THE PROBLEM OF TIMING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R001000070003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MF

Approved F g
_ _ _ _ ____ 1I,916@ 1000070003-6-
IEW
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT The Problem of Timing
1. This memorandum identifies an urgent'problem
for the future of the Agency and presents a recommen-
dation for your action in Paragraph 7.
2. Now that most if not all of the issues related
to the Executive Orders on restrictions on intelligence
in the US and on a reorganized PFIAB have been settled,
the Executive and Legislative Branches must face more
fundamental issues of change in the organization and
management of the Community and CIA. Change is under
discussion in both Branches; the intelligence provisions,
of the National Security Act of 1947 are certain to be
reconsidered and probably will be rewritten. Before
this can. be accomplished, however, Congress, the
Administration and the Community itself will have
to engage in lengthy and intensive debate on many
complex matters.
3. We cannot confidently predict whether the
House and'Senate will be considering new legislation
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R001000070003-6
 Approved For L 1A qJj 1LMC 1900070003-6
on intelligence by late in the spring of 1976.or
whether requirements of the 1976 election will force
the participants to set the investigations aside, with
the result that recommended new legislation will not
be addressed until a new Congress takes office in 1977.
The latter, however, could well occur. One possibility,
for instance, is that the Senate Committee will recom-
mend formation of a temporary Joint .Committee to study
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R001000070003-6
 Approved For ease 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M0069,01000070003-6
SITIVE--CIA INTERNAL USE LY
possible legislation. And in any case legislation
acceptable to the Executive can be developed only through
a.time-consuming process of education and argument.
4. Whether the time is mid-1976 or early 1977,
however, it is important to begin moving now to speed
the process of bringing the investigations to a close
and getting, legislation drafted. Rudderless drift for
as much as two years lduring which CIA and the rest of
the Intelligence Community will have no guidance as to
the future shape or purpose of American intelligence,
can only be damaging. The present fraying away of the
morale and cohesion of CIA is one of the.dangerous
symptoms.
5. Moreover, important events are on the horizon
that will require decision on things which may appear
to be matters of detail but are in fact rooted in
principle--and such decisions will depend on the future
structure of the Community. One example is organization
These decisions must fit into a larger
blueprint for the' Community if they are to make sense
and to be something the Community can live with for
years to come. No such blueprint can be prepared
until the Legislative-Executive dialogue is over and
Approved For I~~~/12J1A Cll 91 M00696R001000070003-6
AL USE ONLY
 Approved For ase 2004/12/21 CIA-RDP91 M00696001000070003-6-
SITIVE--CIA INTERNAL USE qJFLY
there is clear understanding of the relative roles of.
the senior US intelligence"officer, the central in-
telligence organization, and the Department of Defense.
Moreover, should the President wish to appoint a new
senior US intelligence officer, it is difficult to
imagine a qualified candidate who would take the job
until he knows how it is to be defined.
6. The chances of providing a strong, independent
and objective national intelligence capability--the
intent of Congress in 1947 (and there is no current
reason to believe that intent has changed)--will
measurably decline the longer that action on new legis-
lation is delayed. What is needed is positive action
to shortcut the process. There is no reason why informed
debate cannot begin while the investigations are still in
progress. If an active.effort is launched now, it should
be possible to arrive at an agreed package of changes
early in 1976, and to enact these into statue before the
political campaign. A long and-destructive uncertainty
for our national intelligence system might thus be avoided.
-3-
SENSITIVE--CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 CIA-RDP91 M00696R001000070003-6
 Approved For Vase 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M0069 01000070003-6.
SITIVE--CIA INTERNAL USE LY
7. We recommend that the DCI suggest to the
President that he:
--Call in the Congressional leadership, in-
cluding the CIA oversight subcommittees
and the Select Committees;
--Point out.to them the destructive effects
of delay, and urge that proposals for the
future be decoupled from investigation and
correction of past abuses;
--Request that they, in cooperation with the
Executive, begin work now to develop what-
ever legislative proposals in the organiza-
tional field seem appropriate; and
--Set a target date of,.perhaps, 1 February,
for submission of agreed legislation to
the Congress.
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 CIA-RDP91 M00696RO01000070003-6
 Approved For ease 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M00690018000P203=
~~C
OBJECTIVES
The Intelligence Community, and CIA in particular
are passing through a crisis of public confidence. If
the nation is to have the intelligence system it needs,
that confidence must be restored.
At the same time the political atmosphere of the day,
together with the breakdown in confidence, has encouraged
an attack on the conventional defenses of intelligence
security. If the national intelligence system is to be
effective, better defenses must be found for those things
essential to intelligence operations.
The need for public confidence and the need for
secrecy mean that change is inevitable. Congress will
clearly reconsider the intelligence provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947. There is thus a unique
opportunity to make fundamental improvements in Community
management, and ultimately in the intelligence product,
improvements that many intelligence officers have believed
long overdue.
There are thus three major and inter-related cate-
gories of measures that are needed: measures to restore
public confidence; measures to protect secrecy; measures
to improve management.
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R001000070003-6
 Approved Forlease 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M0069it01000070003-6
I. Measures to Restore Confidence
A. In the short range, stronger external
oversight. (There is a question whether it is
proper for CIA to have a position on how it is
to be overseen.)
1. Executive. A body devoted to ensur-
ing that foreign intelligence activities are
proper and legal (Preferably neither PFIAB
nor NSCIC, which have other purposes) Such
a .body might also serve as a court of
appeal and authorization for covert action
and for collection operations that raise
a question of propriety.
2. Congress. A Joint Committee, or
one in each house, to supervise the full
range of intelligence activities. No other
committees except Appropriations (and Budget?)
would have any jurisdiction over CIA.
3. Public. A public commission, formed
in some way by agreement of the President and
Congress, might serve the purposes of Al above
for both the Legislative and the Executive
Branches.
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M00696RO01000070003-6
 Approved For0ease 2004/12/21 : CIA-l DP91 M0069 it 01000070003-6
B. Stronger Internal Controls
1. Character of the DCI. As the Rockefeller
Commission pointed out, this is basic but hardly
appropriate as an objective.
2. A Stronger IG. Question: Should there
be an IG for the Community?
3. Better reporting within the Agency, but
this must be balanced against our need not to
become bureaucratically muscle-bound.
4. Better record-keeping.
C. In the longer run, public education on the
purpose, goals, and techniques of national intelli-
gence.
II. Measures to Protect Secrecy
A. A statutory basis for classification, more
narrowly focused than "national security", more
broadly than "sources and methods."
B. Criminal penalties for unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information by government
employees.
C. Acceptance, particularly by the Congress,
of the principle of "surrogates", i.e., the dele-
gation to a trusted few of the right of access to
sensitive classified information.
Approved For Release 2004/12/213-CIA-RDP91 M00696RO01000070003-6
 Approved Forlsease 2004/12/21 : C1.4- I DP91 M0069 if 01000070003-6
D. Some modification of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and Privacy Act as they apply to foreign
intelligence. (This does not mean to seek blanket
exemptions.)
E. Continued concealment of.the CIA budget.
F. Measures to accommodate inevitable GAO audit.
III. Measures to Improve Management.
A. Preservation of a national organization for
collation and analysis independent of State and
Defense.
B. Preservation of national capabilities for
covert action and clandestine collection.
C. Preservation of a national capability for
R&D on technical collection independent of Defense
Dept. constraints.
D. Maintenance of the principle that covert
action and clandestine collection cannot be organi-
zationally separated.
E. A redefinition of roles for the DCI and
Defense in the intelligence field to take into
account both the DCI's national interests and Defense's
legitimate departmental vies, thereby to reduce the
present bureaucratic guerilla warfare. Consideration
must also be given to the rapidly growing need
-4-
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R001000070003-6
 Approved For.ease 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M0069001000070003-6
for the DCI to involve himself in certain
aspects of tactical intelligence.
E. On the basis of the above, a greater
voice for the DCI in the management of the
Community.
1. Greatly strengthened budgetary
authority, while preserving the flexibility
in handling funds given to the DCI by the
CIA Act of 1949.
2. A voice in the management of NSA.
3. A reorganization of the NRO.
4. A mechanism at the senior management
level for handling the many important matters
involving both State and elements of the
Community.
5. A rationalization of the Boards and
Committees serving the DCI (USIB, IRAC, EXCOM).
F. Reduction of the DCI's responsibility for
management of CIA, both to free him for his
Community responsibilities and to avoid the impres-
sion of creating a "czar." (There is clearly
a political necessity for more than cosmetic change:
the DCI and CIA must not come out more powerful than
they now appear.)
-5-
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R001000070003-6