THAILAND: THE UNCERTAIN KINGDOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Secret
~RSTER FILE COPY
GO NOT GIBE OUT
6'l EMA X N
Thailand: The Uncertain Kingdom
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
NI JIM 87-10001
February 1987
Copy 4 81
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
NI I I M 87-10001
THAILAND: THE UNCERTAIN KINGDOM
Information available as of 15 January 1987 was used in the
preparation of this Memorandum, approved for publication
on 2 Feburary 1987 by the Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
w
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
SCOPE NOTE
Thailand's nagging political and economic problems-and expect-
ed changes in leadership-suggest that this important US ally may be
headed for a period of uncertainty that could be detrimental to US
interests in Southeast Asia. This Memorandum examines the political
and economic variables affecting the stability of the Thai Government
and the probable course of events over the next five years, as well as al-
ternative scenarios.
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
KEY JUDGMENTS
Since the late 1970s, Thailand's relatively moderate political and
economic course has been considered a success story both for Thailand
and for US interests in the region. With the waning of the Communist
insurgency in the early 1980s, many observers concluded that the
government's effective counterinsurgency program had removed a
major source of instability. As the end of the decade nears, however, we
believe that Thailand may be approaching a period of uncertainty at
home and abroad. We see several potential stumblingblocks ahead:
- Respect for civilian political institutions remains weak, and the
likelihood of a sudden coup attempt will remain fairly high over
the next five years.
- Chances are high that one or both of the preeminent political
figures-Prime Minister Prem and King Bhumibol-will, step
aside within the next five years, creating worrisome succession
problems in Thailand's highly personalized political environ-
ment.
- Despite a fairly strong economic performance overall during the
past decade, agriculture and some other sectors are depressed-
and unlikely to recover quickly-while protectionist measures
are complicating Bangkok's export strategy.
Over the next five years, however, we are generally optimistic
that the Thai will cope successfully with their problems. Although we
rate the chances of another coup attempt as medium to high over the
next few years, it is unlikely that a new military-dominated govern-
ment would make radical changes in domestic or foreign policy.
An orderly departure by Prem-which we anticipate within the
next 18 months-will probably intensify the debate over civilian and
military roles in Thailand's fledgling democratic system, because
constitutional provisions for appointment of a new prime minister are
vague. Neither the military nor the civilians are satisfied with their
shares of political power. If Army chief Chavalit succeeds Prem-and
he is the top contender-he would probably allow limited parliamenta-
ry politics to continue. Other contenders in the Army ranks believe
civilian political activity should be further restricted.
Moreover, should the King abdicate during the period covered by
this Memorandum, it would remove the only person influential enough
to serve as an arbiter during times of political tension.
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3 _
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
Meanwhile, Bangkok faces a tough reevaluation of its development
policies because of changes in the economic environment since the mid-
1970s:
- Economic growth-which fell to just 4 percent in 1985 and
1986, the lowest level in two decades-is unlikely to return to
the high rates of the 1970s.
- Inadequate domestic savings and investment along with balance-
of-payments problems since the beginning of the decade have
made foreign debt management more difficult.
- Unemployment is growing rapidly among certain sectors of the
population, while agricultural incomes have stagnated or
declined.
- Bangkok's efforts to continue to boost exports have heightened
trade frictions-especially with the United States-as protec-
tionist pressures in Thailand's overseas markets have increased.
Nevertheless, we believe that conservative technocrats can retain
their influence over economic policy and proceed with reforms that
will allow Bangkok to boost exports and reduce its need to borrow. In
our judgment, Thailand's comparative advantage in agriculture and
its adaptable private sector should continue to provide a sound
foundation for future economic development.
The Cambodian conflict could also pose risks for Thailand,
although the danger of hostilities with Vietnam will remain low. Thus
far, efforts to bring about either a favorable diplomatic settlement or a
Vietnamese withdrawal have failed, forcing Bangkok to accept a
Vietnamese presence on the Thai border for an indefinite period. On
the other hand, Bangkok's dependence on others, particularly ASEAN
and China, for diplomatic and materiel support for the Cambodian
resistance, makes it vulnerable to changes of mind or approach over the
longer term by those footing the bill.
Because Thailand is deeply involved in the conflict in Cambodia,
both Beijing and Moscow have redoubled efforts to woo Bangkok during
a period when Thai-US relations are experiencing strains caused by
trade frictions. We believe Bangkok will continue to support the
Cambodian resistance but will try to limit the chance of direct conflict
with Vietnam. As a result, we expect Thai-Soviet relations to remain
chilly, even as the Soviet Union steps up efforts to improve them. In
4
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
addition, Thailand, while seeking to exploit its relationship with China,
will probably try to control the pace of the military cooperation because
it distrusts Beijing's long-term plans in the region, and will wish to avoid
alienating its ASEAN partners. We believe that ASEAN's diplomatic
consensus on Cambodia will continue, although there probably will be
differences in approach and tactics. Malaysia and Indonesia are
nervous about the prospects for the resistance and the Thai's close
collaboration with China on Cambodia.
We believe Bangkok will guard its alliance with Washington as the
pillar of its foreign policy, and we expect US-Thai security relations to
remain close. But, because the Thai view the level of security assistance
as symbolic of the US commitment to Thailand, probable reductions in
US aid in coming years are likely to erode Thai confidence. This process
could be further aggravated by:
- More aggressive Vietnamese action to eliminate resistance to
Hanoi's control over Cambodia. In our opinion, Thailand would
be likely to respond by pressing for more military aid and/or a
more specific commitment on US intervention in the event of
an invasion.
-Economic limitations on Bangkok's ability to modernize its
armed forces.
- Increasing Soviet military activities in the area or the provision
of sophisticated military technology to Vietnam.
- Threatened loss of US access to bases in the Philippines. We
believe Bangkok views a large US military presence in Southeast
Asia as very much in its interest, but, while we believe a small
US facility might be established in Thailand under certain
conditions, strong domestic opposition to the return of US forces
probably would rule out a large US military presence on Thai
soil if the United States loses access to bases in the Philippines.
Moreover, bilateral trade tensions are likely to become a larger part
of the US-Thai relationship as Bangkok tries to expand exports to the
United States and to maintain its share of world agricultural exports.
We do not anticipate direct retaliation for trade frictions because the
Thai will seek to avoid derailing the security and diplomatic relation-
ship. Nevertheless, Bangkok may respond by becoming less cooperative
on other issues of importance to the United States.
If Thailand is unable to manage as we anticipate, we believe the
most likely causes would be intensified power struggles among the Thai
elites, such as a royal succession crisis, or a series of external shocks to
the economy. For instance, we believe that the transfer of royal power
will raise political tensions in Bangkok and, at worst, could precipitate a
violent conflict among the political and military elites.
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3 -
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
Indications that a more pessimistic assessment was coming into
play might include:
- King Bhumibol's death or early abdication.
- A rise in public political activism or sustained public protests.
- Frequent or more violent coup attempts.
- A marked deterioration in Thailand's external accounts and in
living standards, especially for urban consumers.
6
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3 -
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3
Iq
Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000100070002-3