SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200280002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 28, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

25X1
Approved For Relea
SUMMARY OF
ell' i'd,U
05/03/24: CIA-RDP91T01.1721101A662804W99
Office of Current Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
28 April 1952
ENT IT
TICAL SITUATION.
ortbcoai local elections in southern Its
The diminishing popularity of Premier do Gasperi's Christi*
Democratic Party has tended to strengthen the two political extremes
in Italy at the expense of the middle-of...the-road groups. All the
evidence suggests a loss of votes by the Christian Democrats in the
fort#coming local elections to both the Communists and* to an *Von
greater extent the neo-Fascists (MSI) on the extreme right.
The results may be similar to those of last year's regional
elections in Sicily* when Communist gains were such as to balance
exactly the strength of the Christian Democrats in the Sicilian Regional
Assembly* leaving the neo-Fascists and Monarchists holding the balance
of power. This would stimulate a popular protest vote in favor of the
Communists in the national elections planned for late 1952 or early 25X1
1953.
Despite the moo..Fascist claim to anti-Communiem
'both groups would welcome a modus vivendi. 25X1l. There are also
ineicatlons that the Catholic Action* which exerted important influence
in swinging the 1949 elections to the Christian Democrats* is not anxious
to support de Oasperi in the forthcoming local elections and may desert
him completely in the national elections if his party makes a poor showing
in the balloting starting 25 May.
25X1
Relative strength of the parties:
Less of support for the Christian Democrats was evident in the
1951 local elections in north Italy* when they won 39 percent of the
votes* compered with 48.5 is the 1948 national election and 36.5 in the
1946 local elections. The Communists and Menet Socialists together won
35.2 percent compared with 34.9 in 1948 and 48.8 in 1946. The Monar-
chists and MSI combined won 4.7 percent compered with 2.0 in 1948 and
3.5 in 1946. The MSI alone more than trebled its strength from 1.2 per-
cent in 1948 to 3.8 in 2951.
Despite their loss of popular supper
Christian Democrats were able through the us
control of the municipal councils in most
and central Italy. In some of the south
and Taranto* however* the Communists won a
Relations among the so-called demoOtti
The only outside support of the Chris
the leadership of the Republican Party, the single minority pirty left
25X1
daApproved For Rele se 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP91T01172R000200280002-9
Approved For Release 2005/03/4...CIA-
loch now a
the Chris
Mopubliesss
Cabinet is MO,
in goners' to partic
lier parties have specified
he Christian Democrats have
Promoter de Gasper', has promised set to align
it Italian Social Movesent, following refusal
to join his bloc otherwise.
of the Neserchists and neo-7e and the
mallets is Southern Italy, it expire ed
11 find it expedient to join Somme-
with a Corresponding loss of Democratic
tots sod Monarchists have lined op to-
wive discussions of the possibility of
tat Me blies** aad Democratic Socialists
0002-9
iaa Desocrate 25X
been OUOGOOR-
r*Ill? (Cos-
Socialists
in an
would 1107
them-
sot a
addition to the inherent vekkoesses Of their situation
a Democrat and vaster parties have made specific bleeders durier
In. Foremost is the proposal by Dos &tura?, Catholic elder
a$ for a last-minate electoral alliance is Some with the son-
and-Mesarchist group. Although Sturao has withdrawn his sug-
gestionthe doings demo by his faux :m will make the public suspicious
of possible future deals with tirrialo=4*scists. Moreover, nurse's
*atlas reveals the fear that grips the leadership of the democratic bloc.
The Christian Demo-orate have suffered damage from constant reference
te, the Western powers' 194.0 pre-election samouseement supporting the re-
turn of Trieste to Italy. They also appear usable to benefit from the
present intermational discussions on Trieste. The right-wing bloc, on the
other hand, is,wmploltiag for its own ends the nationalist agitation that
has spread throughout the country.
Another roahmess is the ineptness of the government's aced
labor Witty, Sr4selpally the pey raise bill, restrictions on labor
unions, and proposals for a strictly Christian Democratic labor union.
lryjmn of caspaig5i3O in presr
Since the campaign get underway only in vivant days, there have
been fw reports thus far that would give any specific indication of
the campaign strategy of the various parties. Prow the limited evidencl
at hand, and from knewlodge of tactics pursued in previous elections.
it can be assumed that:
1) The Communists
Attune to **plus
by bringing into their fold aon-Cesmusist
Approved For Release 2005/03/24:
he th. elder
0002-9
25X1
Approved For,Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP91T0117
-3-
statesman Nitti. They will capitalize
and avoidance of a third world var.
000200280002-9
the popular desire for peace
25X1
2) The Christian Democrats will continue to make use of the power
and prestige of the Church; priests will admonish their parishioners to
vote against Communism. The party will emphasize that unless the center
stays in power, economic aid from the United States will cease. The
Catholic Action will ork aim, a campaign to get the Catholic voters to
the polls.
3) The neo-Fa clots will resort to bribery and ntim dation. In
particular, they will stress hypernationalismneutralism, and ant
Communism.
There has been no evidence of any effective counter-propaganda
by the democratic parties, which are notoriously slow to react.
Approved For Release 2
05/03/24: CIA-RDP91T01172
000200280002-9
25X1