U.S. INTELLIGENCE AT THE CROSSROADS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900060007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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uil,'4& INT, -IT'll-LIGGELE, NNE E
All
CROSSROADS
by
LT. GEN. DANIEL 0. GRAHAM, USA (Ret.)
USSI REPORT 76-1
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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USSI REPORT 76-1
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INSTITUTE
Washington, D.C.
Arthur G. B. Metcalf Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, USAF(Ret.) General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA(Ret.)
Chairman Vice Chairman
Vice Adm. Harold D. Baker, USN(Ret.) General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF(Ret.) Richard R. Glendon
Vice President Vice President Secretary and Treasurer
Maj. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF(Ret.) Hon. Clare Boothe Luce
Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret.) Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN(Ret.)
Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane, USA 1906-1975 Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN(Ret.)
Vice Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, USN(Ret.) Hon. William D. Pawley
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Maj. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF(Ret.)
STRATEGIC STUDIES EDITOR
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The United States Strategic Institute is pleased to present U.S.
Intelligence at the Crossroads, by Lieutenant General Daniel 0.
Graham, USA (Ret.), as a significant contribution to the current
debate on U.S. intelligence policy.
For some months now the shortcomings of American intelli-
gence agencies have been front-page news. The sensational nature
of these news stories has tended to obscure in the public mind the
vital importance of intelligence in the process of formulating U.S.
foreign and national security policy.
In trying to correct the actual and alleged shortcomings and
abuses of the intelligence agencies,- there is a very real danger of
overreaction. General Graham seeks to put these issues in perspec-
tive. He decries the damage which has been done to our intelli-
gence effort in terms of lost sources, decline in morale, breakdown
in bureaucratic discipline and the loss of essential secrecy. At the
same time he points out some of the serious intelligence shortcom-
ings in the system and offers a thoughtful approach to remedying
them through a combination of legislative, organizational and pro-
cedural reforms.
? Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF (Ret.)
Editor-in-Chief
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U.S. INTELLIGENCE AT THE CROSSROADS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL 0. GRAHAM, USA (Ret.)
THE AUTHOR: General Graham, recently Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, has also served as Deputy to the Director
Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community. He .
declared his intention to retire on November 3, 1975 when the
dismissal of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and CIA
Director William Colby was announced. He retired on
January 1, 1976 and will become a consultant. During the past
sixteen years General Graham has held a wide variety of
positions in the intelligence field. After a four-year tour in the
office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department
of the Army, from 1959 to 1963, he served as Military
Intelligence Officer, Office of National Estimates, CIA. He then
became the Commanding Officer of the 319th Military
Intelligence Battalion in Hawaii from March 1965 to June
1966. Later he served as Chief, Current Intelligence,
Indications and Estimates Division, in the United States
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from June 1967 to
July 1968. -Upon his return to Washington, D.C., he was again
assigned to the Office of National Estimates. Following this
assignment, he served as Assistant Director for Collection in
the Defense Intelligence Agency from January to November
1970; then as Deputy Director for Estimates to May 1973, at
which time he joined the Intelligence Community Staff at -.
the Central Intelligence Agency. In September 1974 he became
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. General Graham was
graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1946.
He has attended a number of Service schools, including the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the
U.S. Army War College.
o mteatigence omcer, civi.nan or min-
tary, can view with equanimity the
damage done in the past year to
logical person to understand that losses. have
been. severe and will increase., Intelligence of
value to the United States is, by definition, in-
formation which other governments would
prefer not get into our hands. Thus, any
source of information runs a certain risk- of
arousing-the ire of anotherTarty if-he-provides
it to U.S. intelligence agencies. In some in-
stances, the source runs the risk of losing his
freedom or his. life;. in others he runs the risk
of losing his contacts, his job, his business.
Such sources of information, be, they cooperat-
ing- foreign intelligence services or private in-
ditiduals, caniot'but View with alarm the pub-
lic exposure of U.S. intelligence activities.
Simple self-preservation will cause many
sources to put distance between themselves
and U.S. intelligence contacts. Worse, for the
long run, is the sharply increased reluctance
bf potential rrew sources to have anything to
do with U.S. intelligence in the future.
intelligence. Congressional investiga-
tions, sensational media treatment and "in-
sider" exposes have combined to paint U.S. in-
telligence agencies as generall? evil- and sins-.
ter, at best inept and often ridiculous. The
damage done is enormous, though hard to
quantify -publicly. Were intelligence agencies
to try, they would only compound the dam-
age. If they enumerate sources lost, they will.
lose more; if they spell out serious morale
? problems, morale will erode even further.
Intelligence on the Cross
The problem of lost sources has been men-
tioned openly by Mr. William Colby, former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
but it need not be recounted in detail for any
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It is hard to overestimate the value of infor-
mation obtained without remuneration from
U.S. citizens who travel or work abroad and,
from friendly foreign nationals who, out of
simple patriotism or sympathy to our country,
provide information. It is also hard to over-
estimate the future damage to our intelligence
that will result from the new need for such
people to weigh their cooperative inclinations
against the possibility of their public identifi-
cation with such "wicked" organizations as the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. This ongoing and poten-
tial damage, coupled with that inflicted on the
National Security Agency through exposure of
its intercept capabilities and activities, provides
ample reason for the despondency current in
the intelligence community.
The morale problem is serious. Men and
women, civilian and military, who have proudly
devoted a large part of their lives to the intelli-
gence profession, are faced with a barrage of
-accusations against themselves and their su-
periors which paint them as fools, if not the
agents of utter wickedness. - The intelligence
"heroes" on the current scene are those who
break their oaths and for profit, ego, or even
vengeance, -vilify their embattled former col-
leagues. Disillusionment, frustration and bit-
terness are common among intelligence pro-
fessionals.
The morale problem is worst at CIA, which
has borne the hrpnt of the flagellation.by Con-
gress and the media. The Defence Intelligence
Agency has a far less acute problem; since it
is only peripherally involved in the intelligence
functions which critics find so fascinating-
clandestine intelligence, covert operations, and
counterintelligence. -However,.DIA, along, with
other-Defense Department intelligence agen-
cies, shares a deep concern for the malaise 'of
morale at CIA. All are heavily dependent on a
continuing high level of competence and effec-
tiveness in the clandestine services of CIA.
Despite press suggestions to the contrary and
despite some efforts= on Capitol Hill to drive
wedges between CIA and the military intelli-
gence agencies, there is no smug satisfaction
in the Pentagon intelligence circles over CIA's
difficulties. There have always been (and
probably always will be) important and strongly
held substantive intelligence differences of
opinion between DIA and CIA, as well as bu-
reaucratic competition. But such differences
have not diminished the respect of military
intelligence people for the professionalism and
dedication to high purpose of their colleagues
at CIA. The unconscionable slurs directed at
CIA and preposterous accusations such as those
suggesting CIA involvement in the assassina-
tion of John Kennedy damage all of us.
For my own part, I can speak from the van-
tage point of having served with CIA for about
three and a half years in three separate assign-
ments. CIA has been without a doubt the most
competent and innovative organization in
Washington, containing the brightest and most
dedicated corps of civil servants I have ever
encountered. My admiration for CIA has re-
mained undiminished through the years, de-
spite the fact that I found a number of the CIA
people to be cocky, arrogant, and-most an-
noyingly-all too willing to knock their mili-
tary colleagues as numskulls to enhance their
own image. These are familiar failings paral-
leling those I have encountered in military
duty with elite airborne units-and they are
evidence of high morale and esprit de corps.
I do not believe there is anyone in the intelli-
gence business who has had more numerous
or more serious disagreements with CIA on is-
sues of substance, organization and programs.
But I deplore the savage attacks on the compe-
tence and integrity of CIA. The country can-
not afford the impairment of that Agency's
morale-. let alone .the abolishing of the Agency,
itself.
The Congressional Investigations
Senator Frank Church and Representative
Otis Pike have made pious speeches about the
continuing need for. intelligencbut. they seem
unable to resist the urge to defame intelligence
people -and'endanger their lives-if it' seems
politically acceptable to do so. Senator Church
insisted on publishing his Committee's findings
on alleged' CIA assassination attempts despite
the strong and cogent pleas of William Colby
that the naming of large numbers of CIA men
and their contacts would put their lives and
well-being in jeopardy-a warning that came
tragically true in Greece, where a CIA man was
assassinated. Church could have published
only the findings without all the masses of de-
tail containing the names of the men involved.
What purpose was served by all this exposure?
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U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads
Well, the basic findings were pretty dull read-
ing. CIA, it turns out, never assassinated any-
one. The closest they ever got was providing
the means to anti-Castro Cubans. But the sug
gestive details of the testimony given were.
much more likely to titillate the press than
were the bare findings.
As for Mr. Pike, he was very much interested
in the story of one malcontent ex-CIA analyst
named Adams, who accused all intelligence
men, military leaders and diplomats who failed
to support his unique view of Vietcong strength
at Tet, 1968, of outright lying. Adams wound
up his testimony by recommending the firing
of Mr. Colby, Mr. William Hyland of the State
Department, and myself for "screwing up in-
telligence in Vietnam." A Mr. Ogle, another
ex-CIA man, appeared" later at the hearings
to testify against the Adams' accusations but
was turned away. The sensational charges of
Adams made the news for weeks, with Mr.
Pike himself (according to Walter Pincus)
adding fuel to the fire by stating he was going
to look into my military promotions to see if I
had been rewarded for lying about Vietcong
strengths.- Despite the efforts of Mr. David
Treen, Republican of Louisiana, and Mr. Dale
Milford, Democrat of Texas, on Pike's Com-
mittee, no rebuttal witnesses were called for
nearly three months. Although William Colby's
testimony and mine- belatedly but thoroughly
disproved Adams' wild accusations, no word
was forthcoming from Pike.
There is little doubt that such behavior on
the part of the Congressional Committees has
had a deleterious effect on intelligence, but to
be fair about it, it must be said that we were
having very serious trouble even before the
Congressional investigations. They were, after.
all, a trailer to the Watergate affair. The pro
vious association of members of the "plumbers".
with CIA was an irresistible lure to Congres-
sional investigators. The fact that the Water-
gate investigation revealed remarkable resis-
tance on the part of CIA to pressures from the
White House staff and that General Vernon A:
Walters, CIA Deputy- Director, offered his head
on a platter rather than involve the Agency,
never seemed to sink in.
The Breakdown of Security
Another woe had begun to beset the intelli-
gence community well before the Watergate
circus. This was the breakdown of self-disci-
pline in government and press on security
matters. It had become exceedingly difficult
for the U.S. government to keep a secret.
Sadly for intelligence, the efforts of two ex-
insiders, Marchetti and Agee, to make money-
by publishing such secrets as they knew about
CIA's business, came to fruition during the
Watergate period. These books whetted the
appetite for investigation by Congress and for
scandal by the press. Other books had been
published which were severely critical of CIA
and other intelligence agencies, but most were
serious, scholarly treatises and lacked the scan-
dal-mongering, name-dropping sensationalism
of the Marchetti and Agee books.
For decades the government had relied for
security of state secrets on a sort of honor. sys-
tem in the Legislative and Executive branches
of government. Bureaucrats entrusted with
sensitive classified information guarded it out
of a sense of duty. Special oaths were signed
to gain access to the more highly sensitive
types of intelligence. These oaths were backed
up with references to certain laws, especially
the Espionage Act -of 1948, under the provi-
sions of which those who failed to honor their
trust -and passed classified information to "any
person not entitled to receive it" could wind up
in jail for ten years. For passing information
on U.S. codes and cryptographic information
or information pertinent to nuclear weapons,
special statutes were cited.
The -warning .of- possible penal action, how-
ever, was not the operative cause for the rather
good U.S. security over the years preceding the
late sixties. Generally, bureaucrats and legis-
lators kept their mouths shut out of a sense of
obligation, and newsmen tended to respect the
obligations of tlgoaernment. spbk'smen as
well as the" right of the government to have
some state secrets.
All this changed in the late sixties and early
seventies. The rise of the anti-establishment
syndrome 'stripped away - the tacit restraints
which had made the system work. Government
and exgovernment people lost all compunction
to guard a secret if blabbing it to the press
offered personal, bureaucratic or political ad-
vantage. Some individuals actually reversed
the old feelings of obligation to keep secrets
and felt themselves duty bound to reveal them
out of a sense of superior morality; Daniel
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Ellsberg and the famous Pentagon Papers was
a case in point.
The same wave of attacks on the establish-
ment and governmental institutions which
broke down the moral barriers to breaches of
security made the application of the legal sanc-
tions of the Espionage Act almost impossible.
The Justice Department had only a slight
-chance of successfully prosecuting. those who
disclosed government secrets. The Ellsberg
case was clearly in violation of the Espionage
Act's provisions, but in the atmosphere prevail-
ing at the time, conviction was an unlikely pos-
sibility. And here was a -case in which the
culprit was identified. Most leakage of secrets
is untraceable. There are always at least two
people involved in these matters-an untrust-
worthy insider and an agent of the public news
media. The government man's motive can be
financial reward (as little as a free lunch),
bureaucratic advantage, budget impact, politi-
cal gain, or a simple ego trip. The newsman's
motive is usually described as "keeping the
public informed," but competition with his fel-
low journalists in getting those forbidden tid-
bits of classified information is often a more
honest description of motive. in- the "leak"
game.
Both parties to this collusion are guilty of
violation of the -Espionage Act if the informa-
tion passed is "related to the national defense."
They can be charged jointly under the pro-
vision which starts out, "If two or more persons
conspire -to violate any of the foregoing pro-
visions.... .
But the evidence of this particular type of
malfeasance invariably starts with the publica-
tion of the classified material in the media-
and there the trail ends. The newsman im-
mediately invokes -"freedom of the press" and
refuses -tct name his -source. For the media,
protection of sources is a sacred right; the right
and duty of intelligence people to protect the
government's sources are ignored. Media men
often take the tack: "It's up to the government,
not the press, to police its own leaky security
system." That sounds logical, but in fact it's
not possible, without press cooperation. When
security people try to locate the guilty parties
in a damaging press leak, they are faced with
a wide range of possibilities-all persons who
had the classified information in the various.
departments of government, congressmen and
their staffs, and the White House itself. To be
effective in policing the government to stop
leaks, officials are almost forced to turn to sur-
veillance, bugging, phone taps and entrap-
ment. It is precisely this dilemma that drove
the Nixon Administration to set up the infa-
mous "plumbers" operation in the first place.
iViost reporters know this perfectly well, and
this is why their retort of "clean up your own
house" is cynical, not logical.
Overclassification
Of course, not all the blame for damage
done to the intelligence community from. the
breakdown of security can be laid at the feet of
the press. Too many bureaucrats have slapped
"Secret" and "Top Secret" labels on matters
which do not deserve such protection. The
labels go on simply because the office or bu-
reaucrat concerned does not want the matter
to be too well known. Some of it is sheer ad-
ministrative sloppiness or laziness. Documents
remain classified long after the need to protect
"sources and-methods" has passed. Intelligence
agencies are particularly reluctant to put out
papers with- no classification stamp on them.
One wag at CIA said that the only unclassified
papers put out at Langley were the paychecks
and they would be classified if a secret bank
could be set up to cash them. It is hard to con-
vince a newsman that he should respect a
classification stamp if he has seen it too often
on trivia.
On the other hand, some critics of over-
classification are curiously ambivalent on-the -
matter, dependin.g on the nature of the mate-
rial involved. About a month before I sub-
mitted my request to leave my post as Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, a great furor
-erupted in the public media about an analysis.
I had chosen to. publish as unclassified. It was
an excellent piece of work by one of my best
analysts of Soviet politico-military affairs, Dr.
Wynfred Joshua. It concerned the Soviet view
of detente and- f advantages Moscow per-
ceived as inherent in. it.. It was first -distribiited
in a few copies around the Department of De-
fense with a "Confidential" stamp on it. Before
it was -formally printed-in "hard copy" as our
jargon goes-one reader pointed out to me that
the analysis was drawn from open 'literature
and there was no need -for the classification. I
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reread it and agreed with him. With the re-
moval of one nonessential phrase, the piece
was indeed unclassified. So we put out the
"hard copy" without the "Confidential" stamp,
and received a hail of criticism for it in the
press. It was painted as a "Pentagon assault"
on detente policies. It seems that the public
"needs to know" some intelligence matters but
not others-especially not the analysis of a
capable intelligence officer whose findings run
counter to what some newsmen think the
public ought to think.
may not get the Congressional support neces-
sary to enact the laws required for the protec-
tion of our sources of information. It is per-
haps a hopeful sign that Senator Church felt
obliged to state recently his support for legis-
lation punishing ex-CIA men for making pub-
lic the names of its agents. It is sad that
the death of the CIA man, Richard Welch, in
Athens was necessary to demonstrate the
damage that can be done. Unless there are
some teeth put in the U.S. security system,
however, there will be more deaths of intelli-
gence people. As of today thirty-two Ameri-
cans in France, whether CIA personnel or not,
must either be brought home or live in fear of
being the target of crackpots. Even if they all
come home, they will never fully escape the
possibility of physical assault or death at the
hands of the fanatical or mentally deranged.
Congress may not help out with the security
situation, but it will certainly press for change
in the organizational.-structure of intelligence.
The-Church and Pike Committees will demand
changes if only to show that their efforts
yielded something besides damage to U.S. in-
telligence.- But- even. those Committees. have
not made a case that intelligence agencies
are "rogue elephants" culpable of serious mal-
feasance, and therefore requiring massive
overhaul.
Another complicating factor in the leak prob-
lem is the tendency of some key officials to try
to manipulate the press by passing selected
tidbits to favorite newsmen. Given the nature
of the relationship of press to government in
this country, it is doubtful that this practice
will.. ever cease completely, and sometimes.the .-
deliberate disclosure of intelligence informa-
tion (not sources) to the public is .a positive
good. The problem is that the practice can
easily.get out of control. It happened recently
with a. series of leaks and counterleaks about
Soviet compliance with arms control agree-
ments. Further, while leaks of information by
a top official are generally protective of intelli-
gence sources, they cause some newsmen to
-look up their less discreet contacts to find out
what the intelligence sources were., A news
item mentioning "satellites," or "communica-
cations intercepts always, has a bit- more -cre-
dence and much more pizzazz. The-code word
of the intelligence operation involved really
adds luster.
Plugging the Leaks
Both babbling bureaucracy and irresponsible
press share the blame for the hemorrhage of
leaks in the public media which have done
grave damage to intelligence. But the solution
is not to determine who killed Cock Robin; the
solution is to make the-laws of the land pro-
tecting its intelligence sources enforceable, and
then enforce them. Until this is done, the
United States will remain a powerful giant,
gradually going blind for lack of intelligence
information.
The U.S. intelligence community may or
Who's, in Charge?
After all the smoke of sensationalism- and
political. posturing is cleared away, one or-two
matters still emerge which suggest a need for-
reorganization. For example, the lines of re- I
sponsibility for one type of intelligence activity
-covert action in support of foreign policy-
are too hazy. It is hard to trace responsibility
upward from the CIA to national authority.
However, it should be abundantly clear that
the intelligence agencies did not undertake the
operations criticized by the Committees on
their own initiative. The finger of responsi-
bility points at those in ultimate power over'
national security affairs. The Church Commit-
tee's report on alleged assassination attempts,
despite carefully obscure treatment of Presi-
dential responsibility, cannot exonerate Presi-
dents and their key political advisers-even l
those who were the political allies if not heroes
of the report's drafters. If, as Senator Church
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has stated, assassination of a foreign leader
such as Fidel Castro is "utterly alien" to the
American way, was it President John F. Ken-
nedy who was acting in an "utterly alien"
fashion, or some lesser figure in CIA? The
notion that the CIA would decide to assassinate
the Cuban dictator and keep the White House
in the dark about it is preposterous. Of course,
without the President's knowledge, some. overly
imaginative technician in the intelligence struc-
ture might devise a scheme to put a powder in
Castro's shoes which would make his beard
fall out. Wild ideas like that get cut off in the
structure far short of the White House. But.
action designed to remove a foreign leader
from office by any means, let alone by assassi-
nation, would never be taken by CIA without
the approval of the highest national authorities.
The danger which Congress uncovered,
then, was not that of a "rogue elephant" CIA
unilaterally perpetrating wickedness; it was
of a fuzzy chain of responsibility for intelli-
gence actions.
On the Executive Branch side, there is no
single point of responsibility for the conduct
of intelligence affairs. The head of CIA also
carries the title Director, Central Intelligence,
(DCI), and as such is the primary intelligence
advisor to the President. But he is in fact a
servant to the \ SC collectively and to Cabinet
members dealing with foreign affairs individ-
_ ually. He cannot assume sole authority and
responsibility for the conduct of intelligence
affairs, many of which are conducted by or-
gans outside his control-e.g., in 'the Defense,
-State,- or the Justice Departments. Thus the
blame for covert intelligence actions which
Senator Church finds reprehensible cannot
rest on the shoulders of the Director, CIA.
A good case can be made for keeping the
lines of responsibility for covert action hazy.
There is merit to the old doctrine of "plausible
deniability," that is, that it is often useful to
provide the President and his principal Cabi-
net officers a means short of flat lying to deny
responsibility or even knowledge of a specific
covert action that goes sour. Friendly foreign
leaders, political parties, or individuals can be
destroyed by revelation that the U.S. has se-
cretly aided them, particularly if the President
admits his knowledge and approval. Thus, in-
formal and deniable lines of responsibility for
covert actions make a certain amount of sense.
Whatever the merits of the hazy lines of re-
sponsibility and "plausible denial," it appears
certain that closer Executive and Legislative
Branch oversight of the intelligence function
will be part of an upcoming reorganization.
An Inspector General
There is a second problem area surfaced by
the Congressional inquiries which is pertinent
to reorganization schemes; the need for an In-
spector General for Intelligence outside the
chain of command of the intelligence agencies
themselves. As was to be expected, every ex-in-
telligence officer with an unsatisfied gripe about
the way his agency had operated in the past
showed up at the door of one or both of the in-
vestigating Committees. These were mostly
ex-CIA employees. Most of their gripes lacked
merit, but they did establish the fact that there
was no way to air them outside the employees'
parent agencies, except by going to the press
or otherwise violating secrecy oaths. The need
for an Inspector General for Intelligence is
only partly a matter of protecting the country
from intelligence abuse; it is also a matter of
removing the excuse for disgruntled individ-
uals in the intelligence system to abuse their
access to sensitive information outside the sys-
tem. The establishment of an Inspector Gen-
eral outside CIA will tend to inhibit some of
the wilder schemes which have been from
time to time hatched- at lower staff levels of
the Agency.
The Congressional inquiries uncovered
..other areas of intelligence activities -.-which
may require remedial action. As discussed
earlier, there is the problerp of the current in-
ability of the U.S. government to keep a secret,
and the great damage done by public disclo-
sure of sensitive information. The, Congres-
sional Committee activity demonstrated this
problem more than proved it through inquiry.
However, this is not a problem to be solved by
reorganization; it-is a problem to be solved by
legislation.
ether matters--_ arising fr9m_ _ the _Cong s-. _
sional inquiries are those impacting on the
rights of U.S. citizens, such as interception of
communications, mail openings, surveillance
and the like. Such activities are often con-
nected with law enforcement, prevention of
terrorist activity, controlling drug traffic, coun-
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U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads
tering espionage, or fighting organized crime
rather than with purely foreign intelligence
matters. While there will be a hue and cry
from some quarters that such activities should
be totally abolished, reasoned examination of
them will prove. to .any sensible man that they
should not be ruled out altogether. For in-.
stance, if U.S. intelligence discovers a channel
of communications, by mail or radio, or other
means, between a terrorist organization
abroad and an American- citizen, it would
make no sense to prohibit interception of those
communications by U.S. intelligence on the
grounds of protecting the American's "civil
rights.- In fact, it could be considered uncon-
scionable negligence not to intercept such
communications. Abolishing these practices
will not solve the problem. The problem is one
of insuring that these intelligence collection
activities are not misused for purposes other
than the legitimate functions of law enforce-
ment, security, and intelligence agencies. And
-it will be solved by legal and administrative ac-
tion delineating the bounds of propriety in
such activities. The'problem is not'one to be
solved by reorganization either in the Execu-
tive-Branch -or 'the?Legislative- Branch.
What is Allo7c able?
Much of the other hurrah coming out of
Congressional inquiry and the public media
has to do with the te-chniques of intelligence.
There is much pious tongue clucking about the-
CIA's use of journalists and businessmen in
intelligence work, affiliation with 'andfinan-
cial support to oversea churchmen and mis-
sionaries,..-planting .false stories in the foreign
press, and so on, it seems ad infinitum. Today
there seems to be no better peg for a news
item than exposition of some new allegation
of wickedness on the part of CIA. Much of
this neo-piety on the part of the press is sheer
hypocrisy. There are few brands of devious-
ness and skullduggery. out. of bounds to new-s-
men in digging out information for their own
purposes. They know perfectly well that U.S.
intelligence 'agents cannot function effec-
tively using the Guide Book for Girl Scouts as
an operating manual.
One hears and reads a lot of inane argu-
ments involving demands to continue or abol-
ish certain intelligence techniques on the basis
of similarity to KGB practices. It makes no
more sense to demand the outlawing of an in-
telligence practice because the KGB uses. it
than., it does to demand that all practices al- -
lowable to the KGB should be allowed to U.S.
intelligence agencies. The thing to bear in
mind.about the KGB (and its counterparts in
other Communist countries) is- that it repre-
sents the. opposing- team in a deadly serious
game which the United States can forfeit only
at great peril to free. men everywhere in the
world. The rout of, U.S. intelligence by the
KGB would mean that Moscow would know
everything they wanted. to know about, U.S..
-military matters and diplomatic efforts, while
Washington would be totally ignorant of ev-
erything the Soviets wished us not to know.
Further, the KGB is in fact the official instru-
ment of the Kremlin for suppressing the free-
dom.- of the people of the. USSR; as such it
should be denied as many triumphs as pos-
sible.
The-KGB prides itself on operating under
the frankest of amoral codes, the creed of the
Chekist. Absolutely anything goes-sex, brib-
ery, blackmail, terror, torture, and murder are