RESIGNATION OF MALENKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200250001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION AND "OFFICIAL"
EXPLANATIONS GIVEN . . . .
KHRUSHCHEV'S RISE IN PROMINENCE SINCE
STALIN'S DEATH. . . .. . . . . .
CHANGES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY
IN 1953--THE NEW COURSE. . . . . . . 14
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY . . . . . . . 32
PERSONAL RIVALRY AND STRUGGLE FOR POWER 42
MALENKOV'S ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN
MANAGERIAL ABILITIES* 45'
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER MALENKOV . . . . . . . 47
The Soviet Leadership Since
Malenkov . . . . . . 47
Post-Malenkov Trends in Soviet
Foreign Policy . . . 53
Economic Policy After Malenkov . 57
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . 63
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RESIGNATION OF MALENKOV
INTRODUCTION
A number of differing interpretations have been advanced
to explain the demotion of G. M. Malenkov in February 1955
from his position as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.
At one end of the spectrum of interpretation is the view that
Malenkov's demotion represented his defeat in a struggle for
personal power, with little or no conflict over matters of
domestic or foreign policy involved. At the other extreme
is the view that sharp conflict existed or developed over
policy problems, that in some manner the conflict on these
problems came to a crisis, and Malenkov's ouster represented
the resolution of this crisis. A third interpretation involves
a "scapegoat" theory, according to which continued failures in
Soviet agriculture or consumer goods production required that
someone be "served up" as responsible for the failures.
There are numerous variants of these basic hypotheses.
Variants of the power struggle theory range from rivalry of
the individuals to rivalry of cliques and groups; from devel-
opment of rivalry for heritage of Stalin's mantle to the work-
ing out of long-standing enmities rooted deep in the past.
Of the policy conflict hypothesis, different versions attrib-
ute primary significance to foreign policy issues--Germany,
Communist China, over-all assessment of the contemporary situa-
tion; to domestic issues--agricultural problems and policies,
light versus heavy industry, short-run military requirements
versus longer-run strengthening of the economy; and so on.
Under the "scapegoat" theory, one version is that the
regime failed in its "new course" program for the consumer;
another is that continued failure radically to improve agri-
culture. required that someone.be blamed.
Some analysts have attempted to avoid attributing undue
significance to any one factor or several factors, and instead
view the ouster of Malenkov as resulting from the interaction
of all of the various factors. The problem, in this view,
is to attempt to trace out the pattern and mutually reciprocal
interactions of the various causal factors.
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Each of the above views constitutes a hypothesis and
a problem. Given a factor or"dause,*" to what extent did that
factor actually operate in the Malenkov upset, and how important
a -rol'e, did it play?
The following paper assembles and re-examines the principal
evidence believed pertinent to the leadership problem in the
USSR. The re-examination was directed at ascertaining the
validity of various causal elements in Malenkov's upset. The
paper is not, therefore, an historical "reconstruction" of
Malenkov's ouster and of Khrushchev's rise, a topic which in
itself offers promising opportunities for further research.
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MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION AND "OFFICIAL" EXPLANATIONS GIVEN
The "resignation" of G. M. Malenkov as Chairman,of the
USSR Council of Ministers on 8 February 1955 climaxed a long
period witnessing the rise of N. S. Khrushchev to.pre-eminence
among the Soviet leaders, and more immediately, a period
manifesting signs of controversy among the top leaders of the
Soviet Union.
Specifically, the month preceding Malenkov's demotion
was marked by authoritative Party attacks against "perversions"
of the Party line, allegedly favoring equal or higher rates
of growth in light industry as compared with heavy industry.
References were made to "rightist deviation" in this connection.
A "Stalinist" tone had developed in the political atmosphere:
there was the emphasis on heavy industry;`the references to
"right deviation"; numerous references to a foreign danger
to the USSR and the Soviet bloc; and justification of the
heavy industry line on the grounds of increasing the mili-
tary might of the USSR. Also, late in January a Plenary
Session of the Central Committee was held, and it was announced
that the Supreme Soviet was to convene on 3 February. The
date set for the Supreme Soviet was a month earlier than
usual, and this fact, conjoint with the other indications
noted, created an expectation that important decisions would
be announced.
The Supreme Soviet session itself first witnessed im-
portant revisions of the USSR budget, as compared with-the
1953 and 1954 budgets. Significant changes were a substantial
increase in overt defense expenditures,' a leveling-off of
capital investment, and a substantial retrenchment in alloca-
tion for light industry.
In this setting, the world was electrified on 8 February
by the presentation to the Supreme Soviet of a letter. of
"resignation" from Malenkov. This letter is of considerable
interest in itself, and the text invites certain commentary.
a'. Malenkov based his "request" on "the neces-
sity of strengthening the leadership" of the Council
of Ministers and "the expediency of having /In
this7...post...another comrade who has greater ex-
pertence.'" Further, Malenkov admitted that his?per-
formance was "negatively affected" by "insufficient
experience in local work" and by the fact. that he
did not earlier "effect direct guidance of individ-
ual branches of the national economy."
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The above remarks,, while not exactly false, are not fully
true. Malenkov, although he never possessed the formal title
of Minister, did in fact direct "individual branches" of the
national economy: during the war he was responsible for air-
craft production; from 1943 until at least 1946 he was re-
sponsible for reconstruction in war-devastated areas; from
1947 to 1953 he held high-level responsibility for agriculture.
Also, from 1948 to March 1953, he was the top Secretary, under
Stalin that is, of the Central Committee.
It is interesting to recall that several sources have
averred that Malenkov's political decline in 1946 resulted from
charges by his political enemies of inefficiency and lack of
foresight in Soviet aircraft. manufacture, planning and develop-
ment. Also, Malenkov's leadership in reconstruction of war
damage is believed to have involved him in serious conflicts
with other top Soviet leaders in 1945 and 1946 and to have
been one of the political issues connected with his decline in
1946.
It is also interesting to compare Malenkov's experience
in directing "branches" of the economy with Bulganin's who
succeeded him as Premier. Although Bulganin had been a direc-
tor of Gosbank and was Minister of Defense from 1947 to 1949,
he has had no more experience at the USSR Council of Ministers
level than Malenkov.
b. Malenkov in his next section proceeds to
contradict his own preceding statement by admitting
that "for several years previously (v techenie ryada
let do etogo)" he had the assignment "to control
and guide the work of central agricultural organs
and the work of local party and administrative or-
ganizations in the sphere of agriculture." Malenkov
admitted "guilt and responsibility for the unsatis-
factory state of affairs which has arisen in agricul-
ture."
This is the only specific failing Malenkov discusses.
It very probably refers to the period 1947 to 1955, and makes.
very strong the possibility that he was involved in the
"agrogorod" dispute of 1951, the principal figure of which
was N. S. Khrushchev. It will be recalled that at the
October 1952 Party Congress, Malenkov in his review of domestic
policies remarked that "certain of our leading comrades" had
advanced and supported this "incorrect" policy.
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It will also be recalled that the original charges against
Beria included a reference to opposing reforms in agriculture.
c. Malenkov states, regarding the agricultural
tax reform, "it is opportune to say that it was
carried out on the initiative of and in accordance
with the proposals of the Central Committee of the
CPSU,and it is now evident what an important role
this reform has played..."
This statement, at least technically, is probably false.
The agricultural tax reform was proposed and approved at the
August 1953 Supreme Soviet session; the Plenum of the Central
Committee held in July 1953 concerned itself, so far as is
known, with the Beria case. More important for our purpose
here is a statement made by Khrushchev at the September 1953
Central Committee session on agriculture. Khrushchev said,
concerningthe Supreme Soviet actions on obligatory procure-
ments and tax reform, that "the USSR Council of Ministers
and the Presidium of the Party Central Committee... considered 11
/these measures/ necessary...
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had very p pu a among a peasantry and that they
tended to identify this reform with Malenkov. This seems
very likely, and would explain the contrived effort to dis-
sociate this measure from Malenkov.
d. Malenkov finds it necessary twice to say
that "on the initiative and under the guidance of
the Central Committee" serious and large scale
efforts for surmounting agricultural deficiencies
were being undertaken. Malenkov states that this
program is "based on the only correct foundation:
the further development by every means of heavy in-
dustry." Malenkov adds that only this course can re-
sult in a real "upsurge" in production of "all com-
modities essential for popular consumption."
Interestingly, the above reference to heavy industry is
the only reflection, in the whole official public documenta-
tion of Malenkov's demotion, of a presumed inner-Party con-
troversy concerning the respective rates of growth of light
and heavy industry. As will appear later, there is no real
reason not to believe that Malenkov personally espoused the
so-callecT"consumer goods" program. Yet Khrushchev had tagged
advocates of preferential development of light industry as
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"right deviationists.'" Thus the Malenkov text appears delib-
erately to avoid this issue, so as not to equate Malenkov, at
this stage at any rate, with the "traitors" Bukharin and Rykov.*
Several speculative points can be made regarding this
letter of resignation. The first concerns the emphasis on
inexperience and lack of leadership. One can legitimately
ask: were these "facts" not known when Malenkov was first
made Chairman of the Council of Ministers? The implication is
that Malenkov should never have received this post at all, with
the suggestion that some unusual factors must have operated to
elevate him to this post. This consideration provokes re-
newed speculation regarding the role of Beria in the period
following Stalin's death.
A second point is that these same references may be taken
to signify an element of resentment, and perhaps even revenge,
on the part of the older members of the Presidium, several
of whom are "old Bolsheviks," against the younger "upstart"
Malenkov. This would imply a certain element of personal
friction and animosity between Malenkov and the senior Soviet
leader.
The actual circumstances of Malenkov's ouster are unknown.
It seems almost certain, however, that the matter was decided
at the Central Committee plenum held from 25 through 31
January. For example, on 6 February the US Embassy reported
that members of the Hearst party, which arrived in the USSR
on 25 Janauary, were told they would be received by Bulganin
if they could stay until the conclusion of the Supreme Soviet
meeting. Their numerous requests for an interview with
Malenkov were apparently ignored by the Russians. Furthermore,
the Embassy noted on 6 February that Malenkov's name had not
been mentioned once by speakers at the Supreme Soviet, which
began on 3 February, whereas more than half of the speakers
had referred to.Khrushchev in one way or another. This appears
to reflect an already accomplished shut in power relationships.
Finally, have reported that the
fact of kaiers ti asqq ii ell known in certain
Soviet circles before the Supreme Soviet meeting took place.
Pierre Courtade, speaking on a Cominform broadcast to
France on 3 May, gave an interesting discussion of Malenkov's
demotion. The discussion presented his "resignation" as a
prime example of the workings of the "superior" Soviet "democ-
racy." Inter alia, Courtade stated that "the question had
been discussed previously /To its announcement7 by the Central
Committee of the CPSU, and the deputies of the Soviet parliament
had received exact information on the whole situation."
The Hungarian comrades were not so thoughtful in their
treatment of Nagy.
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Courtade the foreign editor of L'Humanite, earlier had
given Ian account of Malenkov's
"economic s or com ngs, and, w i e denying that there had been
any differences with Malenkov on foreign policy, added that
Malenkov had been prepared to "sacrifice the East German com-
rades" though "not in the same sense" as Beria.*
Ambassador Bohlen reported on 9 February a version of the
Malenkov'ouster circulated by Ralph Parker, correspondent of
the London Daily Worker. According to this story, Malenkov
walked, out o_the Central Committee discussion of economic
problems, and only after this action was the decision made to
replace him. Elaboration of this story was reported on 10
March. According to Parker, who allegedly received the informa-
tion from a Soviet source, it had been Foreign Minister
Molotov who attacked Malenkov at the Central Committee; Khru-
shchev was allegedly absent that day. Molotov charged that
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Malenkov as Prime Minister s brought confusion in the Soviet
economy by overemphasis on consumer goods production. The im-
portant matters were apportionment of vital raw materials.
and of skilled technical workers. Molotov asserted that, in
effect, Malenkov was disregarding or exceeding the instructions
of the Central Committee. Furthermore, according to this
story, Molotov said that Malenkov had encouraged government
workers in various economic ministries to disregard the Party
representatives. The Plenum then reportedly voted against
Malenkov's policies, at which point Malenkov lost his temper
and walked out.**
Yuri Zhukov, a Central Committee member and a deputy
editor of
a vda, took some pains to impress
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T a result of "mere clashes" of personalities or
rivalries. Zhukov assented "emphatically"
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different personalities reflected different nes of policy,
philosophy, et cetera. Zhukov also, in this same interview,
played down the idea that "the military" were taking over the
direction of events.
See -below, page 9, on Beria's alleged views on Germany.
** Ambassador Bohlen, while interested in the idea that it was
Malenkov's recalcitrance that forced the issue, nonetheless
noted tha.t';. Parker's version does not, except on the point
of maladministration, coincide in any respect with the
official overt Soviet line on the demotion.
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A 31 January 1955 Central Committee Resolution, signed
by "all of the members of the Presidium" (including Malenkov?)
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the following accusations:
a. Malenkov lacked decisiveness and experience
to direct the government. He had handled a number
of important foreign and domestic policy matters in-
competently.
b. Malenkov had been politically "near-sighted."
He had been under the influence of Beria, supported
him, and had been blind to the significance of
Beria's proposal to halt efforts to socialize East
Germany and to permit reunification of Germany as
a "bourgeois" buffer state. Malenkov permitted
Beria's "adventuristic" schemes to take place:
specifically the "Leningrad Affair" and the "Yakovlev
Affair." He likewise permitted Beria's rural pro-
gram to be carried out.
c. Malenkov's emphasis on light industry im-
plied a retardation of the tempo of heavy industrial
production. This was a "rightist deviation."
d. Malenkov attempted to seize complete con-
trol of the Party and government.
The only ameliorating statement was; that when Beria's
activities were exposed, Malenkov took a prominent and decisive
role in denouncing and removing him.
Another discussion of the background of Malenkov's de-
motion took place.between the Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow,
Subandrio,and Party First Secretary Khrushchev on 22 March.*
Khrushchev in this interview was outspokenly critical of what
* This section is replete with qualifiers "apparently" and
"reportedly." Four different versions of this interview, or
parts of it, are available, and one cannot be too sure
exactly what Khrushchev did say. Not all of the reports are
first hand.
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it probable that the sense, if not the exact words, of the
conversation is accurately rendered.
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he termed "the previous government," unmistakably referring to
Malenkov. This polemic was startling and practically unprec-
edented,,in.s that one Soviet leader discussed another Soviet
leader with a foreign representative.
Khrushchev was quite critical of Malenkov's administration.
He apparently accused Malenkov of "bureaucratic methods," and
also of placing reliance on the state apparatus, rather than
upon the Party and Party channels.*
Khrushchev reportedly stated that a wrong course had been
adopted in dealing with the problem of demand. Malenkov had
created demands in the Soviet people without having created
the capacity for satisfying them. It-was now clear that the
only proper method of raising the standard of living was through
continued emphasis on the development of heavy industry.**
On foreign matters, so it is reported, Khrushchev stated
that Malenkov had not been sufficiently "strong." He did not
know exactly what he wanted; he was uncertain, weak and con-
fused. Khrushchev asserted that the firmer tone of the Soviet
attitude in foreign affairs, as compared with the "previous
government," should not be taken to reflect aggressive intenT-.
tions, but was designed to "sober" aggressive circles abroad,
especially in the United States. Khrushchev reportedly added
in this connection that the Soviet Union was not afraid of
US bases, since the US must be aware that the USSR could
destroy these bases with "!a blow."
Other lesser Soviet officials have also on occasion
"frankly" discussed Malenkov's alleged managerial and executive
deficiencies with foreigners.
-This aaccusation has not figured in any overt discussion of
the Malenkov affair. Again, what the Russians did not say,
Rakosi in Hungary did--i.e., that Nagy attempted to dis-
regard the Party and to elevate the role of the state ap-
paratus with respect to the Party.
** This is an interesting reversal of Khrushchev's reply to
F ___]question regarding the return to heavy in-
dustry. Kffrushchev said on that occasion that there was no
such "return," since the Party had never removed emphasis
from heavy industry in the first place. Khrushchev said
that Soviet statements had been "misinterpreted" in the
West.
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KHRUSHCHEV'S RISE IN PROMINENCE SINCE STALIN'S DEATH
In the 23 months since Stalin's death, Khrushchev moved
from fifth position in the listings of the all-powerful Party
Presidium to a position of top influence in the USSR.
The stage for his rapid rise was set in March of 1953,
when Malenkov resigned from the Party Secretariat, leaving
Khrushchev as senior man on the body that exercises immediate
supervision over the powerful Party apparatus and controls
most personnel appointments. It was the vehicle for Stalin's
rise to power in the 1920's.
Following the purge of Beria in July of 1953, Khrushchev
moved up to number three position in the listing of the Party
Presidium. Then, in September of that year, a plenary meeting
of the Party Central Committee made him First Secretary of the
Party and heard his report detailing the important new agricul-
tural program.
During the latter months of 1953, Khrushchev continued to
receive considerable publicity in connection with the agricul-
tural program, and in February 1954 he made another highly-
publicized report to the Central Committee outlining the re-
sults and prospects of the agricultural program. By this time.
Khrushchev was receiving more personal publicity than any other
top Soviet leader and had definitely outstripped Molotov to
become number-two man in the hierarchy.
The extent of Khrushchev's rise was fully revealed in
April of 1954 when he and Malenkov each gave a principal address
to one of the houses of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev ap-
pearing before the slightly more important Council of the Union.
During the spring, Khrushchev's personal publicity far
outstripped that of the other Soviet leaders and reached a
point where it threatened 'to shatter the facade of collective
leadership. He was active in many aspects of domestic affairs
and led the Soviet delegation to the Polish and Czechoslovakian
party congresses.
In June, however, Khrushchev's position appeared to suf-
fer slightly. Contrary to previous practice, he apparently did
not give a report on agriculture to the Central Committee meet-
ing and was not publicly associated with its decisions.
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Khrushchev's position again improved markedly in Sep-
tember of 1954, however. He led the well-publicized Soviet
"government" delegation to China and signed the important
Sino-Soviet agreement concluded at that time. On his way back
from China, Khrushchev made an extensive inspection trip
through the Soviet Far East and followed this with a trip
through Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan. These journeys gave
Khrushchev a valuable opportunity to make contacts in many
areas of the USSR and cast him in the role of principal Party
spokesman for many local Party and government officials.
Khrushchev's personal publicity increased during this
period in connection with these trips and his other activities
as Party First Secretary. He was included in lists of Lenin's
co-workers and "leading central committee workers sent directly
to war work" which pointedly excluded Malenkov, and his name
appeared increasingly in the Soviet press.
During the late fall Khrushchev's public activity in-
creased. He acted as principal regime spokesman in an in-
creasing number of fields and, on 7 December he made a
speech to a conference of construction workers which fore-
shadowed the increased emphasis officially accorded the im-
portance of heavy industry later in the month. In a speech
to a gathering of Komsomol members, Khrushchev, contrary to
previous practice, stressed his close personal relationship
with'Stalin, and on 10 January 195y5, Khrushchev's name was
linked with Lenin's when he signed a Central Committee decree
changing the date and character of the celebration of.Lenin's
memory.
Astriking sign of Khrushchev's importance came out of
the Central Committee meeting commencing on 25 January. His
report to the plenum on increasing livestock production heavily
stressed the importance of heavy industry and equated the.posi-
tion of those "woe-begone theoreticians" who had underestimated
its importance with that of Bukharin.and Rykov, politburo mem-
bers who were first demoted and then shot in 1938 for "rightist
deviations." This speech, which occupied six pages of Pravda
on 3 February, the opening day'of the Supreme Soviet session
set the tone for the modification of the "New Course" effected
at that session and made Khrushchev the principal spokesman for
that important shift. The awareness of the Supreme Soviet
delegates as to Khrushchev's leading position was evidenced
by the fact that over half of the speakers mentioned his name
in their reports, while none of them cited Malenkov.
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Since the February 1955 changes, Khrushchev's predominant
position within the Soviet leadership has been confirmed. He
has followed a very aggressive course in implementation of his
agricultural policies, and has participated in the interna-
tional conferences undertaken by the Soviet leadership. Of
particular-interest here was his explicit designation as head
of the Soviet governmental delegation to Belgrade.
While indications of Khrushchev's personal power position
immediately after Malenkov's demotion were somewhat incon-
clusive, the situation had clarified by mid-July 1955, at
which time the US Chargd in Moscow reported that he was
"particularly struck...by the deference which members of the
leadership, including Bulganin, showed to Khrushchev, par-
ticularly when the conversation was on real substance."
In his various public contacts, especially since Stalin's
fall, Khrushchev has revealed himself as an aggressive,
energetic, dynamic and demagogic personality. At receptions
and dinners, he has seemed blunt, uncompromising and generally
tactless, although since Malenkov's fall he has been on "better
behavior" than he was earlier. Khrushchev has been described
as possessing inordinate ambition and confidence, not in the
personal sense but rather in the sense of an executive director
completely identified with his vast and complex enterprise.
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CHANGES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY IN 1953--THE NEW COURSE
conclusively that a significant change in the s econom c
policy occurred during 1953 and 1954 while Malenkov was
Premier. In brief, these changes consisted of a real though
marginal increase in the proportion of economic resources
devoted to raising agricultural production and expanding out-
put of industrial consumer goods, and a leveling off (possibly
an actual decrease), of military expenditures. At the same
time, the regime planned to maintain a rapid rate of heavy
industrial growth.
In late 1953, Soviet internal and foreign propaganda
belabored this new emphasis on welfare of the population very
heavily, shifting in 1954 to emphasis on agricultural pro-
duction. Malenkov's August 1953 speech before the Supreme So-
viet gave the first comprehensive survey of the program under
which the output of agriculture and consumer goods was to be
rapidly expanded "in the next two or three years." Voluminous
public decrees were issued'in September and October 1953 to
implement the individual sections of the program. Other
documents issued by the regime, the published versions of
the Soviet annual budgets for 1953 and 1954,reveal the planned
leveling or possible decrease of military expenditures, and
the continuation of rapid industrial growth.
Four major types of evidence show that during the last
half of 1953 and most of 1954 the Soviet Union seriously in-
tended to implement the changes in policy called for by its
propaganda.
(1) The decrees issued in September and October 1953 to
implement the agricultural and consumer goods programs con-
tained a vast quantity of statistical details concerning
planned output of individual items and specific measures to
be undertaken. Publication of this mass of information would
have been unnecessary if the regime had not intended to carry
out its promises to the population of a better life and greater
material incentives.
(2) During 1953 and 1954, Soviet economic journals pub-
lished numerous scholarly articles attempting to provide
theoretical justification for the planned sharp rises in
agricultural and consumer goods output, which would inevitably
result in a lowering of the proportion (though not necessarily
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the absolute level) of economic resources devoted to the
defense industry sector of the economy. These articles, by
such economists as Ostrovityanov, Vekua, and Mstislavski,
were definitely not intended as propaganda to mislead the
West or even the Soviet population, because of their highly
technical, theoretical nature. They were apparently efforts
to buttress with politico-economic theory actual policies
already introduced by the government.
(3) The impressions gained by US Embassy personnel in
the Soviet Union,
1954, almost uniform y snow a e governmeni was -
ing to implement the consumer goods and agricultural programs.
In many cases achievement was lagging behind planned goals,
but serious efforts were being made.
While the changes of Soviet economic policy in mid-1953
were not of large magnitude in terms of economic aggregates,
and while they caused only marginal changes in the proportion
of total resources devoted to defense, heavy industry, and
consumption, the direction of change was very important.
The change apparently reflected a desire by the then dominant
faction of the regime to devote increased efforts toward
expanding the nation's basic economic and strategic potential
and indicated a serious concern regarding basic economic
weaknesses such as low food production and lagging productiv-
ity, which, in the future, might hinder growth of the USSR's
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strategic power. In 1953 and 1954, the leadership seemed to
feel that these goals were more important than continuing to
increase the already high production of military end. items
and expand the size of its armed forces.
Malenkov's Identification with the Consumer Goods Program.
The emergence in the Soviet press in January 1954 of theoret-
ical polemics concerning the "incorrect" view that light in-
dustry should, in contemporary conditions, enjoy preferen-
tial development relative to heavy industry, engendered wide
speculation concerning a "policy split" between top Soviet
leaders. In this view, Malenkov was identified as the pro-
ponent of the "light industry" program, and the "defeat" of
this program was held to be an indication that he had lost
out. This argument was based on the fact that Malenkov
originally set forth the program in August 1953; that his own
political fortunes appeared to coincide with the ups and
downs of the program in Soviet propaganda; that Malenkov, the
"realist," was more inclined to appreciate the importance of
incentives, whereas Khrushchev had made open statements which
tended to qualify the consumer goods approach, and which were
later in more or less open contradiction with the earlier
formulations. This point of view was given apparent confir-
mation by the "resignation" of Malenkov in February 1955,
by the revised Soviet propaganda line emphasizing the heavy
industrial development, and by the changes in the 1955 budget.
Other serious students of Soviet affairs have questioned
this identification. They have argued that no reliable source
has ever made such an identification, that it had never been
implied by Soviet press material, and that all Soviet leaders,
on appropriate occasions, made appropriate statements reaffirming
support of: ;the -consumer goods program." :- These analysts argue further
that there is no reason not to believe that the program re-
flected a "collective" decision, and that it is therefore
hazardous to assume that Malenkov advocated the program any
more than any other leader. Finally, in,this view, the dis-
cussions in the Soviet press in January 1954 were directed
against "misinterpretations" of the Party line by certain
obscure and little known economists, and therefore should not
be taken as indications of policy controversy.
There are a number of peculiar circumstances in regard
to the consumer goods program. It was propounded by Malenkov
before the Supreme Soviet in August 1953. This in itself was
an unprecedented action, in that the Supreme Soviet had never
previously been the forum for announcement of an important
policy change. Furthermore, despite the fact that some
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preparatory work had already been done on the program,
as evidenced by the incorporation of it in the 1953 budget
presented on 3 August
a
It seems fairly clear that the consumer goods program
was not presented to the Central Committee as was the agri-
cultural program. There is no indication whatever that the
July Plenum of the Central Committee, which considered the
Beria matter, discussed or passed resolutions on consumer
goods production.
Even more interesting are indications that the Sep-
tember Plenum, which considered agricultural problems, also
did not concern itself with the over-all program. Khru
shchevv speech at this Plenum only briefly noted the existence
of this program. Later in his speech, Khrushchev noted, in
connection with the incentive concessions granted to the
peasantry at the August Supreme Soviet session, that the
Government "and the Presidium of the Party Central Committee 11
have considered it necessary...
In September 1953, after the Central Committee session,
several implementing decrees were issued, over the joint
signatures of the Central Committee and the Council of
Ministers, setting forth and elaborating details of the
7 September Central Committee resolution on agriculture,
which was in the nature of a broad policy directive. Each
of these implementing decrees, as is customary, cited the
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authority of the 7 September Central Committee resolution.
Yet there is no indication of the existence of a similar
Central Committee decree on manufactured consumer goods.
Several joint Government and Central Committee decrees of an
implementing nature were issued in October on manufactured
consumer goods and light and food in ucs tries, but in con-
trast to the agricultural decrees, no citation or suggestion
of a broad policy-authorization decree was evident. Further-
more, in none of the speeches given on the consumer- goods
program was there reference to or suggestion of a basic
Central Committee decree on the subject.
These indications suggest that the over-all consumer
goods program was conceived and decided upon solely within
the small top group of Party leaders, and that it was never
presented to the broader Central Committee Plenum, even for
ratification.
This point has been developed at some length, since the
criticisms of Malenkov, as reported by some sources, include
the charge that he placed reliance on the state apparatus
rather than upon the Party and Party channels; one source
went so far as to charge that Malenkov attempted to set the
state apparatus in opposition to the Party apparatus. Khru-
shchev,.on the other hand, has been said to have made the Cen-
tral Committee his base of support, by appealing to it and
presenting his proposals to it. The history of the develop-
ment of the New Course, and in particular of the agricultural
programs, tends to support this analysis.
It is quite true that the Soviet.press has never ex-
plicitly identified Malenkov or anyone else as the originator
or inspirer of this or that particular policy or economic
program. The nearest thing to such an attribution may be
found in Khrushchev's interview with Professor Bernal in
September 1954, published by the Soviet press in December,
and in Khrushchev's January 1955 speech to the Komsomol, in
which he claimed responsibility for a tax law of the Stalin
period. In the Bernal interview, Khrushchev merely failed
to deny Bernal's suggestion that he, Khrushchev, was per-
sonally responsible for the New Lands program.
Both Mikoyan and Kosygin, in their speeches in October
1953, made laudatory reference only to Malenkov in connection
with the over-all consumer goods program. Equally, both re-
ferred to Khrushchev, but only in connection with agricul-
ture. The alternatives were to cite "the Party and Govern-
ment" or the "wise collective" of leaders, and for this
reason the attributions to Malenkov and Khrushchev are thought
to have some significance.
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. The publicity in the Soviet press at the time of Malen-
kov's ouster carefully avoided any suggestion that Malenkov
had favored or advocated the light industry. argument. It has
already been noted that his letter of resignation avoided the
problem and concentrated on his alleged errors in agriculture
and administration. Since the light industry point of view
had been proscribed during the previous month as "right de-
viationism," close to if not actually synonymous with treason,
it is clear that a serious effort was made to avoid identifying
Malenkov with it.
Soviet and Communist sources have been less reticent in
their private contacts, however. The 31 January Central Com-
mittee Resolution on Malenkov explicitly stated that he had
favored the preferential development of light industry and
specifically branded that as a "rightist deviation." This
evidence is of particular importance, since the document was
intended for the information of high Soviet government and
party officials, many of whom were undoubtedly at least
partially aware of the true facts. Khrushchev,in his interview 25X1
with Subandrio, identified Malenkov with the "erroneous" policy,*
and London Daily Worker correspondent Ralph Parker reported a
similar statement bay Communist source. Yuri Zhukov
xplicitly affirmed that policy diffe
of Malenkov's upset.
Another indication of Malenkov's responsibility for the
consumer goods approach is the fact that he alone of the
really important leaders described the program in a glowing
and enthusiastic manner. Other less important leaders who
used similar language were Mikoyan, Pervukhin, Saburov and
Kosygin. These leaders, in their speeches, spoke of the prob-
lem in terms of great urgency and tremendous importance. None
of the other top leaders, in their references to the program,
exhibited this same "enthusiasm" for it. Khrushchevr, in
particular, concentrated on his own agricultural schemes as of
principal and foremost importance.
The role of the manufactured consumer goods program in
connection with Malenkov's emphasis on "material self-interest"
is important. Soviet sources have discussed this at sufficient
Nagy in Hungary was openly branded a "right deviationist" at
the. very beginning of his downfall in March.
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length to permit the conclusion that the two programs were
integrally related. This point is stated more explicitly by
economist Vek'ua,* who, in his article in Problems of Econom-
ics in September 1954, said:
"Under socialism it is impossible to develop
production without a corresponding growth in the
material well-being of the workers.... Without a
constant growth in the material and cultural level
of the life of the workers it would be impossible
to ensure the reproduction of skilled manpower, and
consequently, the mastery of advanced technology.
In the absence of such growth, an increase in the
creative initiative of the workers, and an increase
in labor productivity...would be unthinkable."
"Increasing the material self-interest of
workers in the results of their labor is possible
only under conditions of maximum development of
Soviet trade. In the absence of development of Soviet
trade, economic stimulus by means of differentiation
in the pay scale...cannot yield its proper effect."
11...In proportion as the titanic program cur-
rently planned by the Party and Government for in-
creasing the production of consumer goods is imple-
mented, and as Soviet trade is developed and the
resulting further rapid increase in the purchasing
power of the ruble is effected, the material self-
interest of socialist production workers in the
results of their labor will increase still further."
It is a noteworthy fact that-, in the polemical literature
of December 1954 and January 1955 supporting preferential de-
velopment of heavy industry, little or no reference is made
to "material self-interest" as an important principle of
Party policy.
While the evidence is thus sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that Malenkov probably was principally responsible
for the initiation of the consumer goods approach, it is still
Vekua was severely castigated in articles in Party Life and
Pravda in January 1955 for his theoretical "errors."
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clearly unreasonable to suppose that he was alone in its
advocacy, or that he brought the program into existence
over any strong and unanimous objections of his colleagues.
As has been made only too clear by subsequent events, Mal-
enkov himself never had the political strength singlehandedly
to push throug such a basic revision in the direction of the
Soviet economy.. Nor did Malenkov alone have the strength,
after his decline in late 1953 and in 1954 (relative to Khru-
shchey),tomaintain the consumer goods program through 1954 (as
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It therefore seems evident that Malenkov was supported
by at least a majority within the Presidium, although there
apparently were doubts and reservations on the part of some
of the members.
It thus may very well have been the case that Malenkov's
program (like Khrushchev's later) was adopted on something of
a trial basis by the other leaders and that opinion swung
against Malenkov's "platform" as it was overtaken and super-
seded by the New Lands program and as difficulties and pri-
ority conflicts emerged over the course of time. This view
is supported by Khrushchev's remark to Subandrio to the effect
that "we now know" that the only way to increase supply of con-
sumer goo sa is by continued forced heavy industrial development.
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THE AGRICULTURAL CONTROVERSY
It is generally agreed that the state of Soviet agricul-
ture and different approaches to the solution of this problem
were key issues in the Malenkov ouster. One analysis notes
that "only in the case of agriculture did Malenkov and his
chief contender, Khrushchev, openly adopt positions which
were contradictory, and these were on issues extending back
to Stalin's lifetime."
It will be recalled that agriculture was the only
specific economic problem area discussed in Malenkov's let-
ter of resignation. And, as noted above, agriculture is the
only area in which overtly contradictory indications appeared.
It is an interesting fact, therefore, that agricultural
problems have figured either not at all or only marginally
in the several "private" discussions of the Malenkov de-
motion by Communist or Soviet sources.
The principal events of the period, as related to agricul-
ture, are listed here for convenience:
a. The inauguration of the so-called "New
Course" by the August 1953 Supreme Soviet session,
and Malenkov's major policy speech at that session.
Major concessions in procurements, prices, and
taxation were granted to the peasantry, especially
as regarded livestock raising and fruit and vege-
table growing;
b. The speech of N.. S. Khrushchev at the
September 1953 Plenary Session of the Central Com-
mittee, and the Party decrees and Government decrees
following;
c. The revelation in January and February 1954
of the so-called "New Lands" program at a series of
agricultural conferences in Moscow, and the evident
primary role of Khrushchev, who spoke at each of
these conferences;
d. The Plenary Session of the Central Committee
held in February and March 1954, at which Khrushchev
delivered a major report, and at which a reversal of
emphasis from the August-September 1953 policy was
formalized. Major emphasis shifted to grain pro-
duction, and the New Lands program was formalized.
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e. The Plenary Session of June 1954, at which
Khrushchev apparently did not speak, and at which
concessions in procurements and pricing were granted
to the production of grain, similar to those granted
in August-September 1953 to animal husbandry and to
fruit and vegetable growing;
f. A Central Committee decree of August 1954
,extending the goals of the New Lands program by a
substantial amount;
g. The Plenary Session of the Central Com-
mittee of January 1955, at which emphasis was re-
stored to heavy industrial production, and at which
the "corn and fodder" program was formalized. Khru-
shchev spoke at this Central Committee Plenum. The
"corn" program again signalized a shift in agricul-
ture: substantial areas in the traditional agricul-
tural areas of the USSR were to shift from traditional
crops to corn, represented as a cheap and easy way of
increasing the fodder base of the livestock economy.
It was at this Central Committee session, presumably,
that the demotion of Malenkov was arranged.
Before discussing the apparent respective positions of
Malenkov and Khrushchev on agriculture, it is worthwhile first
to dispose of several subsidiary indications of differences be-
tween the two leaders.
The first of these was the remark by Malenkov concerning
the "agrogorod" policy of 1951 in his speech at the 19th
Party Congress in October 1952. In this speech, Malenkov
stated:
"First of all', it should be noted that cer-
tain of our leading officials have indulged in a
wrong approach, a consumer's approach, to prob-
lems of collective farm development, particularly
in connection with carrying out the amalgamation
of small collective farms. They proposed forcing
the pace of mass integration of villages into large
collective farm settlements, suggesting that all the
old collective farm buildings and collective farmers'
homes be pulled down and large 'collective farm
settlements,' 'collective farm towns' or 'agro-
cities' be built on new sites, and viewed this as
the most important task .... The Party took timely
measures to overcome these mistaken tendencies in
the sphere of collective farm development....
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"It must be further noted that the practice of
setting up auxiliary enterprises for making bricks,
tile and other manufactured goods has become wide-
spread on many collective and state farms .... This
situation must be rectified...."
These references unmistakably refer to Khrushchev, the
sole top-level sponsor and spokesman for the "agrogorod"
concept and also for the subsidiary detail of local construction
by collective and state farms. It is interesting to note
that in his September 1953 speech, Khrushchev reverted to
this idea of :local construction, and again recommended it.
The above statements are of course clearer in retrospect
than they were at the time. The allegation in the January
1955 dedree on Malenkov is worth recalling in this connection,
viz., that Malenkov "permitted" Beria's "rural program" to
be carried out. This cryptic and obscure statement, taken
in connection with the above quotations and with the sub-
sequent evolution of Soviet agricultural policy, strongly
suggests that Malenkov and Beria collaborated in opposing
Khrushchev in 1951.*
The second subsidiary indication of Khrushchev-Malenkov
differences on agriculture is the fact that not once in his
speech of September 1953 did Khrushchev make reference to
Malenkov, who less than one month earlier had expounded the
"new course" in domestic economic policy, including agricul-
tural policy. Later, Khrushchev became increasingly identi-
fied with agricultural policy, expounding the "New Lands"
program in January and February 1954. Curiously enough,
Malenkov in turn made no reference to this latter program
in his election speech in March 1954.
One final point to dispose of before setting forth the
respective positions of Malenkov and Khrushchev is-the matter
of Khrushchev's assertion: of predominance in agricultural
policy in September 1953 and subsequently. He was, as already
noted, rapporteur at the September 1953 Plenum of the Central
Committee. In his speech of February 1954, however, Khrushchev
revealed that,following the September Plenum, numerous' Party
Bureaux of the Republics and Oblasts were required to submit re-
ports on agriculture to the Central Committee, and they were called to
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Moscow to discuss their reports with "the Central Committee."*
According to Khrushchev, "we disclosed shortcomings and arrived
at broad conclusions, but did not adopt decisions; we agreed
to call a plenary session of the given Party committee to
take, up the questions which had arisen. A representative of
the Central Committee attended the plenary sessions and
pointed out... shortcomings...."
Khrushchev was, after this, the rapporteur at the February-
March 1954 Plenum and the January 1955 Plenum of the Central
Committee. He spoke at each of the agricultural conferences
held in January and February 1954, as already noted. He
spoke on other occasions also, principally on agriculture.
In September 1954, in his interview with Bernal, Khrushchev did
not deny Bernal's statement that he, Khrushchev, was personally
"largely responsible" for the "New Lands" program.
While Malenkov and Khrushchev agreed that drastic ad-
vances in agriculture were central to success of one whole
"new course" in consumer goods production, certain, fairly
fundamental differences are evident in their respective
approaches to agriculture.
The first and major difference is Malenkov's apparent
greater realization of the-importance of incentives, as
opposed to Khrushchev's more "orthodox" Bolshevik reliance
on bureaucratic and organizational measures. This supposi-
tion is based principally, although not completely, on analysis
of the published speeches of the two leaders; the conclusion
derives in part from the impressions of the two men carried
away by diplomats and others who have observed the Soviet
leaders.
Malenkov, as is known, publicly inaugurated the "con-
sumer goods" course in his 8 August 1953 speech. In his re-
marks on agriculture in this speech, Malenkov almost com-
pletely confined himself to discussion of the agricultural
tax reform; decrease in obligatory procurements and increases
in state purchase prices; and the encouragement of personal
garden plots and of personally owned livestock.
ese discussions must have been held with the Agricultural
Department of the Central Committee apparatus, with the
Secretariat, and/or with the Party Presidium. Khrushchev
alluded only to the "Central Committee," implying one or
both of the first two bodies mentioned above. These groups
would have been largely under Khrushchev's personal control.
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M"We
In Malenkov's view, "the Government and the Party Central
Committee" found it necessary "first and foremost ...to raise
the economic interest of collective farms and collective
farmers" in developing the lagging branches of agriculture.
(underline added.)
Khrushchev, in his speech a month later, noted that in-
creasing the "material self-interest" of the peasantry was
"of great importance," but added important qualifications:
"However, these measures must be properly
evaluated. Their importance and necessity at the
present time is obvious, but they do not determine
the main path for developing collective farming."
According to Khrushchev, "hundreds and thousands of ad-
vanced collective farms" were successfully meeting the old
delivery norms at the old delivery prices and were neverthe-
less showing a profit. Thus, "this means that the matter
rests not solely on the raising of procurement and
prices but princi purchasing
y on the eve o economic eve opmen
_of a given collective army " under ine a e
To Khrushchev, the principal problem in agriculture was,
and is, the problem of managementand managerial personnel.
"In order to convert /?ur7 potentialities into
reality ...each collective Tarm must be strengthened
in the organizational and managerial aspect and, above
all, intelligent organizers... must be put in admin-
istrative posts on each collective farm."
Further:
"The State has provided everything necessary
to handle work well on every state farm, but farming
results differ completely, depending on the quality of
leadership."
And:
"One has only to place and utilize people cor-
rectly; the apparatus in province, territory and
republic centers must be reduced.,. and good officials
must be transferred to strengthen the district sec-
tor, the collective and state farms and machine
tractor stations."
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The second major difference between Malenkov and Khrushchev
concerned the matter of grain production. This is integrally
related to the third problem area, the'"New Lands" program,
which is principally directed at increasing grain output.
At the 19th Party Congress, Malenkov said:
"The grain problem, formerly considered the
most acute and serious problem, has been solved,
solved definitely and finally."
In his 8 August 1953 speech, Malenkov stated flatly:
"Our country is fully supplied with grain."
Khrushchev, in contrast, said a month later:
"We are in general satisfying the country's need
for grain crops, in the sense that our country is
well supplied with bread...."
"We must ensure further and more rapid growth
in grain yields... this is necessary not only to
satisfy the population's growing demand for bread
but also for rapid advances in all branches of
agriculture."
In his February 1954 speech, Khrushchev repeated the sense
of the above excerpts, but then proceeded to remark only four
paragraphs later:
"It should be noted that the level of grain
production so far has not met all the requirements
of the national economy.... It cannot be overlooked
that until recently some of our personnel did not
wage a sufficient struggle to increase grain pro-
duction. The gross grain crop is inadequate."*
Interestingly, the incentive measures adopted in August
1953 to increase potato and vegetable growing and livestock
production--i.e., decrease in obligatory procurements and in-
crease in purchase prices--were not recommended for grain
production at that time, or for that matter either in the
In his--interview with Bernal in September 1954, Khrushchev
explicitly denied that he had in any way contradicted Malen-
kov, but rather that he, Khrushchev, discussed over-all
grain requirements, whereas Malenkov had talked only of
bread grain requirements.
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September 1953 or February 1954 Plenums which Khrushchev
seemed to dominate. They were however, adopted at the June
1954.Plenum of the Central Committee, the only Central Com-
mittee session concerned with agriculture whereat Khrushchev
was not the rapporteur.
A final area of difference very probably existed with
respect to the entire "New Lands" program. Malenkov viewed
the agricultural problem chiefly, if not completely, as the
problem of inducing the backward and inefficient collective
and state farms to achieve the'production levels of the ad-
vanced collectives. He apparently did not envisage any great
program of expansion of cultivation into marginal or remote
areas. At the 19th Party Congress, a time when Malenkov was
still the top Politburo man responsible for agriculture, he
said:
"Now that the prewar level of sown acreage has
been reached and surpassed, the only correct course
in increasing farm output is to increase yields
comprehensively. Raising yields is the principal
task in farming. In order to meet this task it
is necessary to raise the quality of field work
and reduce the length of time for it, to improve
utilization of tractors and farm machinery, to
complete the mechanization of the basic operations
in farming, to ensure the quickest possible de-
velopment of crop rotation.and the sowing of peren-
nial grasses on collective and state farms, to
improve seed selection, to make proper soil cul-
tivation universal, to increase use of fertiliz-
ers and enlarge the irrigated area. It is neces-
sary to heighten the organizing role of the ma-
chine and tractor stations in the collective
farms, raising the responsibility of these sta-
tions for fulfillment of the plan for yields and
gross harvests and for development of animal
husbandry."
Further, on 10 June 1953, after Stalin's death and shortly
before Beria's purge, an authoritative article in Pravda on
the Communist, Party had this to say of agriculture:
"The Soviet State constantly augments capital
investments in agriculture. Much work has been
undertaken for the mechanization of agricultural
production, for increasing the fertility of the
soil..., and there are also other great measures
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for advancing agricultural production, especially in
the central, densely populated areas of the country
where capital investment may give the greatest
economic results in the shortest possible per od of
Time." (Underline added.)
In his 8 August 1953 speech, Malenkov recommended measures
toward the above ends, although, as earlier noted, he did not
dwell at any length on this aspect of the agricultural problem.
Khrushchev's September 1953 program was on the above
lines, although it elaborated every point to a considerable
extent. Khrushchev did mention expansion of sown areas,
however, and the Central Committee resolution of 7 September
incorporated a brief statement on expansion of sown areas.
In January and February 1954, however, it became evident
.from the speeches at a number of agricultural conferences in
the Kremlin that expansion of sown acreage was being under-
taken on a massive scale. This program was then presented by
Khrushchev to the Central Committee at its plenary session
in late February, and was approved.
The expansion target approved by the Central Committee
was 13 million hectares. This apparently was an increase
from the target revealed in earlier speeches.*
It was stated that the proposed increase of sown area
was merely the beginning of such a program. Khrushchev said
that "during the next two years we must prepare to continue
developing new and more difficult tracts in the East...." In
actual fact, the goals were again raised, to 30 million
hectares, by a Central Committee decree in August 1954.
The new lands program was justified on the grounds that
an urgent and rapid increase in grain production was basic to
a rapid advance in all other branches of agriculture and in
the entire consumer goods program. This note of urgency runs
through all of Khrushchev's discussions of the problem, and
NoA specific totals are available. However, the comparison
can be made by plans for the RSFSR. On 27 January 1954,
Lobanov, RSFSR Agriculture Minister, stated that in 1954
and 1955 4.7 million hectares of new lands were to be tilled.
On 22 February, Lobanov stated that, in 1954 and 1955, the
RSFSR was to develop 6.7 million hectares. It was this
latter figure that was incorporated in the Central Commit-
tee resolution.
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1114 go, -
was forcefully expressed in his interview with Bernal in
September 1954. Also, the new lands expansion was claimed to
be the cheapest way of bringing about a rapid increase.
Furthermore, despite Khrushchev's assertions in his
speeches and in the Bernal interview that more intensive use
of existing agricultural areas remained an essential point
of agricultural policy, he also told Bernal that agricul-
tural machinery produced in 1954 and 1955 would be sent
chiefly to the new lands.
"Consequently, the number of caterpillar trac-
tors this year and next on the old cultivated lands
will not be increased; to these lands will be sent
inter-row tractors, cultivators and other imple-
ments to cultivate the soil, as well as spare parts
for existing tractors."
An essential point both of Malenkov's recommendations
and of Khrushchev's program was the dispatch to the country-
side, especially to the machine tractor stations, of skilled
workers and mechanics from schools and from industry as well.
The new lands program upped the requirements for such per-
sonnel, as well as for agricultural specialists and farm
managers, considerably. Thus personnel for the new lands have
been drawn from the traditional agricultural areas as well
as from industry. While it is impossible accurately to
estimate the impact of these withdrawals on both the traditional
agricultural economy and on industry, it is almost certainly
great.
Finally, in January and February 1955, the Central Com-
mittee formally adopted a further element of Khrushchev's pro-
gram, a significant expansion of corn growing, intended to
provide a fodder base for livestock expansion. The expansion
of corn cultivation is to take place largely, though not completely,
at the expense of area sown to grain in the traditional agri-
cultural areas.
One interesting little thread runs through the documents
concerning the new lands: a continued protestation that the
programs are "realistic" and reasonable. This remark was in-
cluded in the first Central Committee decree on the subject,
in March 1954,whereas speeches during the political crisis
in January and February 1955 made the point that the 1954
successes had proved the realism and reasonableness of the
program, despite h e doubts and trepidation of some of the
"comrades."
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In addition, there can be read into Khrushchev's two
speeches in January 1955--to the Komsomol and to the Central
Committee--a certain triumph over the doubters who had questioned
the new lands program.
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FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY
One of the most debatable and obscure aspects of the
Malenkov affair is the role that foreign policy problems and
issues may have played in it, and the implications that dif-
fering estimates of the international situation may have had
for the level of defense expenditures of the Soviet government.
For the six weeks or so preceding Malenkov's resigna-
tiqn, Soviet propaganda emphasized the need for heavy in-
dustrial development, justifying it by a marked increase in
emphasis on building the might of the Soviet state, the re-
quirements of national defense, and heightened international
tension.
One line of analysis argues that a split in the Presidium
on foreign policy matters was the central and fundamental
factor in Malenkov's ouster. In this view, the leaders dif-
fered in their evaluations of the degree of seriousness of
the world situation; these differences led to correspondingly
different estimates of the defense requirements of the USSR;
and the defense requirements in turn affected the whole range
of domestic issues, but most particularly the problem of the
relative priority to be accorded heavy industry.
Another line of analysis argues that foreign policy
issues, while important, were nonetheless secondary to more
fundamental domestic issues and the issue of power.
A third line of argument denies that foreign policy mat,
ters had much if any relation to the leadership problem.
Analysts holding this viewpoint believe. that Malenkov's ouster
was the result of either a serious domestic issue or a pure
struggle for power. These analysts argue that even the "new
course" in Soviet foreign policy has been consistently applied
by both Malenkov and Khrushchev, reflecting similar appraisals
of the world situation, and that they have pursued foreign
policy aims with a consistency and decisiveness which would
argue against significant differences in policy outlook.
On the other hand, Ambassador Bohlen on a number of
occasions commented on an apparent difference in outlook of
Malenkov'and Khrushchev on international affairs. In Bohlen's
view, Malenkov was inclined to take a more sober and calm
view of the international situation than did Khrushchev. In
addition, the Ambassador interpreted the disparate treatment
of light and heavy industry by the Soviet press in December
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as a sign of division in the top Soviet leadership, and sug-
gested that the problem of the exact course of action to be
followed in the event of ratification Of the Paris accords
may well have brought about a dispute regarding the domestic
economic policies. Bohlen suggested, after'Malenkov's actual
ouster, that a "latent dispute" concerning economic policies
WAR "triggered off" by the problem of German rearmament..
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alarm over the world situation the ro
that brow ht serious agricultural and industrial problems to
a head.*
Government was particularly coucurauu r the course of events
in China, more so than over the German problem. This latter
view is shared by certai
One analysis, based on a detailed textual analysis of
the leaders' speeches,** develops the thesis of controversy
on defense policy during the year preceding Malenkov's ouster,
with Malenkov and Bulganin emerging as principal spokesman
for the two points of view. This controversy, according to
this analysis, was generated by conflicting views on the
implications for international affairs of possession of the
H-Bomb by both the United States and the USSR.
The Malenkov view, according to this analysis, was
apparently that the threat of mutual destruction had made
war less likely and that defense spending might therefore
be stabilized,
The opposing view, propounded by Bulganin, implied that
even with modern weapons war was inevitable, emphasized the
danger of a surprise onslaught, and insisted on continued
strengthening of the armed forces.
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According to this analysis, this policy controversy
continued at least until November 1954, and must have been
an important element in the controversy concerning relative
priorities of light and heavy industry,
Divergent Statements and Outlook of Soviet Leaders
on International Situation and Foreign Policy: After :Ebe
death of Stalin and the purge of era, the Soviet leaders
inaugurated a practice of frequent appearances at diplomatic
or semiofficial receptions and social occasions, and in the
course of these contacts have given some indication of their
temperaments and sometimes their policy views.
Malenkov in his public speeches and personal contacts
gave the diplomatic colony the almost unanimous impression
of a realistic and calm approach to problems of foreign policy.
Malenkov inaugurated the "peace" campaign immediately after
Stalin's death with his remark that there were no outstanding
international issues which could not be settled by peaceful
negotiation. On diplomatic occasions he invariably took a
peaceful line, on one occasion, correcting Khrushchev, who was
making belligerent statements.
All Soviet leaders have expressed this peaceful line
in one way or another, however. The sole instance in which
Malenkov strayed from a "united" position on foreign policy
was in his "election" speech in March 1954 in which he said
that a new world war would signify the "destruction of world
civilization," which in turn made it imperative, according
to Malenkov, to settle problems by negotiation rather than
by resort to arms. Malenkov was the only top Soviet leader
ever to.give voice to this phrase.
Significantly, Malenkov a month later returned to the
standard formulation concerning this problem; i.e., in his
speech at the April 1954 Supreme Soviet session he said that
anew world war would result in the destruction of capitalism,
a tacit repudiation of his earlier remark.
In his speech at the Supreme Soviet in February 1955,
Molotov explicitly repudiated Malenkov's formulation, asserting
that a new war would not mean the end of "world civilization"
but only of capitalism. Since then there has been sustained
discussion of this thesis in Kommunistt and other Soviet
publications. In these articles, the idea of the destruction
of civilization is rejected as "theoretically erroneous" and
"politically harmful." Acceptance of this thesis, they argue,
is a result of falling victim to the "atomic blackmail" of
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the "imperialists" and reflects "weak nerves" and political
shortsightedness. Malenkov is not mentioned by name in these
articles, but one of them left no doubt by its remark that "some
comrades" had given expression to this idea in their oral and
printed speeches--Malenkov is of course the only top-level man
to have made this statement in a public speech.*
Malenkov's formulation is "politically harmful," according
to Pravda and Kommunist, in that it plays into the hands of the
imper a sts and destroys the "peace" movement throughout the
world and thus engenders a fatalistic attitude in the struggle
against war.
Thus Malenkov's remark may very well have been one of the
"mistakes" of which he was accused both in the 31 January 1955
decree and in Khrushchev's remarks to Subandrio.
Khrushchev, from the time of Stalin's death until he be-
came top man in the USSR, was outspoken in his hostility toward
the West,'demonstrated none of the subtlety shown by Malenkov,
and repeated dialectical stereotypes with seeming conviction.
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a e sp aye a a shocking r g y in
his thinking about the West--an apparent willingness to swallow
the propaganda he himself has helped create."
Khrushchev's speeches in 1954 were. very, strongly .: anti-US.
One of these was a tactless address at the Malenkov reception
and dinner for the visiting British Laborite delegation in
August 1954. Another was his address in Peiping last October
in which he supported the Chinese Communist claim to Formosa
as a_ "legal and indivisible part of China." Khrushchev
avoided, however, promising support in a military sense.
In some contrast to Malenkov, Khrushchev's speeches have
conveyed the d
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Khrushchev
stated that ratification would mean a larger defense program for
the USSR. He showed little interest in diplomatic moves to ex-
ploit Western disunity.
is rather important to note that several important Soviet
officials have privately affirmed this "heresy," well after
the issue was "settled" in the Party press. It seems likely
that the Soviet leadership is indeed fully aware of the de-
structiveness of A-weapons.
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Although Khrushchev has been careful to pay lip service to
the coexistence theme, this has apparently meant for him little
more than an absence of armed conflict. In a speech in Prague
in June 1954, he stressed Soviet possession of the atom and hy-
drogen bombs,, as well as the necessity for maintaining and
increasing Soviet armed strength. Several times he referred to
the West as "the enemy" and spoke of capitalist encirclement.
He also attacked Churchill by name for his known views on the
Soviet Union, and especially for his idea of acting from a
position of strength.
There presumably was some discussion of this speech in the
Kremlin, for at a diplomatic reception on 28 July Khrushchev
adopted a less truculent tone and seemed to make special efforts
to ingratiate himself with the British Ambassador. Khrushchev
reportedly stated on this occasion that neither the USSR nor
Great Britain had designs on each other's territory, and claimed
that both he and Churchill were in complete agreement on the
issue of coexistence.
On 10 August, however, at a dinner for the visiting English-
men, he stated twice that the Soviet government, although it
deeply desired peace, would make no concessions whatsoever in
its foreign policy. He reportedly warned of a dire fate for
any potential attacker. To the British union leader Sam Watson
he indicated that there could be trade and increased diplomatic
intercourse, but no change in ideology, thereby implying no
respite from political warfare. When Watson complained to him
of Communist intolerance of other political systems, Khrushchev
blurted, "In this field there can be no coexistence."
Khrushchev expounded further on coexistence in an inter-
view with the publisher Hearst on 5 February. He said he recog,
nized the right of the United States and "of the bloc it has
formed" to be strong in the interests of security. Khrushchev
remarked that this "might be termed a balance of power." He
complained, however, that "Churchill and Dulles by positions of
strength do not mean balance of power, but that one position
should be stronger than another in order to enforce its will
on the other side." This, he asserted, leads to an armaments
race with all its dangers and unfortunate economic consequences.
Khrushchev's various remarks and statements on foreign
policy matters during the Maler}kov regime are particularly
interesting in that he was, at the time, out of step with the
other members of the leadership.
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Bulganin, who in his public speeches has tended to harp on
the necessity for increasing Soviet military power and for
vigilance,* nonetheless has made some startling statements in
his personal contacts, statements which have gone far beyond
those of other leaders.
Specifically, Bulganin has on several occasions repudiated
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Stalin's policies and approach to international affairs. At the
7 November 1954 reception, Bulganin told
that Stalin's policy had spoXied relations be-
ween the USSR and its neighbors.** pulganin,,went on to say
that, although a colleague of Stalin's, he had always disagreed
with Stalin on the latter's policy. Bulganin then said that
"well qrp rpturnina to ~"4_fs policy of good neighbor and friend-
ship and that he was not speaking per-
sonally but was expressing the view of the Soviet government.
At the 12 December 1954 reception, Bulganin, along with
Mikoyan and Malenkov, gave tacit assent to a presentation by
French Ambassador Joxe to the effect that it was postwar Soviet
policy under Stalin which had brought about a feeling of in-
security and threat to the nations of Western Europe. Molotov,
however, was reportedly visibly irritated by Joxe's reference
to the policies pursued under Stalin.
* Bu gan n's expressions on these points are understandable in
that he was Defense Minister. However, in his November 1954
speech he used a phrase slightly at variance with other formu-
lations regarding the international situation: viz., that
.there had been no changes in the international situation that
would warrant re axa~#fon of effort to strengthen Soviet de-
tense. This phrase reappeared in Finance Minister Zverev's
budget speech in February 1955, at the time when the defense
budget was increased by 12 percent, and in Bulganin's own
speech to the Supreme Soviet after he had been elected Premier.
**
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Kaganovich, like Khrushchev, apparently entertains an
orthodox and 'doctrinaire Stalinist view of the world. At the
Foreign Ministry reception on 7 November 1953, as he became
drunker, he lapsed more and more into "old. Bolshevik" jargon.
A better indication, however, is Kaganovich's speech at
Prague in May 1955. Like Khrushchev a year earlier, also at
Prague, Kaganovich apparently departed from his prepared text,
adding some sentences and phrases anq deleting others from a
prepared text. His departures from the text appeared to reflect
a particularly strong abhorrence of the Germans, and a "com-
mitment to Communist ideology and its goals of world revolution
equalled only by Khrushchev among top Soviet leaders."**
Khrushchev, Bulganin and Zhdanov: Since March 1954, a
very curious change has taEen place in Soviet propaganda re-
garding World War II. This change, which became pronounced
and unmistakable in December 1954, was a deliberate effort to
de-remphasize the role of the State Defense Committee, to
elevate the roles of Bulganin and Khrushchev, and to associate
these two leaders with the deceased Communist leaders A. A.
Zhdanov and A. S. Shcherbakov.
For example, New Times for December 1954 stated:
"The Central Committee of the Party and the
Soviet Government appointed Stalin Chairman of
the State Defense Committee and made him head
of the armed forces of the country. N, A. Bulganin,
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A. A. Zhdanov, A. S. Shcherbakov, N. S. Khrushchev
and other outstanding leaders were likewise as-
signed' by the Party to the work of directing the
war effort."
The State Defense Committee, under Stalin, had previously
been accorded, in propaganda, full credit for victory in the
war, and individuals, other than Stalin, were singled out for
credit. In July 1953, for example, the Juridical Dictionary
gave this committee "exclusive credit for organization of the
destruction of German fascism."
The new propaganda trend not only subtracted credit from
the State Defense Committee, but in at least one instance
(24 February 1954) relegated it to a secondary position.
Obviously, the composition of the State Defense Committee
had something to do with its treatment in propaganda. The five
original members were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and
Beria. Later, Voznesensky, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Bulganin
were added to it, and Voroshil4v was removed. Clearly, the
new propaganda treatment of the wartime victory was intended to
subtract from Malenkov's stature (and perhaps from that of others
also), and to enhance the roles of Khrushchev and Bulganin.
More interesting, however, is the effort to associate
Khrushchev and Bulganin with Zhdanov apd Shcherbakov.
Shcherbakov, who died in 1945, and Zhdanov, who died in 1948,
were the alleged "victims" of the so-called Doctors' Plot of
January 1953. While Zhdanov's name had never been deleted from
the roster of heroes of Communist mythology, it was nevertheless
true that his name was very rarely mentiongd, and the frequency
of references in the recent past, therefore, is undoubtedly cal-
culated. The presumed rivalry between Zhdanov and Malenkov is
believed to have been responsible for the near absence of ref-
erences to Zhdanov after 1948. It is, therefore, of interest
that Khrushchev and Bulganin have seen fit to identify them-
selves with the Zhdanov symbolism.
In addition, there has emerged in the Soviet press and-in'
Soviet ideological journals articles and references reflecting
a4 "Zhdanovist" orientation. Three emphases are evident: a
return to "partinnost" ("partyness")--ideological purity and
discipline in Party ranks; an emphasis on "proletarian inter-
nationalism" and a resurgence of international aspects of
Communism; and an inveighing against "fear and panic" in the
face of "new and complicated" situations. The theme of
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"partinnost" is evident in recent literary discussions, but
also has been introduced into the diatribes against the pro-
ponents of "light industry," who are castigated as "opportun-
ists" and "right deviationists,"
The themes relating to Communist internationalism and ex-
horting against "fear and panic" are an essential component
of the argument denouncing Malenkov's assertion that a new
war would result in destruction of world civilization.
There is thus very little question that these recent
ideological tendencies are intimately related to the Malenkov
ouster.
The military budget as a political issue: Reference has
already been made to one study w is , on the basis of a close
textual analysis of speeches, concludes that conflicting views
on the implications of modern weapons in the field of inter-
national affairs was an important policy issue between the
Soviet leaders.
The analysis notes that four Soviet loaders--Malenkov,
Saburov, Pervukhin and Voroshilov--failed to call for an
increase or strengthening of Soviet armed forces in their
election speeches in 1954. It notes also that Malenkov's
contention that a third world war "would mean the destruction
of world civilization" seemed to imply that this prospect made
war less likely. This suggestion was supported by quotations
from Pospelov and Mikoyan to the effect t4at Soviet techno-
logical achievements were "having a sobering effect" on the
enemies of the USSR. Mikoyan explicitly stated that "the
danger of war has considerably lessened as we now have not only
the atomic but also the hydrogen bomb."* Mikoyan noted that
the United States, now vulnerable to destruction, had adopted
a new policy line as a result of Soviet possession of atomic
and thermonuclear weapons.
Bulganin, the analysis continues, presented a contrary
line in his 10 March 1954 speech:
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"We ,,annot assume that the imperialists are
spending enormous material resources and vast
sums of money on armaments merely to frighten
use Nor can we count on the humaneness of the
imperialists who, as life has shown, are capable
of using any weapons of mass destruction."
The analysis observes that both Khrushchev and Bulganin
on several occasions called for strengthening of Soviet
defenses. In the meantime a new note appeared in discussions
of the possibility of war: in July, in Warsaw, Bulganin pointed
out that the USSR is forced to develop atomic weapons "so as
not to be left without weapons in case of surprise. While this
theme of the possibility of surprise attack was not developed
at the time, a number of references were made to it in speeches
of Voroshilov, Molotov, and Bulganin in December 1954 and in
February and March 1955.
On 7 November 1954, Bulganin asserted:
"In the international situation so far no such
changes have taken place as would give us
grounds to lessen in any measure our attention
to questions of strengthening our defense
capability."
This thought was echoed by Finance Minister Zverev in his
budget speech in February 1955, as justification for the 12-
percent increase in military allocations. The contradiction
in thought of this expression with the remark of Mikoyan above
is clearly evident.
The analysis concludes that the 1955 stress on the danger
of being caught "unawares" suggests that Bulganin's view of
the insecurity of the Soviet position even when both sides
possess thermonuclear weapons had won out over those who be-
lieved that the likelihood of war had thereby been diminished.
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It is a difficult matter to separate political or policy
difference from conflict over personal power and position.
The difficulties can be illustrated by the well-known observa-
tion that policy differences tend to become personal issues;
whereas, conversely, Personal rivalry very frequently mani-
fests itself in competing political "platforms." Available
evidence on the Soviet leadership does not permit determina-
tion of such a question.
Nevertheless, while the exact role of personal rivalry
as a factor leading to Malenkov's resignation cannot be deter-
mined, its presence to a considerable degree would appear to
be almost certain. It would seem particularly likely however,
that Malenkov, presumably well schooled in the art of accommo-
dating himself to a changing party line, would have been able
to alter his own policies to fit the demands of the other
leaders, if the question had been one of policy alone.
There is considerable reason to think that antagonism
and perhaps enmity existed in Malenkov's relations with
Khrushchev. These relations go back at least to the early
1930's when both were members of the Party organization in
Moscow. During World War II, they were directly associated
in the Military Council of the Stalingrad front, and both were
secretaries of the Central Committee from 1949 to 1953. Khru -
shchev, became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1938 and a
full member in 1939, while Malenkov attained these positions
in 1941 and 1946, respectively, although in Stalingrad and
in the Secretariat, he had had the senior post. There were
no indications during this early period that Khrushchev and
Malenkov were antagonistic toward one another.
Hints of friction began to appear, however, at the 19th
Party Congress in October 1952. At, that time, Malenkov, in his major ad-
dress to the Congress, appeared to go out of his way to remind
that "certain of our leading officials" had been wrong in their
efforts to amalgamate small collective farms into collective
farms, towns or "agrogorods." This seemingly gratuitous remark
made more than a year after the policy had been abandoned
must certainly have been aimed at Khrushchev, the only top of-
ficial publicly associated with the policy.
Following Stalin's death, rivalry between Malenkov and
Khrushchev may very well have been engendered over Malenkov's
requested "release" from his key position on the party Secre-
tariat in favor of Khrushchev. Even more damaging, however,
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was Khrushchev's formal promotion six months later, in Sep-
tember 1953, as First Secretary of the Party--an important'
symbol of prestige vis-a-vis Malenkov.
During this same period Khrushchev delivered his first
major post-Stalin speech, which filled in the details of the
agricultural program Malenkov had outlined the month before,
yet made no attribution to him.
After that time, Khrushchev mentioned Malenkov on only
two occasions--in his talk with Bernal in September 1954 and
in his speech to the Komsomols in January 1955. However,
neither of these references reflected any desire to praise
Malenkov and indeed may even be regarded as patronizing, an
interpretation favored by Ambassador Bohlen.
There were other moves which suggested political jockey-
ing. Khrushchev personally attended the Leningrad party plenum
in November 1953 which removed.V.M. Andrianov, long considered
a Malenkov protege, from his post as First Secretary of the
Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. A year later, the execu-
tion of former State Security Chief.V. S. Abakumov and five
of his associates in December 1954 also suggested rivalry
between Khrushchev and Malenkov. The reference to the
falsification of the "Leningrad Case" in the announcement
of the execution seems almost certainly to have pertained
to the widespread shake-up of the Leningrad party organiza-
tion in 1949 when Abakumov was security chief. At that time,
Malenkov was generally credited with masterminding the re-
movals in order to place his own henchmen in important posts
in the Leningrad organization.
In addition, Malenkov's unique resignation announcement
with its admission of guilt and lack of experience suggests
the collaboration of a revengeful Khrushchev. This supposi-
tion is buttressed by the heavy emphasis in the document on
the role of the party, and the obvious admission that the
Malenkov agricultural tax reform was the work of the Central
Committee. It was during this same-Central Committee Plenum
in January 1955 that Khrushchev denounced manifestations of
right-wing deviation in connection with some of the liberal
domestic policies associated with Malenkov, thus clearing
the path for Malenkov to be accused eventually of doctrinal
heresy.
Malenkov's youth in comparison to the "Old Bolsheviks"
in the Presidium, his rapid political rise, his role in the
purge of the 1930's, and his personal influence with Stalin
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probably were other sources of antagonism or resentment.
Finally, enmity can also be detected in Khrushchev?s outspoken
conversation with the Indonesian Ambassador in which he said
that Malenkov had attempted to run the government through
bureaucrats rather than through Party representatives.
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MALENKOV'S ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN MANAGERIAL ABILITIES
One problem which must be discussed, inasmuch as it has
been raised by various Soviet versions of Malenkov's demotion,
is the question of Malenkov's alleged inexperience and inepti-
tude in directing the affairs of state of the USSR.
It was noted earlier that in 1946, Malenkov reportedly
came under fire for ineptitude and lack of foresight in his
wartime direction of the Soviet aircraft industry. Further-
more, the program for dismantling of industry in occupied
areas which was under Malenkov's direction, was badly mis-
managed and many losses, both industrial and political, were
incurred as a result of this program.*
Alleged deficiencies in executive abilities figured large
in Malenkov's letter of resignation. The 31 January resolu-
tion on Malenkov mentioned them; Khrushchev specifically cited
this point in his interview with Subandrio; and officials of
the Soviet Ministry of Electric Power Stations openly alleged
such deficiencies in discussions with the members of a Swedish
technical delegation visiting in the USSR.
A Soviet defector has discussed this question at length,
and avers that the frequent reorganizations and an intensive
"Malenkov program" to reduce substantially the number of per-
sonnel in the state apparatus introduced chaos and confusion
in'Soviet administration. According to this source, the re-
sulting frictions, uncertainties and sagging morale caused
a serious and growing resentment against Malenkov.
There is, unfortunately, very little that can be affirmed
regarding this question. One observation, however, is that
other leaders, particularly Khrushchev, are at least as re:'
sponsible as Malenkov for the RIF program and for the transfer
of government bureaucratic personnel to agriculture and in-
dustry. The New Lands program, in particular, has Undoubtedly
required a far greater number of persons to be drawn from the
government apparatus than any specific program of Malenkov.
Despite the true facts of responsibility for the reductions
and transfers, however, it cannot be denied that in the minds
of the personnel affected, Malenkov could very well have been
blamed for the situation.
In the one area in which sufficient evidence is avail
.able, the facts appear to support the allegations against
Malenkov. On the subject of returning Dalstroi to the MVD
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in early 1954, when the MVD began to regain some of the economic
organizations it lost after Stalin's death, the negotiations
and controversies extended over a number of months. The matter
seemed decided several times, first in favor of one party
and then in favor of the other, but after each decision the
question was reopened.
At the very least, the history of this organization dur-
ing 1954 is evidence of confusion and lack of decisiveness
in top government circles and of a strong and effective inter-
play of rival interests. It is certainly plausible to assume
that the handling of the Dalstroi matter was characteristic
of the handling of other problems in the government.
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The Soviet Leadership Since Malenkov
The removal of Malenkov from the Soviet premiership
plainly marked a realignment of power within the Soviet party
presidium, but there has been as yet no indication that the
search for a durable substitute for the monolithic personal
leadership of Stalin terminated with that event. There is
no doubt that Party Secretary Khrushchev has been the chief
beneficiary of Malenkov's decline and that he is now the
single most powerful Soviet leader although he still does not
appear to have a monopoly of power. While the narrowing of
the circle, first with the elimination of Beria and then with
the political emasculation of Malenkov, has weakened the founda-
tions of group rule, a conscious effort is apparently still
being made to preserve the principle of collective leadership.
There have been a number of personnel changes in the
Soviet party and governmental hierarchy since Malenkov's
resignation in February. Some of these have resulted in the
replacement or demotion of officials closely connected with
Malenkov in the past and the appointment of Khrushchev
proteges. This is, of course, a classic Soviet device for
building power and if the changes continue, Khrushchev's
personalposition may gradually become unshakable. Some of
the changes appear to have been dictated largely by a search
for competent management, and the present picture might be
distorted if they were to be interpreted uniformly in terms
of factional alignments and power struggle. The changes so
far effected do not in any case amount to a wholesale shake-up,
and it would seem that, if Khrushchev aspires to supreme
personal power, he has either preferred or been forced to
move with caution. Khrushchev's influence on personnel
changes has been most apparent within those areas for which
he has shown special concern, and in which his personal pres-
tige is most directly engaged. A shake-up of the agricultural
ministries, announced on 2 March 1955, brought the dismissal
of A. I. Kozlov as USSR Minister of State Farms and the appoint-
ment to his post of I. A. Benediktov, till then Minister of
Agriculture. Kozlov had a long record of association with
Malenkov and had been personally criticized by Khrushchev on
more than one occasion during the past year. However, Benedik-
tov would probably have been equally liable to complete removal
had the political factor been the only one at work. He has
beep reassigned to what is probably a less important post, it
is true, but the transfer, while it appears to reflect Khru-
shchev's lack of confidence in him, does not have the earmarks
of a political vendetta.
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The appointment on 28 February of four new Deputy Chair-
men of the USSR Council of Ministers has brought into leading
positions in the governmental structure, over the heads of
former superiors, men who are presumably in sympathy with
Khrushchev's methods and policies. There is no evidence of
personal links between Khrushchev and two of the four new
deputy chairmen . A. P. Zavenyagin.,and M. V. Khrunichev,*
but there is fairly good reason to suppose that P. P. Lobanov
and V. A. Kucherenko owe their appointments to Khrushchev.
Lobanov played a prominent part, alongside Khrushchev, at
the zonal agricultural program with which he is so closely
identified. Kucherenko, who has been'named chairman of the
State Committee on Construction Affairs, served under Khru-
shchev in the Ukraine and was singled out., by the latter for
praise at the construction conference held in Moscow in
December 1954. Khrushchev has displayed a.keen interest in
construction affairs and is largely responsible for the great
stress which has been given to ferro-concrete construction.
The recall of L. G. Melnikov from the Soviet embassy in
Rumania to head the newly-created Ministry of Construction of
the Coal Industry, announced on 8 April, can probably be
traced to Khrushchev, who was Melnikov's predecessor as First
Secretary of the Ukrainian Party. Melnikov had been purged
from the Ukraine by Beria in June 1953. He was partially
rehabilitated after Beria's purge by receiving the Rumanian
ambassadorship. The personal factor may also have played an
important part in the removal of G. P. Aleksandrov as Minister
of Culture on 21 March, for there are indications of a close
link between Malenkov and Aleksandrov. However, Aleksandrov's
successor at the Ministry of Culture, N. A. Mikhailov, was
once commonly regarded as a Malenkov protege also.
Within the party there have been very few announced changes
since February. P. K. Ponomarenko was released as First Sec-
retary of the Kazakh party on 7 May to succeed Mikhailov as
Soviet Ambassador to Poland, but the significance of this
change is not yet clear. Khrushchev's hand can, however, be
clearly seen in the removal of D. N. Melnik, who was criti-
cized by Khrushchev at the January party plenum, from the post
of Secretary of the Primorye Krai party. It is also noteworthy
Zavenyagin's and Khrunichev's careers since Stalin's death
suggest that they were unacceptable to Malenkov, which may
explain their elevation by Khrushchev and Bulganin.
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that N. N. Shatalin, who is thought to have had close ties .
with Malenkov, was apparently removed from his powerful posi-
tion as secretary of the Central Committee and appointed First
Secretary of this far-distant Primorye Krai. Shatalin had
been concerned as Secretary with party personnel appointments
and probably also with party supervision of the police ap--
paratus, and his removal. from, the Secretariat almost certainly
means a tightening of Khrushchev's grip on the party.
The appointment of K. F. Lunev as Deputy Chairman of the
Committee of State Security (KGB), though it pre-dates
Male.nkov's resignation, is possibly another sign that Khru-
shchev has gradually increased his control of the vital
instruments of power, in this case, the police apparatus.
Lunev, whose present post was revealed by the Soviet press on
20 January, was identified as a first deputy minister of the
MVD in December 1953 when he sat on the special court which
condemned Beria. He had previously served under Khrushchev
as an official of the Moscow Oblast, and it has been thought
that Khrushchev was largely responsible for his position in
the post-Beria security apparatus.
It seems, also, that the army has not been overlooked.
While it has yet to be shown that the military have begun to
exercise a significant political influence, it is, nonetheless,
likely that their good-will is something especially to be
sought and held at a time when crucial decisions must be made
and power is still in flux. It is possible, then, that Khru-
shchev had a direct and personal part in the recent promotion
to marshal's rank of a number of prominent Soviet generals, at
least two of whom, Grechko and Moskalenko, have served with
him in the past.
Khrushchev's salient role in the Belgrade parleys, in which
Premier Bulganin was thoroughly overshadowed, is the clearest
public sign yet that he is the ranking member of the Presidium.
However, he has not been given a blatantly artificial publicity
build-up. Although he usually has the place of honor among his
presidium colleagues at public ceremonies, Premier Bulganin's
picture was placed before his in some of the May Day portrait
displays. This is a trifling sign, perhaps, but not a mean-
ingless one among the protocol-careful Soviet leaders. His
numerous speeches before party, agricultural and industrial
promotional conferences have been duly but not fulsomely
reported by the Soviet press.
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Allusions to collective leadership, among them Bulganin's
assurance to the Hearst party that the ,principle of collective
leadership with us is unshakeable," still appear regularly in
the press, and alphabetical listing of presidium members, the
literal symbol of collectivity, has been continued. Perhaps
the most interesting reference to collectivity to appear
recently is found in an article by the Old Bolshevik,
G. Petrovsky, published in Pravda on 20 April. "Lenin,"
Petrovsky wrote, "taught us co ectivity in our work, often
reminding us that all members of the Politburo are equal,
and the secretary is elected to fulfill the decisions of the
Central Committee of the party." This standard has been
publicly ignored only occasionally. Both A. I. Kirichenko,
First Secretary of the Party in Khrushchev's old bailiwick,
the Ukraine, and Marshal Konev, for example, paid special
deference to Khrushchev in their speeches. Interestingly
enough, however, Pravda's version of Konev's speech revised
the passage in the broadcast version in which an attempt seems
to have been made to set Khrushchev apart from and above his
colleagues. In addition, Soviet diplomatic officials have
on a number of occasions affirmed that collectivity has not
been destroyed by Malenkov's ouster.
Since Malenkov's demotion Khrushchev seems to have
obtained a freer hand in guiding policy, although not to the
point of independence from the other leaders, and to have
become more firmly entrenched in the party apparatus. There
is some reason to suppose, also, that he has managed to
strengthen his ties within the police apparatus and the armed
forces, and may be able to count on greater support from that
direction than before. However, there are almost certainly
many men left in important positions who are indebted to
Malenkov, and there is no sign that a full open season has
been declared on them. The search for effective leadership
of the current agricultural and industrial program is the
most plausible explanation of some of the personnel changes
which have taken place recently and probably has had some
influence even in those cases where the political motive is
most clear. While Khrushchev has become the spearhead of both
domestic and foreign policy, he does not appear to have the
power to make unilateral decisions either in respect to policy
or to personnel appointments. His authority is probably
shared with, and to some extent depends on, other members of
the presidium, among whom Bulganin, Kaganovich and Mikoyan
appear to be the most influential.
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Bulganin's role is difficult to define. He does not
have Khrushchev's authority, but he is probably a force in
Soviet policy-making and an important factor in the intri-
cate balance of personal relationships which presumably
exists within the Presidium. He has a reputation for execu-
tive ability and, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
presumably exercises a direct and positive influence on the
operations of the Soviet government.
The three Old Bolsheviks, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and
Molotov, are men of long experience in particular areas of
Soviet policy. It seems probable that neither Kaganovich
nor Mikoyan aspires to the formal trappings of power, be-
cause of their racial origin. However, for this same
reason, they may now be a pivotal force within the "col-
lective," the force which can tip the scales in either
direction in important deliberations. Furthermore, it is
to their advantage to keep the collective leadership alive.
Kaganovich appears to be closest to Khrushchev personally
and policy-wise; he is the one who in a speech in May 1954
gave pre-eminence to Khrushchev over Malenkov. Kaganovich's
behind-the-scenes influence is probably considerable, partic-
ularly in questions relating to industrial development.
Molotov'.s prestige appears to have suffered from the
partial rapprochement with Tito, and it is possible that
confidence in his judgment on other questions of foreign
relations has been impaired. It seems fairly certain, in
any case, that Molotov does not have a paramount voice in
setting the broad lines of Soviet foreign policy. Both
the larger decisions and those affecting relations with
Communist states appear to be, instead, subject to collective
discussion and agreement within the Presidium. Against this
background, Molotov's resignation from the Foreign Ministry,
which has been rumored since the Belgrade conference, is not
inconceivable, but would shed little light on the balance of
power within the Presidium
Mikoyan, whose resignation as Minister of Trade was
announced on the eve of Malenkov's demotion, accompanied
Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade, presumably to conduct
the trade negotiations. Since February he has been promoted
from Deputy to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of
Ministers and apparently continues to act as the overlord
of Soviet domestic and foreign trade. Mikoyan, who was
probably aligned with Malenkov in favoring increased produc-
tion of consumer goods, does not seem to have been seriously
injured by repudiation of that policy. It has been suggested
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that his promotion, like that of Pervukhin and Saburov, who
were appointed First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of
Ministers simultaneously, was a political reward for abandon-
ment of Malenkov. However, this interpretation, which
seems to presuppose that the victory of one of two clearly
defined factions was the prelude to Malenkov's demotion, may
oversimplify the pattern of current relationships within the
Presidium and the manner in which power has shifted there.
Some of the Presidium members may have favored the present
line earlier and more emphatically than others, but Malenkov's
defeat seems to have been the consequence of a gradual shift
of opinion which coalesced around Khrushchev, rather than
of a sudden showdown between unequal factions. If this is
the case, the promotion of Mikoyan, Pervukhin and Saburov
may have been intended, not as payment of a political debt
nor as a peace-offering to a defeated faction, but as a
sign that the Presidium's ranks had not been sharply divided
and also, perhaps, as a demonstration of the extent of
Malenkov's disgrace.
Malenkov's present status resists clear-cut definition.
It is uncertain whether his immediate and complete elimina-
tion from the top ranks of the regime was considered impos-
sible or merely undesirable. It may have been ruled out on
the grounds that it would have disturbed a precarious polit-
ical balance or because it would have presented an undesir-
able picture of division and instability, thus undermining
Soviet prestige at home and abroad. Malenkov is still formally
a member of the USSR's topmost ruling body and, as such,
continues to take his place beside other Presidium members
at public functions. He is, however, the only member of the
Party Presidium who sits on the Council of Ministers without
the rank of First Deputy Chairman. It is possible that there
is still a considerable body of opinion which favors his
point of view, but it seems more likely that his present
influence is negligible. The process of isolating and dis-
crediting him.seems, however, to have been halted for the
moment. While culmination of the process may be scheduled
for a more opportune time, it is equally possible that Soviet
leaders are as uncertain about his future as the outside
world. His position probably will be clarified at the
20th Party Congress, presently scheduled for February 1956.
The Soviet leadership has passed through its second ma-
jor readjustment since Stalin's death. Collective leadership
appears to continue to be a fact and not a fiction, but its
base has been narrowed, as a predominance of power has tended
to pass more and more into the hands of four or five top
leaders.
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Post-Malenkov trends in Soviet foreign policy:.
Soviet leaders have continued since Malenkov's demo-
tion to show the high degree of flexibility in the conduct
of foreign policy characteristic of the entire post-Stalin
period, and have re-emphasized the possibility of negotiat-
ing international issues.
Three main themes, addressed alike to friends, enemies
and neutrals, have formed the framework within which post-
Malenkov foreign policy is being executed:
1. The strength and unity of the.Sino-Soviet bloc,
2. The Soviet government's willingness to negotiate on
all international issues.
3. The advantages which accrue to "in-between" nations
with neutral foreign policies.
The first theme, peculiar to the post-Malenkov period,
was introduced by:
1. Molotov's declaration on 8 February that Communist
China occupies a position of equality with the USSR
at the head of the Socialist camp..
2. Bulganin's speech on 9 February giving greater
Soviet support to Peiping on the Formosa issue.
-3. Attempts by top Soviet leaders to underscore the
strength of the "Socialist camp" in comparison with
the United States.
In Molotov's foreign policy speech of 8 February, he
asserted five times that the "correlation of forces" between
the two rival social systems "has definitely changed to the
advantage of Socialism." He claimed, for the first time, that
the USSR had nuclear superiority. Bulganin's 9 February speech
likewise emphasized the theme of invincible Soviet power and
noted that production of Soviet heavy industry "at present is
almost three and one half times greater than in prewar 1940."
At the same time, Soviet leaders provided a counterbalance
to this militant tone by stressing "peaceful coexistence" in
speeches and interviews.
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The bellicose and chauvinistic tone of the early February
Supreme Soviet speeches may, in addition, have been intended
to prepare the bloc for unpalatable decisions in domestic
economic policy and to reassure them of the Communist world'e
ability to deal with any threats arising from the agreements
to rearm West Germany.
It is apparent that by the time the Supreme Soviet con-
vened on 3 February, the Soviet leaders had concluded that
there was little chance of averting ratification of the Paris
accords and that the time had come to launch a new line of
action calculated to regain the initiative and to disrupt im-
plementation of Western defense agreements.
The first Soviet move to regain the initiative was the
reopening of the long deadlocked Austrian question. From the
reference to Austria in Molotov's 8 February speech to the
signing three months later of the Austrian state treaty on 14
May, Moscow moved rapidly, showing unprecedented flexibility
and willingness to compromise. Meanwhile, the USSR began put-
ting into effect some of its threatened harsh countermeasures
against West German rearmament. On 21 March, the USSR an-
nounced that the eight Soviet bloc powers had reached agree-
ment on a treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual aid
and the organization of a unified bloc military command. On
9 April, the Soviet government requested the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet to abrogate Soviet wartime treaties with the.
United Kingdom and France.
Moscow apparently chose the Austrian settlement as the
most impressive gesture it could make at the least cost, for
the purpose of convincing the outside world that it was
sincerely desirous of working out a settlement of the outstand-
ing issues between itself and the West. The apparent explana-
tion for the USSR's rapidity of action on Austria is that it
continued to'view the political defeat of West German re-
armament as a primary objective of Soviet foreign policy.
It is evident, however, that. West German rearmament as
such was not the sole target of this phase of Soviet diplo-
macy. On 10 May, the USSR accepted a large part of the Anglo-
French disarmament proposals, in an omnibus "peace" and dis-
armament proposal to the UN General Assembly which it made in
a meeting of the stalemated UN disarmament subcommittee. On
26 May, the top Soviet leaders made an unprecedented journey
to Belgrade where Khrushchev called publicly for a rapproche-
ment between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist parties and
apologized for Soviet actions which lead to the 1948 break.
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On 7 June, the USSR invited Adenauer to visit Moscow to discuss
establishment of normal relations, including trade, between
the two countries. This rapid-fire series of moves seemed to
be aimed at undermining Western European support for NATO by
persuading the Western Europeans that the Soviet military
threat has faded.
In contrast to Moscow's hasty diplomacy in Europe, Soviet
foreign policy in Asia has continued to be more cautious, with
an emphasis on actions directed toward firmer support of Com-
munist China's In an interview
Khrushchev said that
ov nad not een sufficiently s rong" on his foreign
policy. Khrushchev took great pains to stress the USSR's soli-
darity with China in all fields. Bulganin, in his Supreme
Soviet speech, likewise implied a greater measure of support
for Peiping. The USSR's primary objective, both in private
exchanges and in propaganda on the Formosa issue during this
period, has been to establish itself in the eyes of the world
as the champion of a negotiated settlement and place the
United States in the position of refusing to settle interna-
tional issues and relax tension.
Moscow's most immediate diplomatic target in the Far East
has been Japan, and approaches for establishment of normal
relations were made by the Malenkov government. During the
post-Malenkov period, the USSR continued this slow courting
of Japan, but moved steadily toward bilateral negotiations
which began in London on 1 June.
Moscow's long-established policy of encouraging India in
its independent foreign policy and in its aspirations to play
a mediatory role between the two power blocs was continued.
Greater emphasis has been placed on India, with laudatory
statements on Nehru's government (which contributed to a
serious local election defeat for the Indian Communist Party),
an invitation for Nehru to visit the USSR which he did in
early June, and the acceptance by Bulganin of an invitation
to visit India at a later date.
The Communist bloc continued a large-scale effort to en-
courage cultural and technical exchanges with private groups
and officials in the south Asian area, particularly India,
Indonesia and Burma. Concurrent with this activity, it has
made a series of offers to contribute technical assistance to
economic and scientific projects, and to increase trade with
the area. This effective combination of propaganda, trade
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promotion and offers of economic aid was first given increased
emphasis by the USSR in 1954, and is an attempt to persuade
the underdeveloped south Asian countries of the'advantages
of neutrality in the cold war.
Moscow maintained its more passive role in the Near East.
It temporarily increased its propaganda attacks on Western-
sponsored defense arrangements to take advantage of new dis-
putes between Turkey and the Arab states over the Turkish-
Iraqi pact and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There were
a few signs that the USSR might be initiating more active
trade promotion and economic aid efforts similar to those. in
south Asia.
In summary, the major trends in Soviet foreign policy dur-
ing the post-Malenkov period included:
(1) The beginning of a new course of action, character-
ized by the use of conciliatory deeds, and designed
to regain the advantage in Europe which was lost
when the Paris accords were drafted.
(2) The continuation of the long-term policy of concilia-
tion toward the Sino-Soviet bloc's neighbors in-
itiated soon after Stalin's death.
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Economic Policy after Malenkov:
The -continuous growth of heavy industry, at as rapid a
pace as possible, has been the chief peacetime aim of Soviet
economic policy since the end of the Civil War in 1920. At
any particular time, policy is defined by the relative empha-
sis given to each of the factors responsible for industrial
growth. Policy changes and controversies over policy there-
fore necessarily concern the distribution of emphasis among
these factors and considerations of short-term versus long-
term prospects are frequently involved.
The change in economic policy in 1953 was essentially
the raising to higher priority of two factors in industrial
growth. First, greatly increased attention was thenceforth to
be paid to worker attitudes as a factor in economic growth.
The opportunities here were especially great because of the
long neglect of mass incentives under Stalin. Second, it was
recognized that the stagnation of agriculture had to be bro-
ken in order to raise incentives by providing more and better,
consumer goods, and even merely to avoid a drop in per capita
consumption as a result of the population growth, particularly
urban. These measures were not, however, intended to decrease
the resources going to heavy industry, although they did in-
volve a leveling off of defense expenditures. Rather, they
were apparently to be implemented with resources made availa-
ble by the general growth of the economy.
The measures taken in 1953 and 1954 to solve these
problems have already been described. This section analyzes
the policy innovations of 1955 in order to determine the
economic reasons behind them and whether, taken together,
they add up to a second change in basic policy or to a read-
justment--in the light of two years' experience--in an essen-
tially unchanged policy.
The budget presented by the Bulganin government in Febru-
ary 1955 differed from its predecessor in several respects.
Defense allocations, which had actually fallen in 1954, were
increased by 12 percent to equal the all-time high of 1952.'
Expenditures for investments fell slightly below the 1954
target, in contrast to the substantial gains of previous
years. While other sectors of the economy received about the
same treatment as in 1954--agriculture in particular retained
the high priority rating established in 1953--within industry
a change in the pattern of allocations was made, with heavy
industry apparently obtaining substantial increases while
light industry suffered a slight reduction.
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The budget announcement was accompanied by the launching
in January of an ambitious and risky program to expand the
acreage under corn eightfold by 1960. Three months later,
a campaign was begun to send 30,000 urban workers, politi-
cally reliable and administratively skilled, to replace the
chairmen of nearly one third of the collective farms.
Another series of measures was directed at the average
citizen, both as consumer and producer. The general cut in
retail prices was omitted, for the first time since 1948.
The compulsory State Loan, which had been halved in 1953
and kept at the same level in 1954, was raised again to take
three to four weeks' pay from each worker, as it had under
Stalin. Lastly, the formation of a new State Committee on
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that this re-examination would involve a raising of production
norms, which determine the output a worker must deliver to
receive a given amount of pay.
The boost in military expenditures may have represented
a revised estimate of the USSR's international position, but
it is at least in part the result of another development:
the coming to fruition of developmental programs initiated
earlier for complex modern weapons. As the time arrives for
delivery of these advanced and high-cost end items, e. g.,
the new planes in the airshows, the procurement portion of
the military budget must increase in order to pay for them.
The investment question is complicated in 1955 because
the Soviet data indicate that, while investment expenditures
are planned to increase only slightly (4-6 percent), the
volume of investment this year is to increase two to three
times faster than this.* A recorded volume this much greater
than new expenditures can perhaps be achieved, chiefly
through concentration on the completion of existing projects,
but gains of this type are of a one-time nature and cannot
be maintained indefinitely. The restriction of expenditures
* &dvietdata on expenditures represent new money spent,
while data on volume represents the value of investment
which has been accepted as completed. One major difference
between the two is capital equipment; the value of a machine
tool, for example, is included in expenditure statistics
as soon as it is bought but in volume statistics only after
it has been installed in a factory.
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probably is due to the heavier financial requirements of
defense p complete existin
Projects,
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pen ures but wil-I leave the economy with fewer projects
from which to derive production increases in later years.
In the industrial sector, budget allocations to heavy
industry rose by 21 billion rubles, a 27-percent increase,
while those to light industry fell by 2 billion, a 16-
percent decrease over 1954. While it is believed that a
large part of the increase in heavy industry was made by a
change in budgetary accounting practice.to include in this
item expenditures on another activity, probably atomic energy,
it is true that,, even after allowance is made for this, the
allocations to heavy industry show an absolute gain while
those to light industry were reduced.
This divergence, coupled with official assertions that
heavy industry must grow faster than light, is regarded by
some analysts as evidence of a policy change in early 1955
which increased the emphasis on heavy industry at the expense
of light industry. This is interpreted as representing a
change in economic policy which stresses the output of capital
goods as the principal means to growth to the neglect of mass
incentives and which regards the relative effort devoted to
the two in 1953-1954 as an improper combination.
This view would be more valid if the Soviet leadership,
in determining its new policy in 1953, had planned for light
industry to grow rapidly in 1954 and to compound this growth,
although perhaps more slowly, in 1955. In fact this was not
the plan laid down in 1953. The investment goal for light
industry originally set for 1954 was 90 percent above the
1953 rate and over twice the 1952 rate, but the original 1955
target was only slightly higher (13 percent) than 1954. Thus
the phasing of the plan called for a radically increased
effort in the first year and a moderate expansion of this
achievement in the second.
As it turned out, the 1954 effort was only partially
successful: investment in light industry increased an esti-
mated 50 percent instead of the planned 90 percent. The
real problem faced in drawing up the 1955 budget for light
industry was therefore to decide whether to try to make up
the 1954 investment failure and then perhaps go on to the
level of the 1955 plan. It was decided not to make the attempt.
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The apparent reason for this is that the consumer goods
program had,by the end of 1954, come up against certain hard
facts in agriculture, on which the consumer approach largely
depended. Promising as the new agricultural program might
still seem to its authors, it had produced no startling re-
sults in its first year's test. Total agricultural output
rose by only three percent, livestock numbers grew only slow-
ly, and thetargets for food output were consequently missed
by varying amounts. It was to this set of circumstances
that the Minister of the Food Industry was referring when he
said in February that his industry would produce in 1955 1.6
times more food products than in 1950; in the 1953 policy
change, the 1955 target was 1.85 times the 1950 level. The
1954-1955 investment plan for light industry, as laid down
in 1953, was predicated in large part on much higher out-
puts of foods and fibers; until these materialized in fact,
the original investment rate was uncalled for and even, in
a heavily committed economy, wasteful.
The same set of facts--the disappointments of the 1954
record in agriculture--were responsible for other innovations
in 1955. The adoption of the corn expansion plan, for example,
is a response to previous livestock failures. It is an inno-
vation which is quite in character with 1954's New Lands pro-
gram, and in fact presumes that the success of that program
will justify the expansion of fodder corn in the old lands.
In the field of fiscal policy, agricultural failure clearly
is responsible for the State Loan increase and the skipping
of the price cuts. The income and price benefits extended
to the population in 1953 and 1954 had already created in-
flationary pressures. Further concessions would be not only
irresponsible but, in the end, illusory and self-defeating.
What was required instead was an adjustment in purchasing
power to correspond to the availability of goods, and these
two moves were the easiest way to achieve it. On the other
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allocation of completed production, both the private consumer
and the agricultural sector retained the high priorities
they had been assigned in the policy changes of 1953. The
retention of this priority throughout and beyond the period
of public discussion of "heavy versus light industry" indi-
cates that, whatever the real issues in this controversy,
consumption remained a major concern of the leadership.
In one area, the pattern of innovations was not complete-
ly clear. The revisions of 1953 staked much on the enlist-
ment of worker enthusiasm as a means to growth. To this end ,
purchasing power was increased through higher prices to peas-
ants, arfre cuts in retail prices, reduction in the State
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 Loan and agricultural tax, and other measures. For reasons
already examined, it was impossible to augment these benefits
in 1955. While none of them were retracted,* other measures
were adopted which tended in the opposite direction. The
appointment of 30,000 urban workers as collective farm chair-
men seems likely to be unpopular in the villages, and it is
probable that the overhaul of the wage structure and the
raising of output norms will result in increased pressures
on urban workers. It is difficult to say whether these meas-
ures were regarded as necessary precisely because further
concessions were for the moment impossible or whether they
represented a disillusionment over the general effectiveness
of concessions to promote further growth (they had not, it
could be argued, produced much in the way of concrete re-
sults). Even if the latter explanation were correct, the
policy change involved was marginal in view of the continuation
of priority efforts in agriculture and housing, the major prob-
lems in the campaign to raise incentives through improved
living standards.
In sum, while it is too early to make final judgments,
the innovations in economic policy in the first half of 1955
appear to represent adjustments in the New Course rather than
an abandonment of the commitments which defined that policy.
Present policy seems to give roughly the same importance as
before to the various factors contributing to long-run in-
dustrial growth. But the readjustments required by two years'
experience were themselves of sufficient import to require
corresponding adjustments in public opinion..
There can be little question that Malenkov's address of
August 1953 and the spate of decrees on agriculture, light
industry, and trade which followed it had aroused popular
expectations of improved living standards to their highest
pitch since the end of the war. Welfare promises have always
been a staple of Soviet propaganda, however, and when the 1954
crop results were in, it.became evident that the assurances
made in 1953 of "abundance within the next two or three years"
were a major blunder. Adjustments in purchasing power were
begun in the February 1955 budget session, but even before
this, the media of mass communication had begun to effect
readjustments which would prepare the Soviet citizen for the
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n at least one instance, the granting of special incentives
for corn production, worker benefits were extended. In-
terestingly, however, the increased incentive was in kind
rather than in cash, thus avoiding further fiscal difficulties.
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1%1= "Now
bad news. The message took the form of a series of articles
and editorials stressing the primacy of heavy industry over
light and the need for a faster development of the former than
the latter. This policy was justified by its effects on
future consumption, but the requirements of defense in a
hostile world were repeatedly adduced as a reinforcing argument.
As on sc many previous occasions, the extirpation of a
heresy was chosen as the vehicle for bringing home this mes-
sage. And a full-blown heresy was in fact at hand in the
views, published and unpublished, of a group of economists
who, carried away by the decisions of 1953, had called for
-adecisive and fundamental change in Soviet economic policy.
Speaking from an elaborately developed theoretical framework,
they argued that the era of forced industrialization was over
and that the time had arrived when consumption could become
the immediate rather than the long-range goal of the Soviet
economy. To this group, one era was over and another had
begun; 1952 was freely spoken of as the end of the period of
forced industrialization.
These views, particularly as they were expressed in the
thesis that light industry should grow faster than heavy,
were specifically condemned by Pravda on 24 January, the day
before the Central Committee Plenum 'began. They were like-
wise proscribed at the Plenum sessions, and subsequent articles
repeated the condemnation, and stressed heavy industry's
favored position, until 27 March. On this day K. Ostrovityanov,
official head of the economics profession, published in Pravda
a summation of the heretics' errors. At the same time, He -
closed the issue by the device of also attacking those who
"rushed to the other extreme" and "passed over in silence the
decisions of the Party and Government on the expansion of
production of consumer goods."* Thereafter, the theme of the
primacy of heavy industry underwent a gradual diminuendo in
the Soviet press; it continued to be stated, but less bellig-
erently and less frequently.
s rovityanov was chief editor of the important textbook
Political Economy, published in mid-1954, in which it was
maintain ed at, over a short period, light industry might
grow as fast as, heavy in order to remove disproportions
accumulated in previous years.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
It is evident from the preceding topical discussions that
no one of the separate factors discussed can definitely be ex-
cluded as a contributory cause in Malenkov's downfall. It
appears that, in greater or lesser degree, each factor may
justifiably be believed to have played some role. Conversely,
no one factor appears weighty enough to be considered as a
dominant causal element, in and of itself.
It seems probable that Malenkov was indeed demoted by the
"collective leadership," rather than merely falling victim to
Khrushchev alone. It is only too clear in retrospect that.Malen-
kov never had the personal position or power to implement his
own programs singlehandedly. In other words, the "new course"
as a,whole, and Malenkov as a man, must have-enjoyed the. support
of a majority of the Party Presidium in the beginning. Also,
it should be, noted that the policies identified with both
Malenkov and Khrushchev were implemented side by side for a
prolonged period of time.
Khrushchev, on the other hand, despite his obvious strength,
likewise does not appear, even after Malenkov's demotion, to
be so strong as to dominate affairs over combined opposition
from the other leaders. He apparently enjoys their effective
support, at least for the time being. For example, in pursuing
his ambitious and grandiose agricultural projects, Khrushchev
has made numerous journeys of several days duration away from
Moscow. This is not the behavior of a person who is faced by
sharp and combined opposition from the other leaders, or of a
person whose presence is necessary to maintain his dominance.
Thus it must be that Khrushchev has powerful and effective
support in Moscow or, that political controversy there is no
longer at a white heat.
Accepting this basic proposition, that group or collegial
leadership has been effective throughout the Malenkov period
and after, a reconstruction of the Malenkov period would be
as follows:
Following the resolution of the Beria crisis in June 1953,
a crisis which apparently had preoccupied the Soviet leader-
ship since Stalin's death, Malenkov proposed and secured
general acquiescence on a program involving alleviation of pres-
sures on the populace, marked expansion of consumer goods pro-
duction, and reform in agriculture. Despite Malenkov's presen-
tation of this program to the Supreme Soviet, it represented
a "collective" decision, probably with a majority of the Presi-
dium supporting it.
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Probably as a counterweight to Malenkov's prestige, how-
ever, and by virtue of his dynamism and drive and of his ex-
perience in a special field, Khrushchev was elected First
Secretary of the Party Central Committee and allowed to assume
responsibility for agricultural policy. In his role as First
Secretary, Khrushchev was able to appoint an increasing num-
ber of people believed to be his supporters to key posts,
and to reassert the role of the Party, especially in agricul-
ture.
That this blunt and energetic man clearly was not in
complete agreement with Malenkov on agriculture was manifest
at least by September 1953. Furthermore, he undertook a new
and vast program, which was unfolded in January and February
1954, and which shortly began to overshadow all other domestic
programs under way at that time. There is adequate reason to
believe that Malenkov was opposed to this New Lands program,
but clearly it was bought, at least in its first phases, by
the majority of the leaders and the Central Committee. This
persumably was a political defeat for Malenkov and his faction
at that time, yet Malenkov remained as Prime Minister for a
w o e year ere after.
Thus, it appears that throughout 1954 the top leadership
was following both programs concurrently. Political contro-
versy apparently became sharper, however, as Khrushchev forged
more and more to the fore, supported at least by Kaganovich
but presumably at least to some extent by the other leaders.
Khrushchev's dynamism and energy soon appeared to dominate
the other members of the leadership.
As time went on, furthermore, three parallel developments
apparently took place: Khrushchev, in control of agriculture,
drove through more and more. ambitious targets. Secondly, the
failures in agricultural production in 1954 raised questions
about the handling of inflationary pressures and the proper
level of investment in light industry in 1955 which almost
certainly engendered policy discussions at the top. Thirdly,
for one reason or-another, important elements of the Soviet
leadership apparently decided that Soviet military require-
ments demanded an increase in defense production.*
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It seems quite probable that Malenkov supported consumer
goods requirements and that this was the grounds for the
statement in the Central Committee resolution that he was
willing to sacrifice the tempo of heavy industrial devel-
opment in favor of light industry.
It appears however to have been generally agreed among
the Soviet leaders that the entire consumer-oriented program
rested largely on significant advances in various sectors of
agricultural production. From this, Khrushchev could well
have argued that further large increases in investment in
light industry would. endanger other plans and, until
agricultural output responded to his new programs, would be
premature.
In addition to these conflicting demands on the Soviet
economy, it is clear that there was at least a divergence
within the Soviet leadership over the closely interrelated
problems of foreign affairs and defense; the lines of diver-
gence and their importance in the demotion of Malenkov and
elevation of Khrushchev are difficult to define.-and subse-
quent Soviet actions have made them more so. Clearly, the
inclusion in the 1955 defense budget of funds cut out in
1953 and 1954 signifies that defense requirements were one
important factor in the whole complex of changes in early
1955; furthermore, the entire political crisis took place in
an atmosphere colored.by propaganda warnings to strengthen
Soviet military might.
Malenkov possibly entertained the idea of a stretch-out
in Soviet military procurements and a slow-down in the inaug-
uration of production of new weapons (over and above a defined
program involving the regularization of military manpower
practices, extensive reorganization of the armed forces and
intensive weeding out of the officer corps).
The other leaders apparently did not agree with any
stretch-out in.procurements. To the contrary, there are
indications that in mid-1954 serious efforts were begun to
strengthen Soviet defensive capabilities, at least in the
field of air defense. These indications, conjoint with the
increases in the overt defense budget in 1955, argue that,
in some manner, important military questions intruded into
the conflict already existing between Malenkov and Khrushchev.
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The flexible and realistic foreign policy of accommoda-
tion has been pursued with greater intensity and purpose than
before Malenkov's downfall. It seems likely that such
differences as may have existed regarding foreign affairs
were really differences in Khrushchev's and Malenkov's respec-
tive estimates of the international situation, particularly
the implications of West German rearmament, the integration
of Western Europe and the threat of armed conflict in the
Far East. While not affecting the main lines of Soviet diplo-
macy, such differing estimates clearly were important in
the field of defense planning and probably were motivating
factors in domestic economic planning. The only manifest
difference among the Soviet leaders was on the question of
the effects of nuclear warfare. This difference is of little
value, however, in evaluating respective positions because
there is good reason to think that all the Soviet leaders
recognize that a nuclear war would bring serious destruction
to both sides, even though the post-Malenkov line has implied
a decision that it was and would be a fundamental error to
admit this.
Of the actual problems or circumstances that precipitated
the political upset, almost nothing can be said. It is quite
possible that the actual crisis was precipitated by the neces-
sity, toward the end of 1954, to prepare the annual plan for
1955, since at this time all of the conflicting requirements,
priorities and programs would have to be hammered out. A
second possibility is that Malenkov became convinced that a
line must be drawn as Khrushchev propounded his second major
agricultural policy revision--that is, the "'corn" program
adopted by the Central Committee in January 1955. Malenkov
could well have resisted this new program as involving risks
of even greater magnitude than the New Lands program. Thirdly,
Khrushchev and his faction, harboring their basic resentments
and misgivings of Malenkov, may have taken the offensive by
attacking both his broad consumer-oriented incentives approach
and his ideological outlook. Fourthly, the success of the
Paris conference of October 1954 in finding substitute agree-
ments for EDC was such a serious setback to Soviet policy that
it may have triggered the final moves against Malenkov.
These possibilities are not exclusive; all four could very
well be true.
The various considerations above apparently became per-
suasive with the other top leaders, to the extent that a
majority against Malenkov, spearheaded by Khrushchev, emerged
in the Presidium and top Party circles. From this point on,
whether Malenkov was jockeyed out of the Premiership or
whether he was adamant in his espousal of his defeated program
is completely conjectural.
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Thus it appears that Malenkov's differences with the
other Soviet leaders, whether resulting from temperamental
or personality make-up or from his independent rational
analysis of the situation, swept across a broad range of
issues which, at many points, touched on fundamental aspects
of the Soviet order.
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