NOTE TO DICK LEHMAN(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900060013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 4, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

pproved Fcr- LETG2&/eQ 0?- "?f1V1 OCipi 090006001
Attached are a group of papers which
were prepared in support of Hank. As you
can see, most of the flow has been in the
other direction.
Approved For Release 70D#/OJ/03`:'%-RD 3'11VI00696R0009000600
 ? Approved For tease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M0069?00900060013-8
PROVISION OF ADVISORY SUPPORT TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
1. Three areas in which the senior U.S. foreign intelli-
gence officer (DCI) can utilize advisory support are in the
areas of consumer guidance, resource allocation, and substantive
production (which includes statements of requirements for
collection).
2. Advisory boards or councils could be used for this
support in the following manner:
a. A single council chaired by the DCI and composed
of representatives of all the involved interests--consumers,
program managers, collectors and producers. This council
could replace the existing NSCIC, EXCOMs, IRAC and USIB.
PRO: -- Builds in checks and balances
-- Provides for cross-program considerations
-- Enables consumer participation with senior
intelligence officers
-- Links producers and consumers with resource
decisions
-- Provides-a forum for development of inputs
to Congress
-- Puts a "focused handle" on the Community as
a whole
CON: -- To represent all appropriate interests, would
have to be unwieldy in size
-- Agendas invariably would include items of
interest to only part of the membership
-- Active member participation would require
sizeable staffing support in the separate
organizations
-- The council would require a large substructure
and staffing element
b. Three councils or committees, one each for consumer
guidance, resource allocation, and intelligence production/
requirements, with the DCI as chairman of each. This would
be much like the present structure, except that any strengthened
authority of the DCI in the Executive Branch hierarchy would
give the council membership more incentive to participate
actively. The three councils would, in effect, represent a
more active NSCIC, a stronger IRAC (with no competing EXCOMs),
and a continuation of the USIB.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M006910 0900060013-8
PRO: -- Each council of a manageable size, and
consist only of actively involved members
-- Agendas would be of interest to all members
-- Each member would have expertise to contribute
to matters under consideration
-- The direct DCI/member contact in a small
forum would facilitate interchange of views
-- Minimum disruption of the existing system
CON: -- Problems would be addressed in relative
isolation (e.g., resource matters in one
council, consumer guidance in another).
-- More demanding on DCI time than a single
council
c. A single National Intelligence Policy Council
or National Intelligence Advisory Board (which would serve as
a board of directors for the DCI), supported by three subordinate
boards or councils, one each for consumer guidance, for resource
allocation recommendations and for production/requirements.
This arrangement would be a combination of alternatives a and
b described above, with these exceptions:
(1) The top council or board would be small in
size and would not be intended to provide representation
for all elements of the Intelligence Community or the-
"consumer community."
(2) The DCI would be chairman of the top board,
but would not be involved personally with any of the
three subordinate boards. Chairmen of each of these
three boards might logically be Deputy DCI's.
PRO: -- Builds in checks and balances
-- Conserves DCI time
-- Provides the DCI a board of directors of
manageable size, supported by sub-groups
of experts
CON: -- Getting agreement on proper membership of a
small "board of directors" could prove
difficult
Non-participation by DCI in subordinate
boards could lower the level of representation,
and consequent usefulness, of these boards
2
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For lease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M0069&00900060013-8
3. The ICS task group which addressed the foregoing has
split views. The majority favors alternative c, and the minority
(which includes me) alternative b. No one favored alternative a.
4. All of the foregoing comments are based on a concept
that an effective DCI must have responsibilities both for sub-
stantive intelligence matters and for resource allocation control
in the Community. The key, of course, is a clear definition of
what these responsibilities are before, judgments can be made as
to the kind of supporting or advisory organization which the DCI
will require.
Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS
25X
3
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 pprove For Release 2004109%03 CIA-RDP91M00 R0009000?'11Bt8,c r'- i
The concept of checks and balances in the Intelligence
Community includes a negative aspect of limits to power (checks)
and representation of interests (balances).
Within this concept it has been normal to include three
or more representatives in committees or other organizations
related to checks and balances on the ground that when only
two elements are represented, a compromise accommodation may
not adequately address the interests of the entire Community.
Exceptions are bilateral agreement related to rather narrowly
defined problem areas.
Checks and balances currently existing within the Intelli-
gence Community, and suggested expansions thereof, are as shown
below. It should be recognized that, with only one exception
(NRO/EXCOM), the committees and boards involved operate on the
basis that they are advisory to the DCI.
Related to Existing
NRO EXCOM Human Source EXCOM:'
Collection Requirements USIB SIGINT Cmte.
USIB COMIREX
USIB-Human Resource
Cmte.
Production/Requirements
Guidance USIB
NIOs/Organization
Representatives
USIB EIC
USIB GMAIC
USIB JAEIC
USIB SCI
Organization Inter-
relationships SECDEF/DCI NRO agreement
CIA/FBI agreements
Con-6uiner Guidance NSCIC
NSCIC Working Group
Economic Intel. Subcmte.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 CIA-RDP91 M00696R0009000
 Approved For *ease 2004/09/03 CIA-RDP91M00691800900060013-8
Relation of the existing checks and balances, or additional
ones, to a newly designated senior U.S. foreign intelligence
officer would be as follows:
a. If the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer
is also the operating head of the CIA with resource authority
comparable to that presently held by the DCI:
(1) No change in present checks and balances
would be called for and new EXCOMS, such as for NSA
and human resource collection, could be accommodated
easily.
b. If the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer
is not the operating head of the CIA, and does not have
any approval authority with respect to budgets of the
various elements of the Community (i.e., has only recommedation
authority such as is now possessed by the DCI for organizations
other than the CIA):
(1) The USIB and IRAC mechanisms could continue
as at present-, with the senior intelligence officer
as chairman.
(2) The NRO EXCOM and other EXCOMS could continue
as at present, with the senior intelligence officer as
chairman and the operating head of CIA as one of the
members.
c. If the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer
is not the operating head of the CIA, but has decision
authority on resources and estimates:
(1) The USIB and IRAC mechanisms could continue
as at present with the senior U.S. foreign intelligence
officer serving as the Chairman of both IRAC and USIB.
(2) The NRO EXCOM, and other EXCOMS, would be
advisory to the senior intelligence officer. He should
not be a member, otherwise he would be surrendering his
decision authority on the resources involved.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For Oease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M00691000900060013-8
The concept of a single EXCOM to replace the existing EXCOM
arrangement and the USIB and the IRAC is an interesting one, but
it poses several difficult problems.
a. To represent all of the important interests in
collection, production and resource allocation it would
have to be a rather large, perhaps a cumbersome, organiza-
tion.
b. Unless it were clearly limited to an advisory
role, the EXCOM would usurp the decision authority of the
senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer.
C. If it were entirely advisory in nature, there
probably would be difficulty in obtaining appropriate
high-level representation from the NSC Staff, DoD and 0MB
in particular.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 :'CFA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M006900900060013-8
Intelligence Community Checks & Balances:
A Framework for Discussion
Papers related to or addressing the organizational alternatives
facing the intelligence community tend to very quickly devolve into
advocacy of some single course of action. Alternatives may be
presented--but the writer usually has one conclusion in mind. This
is a natural enough tendency, especially since a change, while its
form is unknown, appears inevitable. It is, however, sometimes
useful to step back and, before plunging into a solution, attempt to
establish a framework. Such a framework should permit us to judge
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the options considered in
terms of what we're trying to accomplish. The two necessary aspects
of any such judgment with respect to the problem at hand are:
- the contribution of the DCI
- the built-in checks and balances provided.
The first aspect is every bit as important as the second and
indeed deserves special consideration. To dismiss it lightly is to
proceed to change for its own sake. But, it is the purpose of this
paper to focus on the second aspect. In so doing, I urge that the first
receive equal time elsewhere.
The idea of developing an organizational concept with built-in
checks and balances springs from certain a priori assumptions:
the organization and its environment are intended
to reach some form of stable equilibrium over a
fairly broad range of possible circumstances (and,
as a corollary, the broader the range of circum-
stances, the more intricate the web of checks and
balances needs to be);
checks and balances connote both positive and
negative mechanisms: checks are the limits on
power to be exercised, balances the relative
abilities of the several actors to represent bit;
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For Sase 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M0069?00900060013-8
- the need for checks and balances reflectra desire
to manage organizational conflict in a constructive
fashion;
the effective use of checks and balances depends
rather critically on the number of actors involved:
with one there is no check or balance; two introduces
constant confrontation, polarization and impasse, or
powerful alliance; three permits the exercise of
coalition, compromise, divergence of view; four has
the same problems as two (although slightly more
cumbersome); five or more becomes just plain
unmanageable. So, although not a rigorous
mathematical construction, checks and balances
appear to operate best in a mode of three's.
With these assumptions, a conceptual hierarchy of checks and
balances can be formulated. Such a hierarchy should answer several
questions:
- are the checks and balances all encompassing without
being unduly restrictive?
- do they produce or enable the right (or approximately
right) equilibrium? And do they operate to continually
bring the organization back to equilibrium under stress?
- do they operate to manage, or are they the source;:of
conflict?
- do they operate to permit goal-directed and adaptive
behavior?
- do they enable the community to operate consistently
within the overall federal system?
It is this last point in particular that demands a hierarchy that
operates at several levels.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M0069E00900060013-8
1. Between the branches of the federal government
(interbranch or functional)
Executive
Congressional
Judicial
-substance
-oversight
-application of
-management
-funding
the law
-organizational structure
-adjudication
-budget formulation
-budget execution
2. Within each branch (intrabranch or structural)
Executive
Congressional
o
DoD
o
House
o
CIA
o
Senate
o
Other USIB members
o
Joint Committees
o
Non-USIB executive
o
PFIAB
o
NSC structure
o
40 Committee
3. Internal to the community
(See Seidel paper)
Formulating checks and balances to operate on the community
in the context of the hierarchy described above will permit a more
precise specification of what is needed. It also permits the specifica-
tion and consideration of trades. For example: Under the current
setup, the DCI encounters checks at virtually every turn in his
community role except one--his relationship to CIA. If it becomes
desireable to loosen his tie with the agency, it also becomes necessary
to reduce the number of checks on him elsewhere if it is desirable to
preserve his current level of impact. This can be done by strengthen-
ing his role in the structural sense (level 2) or in the functional sense
(level 1)--or some combinations of the two. One might compensate
for a proposed separation from the agency by giving him stronger
powers in budget formulation, overall management and relationship
to Congress (and consequently reducing those roles for those who now
play them). Once done, it is useful to ask: Does this new set of
strengths constitute in any sense an undesirably strong role? What
other checks exist to limit? Do they exist or must they be created?
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For Sase 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M0069* 0900060013-8
One thing seems evident--checks and balances will rarely grow
through experience. They must be designed up front if they are to
operate dynamically without introducing unwanted side effects--the
situation we have now in some respects.
25X1
12 T4 _F7_5
ju
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Checks and Balan~~sY~`Ttie 'L#u`dive`~C'oin7nittee'~.~`C':17'C~ncepii~tie~~~7~
The ultimate task of the LXCO'1 is resource decision and policy guidance
to the subject manager(s). The process involves the preparation of proposals
by the subject management and the staffing of issues and options for con-
sideration of the EXCu,l.
The membership of any EXCCid is the key to any consideration of the
checks and balances present. The issue revolves around the question of
the degree to which organizations which have a direct interest in,or are
directly affected by,the EXCOM decision process are represented on the
For example, the current NRO EXCOF1 has two members, the DCI
and the ASDfI. The de facto operating managers of the fsXX X M'10 are
subordinate to each of the EXCti-i members, e.g., the US.':F orTanization
through the chain to OSU and the ASD/I, and the CIA/DDS&T to the DCI.
In terms of direct interetts involved in the outcome of the 111.0
EXCOii it is noted that r..0 resources compete with other collection
program resources both in terms of fisedl and budgetary Potters
and substantive efficiency and effectiveness. However, these
organizations are not repr.esrntcd on the NRO EXCON. The purpose
of the NRO resources are substantive information gain and yet,
some of the primary organizations concerned with this interebt
such as the State Department are al?o, not represented on the NO
EXCOM. In like manner, a case can also be made for. NASA membership,
if only ex officio status.
The point here is that a wider representations of organizational
interests is likely to increase the scope of the decision process while
at the same time increasing the checks and balances upon the involved
membership. It can also be argued that the dual membership in the
current iH:.O %XC01% tends to produce a polarization on issues along
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M0069E00900060013-8
the lines of de facto operating management organizations and direct con-
frontation between the two members.
It has been suggested that the L COM concept and its advant.-ges might
be expanded to cover other intelligence activities, such as an EXCGM
for ii SA/CCP activities, an L:::C(,i?1 for Clandestine Collection activities,
and an EXCG1 for Production Actigities. The ultimate suggestion along
this line is an i:ERCOr1 covering all national foreign intelligence activities.
Thus the dichotomy for consideration becomes the pros and cons of a
"Multi-EXCOM" system as opposed to a "Uni-EXCOM system.
However, at this point one must consider the position of the DCI as
the senior U.S. intelligence officer (as related to current Presidential
directives) and as the head of CIA.
For example, the DCI is charged with the leadership of the community
in planning, reviewing, coordinating-, and evaluating all intelligence
programs and activities. Under the concept of a UII_EUOl)M system,
the entire membership would be faced with both de jure and de facto
responsibility for this task with the DCI possessing at most a
primus inter pares relationship to the membership. The implementation
of the UII-i:XCOM review would also create serious problems in staffing
the issues and options for the membership. It is doubtful that a
siggle staff could effectively serve the membership considering the
reality of their differing interests. The likelihood of each member
developing what would be tantamount to his own community staff would
be both probable and compelling.
On the other hand, the MULTI_EXCOM arrangement does not present
this problem. Under this arrangement, )i$xgxxxti:12xtkRxQ-IZ)l xxfmnxkinnx
the current DCI functions remain unique. Another advantage of the
MULTI-EXCOii role is that the membership of each of the EXCOMs can
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 -3-
Approved For ease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M0069E&0900060013-8
be specifically tailored to the subject problem. for example, the interests
and organizations involved in an EXCUM for foreign intelligence production
resources and operations mi;ht appear quite different than that of an
I;SA or I;RO LXC(,M. This would tend to serve the concept of check and
balances with a greater focus upon the pragmatic realities of "interest"
representation. The MULTI-EXXON approach also allows for contiutty of
the USIB role with an even greater emphhsis of its role in production
function primary concerns, e.g., production resources, consumer demands,
and production requirements for collection.
One final point cannot be ignored. The separation of the DCI from
CIA has been argued in many quarters. The primary point made is that the
DCI who must lead and adjudicate matters of interest to the entire community
should not have direct management over specific intelligence interests (CIA5)
which are continuously at issue on the community level. The issue is clear,
however, separation is an act which impinges in many places upon the current
checks and balances of all of the organizations and institutions. for
example, the DCI loses a very real base of organizational and community
power if separated from CIA. CIA loses a very real element of power
and protection of its interests. Gains for Defense and State Interests
appear evident. Thus, separation is not a pragmatic solution in and
of itself, but one which must be accompanied by offsetting actions If
major bureaucratic confrontations and dislocations are to be avoided.
The objective is one of increasing the checks and balances and the
efficiency and effectiveness of community operation, not necessarily
one of changing the power balance or organizational interest and
.mission structure existent in the community.
12/3/75
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M00690000900060013-8
/IjfCJ1~5
SUBJECT: National and Tactical Intelligence: Defining Terms
1. The discussion of issues associated with the interrelationship
of national, departmental, and tactical intelligence is sometimes com-
plicated by semantic confusion. Loose definitions of each may suffice
in conversations among professionals. But outsiders need help when
these terms are tossed about, and even professionals may find themselves
perplexed or in simple disagreement about what these terms mean when
tangible questions (concerning, for example, the allocation of resources)
come into play. Thus, it would be useful to arrive at some common
definitions which--even if they do not satisfy all the interests concerned
and are to a degree arbitrary in their particulars--would start us all off
with the same vocabulary.
2. National Intelligence: In the simplest and most olympian construct,
national intelligence refers to information needed by the President and his
principal advisors for the formulation of foreign and defense policies.
For purposes of convenience, this definition should probably be refined.
We would consider intelligence to be national in character if it meets
three criteria: (1) it concerns matters which impinge on US interests
abroad in such a way as to probably require the attention of senior US
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M0069fe 00900060013-8
policy makers; (2) it is disseminated, inter alia, to a national-level
audience; and (3) it is produced (or processed) by a member of the
Intelligence Community.*
3. Departmental Intelligence: This is information produced within
an intelligence component of a given department which is likely to be of
major interest only to that department and/or which is intended for
use within that department. It is not disseminated to a large national
audience.**
( Fj',si) ,, t:A L)
4. Tactical Intelli ence: This is information, almost always of
a purely military nature, which is of direct and primary (though usually
~Y ATia; ~- Of~: r7~Cr~AL
not of exclusive) interest to t l commanders. del intelligence
may serve as an important source of departmental and national intelligence
.................
Under this definition (and contrary to some opinion), national intelli-
gence does not have to be coordinated intelligence. Further, under
this definition, information from the Department of Agriculture which
met criteria (1) and (2) would still not.be called national intelligence;
a "raw" report not assessed by an intelligence agency would be if it
satisfied all three criteria, though more often than not national intelli-
gence is "finished" (i. e. , analyzed) intelligence.
INR's Afternoon Summary is a departmental intelligence publication.
It may deal with matters of great importance and is produced by a
member of the Community, but it is held within the Department of
State. Defense Intelligence Notices, on the other hand, are sent to
a sizeable national audience, are produced by a member of the
Community, and frequently deal with subjects of national consequence,
and thus are a form of national intelligence.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For .ease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00691000900060013-8
5. None of these definitions take into account the ways in which
information is acquired, and this is a deliberate omission. National
i4Pt J~}i Sl Day /12) SV~LM 1' b'"
means of collection (e. g. , satellites) can acquirEf~iall three kinds of
intelligence. Though less frequently, so too can departmental and
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ase 2004k,OP.OjE?IA-RDP91 M0069 00900060013-8
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS, DYNAMICS,
AND THE CHECKS AND BALANCES
Many knowledgeable administrators and legislators believe that reform and
change are essential in the organization and management of American intelligence.
In analyzing the case for such reform, particular attention should be given to the
mechanisms and procedures developed since World War II which provided some
degree of stability to the activities and relationships of the bureaucratic baronies
which compose the Intelligence Community. To some degree .these mechanisms
and procedures tended to establish natural bureaucratic power balances along with
a system of checks and balances--some imposed by the highest executive level,
but most resulting from bureaucratic agreements. In terms of formal documenta-
tion and as "rules of the game", the DCID's, Defense Directives on DIA, NSA,
and NRO, and various CIA-DoD,memoranda of agreement provide ample evidence.
However, the realities of such arrangements can only be properly understood in
the context of their historical development and the nature of the informal network
and bureaucratic practices and precedents which co-exist with the de jure
formalisms.
It can be argued that these mechanisms and procedures and the very balances
they engendered have not been sufficiently dynamic to meet the changes wrought
by the interaction of new technologies, environments, and decision making.
Indeed, the fact that so many of these documents were promulgated years ago,
have never been updated and do not truly reflect current realities would appear
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/$IA-RDP91 M0069?00900060013-8
to support such a view. However, probably of more importance, is a questioning
and analysis of the changes in the interests, influences, and missions of the
organizations themselves in order to ascertain where real imbalances and dis-
continuities exist.
Historically, the foreign office and the military had controlled the collection
means and intelligence products which officially explained to national leaders the
nature of the external world and its threats. Following World War II the centralized
and independent intelligence organization reporting through the DCI to the national
leadership soon became a threat to both the intelligence power of the foreign office
and the military. However, it was the exploitation of aerospace and communica-
tions technology by intelligence over the ensuing years which served to focus and
technically centralize a greater part of the means to knowledge and which produced
the greatest threat to departmental hegemony over national intelligence.
If changing technology shaped the magnitude of American intelligence, the
changing nature of national decision making conclusively shaped its institutional
and bureaucratic direction. The centralization and focusing of decisions in Washington,
particularly the White House, which were formerly the province of the military or
the foreign office placed an ever growing emphasis upon the DCI as the head of
American intelligence.
Although CIA grew in power and prestige, it was the DoD and the military
which dominated the American intelligence budget and the technical collection
means which comprised the lion's share of that budget. However, the tendencies
(" r _t2' r
Approved For Release 2004/0/03 IA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2r( 4O ).: CIA-RDP91 M0069D0900060013-8
toward centralization caused by the new decision making modes and the new tech-
nology was also having its impact upon military service and command intelligence
interests.
In Signal Intelligence, the National Security Agency, established by a Defense
Directive in 1952, soon dominated an area of activity that was once the pride of
the military services and its operating forces. Each move over the years tended
to stress the national nature of our SIGINT activities as opposed to military war
fighting needs. The military sought counterbalancing moves in strengthening direct
support capabilities and withdrawing activities in the name of electronic warfare.
By 1975, the House Appropriation Committee was hinting at withdrawing NSA from
DoD and making it an independent national-level agency.
Non-SIGINT activities were further centralized in Defense with the establish-
ment of DIA which tended to centralize military intelligence production activities
and provide management control over many of the non-communication intelligence
collection activities of the services.
In the field of aerospace intelligence activities, a keen technical competition
developed between CIA and the military (primarily the Air Force). The result
was NRO. Here again, centralization became inevitable because of the nature
of the technology and its fiscal demands. The latter factor was primary in denying
individual capabilities to single military services, commands, or other government
agencies. Although de jure fiscal control for the NRO effort resides in DoD, the
growth of CIA activities within the program became an endemic source of controversy
Approved For Release 20 4 b99EO3? : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For 'ease 200 a d@ ::';CIA-RDP91 M00694000900060013-8
spurred on by the ever tightening fiscal problems. The nature of the new real-time
system technology and its control by CIA has only served to accentuate the problem.
The growth of CIA's role in national intelligence production, particularly in
the military substantive area, and CIA domination of human covert collection
activities have also served to increase the friction between departmental and
national levels.
In recent years there has been a growing emphasis by the DoD and the military
to reemphasize war fighting intelligence needs and contingencies and the potential
role of "national" intelligence resources in meeting these needs. At the same time,
the age of "Detente" and the demands of national policy levels are exacting ever
increasing requirements for real-time crisis control information in support of
war avoidance. Still another area of this problem is the growing controversy
between NASA and the civil users of foreign and domestic imagery and multi-
spectral data with Defense and the intelligence interests.
The quest for autonomy is a well understood phenomena of government
organization, along with the resistance to policies which require senior officials
to yield autonomy and work closely with another organization. American intel-
ligence community organization in its USIB, IRAC, and ExCom structures is
replete with examples of attempts to deal with this problem. However, the new
technology(changed national decision modes, increased environmental interdepen-
dencies, and new fiscal and budgetary demands)have tended to polarize the con-
flicting bureaucratic interests. This condition has been severely exacerbated
by the current investigations of intelligence and a questioning of the very foundations
for intelligence operations in a democracy.
Approved For Release 20Q4/O9:/03 : QIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03: CIA-RDP91 M006900900060013-8
13
Ef
Key to adequate checks and balances within the Intelligence Community is
the interaction, management control, and oversight of CIA, NSA, and NRO. CIA
and NSA are similar to the degree that they have both gained considerable autonomy
over the past twenty years and have successfully resisted meaningful Community
oversight and evaluation.
It was not until the formation of the IRAC in November 1971 that CIA resources
were explicitly directed to be included in a Community review and evaluation of
intelligence resources and their allocation. NSA resources and programs had
been reviewed in the CCP Program Review exercises conducted by DDR&E since
1961, and later in the ASD(I) CDIP review.
However, the effectiveness of IRAC has been seriously questioned. If the
letter of the November 1971 directive was met rather than its spirit, it is clear
that organizational interests tended to conflict with directed behavior and the
ability to ignore the spirit was built into the directive, as much by what it did
as what it did not do.
IRAC was to create a meaningful review mechanism to allow the DCI to
provide the President (and Congress) with a detailed review of the needs and per-
formance of the Intelligence Community. CIA, NSA, NRO, and the ASD(I) all have
interests with conflict with wholehearted support of IRAC or, in fact, with any
measure which seeks to integrate review and evaluation of the individual programs
under the DCI or anyone else.
Approved For Release 20041091033 CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For0ease 2004/R.:. CIA-RDP91 M0069000900060013-8
3.
One of the Omissions of November 1971 which insured the
ineffectiveness of IRAC was the failure to merge NRO EXCOM under the
IRAC. This assured that any review of NRO resources (e. g. , EXCOM
decisions) by IRAC would be meaningless. The subsequent reduction of
the EXCOM membership to only the DCI and the ASD/I has tended to
polarize conflicts which are already built into the CIA/USAF quest for
autonomy.
Realistically, the NRO EXCOM representation is something of an
exclusive club which clearly has maintained its exclusivity and has not shared
the resource decision process with agencies and departments whose interests
(though clearly related) would tend to introduce different and possibly
divergent elements into the decision process. For example, CIA, Air Force,
and ASD/I would probably be appalled at the thought of an NRO EXCOM with
members from State, NSA, NASA, and JCS. Yet the conflict of tradeoffs
and future decisions involving social welfare and war avoidance capabilities
clearly suggests that principal adversaries should participate in such forums
and decisions.
A recent CIA study of community reorganization suggested that NSA
(CCP) be subject to an EXCOM review in much the same fashion as the NRO.
One notes with interest that the same study failed to subject CIA to the same
review process.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved Forl*ease 2004/09103::. CIA-RDP91 M0069000900060013-8
The point is that existing. checks and balances at the community
level are not uniform with respect to interests, participants, or equities.
What is needed is not all embracing central authority but greater partici-
pation of interests and adversaries in meaningful decision forums. Real
checks and balances will not be gained by subordinating NSA and NRO to
CIA -- nor will they be gained by leaving NSA and NRO in a position to
play the DCI against the Secretary of Defense and vice-versa with other
vital interests such as those of the State Department clearly reduced to
minor participation.
The real meaning of the separation of the DCI from CIA is the creation
of a senior foreign intelligence officer who will be a positive force in
managing and arbitrating the diverse interests of the functional intelligence
bureaucracies and the related problems of the national, departmental and
agency interests which they serve.
For example, the CIA reorganization paper recognized implicitly that
CIA would lose authority and autonomy if the DCI were separated. Their
answer was to absorb NRO within CIA and balance the NSA power by creating
an EXCOM for NSA.
Behaviorally, we cannot expect CIA,or any other intelligence agency or
interest to regard the separation of the DCI in terms or options which will
reduce the power, position, or relative autonomy of their current position.
The November 1971 directive attempted to establish a corporate manager
and still retain the checks and balances of the existent status quo. It did
not work and could not work.
Approved For Release 2004/09/0. CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 Approved For.ease 2004/0 ((1;- CIA-RDP91 M0069000900060013-8
If the priorities and direction of the November 1971 directive as
upheld by President Ford in October 1974 are still the same, it is evident
that a more workable community arrangement is possible. However, if
the options are to be realistic, organizational involvement in the decision
process should be optimized so that organizational interests will have full
expression and the potential for new checks and balances are increased with
issues fully aired.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 " CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
 v6jc
W a r
Approved For .oase 20041b 'ffi RDP91M0069;600900Q60qj3C8.C
in assessing the Community's overall performance by
spotting areas where corrective action needs to be
taken. I also use the KEPs to formulate the Zesource
allocation recommendations included in the annual
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget.
The Future of the Intelligence Community
The changes directed by the President in 1971, and
those that I have undertaken, are not, however, going
to be sufficient. The nature and role of both the In-
telligence Community in general and, especially, the
powers and functions of tr:h? DCI, are in for a thorough
revamping. If fundamental change could be at least con-
templated in 1971, it is a central issue in 1975. Cur-
rent political developmets suggest that the National
Security Act of 1947 will be rewritten, at least to some
degree. I believe it should be. It is not an exaggera-
tion to observe that we are fast approaching an histori-
cal moment and unique opportunity to charter the Intel-
ligence Community to meet future needs for effective in-
..telligence support. I.t may be another 23 years before
events provide the President and Congress a:cgmparble
-opportunity. So,".I will conclude with what is supposed
to be.unheard of for an intelligence officer --- a bit of
crystal ball gazing. I think we can at least suggest what
kind of DCI we may have in the future.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
SECRET ?
 Approved For ease 20041 -RDP91 M0069*00900060013-8 - .
? It is not hard to conceive ,of several variations of
the role of the DCI,~plus, of course, an almost infinite
number of subvariations. I will discuss only the three
most obvious -- or most likely -- possibilities, and point
.out what I personally see as the pros and cons of each one.
First, we could have an independent DCI attached to
the Office of the President, or the National Security
Council, with supervisory and direct management authority
over CIA, NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office..
This DCI would also have responsibility for production
of national estimates, which would mean that the NIOs
and IC Staff presumably would become the nucleus of the
"independent DCI's" staff.
This variation would give the DCI greater access
to the President, and make him indeed the senior spokes-
man for the Community as a whole. It would arm him-
with strong_.authority-over three national agencies rather
than only one, thus concentrating responsibility for
national intelligence performance. It would also elim-
inate charges- of favoritism among agencies`, focus re--
sponsibility on national intelligence, and leave de--
. partmental intelligence 'Co the deart:ents.. Finally,
it would relegate"most detailed administrative chores
to the various agency heads -- CIA, NSA, and the N
tional Reconnaissance Office.
- 30 -
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8 .
SECRET -
 Approved For. .ase fRDP91 M006900900060013-8
There would, of course, be 'some disadvantages to
this variation, such as possible politicization through
proximity to the President, as well as a weakening of
the DCI's direct access to the analytic resources of the
Community unless the NIOs and NIE production went with
him. It certainly would establish a bureaucratic bar-
rier to detailed control of sensitive CIA clandestine
activities. It would also raise the possibility of "end
runs" directly to the President by agency heads, and
could create conflicts with State and Defense Depart-
ment chiefs over intelligence assessments and activities
of departments. Further, it would weaken the DCI's line
authority over subordinate agencies, due to breadth of
responsibilities., and have -- at first -- the unsettling
effect of changing current Community structure.
Secondly, one can envisage a DCI of approximately
the present standing, but with greater influence over
NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office. This DCI
could have two Deputies with appropriate staffs -- one
for Community management, and one for direct manage-
ment of CIA.
This variant would maintain and strengthen the present
Community. structure, while giving the DCI increased in",
fluence.on and responsibility for all national intelli-
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
SECRET
 Approved For .ease 2004I666 1ALRDP91 M0069000900060013-8
gence programs, such as signals and satellite intelli-
gence. He would also have direct responsibility for
sensitive clandestine action. There would be minimum
turbulence due to bureaucratic changes, and the tradi-
tion of independence. of intelligence from departmental
or White House pressures would be preserved, while pro-
viding a spokesman for Congressional review of all na-
tional intelligence. Conflict with department heads
over departmental intelligence activities could be
minimized, and only minor legislative modifications to
the present intelligence structure would be needed.
On the debit side, however, the ambiguous respon-
sibility of the DCI for departmental intelligence ac-
tivities would still be.with us, and he would still have
responsibility for non-CIA budgets without full authority.
Separation from the White House would limit feedback from
the President and policy makers concerning intelligence
requirements and policy needs. More important, the DCI's
status as subordinate to the Secretaries of State and De-
fense would reduce-the impact-of intelligence judgments,
and - reducehis access to sensitive departmental activi-
ties and communications. Lastly, this variant would miss
the opportunity to make a substantial reshuffling in in -
telligence. It would not refurbish the CIA image, or in-
crease the DCI's authority over the Community.
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
SECRET
 Approved For ase 2004/Q j 1RDP91 M00696W0900.060013-8
A third.variation would reduce the DCI's role to
direction of.a CIA that had no responsibility for
other departmental intelligence activities. Analysis
and technical collection would be. accomplished by other.
agencies, or even the NSC.
This would have the advantage of reducing the
visibility of CIA -- in fact, the Agency might even
be renamed -- while allowing it to continue clandestine
activities. Attaching analytical elements to the NSC
or other agencies would improve their direct access to
and impact on policy concerns, while putting techni-
cal intelligence activities within Department of Defense
management structure might increase efficiency. Coordina-
tion of clandestine activities with State Department policy
could be improved by making CIA a subordinate agency to
the Secretary of State, like AID and USIA already.are.
Lastly, there could be some reduction in the service and.
support structure developed for the present larger CIA.
This plan would, however, have some serious draw-
backs. First, the dependence of. the Intelligence Com-
munityr on technology is increasing, not reducing, the
activities, and the objectivity of Estimates might be hard
need for centralized Community manauement. There would
also be poorer coordination of national intelligence-
- 33 -
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
SECRET
 Approved For ease 2004/R"3KC -RDP91 M00696W0900060013-8
the Intelligence Community, it would be manifestly in-'
to maintain.* CIA would lose its flexibility in opera-
tions, technolag_y, analysis, and support to the govern-
ment as a whole, while the morale and.momentum of on-
going CIA cohesion would be destroyed. There would
.probably be some reduction in the independence of in-
telligence advice and assessments if the analytical
functions of CIA were transferred to the NSC. If they
were transferred to some of the other existing agencies,
a myopic departmental analyses might replace the present
broad interdisciplinary approach. Finally, there would
be the costs -- monetary and emotional of a major
bureaucratic upheaval.
I must stress that in offering these options I speak-
solely as the present Director of Central Intelligence.
Since neither the Administration nor the Congress has
yet made any formal proposal for the reorganization of
appropriate for me to express any personal preference for
any of the possibilities I have just outlined.
But I can.sav that the role of the Intelligence Com-
munity in relation to national security policy is both
extensive and important. It calls for a lot of hard work
from the dedicated men and women who staff the various
components of the Community. As has often been pointed
- 34 -
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
SECRET
 Approved For Sase 2004/Q 0,3,`C~,p,- DP91 M0069 fo00900060013-8
out, our failures get wide publicity, and our successes
frequently go iiheralded. But every now and then we do
get a "well done" from those who really count. I only
hope that, whatever changes in the Community are in fact
finally made, they will still permit the intelligence pro-
fessionals to serve the President, the Congress, and the
American people as well, or preferably better, than they
have in the 28 years since the Intelligence Community was
created.
- 35 -
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900060013-8
SECRET