DEATH OF STALIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200150001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 16, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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DEATH OF STALIN
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Office of Current Intelligence
16, July 1953
C pyNo. 45
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DEATH OF STALIN
LAST DAYS OF STALIN
This then was the situation in the Soviet Union on 4 March, when
Radio Moscow announced that Stalin was in critical condition as a re-
sult of a stroke on the night of 1-2 March. The continuing medical
bulletins were couched in pessimistic terms. They carefully outlined
tie nature of Stalin's illness and meticulously described the measures
being taken by the doctors who were treating him. These play-by-play
accounts revealed concern lest listeners'interpret this news; as mean-
ing that either the old "doctor wreckers," or a group of new ones,
had succeeded in shortening Stalin's life. The eight doctors in at-
tendance'were under the supervision of a new Minister of Health,
Tretyakov.
Stalin had been last seen by a non-Communist on 17 February when
he had given an audience to the Indian Ambassador (who had, however,
never met him previously). While it is possible that Stalin's illness
had been carefully concealed, and that a double was used for this in-
tervi?w, this is unlikely; it is considered highly doubtful that a
double would have been used for Stalin's last interview. Stalin's
collapse actually followed several months of what for him was unusual
activity. Work on the Party Congress had evidently kept him in Moscow
throughout the fall; in addition to this, he had granted at least four
interviews to foreigners, had.attended the anniversary ceremonies on
7 November and had appeared in the Bolshoi theatre on 12 January. (It
is true, however, that Stalin's movements had been somewhat restricted.
He delivered only a short speech at the Party Congress, yielding the
main address to Malenkov. The 7 November ceremonies had been much
shorter than usual, probably out of deference to him.)
The nature of the reporting on Stalin's illness suggested that
his final stroke caught the Politburo off guard. There had been no
advance warning. An examination of all Soviet radio propaganda from
1 to 4 March yielded no indication prior to the public announcement
of Stalin's actual condition. There were'no significant differences
either in the nature pr in the number of references to Stalin, who
continued to be presented during this period as the focus of power
in the Soviet Union. Similarly, an examination,of all the Satellite
radio propaganda material from the time of the October Party Congress
to Stalin's death revealed no attempt to build up any of his lieuten-
ants in possible anticipation of his voluntary or involuntary relin-
quishment of power.
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This information is of course far from'conclusive. Many hypoth-
eses concerning the circumstances of Stalin's death Could be advanced
to explain this lack of preparation. Furthermore, the West was com-
pletely dependent on the Soviet radio and press'for all'news on this
development. It is impossible therefore to determine whether Stalin
.had been dead for some time, whether he was murdered, or whether he
died in the way the medical bulletins said he did.
THE QUESTION OF STALIN'S SUCCESSOR
The announcements regarding Stalin's condition, indicating as
they did that the Soviet Union would soon be without its leader and
revealing that Stalin's. disciples had waited four days before inform-
ing the people of their impending loss, immediately focused attention
on Malenkov as the most likely successor. His career had moved 'steadily
forward since Zhdanov's death in August 1948. He was the senior member
of the Party Secretariat, the position from which Stalin originally
consolidated his power. He was the only man other than Stalin who was
a member of all three of the highest bodies of the Party and Government--
the Politburo, the Secretaria~, and the lle ium of the Council of
Ministers (Deputy Chairmen). 1 -1
Ignatiev's appointment in 1951 as MGB Minister was also thought
to have had the blessing and approval of Malenkov. The nature of
Ignatiev's Party career indicated that he had prospered under, and
had possibly been brought along by, Malenkov.
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Malenkov had delivered the key address at the Party Congress, and
subsequently, as might have been expected, it had been accorded much
publicity throughout the Communist world. The replacement of the Polit-
buro by a Presidium, the composition of which apparently favored Malen-
kov if it favored any of the old Politburo men-oers, also seemed to con-
tribute to his leading position. This was even more true of the enlarged
Secretariat.
Thus it was commonly expected that Malenkov would attempt to fill
the void left by Stalin. The official announcement regarding Stalin's
illness, however, threw no light on the subject of his successor. It
merely placed responsibility in the Central Committee of the Party and
in the Council of Ministers, claiming that these two bodies would "take
into account all circumstances connected with the temporary withdrawal
of Stalin from leading the State's and Party's activity."
The announcement of Stalin's death came on 5 March. It linked
his name with that of Lenin in an eulogy of the Party as leader of the
people. It underscored the "steel-like, monolithic unity" of Party
ranks and defined its task as the "guarding of unity, as the "apple
of our eye." Reuters at the time recalled that Malenkov used this
phrase in his October Party Congress speech and suggested that he was
the author of the document. The same phrase, however, had appeared
in connection with Lenin's death. Neither Malenkov nor any other as-
sociate of Stalin was mentioned in the announcement. Malenkov had
come before the public eye, however, in a 4 March Pravda editorial
which quotes from the section of his Congress speech dealing with
Party unity.
The announcement affirmed the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions
and desire for "business-like" relations. It named the "great Chinese
people" first on the list of those people with whom the Soviet Union
intended to develop friendship.
Khrushchev was listed as chairman of the Committee for organizing
Stalin's funeral. On it were Kaganovich, Shvernik, Vasilevsky, Pegov,
Artemev, the Commandant of the Moscow Military District, and Yasnov,
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet. The funeral
rites were set for 9 March.
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THE FIRST GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION
On 7 March, Moscow radio announced that in order to prevent
"panic and disarray," a major reorganization of the Party and Govern-
ment had been made at a joint meeting of the Central Committee, the
Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This
almost unprecedented method of handling business was in keeping with
the gravity of the situation and reminiscent of the days of the German
attack, when the Soviet leaders had met in a similar joint session
and formed the State Defense Council. It strongly suggested that the
leaders in this moment of crisis had moved swiftly to show their unity
and to gird themselves for any battle that might be coming from either
inside or out.
In a complete reversal of the organizational decisions taken by
the October Congress, this new decree clearly outlined the spheres of
interest and power of Stalin's closest collaborators -- the, members of
the old Politburo. Malenkov became Premier (Chairman of the Council
of Ministers); Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich became first
Deputy Premiers. In addition, Beria returned to direct control of
the security' forces by becoming Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD),
with which was combined the Ainistry of State Security (MB); Molotov
returned to direct leadership in Foreign Affairs; Bulganin took over
as Minister+of War; Kaganovich received no ministerial assignment, but
presumably, was to be the economic czar. The Party's Presidium was
reduced to ten men, eight of whom had been members of Stalin's Polit-
buro. Here, too, Malenkov's name came first, indicating his ascendancy..
He was followed by Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khruschev, Bulganin,
Kaganovieh, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin, in that order. Saburov
and Pervukhin were the only newcomers to the group as it had existed
before October.
Voroshilov was given the honor of titular head of state. He
was "recommended" to become Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet. Khrushchev was "to concentrate on his work in the Central
Committee." Mikoyan took over as head of the new Ministry of Internal
and External Trade. Saburov was relieved of his job as head of Gos-
plan and became the new Minister of Machine Building. Pervukhin be-
came the chief of the new Ministry of Electric Power Stations and the
Electrical Equipment Industry.
Thus Party and Government continued to be welded together at the
top. Even at this early date, however, there was at least one visible
flaw in this attempt at "monolithic unity": the peculiar shuffling of
the Secretariat on 7 March suggested that the transition was experiencing
difficulty.
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In the 20's, Stalin had been accorded the title of General Secre-
tary of the Party, and from this position he had manipulated its ap-
paratus to the point where it was completely under his control. He
had then proceeded to eliminate his enemies, step by step, culminating
in the'dread purges of the 30's. It is perhaps small wonder that the
Soviet leaders were sensitive over the Secretariat and who should lead
and control it. The Orgburo had been dissolved and the day-to-day
control of Party affairs, as well as the control of Party (and Govern-
ment) personnel appointments, were recognized as the function of the
Secretariat. Most observers had expected that Malenkov would be ac-
corded Stalin's title as "General Secretary" but this was not the case.
The new decree did not even mention Malenkov's name in connection with
the Secretariat,. nor did it mention the names of two other members --
Suslov and Aristov. The Secretariat was reshuffled as follows-
1. Pegov was removed from the Secretariat and appointed
Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, where he
replaced Gorkin, who became Deputy Secretary. This appeared to
be a demotion for Pegov, an old apparatus functionary who had
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been chief of the Central Committee's light industry section.
Pegov's career had been climaxed
by his appointment to the Secretariat at the 19th Party Congress.
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Corkin, whom Pegov replaced, was noted on the downgrade
in October when he lost his membership on the Central Committee;
he was, however, appointed a member of the Party's Auditing Com-
mission.)
2. Ignatiev, Pospelov and Shatalin were elected Secretaries.
This was very unusual- (a) Shatalin was not made a full member
of the Central Committee in October, but was listed as an alternate.
He had been elected to the Orgburo in March 1946, and had presumably 25X1
been elevated, at that time, from alternate to full membership on
the Central Committee.: At any rate he was named only an alternate
in October 1952.
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Malenkov's deputy in the Cadres Department. Yet the record of
the October Congress indicates that he was not regarded as too
important at that time. (b) Pospelov, as mentioned previously,
.had been overlooked in the selection for the Party's Presidium
in October, despite his seniority, ability and Party record.
He suffered another setback in January when he was replaced as
head of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.
ospe ov
was closely linked with Molotov. There Is c rcums an al evi-
dence to support this. Pospelov and Molotov were the only two
to survive on the editorial staff of Bolshevik in 193+ when it
was purged of Bukharin and all his supporters. (c) Ignatiev,
as mentioned previously, had been MGB Minister prior to October.
The new decree did not spell out Beria's deputy ministers, as it
did in the case of most of the other ministers. It nevertheless
appeared most probable that Ignatiev bad left the MGB..
3. Khrushchev was relieved of his duties as First Secre-
tary of the Moscow Committee of the Party, in order to "con-
centrate on his work in the Central Committee."
4. Ponomarenko and Ignatov were relieved of their duties
as Secretaries and transferred "to leading work in the Council
of Ministers."
5. Party "Secretary" Mikhailov was confirmed as First
Secretary of the Moscow Committee, replacing Khrushchev in this
post.
6. Brezhnev was relieved as Secretary and transferred to
the post of head of the Political Department of the Navy.
Thus, of the nine Party Secretaries incumbent when Stalin died,
the status of, three -- Malenkov ?/, Suslov and. Aristov -- was unde-
termined; Khrushchev had apparently been upgraded, judging from the
phraseology of the decree (quoted above); Pegov, Ponomarenko, Ignatov
and Brezhnev were transferred to other duties; Mikhailov was still
listed as a Secretary. In addition, three newcomers -- Ignatiev,
Pospelov, and Shatalin had been added. Clearly the joint meeting
which drew up the reorganization decree of 6 March had run into trou-
ble when it came to the Secretariat and had been unable to make up its
mind.
Malenkov, however, was listed by Pravda as a secretary on 11 March.
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The Central Committee meeting on 14 March was to reduce the Sec-
retariat still further, and eventually it was to become a four-man
group. For the moment, however, there was uncertainty. The only
things clear were that four of the Secretariat members had been trans-
ferred, three had been added and no successor for Stalin's position
as First Secretary had been selected.
Returning to the decree itself, there were several other points
worthy of note :
1. Top control of the Government was centered, at least
formally, in Malenkov, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
and his four deputies. No other deputy chairmen were listed.
The decree, however, indicated that two organs had existed in
the former Council of Ministers -- a "Burg" and a "Presidium".
Presumably the new Presidium was composed of most of the members
of the old "Buro", while the old Presidium probably numbered
among its ranks the remaining former deputy chairmen who were
not in the old "Buro". How long these groups had existed is un-
known. It was also revealed that an identical setup had existed
in the Party's Presidium, i.e., that it had been composed of a
"Burn", presumably including most of the members of the old Pol-
itburo, and a Presidium, probably composed of the new blood taken
on in October. In effect, therefore, a previous centralization
was publicly displayed for the first time.
2. Shvernik, whose replacement by Voroshilov as Chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was "recommended", was in
turn "recommended" as chairman of he Council of Trade Unions, a
position he had held in the past.l V. V. Kuznetsov, the incum-
bent chief of the Trade Unions, was relieved and made a Deputy
Foreign Minister, while Vyshinsky and Malik were named First Dep-
uty Foreign Ministers under Molotov. Vyshinsky, in addition,
was appointed permanent USSR delegate to the E?N.
3. Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov were named as Bulganin's
deputies in the War Ministry. Vasilevsky had been War Minister
prior to Bulganin, while Zhukov had been in semi-obscurity since
1946, serving as a military district commandant. His return to
this position had been ascribed to (a) a desire to restore this
key general to an authoritative position in time of stress, (b)
a plan on Malenkov's part to secure the support or at least the
l~ This play on words was necessary on legalistic grounds; the Supreme
Soviet is supposed to choose the chairman of its own Presidium
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neutrality of the pro essional military, (c) the need.for a
counter to Bulganin,l and (d) a desire to reduce the panic of
the people.
4. I. G. Kabanov was appointed Mikoyan's First Deputy Min-
ister in the Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade, and Kumykin
and Zhavoronkov, Deputies. The latter two had been the ministe-
rial incumbents of the merged trade ministries. Kabanov had
been identified as Chairman of Gossnab in January. His .new job
suggested that Mikoyan's ministry would take over some of Goss-
nab's functions.
5. No deputies were listed for Beria's Ministry of Inte-
rior, Saburov's Ministry of Machine Building, Malyshev's Minis-
try of Transport and Machine Buildings or Pervukhin's Ministry
of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry.
6. Kosyachenko became the new chief of Gosplan. A contro-
versial figure, as recently as February 1952 he bad recanted in
Planned Economy for his support of Voznesensky's economic views.
He bad become a Deputy Chairman of Gosplan in November 1940 and
was raised to First Deputy Chairman in May 1941 shortly after
the Chairmanship passed to Saburov. He remained in this position
when Voznesensky returned in 1943. He edited Planned Economy
from at least March of 1945 until June of 1951.
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7. With regard to Party affairs, the decree also .named
four alternates to the Party Presidium -- Shvernik, Ponomarenko,
Melnikov and Bagirov.
(a) Shvernik had been a perennial alternate before
his elevation to the enlarged Presidium in October.
Zhukov's relations with Bulganin are a matter of some interest but
there is no firm evidence on this point. At one stage during World
War II, Bulganin served as political commissar to Zhukov. This
may have engendered some friction and, there are several reports
indicating that this was the case. Bulgani.n, of course, is strictly
a political administrator.
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(b) Ponomarenko was at the same time relieved of
his position on the Secretariat. Along with his running
mate, Suslov, he had long been thought to rank just below 2 5X1
the Politburo level. (Most observers associate Ponomarenko
with Malenkov because of the fact that he became Minister
of Procurement in 1950.
(c) Melnikov, First Party Secretary in the Ukraine,
had also been elevated to the Presidium in October. His
retention as an alternate was viewed as a move to keep
some regional Party representation on this body. He had
served as Second Secretary to Khrushchev in the Ukraine
from 1947 to 19+9 and succeeded Khrushchev when the latter
moved to his Secretariat assignment in Moscow in December
1949.
(d) Bagirov's appointment was unusual. A senior
Party regional leader, he had been overlooked in the Octo-
ber promotions for some unknown reason. He now superseded
twenty-two members of the October Presidium. He had worked
with Beria in Transcaucasus security affairs and at one
point had been Beria's superior. Yet his writings on Party
affairs in the Transcaucasus had paid little lip service
to Beria. While both Melnikov's and Bagirov's appoint-
ments were interpreted as a maneuver to retain some re-
gional figures on the top Party organs, it soon became
evident that both these men were to continue in their
regional jobs and hence would not be physically present
in Moscow most of the time.
STALIN'S FUNERAL - REACTION TO DEATH
Following publication of the 6 March decree, attention was once
more centered on Stalin's funeral, whichh was scheduled for the 9th of
March. Presumably fear of disorder had been reflected in the swift
moves of the Soviet leaders to set their house in order. Some part
of this atmosphere had crept into the lnguage of the decree itself
which talked of "panic and disarray." 17 2 5X1
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J On 1 April the US Naval Attache in Helsinki
tating that when a Finnish Border Guard officer attempted.
to offer condolences on Stalin's death to a counterpart in the Pork-
kola Guard, the latter broke into tears and said hey were aalllllwor-
ried about their future and feared military purges
for power. Yet reports from Moscow indicated that in general the
militia handled itself with normal effectiveness.
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Western press reporting from the Soviet capital drew attention
to the vast wave of mourners who came to view Stalin. In contrast to
this, the US Embassy in Moscow found little evidence of extreme grief
in the capital over the death of Stalin. On 8 March it noted that
the atmosphere in Moscow was calm, that markets were open and busi-
ness was conducted as usual. The Embassy in fact reported that an
American who had been in Moscow in 19+5 recalled more evidence of
grief over Roosevelt's death than there was over Stalin's.
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The official reaction of the European Satellites to Stalin?s
death was expressed in propaganda reaffirming unity and gratitude
toward the USSR, and in increased internal security precautions.
Reports of unusual security measures came from various sources -- in
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dio broadcasts concerning them. Such a tightening of security is
fairly standard practice on occasions which might elicit unexpected
reactions from the public. In this case, non-Communist response
to the news was generally a mixture of hope and despair 25X1
It seems to be the consensus of most Western students of Soviet
affairs and propaganda that the deification of Stalin was so all-
pervasive in scope, so penetrating, as to have had a profound effect
on the Russian people, particularly on the uneducated. Stalin was
portrayed as a god, who of course could do no wrong. His goodness
was unbounded. The bureaucratic level between Stalin and the peo-
ple was blamed for anything reflecting negatively on Stalin?s di -
vinity. Between the lowly peasant and the great god Stalin, there
was a vast middle ground wherein lay responsibility for all ills
affecting the Soviet Union. Stalin prevented those ills from be-
coming worse and was responsible for all good in the USSR. No
other Soviet leader had ever been allowed to achieve independent
stature .l
When Stalin died, therefore, it was necessary to fill the tre-
mendous void with secondary figures. All of the important ones were
apparently employed to fill the breach, at least as a holding opera-
tion, to calm the people and keep them under control until a more
permanent setup could be worked out.
The Soviet leaders also began what in retrospect appears to have
been a very clever and intelligently-conceived de-emphasis of Stalin,
imperceptible at first but one which was eventually to make itself
apparent to the entire world. A Western survey of Soviet propaganda
J In World War II, the pattern had been interrupted, but only
briefly, by the attention given such men as Zhukov and Zhdanov.
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in the period following Stalin's death revealed that a two-week
period of idolizing Stalin had been followed by an apparently
deliberate de-emphasis, and concluded that the "progressively but
still only partially eclipsed god-head is being replaced only by
the impersonal concept of government and Party."
This change took the following forms: (a) avoiding or mini-
mizing the use of Stalin's name in connection with his hitherto
heavily publicized contributions to communism, such as the Soviet
nationalities policy and the 1936 constitution; (b) utilizing quo-
tations from Stalin without attributing them to him; (c) avoid-
ing or minimizing the use of his name in connection with several
measures apparently intended to woo Soviet public opinion -- the
price reduction, the amnesty, the release of the accused doctor
plotters, the Pravda answer to Eisenhower; (d) paying tribute to
the Communist Party leadership rather than to Stalin as being
responsible for victory in World War II (Bulganin's speech of 1 May);
and (e) failing to award the annual Stalin prizes for literature and
science.
The de-emphasis apparently moved from the Moscow center out to
the provinces gradually. A Department of State survey was to con-
clude in May that Soviet propaganda media had achieved a basic uni-
formity in the treatment of Stalin. Both the central and provin-
cial press continued to refer to him regularly, but not nearly as
frequently as during his lifetime. References were always made
with respect and admiration, however, and nothing suggestive of
criticism of Stalin appeared. In many cases, Stalin was referred
to jointly with Lenin.
Stalin lay in state for four days, the key Soviet leaders serv-
ing as honor guards. On the day of Stalin's funeral, the US Embassy
commented that, considering the facilities available, the rites for
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Stalin were'unspectacular. The embassy found particularly incon-
gruous the fact that Stalin's body was placed in a narrow aisle on
coumtented that the decision to hold the
burial only four y -after Stalin's death, "contrary to conjecture
and without allowing the public sufficient time to view the bier, is
interpreted as meaning that the present high ranking officials do
not eye favorably the continual demonstrations of affection accorded
the former dictator by the people."
Of the three funeral speeches delivered by Malenkov, Beria and
Molotov, only Molotov's was regarded as a real funeral oration by
the American Embassy. The embassy noted that while Molotov's voice
was shaken in delivery, Malenkov and Beria remained in complete con-
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trol of themselves. Malenkov and Beria devoted most of their atten-
tion to the future. Malenkov's speech was non-belligerent in tone,
and in general indicated that the same policies would be carried on.
Beria's speech was in a similar vein, with the curious exception
that it did not refer once to Stalin as Comrade Stalin, and that it
rarely mentioned Stalin except in conjunction with Lenin's name. In
addition Beria emphasized that the Party's policy would brook no in-
terference, that the Party's organs had decided to continue national
policy without interruption, and that one of the decisions taken in
this connection was the appointment of Stalin's comrade in-arms,
Malenkov, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
All three speeches paid special deference to the Chinese ,2/ and
in every reference to the Satellites, China came first. None of the
speakers specifically mentioned the US, UK or the Western nations.
A close re-reading of all three speeches was to provide Western
observers with much food for speculation, perhaps more valid than
usual, since the speeches were delivered in a rather unique situation.
For example, Malenkov, who had been placed at the top of the list of
the new Party Presidium, did not once refer to the Central Committee;
Berta, on the other hand, referred to it five times, suggesting that
-perhaps, in contrast to Malenkov, he was making a bid for its support.
THE ABORTIVE MALENKOV BUILD-UP
The funeral ceremony presented the Soviet leadership to the
world as a triumvirate: Malenkov, evidently the sp imus inter pares;
Beria, close behind and giving Malenkov a sort of half-hearted
blessing; and Molotov, running a relatively poor third. A survey of
l/ Various observers differed in interpreting this passage in Beria's
speech. Some thought it to be laudatory of Malenkov; others thought
the praise extremely reserved, since Beria had said Malenkov's ap-
pointment was one of the most important decisions and that respon-
sibility had now fallen on "leaders" trained by Stalin.
2f Chou En-lai was granted the unusual honor of marching third in
Stalin's funeral procession.
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official comment in the Western world on the personal power rela-
tionships within the Soviet Union shortly after Stalin's death found
general agreement that no single leader of sufficient stature was
available to assume the position and role of Stalin. Most of the
individual estimates concluded that political power would be distrib-.
ute d among several of the top Soviet leaders. There was some dif-
ference of opinion as to whether a harmonious relationship would
prevail, and predictions varied as to the strength of the individual
power positions.
Many Communist and non-Communist observers had predicted that
Molotov would return to his old job as Chairman of the Council of
Ministers and that Malenkov would become Party Chief an ossibIv in-
herit Stalin's title of General Secretary of the Party.
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Communist leaders in Western Europe thought Molotov wou become
Malenkov had already begun to capitalize on his position as ap-
parent head of the triumvirate. On 5 March, the day after Stalin's
death, Pravda singled out Malenkov for special attention by quoting
from his speech to the Party Congress. This was the first reference
to any individual leader, except to Stalin, since the Soviet Premier's
illness had been announced. On 7, 8 and 9 March, Pravda again fea-
tured quotations from Malenkov's report to the Congress, beginning at
this time to use the heavy black type previously reserved for quota-
tions from Stalin. The 8 March issue also contained a picture of
Malenkov delivering the Party Congress report in which Stalin was the
only other person visible. On 9 March Pravda again gave Malenkov a
heavy play and Izvestia printed a picture of Malenkov and Stalin taken
on May Day 1952. On 10 March, Pravda and Izvestia both reported that
Khrushchev had called on "Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
USSR and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, G. M. Malenkov",
to speak, the first indication that he had remained on the Secretariat
following the 6 March reorganization.
On 10 March Pravda printed the much-publicized picture of Stalin,
Mao and Malenkov at the 1950 signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty. The
picture had been retouched to place Malenkov next to Mao by eliminat-
ing three persons who had been standing between them. The picture also
eliminated Molotov, who had been at Stalin's right hand, and Vyshinsky,
who had been seated in front of Mao. The newspaper also published an
article by Mao Tse-tung referring to the Central Committee and the
Soviet Government headed by Comrade Malenkov.
Stalin had waited five years after the death of Lenin to usher
in his own deification campaign in 1929; Malenkov made his bid even
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before Stalin's funeral. In the days immediately after the funeral,
Malenkov's funeral speech was rebroadcast almost more times than
Beria's and Molotov's together, and began to be referred to in edi-
torials in the provincial press. This effort to build up Malenkov
was also evident in Radio Kiev broadcasts on 11 and 12 March stating
that the local city and ablest Soviets had enthusiastically dispatched
letters of greeting to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
and the Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Comrade Malenkov.
An effort to model Malenkov after Stalin was also apparent in another
Radio Kiev broadcast, which quoted the chief Ukrainian-language news-
paper to the effect that "Comrade Malenkov made an oath on behalf of
the Party over the coffin of Comrade Stalin to serve the people faith-
fully." Stalin had made a similar oath at Lenin's funeral.
The Malenkov buildup was short-lived, and in the ensuing days of
March his prominence was sharply cut back. An outside observer,
Solomon Schwartz, was to note that the buildup had cost Malenkov a
great deal. Upon checking the Soviet press, he found that from the
llth of March to the end of the month, Pravda did not once quote
Malenkov in its editorial articles and only infrequently (on the 11th,
12th, 18th, and 24th) made any reference to the funeral speeches of
Malenkov, Beria and Molotov. He noted that "only in its editorial of
17 March, devoted to the Supreme Soviet session did Pravda refer to
the speech of the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but in this
case the editor hastened to underscore the confidence of the Soviet
peoples in the 'Government headed by the faithful pupils and comrades-
in-arms of great Stalin,' not by a pupil and a comrade-in-arms but by
'pupils and comrades'."
A Bulgarian Communist travelling in the West is alleged to have
stated that following Stalin's death, the Bulgarian Government ordered
substitution of Malenkov's portraits for Stalin's. Later the Soviet
Embassy in Sofia ordered Malenkov's picture removed and replaced by
Stalin's.
This initial buildup of Malenkov threw some Satellite and Commu-
nist publications off the track. Bertram Wolfe has pointed out that
the April issue of the American Communist journal Political Affairs,
which was prepared in early March, published Malenkov's funeral speech
and not those of Beria and Molotov, and a lead article by William Z.
Foster entitled "Malenkov at the Helm." However, in the May issue
which was prepared in early April, Foster dealt with Stalin and co-
existence, not even referring to Malenkov's remarks on this subject
in his funeral oration.
On 12 March an article by Alexeyev in Izvestia, entitled "The
Great Stalin is the Creator of our Five Year P ans," contained a
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substantial quotation from Beria and ended on the note that Party
and State leadership was in the reliable hands of the Great Stalin's
faithful "companions-in-arms."
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During the period from 1 to 1 March, articles
by regions Party leaders Patolichev (Byelorussia) and Kalnberzin
(Latvia), as well as by Party theoretician Chesnokov, made no mention
of Malenkov, but stressed the leading role of the Central Committee.
On 16 March Pravda referred to the leading role of the Central
Committee. The same issue described the Big-Three -- Malenkov, Beria
and Molotov -- as "faithful comrades-in-arms of Stalin."
There were some indications in the immediate period following
Stalin's death that the Satellites were not clear on the leadership
in the USSR, but leaned a little toward Malenkov. A survey of Sat-
ellite propaganda up to 15 May found that Malenkov, as well as other
Soviet leaders, was mentioned only sparingly after Stalin's death.
On the few occasions that Malenkov was mentioned, it was in connec-
tion either with his speech at Stalin's funeral or with his speech at
the 19th Party Congress. Malenkov, however, was mentioned more than
Beria and/or Molotov, and these latter two were not mentioned inde-
pendently of Malenkov.
This braking of the Malenkov buildup was to be paralleled in
the action taken by the Central Committee meeting of 14 March, an
action that was not publicly revealed until six days later.
THE SECOND GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION
Meanwhile the Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for the loth was
postponed one day, obviously to allow the Central Committee meeting
to take place. When it met, the Supreme Soviet approved with its
customary unanimity the appointments of Malenkov as Chairman of the
Council of Ministers and Voroshilov as Chairman of its own Presidium.
In addition, it ratified a sweeping reorganization of the Government
which went far beyond the changes proposed at the joint session on
6 March. By 15 March, it looked as though the earlier changes had
lacked unity and had been hastily put together in a disorderly compro-
mise arrived at under considerable pressure and tension during the days
of Stalin's illness.
At the 15 March meeting, Khrushchev gave the nominating speech for
Voroshilov as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Beria
gave the nominating speech for Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of
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can Embassy in Moscow at the time, observed that of all the Soviet
leaders, Molotov received the warmest applause.
Mr. Beam, the Counsellor of the meri-
Malenkov'presented the composition of the new Government, stat-
ing that the measures for amalgamating the ministries were worked
out over a long time during Stalin's lifetime and that their adop-
tion had been "merely hastened." Some of the highlights of the
additional reorganization measures follow:
1. The decree represented a sweeping reversal of the
administrative policies followed since 1948. It reduced the
number of Soviet ministries or organs of ministerial level from
57 to 27, placing control of this simplified structure in the
hands of men who were for the most part experienced.
2. The Ministry of the Navy was merged with the War Minis-
try and became the Ministry of Defense, under Bulganin. (On
6 March Bulganin had received control of the Ministry of War
only).
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3. A. I. Kozlov received control of the newly-merged
Ministry of Agriculture and Procurement, formed out of five re-
lated ministries. Kozlov's appointment was quite a surprise.
He was a relatively young Party functionary who had been chief
of the agricultural section of the Central Committee
4. P. K. Ponomarenko received control of the new Ministry
of Culture. Ponomarenko, in addition to being a member of the
Secretariat, had been Minister of Procurement since 1950. The
6 March decree had slated Ponomarenko for "leading work in the
Council of Ministers," and Western observers thought that he might
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become a Deputy Chairman of that body or receive control of
agriculture. His new Ministry of Culture was formed out of the
Ministries of Higher Education, Cinematography and Labor Re-
serves, the Committee on Affairs of the Arts, the Radio Broad-
casting Committee, and the Chief Administration of Printing,
Publishing and Bookselling.
5. The State Committee of Material and Technical Supply
of the National Economy (Gossnab) and the State Committee on
Supply of Food and Industrial Goods (Gosprodsnab) were merged
with the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). This gave Gosplan
the supervision over allocations of materials, food and indus-
trial products, thereby greatly increasing its importance.
Kosyachenko, the new Gosplan chief appointed on 6 March, was not
even a member of the Central Committee. At that time it was
thought that Mikoyan's Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade
would receive at least some of Gossnab's functions since its Chief,
Kabanov, had become First Deputy Minister under Mikoyan.
6. Mikoyan, who on 6 March had been named Minister of
Internal and External Trade, was appointed on 15 March a Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. His stature was thus in-
creased in a curious way. Since Mikoyan was now the only Deputy
Chairman, he occupied a niche by himself, presumably below the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers composed of the five First
Deputy Chairmen yet above the ordinary ministers comprising the
full Council of Ministers.
7. N. G. Ignatov who, like Ponomarenko, had been marked
for "leading work" in the Council of Ministers on 6 March, did
not receivA a ministerial assignment. His status was not de-
termined until 2 April when Leningrad Pravda announced his selec-
tion as a Party Secretary in Leningrad.
8. The Supreme Soviet failed to ratify either the Fifth
Five-Year Plan or the 1953 State Budget, both of which were al-
ready in effect, suggesting that a review of existing plans by
the reorganized overnnment was underway.
9. Malenkov, in submitting the nominations of the
government appointments, referred to the principle of collective
leadership. He stated that "the strength of our leadership rests
in its collective, cohesive and moral-ethical nature. We regard
strictist observance of this supreme principle as a guarantee of
correct leadership of the country and a most important condition
of our further successful progress along the path of building
communism in our country." He said that the USSR would follow
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the policy elaborated by the Party, and that this policy had been
stated by himself, Beria and. Molotov at Stalin's funeral on 9 March.
He elaborated further to say that there was no question that could
not be "settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested
countries. This applies to our relations with all states, includ-
ing the United States of America."
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10. V. V. Kuznetsov was released from his duties as a
member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection
with his appointment as USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
On 10 March Kuznetsov had been assigned as Ambassador to Peiping.
In contrast to previous Soviet practice, he evidently did not
relinquish his title as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs upon
receiving a diplomatic post in a foreign country. Malik, for ex-
ample, who replaced Gromyko in London, was relieved of his title
of First Deputy Foreign Minister upon receiving this assignment.
(An exception to this is the USSR permanent ambassadorial post at
the UN, which in recent years has been held by men of Deputy
Foreign Minister rank. Vyshinsky, the present incumbent, is a
First Deputy Minister).
11. A. A. Andreyev, the ex-Politburo member and ex-Dep-
uty Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was elected a member of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. (This automatically excluded
him from any ministerial position;
N. M. Shvernik,
deposed as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was
nevertheless elected a member of that body.
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The complete reorganization was presented to the Supreme Soviet in
about an hour's time. It was revolutionary and hence bound to cause
much confusion in the country as a whole.
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This atmosphere must have also affected another rival for
power -- G. M. Malenkov.
As mentioned previously, a meeting of the Central Committee had
been held on 14 March, resulting in a day's postponement of the Supreme
Soviet meeting. Undoubtedly, it was called to work out the reorganiza-
tion which Malenkov was to present to the Supreme Soviet. The results
of this plenary session of the Central Committee, unlike those of the
15 March Supreme Soviet meeting, were not made public until 20 March,
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six days after the Central Committee meeting. The Soviet press then
published a list of three decisions taken:
(a) To accede to the request of Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, G. M. Malenkov, for his release from the
duties of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
(b) To elect a Secretariat of the Central Committee of
the CPSU to consist of the following: Comrades N. S. Khrushcheev,
N. A. Suslov, P. N. Pospelov, N. N. Shatalin, S. D. Ignatiev.
(c) In accordance with paragraph 32 of the Communist Party
Statute, to transfer Comrade N. N. Shatalin from candidate to
member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Thus a five-man Secretariat was named with Khrushchev listed
first. Among other things, Suslov, who was not mentioned in the 6
March decree, was retained; Aristov, also unmentioned on 6 March, was
dropped; Mikhailov, identified as being in the Secretariat on 6 March,
was also dropped. The ranking of the three newcomers was reversed:
on 6 March Ignatiev was listed first, then Pospelov, and Shatalin; on
the 20th, Shatalin was listed first among the newcomers, followed by
Pospelov and Ignnatiev.
SIGNIFICANCE OF REORGANIZATION OF PARTY SECRETARIAT
Malenkov thus abandoned direct control of the Party Secretariat --
something which Stalin in his lifetime had never done. Stalin had used
the office of General Secretary to achieve absolute dictatorship. In
later years he had delegated considerable authority to the ranking se-
cretary, a position held by Malenkov at the time of Stalin's death.
The presumption of the authors of this paper has been that Stalin
had allowed Malenkov's influence to grow, that Malenkov had achieved
predominance by capably handling the intricate affairs of the appara-
tus in the name of Stalin, and that Malenkov's influence bad become
quite strong in the last two years of Stalin's life. Stalin, despite
whatever infirmity may have gripped him, must have been aware of and
allowed this personal rise to take place, a rise which culminated in
Malenkov's leading role at the Party Congress. Stalin therefore ap-
peared to approve of this Malenkov preeminence and had done nothing to
stop it.
It is the author's contention that Stalin was unable to contem-
plate anyone succeeding him. Perhaps in the doctors' plot the evil
genius of Stalin, as has been speculated earlier, was moving against
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all his enemies, and perhaps he had planned to use Malenkov for
this purpose and then discard him. If this supposition is valid.
it would appear to have been only a question of time before Stalin,
realizing Malenkov's independent power position would have set about
to destroy him.
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At any rate Stalin's death prevented this, and left Malenkov
with his power intact. This power evidently was not great enough,
however, to withstand the pressure of the other Soviet leaders, who
apparently moved at an early.moment to restrict it. It appears rea-
sonable to assume that Malenkov gave in to their pressure -- whether
direct or indirect, spoken or unspoken -- and withdrew from the
Secretariat. It is probably true that in so doing he immediately
began to take steps to minimize the role of the Secretariat. There
is some evidence that this has been the case. It is also probably
true that the other Soviet leaders wholeheartedly approved of these
attempts.
Malenkov's withdrawal, thus does appear to stand as a sign of
weakness, a sign that he was not able at the outset to inherit all
the trappings of Stalin's power. He appeared to have some supporters
left in the Secretariat, and his influence and power would undoubt-
edly continue to be felt there. But this was not the same as being
in it himself. Malenkov, the first ranking member of the Party
Presidium, but not officially its Chairman, would still have to ac-
cede to the desires of others. Stalin also was never formally a
"Chairman" of the Politburo, but he had certainly acted in this ca-
pacity and had done more than break tie votes. In Stalin's absence
from the Politburo sessions before the war, reliable Soviet defectors
have reported, Molotov chaired the meetings.
Krushchev's rise in the Secretariat, first indicated in the
6 March decree, was confirmed by this announcement. He was listed
first in the rankings of the Secretariat, and hence took over the
day-to-day control of party affairs previously performed by Malenkov.
Much speculation immediately centered on the political orienta-
tion of Khrushchev and the other members of the Secretariat, espe-
cially their relations with Malenkov. As has been previously noted,
Khrushchev and Suslov figure prominently in the vigilance cam-
paign. While this was not unusual in light of their positions and
the Party's role in the campaign, it did seem to align them in this
instance with Malenkov. In addition their careers were not such as
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to indicate that they were anti-Male.nkov.I
appraisals of Khrushchev lay stress on his
ability to hew a center line, his opportunism and his blind obedience
to Stalin; yet such appraisals are common to most Soviet leaders.
Suslov's orientation had come in for a good deal of attention at the
time he entered the Secretariat in 1947 when Zhdanov was in ascen-
dancy. He remained prominent, however, after Zhdanov's death, sug-
gesting that he had been able to overcome any stigma that may have
been attached to him in this regard. His attack on Fedoseyev had
also served to array him against Voznesensky, a Zhdanov adherent.
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With regard to Ignatiev, the authors had previously assumed him
to be a Malenkov man. The fact that he was listed after Shatalin and
Pospelov, rather than before them as had been the case on 6 March,
was perhaps an omen of his later downfall. Shatalin was only an alter-
nate Central Committee member in October, possibly indicating a fall-
ing out with Malenkov. Pospelov, although an old time Bolshevik and
Party theoretician, had declined in stature prior to Stalin's death.
There is some indication that he is on close terms with Molotov.
The braking of the Malenkov propaganda buildup, and the with-
drawal of Malenkov from the Secretariat, was to be followed in the
ensuing months by stress on the collegial nature of the leadership;
it is perhaps reasonable to assert that this concept received the
Central Committee's formal support in its 14 March meeting. This
stress on collegial leadership is best?documented in Soviet and Sat
ellite propaganda media of the period.
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