COMMUNIST INTENTIONS TOWARD INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200330016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: September 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 8459 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No.242 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
24 September 1953
COMMUNIST INTENTIONS TOWARD INDOCHINA
Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda has extended the
"campaign for negotiations" to Indochina, but there is no
firm evidence that'Moscow and Peiping are ready to with-
draw their support of the Viet Minh or to take the initiative
in opening truce negotiations.
.Of the three principal courses of action open to the
Communists in Indochina -- an all-out offensive supported
by Chinese forces in an attempt to obtain a military de-
cision; an armistice; or a continuation of a war of attrition,
accompanied by "peace" bids for tactical reasons -- the third
would appear to be their most probable choice.
Increased Soviet propaganda attention to Indochina since
July has featured the theme that there, as elsewhere, the
peaceful purposes of the Communist world are being thwarted
only by American intransigence and aggressive ambitions. To
earlier claims that the Korean'armistice has greatly encouraged
the French people "to struggle for the cessation of the war,"
Moscow has recently added that the armistice has also "rein-
forced the confidence of the Vietnamese people in the possibi-
lity of ending the war and settling Franco-Vietnamese relations
through direct negotiations."
Since early September Peiping's propaganda on Indochina
has followed the line introduced by Moscow in July. Commun-
ist China's Peoples Daily on 2 September, the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam* e glitzanniversary, warned that "only by
applying the principle of settling international disputes
through negotiations" can-France find a solution.
At the same time, however, the Peoples Daily also assured
the Viet Minh that the "Asian people look forward to the "DRV
achieving still greater successes and victories in their
struggle for national liberation," and Molotov expressed
his wishes that the "Vietnam people may score many new victor-
ies in their struggle for the freedom and independence of
their fatherland."
ass.
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negotiate were also conspicuously absent from Ho Chi Minh's
anniversary address. He cautioned against any belief that the
Korean armistice might bring about a relaxation of the struggle
in Vietnam. Claiming that the position of the enemy is "weaker
and weaker," Ho said "our victory is certain on the military
plane" and warned that "peace is possible only when there is
real unification and independence."
In considering whether to continue the war in Indochina,
the Communist leaders enjoy a wider range of courses of action
and considerably greater maneuverability than they had in
deciding to conclude a Korean armistice. Communist planning
of strategy and tactics in Indochina is not subject to the
heavy pressures which induced Moscow and Peiping to make the
substantial concessions necessary to achieve an armistice in
Korea.
The war in Indochina does not occupy such a key role in
the East-West conflict, nor does it generate such dangerous
pressures as to threaten the success of Soviet global strategy
or the security of Soviet territory.
There are three main considerations which distinguish the
Indochina war from the Korean conflict:
First, the geographical remoteness of this war from the
borders of the USSR in itself gives Moscow much greater free-
dom of action The'extreme sensitivity of the Soviet leaders
to potential threats to the security of the Maritime Provinces
and to strategic Manchuria exerted a strong influence toward
caution and restraint in the Korean war,
Second, the armed forces of Communist China have not been
committed. In Korea the heavy commitment of Chinese manpower
exposed the USSR to the danger that, should China be faced
with the destruction of its forces, Soviet troops must be
engaged to protect the USSR's frontiers and to defend its vital
interests in the Far East. In Indochina, the USSR enjoys a much
wider margin of security and maneuverability because Chinese
forces have so far been held in reserve.
Third, the Indochina war has not been "internationalized"
after the pattern of Korea. In particular, US armed forces
have not been committed. France's insistence that the Viet
Minh revolt is the exclusive concern of the French Union and
not a proper subject for UN discussion, much less intervention,
has so far permitted the Communists to escape the military,
political, psychological and economic handicaps which "inter-
nationalization" would generate.
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In addition to these three main distinctions, the Indo-
china war differs from the Korean conflict in that there is
no.heavy Soviet investment in weapons and supplies, the USSR
is not faced with a high rate of attrition.
These considerations presumably form the foundation of
current Soviet policy toward the Indochina war. The primary.
aim of this policy is to preserve and strengthen the military
and political power of the Viet Minh, the strongest "national
liberation movement" in Southeast Asia. In pursuit of this
aim, Moscow is attempting to forestall increased US and possible
UN intervention by oblique diplomatic pressure and by ex-
ploiting public pressure in France for a negotiated settlement
to end the war at almost any cost.
Moscow evidently bases this policy on the assumption that
continued Sino-Soviet support of the Viet Minh will not seriously
conflict with the "peace offensive." The Soviet leaders have
attempted to avoid being charged with responsibility for this
war by portraying it as a struggle against Western colonialism.
There appear to be three principal courses of action open
to those who determine Viet Minh strategy and tactics.
One alternative would call for an all-out Viet Minh offen-
sive, supported by the introduction of Chinese Communist "vol-
unteers" and possibly of Soviet aircraft, military supplies and
advisers, in an attempt to force a military decision. The min-
imum objective of such an offensive would probably be to expel
the French from the strategic Tonkin delta, its maximum objec-
tive to drive the French out of Indochina entirely.
This alternative would involve grave risks for the Com-
munists in view of the recent warnings by American leaders.
The Soviet Union, with the example of Korea before it would
probably not choose this course unless it were prepared to
provoke formidable US-UN retaliation.
The Chinese Communists were capable, throughout the course
of the Korean war, of simultaneous. large-scale intervention in
Indochina. The Korean armistice does not significantly change
the picture. The key consideration is the apparent desire of
both Moscow and Peiping to avoid another Korean-type venture
in the current phase of the world Communist program. An all-
out offensive now, or in the near future, would run counter-to
the whole orientation of Soviet policy since Stalin's death.
A general offensive in Indochina would work to the
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advantage of global Communist interests only as a component part
of a larger, calculated policy of military conquest which would
reach far beyond the borders of Indochina and signal the abrupt
abandonment of the well-established tactical line of the "peace
offensive."'
A second alternative would involve a decision that the
over-all interests and objectives of the Communist world re-
quire an end of the hostilities in Indochina.
There are several avenues through which the Communists
could explore the possible benefits of serious negotiations.
Peiping might make a direct approach to the French, although
it is extremely unlikely that the Chinese would, as the French
hope, be a party to isolating and destroying. the Viet Minh in
exchange for French recognition or any other consideration.
The more likely course, assuming a genuine Communist
interest in negotiations, would be to introduce the Indochina
question in the Korean political conference. Chou En-lai
has twice in recent weeks called for discussion in the con-
ference of "other questions" affecting the Far East. Although
he has also said that the Communists do not wish to discuss
the Indochina question "parallel" with the principal agenda
items of troop withdrawal and Korean unification,they may plan
to put the question forward later in the conference.
The major advantage which might be expected to accrue to
the Communists by concluding an Indochina truce would be the
removal of a situation which might ultimately result in
the military defeat of the Viet Minh or in US armed interven-
tion. Moscow might therefore conclude at some future date
that a truce followed by "political forms of action" might
offer the better_praspect of success, as well as giving the USSR
the opportunity to point out in Paris the advantages of French-
Soviet cooperation on European problems also. Recent Soviet
propaganda reveals Moscow's concern over increased American aid
for Indochina and suggests a genuine apprehensiveness over a
possible commitment of US armed forces.
The disadvantages of an armistice for the Communists
would include the removal of the heavy drain on French man-
power and resources which has substantially reduced French
military power in Europe and strengthened French reluctance
to permit German rearmament.
Because the Indochina peninsula is the gateway to the
rest,of Southeast Asia, an armistice would jeopardize the
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strength and reduce the effectiveness of other. "liberation
movements" in this area. It would weaken a long-standing
Soviet policy of encouraging the "liberation movements"
and might raise fears that their interests will be sacrificed
in favor of broader Soviet.ob,jectives.
So far the French have given little encouragement to
any such Communist hopes for an armistice beyond indicating
their own hope that negotiations may be possible through a
general conference on the Far East. There is no likelihood
that France will go back on its obligations as ?a Western ally,
but it might respond to Soviet offers of negotiation by further
pressing the United States for greater support of French policy.
A third alternative would be a continued war of attrition,
accompanied by "peace" bids and feelers as a form of insurance
on which the Viet Minh could fall back if French successes
threatened to upset Communist plans. This tactic would be
supported by continued aid from China but would not involve
the introduction of Chinese forces.
Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh has been flowing
.at a rate of an estimated 1,000 tons a month during 1953. The
Korean truce may encourage Peiping to increase it. The current
.Communist program in Indochina would seem to present Peiping
with no problems, as Chinese aid at its present or probable
future levels would preserve Viet Minh capabilities without
seriously risking allied retaliation against China.
This course, which for the present at least would avoid
confronting the French with the unequivocal choice between
military defeat and US or UN intervention in force, would
probably be regarded as the most effective method of limiting
the scope of American intervention. Even with greatly in-
creased US financial aid, a continued war of attrition would
still exact a heavy toll in French officers and non-corns
urgently needed to train and staff French forces in Europe.
Another advantage for Moscow would be a demonstration of
consistent support of Asian national liberation movements, the
main instrument of Soviet policy in this area.
Finally, the Communists may believe that a continuation
of military pressure combined with "peace" bids would have a
debilitating effect on the morale of the Vietnamese, who-are
still no match, politically or militarily, for the Viet Minh.
The disadvantages of a continuation of the war of attri-
tion would include the constant risk of an unexpected French
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success which would threaten the Viet Minh with extinction
and bring Western military forces to China's borders.
Another disadvantage would be that the US would be in a
stronger position to urge on the French the necessity of
grant-
ing greater independence and sovereignty to the Associated
States and to train and equip their armies.
The third course of action -- continuation of a war of
attrition, with "peace" bids for tactical reasons -- would ap-
pear the most probable, choice. There are no indications that
Chinese combat forces will be sent into Indochina or that
"volunteers" will be engaged in large numbers in the fighting.
The time does not seem ripe for a genuine Communist ef-
fort to negotiate. No Communist movement in the Far East has
yet been willing to negotiate a military conflict which it was
winning. The Viet Minh are still winning. Should the tide
turn, the current "peace" line could then be put forward ser-
iously.
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