GUATEMALAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF 18 DECEMBER 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300070026-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: November 28, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CON El - lAL
OCI No. 8575/55 ( 1'NTRAT. Tumz+T T Tfl"xTnr., .,.-..__
"E'Y 1'`u ? 3 OFFICE OF `CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
28 ;ovember 1955
TO: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Guatemalan Congressional Elections of 18 December 1955
1. Offices to be filled: Deputies to the entire Congress of
the Republic, a unicameral national legislature. The
66 deputies are to be elected for four-year terms.
Municipal councils are also to be elected in Guatemala's
322 municipalities.
2. Parties or factions participating:
a. National Democratic Movement (MDN): The "official"
party, formed by supporters o esident Castillo
1`2.rrflr?F-, and subsidized by the government. Best orgy;.
is political group. Essentially a middle-of-the-
::oad party, it contains many influential men and
government officials. Greatest weakness is that
its members include many strong personalities of
varying political viewpoints and.it is thus sub-
ject to splintering,
b. National Democratic Association (ANDE): Reconsti-
tute ant c er ca Li eral Party w is ruled Guate-
mala between 1871 and 1944. Considers itself a
moderate group, however, and grants that the pre-
1944 dictatorships were "excessive." Differs from
the MDN mainly on the latter's willingness to com-
promise on the controversial issue of church-state
relations. A few important government officials
are members.
c. Party of Anti-Communist Unification (PUA): Lead-
ing opposition party during the pro-Communist
Arbenz regime, now the party of the extreme right.
Tenuously united with the Independent Anti-Commu-
nist Party of the West (PIACO) which is strong in
Quezaltenango, Guatemala's second largest city.
d. Social Christian Party (PSC): Formed mainly to
oppose tFie an c erica sentiments which have been
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dominant in Guatemalan political life since the revo-
lution of 1870. Enjoys strong backing from the Roman
Catholic Church. Contains an unlikely combination of
partisans, ranging from leftist labor elements to pre-
1870 reactionaries.
e. Social Democratic Party (PSD): Reconstituted moderate
party of the same name which was active 1944-45.
Pledges to support the goals and principles of the
popular democratic revolution of 1944. Anti-Commu-
nist.
3. Outstanding personality: Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, presi-
ent o the republic. Leader of the anti-Communist revolu-
tion of June 1954, his term runs until March 1960. He
backs the MDN, and the MDN as well as all other political
parties claim to support him. No political party has
dared openly to attack him.
4. Present party strength: President Castillo's MDN is,
strongest. It got a head start in building up its organi-
zation and in forming new affiliates throughout the coun-
try. ANDE is probably next strongest. The PUA, still
traveling on its reputation as the leading opposition
party during the Arbenz era, has adopted a negative
approach to the country's problems and probably is weaker
than ever before. The PSC is potentially strong among
partisans of the Catholic Church, but the majority of
politically active Guatemai.ns, though Catholic, hold
anticlerical sentiments.
5. Principal issues: The fundamental issue is support or
rejection of the Castillo administration's basically
middle-cf-the-road policies. Castillo's compromise
stand on the divisive issue of church-state relations
has antagonized die-hard anticlericals (represented by
ANDE) as well as some strong partisans of the church
(PSC and some members of the PUA). His decision to
maintain the basic social gains which emanated from the
1944 revolution, such as social security, labor's right
to bargain collectively, and a modified agarian reform
program, has antagonized extreme conservatives (PUA and
some members of PSC) while leftist and pro-Communist
elements remain hostile. Castillo's friendship for
the United States and charges that the United States
backed Castillo's anti-Communist revolution of 1954 may
be injected into the campaign by leftist-nationalist
CO.NFIDEI' TLA
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1 :A
elements supported by underground Communists. Secondary
issues, such as alleged corruption in government and the
regime's alleged lack of respect for democratic processes,
will be tactically important for the opposition.
6. Principal factors influencing the outcome: Government
support for the MDN and the continued wide popularity
of President Castillo would probably be sufficient in
themselves to assure the MDN of victory. The govern-
ment's sudden scheduling of the election and simultaneous
lifting of the 15-month-long ban on all political parties
only a month before the election gives the "nonofficial"
parties little chance to organize their campaigns. The
government's plan to delay promulgation of the new consti-
tution until after the election means that balloting will
take place without the guarantee of freedom of assembly
and speech. The government, furthermore, will have the
power to manipulate the results of the election.
The electoral law, which is to govern only this election,
contains several provisions which hamper the "nonofficial"
parties. For instance, illiterates, who represent over
half the registered voters, are to be denied the secret
ballot. This enables the government toxecruit.and vote
groups of Indians en masse, a practice frequently employed
by past regimes. The action is contrary to the draft con-
stitution which guarantees the secret ballot to all voters.
7. Background: The Castillo regime has ruled without a con-
stitution and without a congress since it came to power
in mid-1954. In a nationwide referendum in October 1954,
Castillo received the approval of over 99 percent of
those voting. A constituent assembly, elected at the
same time, inaugurated Castillo president for a term to
last until March 1960. The assembly has now nearly
completed a constitution which will probably be promul-
gated with the installation of congress in March 1956.
8. Informed opinion on outcome: The MDN, with government
suppor , is expected to win a working majority in the
congress. It is not a cohesive political party, how-
and party discipline among MDN deputies will prob-
ably be weak.
9. Significance for US security interests: Although the
Castillo regime will not stand or fall on the results of
the election, the balloting will be akin to a vote of
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confidence in the moderate course which the government
has followed since it came to power.
The conviction that the United States was responsible
for the successful anti-Communist revolution of June
1954 which brought Castillo to power is widespread in
Latin America and to some extent in other parts of
the free world. The United States is thus committed,
in these eyes, to a continuing responsibility for the
development of democratic and stable government under
Castillo. High United States officials have frequently
praised Castillo as the leader of the "only people to
emerge from behind the iron curtain." The United States
has programmed a total of $24,500,000 in assistance of
various types to the Castillo government for the 1955-56
fiscal year, thus making Guatemala the recipient of more
direct US aid, exclusive of loans, this year than has
been programmed for any other Latin American country.
HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
.CONFIDED
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