SOUTH MOLUCCAN DISSIDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300050005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 13, 1955
• Content Type: MF

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OCI NO. 0058/55 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COPY NO. OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
3 5 13 January 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: South Moluccan Dissidence
came to a vote in the General Assembly. .
u
on 9 December, the day before the UN resolution on w
The Indonesian government's 5 January declaration of a
state of emergency in the South Moluccas climaxed Indonesian
claims during the preceding month of increased Dutch-supported
dissidence in the area. Both army and government sources, how-
ever, now minimize the situation, and the approximately 2,600
troops and police in the South Moluccas are believed capable
of containing the dissidence.
The "South Moluccan Republic" is a separatist movement
generally supported by the 100,000 Ambonese who inhabit several
of the Moluccan islands. They are extremely anti-Javanese and
are pro-Dutch. Following an unsuccessful military effort in
1950 and 1951, remnants of the South Moluccan army fled to the
island of Ceram where they have engaged in intermittent dissi-
dent activity ever since. Since 1951, the movement on Ambon
has been largely restricted to political subversion.
It appears that active dissidence has re-emerged on Ambon
but on a small scale. The total number of armed rebels is
believed to be less than 200 despite claims of an army of 4,000
by a spokesman for the "South Moluccan Republic" in the
Netherlands.
American service attaches have suggested that the entire
story of Dutch-supported landings on 9 December, their control
by the Indonesians, and the present need for a state of emer-
gency is largely a fabrication. By claiming Dutch interference
in an area not far from New Guinea, Indonesia may hope to
demonstrate the necessity for transferring Netherlands New
Guinea to Indonesian sovereignty. The first reports of Dutch-
supported landings in Ambon from a Dutch submarine were released
WT_ G
inea
DIA review(s) completed.
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On 12 December the army chief of staff corroborated a
statement by the defense minister that the "Ambon incident"
was "insignificant." He said such incidents were customary,
however, in view of the Moluccas' proximity to "Dutch-
occupied West Irian."
On 24 December the Indonesian government denied Australian
and Netherlands press reports--which spoke of "heavy fighting"
in Ambon. The Indonesian government called them a "Dutch
propaganda stunt intended to discredit Indonesia in the eyes
of the world," but admitted that small-scale fighting was
going on.
The government may feel that the reimposition of a state
of emergency in the South Moluccas serves the double purpose
of aiding the military authorities to restore security and
reminding the world of the threat to Indonesian sovereignty
which proceeds from continued Dutch control in West New
Guinea.
HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Assistant Director,
Current Intelligence
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300050005-0