SYRIA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T00498R000100010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
o-~-r-cr~-ou
OR MARK ON
Syria's Role in
International Terrorism
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum to Holders
et
ret
NI IIM 85-10012
March 1987
C O P Y 3 1 6
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
NI I I M 85-10012
SYRIA'S ROLE IN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Information available as of 25 February 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum,
which was approved for publication by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ..................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS ............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
Syrian Involvement in Terrorism .................................................... 5
Direct Involvement ....................................................................... 5
Surrogate Support ......................................................................... 6
Sponsorship of Abu Nidal ................................................................ 7
Other Syrian-Supported Groups ...................................................... 8
Syrian Relations With Libya and Iran ............................................ 8
Support Infrastructure ...................................................................... 9
The Assad Variable ........................................................................... 9
Outlook .................................................................................................. 10
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum to Holders of NI IIM 85-10012C, Syria's Role
in International Terrorism, examines developments since publication
of the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum in November 1985. It
examines Syrian involvement in terrorist incidents-directly and
through surrogates-and discusses the fallout from the revelations
stemming from the trials of Syrian-supported terrorists in the fall of
1986. The Memorandum projects how Syrian-supported terrorism will
evolve over the next year and assesses the likelihood of terrorist attacks
against Western interests during that time frame. This Memorandum
does not address Syria's deployment into Beirut in February 1987 or the
subsequent Syrian-Hizballah clashes and their implications for Syrian
terrorism policy.
The Intelligence Community has some key intelligence gaps on
Syria's role in terrorism. Most broadly, part of the time period under re-
view in this Memorandum-the 90 days since Western sanctions were
imposed-is too short to allow conclusive evidence of changes in Syrian
patterns of behavior to emerge. More particularly, we lack information
on the extent of Syria's role in Abu Nidal's selection of Western targets.
We lack specific information on President Assad's direct knowledge and
involvement in Syrian-sponsored terrorist planning. Political maneuver-
ing at high levels of the Syrian Government at this time also complicat-
ed our analysis. These gaps and others preclude a comprehensive
picture of Syria's role in terrorism and any recent shifts in the overall
pattern of involvement. This Memorandum accordingly should be
regarded as an interim finding.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Western sanctions intended to alter Syria's involvement in interna-
tional terrorism have so far failed to produce any more than tactical
changes in the patterns of Syrian behavior. Syria continues to have close
ties to several terrorist groups and has not made significant progress in
six key areas. It is very unlikely existing Western sanctions will change
significantly Syrian behavior because Damascus regards terror as a vital
tool of its foreign policy. An alternative view is that in light of Syria's
traditional unresponsiveness to external pressure, the actions already
taken by Damascus to repair its relationship with the West should in
themselves be considered significant. Syria has been shown the costs of
being held responsible for terrorism against the United States and
Western Europe, and may be willing to take further steps.
Between publication of the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
(IIM) in November 1985 and the trials of Syrian-backed terrorists in
London and West Berlin in the fall of 1986, Syria continued its role as a
major sponsor of international terrorism and, for the first time since
1982, we detected direct involvement by Syrian personnel in terrorist
operations:
- Syrian officials directly supervised attempts to blow up El Al
aircraft in London and Madrid as well as the bombing of the
German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin in the spring of
1986.
- The Syrian-backed Abu Nidal group took its terrorist campaign
to a new level of anti-Western violence as attacks by the group
in Rome, Vienna, Karachi, and Istanbul resulted in 57 fatalities,
including seven US citizens.
- Syrian Air Force Intelligence eclipsed Military Intelligence in its
involvement in terrorism outside Lebanon in 1986, directing the
London and West Berlin operations, and performing liaison
duties with several Turkish and Palestinian terrorist groups,
including Abu Nidal.
During the past three months, however, Damascus has responded
to Western political and economic pressures by making some changes in
its terrorist policy. Damascus has been on the defensive since the United
' This view is held by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the
Director of Intelligence, Marine Corps
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Kingdom severed relations with Syria following the trial and conviction
in London last October of Nizar Hindawi, the key operative in the first
El Al bombing attempt:
- Syrian-supported groups have lowered their public profiles in
Damascus. Damascus probably asked groups it supports to
postpone operations in order to avoid further embarrassment.
Moreover, we have not detected direct involvement in terrorism
by Syrian personnel since the Hindawi trial.
suggests that Syria has imposed stricter travel
controls on the Abu Nidal group. However, such action proba-
bly is most related to the involvement of Abu Nidal organization
personnel in fighting against the Syrian-backed Amal militia in
the Lebanese "camps war."
- Assad reportedly froze all foreign operations by Air Force
Intelligence last December and may have begun to ease its chief
Muhammad al-Khuli out of his post, although we are uncertain
of al-Khuli's actual status or the reasons for any change in status.
Nonetheless, we believe these actions by Assad-apparent conces-
sions to the West-are primarily tactical and most likely only tempo-
rary. Syria continues to provide weapons, operational bases, safehaven,
and terrorist training facilities to numerous terrorist groups, including
Abu Nidal. Moreover, Military Intelligence is expected to assume the
terrorist responsibilities of Air Force Intelligence.
We expect the current reduction in Syrian-sponsored terrorism will
continue, particularly against US and West European targets, as long as
Syria's first priority is to refurbish its international reputation and repair
relations with the West. Terrorism, however, remains an integral part of
Syria's foreign policy, enabling Damascus to wield influence in the
Middle East, and it is not likely to abandon this weapon against Israeli
and moderate Arab targets. We believe Syria will use terrorism
whenever it calculates that the potential benefits of attacking Israel,
undermining movement in the Middle East peace process, exerting
control over the Palestinian movement, pressuring neighboring states,
(including NATO member Turkey), and maintaining its influence in
Lebanon outweigh the political risks. If US policies collide with Syrian
goals in these areas, Damascus will target US interests as it has done in
the past.
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