STATUS OF SYRIAN COASTAL DEFENSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01115R000200090004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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t
Status of Syrian
Coastal Defenses CU)
Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
IA M 85-10020
March 1985
E n~
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March 1985
Status of Syrian Coastal Defenses
Summary
Syria's defenses along its 150-kilometer coastline
include unoccupied launch sites for recently acquired
SSC:-3 (Styx) and SSC-l b (Sepal) surface-to-surface
cruise missile systems, conventional artillery, radar
sites, and regularly spaced observation posts. The
Syrians apparently are in the training phase with both
cruise missile systems, and coastal defenses still must
rely on inaccurate and aging 130-mm fv1-46, 100-mm KS-19,
and 57-mat S-60 artillery pieces. When operationally
deployed, however, the SSC-3 and SSC-lb, with ranges of
100 and 300 Kilometers respectively, will fundamentally
improve Syrian coastal defense capabilities. The
missiles are more accurate, are mobile, and are capable
of delivering large warheads. The mobility of the
systems will reduce their vulnerability to air attack.
1uore importantly, the range of the missile systems, in
particular the 300-kilometer SSc;-1b, will greatly
increase Syrian reach into previously "safe" areas of
information available as of 1 December 1984 was used in this
report. (u)
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the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Acquisition of sophis-
ticated coastal defense missiles--at a time of
continuing US naval activity in the Mediterranean--will
sharply increase the potential threat from the Syrian
shore. (S
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Introduction
As part of their continuing effort to modernize Syria's military,
the Soviets have recently provided the Syrians with two sophisti-
cated coastal defense cruise missile systems--the SSC-3 (Styx)
and SSC-lb (Sepal). These missile systems will modernize the
Syrian coastal defenses, which presently depend on aging and
inaccurate conventional artillery deployed along the coast.
Particularly because of US-Israeli joint naval exercises in the
eastern Mediterranean, the acquisition of these systems has
caused increased concern about Syrian intentions, and about their
capability to fire on and hit naval vessels operating off their
coastline. (S F_ -1 25X1
This study addresses the land-based coastal defenses in Syria.
These defenses are described in detail and their locations are
shown in figure 1 at the end of the report. Although early
warning radar sites are included on the map and its key, these
sites are an integral part of S rian air defenses, and are not
addressed in detail. (S 25X1
Land-Based Cruise Missile Systems
Syria has acquired two land-based cruise missile systems--the
SSC-3 (Styx) and SSC-lb (Sepal)--from the Soviet Union since
February 1984. Since the Syrians' land-based coastal defenses
have consisted of short-range and relatively inaccurate conven-
tional artillery, the introduction of these modern missile
systems will greatly increase their coastal defense capability.
The ranges of the missiles--100 kilometers for the SSC-3 and 300
kilometers for the SSC-lb--will also increase the threat to naval
forces--including US--operating in the eastern Mediterranean
Sea. In addition, the mobility of the cruise missiles, in con-
trast to the static positioning of co , decreases
their vulnerability to air attack. (S 25X1
SSC-3 equipment was first identified in Syria in February 1984 at
Qantarah Port Facilities, about 4 kilometers north of Latakia.
To date, only two transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) have been
identified in Syria. The SSC-3 system is believed to fire the
most recent version of the Styx missile, the SS-N-2c, which is
subsonic and has a range of approximately 100 kilometers. It has
been manufactured with both radar and infrared seeker guidance
systems. The SSC-3 is a highly mobile system, designed to fire
either from a presurveyed position or from any level, open site.
(S 25X1
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The presence of the SSC-lb system in Syria was confirmed
imagery of Qantarah Port Facility (figure 2). Only one TEL,
one probable missile transporter, and two missile crates have
been identified to date. This system fires the supersonic SS-N-3c
missile, which has a range of approximately 300 kilometers and
carries a 1,000-kilogram warhead. Like the SSC-3, the SSC-lb i
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mobile and does not require a presurveyed firing position.
(S
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Although both missile systems can operate from almost any
open area, the Syrians have constructed tour fixed cruise
level,
missile
launch sites on their coastline. The sites were constructed
between June 1982 and September 1984 in the area between the
ports of Latakia and ri'artus. (S
Each fixed cruise missile launch site in Syria consists of four
large, circular launch positions with revetments to the rear
which probably serve as vehicle or missile storage areas (figure
3). To date, no cruise missile-related equipment has been iden-
tified at any of the four sites. (S
The Syrians are probably still in the training phase with both
the SSC-3 and SSC-lb. The limited time period since the missiles
were introduced into Syria and the small amount of cruise
missile-related equipment identified to date in Syria suggest
that neither system has been assimilated into the operational
inventory. one SSC-3
TEL and one posse e SSC-lb TEL were observe in revetments at
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Qantarah Naval vase, where they had been stored. Although we
cannot rule out the possibility that this was the first observed
operational deployment of cruise missiles in Syria, the presence
of one TEL from each of the two systems indicates that it was
more likely related to a training and familiarization program.
(S
Coastal Artillery
Prior to the introduction of cruise missiles, Syria relied
entirely on conventional artillery for land-based coastal
uefense. Syrian coastal artillery consists of two battalions of
130-mm M-46 field guns and three batteries of towed antiaircraft
artillery (two 100-mm KS-19 and one 57-mm S-60 batteries) (figure
4). The AAA pieces are believed to be deployed in a direct-fire
mode for two reasons: they are deployed in linear positions
instead of the typical circular pattern of antiaircraft artil-
lery, and the guns are deployed with surface search radars rather
than the Fire Can fire control radars which are usually deployed
with these types of AAA. The M-46 batteries use British-produced
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CDR-431 radars, and the KS-19 and S-60 batteries use Sheet i3end/
Square Head radars. The artillery is deployed in batteries of
four or six guns in fixed positions defending Syria's main ports.
These guns are relatively inaccurate against ships, and are a
viable threat only to targets at close range. The guns do not
threaten vessels operating at distances further than a few kilo-
meters from the Syrian coast. (S
Coastal Radar Sites
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has reported that in
addition to deploying Sheet Bend/Square Head surface search
radars with the coastal defense artillery, the Syrians have
deployed Low Sieve radars along the coast to provide low-altitude
early warning. These are small, mobile radars,
(S
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Coastal Observation Posts
In addition to the radar facilities, visual early warning is
achieved through a series of observation posts along the Syrian
coast. Observation posts are positioned 5 to 7 kilometers apart
and are concentrated between the major ports and north of the
Lebanese border. The posts are manned by coastal defense
platoons. (S
In previous DIA studies, Syrian observation posts have been
reported at approximate locations. In our search of the Syrian
coastline, we identified a unique type of building--a two-story
structure with an observation tower on one corner--that the
Syrians apparently use for coastal observation (figure 5). We
identified this type of structure near many of the approximate
locations and identified additional posts of similar design at
several new locations. At least 13 of the 17 observation posts
identified on the Syrian coast are of this design. (S
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Secret
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