INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PERU, COLOMBIA, AND ECUADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Director of
Central
Intelligence
IV?)tcl,
01)1
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in
Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
et
NI JIM 87-10005
May 1987
Copy
459
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
--ErE at ET
NI IIM 87-10005
INSURGENCY AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
PERU, COLOMBIA, AND ECUADOR
Information available as of 21 April 1987 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved
for publication on that date by the Chairman of
the National Intelligence Council.
.0,0,S reel if
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
3
DISCUSSION
9
The Scope of Violence in Peru and Colombia
9
Variables Affecting the Level of Violence
11
Foreign Support
11
Soviet Involvement
11
Cuba's Role
11
Role of Nicaragua
13
Role of Libya
14
Regional and National Insurgent Cooperation
14
Domestic Linkages and Support
14
Transnational Linkages
15
Linkages to Drug Traffickers
15
Government's Abilities To Confront the Growing Threat
16
Peru
16
The Political Context
16
Security Force Capabilities and Weaknesses
17
Colombia
19
The Political Context
19
Security Force Capabilities and Weaknesses
20
Outlook
21
ANNEX: Insurgent Groups in Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador
25
III
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
SCOPE NOTE
The purpose of this Memorandum is to assess the threat of terrorist
and insurgent violence in Peru and Colombia in terms of national
counterinsurgency capabilities.' It treats Ecuador as an exceptional case,
where security forces have delivered major, perhaps decisive, setbacks
to urban terrorists. The paper also examines the extent of foreign
support to local revolutionaries as well as regional and national links
among terrorist and insurgent groups. This Memorandum is intended to
provide a corollary study to the JIM, Prospects for Leftist Revolution-
ary Groups in South America, published in July 1986. We still regard
the overall judgments of that paper as valid, but it was broader in
geographic scope and did not focus on the counterinsurgent capabilities
of host governments
'For the purposes of this Memorandum, insurgency is defined as protracted political military activity
aimed at gaining control of national resources, using both irregular combat units and political front
organizations. Insurgent activity can include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, political mobilization, propagan-
da, recruitment, front and covert party organizations, and international activity. It is designed to weaken
government control and legitimacy by increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common
denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective
differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives generally do not include
the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country. Most of the
organizations that we treat in this assessment are insurgent groups?some of which use terrorism as a tactic.
Other organizations, however, such as Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and Ecuador's Alfaro
Vive, Carajo, primarily use terrorist tactics and do not easily meet the definition of insurgency
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
KEY JUDGMENTS
The level of leftist-inspired, politically motivated violence contin-
ues to rise in Colombia and has increased substantially in Peru in the
past few years. Although insurgent gains are likely to be gradual and
government security services also will improve their capabilities, on
balance we believe that security conditions in Peru and Colombia will
worsen over the next two years. From the US perspective, the most
immediate consequence of the growing terrorist threat in Peru and
Colombia is the growing danger to US citizens and property. Over the
longer term, worsening security conditions in these countries could
jeopardize US antinarcotics efforts and fundamental US policy objec-
tives regarding the institutionalization of democratic rule.
We judge that current trends in revolutionary activities are likely
to continue:
? In Peru, Sendero Luminoso (SL) has expanded its brutal insur-
gent operations from the rural highlands into new regions,
including Lima, where it now has a permanent, highly compart-
mented terrorist apparatus. Peruvian security forces must also
contend with the smaller, urban-based Marxist Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) that conducts independent
terrorist operations, primarily in Lima, often directed at for-
eign, especially US, targets.
? In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARO, the largest insurgent force, is the only guerrilla group
still claiming adherence to the truce initiated by the govern-
ment in 1984. FARC is exploiting the legal protection the truce
provides, however, to recruit and rearm and is putting the truce
under pressure by engaging in limited armed operations, kid-
napings, extortion, and other antigovernment activities. Three
smaller but active guerrilla organizations, the National Libera-
tion Army (ELN), the 19th of April Movement (M-19), and the
Popular Liberation Army (EPL), have formed a loose guerrilla
alliance, the National Guerrilla Coordinator (CNG). These
groups operate throughout Colombia, with the ELN undertak-
ing increasingly effective attacks on the nation's major oil
facilities. In addition, US Embassy personnel remain targets for
drug traffickers and guerrillas.
? Ecuador is the exception in the region because government
security forces scored impressive gains last year against the
Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC), an urban extremist group that began
to pose a subversive threat in the 1983-85 period.
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
Foreign Support to Andean Revolutionaries
Insurgent groups in Colombia and Peru are largely self-sufficient,
but most remain open to external support. The Soviets, Cubans,
Nicaraguans, and Libyans have contributed varying?but generally
limited?amounts of political guidance, training, funding, materiel, and
propaganda support to radical leftist groups in the region. The strongest
insurgent groups, however, such as the SL?which continues to reject
foreign sponsors?and the FARC do not need external support to sustain
current levels of operation, in our view:
? We have no evidence of direct Soviet support to Peruvian and
Colombian insurgent groups, but we believe Moscow maintains
limited contact?and influence?with guerrilla groups, when
possible, through intermediaries such as local Communist par-
ties or front organizations. It seems likely, however, that the
Soviets channel some aid to Colombian groups through the
Cubans, so as to conceal their own role.
? Cuba's influence is of significance only in Colombia. Havana
has maintained close and longstanding relationships with several
guerrilla groups, and we believe that Castro is probably respon-
sible for the continued viability of the CNG and sees Colombia
as a long-term target for destabilization.
Nicaragua has also provided limited assistance to Colombian
revolutionary groups and the Ecuadorean AVC in the form of
advice, arms, political and military training, and to a lesser
extent funds.
? Libya has supplied limited training and funds to some Colombi-
an groups, especially the M-I9, and to the Ecuadorean AVC.
Although Tripoli is notorious among Latin American revolution-
aries for failing to deliver promised assistance, these contacts
continue.
Regional and Internal Insurgent Links
Domestic insurgent coordination is apparent only in Colombia,
where the CNG has staged larger and more coordinated attacks than
were previously possible by the individual guerrilla groups. In our
judgment, however, leadership rivalries and ideological disputes are
likely to hinder an effective functional division of responsibility among
CNG participants during the next two years.
We doubt that Peru's SL and MRTA groups will ever establish a
close relationship because of SL's radical ethnocentricity and its ex-
treme, Maoist rural populism. We have no evidence that they coordi-
nate attacks, and we believe that the coincidence of their actions at
4
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
times reflects both groups' prediliction for timing their attacks around
major public events in Peru. We cannot rule out the possibility of future
cooperation between MRTA and other small radical Peruvian leftist
groups because the Castroite MRTA seeks to fuse all "progressive"
forceswithin Peru into one revolutionary organization.
We believe efforts at transnational insurgent cooperation will
continue to falter. The Colombia-based America Battalion is the only
multinational guerrilla force in the region. Originally composed of
Colombia's M-19, ELN, and EPL, Ecuador's Alf aro Vive, and Peru's
Tupac Amaru, the Battalion has suffered significant losses and is now
composed almost entirely of M-19 members. We believe that it will
continue to function primarily as an M-19 guerrilla unit. We do not ex-
pect Peru's SL to establish working relationships with other insurgent
organizations in Latin America because of its extreme ethnocentricity.
Linkages to Drug Traffickers
Colombia's FARC is the only major insurgent group in either
Colombia or Peru whose ties to drug traffickers are well documented. It
has regularly taxed and provided protection for traffickers and occa-
sionally engages in drug cultivation, production, and merchandising.
The FARC probably is using drug money to obtain weapons, and FARC
ambushes and sniper fire have made the police reluctant to mount
antidrug operations without military support. All other major Colombi-
an insurgent groups?the M-19, ELN, and EPL?reportedly cooperate
sporadically with traffickers.
M-19 has contracted with traffickers to kill proponents of drug control
programs, including US officials.
In Peru, available evidence suggests that cooperation between
insurgents and traffickers is limited and episodic. Infrequent reporting
suggests that SL occasionally provides security for traffickers, but other
reports indicate that SL also extorts money from drug producers and
that some rural violence is the result of insurgent-trafficker clashes.
Sendero may be gaining local support in some areas by helping villagers
in drug producing areas resist government antinarcotics efforts.
Government Counterinsurgent Capabilities
Peruvian President Garcia has taken some recent steps to strength-
en the government's counterattack against insurgent violence,
Garcia continues to send what his
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
military chiefs perceive as mixed signals by ordering them on one hand
to adopt aggressive tactics to deal with suspected insurgents and to
intimidate their supporters while, on the other hand, publicly heralding
his administration's commitment to punish human rights abuses com-
mitted by the military. Moreover, we believe that his efforts to assert
civilian primacy over the military, particularly his creation of a new de-
fense ministry, are widely perceived as meddling in armed forces
institutional matters and are likely to distract military leaders from their
counterinsurgency mission?at least in the short term.
In Colombia, President Barco is demonstrating increasing political
will to confront the guerrillas, in our judgment. After only nine months
in office, Barco appears to be aggressively pursuing programs to bolster
the size and strength of Colombia's security forces. Barco has yet to
articulate a long-term comprehensive national security strategy, but we
believe the new defense plan that was put into motion in January is a
first step to try to maximize the use and impact of Bogota's limited
defense assets.
Security forces in both Peru and Colombia have serious weaknesses
and, on balance, have been unable to curtail increasing guerrilla activity.
Although security forces in both countries are improving their capabili-
ties, we believe they will find it difficult to contain insurgent expansion
until at least some of the following shortcomings are remedied:
?Weak Leadership. The failure of political leaders, particularly
in Peru, to implement an effective and consistent counterinsur-
gency strategy has negatively affected the performance and
initiative of field officers. Some officers are undertaking aggres-
sive patrolling, but others keep their troops garrison bound.
? Shortage of Trained Personnel. The officer corps in Peru and
Colombia are generally well schooled, but both militaries will
continue to suffer from a shortage of pilots, maintenance
personnel, and other technical specialists. Conscripts are often
illiterate, generally serve only 24 months, and usually attain
only a marginally satisfactory standard of proficiency.
? Shortage of Equipment. A major deficiency in both countries is
poor tactical air mobility and troop transport capability because
of a lack of operational helicopters, particularly helicopters that
are effective at high altitudes. Ground mobility is poor because
of difficult mountainous and jungle terrain, and these countries
have few brown-water riverine patrol boats.
? Logistic Weaknesses. The Peruvian and Colombian armed
forces are equipped with an odd assortment of weaponry
purchased over time from various countries. Maintenance of
6
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
aging equipment is good in Peru and fair to poor in Colombia.
Inadequate maintenance, spare parts, and logistics systems
inhibit operational readiness.
? Poor Intelligence. The failure of multiple intelligence services
in both countries, but particularly in Peru, to share intelligence
and coordinate operations efficiently is a serious problem.
Collection, as well as dissemination of intelligence to the field, is
generally poor. Ineffective tactical intelligence will continue to
keep most counterinsurgency units in a reactive posture rather
than allowing them to take the initiative
In addition, we believe that financial constraints in Peru and
Colombia will limit the security forces' ability to improve substantially
their counterinsurgency capabilities through appropriate equipment
acquisition. Lima and Bogota have put helicopters at the top of their
acquisition priority lists and probably will move to fill that gap in their
counterinsurgency capability within the next two years. Nonetheless,
the recent history of declining military budgets suggests that any
additional improvement in Peruvian and Colombian counterinsurgency
programs during this period will more likely come from advances in
areas such as planning, command and control, intelligence, logistics and
maintenance, and training?not from equipment.
Outlook
On balance, we believe that security conditions in Peru and
Colombia will worsen over the next two years. Even if Lima and Bogota
act quickly to acquire needed equipment and move to overcome other
counterinsurgency weaknesses, there is considerable startup time re-
quired for reorganization, training programs, and the integration of new
equipment and personnel into operational units. We believe counterin-
surgency improvements in planning, training, and intelligence that is
being initiated probably will not begin to result in substantial inroads
against the insurgents for at least two years.
We believe the danger to US citizens and property will grow. In
Peru, Sendero's activities?including assassination attempts against for-
eign businessmen?are increasing, particularly in Lima, and more
frequent MRTA bombings pose a particular threat to US facilities. In
our opinion, it is increasingly likely that American citizens in Peru will
be either deliberately targeted by terrorists or injured incidentally in an
attack. In Colombia, Bogota has been the scene of repeated attacks
against Colombian nationals but relatively free of terrorist attacks
against US personnel over the last year. There is still a high risk of street
assassination attempts by guerrillas as well as narcotics traffickers who
7
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
have threatened to kill US personnel. Moreover, guerrilla attacks on
major oil facilities have targeted US and other foreign investors with in-
creasing specificity and could eventually threaten US investments in the
northeastern oil region.
Over the longer term, worsening security conditions in Peru and
Colombia could jeopardize fundamental US policy objectives regarding
support for antinarcotics efforts and the institutionalization of demo-
cratic rule. In Peru, frictions between Garcia and the armed forces
could become more frequent as the military grows impatient with the
President's authoritarian style and budgetary constraints. Garcia's popu-
larity is still his best defense against a coup, but a failure to move
forcefully against the insurgency could, in our opinion, undermine his
image as a decisive leader and cause his popularity to erode. Such a
development, combined with further deterioration of the economic
situation, would greatly increase the odds of a military coup.
In Colombia, even a total breakdown of the truce with FARC
would not threaten civilian rule, but we believe that increasing violence
will have side effects that spill over into other areas of US concern. The
need to fight an all-out war against the guerrillas would drain
resources?including police personnel and equipment?from Barco's
antinarcotics drive and would probably force Bogota to halt raids
against FARC-associated cocaine laboratories until government forces
could reassert control in the guerrillas' strongholds. Such an increase of
violence, particularly with accelerated guerrilla targeting of economic
infrastructure, would also drain the budget and divert government
attention from social and economic development goals. Moreover, a
rapid escalation of the conflict with FARC would likely force Bogota to
reduce counterinsurgency efforts against other insurgent groups, sub-
stantially raising the risk of attack for US and other foreign developers
in Colombia. Over the longer term, rising violence and a freer
operational climate for drug traffickers are likely to weaken such key
Colombian institutions as the judiciary, already a primary target for
intimidation and bribery.
8
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
DISCUSSION
1. The level of leftist inspired, politically motivated
violence continues to rise in Colombia and has in-
creased substantially in Peru in the past few years.
During that period, rural insurgencies in both coun-
tries have gradually expanded their scope of opera-
tions, and urban terrorism?particularly in Lima?has
risen steadily.2 Although by far most of the violence in
the region continues to be directed against domestic
targets, attacks against foreign personnel and property
are rising. Terrorist strikes against US targets?gener-
ally against facilities rather than people?have become
frequent. At the same time, the capabilities of security
forces in Peru and Colombia have improved but have
not kept pace with the advances of their leftist
adversaries. Both governments have had difficulty
responding effectively to the threat and economic
problems during the mid-1980s forced cutbacks in
military budgets and postponement of necessary
equipment acquisitions.
The Scope of Violence in Peru and Colombia
2. In Peru, persistent and growing insurgent vio-
lence throughout the country, including increasing
terrorism in Lima, has become a major challenge to
the government of President Alan Garcia. Of the two
major subversive organizations?the Sendero Lumin-
oso (SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Move-
ment (MRTA)?the SL is significantly the more dan-
gerous and is likely to remain the most politically
destabilizing force within Peru. A tightly knit group of
fanatics, the SL?about 4,000 to 5,000 strong?has
extended its membership and guerrilla activities
nationwide since 1980, despite the counterinsurgency
efforts of two successive administrations. Since Sen-
dero began armed operations in 1980, police estimates
and press reports indicate that insurgent and terrorist
attacks?and the resultant government counterinsur-
gency operations?have accounted for 8,000 deaths.
3. Sendero's recent activity shows a continuing
trend of a geographical expansion of its operating area.
Although sustaining a high level of action in its
Ayacucho home base, the group is making particularly
strong advances into Peru's southern departments of
'See annex for a discussion of insurgent groups in these countries
Apurimac, Cuzco, and Puno?which borders Bolivia.
In these new areas Sendero is staying true to its
strategy of ridding remote areas of the vestige of
central government authority. Sendero continues to
intimidate and "selectively assassinate" local ruling
party and elected officials, policemen, government
rural development workers, as well as civilian defense
personnel and other peasants they accuse of collaborat-
ing with the government.
4. Sendero is increasing operations against soft eco-
nomic infrastructure and foreign investment targets.
Total economic damage from such attacks is difficult
to assess, but we believe economic sabotage costs the
country millions of dollars annually by disrupting
transport, frightening away tourists, discouraging in-
vestment?both domestic and foreign?and draining
the government budget with counterinsurgency and
infrastructure expenditures. Postal, telephone, oil, and
water facilities are of ten damaged, as are rail and road
bridges and electric power installations. Small electric
power substations and transmission lines are favorite
targets, and blackouts have become a regular feature
of life in Peru's rural areas and in Lima?raising the
costs of production and creating an atmosphere of
economic uncertainty. In our view, Sendero leaders
are only beginning to appreciate fully the disruptive-
ness and publicity value of such attacks, and we
believe the insurgents will substantially increase eco-
nomic sabotage over the next two years
5. Since mid-1983 the SL has established a perma-
nent, highly compartmented terrorist apparatus in
Lima and actually carries out more attacks in the city
than in any single department of Peru. Since the
beginning of 1985, about 300 documented terrorist
incidents have occurred in the Lima metropolitan
area, giving it one of the highest rates of terrorism in
the world. We believe SL use of urban terrorism as a
tactic will increase. Such attacks divert government
security efforts from the SL's heartland in Ayacucho
and fuel a popular sense of instability and insecurity.
The group also gains publicity from the highly visible
acts of violence and sabotage, especially those directed
at the foreign presence in Lima.
6. Part of the steady rise of violence in Lima is also
attributable to cyclical activity by the MRTA. In
contrast to the SL, the MRTA is almost exclusively
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
urban based and, so far, generally has targeted prop-
erty rather than people. The MRTA is of concern,
however, because its terrorist operations are often
directed against foreign, especially US, targets. For the
most part, its attacks involve nighttime bombings?
often from cars?of US diplomatic, commercial, and
cultural facilities in Lima. In late 1986, the group
carried out a spate of seven such attacks in a three-day
span. So far this year, MRTA has bombed over 40
branches of Peru's largest bank, wounding several
people and killing a few who were in the vicinity of
the blasts. MRTA's increasing activity will raise the
probability of such incidental casualties. (s NF)
7. In Colombia, President Barco faces an insur-
gency very different from the sporadic violence that
plagued the country less than 10 years ago. Rebel
leaders emphasize political activity, both in the legiti-
mate arena and through penetration of organized
labor and other interest groups.
more guerrillas are active, and the level of
politicalviolence is higher than at any time since the
civil war of the 1950s. Barco's administration inherited
a tenuous truce with the rebels, negotiated by former
President Betancur in 1984. Of the four major insur-
gent groups, however, three have already rejected the
truce, and rising levels of guerrilla violence threaten to
undermine it completely.
8. By far the most formidable of the rebel factions
is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), the armed wing of the Colombian Commu-
nist Party?the only guerrilla group still claiming to
adhere to the truce. President Barco has made little
headway in peace talks with the FARC. Even under
the truce, FARC has engaged in some armed opera-
tions, kidnapings, extortion, and other antigovernment
activities. The legal protection provided by the truce,
moreover, has given FARC a respite that it used to
recruit and to build its forces, from approximately
1,000 to 1,500 fighters to its current strength of at least
3,500 to 4,500 armed combatants and probably another
5,000 supporters. The cease-fire also enabled FARC to
establish a legal political party, which is making
inroads into labor organizations and expanding its
popular base of support in rural areas. This party, the
Patriotic Union, fielded a candidate in the 1986
presidential election and won minority representation
in both houses of Congress?unprecedented gains in
Latin America for an insurgent political front. The
Patriotic Union is already organizing for nationwide
mayoral elections?the first ever in Colombia?in
March 1988. In our view, its recent public dissociation
from FARC is clearly a propaganda move aimed at
preserving its political gains and popular credibility if
the FARC's truce with the government fails.
Factors Contributing to Violence in Peru,
Colombia, and Ecuador
As in much of the Third World, leftist insurgencies in
the Andean countries are in part the consequence of
intractable demographic, class and ethnic, and socioeco-
nomic problems and inequities. In Peru, and to a lesser
extent in Ecuador, central governments have historical-
ly neglected the development of remote rural areas that
are predominantly populated by Indians with a culture
almost totally distinct from that of whites and mestizos
in the urban centers. In Colombia, where an elitist
political system containing two major parties of similar
ideology has dominated government for decades, it is
difficult for new political forces to work effectively
within the system.
Current economic conditions, particularly in Peru
and Ecuador but generally throughout the Andean
region, are contributing to a climate conducive for
insurgent recruiting and expansion into new areas.
Population pressures, rising unemployment and under-
employment rates, heavy external debt burdens, and
other economic problems have caused some govern-
ments to cut funding for social programs and security
forces alike. Adverse economic conditions have led to
declining living standards, resulting in a growing pool of
deprived and disaffected citizens from which insurgents
are recruited. The insurgencies may be further helped
if sagging economies force governments to impose
unpopular economic stabilization policies
In two countries, Peru and Ecuador, increasing leftist
violence has occurred in the context of a transition from
unpopular, restrictive military rule to civilian democra-
cy. Although we believe that over time democratic
administrations providing legitimate outlets for political
grievances will help undercut popular support for insur-
gents, in the short term the increased political latitude
has given committed leftist revolutionaries more operat-
ing room to recruit, raise funds, propagandize, build
front groups, and infiltrate legitimate labor, education,
human rights, and other politically active interest
groups.
Within this climate of economic deprivation and
political liberalization, state sponsors of leftist revolu-
tion have acted?through paramilitary training, fund-
ing, weapons support, and political mentoring?as cata-
lysts for insurgencies. Although Peruvian insurgents,
specifically SL, have generally remained aloof from
external influences, the AVC in Ecuador and several
groups in Colombia have sought and benefited from aid
from the Soviets, Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Libyans.
9. We judge that the FARC remains the single
greatest long-term threat to the authority of the
Colombian Government. The Colombian military now
credits the FARC with one urban and 33 rural mili-
10
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
tary fronts. The FARC's growth and wealth have been
abetted in recent years by financial links forged to
Colombia's narcotics traffickers. It is the best armed
and most highly organized of the guerrilla forces, with
a demonstrated capacity for patience and discipline.
FARC guerrillas
possess arms as good as or better than the Army's?and
in the southeastern jungle, where FARC is strongest,
the ratio of government forces to guerrillas is roughly 1
to 1. If the FARC returns to open hostilities, which we
view as likely during the next two years, the govern-
ment's ability to maintain order in urban and rural
areas will be severely tested.
10. Besides coping with the FARC, Barco must also
contend with three major guerrilla groups outside the
truce: the National Liberation Army (ELN), the 19th
of April Movement (M-19), and the People's Libera-
tion Army (EPL). These three groups, which contain
an estimated 2,500 armed combatants, are members of
a loose alliance known as the National Guerrilla
Coordinator (CNG), which was formed in 1985 by the
M-19 organization but is apparently now dominated
by the ELN. The various CNG leaders still squabble
over ideology and tactics, but we believe the coalition
has led to some better coordination of attacks and
improved propaganda efforts.
11. CNG member groups operate throughout
Colombia. Over the past year, ELN has become
increasingly active, abandoning its former isolation to
take a leadership role in the alliance. The M-19 has
apparently diminished in strength with losses of top
leaders over the past year, especially in Bogota, but it
continues recruitment efforts and is attempting to
expand into northern Colombia. EPL has historically
played a minor role in the insurgency, but recent
reporting suggests that the group may be expanding.
The members of the CNG do not coordinate opera-
tions systematically, but CNG guerrillas apparently
use the alliance as a clearinghouse to facilitate train-
ing, information sharing, and probably arms acquisi-
tion and contact with foreign sponsors.
12. The insurgency has become increasingly expen-
sive for Bogota during the past year. Under the rubric
of the CNG, ELN guerrillas are concentrating more
attacks against the economic infrastructure. They have
struck the nation's major oil pipeline repeatedly since
its completion in March 1986, progressing from minor
damage to destruction of segments of pipeline, control
panels, and a pumping station. Total damage is esti-
mated at more than $50 million. ELN and the other
major insurgent groups make frequent extortion de-
mands on Colombian and foreign oil developers. Guer-
rilla strikes at electrical pylons and transmission sub-
stations are frequent, and the rebels inflict substantial
damage on commercial activity by employing rob-
bery, kidnaping, and extortion against local banks and
businesses. Guerrilla disruption of ranching and farm-
ing activity has also increased and is likely to impose
greater costs on the economy in terms of capital
damage, production losses, and rising protection costs.
Variables Affecting the Level of Violence
Foreign Support
13. The Soviets, Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Libyans
have all contributed some support in recent years to
radical leftists in the region. Such aid ranges from
Soviet propaganda support for most of the groups to
Cuba's provision of guidance, arms, funds, and train-
ing. In our judgment, however, foreign support has not
played a decisive role in the current successes of
insurgents in Peru and Colombia, and the most power-
ful groups?SL in Peru and Colombia's FARC and
ELN?do not require external support to maintain
their current levels of operation.
Soviet Involvement
14. We have no evidence of direct Soviet support to
subversive groups in Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador.
We believe Moscow probably maintains limited con-
tact with the insurgents when possible through inter-
mediaries such as local Communist parties?particu-
larly with the FARC?or international front organ-
izations. Such contact may provide the Soviets with a
measure of influence. Moreover, the USSR and Cuba
generally agree on a long-term strategy of unifying
insurgent groups in preparation for opportune revolu-
tionary conditions. It also seems likely that the Soviets
channel some aid to Colombian groups through the
Cubans, so as to conceal their own role.
Cuba's Role
15. Castro has a relationship with all the major
Colombian guerrilla groups, particularly with the
ELN and the M-19. Castro played an important role in
the founding of the ELN in 1963. More recently, in
1985 the Cuban leader helped forge the CNG, a loose
coalition of the ELN, EPL, and other groups that was
initially spearheaded by the M-19. Cuba late last year
reportedly received M-19's leader, Carlos Pizarro
Leongomez, as an honored guest and hosted a summit
meeting for the CNG rebel alliance in early January,
presumably for a 1987 strategy session. Although the
11
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Ecuador
In Ecuador, the only significant subversive group?
Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC)?first surfaced in Quito in
1983 as an urban terrorist organization composed large-
ly of students. The group's initial actions in 1983-84
generally involved criminal activities, including a string
of bank robberies, to obtain money, arms, and other
supplies. The AVC threat became more serious when
the group staged a relatively limited attack against a
military arms storage facility in mid-1985 and abscond-
ed with several hundred weapons. The group also
gained notoriety by kidnaping a prominent Guayaquil
banker in 1985. By early 1986, Alfaro Vive probably
had grown to some 300 activists and was only on the
verge of becoming a formidable subversive organiza-
tion.
Much of the AVC's early success was attributable to
foreign support. From the beginning, the AVC and
Colombia's M-19 had a close relationship that extended
to operational support and military training. AVC
members reportedly trained in guerrilla warfare and
political indoctrination at M-19 camps in Colombia.
M-19 instructors have also gone to Ecuador to provide
training, and M-19 guerrillas have participated in joint
operations with the AVC. Moreover, the two groups still
cooperate and fight together in the America Battalion.
During the early years, individual AVC members also
received some limited training in Nicaragua and Libya
and probably are still in contact with people in both
countries. Nicaragua still permits Alfaro Vive to main-
tain a small unit in Managua dedicated to making
contact with and soliciting aid from international ter-
rorist groups and foreign governments. The leaders of
the unit have contacted and received promises of
assistance from the Vietnamese, Syrians, and Cubans,
but we have
no indication that any aid has been received.
When conservative, pro-US Ecuadorean President
Febres Cordero came to power in 1984, he faced an
incipient, poorly organized insurgency rather than a
large, well-entrenched guerrilla adversary such as those
found in Peru and Colombia. With full political back-
ing from the strongly anti-Communist Ecuadorean
security forces, Febres Cordero almost immediately
adopted a "get-tough" policy against the AVC. He
reorganized his police forces?initially inexperienced
and lacking in resources?and placed one of his closest
civilian advisers in charge of the national police with
full counterterrorism responsibilities. He secured train-
ing and assistance from the United States and other
governments. Most important, Febres Cordero fully
supported his counterterrorist units by raising their
morale and protecting them from attacks by opposition
political parties.
As a result, an AVC insurgency that was growing
during 1983-85, has been stalled. Benefiting from the
US counterterrorist training, the security forces pene-
trated and largely undermined the terrorist organiza-
tion last year. We believe that the AVC now has 150 to
200 members at most and is in a state of disarray from
which it is unlikely to recover soon. Most of Alfaro
Vive's top leaders are in prison or have been killed
during the past year, and the group reportedly is
experiencing an internal leadership crisis. In our view,
although some active cells are still capable of staging
limited operations, the AVC now consists largely of
isolated cells working independently and haphazardly.
Febres Cordero is continuing his efforts to bolster
Ecuadorean security force capabilities to forestall any
rebound of the AVC. The armed forces?which did not
play a major role in the fight against AVC?have
requested US assistance to help overcome their counter-
insurgency weaknesses, and the military is implement-
ing a 10-year plan to organize, train, and equip five
special units?called antisubversion suppression groups.
Drawn from Army, Air Force, and Marine elements,
the units will include detachments for psychological
operations, medical, and civic action, as well as a special
forces battalion and an air wing with helicopters.
Although earthquake-related budget constraints proba-
bly will force the government to slip the timetable for
forming some of the units, the formation of a special
operations group for urban areas is under way. In
addition, Febres Cordero has ordered the police to
continue to work closely with US training teams to
overcome shortcomings in crisis management, intelli-
gence gathering and exploitation, and hostage negotia-
tion.
CNG is still in its infancy, Castro probably envisions
CNG rebel unity similar to that of El Salvador's
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
or Nicaragua's pre-1979 FSLN.
16. In the wake of M-19's assault on the Palace of
Justice, which Castro reportedly condemned as ill
considered and unproductive, Havana may have
shifted some of its support away from the M-19 to the
more doctrinaire, and recently more active, ELN.
With the ELN in control, we expect the CNG to
become more explicitly anti-US in focus.
17. Cuba has no known ties to Peru's SL. Havana
did provide training in the 1960s and 1970s to Peruvi-
an radicals who later formed the Lima-based MRTA.
12
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
The Threat to US Citizens
In 1986 Latin America ranked second in the world?
outplaced only by the Middle East?in the number of
terrorist attacks against foreign targets. Such attacks
have risen dramatically in the past few years, and the
majority have been directed at US official and business
facilities in Peru and Colombia. Although most attacks
so far have been against property rather than people,
we believe the hazards for US citizens in those countries
will remain high, particularly as US personnel are
identified with host-country counterterrorism and
antinarcotics efforts. In Ecuador, the risk has declined
with the sinking fortunes of the Alfaro Vive terrorist
group, but isolated attacks may still occur
Peru. Anti-US terrorism in Peru increased from 12
incidents in 1985 to some 30 attacks in 1986, an alltime
high. Many of these incidents?mostly low-level bomb-
ings that caused little damage?have been directed
against US financial institutions. The US Ambassador's
residence has been a target several times in recent years,
but no other US residence has been attacked. So far, no
US citizen has been injured or killed in Lima, and, to
our knowledge, none has been the target of a deliberate
personal attack by terrorists
Nonetheless, Peruvian authorities have officially ad-
mitted their inability to provide adequate protection to
the diplomatic missions in Lima, and we believe it is
increasingly likely that American citizens will be delib-
erately targeted by terrorists or be incidental victims in
an insurgent bombing or strafing action. According to
the US Embassy, about 9,000 Americans reside in Lima,
including approximately 400 US Government personnel
and their dependents. Moreover, an estimated 200 to
250 American tourists are likely to visit Lima on any
day of the year. Both SL and MRTA actively target sites
in neighborhoods where Americans live and places
where tourists congregate
In the countryside, the situation may be as dangerous
as in Lima. Additional security has been provided for
the tourist train from Cuzco to Machupicchu that was
bombed in mid-1986, killing two Americans among
others, but the US defense attache in Lima remains
concerned about safety on the rail line because of the
difficulties involved in protecting the track that runs
through precipices and gorges in the Urubamba River
Valley. Areas designated by the Peruvian Government
as emergency zones because of insurgent activities and
narcotics-related violence are also highly dangerous.
Colombia. Anti-US terrorist incidents in Colombia
rose by nearly 70 percent from 1985 to 1986?from 21
to approximately 35?making it the highest number of
anti-US terrorist incidents in the world. Some 90 per-
cent of these attacks, however, were harassment bomb-
ings directed at US business interests, particularly in the
petroleum industry. Colombia has been ranked by
Washington as a high-risk area for US personnel since
1984 because of threats from narcotics traffickers, and
travel restrictions outside of major cities are in force.
We believe the threat to US citizens in Colombia will
remain high from both drug traffickers and insurgents.
This judgment is based in part on many reports of
specific threats and plans to attack US personnel and
facilities
Enhanced security for official US installations ap-
pears to have prompted a shift in insurgent attacks to
softer targets such as US-related businesses, schools, and
binational cultural centers that usually produce few
casualties but attract the desired media attention. In
Latin America, kidnapings?not always politically
motivated?have occurred most frequently in Colom-
bia, and, because US and other foreign companies have
a known practice of paying ransom, their representa-
tives will probably continue to be victims. Moreover, we
cannot rule out the possibility of another massive
terrorist assault, such as the Palace of Justice takeover
by M-19 in 1985, and high-profile US personnel are
likely targets in any future hostage taking
Ecuador. The terrorist threat to US interests in
Ecuador is low and will most likely remain so. Never-
theless, we cannot rule out that the possibility that the
remnants of Alfaro Vive will try to regain a modicum of
lost prestige by attempting to kidnap or assassinate a US
citizen.
If Cuba's ties to MRTA still exist, we believe they
probably consist of occasional contacts rather than
ongoing material aid or active collaboration.
Role of Nicaragua
18. Nicaragua, which serves as a symbol of a suc-
cessful Marxist revolution to Latin American insurgent
groups, has provided assistance to guerrilla groups in
Colombia and to the AVC in Ecuador and has facili-
tated contacts between Latin American leftists, includ-
ing meetings between Central and South American
subversives. Members of the M-19?led America Battal-
ion, for example, have met with representatives of El
Salvador's FMLN in Managua to discuss cooperation.
Militants from Ecuador's AVC reportedly have re-
ceived military training in Nicaragua and combat
experience from the veteran FMLN, undoubtedly
after transiting through Managua
13
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
19.
claimed that Nicaragua has been the principal source
of funds and arms for the beleaguered America Battal-
ion, a coalition of Colombian insurgents and some
Ecuadoreans fighting in southwestern Colombia. The
America Battalion communication center, manned by
M-19 technicians, contained computer and encryption
equipment used to coordinate fighting by several
Colombian insurgent groups as well as to facilitate
communication with Havana and Managua,
Moreover, some of
the arms used by the M-19 in its November 1985
takeover of the Bogota Palace of Justice have been
traced to Nicaragua.
Role of Libya
20. Libya provided training to Colombian M-19
guerrillas and Ecuadorean AVC radicals in the 1983-
84 period. Although Libya has not been successful in
its attempts to direct Latin American subversives'
operations against Western interests, recent reporting
suggests Libya's interest in the longer term in foment-
ing terrorism in Latin America has not subsided. We
believe that the M-19 and AVC are still maintaining
contact with Tripoli, but we have no conclusive
evidence of current Libyan material or financial
assistance. We suspect that Tripoli continues to have
difficulty influencing radicals in the region because of
Havana's stronger sway with these groups and report-
ed opposition to Libyan involvement in Latin Ameri-
ca, an area Cuba views as its natural sphere of
influence. Some financially strapped Andean groups,
such as M-19, AVC, and possibly MRTA, probably
would accept Libyan funding if offered but, in our
opinion, even those groups may be reluctant to be-
come closely tied to Tripoli or dependent on Libyan
aid. Regional insurgent leaders undoubtedly are aware
of Libya's notoriously erratic record on delivery of
promised aid, probably resent the strings that are often
attached to funding from Tripoli, and may fear a
backlash from Cuba?or a direct countermeasure
from the United States?if they did Qadhafi's bidding.
Regional and National Insurgent Cooperation
Domestic Linkages and Support
21. The only evidence of effective domestic insur-
gent cooperation has been in Colombia, where the
CNG facilitates larger and more coordinated attacks
than were previously possible, but we believe leader-
ship rivalries and ideological disputes are likely to
hinder an effective functional division of responsibility
among the participating groups.
22. If the truce breaks down, the FARC is likely, in
our judgment, to try to assert its leadership over other
Colombian insurgent groups. Talks between CNG
leaders and the FARC have already produced limited
political cooperation, particularly in the labor sphere,
and may lead to further operational coordination
among the four major insurgent groups. An effective
united guerrilla front, however, is unlikely to emerge
within the next two years.
23. In Peru, we have no evidence that SL and the
MRTA cooperate in any way. SL's extreme ethnocen-
tricity and radical, rural-based Maoism undergird its
scorn of other Peruvian leftist groups. We believe the
coincidence of their actions at times reflects both
groups' prediliction for keying their attacks to major
public events in Peru. The MRTA, however, does seek
to unite all "progressive" forces within Peru into one
revolutionary organization. In late 1986 the MRTA
merged with the Revolutionary Movement of the Left
(MIR), a tiny leftist organization, and we cannot rule
out further MRTA cooperation with other small, radi-
cal Peruvian groups.
24. The dismal social and economic conditions that
most of the Peruvian and Colombian people endure
will continue to provide fertile conditions for insurgent
efforts to attract adherents and build local bases of
support. In Peru, evidence strongly suggests that the
SL attracts most of its followers in rural areas neglect-
ed by the Federal Government and in the vast squat-
ter slums surrounding Lima and that most recruits are
young, Quechua-speaking Indians. We believe that the
ample pool of potential recruits is sufficient to ensure a
gradual growth of SL's ranks. Nonetheless, the group's
tight security provisions, brutality, and unwillingness
to form alliances with either international sponsors or
other Peruvian leftist groups probably will alienate
many potential sympathizers and, in our view, will
restrict the rate of SL's growth. We believe that the
MRTA also may come to pose a more threatening
challenge to the Garcia government than it now does.
The MRTA ideology and image are more likely to
appeal to disaffected members of the urban middle
class than the rural-based, ethnocentric SL. If an
economic slump imposes new hardships over the next
two years and the legitimate leftist opposition to the
government continues to temporize, the MRTA might
be a major beneficiary?successfully recruiting radi-
cals who opt to give up legal political activity for the
armed revolution.
25. Colombian insurgents have conducted deter-
mined campaigns to build popular support for their
actions, with varying degrees of success. Despite the
FARC's effective control over large areas of rural
14
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
Colombia, the guerrilla-backed Patriotic Union relied
on armed intimidation to muster votes for last year's
national elections, and reportedly used similar tactics
to organize a demonstration against drug control
efforts in the southeast. All major insurgent groups,
however, have support networks in the large cities,
and some guerrillas have apparently gained a foothold
within legitimate organizations in Bogota. The ELN
reportedly infiltrated the voter registration system in
the capital last year, and M-19 members in Bogota
devote much of their energy to urban housing efforts.
26. Penetration of organized labor has recently
become an important objective for Colombian insur-
gents. Both FARC and the CNG publicly support a
Communist-backed labor union?formed in late
1986?which has mounted several strikes this year
against government and private enterprises. Guerrilla
influence is strong in some agricultural labor syndi-
cates, notably among flower and banana growers. The
oil sector, however, is particularly vulnerable to infil-
tration and agitation.
ELN guerrillas have extensively
penetrated the ranks of oil workers, and have probably
used inside knowledge to maximize the impact of their
attacks on the nation's major oil pipeline and other dl
facilities. The state-owned oil company recently
charged a guerrilla-infiltrated union with involvement
in a wave of terrorist attacks?which coincided with
negotiations for a new labor agreement. President
Barco has so far failed to counter leftist labor activism,
and, in the absence of an aggressive domestic labor
strategy, we believe insurgent influence over orga-
nized labor?particularly in the oil industry?is likely
to grow.
Transnational Linkages
27. The only recent major effort at transnational
insurgent cooperation?the Colombia-based America
Battalion formed by the CNG?has remained a guer-
rilla force but is now composed almost entirely of
Colombian M-19 members. Although a contingent of
Ecuadorean AVC members remains with the Battal-
ion, most foreign
guerrillas have been killed or have deserted. Battalion
participants from Peru and Ecuador probably were
primarily from urban areas, and were ill prepared for
rural guerrilla warfare. We believe that the Battalion
will continue to evolve through attrition into an M-19
guerrilla unit, although it is likely that armed actions
will continue to be attributed to the Battalion for
guerrilla propaganda purposes.
28. We do not expect SL to establish working
relationships with other leftist groups or insurgent
organizations elsewhere in Latin America because of
its extreme ethnocentricity. Nonetheless, we see some
potential for geographic spillover, particularly in
Bolivia where SL may increasingly use its territory for
safehaven, rest, and recuperation.
Linkages to Drug Traffickers
29. Colombia's FARC is the only major insurgent
group in either Colombia or Peru whose ties to drug
traffickers are well documented. It has regularly taxed
and provided protection for traffickers and occasional-
ly engages in drug cultivation, merchandising, and
production. The FARC probably is using drug money
to obtain weapons. FARC ambushes and sniper fire
have made the police reluctant to mount operations
unless they are supported by the military:
? Drug enforcement efforts have led to a series of
skirmishes between government troops and guer-
rillas. Several National Police officers were killed
last year after they walked into a FARC ambush
while returning from a raid on a nearby cocaine
laboratory.
? Guerrilla base camps reportedly have been locat-
ed at some laboratory sites. Colombian authori-
ties point to the capture of FARC weapons,
uniforms, and documents at other sites as further
evidence that insurgents are protecting or partici-
pating in trafficking operations.
30. We have no evidence that any other groups
have such systematic ties, although the geographic
proximity of insurgent and trafficker operating areas
undoubtedly results in contact and some ad hoc
cooperation. In Colombia, all of the other major
insurgent groups?M-19, ELN, and EPL?reportedly
cooperate sporadically with drug traffickers. More-
over,
M-19 has contracted with traffickers to kill proponents
of drug control programs, including US Embassy
personnel.
31. In Peru, available evidence suggests that co-
operation between insurgents and traffickers is limited
and episodic, generally restricted to the Upper Huallaga
Valley where both groups operate. Limited reporting,
usually press accounts, suggests that the SL occasional-
ly provides security for traffickers. Just as frequently,
however, we receive reports that some of the rural
15
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
violence in Peru comes from armed encounters be-
tween guerrillas and traffickers vying for control of a
region. Sendero has been making some headway in
recruiting sympathizers in the narcotics producing
areas by helping the local townspeople?whose liveli-
hood depends on cocaine cultivation?resist govern-
ment antinarcotics efforts.
Governments' Abilities To Confront
the Growing Threat
32. Despite renewed efforts to improve capabilities,
security forces in Peru and Colombia have been
unable to curtail increasing terrorism and insurgent
violence. We are not optimistic that Peruvian and
Colombian Government security forces, even with
outside assistance, can keep pace with growing vio-
lence and guerrilla strength over the next two years
given the formidable nature of the insurgencies, finan-
cial constraints, and history of inadequate counterin-
surgency planning in both countries. Only in Ecuador,
where police and military units last year rolled back
initial AVC gains, is the government likely to contain
violence at, or below, its present level.
Peru
The Political Context
33. When President Garcia assumed office in July
1985, he apparently hoped that he could stem leftist
violence by initiating a dialogue with the insurgents
and by dedicating his government to social action.
Under a "plan for reconciliation" publicly articulated
by Garcia, he outlined three major initiatives:
? A peace commission.
? An agricultural development program.
? A "moralization" campaign to eliminate corrup-
tion within the security forces.
The first and third aspects of Garcia's strategy were
designed to solve the short-term problems?such as
human rights abuses?he believed were fueling the
insurgency, while his proposed agricultural program
was aimed at elimination of rural poverty, the root
cause of discontent
34. The first two elements of Garcia's plan quickly
ran into serious problems. SL flatly rejected any
dialogue with the government and, characterizing
Garcia as its archenemy, continued acts of violence
throughout the country and began assassinating offi-
cials of Garcia's ruling party with alarming frequency.
Garcia's civic action and agricultural development
programs have not fared much better, in our opinion,
because neither Garcia's party nor the government in
general has an effective administrative apparatus in
the war-torn southern departments. In addition, peas-
ant farmers are suspicious of government programs
because of the failure of previous Peruvian adminis-
trations to sustain any commitments to rural develop-
ment. Moreover, the insurgents have included the
rural assistance agencies among their targets.
35. Garcia's commitment to improve Peru's human
rights situation and his desire to assert civilian and his
personal authority over the military led him to focus
his energies on the so-called moralization campaign.
Aiming accusations of abuse of power primarily at the
Peruvian police forces, notorious for corruption and
inefficiency, Garcia purged over 2,000 policemen,
including about 200 high-ranking officers. Garcia also
removed three Army generals for human rights abuses,
including a field commander who was considered one
of Peru's best counterinsurgency specialists,
Clearly
concerned with establishing the tenet of civilian ascen-
dency, Garcia also cut planned military purchases,
required military chiefs to swear allegiance to him in
an unprecedented ceremony, and involved himself in
institutional matters such as promotions and assign-
ments.
36. In our view, Garcia's antagonistic posture
toward the security forces hurt military and police
morale and has hindered improvement of the counter-
insurgency effort. The high command continues to
chafe at Garcia's ad hoc approach to combating
violence, pointing to his willingness to arm civilians so
that they can protect themselves as indicative of his
lack of faith in the security services.
37. Garcia still has not put into place a comprehen-
sive counterinsurgency program, but he has recently
begun to give personal attention and top priority status
to countering Peru's rising violence. His increasingly
hardline rhetoric, authorization in February 1987 of a
police raid against three Lima universities suspected of
harboring guerrillas, and submission of tough new laws
on terrorism?which the Peruvian Congress ratified in
March?all suggest that Garcia is toughening his
16
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3 _
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
approach in dealing with subversives. In early Febru-
ary Garcia held an emergency meeting on terrorism
with his security chiefs in which he demanded an
improved intelligence effort against the guerrillas and
told the security forces to develop intelligence opera-
tions to penetrate the guerrilla groups?something
they have not accomplished?and to design psycholog-
ical operations to create dissension within subversive
ranks. He also ordered the establishment of a unified
intelligence command under the direction of the Vice
Minister of Interior?one of Garcia's closest civilian
advisers
38. Despite these recent initiatives, we doubt that
Garcia will substantially ease legal and political con-
straints on the armed forces and give the military a
much freer rein to prosecute the war. Peruvian law
stipulates, for example, that internal security is the
responsibility of the national police, and the armed
forces can become involved only in the event that the
president invokes a state of emergency or siege. The
government currently has states of emergency in three
areas?the Ayacucho heartland of Sendero Luminoso,
the narcotics producing region in north central Peru,
and the Lima-Callao urban complex. Although the
guerrillas are expanding rapidly into new depart-
ments, Garcia has not put these areas under a state of
emergency that would give the local military com-
manders legal authority to become fully involved in
the counterinsurgency effort. Charges of human rights
abuses by the military continue in Peru, and Garcia,
who has vowed to end such abuses, probably fears that
a tougher counterinsurgency strategy and expanded
military involvement in remote areas could portend a
substantial increase in abuses. From Garcia's perspec-
tive, a dramatic upswing in human rights abuses or
even a single event?such as the massacre of prisoners
during prison riots in June 1986?could undermine his
political credibility, damage the counterinsurgency
effort over the longer term, and damage foreign
relations with the West
39. The success of counterinsurgency and counter-
terrorism programs in Peru will also depend in part on
more effective judicial institutions. Corruption, intimi-
dation of judges, widespread fear, cumbersome prose-
cution procedures, and serious budgetary constraints
have made it difficult for courts to ajudicate the
counterterrorism laws already on the books. Laws
recently passed in Peru are designed to reduce judicial
barriers to effective prosecution and incarceration of
terrorists, including the possibility of the reduction of
sentences for terrorists who cooperate with the
authorities by providing information.
Security Force Capabilities and Weaknesses
40. Military leaders have decried Garcia's lack of
clear direction and failure to put in place a compre-
hensive counterinsurgency program, but the military
as an institution has not become fully committed to
the effort. Although it is the largest and best equipped
military on the west coast of South America, the
Peruvian armed forces are structured to defend the
country against simultaneous, conventional attacks
from traditional rivals Chile and Ecuador. One-third
of the Army, for example, is deployed in the far south
near the Chilean border and approximately another
third is stationed on the northern border adjoining
Ecuador, with which Peru engaged in brief border
clashes in 1981. Almost all of the remainder of the
forces are deployed in the Lima area, leaving relative-
ly few troops for prosecuting the counterinsurgency in
Peru's central and southern highlands. At present,
probably less than 10 percent of armed forces man-
power is committed to counterinsurgency operations.
Thus,
1 a large
share of the counterterrorist burden still falls on Peru's
three national police forces.
41. In view of the primacy of its external threat
mandate, the Peruvian military has not yet attained
the degree of professionalism as a counterinsurgency
force as have those units trained strictly as convention-
al forces. Overall, Peru's defense and police forces
suffer from a number of serious weaknesses that will
hamper their ability to make significant advances
against the insurgents, particularly SL, over the next
two years:
? Tactical Mobility. Peruvian counterinsurgency
efforts have been particularly hampered by a
lack of helicopters that are effective at high
elevations, either for troop transport, aerial
reconnaissance, or rapid reaction operations.
Soviet-made MI-8 helicopters?the mainstay of
Army aviation?can transport 24 troops at sea
level but that capability drops to only six soldiers
at 4,000 meters in areas where Sendero frequent-
ly operates. Moreover, there are generally only a
few helicopters available in the insurgency-
plagued highlands at any one time. The Army
and Air Force continue to place top priority on
acquisition of helicopters, and the government is
discussing a trade with Moscow of some aging
MI-8s for new high-altitude capable MI-17s.
? Logistic Weaknesses. The Army and Air Force
are equipped with a heterogeneous assortment of
materiel purchased from a number of different
17
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
countries. Overall, Peruvian maintenance of the
equipment is good, but frequent delays in ac-
quiring spare parts, particularly from the Soviet
Union, constantly lowers operational readiness.
Soviet-made equipment, which now comprises
about 70 percent of the Army's inventory and
over half of the Air Force's, suffers from a higher
rate of downtime than materiel from other sup-
pliers because of the spare parts shortages and
Soviet foot-dragging on training Peruvian person-
nel on depot-level maintenance of some of the
weapons systems. The recent acquisition of Soviet
AN-32 aircraft will improve the armed forces'
high-altitude transport capability, but reflects
Lima's continuing reliance on Moscow for major
purchases, principally because of attractive base
prices and financing.
? Intelligence Gaps. Because of the armed forces'
preoccupation with the external threat posed by
Ecuador and Chile, there is a notable lack of
intelligence on the insurgents.
!Security force attempts to penetrate the
group have been unsuccessful because of Sendero's
tightly controlled cell structure and obvious cul-
tural and ethnic differences between the guerril-
las and military and police personnel. Adding to
the security forces' intelligence woes is the multi-
plicity of organizations involved in the effort,
distrust, and interservice rivalry among them. A
lack of integration and coordination at any level
among the seven major police and military ser-
vice intelligence organizations is seriously de-
grading, in our view, the ability of the security
forces to prevent or react to terrorist actions.
Leadership and Personnel Deficiencies. Officer
and troop performance is spotty. Many officers
and NCO's are not well trained in counterinsur-
gency tactics and adopt a reactive static defense
posture rather than employing aggressive small-
unit patrolling. Although more and more field
officers are using proven counterinsurgency tac-
tics such as ambushes and night operations, oth-
ers continue to keep troops virtually garrison
bound or mount ineffective large sweeps that
probably net few guerrilla militants. Officers,
posessing few resources with which to work,
apparently pursue little civic action and mount
few psychological operations against the guerril-
las. A growing shortage of skilled personnel is
another major problem, and the training of pilots
and technical specialists to maintain an increas-
ingly complex arsenal has not kept pace with
equipment acquisition. The low quality of con-
scripts?many lack even elementary education?
and low retention rates because of uncompetitive
salaries will make expanding the number of
skilled personnel exceedingly difficult.
42. We believe that budget constraints and declin-
ing foreign reserves will disincline Garcia to approve
any major purchases that are not barter arrangements
or do not have attractive, concessionary financing. For
economic reasons, Garcia has reduced military expen-
ditures from $825 million in 1983 to only $400 million
in 1986. Garcia reduced an order for 26 French
Mirage 2000 interceptors to 12 and, because of financ-
ing problems, canceled a countertrade deal for 10 US-
made helicopters intended for counterinsurgency use.
He has purchased assault rifles from North Korea at a
Difficult Military Geography
The geography and climate in all three countries
favor insurgents, hinder counterinsurgency objectives,
provide excellent cover and concealment, and, at the
same time complicate military mobility and tax equip-
ment capabilities. In Peru, towering mountains reach-
ing 6,000 meters are interspersed with plateaus at 3,000
to 4,000 meters. Airborne operations are thus confined
to scattered basins and valleys, and slopes and gorges
often preclude cross-country movement by tracked or
wheeled vehicles. Radio communication is usually inef-
fective in the mountains because of limited range.
Frequent fogs, persistent cloud cover, and heavy rain-
fall frequently prevent aerial reconnaissance. The high
elevations often cause mountain sickness among troops,
who may require a month to become fully acclimated.
The steep eastern slopes of the Peruvian Andes are
covered with mountain rain forest that provides excel-
lent cover for camps, training areas, and ambush sites.
In Colombia, the geographic spread of the insurgent
forces over mountainous terrain as well as extensive
jungle regions strains the military's resources. Moreover,
many large cocaine laboratories are located in the
southeastern jungle in areas controlled by the FARC.
The security forces are hard pressed to defend many
critical political and economic targets?including the
oft-attacked Cano Limon oil pipeline along the Venezu-
elan border. Ecuador's AVC has operated mostly in
urban areas, but America Battalion attacks on remote
Army and police outposts in the jungle along the
Colombian border demonstrate the difficulty of rapid
response by the military to such regions. Finally, in all
three countries, tropical conditions of heavy rainfall and
high humidity quicken corrosion of heavy equipment
and webgear alike.
18
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3 -
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
bargain rate for his poorly armed national police units
in rural areas. Peru also took delivery of the first five
of 15 AN-32 light transport aircraft from Moscow in a
deal that has Peru bartering 15 aging AN-26 transports
and $75 million in exchange.
Colombia
The Political Context
43. Colombian President Barco, who took office
last August, was initially slow in formulating a policy
against subversion but is now reacting more fully to
the threat posed by insurgent violence. Barco had little
choice initially but to base his strategy on preserving
the truce with FARC. Rebel leaders gained a measure
of legitimacy and popular support by establishing the
Patriotic Union, and have consistently denied responsi-
bility for attacks by guerrillas in remote rural areas.
Public support was strong for former President Betan-
cur's dialogue with the rebels, but attitudes have
hardened during the three-year tenure of the truce,
and only FARC?of the major insurgent groups?still
retains a vestige of its image as an organization that
should eventually be reintegrated into society. In
contrast, the members of the CNG, which remain
outside the government's peace process, are viewed as
recalcitrant criminal groups, undeserving of public
sympathy.
44. Erosion of support for the insurgents was dra-
matically accelerated by M-19's November 1985 take-
over of the Bogota Palace of Justice, which triggered a
sustained and continuing government response to
attacks by CNG insurgents. Sympathy for FARC has
also waned as peace talks have produced few results
and truce violations have become more blatant. Over
the past year, the climate of public opinion has
hardened against negotiation, and the government
now appears to have widespread public support for
expanded initiatives against Colombian insurgents.
President Barco's electoral campaign last year focused
on social and economic concerns, and he continues to
stress economic development as the primary means of
undercutting support for the insurgency. Even as he
continues peace talks with FARC, however, Barco?
building on security measures belatedly authorized by
the last administration?has begun a drive to improve
his counterinsurgent, antidrug, and counterterrorist
capabilities
45. Although he continues to negotiate with FARC,
recent reporting indicates that Barco has lost patience
with the stalemate and is bracing for a major confron-
tation with the rebels. He recently demanded demobi-
lization of all FARC military fronts before the sched-
uled March 1988 elections, when Colombians will
elect mayors by popular vote for the first time. The
demand, promptly rejected, brought Barco into a
deadlock with FARC. It also spurred a move by the
Patriotic Union to protect rebel political gains by
publicly dissociating itself from FARC. In our view,
mounting tension between the government and the
insurgents over the issue of disarmament has raised the
odds of a return to full-scale guerrilla war with FARC,
perhaps within the next two years.
46. The fate of the truce also hangs on Bogota's
ability to sidestep a major clash with FARC over its
involvement in narcotics production, particularly in
the southeastern jungle where many large cocaine-
processing facilities are located. Patriotic Union lead-
ers have warned President Barco that strikes at FARC-
associated drug facilities would end the truce,
25X1
25X1
25X1
To 25X1
avoid an on-the-ground confrontation with FARC,
Barco has ordered police to conduct raids on guerrilla-
associated cocaine laboratories by air, without coordi-
nated ground assaults. Nonetheless, we believe drug
enforcement efforts could provide a flash point for
expanded conflict between the government and
FARC. 25X1
47. Preservation of the truce with FARC has al-
lowed Barco to direct his counterinsurgent forces
against CNG guerrillas openly engaging in armed
actions. Barco has the armed forces fully involved in
operations against CNG, particularly in the northeast-
ern oil region and in rural southwestern Colombia.
Although military forces have delivered several set-
backs to the M-19 and to the America Battalion, both
groups remain viable. The security forces have not
succeeded in halting attacks on oil facilities by the
ELN.
48. Barco has also used the truce to gain time to
strengthen his security forces and to develop a more
coordinated national security strategy. A new defense
plan was initiated in January 1987, the major elements
of which include a redeployment of troops into the
areas of highest insurgent concentration and the even-
tual creation of a rapid-reaction counterinsurgent task
force composed of several battalions with assigned
helicopters. Barco has apparently authorized selective
reprisals against FARC units that violate the cease-fire,
but, as long as its truce with the government remains
in effect, Barco will have to use reactive, ad hoc tactics
against this group and the drug traffickers associated
with it. Despite this constraint, the new defense plan
represents a serious effort to confront the growing
insurgency.
19
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
49. President Barco has also approved an overall
security force expansion, including the creation of
several new military units. Bogota may eventually try
to expand the Army by as much as two-thirds, to a
strength of 100,000, according to the US Embassy.
Barco reportedly recently approved a $156 million
emergency supplementary defense appropriation for
this year?probably to outfit new units he has ap-
proved and to purchase some of the 50 new helicopters
the military believes it must acquire over the next five
years. We believe that Barco's new defense plan and
emergency spending bill demonstrate his growing
political will to confront the insurgents and drug
traffickers, but, in our view, it will take substantial
spending increases over several years to overcome
chronic security force deficiencies
Security Force Capabilities and Weaknesses
50. Colombian military leaders are intent on re-
gaining the initiative against the insurgents, but will
face formidable obstacles as they attempt to do so.
Despite their professionalism and sense of commit-
ment, the security forces' readiness and capabilities
have been eroded by longstanding funding limitations
and lack of clear guidance. Moreover, competing
priorities and manifold combat and support deficien-
cies have hindered effective cooperation against insur-
gents and drug traffickers, whose symbiotic relation-
ship in Colombia has blurred the traditional dis-
tinction between the missions of the military?charged
with national defense and counterinsurgency?and the
police responsible for narcotics control.
51. The 60,000-man Army has primary responsibil-
ity for the counterinsurgency effort. After more than
three decades of guerrilla violence, it has honed its
internal security skills at the cost of conventional
capabilities. The 6,200-man Air Force is increasingly
asked to provide key support for Bogota's counterinsur-
gency and antinarcotics efforts. The Navy?with a
strength of almost 10,000?is little used in an internal
security role, although its 5,700-man Marine Corps is
well trained and effective in limited counterinsurgency
operations. The 60,000-man National Police, the civil-
ian wing of the uniformed forces, was designated the
primary drug enforcement agency in 1980. Its antidrug
mission has become increasingly important, and Presi-
dent Barco recently consolidated all police antinarco-
tics personnel into a new Directorate of Anti-narcotics,
including a 1,500-man National Command for Narcot-
ics Control force?which conducts joint drug interdic-
tion operations with the military in insurgent con-
trolled areas?elements of a 6,000-man Intelligence
Division, and a well-equipped and -maintained air
wing for interdiction and eradication efforts. A third
major element in Bogota's security forces is the civilian
Administrative Department of Security (DAS), an FBI-
type organization of about 3,500, which shares with
the armed forces the responsibility for domestic intelli-
gence collection and exploitation and probably will be
called on to play a greater role in the future.
52. The Colombian security forces' overriding
weakness is inadequate funding?historically low and
recently slashed. Facing serious economic problems
and in hopes that the truce with major guerrilla groups
would succeed, the previous administration slashed the
defense budget from $885 million in 1983 to $378
million in 1986. Despite substantial improvement in
the economy last year because of high coffee prices,
the 1987 armed forces budget, projected at about $404
million, represents a slight increase but remains sub-
stantially lower than spending allocations during the
mid-1980s. Such draconian cuts, of course, not only
prohibit the purchase of needed large ticket equip-
ment but also seriously crimp the day-to-day opera-
tional readiness and effectiveness of the forces. These
longstanding budgetary constraints, moreover, have
left the Colombian military with antiquated equip-
ment and a shortage of personnel. Overall, the Colom-
bian Armed Forces would require a sustained govern-
ment commitment for several years to overcome a
number of serious weaknesses:
20
SECRET
? Shortage of Personnel and Obsolescent Equip-
ment. The military has demonstrated that it can
maintain security in Colombia's urban areas, but
it does not have sufficient troops to deploy to
rural areas to stem insurgent advances at the
same time. Colombian officers believe that they
would need an additional 15,000 troops to con-
tain the insurgency at its current strength if the
government's truce with FARC breaks down. A
shortage of technically skilled people?enlisted
men are frequently illiterate?is hampering
maintenance of equipment, some of which is
World War II vintage and in poor condition.
? Logistic and Mobility Problems. All three mili-
tary services lack a sustained mobilization capa-
bility because of the paucity of technical skills,
weak supply systems and insufficient stocks, poor
acquisition planning, and limited maintenance.
Although most of the Colombian inventory is US-
manufactured, the military is continually short of
spare parts because of financial constraints and a
lack of data?specifically demand histories?
necessary to determine current and future needs.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3 ?
SECRET
The Air Force has been hardest hit, with opera-
tional status of its helicopter fleet generally at
about 30 percent. At least 10 helicopters have
been cannibalized in recent years for spare parts.
The lack of operational helicopters is the key
factor hampering the military's tactical mobility,
and Bogota wants to acquire at least 50 new
helicopters?both transport and assault?during
the next five years. Without substantial upgrades
in the logistic and maintenance infrastructures,
however, improvements in air mobile capabilities
will be short lived.
? Intelligence Gathering and Exploitation. The
security forces have improved their use of intelli-
gence, particularly in urban areas, but as in Peru
poor tactical intelligence has hindered effective
military action against rural insurgents. The
Colombian intelligence effort also suffers from
inadequate collection, inefficient coordination
among the multiple collection and analysis agen-
cies, and slow, ineffective dissemination to the
field end user.
Corruption. The actual extent of corruption in
the armed forces is unknown, but reports of
corruption at field level and above?especially in
major drug trafficking areas?are common, gen-
erating distrust both within and among security
services. At least FARC, and possibly other guer-
rilla groups, has systematically bribed or intimi-
dated local government and military officials in
isolated areas. Intimidation and corruption un-
doubtedly partly explain an apparent lack of
leadership initiative in the field that has had a
negative impact on military performance
Outlook
53. Over the next two years, we believe well-
entrenched insurgent groups?particularly SL in Peru
and the FARC and ELN in Colombia?will continue
to grow gradually in numbers and pose an increasing
threat to personal security and political stability. In
our opinion, poor social and economic conditions in
many urban slums and remote rural areas in both Peru
and Colombia, as well as the traditional political
marginalization of the countryside, will ensure a sup-
ply of recruits that will allow the guerrillas to sustain
their growth of recent years.
54. We expect recent trends of insurgent activity in
both countries to continue. In Peru, we believe SL will
have substantial success moving into new departments
in the south?even farther from Lima than Sendero's
home base in Ayacucho. Garcia will probably remain
resistant to putting more regions under emergency
status that grants local military commanders extraordi-
nary legal and administrative powers. In our view,
Garcia remains concerned that broader powers for the
military and a tougher counterinsurgency effort could
result in an upswing in human rights abuses that
would undermine his political credibility on the issue.
Widespread accusations might frustrate attainment of
his foreign policy objectives as well, damaging Peru's
relations with the West and his personal drive for
Third World leadership. Garcia also apparently be-
lieves that placing extensive areas of Peru under states
of emergency constitutes an admission that security
conditions have deteriorated during his administra-
tion. Moreover, we believe that Garcia will resist
broadening substantially the areas under state-of-
emergency conditions because he fears that such a
move would fuel the belief in some military circles
that democratic, civilian governments cannot contend
effectively with leftist insurgent challenges.
55. Sendero activists, as well as MRTA terrorists,
are likely to escalate terrorist attacks in the capital. We
believe the majority of SL attacks will continue to be
directed at official Peruvian targets, with more assassi-
nations of senior military and ruling party leaders.
Like last year, however, the SL probably also will
increase attacks against foreigners?a judgment sup-
ported by Sendero's recent attempt to kill the Bank of
Tokyo's chief executive in Lima and the subsequent
death threats against the local manager of Chase
Manhattan Bank. Most MRTA attacks probably will
continue to be directed at foreign?and particularly
US?business interests. The MRTA disavows Sendero's
brutal tactics, however, and probably will continue to
seek positive political propaganda mileage from its
actions rather than the negative publicity associated
with SL's far more lethal attacks.
56. In Colombia, we believe the FARC will increas-
ingly flex its growing muscle by carrying out more
armed attacks, despite the official truce. At the same
time, the rebels will probably keep their Patriotic
Union front in Congress and accelerate efforts to build
support for mayoral elections next year. The rebels'
actions will probably generate substantial political
pressure on President Barco to renounce the truce?a
move we believe would result in a substantial increase
in violence and jeopardize the security forces' ability
to maintain order in both urban and rural areas. To
forestall a rapid escalation, Barco will probably toler-
ate a higher level of FARC violence but retaliate
against guerrilla units that flagrantly violate
21
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
25X1
the truce. He will probably authorize military actions
against FARC-associated drug laboratories but stop
short at coordinated air and ground strikes that could
spark a major clash with the insurgents. Despite a
measured government response to violations of the
cease-fire, gradual expansion in Bogota's conflict with
FARC will probably eventually cause a collapse in the
truce, perhaps within the next two years
57. CNG member groups will challenge the govern-
ment individually, although we believe operational
unity in the alliance is likely to progress slowly. ELN's
growth over the past year probably will enable it to
step up attacks over the next two years. The group is
likely to continue to favor economic sabotage, concen-
trating on major oil facilities, particularly the north-
eastern pipeline. The extent of the damage suffered by
the M-19 in fighting last year is not totally clear, but its
past actions?and longstanding ties to Cuba?suggest
that it must still be considered a dangerous group. The
EPL is also likely to become more active over the next
two years.
58. We believe that the Peruvian and Colombian
security forces also will improve their capabilities,
although, on balance, their progress is unlikely to
match leftist gains over the next two years. An inflow
of needed equipment such as helicopters would pro-
vide a big boost to the counterinsurgency capabilities
of either country. Such large acquisitions generally
require many months to complete, however, and of ten
do not provide immediate help because substantial
training and outfitting is required?even if the person-
nel are available?before the equipment is integrated
into operational units. Moreover, Lima's and Bogota's
ability to make needed force improvements and
equipment acquisitions over the next two years will
continue to be hindered by financial constraints.
Moreover, development of adequate maintenance,
logistic, and spare parts infrastructures will remain a
critical factor in counterinsurgency capabilities
59. We believe that substantial improvements could
be made in security force performance, especially if
foreign assistance is obtained, by focusing improved
training on operations planning, intelligence gathering
and exploitation, and small-unit counterinsurgency
tactics. Here again, however, there is considerable
startup time required for training programs and sub-
stantial lag time before newly trained personnel begin
to employ their expertise effectively in the field.
60. From the US perspective, the most immediate
consequence of rising violence is the growing danger
to US citizens and property. This situation is unlikely
to improve in the near future in either Peru or
Colombia, particularly if US government personnel
become more involved in antiterrorism training and
antidrug efforts in the host countries. We believe that
leftist revolutionaries in those two countries increas-
ingly will target US official and affiliated property?
and personnel?as a means to heighten the propaganda
and psychological impact of their actions and to strike
at the foreign "imperialist" presence that they revile.
In our view, the danger will grow especially in Lima
where Sendero is increasing its attacks, with notable
assassination attempts against foreign businessmen,
and the MRTA is likely to continue cyclical bursts of
bombings against US targets. We believe it is increas-
ingly likely that American citizens in Peru will be
either deliberately targeted by terrorists or injured
incidentally in an attack. In Colombia, we judge that
there is a high risk of street assassination attempts by
guerrillas as well as drug traffickers who have threat-
ened to kill US personnel. Representatives of US oil
developers, particularly in northeastern Colombia, are
also at risk from attacks by CNG members, especially
the ELN.
61. Over the longer term, we believe that worsen-
ing security conditions in Peru and Colombia could
jeopardize other US interests in those countries, partic-
ularly fundamental US policy objectives regarding the
institutionalization of democratic rule. In Peru, fric-
tions between Garcia and the armed forces could
become more frequent as the military grows impatient
with the President's authoritarian style, budgetary
constraints, what it perceives as persistent meddling in
its institutional affairs, and insistence on human rights
protection for individuals it believes to be guerrillas or
insurgent supporters. Garcia's popularity is still his best
defense against a coup, but a failure to combat
terrorism aggressively could, in our opinion, under-
mine his image as a decisive leader and cause his
popularity to erode. Such a development combined
with further deterioration of the economic situation
would greatly increase the odds of a military coup.
62. In Colombia, even a total breakdown of the
truce with FARC would not threaten civilian rule, but
we believe that increasing violence will have side
effects that spill over into other areas of US concern.
The need to fight an all-out war against the guerrillas
would drain resources?including police personnel
and equipment?from Barco's antinarcotics drive and
would probably force Bogota to halt raids against
FARC-associated cocaine laboratories until govern-
ment forces could reassert control in the guerrillas'
southeastern strongholds. Such an increase of violence,
22
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
particularly with increased guerrilla targeting of eco-
nomic infrastructure, would also drain the budget and
divert government attention from social and economic
development goals. Moreover, a rapid escalation of the
conflict with FARC would probably force Bogota to
abandon counterinsurgency efforts against the CNG,
substantially raising the risk of attack for US and other
foreign developers in Colombia. Over the longer term,
rising violence and a freer operational climate for drug
traffickers are likely to weaken government institu-
tions like the police and the judiciary, already primary
targets for intimidation and bribery.
63. Peru's and Colombia's needs for counterinsur-
gency and antiterrorist assistance may compel them to
seek more foreign assistance and, in our opinion, new
opportunities may open for the United States to work
with regional security forces. The current administra-
tion in Colombia has been closely allied to the United
States and is likely to remain so. In Peru, President
Garcia has begun to request limited US training for his
investigative police force, and we believe the Garcia
administration is receptive to limited US antiterrorist
assistance for his security forces. We doubt, however,
that he will request substantial US aid for the military
or would permit a large US advisory presence in Peru.
64. Moreover, the counterinsurgency needs of Peru
and Colombia will provide opportunities for other
countries, including the Soviet Union and West Euro-
pean nations, to deepen their involvement through
arms sales and counterterrorism training. Both coun-
tries have sought and accepted assistance from suppli-
ers other than the United States in the past. Bogota
almost certainly will reject overtures from Moscow or
Soviet Bloc countries, but Barco currently is consider-
ing French suppliers?among others?for a major
purchase of helicopters. The Peruvians are likely to
continue to rely on the Soviets for most of their major
equipment purchases in the short term. Peru declined
the most recent Soviet offer of Moscow-based intelli-
gence training by the KGB and a similar offer made
by the Cubans last year because of budget constraints
and concern over the ideological content of the train-
ing. Garcia, however, has not ruled out such training
altogether, and the Soviet proposal is sure to be
repeated if, as has been reported, the KGB's second in
command visits Lima later this year.
23
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
ANNEX
Insurgent Groups in Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador
Peru
Sendero Luminoso
Sendero Luminoso's (SL) origins can be traced to the
mid-1960s when its founder, Abimael Guzman, philos-
ophy professor and political activist at the provincial
university in Ayacucho, broke with the pro-Soviet
Peruvian Communist Party to form his own organiza-
tion. Guzman and his followers developed a hybrid
ideology fashioned from elements of Marxism, Lenin-
ism, Maoism, and a rural populism that, according to
one well-researched academic study, combines an
emphasis on the revolutionary potential of the Indian
peasantry with a fanatical Andean messianism recall-
ing a mythical mean golden age before the Spanish
conquest. The Sendero ideology?with its emphasis on
indigenous Indian values?rejects all that the white,
Spanish-descended oligarchy represents. SL's violent
tactics aim at the total elimination of the influence of
Peru's whites and mestizos. Opposed to foreign influ-
ences of any kind, Sendero scorns Moscow-line Marx-
ism and refuses to follow the tenets of any existing
Communist government
Reports from the Peruvian military indicate that
most Sendero recruits are Quechua-speaking Indians
from the south-central highlands, although they also
increasingly include Indians who have migrated to the
squatter settlements surrounding Lima.
most recruits are under 20
and some, particularly in the countryside, are as young
as 14 or 15. Sendero's operational effectiveness is
attributable in large part to its heavy emphasis on a
tightly controlled cell structure and internal security.
Sendero Luminoso has developed
extensive intelligence nets, is highly compartmented,
and uses primitive but effective means of communica-
tion such as couriers and coded messages. These
factors combine to make the organization extremely
difficult to penetrate, particularly so because each cell
is ignorant of the orders of any other cell, and the cells
usually do not carry out operations in their immediate
home environs
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA) is a radical leftist group that began its terrorist
operation in 1984 and currently operates almost exclu-
sively in Lima. We estimate its membership at approx-
imately 300, with most members who are typically
young, middle class, and urban. The group is pro-
Cuban and anti-US in orientation and is responsible
for many of the low-level harassment bombings of US
businesses. Unlike the xenophobic SL, the MRTA is
open to foreign support and seeks to unify disparate
revolutionary movements, including leftist political
parties, under its leadership and control.
Colombia
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) was created in 1966 as the armed wing of the
Colombian Communist Party. It is the largest and
most formidable of the Colombian insurgent groups
and poses the greatest long-term threat to government
stability.
in some areas the ratio of FARC-
to-government strength is 1 to 1. Although it currently
maintains a truce with the government, the FARC
continues to fund its limited military operations and
political front party?the Patriotic Union?through
extortion, kidnaping, and narcotics.
We conservatively estimate its armed combatant
strength at 3,500 to 4,500. The FARC maintains 33
fronts nationwide that are concentrated in the central
mountain range. FARC probably also has a potentially
threatening urban front in Bogota, which, if activated,
would pose a grave threat to US personnel and
facilities.
National Liberation Army
The rural-based National Liberation Army (ELN) is
a pro-Cuban, anti-US hardline Marxist-Leninist guer-
rilla group. Founded in 1963, it is the oldest of the
major Colombian groups. Currently the most active in
the National Guerrilla Coordinator (CNG)?a loose
25
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
I
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
SECRET
alliance of Colombian subversives opposed to the
truce?the ELN is heavily targeting Colombian and
foreign investors in the northeastern oil-producing
region. It is the only major rebel group that refused to
sign a truce with the government in 1984.
Various reports indicate that ELN has grown con-
siderably during the past three years and probably can
field over 1,000 combatants. Rapid expansion and
increasing activity probably impelled the group to
challenge the better known 19th of April Movement
leadership of the CNG. The ELN also reportedly has
plans to establish new military units in central Colom-
bia, including an urban force in Bogota.
19th of April Movement
The 19th of April Movement (M-19) emerged in the
early 1970s as a nationalist, anti-US leftist group. It is
best known for its takeover of the Dominican Embassy
in Bogota in 1980 and the ill-fated takeover of the
Palace of Justice in 1985. Probably at Cuban urging,
the M-19 spearheaded the formation of the CNG in
late 1985. The group also is the primary participant in
CNG's America Battalion?a rural guerrilla force that
has engaged the Colombian military in the southwest-
ern mountain areas since early 1986.
The group has been plagued by serious leadership
strains and ideological disputes since the accidental
death of its charismatic founder, Jaime Bateman, in
1983. Although losing disaffected members, M-19
continues its recruiting activities and is attempting to
expand into northern Colombia. It has been unable to
mount a successful urban terrorist campaign since the
Palace of Justice fiasco. We estimate its current
strength at approximately 850 to 1,000.
People's Liberation Army
The People's Liberation Army (EPL) is the armed
wing of the pro-Beijing Colombian Communist Party/
Marxist-Leninist, founded in 1967. The group funds
operations largely through kidnapings, extortions, and
robberies and is the smallest of the major insurgent
groups. The EPL was responsible for the kidnaping of
two American citizens?one since released, one
dead?in December 1985. We estimate that the group
can field approximately 450 to 600 armed combatants.
Recent reporting suggests that the group may be
expanding.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Ecuador
Alfaro Vive, Carajo
The Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC) terrorist group first
surfaced in 1983. The capabilities of the AVC were
augmented, in large part, with assistance from the
Colombian M-19. The M-19 provided the group with
military training and even assisted in specific opera-
tions. Probably never larger than 300 combatants, the
group appears to be in a state of disarray. Killings of
several key leaders over the past year have demoral-
ized the group and provoked an internal leadership 25X1
crisis. These blows have practically dismantled the
AVC as a national organization. In addition, the
current relationship between the M-19 and the AVC
members in the America Battalion operating in rural
Colombia is apparently strained. Several AVC mem-
bers have deserted the Battalion, and the remainder
reportedly are suffering from low morale. We esti-
mate the current AVC strength at 150 to 200.
26
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3 _
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP91T00498R000200160001-3