COMMENTS ON DICK LEHMAN'S PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900020009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 26, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
STAT FROM
NIO
SUBJECT Comments on Dick Lehman's Paper
I have galloped through Dick's paper in between putting
the finishing touches on an Estimate, telling a Branch chief
in detail what was wrong with his analyst's second draft
of a paper I commissioned, and going off to do battle on a
NSSM analysis of which I deeply disapprove. I have not
commented on points where you and John have already made
points with which I agree. Nor have I paused to be thought-
ful or even tactful. But perhaps one or two of these quick
reactions may be helpful.
p. 3 - not any more systematic - that is the whole
point. Most surveys of "consumer acceptance"
are bureaucratic exercises and produce
responses that, even when they are not merely
polite, are too generalized to be useful.
The NIO is in touch at least with the
Assistant Secretary (Country Director level
consumer) in ways that clarify what they
want and create a somewhat greater prospect
that Intelligence will be able to provide it.
p. 4 - Point re Production - Smooth and literate
texts etc. - It seems hard for people who have
not been continuously engaged in the estimative
process to understand that it really is an
interagency one. What comes out under blue
covers frequently bears very little relation
to the original draft however smooth and
literate. Whether it is the latter depends
less on the original draft than on the mix
achieved between committee formulations --
always cumbersome -- and the ability of the
literate people around the table (there are
always a few) to translate these formulations
into English rapidly and persuasively.
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p. 5 - I don't understand the "who is responsible".
I had always thought that whatever the procedures
by which Estimates were written, the ultimate
judgment on their "internal" and "external"
adequacies was made by USIB under the leadership
of the DCI. To be sure, this is cumbersome
because it is interagency but that's what
Estimates are.
p. 10 - Obvious answer to second sentence is that
division of functions and number of NIOs needs
rethinking from time to time. Some areas may
need to be divided up; others consolidated.
Some to be sure can't be and then as i ST
case you need two deputies.
p. 14 - Office Chief Review - I don't think this is such
a bad idea. Much depends on the calibre and
interests of the Office Chief. Maurice Ernst
has on occasion held up papers I have commissioned
in order to review them himself. I am delighted
when he does so; he stimulates new thoughts and
improves the paper. My own view -- based to be
sure largely on what I have received in my own
area but also on what I read that comes out of
this Agency alone -- is that the review for
substance and analysis provided at the Branch
level and above is often far less rigorous than
it should be.
p. 16 - If OCI analysts were more busy analyzing and less
busy summarizing, it would take them much less
time to produce better-quality estimate drafts.
pp. 16, 17 - Why does OCI have to become an Office of National
Intelligence in order to give its analysts more
training in how to analyze and less reason to
think that their most important mission in life
is to summarize the traffic with reasonable frequency.
The burning and recurring question that comes to
my mind as I read this paper is - what is a
generalist? Surely with so much emphasis on how
much a generalist could do for us, there ought
to be some definition of what he is. Or isn't
all this generalist stuff a red herring?
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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO
SUBJECT: Comments on Dick Lehman's Paper
Concerning National Intelligence
Production
1. It seems to me that the NIO could relinquish the
responsibility for managing national intelligence production
provided he retains the authority to recommend subjects for
national production, and to review the final paper to en-
sure that it is objective and responsive to the needs of
Washington's decisionmakers.
2. Only the NIO is in regular contact with collec-
tors and analysts from all agencies, with decisiormakers,
and with the DCI who, in turn, is in touch with the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State and other top-level policy-
makers. Thus, combined with his specialized knowledge,
the NIO is uniquely qualified to ascertain current and long-
range needs of consumers, to make sure that collection and
production is responsive to these needs, to assess the
quality of performance of collectors and analysts, and to
serve as the DCI's substantive expert in his assigned field.
3. I do feel that if national production is relegated
to analysts in the DDI, INR, and DIA, those analysts should
receive specialized training in the production of estimative
intelligence. This would involve setting up a new course
in OTR which could perhaps be taught by former members of
the ONE.
4. While on the subject of analysts, I think that much
current intelligence could qualify as national intelligence
if the author were to relate the significance of a foreign
development on US national interests. Too often, analysis
relates an event to its effect on elements of the country
concerned or on neighboring countries -- rather than its
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 Acting a iona intelligence icer
for Latin America
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effect on US unemployment, the supply of critical materials
to the US, US commitments under existing treaties, nego-
tiations with a foreign power, or the availability of illi-
cit narcotics in the US.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO
SUBJECT Comments on Dick Lehman's 23 March Draft
Regarding National Intelligence Production
I have four general comments and three or four specific ones.
General Comments
1. As a whole, this paper pays little attention to the fact that
basically we face a people problem. If one is after superior analytic
intelligence (and not just bureaucratic smoothness) one needs superior
analysts working in superior conditions with superior inducements. This
was the original philosophy of ONE and for many years it worked. Inevi-
tably, those not included will charge "elitism." That is the price you
pay, and considering what's at stake -- if we believe what we say about
the importance of quality intelligence -- then the price is not very high.
Certainly it is not as high as implied by the frequent expressions of
concern over it in Dick's paper.
2. A related point. One of ONE's best, and least acknowledged,
roles was as a school of analysis. Most ONE staffers (promising young
officers when recruited) really learned their trade in on-the-job training
in a rigorous school from critical colleagues both within the office, the
community, and the many distinguished academic consultants who were pleased
to associate with that office. Alumni of that school are still manning key
positions all over the government. (This includes Scowcroft's deputy, a
recent head of DIA, two of the Deputy Directors of the Agency, and many of
the staff of the NIO complex.) There is no comparable training system at
work now. Hence, we are living on capital and not replacing it.
3. Here and there this paper reflects the assumption that NIOs in
fact enjoy the authority to commandeer analytic resources in competition
with line managers. NIO needs have, in my experience, been better served
than one might have anticipated in the nature of the relationship, but
they have not been as well served as implied here. And for perfectly obvi-
ous reasons. Neither in the Agency and certainly not in the Community do
they have clear authority and direct-response assets commensurate with
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their responsibilities. Bill Colby's repeated explicit support for the
system enabled it to work, but unless this is constantly reiterated by
the Director, it bogs down.
4. Any discussion of this subject should acknowledge that the
ad hoc nature of the present system has been commensurate with the unique
style of foreign policy and national security management during the past
few years. On the high likelihood that we are approaching the end of one
era (no matter who wins in November), and the historical probability that
the next era will be quite different in style and procedure, planning for
the future should free itself to some extent from criteria relevant only
to the recent past.
More Specific Comments
1. Top of Page 11. Whether or not one could find examples of this
"nice to have" kind of paper or not, I am more impressed with the oppo-
site phenomenon. By that, I mean instances in which offices have scratched
around for papers they would like to do, found a mild consumer "no objec-
tion," launched the papers, and then found themselves so engaged in that
project that they did not have time for more pressing problems turned up
by the NIO or someone else.
2. Page 23, Paragraph 21. In all modesty, there have been a number
of times in the past two years and a number of issues on which the NIO/WE
has played a major coordinating role which I do not believe could have
handily been done by the line officers. This includes three or four NIEs
3. Page 23, Paragraph 22. I would suggest that the major disadvantage
to model two is not "uncertainty" about the linkages. As I read the model,
it is practically guaranteed that they would not work efficiently.
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4. Page 24, Paragraph 25. The last two sentences are obiter dicta
of questionable validity. I am not sure that "the maturing of line anal-
ysts" is enough of a general reality to warrant the alleged consensus, and
while OCI has many excellent analysts, it remains hard to secure their ser-
vices for the time required or give them the incentive they need for first-
class work when their money is still made in the current intelligence business.
And OPR of course continues to resist the idea of working on estimates, even
though many of its analysts would like to do so.
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National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
25X1
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