THE SOVIET AIR AND NAVAL PRESENCE AT CAM RANH BAY, VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01115R000100190002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Summary
Information available as of
I April 1984 was used to
prepare this report.
The Soviet Air and Naval
Presence at Cam Ranh
Bay, Vietnam (S)
The Soviets have been increasing their air and naval presence and ex-
panding facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, since 1979. In late 1983
they deployed naval Badger medium bombers, including strike models,
to Cam Ranh; and they appear to be making preparations at the air-
field to support long-term deployment of Badgers. The number of So-
viet naval ships routinely present at Cam Ranh port has increased
steadily during the last few years.
Soviet naval aircraft and ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay demon-
strate visible Soviet support for the Vietnamese government and pro-
vide the Soviets the capability to:
? Monitor and interfere with international shipping
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
? Strike US air and naval bases in the Philippines.
? Threaten the southern coastal areas of China.
? Conduct surveillance of all of the South China Sea.
The nine Badgers deployed at the airfield since late 1983 form a com-
posite squadron of five strike-capable, two tanker, one photoreconnais-
sance, and one ECM aircraft-a combination that is similar to the
composition of Badger regiments in the USSR. The Soviets began prep-
aration in late February 1984 for their first flight operations from this
airfield with antiship air-to-surface missiles. Both AS-2 and AS-5 mis-
siles and support equipment are present at the airfield. There is no evi-
dence of nuclear warhead storage.
Increases in equipment and expansion of facilities at Cam Ranh Bay
Airfield suggest that up to a regiment of naval Badgers-30 to 35 air-
craft-could eventually be deployed there, perhaps during 1984. Major
construction at the airfield includes:
? An air-to-surface missile storage and handling facility
for the AS-2 and AS-5.
? Air munitions storage buildings.
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 ? Two POL facilities with a capacity of about 6 million liters of fuel.
? New communications facilities, barracks, and support facilities.
The Soviet ship contingent routinely seen at Cam Ranh represents the
largest concentration of Soviet combatants and auxiliaries-usually 12
or more ships-deployed to a naval facility outside of the Soviet Union.
Support for these ships is provided mostly by depot and replenishment
ships. In contrast to expanded aircraft support facilities at the airfield,
there has been little expansion of ship support facilities ashore. The
Soviets may have refrained from constructing substantial and costly
shore facilities to support their ship deployments because they fear that
access to those facilities could be denied at a future date, as occurred in
Egypt and Somalia. The lack of shore facilities may also reflect Viet-
namese sensitivity to a large, foreign-controlled military base on its soil.
We have no evidence of a formal basing agreement providing for Soviet
use of Vietnamese facilities in the Cam Ranh Bay area. Soviet access,
development, and use of these facilities seems assured as long as Viet-
nam requires a major counterweight to the threat from China.
This information is Secret
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Secret
Summary iii
Support Facilities 1
Munitions Storage 4
Ground Support Vehicles 4
Barracks and Storage Area 4
Miscellaneous Support Facilities 4
POL Storage 6
Aircraft Deployments 6
Capability for Air-to-Surface Missile Operations 9
Prospect for Additional Deployments 12
Naval Air Capabilities and Force Options 13
Support Facilities 13
Depot and Support Ships 13
Berthing Facilities 14
Ashore Support Facilities 14
Additional Security 14
Naval Combatant Deployments 14
Naval Ship Capabilities and Force Options 16
Appendix
Capabilities of Soviet Aircraft Based at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam 17
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The Soviet Air and Naval
Presence at Cam Ranh
Bay, Vietnam (S)
The Soviets deployed naval Badger medium bomb-
er aircraft, including strike-capable models, to Cam
Ranh, Vietnam, in November 1983. This develop-
ment significantly increases Soviet military capabili-
ties in Southeast Asia. As important as it is,
however, it is just one more development in the
growth of the Soviet military presence at Cam
Ranh. (s
This paper addresses the buildup of Soviet naval air
and seagoing forces at Cam Ranh since 1979. It
discusses the development of facilities that support
those forces, the capabilities of the forces, and the
potential threat they present to opposing military
forces in the area. (s
Soviet air activities are centered primarily at facili-
ties located in the northern portion of Cam Ranh
Bay Airfield (figure 1). The Soviets are apparently
the sole occupants of this area, which is served by
the largest aircraft parking apron at the airfield.
The parking apron separates the majority of their
facilities from the nearest Vietnamese-controlled
area. The Soviet facilities are secured by fence, and
access to individual areas within the compound also
appears to be controlled. The Soviets are using the
badly damaged US-built POL facility at the south-
ern end of the airfield for their aviation fuel storage
site, and they have begun construction on a second
POL facility (figure 2). They also recently began
upgrading and securing the abandoned US-built
ammunition storage area east of the air-
field. (s
man six SAM sites, three SA-2 and three SA-3, that
protect the approaches to the airfield. Most of the
other airfield facilities built by the US remain
heavily damaged and unused. (s
Support Facilities
Soviet construction and renovation of air-related
support facilities at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield began
in mid-1982. Prior to then the Soviets had only a
communications facility, several small support
buildings, and a few ground service vehicles at the
airfield-an amount sufficient to support only the
Bear D and Bear F aircraft that i)eriodically oper-
ate out of the airfield. ( 25X1
Air-to-Surface Missile Storage. In mid-1982 con-
struction began on several quonset buildings in an
area next to the parking apron that serves as an
air-to-surface missile storage and support facility.
By mid-1983 six quonset buildings were completed
and two additional buildings were under construc-
tion. This separately fenced facility will provide
over 3,000 square meters of floorspace when com-
pleted. It will be large enough to provide missile
storage and checkout for a greater number of strike
aircraft than the five Badger strike aircraft present-
ly deployed at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield. It will be
comparable to ASM storage and support facilities
supporting Badger regiments (30 to 35 aircraft) in
the USSR. (s 25X1
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The Vietnamese use two areas at this airfield. A
helicopter training regiment is located on the west
side of the airfield, and a surface-to-air (SAM)
missile support facility is located on the east side.
Both areas are wall-secured. The Vietnamese also
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Munitions Storage. Construction of what probably
will be air munitions storage buildings began in
June 1983 in the old US-built ammunition storage
area east of the airfield (figure 3). The design of
these buildings is typically Soviet and similar to
buildings at air munitions storage facilities in the
USSR. As of December 1983 three buildings, each
30 meters long and 18 meters wide, were under
construction. Each building is located in one of the
old US-built bunkered revetments. Although con-
struction is proceeding slowly, they could be com-
pleted in 1984. Nine additional old bunkered revet-
ments are available in this area for munitions
storage expansion. There is no construction of, or
provision for, nuclear weapons storage at this
facility or at the air-to-surface missile storage
facility. (s
Communications. Prior to mid-1983 communica-
tions facilities at the airfield consisted of antennas
on and near a 3,600-square-meter communications
and support building, a FIX-24 direction finding
(HF/DF) facility, and a Park Drive mobile satellite
communications (satcom) unit. During the summer
of 1983 communications were upgraded by adding
a second Park Drive mobile satcom unit. The
satcom units directly link the Soviet forces at Cam
Ranh Bay Airfield with Moscow. The communica-
tions and support building probably also serves as
the administration center for the Soviets at the
airfield. (S
Ground Support Vehicles. Before August 1983 the
Soviets had only five TZ-22 aircraft fuel trucks and
about 12 miscellaneous vehicles supporting Bear D,
Bear F, and occasional transient aircraft opera-
tions. The motor pool area was expanded during
the first half of 1983 to accommodate an influx of
ground service vehicles. By September 1983 the
number of vehicles had reached roughly 100, in-
cluding the equivalent of a medium bomber regi-
ment's air technical battalion, in addition to numer-
ous general purpose vehicles.' The number of TZ-
'Air technical battalions provide fuel, armament, and oxygen for
aircraft as well as base security; supply; communications and
administrative services; and air traffic control, transportation,
and airfield maintenance. (S)
15-about the same number normally used to sup-
port a Soviet medium bomber regiment. (SF-
Barracks and Storage Area. During the summer of
1982 the Soviets began construction of 17 one-story
buildings in a separately secured area. Ten of the
buildings, located at the south end of the secured
area, are identical in design and appear to be
barracks. By March 1984 eight were completed, one
was being roofed, and the foundation was being
laid for the tenth. All of these buildings are or will
be partitioned into two-man, or possibly three-man,
rooms with a total floorspace of over 8,600 square
meters. The interior arrangement of these buildings
suggests they will provide living space for 400 to
600 senior technicians and officers. (s
The other seven buildings, located at the north end
of the secured area, have no internal partitioning.
All are complete, and we believe they are probably
for storage. Some, however, could be open-bay
barracks intended for enlisted personnel. The total
floorspace of these seven buildings is 4,000 square
meters; if all were used as barracks they could
house about 1,000 men. (s
Miscellaneous Support Facilities. Several smaller fa-
cilities at the airfield also are occupied by the
Soviets. An AKDS-70 mobile air separation unit
near the motor pool supplies oxygen used on board
aircraft. A probable electric generator facility is at
the south end of the Soviet area, and a supply
building and a support building are near the center
of the Soviet area. An aircraft operations building
has been completed next to the parking apron.
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POL Storage. About March 1980 the Soviets began
constructing a new POL storage facility at the site
of the destroyed US-built POL facility just south of
the airfield (figure 4). As of December 1983 some
200 POL tanks, most of which are below ground,
had been emplaced for a total storage capacity of
almost 5 million liters of fuel. In addition, vehicle
tracks around a large, US-built vertical POL tank
suggest that repair work is under way on the tank.
The earthen cofferdam surrounding the spill pond
for this tank has been breached, apparently to
provide access for repair vehicles. If the Soviets
repair this tank, the capacity of the POL facility
would be increased by about 3 million liters.
In March 1984 the Soviets began constructing a
second POL facility next to the parking apron.
Twenty POL tanks with a total capacity of about I
million liters have been delivered to the site.
The Soviets have made no provisions for hydrant
fueling of their aircraft. TZ-22 aircraft fuel trucks
normally are loaded at the main POL facility and
serve aircraft parked on the large apron 2.5 kilome-
ters away. The new POL facility under construction
will provide improved fueling services for quick-
response missions that otherwise might be delayed
due to the time required to transport fuel from the
main POL facility. (s
There is no evidence of an operational pipeline
connecting either POL facility with the port facili-
ties 1 1 kilometers south of the airfield. Sections of
a US-built pipeline are missing and no repair
activity has been evident. Apparently POL facilities
at the airfield are replenished by fuel trucks. The
fuel probably is delivered to the port by a Soviet
merchant tanker or naval oiler routinely seen
moored at the piers or anchored offshore. Although
these ships primarily support naval operations, they
could also carry aviation fuel. (s
The capacity of the POL facilities at the airfield is
consistent with that normally found at airfields in
the USSR supporting medium-range bomber regi-
ments, and it is more than adequate to support the
missions currently flown by both the Badger and
Bear aircraft assigned there. Based on a maximum
loading of about 42,000 liters of fuel for a Badger
and a radius mission flown to near fuel exhaustion,
t a single sortie from Cam Ranh by the nine Badgers
assigned there would consume about 5 percent of
the airfield's POL supply. A single sortie by a
regiment of Badgers (20 strike and 10 supporting
aircraft) staging from Cam Ranh with the same
mission profile would consume about 20 percent of
the airfield's POL supply. (s
Fuel supplies could limit extended air operations
from Cam Ranh by the Soviets. In the USSR
airfields are supported by an extensive logistics
infrastructure. In Vietnam the Soviets probably
must rely.on sea-delivered fuel supplies and, to a
lesser extent, air deliveries. We have no evidence of
an agreement with the Vietnamese to provide So-
viet forces at Cam Ranh with aviation fuel. Soviet
reliance on such an agreement would be counter to
past practices they have followed in establishing
their overseas bases. (s
Aircraft Deployments
The Soviet Union has routinely deployed pairs of
Bear D maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Bear
F antisubmarine warfare aircraft to Cam Ranh Bay
Airfield since 1980. In 1983 the Soviets deployed
naval Badger aircraft, including strike-capable mod-
els, to the airfield. With the exception of military
exercises, this is the first out-of-area deployment of
Badgers in more than a decade. The last such
deployment took place from 1968 to mid-1972,
when a naval air unit of as many as 36 air-
craft-two-thirds of which were Badgers-operated
from three airfields in Egypt. (s
According to special intelligence, the first deploy-
ment of naval Badgers to Cam Ranh Bay Airfield
occurred Japanese Air Self
Defense Forces (JASDF) aircraft, which observed
the Badgers on their way to, Vietnam. and imagery
of Cam Ranh Bay Airfield
indicated that this deployment consisted of four
aircraft-two Badger A tankers, one Badger E
photoreconnaissance aircraft, and one Badger J
ECM aircraft special intelligence
detected a second deployment of three Badger
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aircraft flying to Vietnam, and on 2 December two
more Badger aircraft arrived, bringing the total
number of Badgers at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield to
nine (figure 5)1 ~ re-
vealed that these five Badgers are strike-capable,
modified Badger Cs.2 This combination of strike-
capable and strike-support aircraft is consistent
with a composite squadron of medium bombers
found in a typical Soviet naval Badger strike regi-
ment. (S
'Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) has three Badger models
equipped for strike operations-Badger Cs, modified Badger
Cs, and Badger Gs. Badger Cs are deployed only with naval
aviation. They entered service about 1960, primarily for use in
maritime strike missions. This aircraft carries a single AS-2 an-
tiship, air-to-surface missile (ASM) on its centerline. Modified
Badger Cs carry either two AS-5 or two AS-6 antiship ASMs
mounted on pylons under their wings, or an AS-2 on its center-
line. Badger Gs also carry two AS-5s or two AS-6s mounted on
pylons under the wings. (S)
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Capability for Air-to-Surface Missile Operations. Airfield without attached pylons in order to obscure
The airfield facility improvements and the presence
of AS-2 and AS-5 missiles and missile-support
equipment indicate that Soviet planning for Badger
deployments to Vietnam included the capability for
strike aircraft to conduct air-to-surface missile op-
erations. (S
The Soviets made a concerted effort to keep mis-
siles and missile-support equipment in covered stor-
age until they were ready for use. In addition, two
of the five modified Badger Cs at Cam Ranh Bay
Airfield were photographed while enroute to Viet-
nam by US Navy aircraft operating from the
carrier USS Midway. These Badgers were not fitted
with missile pylons under their wings, but discolor-
ation on the aircraft indicated that pylons previ-
ously had been attached. It is possible that all five
modified Badger Cs were flown to Cam Ranh Bay
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Missile pylon installation and the first loading of
air-to-surface missiles on the modified Badger C
aircraft took place during February and March
1984 (figure 7). Soviet ground support personnel
moved missile pylon crates onto the parking apron
in early February 1984 in preparation for their
installation on the five strike aircraft. Pylon instal-
lation was completed by early March 1984. A
missile handling dolly for the AS-5 also was posi-
tioned near the aircraft when the pylons were being
installed, suggesting practice ASM loadings for
ground crew training may have occurred (figure 8).
Loading of air-to-surface missiles on the modified
Badger C aircraft was observed
and apparently involved both AS-5 and AS-2 mis-
siles. Although the only missiles seen at the time
were AS-2s, missile handling dollies for both the
AS-2 and the AS-5 were on the apron. An AS-5
missile was seen in front of one of the missile
storage quonset buildings two days earlier (figure
9). (S
The quonset buildings in the missile storage area
can easily accommodate the 10 to 15 ASMs that
can be carried on the five modified Badger Cs.
When the two additional buildings are completed,
the facility will be capable of meeting the missile
storage and handling requirement of a Badger
regiment-probably as many as 60 air-to-surface
missiles. (s
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Prospect for Additional Deployments. According to
special intelligence acquired since December 1983,
the Badger aircraft based at Cam Ranh Bay Air-
field have been flown for pilot familiarization
within the local airfield area and for navigation,
reconnaissance, and probably airborne refueling
training. This training pattern is typical of Soviet
aircraft units newly established within and outside
of the USSR, and it probably will expand to
include strike training later this summer. When the
existing squadron reaches operational readiness, the
Soviets may deploy additional Badgers to Cam
Ranh Bay Airfield, probably during 1984. (SF-
The nature and size of Soviet facilities now in place
or under construction at the airfield strongly sug-
gest that the Soviets are developing the capability
to support extended deployments of Badger aircraft
in regimental strength. The apron where the Soviet
aircraft are parked is large enough to accommodate
a regiment of Badgers and the four Bear aircraft
that routinely deploy there, as well as other tran-
sient aircraft. Except for the absence of revetments
to protect parked aircraft and provisions for nucle-
ar weapons storage, the facilities are comparable to
those supporting medium-range bomber regiments
in the USSR. The only apparent constraint at this
time is missile storage and handling facilities for
additional strike aircraft; however, such facilities
are under construction and could be ready to
support a regiment-sized force as early as the fall of
1984. The typical naval Badger strike regiment
consists of 30-35 aircraft, at least twenty of which
are ASM-capable. The remaining aircraft models
are tankers, ECM support aircraft, and training
aircraft. (S
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Naval Air Capabilities and Force Options
The composite Badger squadron and the Bear air-
craft at Cam Ranh provide the Soviets the capabil-
ity to monitor and interfere with international
shipping between the Indian and Pacific Oceans
(figure 10). The aircraft can conduct surveillance of
all of the South China Sea, as well as strike US air
and naval bases in the Philippines. Soviet use of the
airfield at Cam Ranh also poses a threat to the
southern coastal areas of China, thereby demon-
strating visible Soviet support for the Vietnamese
government. (S
Soviet Navy ships were first seen at Cam Ranh Bay
in early 1979. The Soviet naval ship contingent at
Cam Ranh Bay has increased steadily since then
and, by March 1984, averaged about 12 ships-the
largest concentration of Soviet auxiliaries and com-
batants routinely deployed at any non-Soviet base.
This concentration of ships is larger than the num-
ber maintained by the Soviets in Alexandria during
the early 1970s, when the Soviet Navy had ready
access'to that Egyptian port, and is larger than
present ship concentrations at other facilities used
by the Soviets. At Dehalak Island, Ethiopia-the
major Soviet base supporting operations in the
Indian Ocean-the Soviet Navy maintains a depot
ship, a floating dock, a stores barge, and a few
miscellaneous small craft. Two or three transient
combatants usually are seen there. In Tartus, Syr-
ia-the major port used in the Mediterranean-
only a depot ship, a stores barge, a few miscellane-
ous small craft, and one submarine are seen in
port. (S
Support Facilities
Depot and Support Ships. The Soviet Navy gener-
ally relies on a group of depot and support ships to
provide replenishment and minor maintenance and
upkeep for its ships at overseas bases. In 1980 the
Soviet Navy stationed an Amur-class depot ship at
Cam Ranh Bay, establishing an identifiable naval
presence there. Since then the number of support-
ing ships and craft has grown and now includes
naval oilers, naval-subordinated merchant tankers,
a deperming ship, ocean-going tugs, a covered
Figure 10
Potential Surveillance and Target Areas of Badger Aircraft
Staging From Cam Ranh, Vietnam
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URMA
Andam n
Sea a
South
China
Sea
Nmnfnp ~. M
pine
Sea
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stores barge, yard oilers and fuel barges, oil spill
cleanup craft, possible picket boats, and small tugs
or line-handling ships. Recently, a submarine ten-
der routinely has been seen at the port and may
now be assigned to the support forces there. Mer-
chant ships, which are occasionally seen in port,
may be delivering supplies and stores for use by
Soviet forces. (S 9FX1
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In late 1980 an old Soviet ship repair dock was
delivered to the port. This dock normally is sta-
tioned in the outer bay and may have been turned
over to the Vietnamese Navy. It is capable of
providing minor repairs to conventionally powered
submarines and surface combatants up to the size
of light frigates. In the future a larger, more
capable dock, such as one of the two 8,500-ton
capacity docks delivered to Ho Chi Minh City, may
also be sent to Cam Ranh. This would permit the
repair of ships up to the size of light cruisers of the
Kara-class. (S 25X1
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The Soviet hospital ship Ob makes periodic deploy-
ments to Cam Ranh Bay. This ship probably
provides medical services to Soviets stationed in
Cam Ranh Bay and possibly to Soviets located
elsewhere in the country. (S
Berthing Facilities. When Soviet ships were first
seen at Cam Ranh in 1979, berthing facilities
consisted of two former US-built piers The Soviets
have refurbished both of these piers and have
installed three floating piers. Four of the five piers
are used exclusively by Soviet ships (figure 11). The
fifth and northernmost pier is used only by the
Vietnamese Navy. Work progressed slowly during
1983 and early 1984 on an earth-and-rubble ap-
proach for a sixth pier at the southern end of the
port. When the pier approach is completed, the pier
will be assembled from three pier sections now at
the port. (S
The five existing piers appear to be equipped to
provide water and electricity to ships moored to
them. A 4-kilometer-long pipeline from a reservoir
provides fresh water to the port area. Electricity
probably is provided by a generator located in a
building on a quay between the two northernmost
piers. Security checkpoints were built at the ap-
proaches to the four Soviet piers in 1983. A check-
point also was built at the incomplete pier ap-
proach, indicating impending use by the Soviets.
No checkpoint, however, has been built at the
outdoor chessboards. An infantry-style obstacle
course also has been constructed. Building con-
struction has been limited to a few shed-type struc-
tures in the area of the piers. (s
In addition to these facilities, the Soviets are using
a former South Vietnamese Navy compound lo-
cated adjacent to the Soviet pier area. Although we
cannot determine the extent of its use, we assume
the Soviets are occupying the administration, hous-
ing, and general support facilities. The buildings in
this compound have 7,000 square meters of floor-
space and could provide housing for several hun-
dred persons. Additional warehouse-type facilities
are in the vicinity of the port area, but we have no
evidence that they are being used by the Soviets.
Additional Security. In addition to the security
checkpoints at the approaches to the piers used by
the Soviet ships, four BTR-60 armored personnel
carriers (APCs) routinely have been seen in the port
area. These vehicles may be used by a Soviet naval
security group assigned to Cam Ranh Bay. It
probably is quartered aboard the Amur-class depot
ship. The vehicles routinely are parked in the port
area near the berth used by the Amur; not at the
former South Vietnamese naval compound. A simi-
lar naval security force is believed to be assigned to
the Soviet base on Dehalak Island, Ethiopia.
approach to the Vietnamese pier. (s
Ashore Support Facilities. The Soviets so far have
not constructed extensive shore facilities to support
their ships at Cam Ranh Bay. The reason for this
lack of construction may be that the Navy does not
want to construct substantial and costly facilities
with the risk of losing access to them at a future
date-as occurred in Egypt and Somalia. Also, the
Navy may feel that it does not need substantial
shore facilities to support its ships, since it can
replenish and maintain them from depot and sup-
port ships. Only a few facilities for training and
crew rest and recreation have been built, including
an athletic and recreation area consisting of a
soccer field, basketball and tennis courts, and four
Naval Combatant Deployments
A variety of combatants has been seen at Cam
Ranh Bay since 1979. Surface combatants have
ranged in size from minesweepers and Petya-II-class
light frigates to Kara-class guided cruisers. The
aircraft carrier Minsk, the largest surface warship in
the Soviet Pacific Fleet, also has anchored in Cam
Ranh Bay during its deployments in the South
China Sea. Amphibious ships such as Rogov-class
amphibious assault transport docks, Ropucha-class
tank landing ships, and Polnocny-class medium
landing ships have been identified in port and may
occasionally transport supplies from the Soviet
Union. Submarines calling at Cam Ranh Bay in-
clude F-class conventionally powered attack subma-
rines and N- and V-class nuclear-powered attack
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submarines. E-II- and C-class nuclear-powered sub-
marines equipped with cruise missiles routinely use
the port. One W-class conventionally powered sub-
marine also has been based at Cam Ranh. This
submarine may be used as a training target for
joint antisubmarine exercises with the Vietnamese
Navy or as a battery-charging station for other
conventionally powered submarines using the
port. (S
Naval Ship Capabilities and Force Options
Access to Cam Ranh Bay port facilities provides
major benefits for the Soviet Navy. By using the
port as a logistics support base, the deployment
times for ships operating in the South China Sea
can be significantly extended. The Soviet Navy can
reprovision, refuel, and provide minor upkeep and
maintenance to its ships, eliminating the need for
them to return to distant bases in the Soviet Pacific
area or to rely on open ocean anchorages. In
addition, Cam Ranh Bay is used as an interim stop
to replenish Soviet naval ships transiting between
the Indian Ocean and the Soviet Pacific Fleet area.
The majority of Soviet naval ships operating in the
Indian Ocean are home-based in the Soviet Pacific
Fleet. (S
Soviet ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay can
monitor and, in times of conflict, interfere with
international shipping between the Indian Ocean
and the Pacific. Transit lanes between the US naval
base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and the Indian
Ocean also could be threatened. In addition, Soviet
ships based at Cam Ranh can conduct patrols off
the Vietnamese coast, demonstrating support for
the Vietnamese government, as well as presenting a
threat to southern China. (S
We have no evidence that the Soviets and Vietnam-
ese have concluded a formal basing agreement for
Soviet use of Cam Ranh or other Vietnamese
facilities. Hanoi has consistently denied that any
such agreement exists but has held open the possi-
bility in the event of an extreme threat to Vietnam's
national security. Recognizing that their present
close congruence of interests may not last indefi-
nitely, Moscow seems likely to continue following a
conservative approach-as it has in other coun-
tries-toward investing in long-term, large-scale im-
provements at Vietnamese facilities. The absence of
a massive building program also reflects Vietnam-
ese sensitivities toward any unconstrained growth in
foreign influence in Vietnam. (s)
Soviet-Vietnamese relations, though not especially
warm, are solid enough to allow for a continuing
gradual increase in Soviet use of Vietnamese facili-
ties. As long as Vietnam requires a major counter-
weight to Chinese pressure, Soviet entree to Viet-
namese facilities seems assured. (s)
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Appendix
Capabilities of Soviet Aircraft Based at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam
Aircraft Primary Payload Range Radius Refueled
Mission (km) (km) a (km) a Radius (km) a
Bear D Maritime Recon- Guns 17,000 7,400-8,500 9,400-10,600
naissance and
Targeting
Bear F Antisubmarine Guns, torpedoes, 15,600 6,100-8,000 8,300-10,200
Warfare depth bombs,
sonobuoys,
marine markers
Badger A Tankerb Guns, fuel 2,200-5,700 1,800-3,000 3,100- 4,100
Modified Antiship Strike Guns, bombs, 2,000-3,700 1,350-2,200 2,700- 3,300
Badger C one AS-2 centerline
or two AS-5 wings
or two AS-6 wings
Badger E Photorecon- Guns, cameras 2,200-5,700 1,800-3,000 3,100- 4,100
naissance
Badger J ECM/Strike Guns, click 2,200-5,700 1,800-3,000 3,100- 4,100
Support jammer, other
active ECM
systems
a Range, radius, and refueled radius figures vary based on pay-
load and mission profile and have been rounded.
bMany Badger As are configured as freefall bombers. Range and
radius figures are based on the bomber variant.
This appendix is Secret.
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Secret
Secret
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