RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN NORTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200300029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: May 21, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
21 May 1953
RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN NORTH KOREA
The Soviet Union has been exercising supreme authority in
North Korean affairs and undoubtedly makes the final policy de-
cisions regarding North Korea's role in international affairs.
There are no indications that the war has altered North Korea's
allegiance to Moscow or produced serious Sino-Soviet disagree-
ments over the control of Korea. Future differences cannot be
entirely discounted, however, in view of the increase in Chinese
Communist influence in North Korea during China's two and one-
half year intervention there.
edly limit China's efforts.
Chinese intervention, has probably enabled the Soviet Union to
maintain its predominant influence over North Korean affairs.
Since 1950, however, the Chinese Communists have increased
their participation in North Korean matters, primarily in the
military and economic fields. The Chinese undoubtedly direct
tactical, transport, and logistic activities in the war by
their dominant position in the joint Sino-Korean military
headquarters. They have enhanced their influence in the
North Korean army by integrating Chinese troops into Korean
units and by indoctrinating Korean political liaison officers
serving with Chinese military organizations.
Although Communist China reportedly desires to increase
its economic influence in North Korea, its dependence upon the
Soviet Union for its own economic reconstruction will undoubt-
The Soviet Union has completely dominated North Korea since
its "liberation" by Soviet troops in 1945. After the withdrawal
of Soviet forces in 1948, Soviet control was maintained by plac-
ing Soviet Koreans in government posts and by attaching Soviet
advisers to government ministries and North Korean army units.
Soviet support of the Communist military effort even since the
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Politically, Chinese gains have not been extensive. While
Premier Kim Il-sung's public statements give increasing recog-
nition to China's participation in the war, Soviet advisers
continue to occupy key advisory roles in the North Korean govern-
ment and there is no evidence of comparable Chinese advisers.
Evidence of Soviet control in civic affairs was shown late
last year when Moscow presented the North Korean Labor Party with
important new instructions for tightening party organizations
without coordinating this matter with China. On 27 March, follow-
ing a similar shift in the Soviet Union, the North Korean regime
merged the Ministry of Public Security with the Ministry of In-
terior. This merger, which relegated the Yenan-trained Public
Security Minister to an obscure role and placed a Soviet-
oriented Korean in charge of the combined ministry, was inter-
preted as a Soviet removal of Chinese influence from the Korean
intelligence system.
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There is no evidence that friction has developed between
Peiping and Moscow over the prosecution of the war. Even if a
cease-fire is concluded, both the Soviet and Chinese leaders
will probably consider the continued strengthening of Sino-
Soviet bonds and a joint anti-Western program to be of first
importance. Moreover, the military and economic dependence
of China upon the Soviet Union, as well as the presence of
Soviet advisers in Manchuria, affords Moscow a strong bar-
gaining position for persuading the Chinese to give up their
newly-won position in Korea and accept such other consider-
ations as increased economic and military aid for China's
industrialization.
Eventually, however, the question of primary influence
in North Korea may produce some strains in the Sino-Soviet
relationship. The control of Korea is important to both
parties for reasons of prestige and in terms of each power's
future influence with Japan. Chinese inability to obtain
satisfaction from the West concerning the status of Formosa
and international recognition of China as a price for a
cease-fire may cause the Chinese leaders to resent a return
to the 1950 status quo in Korea.
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While Moscow would probably view the prospect of Chinese
dominance in Korea with disfavor, it may be that the Soviet
Union is no longer completely free to restore North Korea as a
"model" Soviet Satellite. From Moscow's viewpoint, it is vastly
more important to maintain the harmony between Chinese and
Soviet long-range interests and objectives, than to seek to
restore its original position in North Korea arbitrarily.
Should the Chinese, for reasons of prestige, seek to retain
some measure of vested interests in Korea, Moscow may consider
it expedient to accept Chinese proposals in order to avoid
jeopardizing its invaluable alliance with China. Accordingly,
the new balance of influence and control in Korea may result
primarily from a careful weighing by the Kremlin, mindful of
its experience with Tito,-of the political and psychological
factors produced by China's successful reassertion of Communist
control of North Korea.
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