SURVEY OF UNREST IN EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200310019-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 13, 1953
• Content Type: STUDY

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deliveries even though the government has mainly been con-
solidating rather than extending its socialization measures
in the agricultural field for the last two years.
Evidence of concrete acts of resistance has been on
the decline in Bulgaria over the past few years. However,
there is some evidence that antiregime attitudes remain
prevalent and manifest themselves in such things as slogan-
writing and rumor-mongering whenever such events as the death
of Stalin or the peace campaign occur.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
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The unrest which has been endemic in Czechoslovakia during
the past several months was brought to a climax by the drastic
monetary reform and the end of rationing decreed on 30 May.
The increasing tempo of Sovietization during 1952 in-
cited popular disaffection, which was expressed primarily by
means of widespread absenteeism, sporadic strikes and labor
fluctuation in industrial areas, and a growing popular apathy
to the communist program. The government's concern over the
mood of the people is indirectly evidenced by the notable
increase in security measures during the past year, and by
the repeated attempts to convince the people of their general
well being and the popularity of the Socialist program.
Recent events which have tended to aggravate unrest in-
clude the Slansky trial, which is believed to have been un-
popular with a sizable segment of the population, and the deaths
of'Stalin and Gottwald, which may have tended to raise the hopes
oX,.the disillusioned Czechs. In January 1952, false rumors of
an imminent currency reform caused a nationwide buying panic
which worsened the economic condition of a large portion of
the population. The withholding of the 1952 Christmas bonus
caused demonstrations in industrial areas. A step-up in the
collectivization program, increased work norms, shortages of
food and consumer goods, a more stringent rationing program
with a consequent lowering of living standards, an increased
emphasis on security, and deportations from urban areas for the
first time, all increased the latent unrest which was climaxed
by the currency reform.
Word of the imminent monetary reform apparently leaked out
about the middle of May and caused minor riots and a widespread
buying panic. During the last week of May many retail stores
were closed for "inventory" and the government took steps to
reduce the amount of money in circulation. The 30 May decree
which practically wiped out savings and effectively eliminated
all freedom of economic action by the Czech people, stunned the
population.
The American embassy in Prague has reported, and Czech
government propaganda has confirmed, widespread confusion and some
"antistate activities." These apparently consist primarily
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of public demonstrations, a reluctance to accept the new
currency, increased absenteeism, and possibly isolated cases
of riot and sabotage in industrial areas. A large part of the
population is demoralized, and even Communist Party members
and industrial workers who previously were attracted to the
regime have been disaffected by the latest measures.
The Czech regime has increased security precautions in
Prague and Pilsen and probably in the other industrial centers
by increasing the number of people's militia and police, who
are patrolling in small groups with light automatic weapons,
and by intensifying the work of Communist agitators among the
population. However, there is no evidence that violence has
occurred, or that martial law has actually been declared either
in Pilsen or Moravska Ostrava as rumored.
-Although the Czech population is probably more aroused
than 'at any time since the Communist coup, lack of leadership
makes open resistance unlikely. If any develops, the forces
at the disposal of the government are fully adequate to sup-
press it. Individual members of the army, security forces and
Communist mass organizations may have become disaffected by the
recent measures
e
security organizations, however, will undoubtedly remain loyal
to the regime.
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Popular discontent in East Germany, where the vast
majority of the people are opposed to the regime, is believed
to have increased greatly during the past year. This situa-
tion accounts partly for the revision of government policies
announced on 9 June. It is too early to assess the extent io
which this revision will dissipate discontent.
Assuming that the flight of refugees to the West is a
fairly accurate barometer of the general unrest in East
Germany, antipathy toward the government and its policies
may well be at its postwar peak. Although the flow of refugees
into West Berlin fell off somewhat during the initial phases
of the Soviet "peace offensive," recent statistics again re-
flect a record emigration, and West German officials believe
that more than a half-million East Germans will escape from
the Soviet occupation zone during the current year.
The prevailing East German antagonism toward Communism
has been aggravated by government policies such as the
following:
(1) the threat of total isolation of the country from
the West;
(2) the collectivization of agriculture as an ultimate
goal;
(3) the increased exploitation of labor;
(4) the expanded military program with its promise of
enforced military service for most East German
youths;
(5) the harassment of the church with its total sub-
jugation as the eventual objective:
(6) the steady increase in internal surveillance ac-
companied by the invasion of private life;
(7) continuing purges of communist and non-communist
parties and organizations and a prevailing high
level of political tension;
(8) heavy emphasis on military and investment programs
with consequent shortages in consumers' items;
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(9) insistence upon internal and external policies
which make German unity seem only a remote possi-
bility.
Current policy shifts seem to be directed at these
sources of discontent, although their effectiveness is doubt-
ful. Flight from the country remains the most active mani-
festation of widespread opposition to these policies. There
is little evidence of organized resistance, and such possible
centers of opposition to the regime as the non-communist
parties have been largely intimidated. Probably the most im-
portant centers of organized discontent remain within the
churches and in the ranks of labor. In the case of the former,
the measures taken before 9 June against the churches and
their organizations provoked a strong stand from the clergy
which undoubtedly had the sympathy of the population at large.
This was particularly the case in the attacks against the
Protestant youth organizations, the Junge Gemeinden, which
are now evidently to be tolerated. Instances of open de-
fiance from the pulpit in support of the youth organizations
had been reported. Church attendance continues high, and
very few clergymen appear to be deserting their posts.
The high percentage of ordinary working men and skilled
laborers among refugees confirms the frequent reports of dis-
satisfaction in this group. Sporadic protest strikes have
also been reported, and their number is believed to be larger
than can be substantiated. Probably the best clue to the
strength of labor dissatisfaction is the generally conciliatory
labor policy which the government has been compelled to follow.
While most of the typical communist exploitative techniques
have been applied in East Germany, many of these have been
modified in order to avoid a repetition of the serious unrest
which prevailed among workers in 1951.
Equally important but on a less organized basis is the
general discontent among youth and agricultural groups. Dif-
ficulties ficulties faced by the regime in recruiting for the military,
the unsuccessful experiment of the voluntary youth labor
corps, the low morale among the paramilitary units, and the
frequent reports of purges within such communist youth organi-
zations as the FDJ may be indicative of the general attitude.
In an effort to cope with dissatisfaction within the farm
group, the revised policy will reportedly return land to the
farmers who had fled to the West and are now willing to return.
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There have been few overt acts to indicate active re-
sistance in Hungary during the last two months, but there
are signs that the regime still considers that potentially
dangerous discontent exists. On the other hand, there is
some indication that morale has improved compared to the
state close to despair reported last winter.
Special security precautions taken by the regime during
the National Liberation Day (4 April) and May Day celebrations
point to the fact that the government is not satisfied with
the state of mind of the population. Large areas around the
reviewing stand were barred to onlookers on these occasions,
while participants in the May Day parade showed little en-
thusiasm.
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There are signs that the government has inaugurated a
campaign to remove potentially unreliable elements. More
than a hundred-members of the judiciary and several hundred
workers at the high-priority Sztalinvaros Steel Works and
on the Hungarian state railways reportedly have been purged.
The southern areas along the Yugoslav frontier have been
disturbed by a succession of border incidents.
that local government officials sympathize with the peasants.
county for "opposition to collectivization" may indicate
The existence of unrest among the agricultural classes
is indicated by continued governmental pressure to secure
fulfillment of work goals. Several "kulaks" have received
heavy prison sentences recently for failure to work their
land or for abandoning it. The long prison terms given the
chairman and four members of a district council in a southern
The industrial working class has showed signs of apathy
and cynicism rather than of active unrest. However, a slow-
down was reported at the large Rakosi Engineering Works in
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There has been evidence that the Hungarian youth is
dissatisfied with Communist controls. The recent defection
of two popular dancers gives support to this thesis.
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Overt resistance to the regime in Poland is negligible,
but reports indicate that hostile feeling against the regime
and against the Russians continues strong among the population,
most of which is basically and unalterably anti-Russian.
Nevertheless, due to the strong apparatus of control which
has been established over a period of several years, the
regime can suppress any organized manifestation of resistance.
I resistance
among e Polish population is mainly passive in nature, es-
pecially in industry and agriculture. With regard to industry,
a recent speech by the minister of public security confirmed
the fact that sporadic acts of sabotage are occurring in
mines, factories and shipyards. In addition, some unrest
was reported toward the end of 1952 among the labor force,
as a result of increases in working hours and production
norms, particularly in the mines and shipyards. This unrest,
however, never represented a threat to the stability of the
regime. The Communist government which has been stressing
"increased vigilance" by the security forces against such
activity, is fully able to control the situation.
The current heavy agricultural collectivization campaign
is causing certain types of passive resistance, although there
are no indications of any outbreaks of violence such as oc-
curred several years ago. The regime itself is careful not
to directly antagonize the peasants as it has done in the
past. The peasantry, for its part, is resorting to no more
violent actions than taking legalistic means to prevent the
formation of producer cooperatives, or in some cases, break-
ing up meetings organized by Communist agitators to formalize
the formation of collectives.
Following the death of Stalin, reports from Poland indi-
cated an atmosphere of anticipation and expectation of a
change. In the farcical demonstration and parade held in the
streets of Warsaw on the occasion of Stalin's funeral, embassy
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observers reported that not only was the attitude of the popu-
lation marching in the parade not mournful, but gay folk songs
and dances were performed on.the side streets.
Aside from this feeling of relief and anticipation, the
only reliable report of reaction following Stalin's death
came from the Gdansk area in early March. Immediately fol-
lowing a reported skirmish between a small resistance band
and security police at a railway station, and the ensuing
escape of several prisoners, the American military attache
reported observing a two-day manhunt in- the area, in which
all available armed forces were mobilized for the search.
The church continues to tread a cautious line in relation
to the regime, although as recently as 4 June the Polish
Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, spoke out defiantly against it.
In addition, the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic population of
Poland continues to manifest its hostility toward the regime
by work slow-downs, noncooperation in rural areas with the
government's collectivization and resettlement programs,
and most of all, by fervent religious demonstrations and
mass attendance at church.
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The resentment of the Rumanian people toward the Commu-
nist regime and its Soviet sponsors has been aggravated in
recent months by a serious food shortage. Considerable un-
rest was reported in May in Bucharest market places, and it
can be assumed that conditions may be even more stringent in
areas away from the capital.
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One western diplomat was mistaken for a local Communist
official by irate Bucharest crowds who shouted, "Give us food."
Suprisingly enough, even many peasants from the surrounding
countryside were observed in Bucharest bread lines, and re-
tail outlets were reportedly ordered to restrict sales of
unrationed bread to local urban residents only. In the past
week, there appears to have been some slight improvement in
the food situation, with the appearance of early vegetable
crops.
The shortage was due primarily to severe drought in
the summer of 1952, but peasant unrest has been aggravated
by the collection-as-usual program for agricultural produce
and by steady continuation of the collectivization campaign.
measure, reported by the American legation, to force peasants
to sell their surplus produce to trade cooperatives instead
of in the free market will add to agricultural unrest.
Recent government decrees indicate that the regime is
cognizant of popular dissatisfaction. An early May decree
for improvement of the work of trade cooperatives was
sharply critical - an admission that poor organization of
distribution has greatly aggravated the ill effects of the
drought.
IThe decree on the agricultural collection
plan for 1953 also seemed to ease up on measures of compulsion
and made some allowances for extending surrender deadlines.
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In the cities, another step-up in work norms on 1 April
has antagonized the workers, as have increased prices re-
sulting from general shortages and unavailability of certain
basic consumer goods.
Rumors of government hoarding and an impending currency
reform - which caused some anic buying in April - reflect
popular dissatisfaction.
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