in various stages of political and economic devel-
opment. They are loosely federated in an East African
High Commission with an East African Legislative Assem-
bly-empowered to act on subjects of common concern in-
cluding railroads, income tax, customs, communications,
aviation and research services,
Kenya, a crown colony and protectorate, is the most
advanced of the group. It is currently beset by a na-
tive terrori$t movement based on sharp racial cleavages,
Tanganyika is a trust territory where the native
political and economic development is less restricted
than in Kenya. Here the, presence of a smaller number
of European settlers has not yet aggravated the under-
lying racial tensions to an inflammatory degree.
The protectorate of Uganda, possessing a well-
established native political and economic system egad a
very small European settYement, is stable and free from
much of the racial strife of East Africa. The protec-
torate of Zanzibar is governed by its hereditary sultan
and is not plagued with political or racial instability.
a. Kenya
Racial cleavages are at the root of the current
disturbances in Kenya. A white minority of about
30,000, less than one percent of the total popula-
tion, controls the fife of the colony, despite the
presence of almost 100,000 Indian immigrants and
over 5,000,000 native Africans. In the Legislative
Council of 54 members, there are six nominated
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African representatives and six elected Indian mem-
bers. The Arab community has two representatives,
while 40 remaining swats are mostly held by Euro-
peans,
The European electorate vehemently opposes
Indian demands for a common electoral role because
it fears that the Indian voters would swamp the
white settlers at-the polls, The settlers demand
that their unofficial representatives of the Legis-
lative Council will continue to equal the total
number of members of all other races,
The terrorist Mau Mau movement has arisen as a
result of the contact between a changing but still
primitive African society and the more advanced
Europeans and Indians. The contact with Western
civilization has brought about cultural and economic
conflict and has produced African leaders with a
smattering of Western education< They, however,
have no opportunity to achieve economic, political
or social.equality9 The-land laws reserve the
choice agricultural areas for the whites, and the
franchise is largely limited to Europeans and
Indians, Some of the frustrated native intellec-
tuals have taken advantage of the vacuum created by
decaying tribal leadership and traditions to gain
influence among Africans by means of secret ritual-
istic organizations,
These organizations, such as Mau Mau or Dini Ya
Msambwa, are pledged to alleviate native land hunger
by seeking to expel the European settlers from their
estates. Despite the presence of British troops,
the current Mau Mau disturbances. have already re-
sulted in over 100 deaths; about 20 were Europeans
and the remainder natives who would not cooperate
with the terrorists, Some of the leaders were in
contact with leftist circles when they studied
abroad. They may make use of Communist tenent and
techniques without actually desiring to further?
Soviet aims,
There appear to be increasing indications of
Communist interest in the Mau Mau. Left-wing law-
yers have volunteered to defend Jomo Kenyatta,
alleged leader of the Mau Mau, The enicience still
suggests, however, that this society is fundamental-
ly not under direct Communist influence but that the
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Communists are using it to embarrass the British
Government. Some of the measures taken against
the Mau Mau are believed to be aggravating instead
of alleviating tensions.
Underlying economic, political and social fric-
tion makes it quite probable that if Sritain sup-
presses the Mau Mau, a similar secret society will
arise within a few years. Eventually, a common
African front overcoming tribal differences may en-
danger the European position in East Africa.
The Mau Mau disturbance has reinforced the
settlers' skepticism toward the British policy of
gradually advancing the Africans' political develop-
ment toward partnership. The inability of the
settlers to control the situation has dimmed their
hopes of making East Africa a "white man's country"
free from Colonial Office control. The immediate
prospect is an uneasy stalemate with the initiative
in the hands of the London authorities, who have
recently appointed a Royal Commission to study the
situation in Kenya.
b. Tanganyika
This trust territory is relatively stable politi-
cally, but recent reports of Mara Mau threats point
up the possibility that the racial situation might
erupt with little warning, The white settler minor-
ity of 16,000 is small in comparison to an Indian
group of over 70,000 and an African .majority of
nearly 8,000,000.
The European minority has mare political and
economic control than its numbers indicate, but less
than the whites in Kenya. In the Legislative Council
of 29 members, only four persons not connected with
the administration are named to represent the
Africans and three the Indian community, while
seven Europeans are selected to represent the settler
and commercial communities.. In addition, there are
15 nominated European officials. The European set-
lers are currently disturbed over the government's
plans to provide parity for all three communities in
the Legislative Council and, as in Kenya, are skepti-
cal of British policy to advance African political
development,
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Because there are fewer I;urcpear~ settlers in
Tanganyika and they hold less land, the problem
there is not so serious as in Eenya, ~.frican pres-
sure ox~ the land has not yet caused native unrest.
A minor land problem, however, was created by the
resettlement of a few thousand Wa Nteru natives who
were evicted from lands takexa for wl~i~te settlers.
This case was brought up before the UI~,
c. Uganda and Zanzibar
A stable political situation exists in Uganda
and 'Lanzibar because of a relatively high degree of
African political development prior to the advexat
of European control, the use of native institutions
for Lsritish indirect rule, and the small size of the
European minority -- only 8,000 out of a total popu-
lation of 5,000,000.
Both areas face economic problems. Ugaaada has
relatively fertile agricultural areas and special-
izes in cotton and cnf.fec, but the contemplated
exploitation of important mineral resources may
change the basis of the economy. Zanzibar faces a
declining revenue caused by a clove blight w~zich
threatens to destroy the mainstay of tYie island?s
econc?my .
~. Ethiopia and Eritrea
The Ol-year old Emperor Haile Selassie is lil~ely to
retain control of the internal politics of Ethiopia for
his lifetime, The Imperial Fcadyguard, the country?s
only effectively orgainzed military forge, is fax~ati--
cally loyal to him, and he is able to pursue a policy of
judiciously balancing modernists against feudal conserva-
tives. A plot agair3st tl~e Emperor?s life was uncovered
in 1351., and the po:~sibili~ty of assassination remains.
Should a coup succeed, it would probakily be followed by
a period of instability, possibly of a s~:rious nature, in
which various cliques contend for power and evea~ the
throne itself.
The principal current problem is the int~;gration of
Eritrea into the federation with .Ethiopia proclaimed in
September 1952. The performance of the Eritrean Assem-
bly has been better than expected, while the Emperor has
taken a conciliatory tone toward 'the ~Foslem majority and
the Ita~.ian calonis~ts. But whether the E~riperor and his
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appointees can exercise their new authority without
alienating the Eritreans remains to be seen.
The l~,ussians maintain a legation, an information
center and a hospital in Addis ;.baba,
Ethiopia has sent a kiattali4n to Korea and return-
ing veterans are reportedl~- enthusiastic about their
treatment there and about tY-e ilnited Mates --- sa much
so that their reassimilatic~n into the Ethiopian home
forces has posed some problems.
3. F~ritish Somaliland and Satnalia
may a assume ~a - ~.n~;reas ng na Iona -
ist activity in the Arab world will find an echo here,
far t1-:e country leas changed little since its earlier
hi.;tory of Moslem fanatici:~m.
The Italian Trust Ad~iinisirration of Somalia is tansy
creating a host of pro--administration splinter parties
to counter the influence of the nationalistic Somali
k''aut League. The present state of the Lea~~ue, the
principal vehicle for anti~~Italian agitation, is diffi-
cul?t to estimate,
The League has been blamed by the Italians for the
death of several officials in a riot at Chisimaio last
August, and, regardless of who was re:~ponsible, such
incidents are likely to recur. Tly?yy will probably not
have any effect rn the character or tenure of the
Italian administration, whose existence depends on fac-
tors outside ~;c~malia. ~3<
E. Central Africa
Three territories in rliff~ering stages of political
and economic evolution c;r~r~xprsse British Central Africa.
Rapid economic strides ,nave ~..~sarranged the normal
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political development of the area and aggravated labor
and racial tensions, particularly i~ Northern Rhodesian
Southern Rhodesia, politically the most advanced of
the region because of its relatively.large European set-
tler population of 15tf,~00, is a self-govera~ing colo~ay.
It has its own prime minister and legislature.-but is
subject to the control of, the British Parliament in
matters affecting defense, foreign relations and native
policyo
The protectorate of Northern Rhodesia is under
Colonial Office supervisi-ono. The. vocal settler and min-
ing-minority of about 40,0? is .critical of the London
policy of advancing African political development,
which has already-resulted in having two Africans
elected to they legislatureo
Nyasaland Protectorate, with only a small.-European
settler population, has two .nominated Africans serving
in the legislatures
The rapid economic growth of the Rhodesian-area
since World: War II is based primarily on increased
mineral revenues, especially from copper, chrome and
asb?stos~ increased tobacco production;-and from impor-
tant development in the metal processing and consumer
goods industries.
This economic development of Central Africa, with
its problems of labor supply, transportation, eapital
requirements and limited. markets, has led local resi-
dents, as well as thepresent British Governauentp to
seek-closer regional coordinationo The settler. groups
who-fear eventual African domination. or e`en easpulsion
of the whites from Africa have also demanded..a strong
Central African state o
Prime ISinistea? Huggins of Southe~?n Rhodesia con-
siders that federation is the middle ground between '
the complete elimination of European leade~?ship, as in
the Gold Coast, and the repressive racial polic~.es of
South Africae
The proposed federation plan calls for a Federal
Assembly of 35 members, in which Southern Rhodesia wall
have 17 memberso Nine members will represent Africaa~
interests; sia~ of them will be nativeso An African
Affairs Board with seven members, of whocr- three will be
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Africans, is intended to prevent discriminatory legisla-
tion by requiring any bill considered against African
interests to be referred to the British Governmento Any
amendments to the constitution would likewise be re-
served for British approvalo The two aorthern terri-
tories will remain protectorates subject to Colonial
?ffice control in their internai affairs4
The representatives of the Central African and the
British. Governments met in London in early .danuary to
discuss modification of the plano In April, a referen-
dum on federation is planned in Southern Rhodesian At
this time, its result is in doubts
It is generally conceded that most articulate
Africans in Central Africa oppose federation because
they fear that it would replace friendly Colonial Office
racial policy, host Europeans yn Northern Rhodesia
favor federation as a way to escape Colonial office
policyd
In Southern Rhodesia, however, settler opinion is
sharply split, Those who fear South African political
and economic influence want a strong central African
state as a bulwark to oppose its sl,read northward Many
feel, however, that Southern Rhodesia may be outvoted in
the Assembly by a ?'black?t north, and that Africans in
the Assembly may lead to their flooding the electoral
rolls, where there are now fewer than 100 registered
African voterse Principal attentio~a is directed to the
African Affairs Board, which the settlers believe will
perpetuate Colonial Office control over native policy;
without significant changes in the board?s ~ur.isdiction,
a favorable vote in the referendum cannot be assured.
A potential for Communist action eacists in the
copperbelt area of Northern Rhodesia which is adjacent
to the uranium and copper-rich Katanga area of the
Belgian Congoa In the copperbelt, Communist control of
the mining unions, or sabotage of the new power network
serving the Katanga, could seriously cripple strategic
mineral productions
20 Portuguese Africa (Angola and Mozambique)
So far as is known, there are no threats to the sta-
bility of the Portuguese administration of these terri-
tories, which contain the termini of the strategic rail
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routes from Central Africa. The authorities are quick
to react against any indication of anti-government
activity. They are suspicious of outside interests and
Portugal frequently prefers to finance development pro-
jects itself rather than accept foreign capital, even
at the cost of slowing the pace of development,
There is same sentiment among the local Portuguese
population far gore self-administration, if not self-
government, and this sentiment is likely to increase as
the colonies develop economieally< In the last few
months the Portuguese Government Maas taken steps to
cement relations by seaading important missions to the
colonies, announcing a development program -- although
a large share of the program was already on the books
-- and promulgating a new Organic Law to revise the
administration of its Overseas Territories.
3> Madagascar
On the surface Madagascar is peaceful though
nationalistist and Communist propaganda continues, The
extremist nationalist party, the Mouvement Democratique
de Renovation Malgache (~iDRM)s which agitated the
plateau +.ribes into revolt in 1947 for an independent
native Madagascar, has been largely eliminated by im-
prisonment and death. The remaining nationalist parties
are intimidated9 demoralised, and reduced in strength.
Before the 194 rebellion some 23 nationalists held
seats in the five provincial assemblies; in 1952 only
three nationalists were elected to one of the five,
Nationalists currently see independence as something
to be obtained in the distant feature, They are limiting
themselves to the lesser targets of enlarging the impor-
tance of Madagascar within the French tTnione increasing
native participation in the administration, and obtain-
ing more education and health facilities.
Though there is some conflicting evidences the
Madagascar Communist Party appears to be small and limi-
ted in influence. Communists` agitations howevers for
immediate and total independence, and their playing on
the residue of resentment among the natives remaining
from French repression of the rebellions eomhined with
continued French opposition to giving the nationalists
even their present lesser targets may in the long run
gain them a substantial audience'.
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F. Southern Africa
1. High Commission Territories: (Basutoland,
Bechuanaland, Swaziland)
These three territories, important to South Africa
as reservoirs of~native labor, are relatively unde-
veloped agricultural areas.- When the Union of South
Africa was founded in 1909, they were left under the
control of Britain with the general understanding that
at the discretion of the British Parliament they might
be transferred to the Union, Since that time, in view
of South African racial policies, Britain has stated
that transfer can only occur-after consultation with the
natives of the three territories.
Although economically dependent on the Union, the
territories are nearly unanimous in their opposition to
South African policy. The Union has long agitated for
their annexation, and leading nationalists have said
that transfer from Britain's control will become an
issue in the South African election scheduled for .April.
If so, the areas may be the subject of a formal South
African request for a transfer; Britain will probably
not agree to it under present conditions.
Tn both Basutaland and Swaziland the political and
economic situations are static and, aside from develop-
ment projects instituted by the Colonial Development
Corporation, no appreciable change is expected,
Traditional government in Bechuanaland has been dis-
located because tribal chief Seretse Kliama married a
white woman and was subsequently exiled from the terri-
tory. Tribal .factions have not yet agreed on his suc-
cessor, while the South African Government vehemently
opposes the return of a chief whose marriage defies the
Union's racial doctrines.
North Bechuanaland is being turned into a gigantic
beef cattle ranch by the Colonial Development Corpora-
tion in an effort to satisfy much of Britain's meat
requirements.
2. Unian of South Afric"oa
The Unian of Sauth Africa is not included in the
Current Situation because NIE 72, probably: Development in
the Unian of South Africa, has been recently completed.
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 A F
R I
C A
APPROXIMATE POPULATION FIGURES*
rP
i
h
Opuletion
n [
ousan
q 4q NATIVES
-__
tls~
tUROPEAN ~ U ERS
_-_ -
-
NORTH AFRICA
19,850
1,750
Alg
7,500
1,000
M ca IFRS) I
-._.
9,100
_. _._
500 1
.__
__ __--
t
___
Tunisia
3,250
250
WES7 AFRICA
50,300
69
25
Franch West Atrica
16,500
52
Go1o Coast
-_.. ___-
4,100 ~
7
. _
-. _.._
_,
- _
Nigeria
24.500
5
EQUATORIAL AFRICA- _
22.750
106
_ 3___
H Ig- Car go
11 250
70
1
french Equ t al AF ica
4,5_00
_ _ 20
_
EAST AFRICA
29,100
58
_
_ 290_
Ethiopia
10.000
_ _ _
_
Kenya --
5.200
_30 _
_ 122
Tanganyika_
_ 7,700
16
_
_ 71
Uganda _
5_000
S
37
CENTRAL AFRICA
20,`_00
367
-
__I7
_
Angola
4_100
_ __ 79_
___
__
Mozambique
5,700
49 _
,_
Northern Rhodesia
1,700
36
3
Southern Rhptlesie
2,000
136
LO
Nyasaland
2,400
3
__ 4
Meda
gasca--
_
4,300
64
__ _
SOUTHERN AFRICA
10,000
2,700
1.500
Union of South Africa
?i Haze hRnres a.e camalate m
8,500
..eR.on;, bw onl
2,640
r salectea cni,mne
1,470
s ara shown.
Con kry IF
F etvxn
Monrovla~.,
l_~ ~a~
SP.4NI~H GUINEA
~ E G Y P
NhT INCLUDED 1 SURVEY
ti /
Q
UATORIAL
FRICA
~- B ELG IAN
C O N G U
T H tlEGHUAN.4LANU
W E 5 T
--- OF --~-
nA~UTIrLANUJ
SOUTH AFRICA
`"'RHODESIA
MqA
Atltlls Ababa +
a:,i Ten., ~ B
"CAIvGANY1KA ~ _ 4
Oust Terr.) .par es Salaam
rx~M~`NL'~
Oo
. aTana/farlve MA VNiifU,s
M.4 D.4GASC.4R tS
r R6UNi(?N~
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~ l1NITED STATES
_ SOVIET
~ (:LECHOSLOVAKIA
REPRESENTATION -
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25X1
?
Legation
O
~
Embassy
Consulate
MA
Military
Attache
O
Consulate General
NA
Naval
Attache
Business
AA
Air Attache
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1
I U.S.
5
21ff12~CI -1'AN