CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200300018-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 13, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION ..i
Vi-I AO. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No. OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
13 May 1953
CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT
During the recent session of the UN General Assembly there
were hints that the USSR was adopting a conciliatory attitude
toward disarmament. In the coming months Moscow may encourage
further UN talks on this subject and make procedural concessions
in order to open big-power talks outside the UN, thereby im-
proving its propaganda position. There is no indication, however,
that the original Soviet position on the control of either con-
ventional armaments or atomic energy has substantially changed.
During the discussion of the Disarmament Commission's
report in the UN in March and April, the tone and content of
Soviet speeches were considerably milder than in the past. In
its draft resolution on disarmament, which was rejected, the
USSR for the first time failed to reiterate its insistence on
disarmament by a flat percentage cut. In addition, it did not
make an outright call for the prohibition of atomic weapons,
suggesting rather that the Disarmament Commission should reach
decisions on "the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons
and the establishment of strict international control over com-
pliance with these decisions."
Furthermore, although the USSR rejected the US-sponsored
14-power resolution on disarmament, the Communist bloc did
accept certain principles which it has rejected in the past.
These were: (1) the basic UN formula for effective international
control of atomic energy; (2) a disarmament program carried out
under effective international control, and (3) the limitation,
regulation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and arma-
ments.
When the 14-power resolution came up for final approval on
8 April, the USSR proposed only-two amendments. The first,
deleting the commendation of the Disarmament Commission's work,
was accepted by the sponsors. The second, deleting a reaffirm-
ation of the Western position on disarmament as approved by
the General Assembly in the fall of 1951, was defeated.
The Soviet attitude was not further clarified in the Pravda
reply to President Eisenhower's five disarmament proposals.
Pravda recalled that the USSR had in the past made its position
nkown-and that, while it did not object to the president's
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SECURITY INFORMATION
proposals, they were too general in nature. Apparently rec-
ognizing disarmament as one of the "contentious international
problems," Pravda emphasized that the USSR was ready for a
"serious, businesslike discussion" of such problems "both by
direct negotiations and, when necessary, within the framework
of the UN . "
In view of Moscow's criticism of the UN as "Western-
dominated," the USSR may prefer to discuss disarmament and
other problems by "direct negotiations." Accordingly, the
Soviet leaders may call for a big-power disarmament conference.
This would be in line with Molotov's statement of 28 April
supporting the World Peace Council's proposal for a five-power
peace pact. The Soviet leaders are aware from past experience
that the disarmament theme can be effectively utilized in prop-
aganda to promote confusion and dissension in the West at little
cost to Moscow.
Both Molotov's answer to the peace partisans and the Pravda
article appear to leave the door open for further disarmament
talks. On the other hand, Marshal Bulganin's official May Day
speech reiterated the call for the further strengthening of the
Soviet armed forces so that they may "be ready at any time to
rebuff the attempts of any hostile forces to interfere in the
peaceful victorious advance of the Soviet people toward its
great goal -- communism." It appears unlikely, therefore, that
Moscow plans to repudiate its doctrine that the Soviet Orbit
must continue to increase its armed strength, particularly at
a time when the West enjoys apparent superiority in atomic arms
and possesses a superior industrial base from which to build
military force.
Moreover, it is improbable that Soviet intransigence will
decrease on such matters as adequate international inspection
of conventional and atomic armaments facilities or the inter-
national control of atomic energy. In the past Moscow has em-
.phasized the view that free inspection inside the USSR would be
a cover for Western espionage. Similarly, it has rejected the
idea of the international ownership of atomic energy facilities
as being an encroachment on its sovereignty. Moscow's extreme
security consciousness and its abiding suspicion of Western in-
tentions make highly unlikely the disclosure of basic Soviet
military and economic strength which is essential to any funda-
mental change in the East-West impasse over disarmament.
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