FOUR MUNITIONS DEMILITARIZATION FACILITIES IDENTIFIED IN USSR

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• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Four Munitions
Demilitarization Facilities
Identified in USSR (s)
Secret
IA 84-10069
September 1984
Copy 2 1
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Four Munitions
Demilitarization Facilities
Identified in USSR (s)
Secret
/A 84-10069
September 1984
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of I April 1984 was
used in this report.
Four Munitions
Demilitarization Facilities
Identified in USSR (S)
We believe that four previously unidentified facilities located in the
western USSR are probably used for the demilitarization-disassembly,
destruction, and disposal-of solid-propellant munitions. The four facil-
ities-located near Faustovo, Irsha, Kirov, and Nizhnyaya Saida-are
very similar in design, and were all constructed in the mid-to-late 1970s.
We believe that their construction was necessitated by a growing re-
quirement to dispose of deteriorating solid-propellant munitions.
Munitions containing solid propellants are widely deployed in the
USSR, and many are produced in large quantities. Because solid pro-
pellants deteriorate over time, such munitions have a more limited ser-
vice lifetime than most other types of munitions. Some of the solid-
propellant munitions deployed in the USSR are due or past due for
disposal or refurbishment, and more will require such treatment in the
future. We believe that these four facilities are used for such disposal.
Comparison of the sites with a Soviet facility known to refurbish
ground forces munitions indicates that while some refurbishment may
be conducted at these sites, it is probably not their primary function.
The presence at two of the four sites of what we believe are system-
specific missile canisters and missile canister transporters indicates that
the facilities are primarily associated with tactical surface-to-air missiles,
and may be associated with strategic surface-to-air missiles. The large
number and variety of other objects and shipping crates at the same
two sites suggest that other types of solid-propellant munitions-such
as air-to-surface missiles, antitank missiles, artillery rockets, and other
ground forces munitions-may also be processed at the facilities. We
see no evidence, however, that the four facilities are involved with stra-
tegic offensive systems.
This information is Secret 25X1
iii Secret
IA 84-10069
September 1984
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Summary
iii
Operations Area Features
5
Support Area Features
5
Evidence of Solid-Propellant Munitions at the Four Facilities
6
Possibility of Refurbishment at the Facilities:
Comparison With a Known Soviet Refurbishment Facility
10
Refurbishment Activity at Balakleya, Kharkov Oblast
10
Facilities Comparison
10
Probability of Demilitarization at the Facilities:
Comparison With a US Demilitarization Facility
10
The Western Demilitarization Facility, Hawthorne, Nevada
10
Facilities Comparison
13
Materials Flow Comparison
13
v Secret
IA 84-10069
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Figure 1
Location of Probable Solid-Propellant Munitions Demilitarization Facilities, USSR
Leningrad
?
Nizhnyaya Salda
? Balakleya
Aral
Sea J
iterranean
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IA 84-10069
Cespien
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Four Munitions
Demilitarization Facilities
Identified in USSR (S)
Four similar facilities were constructed in the
western USSR during the mid-to-late 1970s, near
Faustovo, Irsha, Kirov, and Nizhnyaya Saida (fig-
ure I). Because the function of these facilities could
not be identified, an ad hoc working group was
established in 1977 within the Central Intelligence
Agency to determine the significance of the four
facilities. At that time the group identified apparent
similarities among the four facilities, but could not
determine their specific function. However, the
working group did agree that, based on their
known characteristics, the installations posed no
strategic threat to the US.' Is
The four facilities are situated along an east-west
line in the western Soviet Union, at intervals
ranging from approximately 650 to 750 kilometers.
Each installation is located in a remote, heavily
forested area; each is rail- and road-served; and
each is well secured. There are no known facilities
of this type elsewhere in the USSR. (S
At the time of the 1977 study, the installations at
Kirov and Nizhnyaya Saida were still under con-
struction. Recent satellite photography indicates
that all four facilities are now operational, and
provides a basis for further analysis. Imagery was
the sole source of information for the current
study, as it was for the 1977 research; as far as we
can determine, other sources of information on
these facilities are not available. This paper de-
scribes the four facilities as they appear in recent
imagery, and ascribes a function to them. It dis-
cusses activity, equipment, and items recently ob-
served at the sites, and compares the facilities'
configuration and work flow with those of a USSR
munitions refurbishment facility and a US demili-
Besides their remote location, the four facilities
share several common characteristics (figures 2, 3,
4, and 5). Each installation has clearly defined
operations and support areas. The arrangement of
buildings and the size and configuration of build-
ings at the four sites are very similar, and in some
cases individual buildings are identical from site to
site. All of the facilities are secured, with one board
fence and one or more wire fences. Construction
was begun on the facilities at Faustovo and Irsha in
mid-1973; the Kirov and Nizhnyaya Saida facilities
were begun in early 1975. All four facilities had
been completed by the late 1970s or early 1980s. 25X1
Based on their appearance, we believe that the four
facilities are part of the Soviet defense-industrial
complex, and that they probably employ a primar-
ily civilian work force to perform a weapons-
processing function. The latter conclusion is drawn
from two factors: a layout uncharacteristic of most 25X1
operational Soviet military facilities, which in most 25X1
cases are almost identical from site to site; and the
absence of on-site military housing or training
facilities. Only at Nizhnyaya Saida is there evidence
of a military personnel presence. That facility is
linked by road to a small military housing area,
about 3 kilometers to the south, that was con-
structed concurrently with, and is probably related
to, the main installation. Nizhnyaya Saida also has
more buildings than the other three facilities. We
do not know the reason for these anomalies at the
Nizhnyaya Saida facility. (~
tarization facility. (s
'For a further discussion of these sites, see CIA, SI-SID 77-01IJ (Top
Secret Multiple Codeword), November 1977, Four Unusual Soviet Installa-
tions iridt Similar Features. (C)
Secret
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Operations Area Features
At all four facilities, the operations area is com-
prised of several key functional structures, includ-
ing rail-served, revetted transshipment buildings
and a fabrication/assembly-type building. Two of
the facilities also have a shop-type building, and
Nizhnyaya Saida has an additional assembly-type
building. A second fabrication/assembly-type build-
ing under construction at the Faustovo facility will
probably be used to increase the facility's process-
ing capability. All four facilities have at least one
small bunker and one or more additional revetted
buildings, indicating that explosive materials are
handled at the sites. The accompanying table lists
the key features of the operations and the support
areas of the four facilities. (s
Support Area Features
The support areas of the four facilities are also
similar. Each installation has several rail sidings.
The Irsha, Kirov, and Nizhnyaya Saida facilities all
have a locomotive shed, a steam plant, and a fire
station. The Faustovo facility is linked by road to
an engine test facility at Kuznetsovo, 4 kilometers
to the southwest; a steam line extends to Faustovo
from Kuznetsovo, and firefighting services are
probably also provided from the engine test facility.
Each of the four facilities also has general-purpose
support facilities, including a motor pool, a buried
water tank, and one or more administration build-
ings. At two facilities, Kirov and Nizhnyaya Saida,
the support area includes a small electrical substa-
tion, and there are several small support structures
at Irsha. The Faustovo installation also has a
helicopter pad. Industrial-scale sewage treatment
facilities are not present at any of the four sites, but
Irsha and Kirov do have small-scale sewage treat- 25X1
ment facilities, and Faustovo and Nizhnyaya Saida
have several ponds that could serve as settling
ponds for sewage. It is likely that these facilities are
used for conventional sewage treatment rather than
for processing of industrial wastes. (s
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Faustovo
Irsha
Kirov
Nizhnyaya
Saida
Key Operations Area
Features
Transshipment buildings
(revetted, rail-served) 2
2
2
2
Fabrication/assembly-
type building
Bunker 1
1
1
2
Wire
Key Support Area
Features
Rail sidings Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Locomotive shed No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Nob
Yes
Yes
Yes
aA steam line is provided to Faustovo from the Kuznetsovo
Engine Test Facility.
bFirefighting services are probably provided from the Kuznetsovo
Engine Test Facility.
Evidence of Solid-Propellant Munitions at the Four
Facilities
At the time of the 1977 study, the ad hoc research
group determined that the facilities under analysis
were industrial rather than military in character,
but also noted that the installations' security and
operational features suggested involvement with
military-related work. The presence of bunkers and
revetments further indicated that explosives were
handled at the facilities, but at that time there was
no evidence to define the types of explosives
Evidence of solid-propellant SAMs has been identi-
fied at two of the four facilities, Faustovo and
Irsha. We have not observed such evidence at
Kirov or Nizhnyaya Salda, even though these
facilities are complete and operational; the reason
for this is not clear. Based on the similarities
among the facilities, however, we believe that all
four installations are involved in the same kind of
work. Moreover, evidence observed at Faustovo
and Irsha appears to be identical, suggesting that
the same types of munitions are probably handled
at all four sites. (S
At Faustovo, probable SA-6 missile canister trans-
porters and possible SA-6 missile canisters were
observed on 1983 satellite imagery; the SA-6 is a
tactical solid-propellant SAM system. Five trans-
porters were identified at the facility in May 1983,
just south of the fabrication/assembly-type build-
ing In July 1983, four transporters were observed
at the same location. Another vehicle, possibly a
fifth transporter, was observed in an open storage
area near the smaller transshipment building, carry-
ing two possible SA-6 missile canisters. (S
Also present in this storage area at Faustovo were
unidentified crates about 4 meters long and 1 meter
wide. Stacks of small, unidentified, light-toned
objects, numbering in the hundreds-which could
be small solid-propellant motors-were observed in
this storage area and near one of the revetted
buildings in the operations area. Figures 2 and 6
indicate the position of the missile canister trans-
porters, the crates, and the stacks of small objects
at Faustovo in July 1983. (S
Evidence of SAMs at Irsha
At Irsha, at least three different types of canisters
and two different sizes of shipping frames have
been observed, near the larger transshipment build-
ing and in the vicinity of the fabrication/assembly-
type building (figures est canisters
observed are abou 1 meter in
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diameter.' These canisters are similar in size to
those used with the SA-10, a strategic solid-propel-
lant SAM; however, because the SA-10 missile was
introduced into the Soviet inventory relatively
recently, the presence of SA-10 canisters at this
facility is difficult to explain. It is possible, there-
fore, that these canisters are for another weapons
system that uses shipping canisters of the same size,
although we do not know of such a system at this
canister is about_ ong and 1 meter in
diameter. This canister has not been associated with
any particular weapons system. (S
Of the two sizes of shipping frames observed at the
facility, the larger is about long and 2
meters wide. These frames are canvas-covered, and
are probably used to ship either two or four of the
canisters seen nearby. The smaller
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time. (S
In addition to these large canisters, two types of
smaller canisters are also present at Irsha. The
larger of these, about Olong and l meter
in diameter, may be for shipping SA-4 solid-
propellant boosters; the SA-4 is a tactical mobile
SAM that consists of four solid-propellant boosters
and a liquid-propellant sustainer. The other small
shipping frames are about long and 2
meters wide, and are probably used to ship two of
the canisters seen at Irsha. (s F_
Near the smaller transshipment building, in an
open storage area, we have seen stacks of objects
that include canisters with a bulbous end, measur-
diameter (figure 8). It is possible that these are
ing about 3 meters long and less than 1 meter in
shipping canisters for the original version of the
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SA-8 missile, a tactical solid-propellant SAM. We
have also seen crates, about 4 meters long and 1
meter wide, and stacks of small light-toned objects,
about 1 meter long-both similar, if not identical,
to those seen at Faustovo (figures 2 and 6). Stacks
of other small objects of various lenhs have also
been observed at Irsha (figure 8). Recent imagery
of the facility shows that sheds or tents have been
erected over most of these objects, probably for
concealment, protection from the environment, or
both. (s
Possibility of Refurbishment at the Facilities:
Comparison With a Known Soviet Refurbishment
Facility
Refurbishment Activity at Balakleya,
Kharkov Oblast
Ithe USSR has refurbished and re-
cycled certain ground forces munitions at least
since 1960, at a facility near Balakleya in Kharkov
Oblast (figure 9).[
a refurbishment facility situat-
ed within the Balakleya Ammunition Depot was
involved at that time in the refurbishment of high-
explosive munitions, armor-piercing and high-
explosive antitank munitions, and spent cases for
100-mm and possibly 115-mm tank munitions.
Unserviceable munitions were shipped to the facil-
ity by rail, and after refurbishment were either
shipped out by rail or stored in nearby bunkers.
During the refurbishment operation, the propellant
charges and primers of the munitions were re-
placed he plant did
not produce munitions, and implied that the work
force consisted mainly of local civilians. Recent
satellite imagery indicates that the facility is still
operational. (S
Facilities Comparison
Like the facilities at Faustovo, Irsha, Kirov, and
Nizhnyaya Saida, the Balakleya facility has a dis-
tinct processing area and adjacent support facilities.
The refurbishment facility consists of a dozen
major buildings, many of which are rail-served.
Unlike those facilities, however, the Balakleya
Depot also includes approximately 80 storage
buildings and numerous open storage areas, as well
as seven storage bunkers and an associated check-
out building, which constitute a tactical surface-to-
surface missile support facility. (s
Although we believe that the four study facilities
are involved in processing munitions, the dissimilar-
ities between these facilities and Balakleya indicate
that their primary function is something other than
refurbishment. There are no long-term storage facil-
ities at or near any of the four sites-an important
functional contrast to the Balakleya Ammunition
Depot, where the many storage buildings and
associated facilities indicate large-scale storage of
processed munitions for eventual reissue to de-
ployed forces. The absence of long-term on-site
storage at Faustovo, Irsha, Kirov, and Nizhnyaya
Saida suggests that the end product at the four
facilities is not finished munitions, but component
materials that will be reused or destroyed. (s
The lack of storage facilities at the four sites also
suggests that a relatively rapid turnaround of
processed munitions was envisioned when the facili-
ties were designed. The makeshift storage of crates
and other objects along the roads and near the
transshipment buildings at Faustovo and Irsha
suggests that these facilities probably process a
greater volume of materials than the other two
sites, and that the initial operations plan for these
facilities was not very realistic. (s
Probability of Demilitarization at the Facilities:
Comparison With a US Demilitarization Facility
The Western Demilitarization Facility, Hawthorne,
Nevada
The Western Demilitarization Facility (WDF) was
constructed in the mid-1970s at the Naval Ammu-
nition Depot near Hawthorne, Nevada, approxi-
mately 150 kilometers southeast of Reno (figure
10). Its construction was dictated primarily by
environmental concerns about the toxic nature of
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the effluents produced by the burning, burying, or
dumping of unserviceable munitions components.
The WDF is designed to demilitarize unserviceable
munitions with up to about 1,300 kilograms of
high-explosive/propellant content. Unserviceable
munitions are shipped to the facility by rail; their
explosive components are removed, and either dis-
posed of on-site or converted to chemicals to be
sold for reuse. Virtually all metals recovered during
the demilitarization process are sold for scrap. (U)
Facilities Comparison
The WDF, like the four Soviet facilities, has both
operations and support buildings. Operations build-
ings at the facility include rail-served, earth-covered
offloading docks, small earth-covered bunkers, a
compartmented, blast-resistant cell complex, and
seven other munitions processing buildings, most of
them with blast walls. Support facilities at the
WDF include an administration building, a steam
plant, a sewage treatment plant, and several settling
ponds, as well as a shipping area with several rail
sidings. (S
The WDF and the four Soviet facilities are similar
in several important respects. All five facilities
are situated in remote locations. Materials to be
processed at all five sites are delivered by rail and
offloaded in blast-protected-either bunkered or
revetted-buildings. After processing, the products
are shipped out from separate buildings located at
the end of the materials flow pattern, as discussed
below. Most of the buildings within the five facili-
ties are revetted, bunkered, or constructed with
heavy, blast-resistant walls to protect adjacent areas
and minimize damage from the blast of an acciden-
tal explosion. All five sites also have comparable
support facilities. (S
Two important similarities indicate that the four
Soviet sites are functionally correspondent to the
WDF. First, neither the WDF nor the four Soviet
facilities have any significant long-term on-site
storage facilities. The absence of such storage
suggests the flow-through of munitions and compo-
nents. Second, large amounts of raw materials have
not been observed either at the WDF or at the four
Soviet sites, and this similarity suggests that the
four facilities, like the WDF, are not involved in
fabrication. Rather, they appear to have been
designed, like the US facility, for the receipt,
processing, and shipment of munitions and muni-
tions components. (S
The WDF differs from the facilities at Faustovo,
Irsha, Kirov, and Nizhnyaya Salda in several re-
spects. Some of these differences are in the flow of
materials through the facilities, as discussed below.
There are also configurational differences: the
WDF's operations and support structures are not
separated into clearly defined and separately
secured areas, and it does not have a central
processing building; the separate stages of the
demilitarization process are carried out in separate
buildings. We do not believe, however, that these
configurational differences represent a significant
factor in assessing the Soviet facilities' probable
functional characteristics. (S
Materials Flow Comparison
At the WDF, munitions flow through the opera-
tions facilities in a clear functional pattern, shown
in figure 10. Unserviceable munitions are received
at the offloading docks (1) and then sent to the
preparation building (2) for removal from shipping
containers.' In the preparation building, munitions
containing smokeless powder are held for removal
of the powder; after removal, the powder is trans-
ported to an adjacent accumulator building (3) by
vacuum pipeline or conveyor for temporary stor-
age. Munitions not held for powder removal are
sent to the large cell complex (4) or the mechanical
removal building (5) if access to the explosive
material must be gained through the use of a lathe
or a saw. If the explosive material can be removed
by melting, the munitions are sent instead to the
steamout building (6), where hot water and steam
are used to melt out the explosives. The effluent
from this operation is processed and reduced to
water and a thick slurry in the adjacent sewage
plant (7). The clear water resulting from this
process is reused in the facility or drained off to the
local sewage system. The processed slurry is dried
in nearby settling ponds (8). Both the dried slurry
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and the explosives extracted by mechanical removal
are either incinerated in the bulk explosives dispos-
al building (9), or further processed in the bulk
explosives refining building (10) and eventually sold
for reuse. Scrap metals eventually end up in the
decontamination and small items furnace building
(11), and are shipped out by rail from a separate
section of the building. Small bunkers (12) in the
processing area provide temporary storage for the
munitions being processed. (u)
been observed in temporary storage near the ship-
ment buildings at Faustovo and Irsha (figures 2
and 3, pages 2 and 3). (s
Explosive components recovered during processing
at the WDF are disposed of on-site. At the four
Soviet facilities, however, such components are
probably shipped from the smaller transshipment
building to another location for disposal. This
conclusion is based on three significant differences
At the four Soviet facilities-Faustovo, Irsha,
Kirov, and Nizhnyaya Salda-the rail patterns and
the relative positions of buildings and roads are
similar to the pattern at the WDF.
figure 3 (page 3) shows, as an example,
the probable flow of materials at Irsha, a pattern
typical of the four facilities. (s
The small bunker or bunkers near the fabrication/
assembly-type building at each of the facilities most
likely provide temporary storage for the munitions,
as do the bunkers at the WDF. Processed muni-
tions components are eventually shipped out from
the smaller transshipment building at each Soviet
facility. Numerous crates and stacks of objects have
These differences mark the only apparent func-
tional divergence of the four sites from the mater-
ials proce
ssing flow at the WDF. (s
The similarities of the four Soviet facilities to the
WDF in the US indicate that these previously
unidentified sites are probably involved primarily
in the demilitarization, and possibly in some limited
refurbishment, of solid-propellant munitions. The
identification of what are probably SA-6 missile
canisters and missile canister transporters at
Faustovo, and of possible SA-8 and SA-10 missile
canisters and SA-4 booster canisters at Irsha, indi-
cates that these facilities are involved with tactical
and possibly strategic solid-propellant SAMs.
Further, the large number and variety of crates,
canisters, and shipping frames seen at these two
sites suggest that additional weapons systems-
probably other solid-propellant munitions-are also
handled there. Based on their strong design and
operational similarities, we believe that all four
facilities perform the same function. There is no
indication, however, that any of the facilities is
involved with strategic offensive missile systems.
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The timing of the facilities' construction is consis-
tent with the probability that they are involved in
the demilitarization of solid-propellant munitions.
All four facilities were constructed in the mid-to-
late 1970s, a time frame that is consistent with a
likely growing Soviet need for demilitarization or
refurbishment of SAMs, and probably of other
solid-propellant munitions as well. (s F_~
The service life of a solid-propellant munition
ranges from approximately five to 20 years, de-
pending, in large part, on the chemical composition
of the propellant and on the storage and handling
conditions it is subjected to. We estimate that an
average of service lives for Soviet solid-propellant
systems is roughly 10 to 12 years. The Soviet
inventory includes virtually millions of solid-propel-
lant munitions, among them air-to-surface and
surface-to-air missiles, artillery rockets, and anti-
tank missiles. Considering the number of solid-
propellant munitions and the fact that some of
these munitions have been in service for decades, it
is reasonable to conclude that the demilitarization
or refurbishment of these systems would be a
considerable undertaking, and would probably re-
quire specialized facilities. We do not know where
unserviceable munitions were demilitarized before
the four demilitarization facilities were established;
it is likely that the Soviets disposed of them locally
by burning, burying, or dumping the components.
(S
The SA-4 system provides one example of the
quantities of munitions that will require demilitari-
zation. This system has been in service for about 17
years; it is expected to be replaced gradually by the
SA-X-12, and this replacement will apparently be-
gin soon. Each SA-4 missile has four solid-propel-
lant boosters, and we estimate that there are six
missiles available at some point in the supply chain
for each of the almost 2,500 deployed SA-4 launch
rails. Thus, there are approximately 60,000 SA-4
boosters in the Soviet inventory, many of them past
due for disposal or refurbishment. Based on the
number of solid-propellant systems in the Soviet
inventory, it is clear that the demilitarization of un-
serviceable munitions represents a significant-and
an increasing-demand. (s F_~
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02 : CIA-RDP91TO 1115R000100300002-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02 : CIA-RDP91TO 1115R000100300002-0
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/02 : CIA-RDP91TO 1115R000100300002-0 ~